Submarines had a vital, if often unheralded, role in the superpower navies during the Cold War. Their crews carried out intelligence-collection operations, sought out and stood ready to destroy opposing submarines, and, from the early 1960s, threatened missile attacks on their adversary’s homeland, providing in many respects the most survivable nuclear deterrent of the Cold War. For both East and West, the modern submarine originated in German U-boat designs obtained at the end of World War II. Although enjoying a similar technology base, by the 1990s the superpowers had created submarine fleets of radically different designs and capabilities. Written in collaboration with the former Soviet submarine design bureaus, Norman Polmar and K. J. Moore authoritatively demonstrate in this landmark study how differing submarine missions, antisubmarine priorities, levels of technical competence, and approaches to submarine design organizations and management caused the divergence.
Norman Polmar is an author specializing in the naval, aviation, and intelligence areas. He has led major projects for the United States Department of Defense and the United States Navy, and foreign governments. His professional expertise has served three Secretaries of the U.S. Navy and two Chiefs of Naval Operations. He is credited with 50 published books, including nine previous editions of Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet and four editions of Guide to the Soviet Navy. Polmar writes a column for Proceedings and was editor of the United States and several other sections of the annual publications of Janes Fighting Ships. In 2019, the Naval Historical Foundation awarded Polmar the Commodore Dudley W. Knox Naval History Lifetime Achievement Award.
The best summary of Cold War submarines is a witticism that the authors report hearing from a Soviet submarine engineer:
Paraphrasing slightly: "The USSR had competition between different design bureaus, and the US had top-down management in which Hyman Rickover would try to destroy the career of anybody who disagreed with him. And competition works better than Stalinism."
By the 1970s, the Soviets were close to even with the US in submarine design, and were probably ahead at the end of the Cold War. This is particularly impressive given how otherwise backwards Soviet technology was.
The book is largely about design, not about service history or operational experience but it does seem like the US made up for lackluster technology with much better-trained crews and better procedures. The Soviets lost several times as many submarines to accident as the US did, and don't seem to have done nearly as well at mitigating this. There was no Soviet counterpart to SUBSAFE.
this book would have done well with color photos, especially given its price. and an editor, though it's not so bad in that regard as other recent selections. exquisite detail, and excellent coverage of vice admiral hyman rickover (something that i was hoping for, but not expecting). certainly the definitive unclassified reference, though i would have enjoyed more naval engineering. i augmented my reading with selections from that endless rabbit's hole known as MIT Open Courseware, and recommend the following:
eventually, of course, i got sucked into watching nuclear engineering and computer science stuff, and then tried to watch an algebraic geometry class and cried at my ignorance, and then remembered that i'd told myself not to lose many more hollow-eyed, adderal-fueled, semi-autistic semen- and mustard-encrusted nights to MIT Open Courseware and had to stop. such is life. uh-oh, ten minutes until wapner.
if someone can get me the notes from this seminar, i'd be mighty pleased! it would in fact make my month.
Solid summation of the evolution of submarines in America and the Soviet Union (not much is said about Britain or France, among others). The work is a bit dry, but not wordy and very balanced in its assessments. If it has an axe to grind it is against Rickover, who is made out to be dictatorial, conservative, and over rated.