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History of the Second World War
History of the Second World War, B.H. Liddell Hart's last work as well as his magnum opus, embodies the fruits of 20 years of research & a lifetime of thinking on war. It abounds with controversial judgments, including provocative assertions about the true causes behind France's defeat in 1940, Hitler's failed invasion of Russia & Japan's stunning victory at Pearl Harbor; the effectiveness of the Allies' strategic bombing of Germany; the questionable necessity of detonating atom bombs over Hiroshima & Nagasaki; & much more. This monumental history is both a crowning achievement & a final summation by one of the greatest military thinkers of the 20th century.
768 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1968
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May 29, 2016
In 1969, Sir Captain B.H. Liddell Hart -- a World War I veteran and poison-gas survivor -- inked the finishing touches on this towering overview of World War II after working on it for 20 years, and thereafter, ironically, died immediately in the comfort of his own home. The book is a grand legacy of a lifetime of brilliant and innovative military thinking, and up to its time was probably the best and most authoritative general overview of the war yet written. Maybe it still is.
The copy I read had sat undisturbed in my parents' library for 40 years until I decided in late summer 2011 to finally give it a go, and once inside I treated it like a military campaign--proceeding cautiously at first, steeling my resources like General Montgomery, and then, once confidently ensconced, striding forth with blitzkrieg speed, gathering ever-faster momentum like generals Guderian and Patton.
And what a great achievement it is, all three pounds of it. The sight of me cradling this 2 1/4-inch-thick behemoth prompted someone to ask if I was reading the Bible. If I was heretofore in doubt as to whether this would qualify as my annual big-ass summer read, that question laid it to rest.
So, is Liddell Hart's book on WWII perfect? No, not at all. There are omissions and certain instances of over-coverage on subjects nearest and dearest to Hart (the North African tank battles, for instance). At the same time, it is hard to imagine a better job being done in only 715 pages of text, which, to be fair, is really not a lot of pages in which to try to cover a six-year occurrence as massive as the second world war.
Liddell Hart was not a great writer, but his prose is clear and uncluttered and user friendly; appropo to his clear and cold-blooded analysis of the strategies and tactics employed. He also, to his credit, eschews hyperbole; there are no instances of "greatest this" or "grandest that" in his account. At the same time he critiques with gusto and well-reasoned authority the mistakes made by the Axis and Allies high commands and political leaders in conducting all aspects of the war.
Unlike Ambrose and Ryan and Toland and their ilk -- WWII writers who pinpoint and hone in on details of particular battles or events with a novelistic, anecdotal flourish -- Hart set out on the far less sexy task of conveying macro strategy, and its tactical manifestations, so there's not a lot of room for anecdotal flavor, even though his postwar interviews with surviving German generals and others do lend great insight and authority to the account.
Liddell Hart has been criticized as being a bit of a braggart know-it-all (he cites himself and his own previous military works a lot along the way), but the fact that he can cite documents that actually prove his own "I told you so" foresight only lend greater weight and credibility to his analysis, in my view. Hart was a great authority on warfare, new military theories and on WWII in particular, and him saying so either directly or indirectly does not detract from the fact. What's in here is often brilliant and made me think about WWII in whole new ways. I learned a shitload from reading this.
Some of what I learned from the book:
* There was a logic to the island-hopping campaign in the Pacific and the desert warfare strategy in North African that I previously did not grasp, thanks to Hart's placing them into a more sensible strategic context. Diverting the Axis to the desert theater shifted valuable troops away that Hitler needed in Russia and could have used more profitably in Italy to stop the first Allied invasion of Europe, and also paved the way for the Allies' complete air and sea control of the Mediterranean.
* The Allied demands for unconditional surrender from both Germany and Japan probably delayed the war for many months and led to the unnecessary deaths of millions of soldiers, civilians and concentration camp prisoners.
* The rosy portrait of Winston Churchill that has so long prevailed does not jibe with Hart's severe criticisms of the prime minister's many strategic and tactical blunders, including his misadventures in Greece, Norway and Italy.
* British approaches to the war were often overcautious, too tied to rigid plans, and failed to exploit new opportunities. Hart is especially critical of Montgomery's delaying tactics in jumping from Sicily to the toe of Italy, the Allied command's failure to use more amphibious landings in northern parts of Italy and on the East coast where there was little resistance toward a Roman drive, and the fiasco of the destruction of Monte Cassino monastery and the poorly executed invasions of the beaches at Salerno and Anzio. Throughout the book, Hart sides with commanders who favored quick adaptation to changing conditions (such as Patton) and forward momentum rather than those who reverted to old and slow attrition tactics.
* Battleships were shown to be outmoded dinosaurs in WWII, hardly useful as anything other than shore bombardment. By contrast, Hart attributes the greatest success to U.S. subs in the Pacific war, which sunk 60 percent of Japanese shipping and cut off the supplies they so needed to continue the war.
There are a number of omissions and disputable points in the book. There are good, if often incomplete, battle maps herein. Hart's coverage of the Normandy invasion seems slighter than it ought to be, and his presentation almost makes the operation sound like a cakewalk; a point I doubt would sit well with the men who were there. The book has nothing about the breaking of the German Enigma code, which proved very valuable, or about the operation of the cipher-breakers in both Britain (at Bletchley Park) or the Navajo Code talkers who stumped the Japanese -- obviously because these ops were still classified as top secret when Hart wrote this book. Some have also accused him of romanticizing German tank commander Rommel.
Hart devotes disappointingly little ink to the siege of Leningrad, where 1.5 million starved, or to the remarkable battles inside Stalingrad, or even to the Holocaust. He only mentions the concentration camps in passing, when at the very least they would fit well into his arguments about how the Axis undermined themselves in fruitless projects that wasted resources needed on the fronts. Although Hart's coverage of the Battle of the Bulge is very good, his treatment of the Battle of Arnhem, one of the bloodiest of the war, is bafflingly slight.
The level of detail about some of the battles (especially all the flanking moves and countermoves) can get dizzying at times and test your attention span. His insistence that Britain was the birthplace of nearly all advanced modern war theory seems to take a biased nationalistic, and -- in his case -- self-serving tone. I don't doubt that a lot of what he says, and certainly understand Hart's frustration that his theories were not adapted more fully and quickly by the British and Allied leadership sooner, which would have helped foil or lessen the severity of one of the great tragedies of human history.
The material Hart gleaned via his postwar friendship with German generals is invaluable, often offering a fascinating look at the decision-making behind the scenes in Hitler's inner circle. Also good is his sense of revulsion and elegant rejection of the strategic use of the atomic bomb on Japan, which he says did not really affect the outcome of the war and was merely a barbaric gesture.
As a one-volume work of WWII strategy and tactical maneuvers, the book could hardly be bettered. But if you're looking for more of the "on-the-ground" human flavor of the war, you are best advised to go elsewhere. Anyone interested in the war to any degree would be doing that anyway.
(KevinR@Ky, 2011, with some slight updates and amendments in 2016)
The copy I read had sat undisturbed in my parents' library for 40 years until I decided in late summer 2011 to finally give it a go, and once inside I treated it like a military campaign--proceeding cautiously at first, steeling my resources like General Montgomery, and then, once confidently ensconced, striding forth with blitzkrieg speed, gathering ever-faster momentum like generals Guderian and Patton.
And what a great achievement it is, all three pounds of it. The sight of me cradling this 2 1/4-inch-thick behemoth prompted someone to ask if I was reading the Bible. If I was heretofore in doubt as to whether this would qualify as my annual big-ass summer read, that question laid it to rest.
So, is Liddell Hart's book on WWII perfect? No, not at all. There are omissions and certain instances of over-coverage on subjects nearest and dearest to Hart (the North African tank battles, for instance). At the same time, it is hard to imagine a better job being done in only 715 pages of text, which, to be fair, is really not a lot of pages in which to try to cover a six-year occurrence as massive as the second world war.
Liddell Hart was not a great writer, but his prose is clear and uncluttered and user friendly; appropo to his clear and cold-blooded analysis of the strategies and tactics employed. He also, to his credit, eschews hyperbole; there are no instances of "greatest this" or "grandest that" in his account. At the same time he critiques with gusto and well-reasoned authority the mistakes made by the Axis and Allies high commands and political leaders in conducting all aspects of the war.
Unlike Ambrose and Ryan and Toland and their ilk -- WWII writers who pinpoint and hone in on details of particular battles or events with a novelistic, anecdotal flourish -- Hart set out on the far less sexy task of conveying macro strategy, and its tactical manifestations, so there's not a lot of room for anecdotal flavor, even though his postwar interviews with surviving German generals and others do lend great insight and authority to the account.
Liddell Hart has been criticized as being a bit of a braggart know-it-all (he cites himself and his own previous military works a lot along the way), but the fact that he can cite documents that actually prove his own "I told you so" foresight only lend greater weight and credibility to his analysis, in my view. Hart was a great authority on warfare, new military theories and on WWII in particular, and him saying so either directly or indirectly does not detract from the fact. What's in here is often brilliant and made me think about WWII in whole new ways. I learned a shitload from reading this.
Some of what I learned from the book:
* There was a logic to the island-hopping campaign in the Pacific and the desert warfare strategy in North African that I previously did not grasp, thanks to Hart's placing them into a more sensible strategic context. Diverting the Axis to the desert theater shifted valuable troops away that Hitler needed in Russia and could have used more profitably in Italy to stop the first Allied invasion of Europe, and also paved the way for the Allies' complete air and sea control of the Mediterranean.
* The Allied demands for unconditional surrender from both Germany and Japan probably delayed the war for many months and led to the unnecessary deaths of millions of soldiers, civilians and concentration camp prisoners.
* The rosy portrait of Winston Churchill that has so long prevailed does not jibe with Hart's severe criticisms of the prime minister's many strategic and tactical blunders, including his misadventures in Greece, Norway and Italy.
* British approaches to the war were often overcautious, too tied to rigid plans, and failed to exploit new opportunities. Hart is especially critical of Montgomery's delaying tactics in jumping from Sicily to the toe of Italy, the Allied command's failure to use more amphibious landings in northern parts of Italy and on the East coast where there was little resistance toward a Roman drive, and the fiasco of the destruction of Monte Cassino monastery and the poorly executed invasions of the beaches at Salerno and Anzio. Throughout the book, Hart sides with commanders who favored quick adaptation to changing conditions (such as Patton) and forward momentum rather than those who reverted to old and slow attrition tactics.
* Battleships were shown to be outmoded dinosaurs in WWII, hardly useful as anything other than shore bombardment. By contrast, Hart attributes the greatest success to U.S. subs in the Pacific war, which sunk 60 percent of Japanese shipping and cut off the supplies they so needed to continue the war.
There are a number of omissions and disputable points in the book. There are good, if often incomplete, battle maps herein. Hart's coverage of the Normandy invasion seems slighter than it ought to be, and his presentation almost makes the operation sound like a cakewalk; a point I doubt would sit well with the men who were there. The book has nothing about the breaking of the German Enigma code, which proved very valuable, or about the operation of the cipher-breakers in both Britain (at Bletchley Park) or the Navajo Code talkers who stumped the Japanese -- obviously because these ops were still classified as top secret when Hart wrote this book. Some have also accused him of romanticizing German tank commander Rommel.
Hart devotes disappointingly little ink to the siege of Leningrad, where 1.5 million starved, or to the remarkable battles inside Stalingrad, or even to the Holocaust. He only mentions the concentration camps in passing, when at the very least they would fit well into his arguments about how the Axis undermined themselves in fruitless projects that wasted resources needed on the fronts. Although Hart's coverage of the Battle of the Bulge is very good, his treatment of the Battle of Arnhem, one of the bloodiest of the war, is bafflingly slight.
The level of detail about some of the battles (especially all the flanking moves and countermoves) can get dizzying at times and test your attention span. His insistence that Britain was the birthplace of nearly all advanced modern war theory seems to take a biased nationalistic, and -- in his case -- self-serving tone. I don't doubt that a lot of what he says, and certainly understand Hart's frustration that his theories were not adapted more fully and quickly by the British and Allied leadership sooner, which would have helped foil or lessen the severity of one of the great tragedies of human history.
The material Hart gleaned via his postwar friendship with German generals is invaluable, often offering a fascinating look at the decision-making behind the scenes in Hitler's inner circle. Also good is his sense of revulsion and elegant rejection of the strategic use of the atomic bomb on Japan, which he says did not really affect the outcome of the war and was merely a barbaric gesture.
As a one-volume work of WWII strategy and tactical maneuvers, the book could hardly be bettered. But if you're looking for more of the "on-the-ground" human flavor of the war, you are best advised to go elsewhere. Anyone interested in the war to any degree would be doing that anyway.
(KevinR@Ky, 2011, with some slight updates and amendments in 2016)
January 16, 2010
I decided to read Liddell Hart’s History of the Second World War because I had seen it cited in many places as the definitive one-volume guide to a subject I have watched too many tv shows on but read few books about. (Surprisingly, it seems to be out of print, but I found several old hardcovers [not the one pictured here:] at the Strand.) I would recommend it to anyone interested in a one-volume history or the war, with the caveats below—most of which will probably not trouble the English speaker and broadly replicate the limitations of the familiar “History Channel” treatment of the subject.
The book is long, but well organized and rather readable, with the exception of several instances where the volume of units and geographical landmarks become too dense to follow. The plentiful maps are generally very good—I found myself referring to the them constantly while reading the text—but, inevitably, they are occasionally not quite detailed enough.
Perhaps unexpectedly, Liddell Hart devotes an undue amount of time to the matters he most familiar with, those involving the British Army. As a result, probably too much of the book is devoted to North Africa and Burma. Conversely, the book skimps on much description of the strategic outlook from the Soviet perspective; the chapters dealing with the Soviet offensives in 1944 and 45 are notably brief. Some of this may be due to a lack of access or resources; nonetheless it is noteworthy compared to the depth in which Hart covers the German leadership.
This is really a military history—there is very little in here about politics. The closest Liddell Hart comes is his treatment of disagreements between allied commanders (famously, Montgomery and Patton), which are good reading but fall short of what I remember from Keegan’s WWII overview. I would have preferred more on industrial and logistic factors, which arise mostly only when needed (allied amphibious resources in the Mediterranean, the Japanese shortages of oil cramping naval operations).
Interestingly, the book was quite interesting at those points where the narrative dips into politics and strategy. Liddell Hart’s handling of the outbreak of war in the neutral Low Countries and Norway was a new approach to the topic for me. He also emphasized the legitimacy of the British and American embargo of Japan as a causus belli, something I don’t think I’ve read very often.
Nonetheless, the book’s strengths really do lie in the authors’ military analysis, especially with respect to the Western and Germany armies. I understand that Liddell Hart got to know many of the German commanders well after the war, and this comes through in the text. At times, it seems bit too much like he is rooting for the Wehrmacht—in particular during the retreat from the Caucuses and Russia—but this also very much reflects the fact that Liddell Hart has a strong opinion on how the war should have been fought, and when commanders did not (in retrospect) follow his advice, he’s critical and vocal about what might have been gained had they done so.
This bias comes through most clearly in his description of the fall of France. He sees Guderian’s offensive as the key to the campaign, rightly so, but there’s a valid criticism to be made that this is justification after the fact, as well as that not enough weight is given the workings of chance (or politics, in the case of the British escape from Dunkirk, which I’ve read persuasively attributed to a political miscalculation on the part of Hitler to make peace with the British). It also features prominently in the chapters on the Russian offensives on the Eastern Front—Liddell Hart constantly criticizes Hitler for not allowing his general to adopt a more flexible defensive posture. Yet, as a reader, while this makes perfect sense, the author does not explain what exactly this would achieve beyond a delay of the inevitable.
It’s also worth remarking on Liddell Hart’s criticism towards the end of the book of the Allies’ demand for the Axis powers’ unconditional surrender. It’s a stance that I don’t think I’ve reader often before, if ever. When the author uses it to argue against the dropping of the atomic bomb, I’m somewhat sympathetic, but I think he too readily discounts the political arguments (i.e., preempting Russian involvement in the Pacific theater) that he mentions briefly and which I understand to more commonly hold sway. The book’s conclusion is also strangely sad. While this is undoubtedly due to the fact that it was written in the middle of the Cold War, presumably leaving Liddell Hart to question an outcome that led to the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, it strangely omits the obvious upside to defeating Germany and Japan. It’s arguable that any history of WWII, even a military one, cannot ignore the war’s unprecedented effect on civilian populations, overwhelmingly (though not entirely) carried out by the Axis powers. In a book that takes understandable umbrage at the RAF’s approach to area bombing, there surely could be some place to mention the atrocities of Nanking and Auschwitz. That said, if one is willing to swallow the caveats above, the History of the Second World War is an engaging and detailed one-volume of how WWII was fought and won.
###
The book is long, but well organized and rather readable, with the exception of several instances where the volume of units and geographical landmarks become too dense to follow. The plentiful maps are generally very good—I found myself referring to the them constantly while reading the text—but, inevitably, they are occasionally not quite detailed enough.
Perhaps unexpectedly, Liddell Hart devotes an undue amount of time to the matters he most familiar with, those involving the British Army. As a result, probably too much of the book is devoted to North Africa and Burma. Conversely, the book skimps on much description of the strategic outlook from the Soviet perspective; the chapters dealing with the Soviet offensives in 1944 and 45 are notably brief. Some of this may be due to a lack of access or resources; nonetheless it is noteworthy compared to the depth in which Hart covers the German leadership.
This is really a military history—there is very little in here about politics. The closest Liddell Hart comes is his treatment of disagreements between allied commanders (famously, Montgomery and Patton), which are good reading but fall short of what I remember from Keegan’s WWII overview. I would have preferred more on industrial and logistic factors, which arise mostly only when needed (allied amphibious resources in the Mediterranean, the Japanese shortages of oil cramping naval operations).
Interestingly, the book was quite interesting at those points where the narrative dips into politics and strategy. Liddell Hart’s handling of the outbreak of war in the neutral Low Countries and Norway was a new approach to the topic for me. He also emphasized the legitimacy of the British and American embargo of Japan as a causus belli, something I don’t think I’ve read very often.
Nonetheless, the book’s strengths really do lie in the authors’ military analysis, especially with respect to the Western and Germany armies. I understand that Liddell Hart got to know many of the German commanders well after the war, and this comes through in the text. At times, it seems bit too much like he is rooting for the Wehrmacht—in particular during the retreat from the Caucuses and Russia—but this also very much reflects the fact that Liddell Hart has a strong opinion on how the war should have been fought, and when commanders did not (in retrospect) follow his advice, he’s critical and vocal about what might have been gained had they done so.
This bias comes through most clearly in his description of the fall of France. He sees Guderian’s offensive as the key to the campaign, rightly so, but there’s a valid criticism to be made that this is justification after the fact, as well as that not enough weight is given the workings of chance (or politics, in the case of the British escape from Dunkirk, which I’ve read persuasively attributed to a political miscalculation on the part of Hitler to make peace with the British). It also features prominently in the chapters on the Russian offensives on the Eastern Front—Liddell Hart constantly criticizes Hitler for not allowing his general to adopt a more flexible defensive posture. Yet, as a reader, while this makes perfect sense, the author does not explain what exactly this would achieve beyond a delay of the inevitable.
It’s also worth remarking on Liddell Hart’s criticism towards the end of the book of the Allies’ demand for the Axis powers’ unconditional surrender. It’s a stance that I don’t think I’ve reader often before, if ever. When the author uses it to argue against the dropping of the atomic bomb, I’m somewhat sympathetic, but I think he too readily discounts the political arguments (i.e., preempting Russian involvement in the Pacific theater) that he mentions briefly and which I understand to more commonly hold sway. The book’s conclusion is also strangely sad. While this is undoubtedly due to the fact that it was written in the middle of the Cold War, presumably leaving Liddell Hart to question an outcome that led to the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, it strangely omits the obvious upside to defeating Germany and Japan. It’s arguable that any history of WWII, even a military one, cannot ignore the war’s unprecedented effect on civilian populations, overwhelmingly (though not entirely) carried out by the Axis powers. In a book that takes understandable umbrage at the RAF’s approach to area bombing, there surely could be some place to mention the atrocities of Nanking and Auschwitz. That said, if one is willing to swallow the caveats above, the History of the Second World War is an engaging and detailed one-volume of how WWII was fought and won.
###
July 13, 2022
失算了，我應該買紙本的…因為這本書裡的地圖對於戰況的閱讀很有幫助，但是閱讀器翻來翻去很麻煩。而且我猜電子版是用掃描辨識文字檔的方式製成，所以錯字跟漏字蠻多的，雖然說不妨礙文章理解啦，但連我這種校對無感的人都可以看到五個以上，還真是不少。有請KOBO回報出版社了，不知道甚麼時候改好。(2022/7/13更新: KOBO回報出版社已經修正檔案了) (其中比較好笑的就是很多次英國的英都變成芇，第一次看還看了很久想說這是在講啥嘞) 所以作者的上一本「第一次世界大戰戰史」就毫無懸念的買了紙本，因為沒有等電子版的必要了。
這本書的大多視角都是以軸心國為主(德國、日本)，著重戰場用兵部分，政治和人道部分偏少。作者簡直像開天眼一樣從上空俯瞰了所有的攻守方戰略，每場戰鬥都生動的像可以拍電影一樣。可惜本人是地理小白所以只能看個略懂，看著看著，突然很不適時宜得想起以前看電競文，也是沒太懂那些打野、中路之類的術語，只憑文章氣勢感受「哇…好厲害喔喔……」，結果跟看這本曠世巨作的情況居然有87分像。作者對不起呀，軍盲沒救XDD
整本書的不同章節就在不同的戰區切換，從一開始歐陸各小國分別被德國一一擊破、歐洲德蘇交鋒、太平洋美日對戰等等(唯一沒有描述到的就只有中國戰區蔣委員長抗日戰線，可能是中文文件解讀上的障礙吧?) 比較熟悉的當然就是日本部分的戰場，作者對珍珠港事件的平反(?)很有意思，好多美國名將的名字也都很耳熟能詳，小時候還讀過麥克���瑟的課文呢，台灣當時是日治時期所以他其實是敵人來著，戰後居然還要背他的家書，想來真是淒涼啊……(不知道日本的課文有沒有XD)
至於德國戰事的篇章，作者很明顯的喜愛德國名將隆美爾(喜歡到還特地為了寫了本書「沙漠之狐隆美爾：隆美爾戰時文件」)，大概���隆美爾親臨前線的古代名將遺風讓人不得不佩服吧，雖然說這也造成了健康上的影響。另外一個將領古德林（世界裝甲車之父）也是個大無畏一直往前衝的類型，感覺德國人蠻瘋狂的？也許是希特勒特別寵愛這種充滿狠勁的將領，所以他們才特別活躍。
但坦克衝得快，補給卻跟不上。這部分日本的狀況也是一樣，閃電戰奇襲能快速地取得成果，但要長久佔領需要耗費的人力和補給量非常可觀，相比之下同盟軍隊拉上了美國爸爸，補給和彈藥像湧泉一樣灌進來，到最後德軍和日軍的攻佔地陷入糧荒油荒，所羅門島的日軍甚至要自己種田捕魚，吃得飽飽的同盟軍打回來時當然是兵敗如山倒……希特勒的指揮也是走一個防線死守、補給沒有的狀態，那還真是完全賭上了軍民對納粹的信仰。信仰是能當飯吃嘛~ 說起來這種又要馬跑又不給草、再加上各種無理取鬧(禁止任何撤退造成軍隊崩潰)，小鬍子跟慣老闆也是挺像的。倏地想起曾經聽聞過有人評論項羽為何敗給劉邦，有一說是項羽雖驍勇但賞賜不大方(古文中好像是很躊躇的意思?)，劉邦則是在封賞有功將領上倒是很豪邁，所以最後劉邦勝出。
本書比較有共鳴的當然還是日本的戰線，但意外的有很多部分與記憶不符合。像原先我一直以為轟炸珍珠港是神風特攻隊做的，但其實發生珍珠港突襲的時候，日本大部分的戰機是有好好的回到航空母艦歸隊。自殺式的神風特攻隊是在日本後期戰況不順時才越來越多。想來也是合理，畢竟實在沒有必要一直白白浪費戰力，除非像後期日本整體的油儲備和經濟都快垮掉，眼看著都要輸，只是時間的問題，才會做這種魚死網破的殉道式攻擊。另一個之前完全不知道的點是，原來珍珠港上使用的日本戰機是在台灣機場，我一直以為本島只負責種香蕉甘蔗給皇民吃嘞……
關於英國元帥蒙哥馬利，作者的形容真是傳神到好笑。說是蒙哥馬利其實是個很聰明、戰略也很有彈性的人，戰場上情況多變時他也總能見招拆招，但因為事後總是大呼「一切都在計畫之中!」，反而讓大家遺忘了他這個優點，甚至讓其他將領對他大吹大擂的態度不滿，結果居然是大家因為憤怒而更努力工作?!這人的個性怎麼跟我同事有87分像XD
本書在日本投降之後就嘎然而止了。全世界纏鬥了六年，每一場戰爭的死傷從千人多則數萬，雖然最後同盟用強大的補給輾壓了軸心，但所有陷入戰場的國家都損失慘重，就連美國光在沖繩就戰死了兩萬多人。也因為如此，美國因為不想在日本本土上再次陸戰，急急忙忙的投下了原子彈。雖然說作者有提到在投彈之前其實日本就已經快不行了，而且天皇有透過外交官與史達林表示想要投降的意願，但蘇聯並沒有積極傳達日本意願給同盟，再加上同盟原本設定的「無條件投降」太難成立，導致最終廣島長崎還是被炸了。一切的事情從後來的檢討有太多令人扼腕的地方，但戰爭砲聲一響，政治跟軍事無可避免的脫韁，就算是一個當下看似英明的決定，不到最後也無法斷定是否正確，而人命僅淪為戰損統計上的一個數字，或甚至無聲地淹沒在泥濘裡。不知道克里姆林宮的那位，和基輔地堡的那位，午夜夢迴時分，心底是否有些喟嘆……但無論如何，一切都無可挽回了。
這本書的大多視角都是以軸心國為主(德國、日本)，著重戰場用兵部分，政治和人道部分偏少。作者簡直像開天眼一樣從上空俯瞰了所有的攻守方戰略，每場戰鬥都生動的像可以拍電影一樣。可惜本人是地理小白所以只能看個略懂，看著看著，突然很不適時宜得想起以前看電競文，也是沒太懂那些打野、中路之類的術語，只憑文章氣勢感受「哇…好厲害喔喔……」，結果跟看這本曠世巨作的情況居然有87分像。作者對不起呀，軍盲沒救XDD
整本書的不同章節就在不同的戰區切換，從一開始歐陸各小國分別被德國一一擊破、歐洲德蘇交鋒、太平洋美日對戰等等(唯一沒有描述到的就只有中國戰區蔣委員長抗日戰線，可能是中文文件解讀上的障礙吧?) 比較熟悉的當然就是日本部分的戰場，作者對珍珠港事件的平反(?)很有意思，好多美國名將的名字也都很耳熟能詳，小時候還讀過麥克���瑟的課文呢，台灣當時是日治時期所以他其實是敵人來著，戰後居然還要背他的家書，想來真是淒涼啊……(不知道日本的課文有沒有XD)
至於德國戰事的篇章，作者很明顯的喜愛德國名將隆美爾(喜歡到還特地為了寫了本書「沙漠之狐隆美爾：隆美爾戰時文件」)，大概���隆美爾親臨前線的古代名將遺風讓人不得不佩服吧，雖然說這也造成了健康上的影響。另外一個將領古德林（世界裝甲車之父）也是個大無畏一直往前衝的類型，感覺德國人蠻瘋狂的？也許是希特勒特別寵愛這種充滿狠勁的將領，所以他們才特別活躍。
但坦克衝得快，補給卻跟不上。這部分日本的狀況也是一樣，閃電戰奇襲能快速地取得成果，但要長久佔領需要耗費的人力和補給量非常可觀，相比之下同盟軍隊拉上了美國爸爸，補給和彈藥像湧泉一樣灌進來，到最後德軍和日軍的攻佔地陷入糧荒油荒，所羅門島的日軍甚至要自己種田捕魚，吃得飽飽的同盟軍打回來時當然是兵敗如山倒……希特勒的指揮也是走一個防線死守、補給沒有的狀態，那還真是完全賭上了軍民對納粹的信仰。信仰是能當飯吃嘛~ 說起來這種又要馬跑又不給草、再加上各種無理取鬧(禁止任何撤退造成軍隊崩潰)，小鬍子跟慣老闆也是挺像的。倏地想起曾經聽聞過有人評論項羽為何敗給劉邦，有一說是項羽雖驍勇但賞賜不大方(古文中好像是很躊躇的意思?)，劉邦則是在封賞有功將領上倒是很豪邁，所以最後劉邦勝出。
本書比較有共鳴的當然還是日本的戰線，但意外的有很多部分與記憶不符合。像原先我一直以為轟炸珍珠港是神風特攻隊做的，但其實發生珍珠港突襲的時候，日本大部分的戰機是有好好的回到航空母艦歸隊。自殺式的神風特攻隊是在日本後期戰況不順時才越來越多。想來也是合理，畢竟實在沒有必要一直白白浪費戰力，除非像後期日本整體的油儲備和經濟都快垮掉，眼看著都要輸，只是時間的問題，才會做這種魚死網破的殉道式攻擊。另一個之前完全不知道的點是，原來珍珠港上使用的日本戰機是在台灣機場，我一直以為本島只負責種香蕉甘蔗給皇民吃嘞……
關於英國元帥蒙哥馬利，作者的形容真是傳神到好笑。說是蒙哥馬利其實是個很聰明、戰略也很有彈性的人，戰場上情況多變時他也總能見招拆招，但因為事後總是大呼「一切都在計畫之中!」，反而讓大家遺忘了他這個優點，甚至讓其他將領對他大吹大擂的態度不滿，結果居然是大家因為憤怒而更努力工作?!這人的個性怎麼跟我同事有87分像XD
本書在日本投降之後就嘎然而止了。全世界纏鬥了六年，每一場戰爭的死傷從千人多則數萬，雖然最後同盟用強大的補給輾壓了軸心，但所有陷入戰場的國家都損失慘重，就連美國光在沖繩就戰死了兩萬多人。也因為如此，美國因為不想在日本本土上再次陸戰，急急忙忙的投下了原子彈。雖然說作者有提到在投彈之前其實日本就已經快不行了，而且天皇有透過外交官與史達林表示想要投降的意願，但蘇聯並沒有積極傳達日本意願給同盟，再加上同盟原本設定的「無條件投降」太難成立，導致最終廣島長崎還是被炸了。一切的事情從後來的檢討有太多令人扼腕的地方，但戰爭砲聲一響，政治跟軍事無可避免的脫韁，就算是一個當下看似英明的決定，不到最後也無法斷定是否正確，而人命僅淪為戰損統計上的一個數字，或甚至無聲地淹沒在泥濘裡。不知道克里姆林宮的那位，和基輔地堡的那位，午夜夢迴時分，心底是否有些喟嘆……但無論如何，一切都無可挽回了。
February 21, 2025
This is a classic history of WWII by a man who immersed himself in research his whole life. He was also an officer (Captain) during the war so knew a bit about it first hand. This is not the most fascinating history by today's standards, in as much as a general history cannot go into too much detail 'on the ground' as a book on a particular battle, for example but Basil Liddell Hart became friends with Field Marshall Montgomery and many other officers on both sides during the course of his research, which adds an extra dimension to the book. He was present at many planning meetings during the war, making notes immediately afterwards that gave him a first hand account of what the protagonists were thinking at the time they made their decisions, unclouded by time, faulty memory and subsequent events. He personally interviewed several German generals while they were in captivity at the end of the war, also getting their take on events lived through not that long before. So while his narrative may have been a bit biased by his personal relationships, nevertheless it is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the war at the time.
On this, my second reading, I have only read a couple of chapters because I was just comparing Liddell Hart's view of the Normandy campaign with that of Antony Beevor, whose book D-Day, The Battle for Normandy I have just finished. Mr Beevor's book is 525 pages just on that campaign, whereas this book is 700+ pages on the whole war, so inevitably it glosses over most of the detail, but he is kinder to the Allied generals than the modern historians. Nevertheless, an excellent book.
On this, my second reading, I have only read a couple of chapters because I was just comparing Liddell Hart's view of the Normandy campaign with that of Antony Beevor, whose book D-Day, The Battle for Normandy I have just finished. Mr Beevor's book is 525 pages just on that campaign, whereas this book is 700+ pages on the whole war, so inevitably it glosses over most of the detail, but he is kinder to the Allied generals than the modern historians. Nevertheless, an excellent book.
October 28, 2020
The book is an all times classic. It is definitely the best account of World War II. Brilliant and insightful, it covers all the events of the greatest conflict in the world. Thousands of "histories" have been written since the publication of this book, but the conclusions of this essay still retain their validity.
Πρόκειται για την καλύτερη ίσως εξιστόρηση του Β΄Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου. Ο σερ Μπάζιλ Λίντελ Χαρτ είναι ένας καταξιωμένος ιστορικός ο οποίος ως στρατιωτικός είναι ιδανικός για να περιγράψει τις εκστρατείες, τους συσχετισμούς δυνάμεων και τους στρατηγικούς ελιγμούς. Το εκτενέστατο βιβλίο του διαβάζεται ευχάριστα. Το ύφος είναι ζωντανό και οι περιγραφές συναρπαστικές με διάχυτο το βρετανικό φλέγμα. Η αντικειμενικότητα είναι το μεγαλύτερο προσόν του. Αν και Βρετανός, δεν χαρίζεται σε κανέναν και ιδιαίτερα στους συμπατριώτες του. Χαρακτηριστική είναι η περίπτωση της κατάληψης της Νορβηγίας από τους Γερμανούς τον Απρίλιο του 1940. Τότε οι δύο αντίπαλες χώρες, Αγγλία και Γερμανία, έκαναν αγώνα δρόμου για να καταλάβουν τη Νορβηγία και η Γερμανία πρόλαβε να την κατακτήσει την τελευταία στιγμή. Στο τέλος του πολέμου η Αγγλία είχε την "αδιαντροπιά" να καταλογίσει στη Γερμανία ως έγκλημα την κατάληψη της Νορβηγίας. "Μια τέτοια πράξη" σημειώνει χαρακτηριστικά ο Χαρτ είναι μια από τις πιο χειροπιαστές περιπτώσεις υποκρισίας στην ιστορία".
Πρόκειται χωρίς υπερβολή για ένα έργο ζωής ενός μεγάλου ιστορικού ερευνητή.
January 2, 2021
I’ve been a fan of Sir Liddell Hart since I was a teenager. I couldn’t wait to get my hands on anything he wrote until today. This book put a fresh perspective on his writings and opinions, many of which I vehemently disagree with. I was hoping this work would be along the lines of Earl Zemke’s books on the Eastern Front or even a a good companion to Shirer’s Rise and Fall. Sadly, it was none of these.
I was not pleased with the broad stroke coverage of Iwo Jima, Okinawa or the savage Kamikaze attacks, yet he covers in detail the Battle of the Bulge. I was glad to see he called out Monty for his arrogance in stating how he stopped the Northern thrust and saved the day. Yet no mention of General Ridgeway.
Why is their absolutely no mention of the Holocaust? Did it not occur? Did it not demand at least one chapter? Damn right it did because as the book starts winding down, Mr. Hart criticizes the harsh “unconditional surrender” terms the allies strapped on Germany. At the time, even though reports were filtering out on the atrocities, would the SS and Himmler have received clemency for these heinous war crimes? I couldn’t help but think how Mr. Hart was coming across as a refined and complicit Chamberlain.
Mr. Hart makes more then two references to the use of the atomic bomb. He is 100% against it and states is should have never been used. Japan would eventually surrender with her navy and merchant marine fleet decimated. Did Leningrad surrender during their 900 day siege? No. So what makes him think the Japs would surrender? Our fleets with the aid of Great Britain and Australia would have had to set up a formidable block-aide around the islands and hoped for the best. How many more sailors and ships would become victims the “Divine Wind.?” How long would public opinion deal with the loss of men and ships with no vision of the strategic objective? Americans would not have supported this Medieval thinking and demanded, “either end it or bring our boys home.” Yes, the allies dominated the air, as they did in Europe. Did I miss the news flash that Germany threw in the towel in ‘44 because they lost air supremacy? The answer is an obvious no. The US already knew the bomb worked when it was tested on July 16, 1945 at Alamogordo, NM. Let us remember, the US didn’t start the Manhattan Project until word came out that Germany was working on one. It took FDR several attempts to convince Einstein to help with the project. Was its use required? Ask the men who would have been in the first wave that would invade Japan. Those I talked to had no problem with its use. If it wouldn’t have been used, when would the world have knows the catastrophic effects it would have on a city and its population? The Russians knew all along about our progress as they had a spy working at Los Alamos. I guess neither side would have known its full potential until they were used in West Germany or Warsaw. Think of us not going through a cold war but a nuclear war. How would the world look today?
Another complaint is the lack of good maps. Those supplied were rudimentary and lacking. If an author/historian is going to go into detail on a particular battle, broad maps do not do it justice nor give the reader a good fell on how the forces were laid out.
Overall, this is a good work for those who want the highlights and broad strokes of the war and where many of the strategic battles occurred, just ignore the running commentary that adds nothing.
Three and-a-half stars
I was not pleased with the broad stroke coverage of Iwo Jima, Okinawa or the savage Kamikaze attacks, yet he covers in detail the Battle of the Bulge. I was glad to see he called out Monty for his arrogance in stating how he stopped the Northern thrust and saved the day. Yet no mention of General Ridgeway.
Why is their absolutely no mention of the Holocaust? Did it not occur? Did it not demand at least one chapter? Damn right it did because as the book starts winding down, Mr. Hart criticizes the harsh “unconditional surrender” terms the allies strapped on Germany. At the time, even though reports were filtering out on the atrocities, would the SS and Himmler have received clemency for these heinous war crimes? I couldn’t help but think how Mr. Hart was coming across as a refined and complicit Chamberlain.
Mr. Hart makes more then two references to the use of the atomic bomb. He is 100% against it and states is should have never been used. Japan would eventually surrender with her navy and merchant marine fleet decimated. Did Leningrad surrender during their 900 day siege? No. So what makes him think the Japs would surrender? Our fleets with the aid of Great Britain and Australia would have had to set up a formidable block-aide around the islands and hoped for the best. How many more sailors and ships would become victims the “Divine Wind.?” How long would public opinion deal with the loss of men and ships with no vision of the strategic objective? Americans would not have supported this Medieval thinking and demanded, “either end it or bring our boys home.” Yes, the allies dominated the air, as they did in Europe. Did I miss the news flash that Germany threw in the towel in ‘44 because they lost air supremacy? The answer is an obvious no. The US already knew the bomb worked when it was tested on July 16, 1945 at Alamogordo, NM. Let us remember, the US didn’t start the Manhattan Project until word came out that Germany was working on one. It took FDR several attempts to convince Einstein to help with the project. Was its use required? Ask the men who would have been in the first wave that would invade Japan. Those I talked to had no problem with its use. If it wouldn’t have been used, when would the world have knows the catastrophic effects it would have on a city and its population? The Russians knew all along about our progress as they had a spy working at Los Alamos. I guess neither side would have known its full potential until they were used in West Germany or Warsaw. Think of us not going through a cold war but a nuclear war. How would the world look today?
Another complaint is the lack of good maps. Those supplied were rudimentary and lacking. If an author/historian is going to go into detail on a particular battle, broad maps do not do it justice nor give the reader a good fell on how the forces were laid out.
Overall, this is a good work for those who want the highlights and broad strokes of the war and where many of the strategic battles occurred, just ignore the running commentary that adds nothing.
Three and-a-half stars
December 29, 2020
Il titolo promette, le oltre mille pagine di lettura mantengono.
L'opera è ottima storiografia moderna, molto specializzata senza dubbio, ma moderna.
Quando nelle scuole italiane si parla della WWII in genere ci si limita a poche ore (2 o 3) di lezione in quinta superiore, ed in genere la visione è estremamente limitata alla guerra dell'Italietta piccola, naif e un poco troppo ignorante. Se va bene, come capitò a me (ma col prof di Italiano e Latino, che da giovane sacerdote la guerra l'aveva vista da entrambe le parti visto che traduceva le lettere dei prigionieri di guerra tedeschi in inglese e poi viceversa) la visuale si allarga all'Europa intera e al bacino del Mediterraneo.
In realtà, ma in genere un ragazzo lo scopre dai colossal di guerra, che in questi ultimi anni sembrano aver ricevuto nuova linfa vitale, la WWII ha avuto tanti teatri e quello europeo è stato solo uno dei due principali. Personalmente sono sempre rimasto molto più affascinato dal teatro del Pacifico, nonché da teatri secondari come la frontiera indo-birmana o la guerra dei sottomarini nell'Atlantico.
Qui, in questo poderoso volume che bisogna maneggiare con cautela, perché così tante pagine in brossura hanno la tendenza ad aprirsi in due blocchi nel centro, ho trovato tutto quello che cercavo. Inoltre la visione della guerra da parte dell'autore, che vi ha partecipato attivamente, e la sua presa di coscienza di alcune situazioni, lo pone sopra le parti.
Pertanto salta agli occhi, a chi ricorda le ore di storia alla scuola superiore, la piccola parte che l'Italia e i suoi fronti hanno avuto, e questo dovrebbe anche far aprire gli occhi a certi assurdi nostalgici o neo nostalgici di quel fottuto ventennio che ci ha portato in questo carnaio senza avere la più pallida idea di quello che si stava facendo.
Unica pecca è la disposizione delle carte geografiche: secondo me ne servivano di più e in qualche caso andava anticipata la loro posizione rispetto al testo.
L'opera è ottima storiografia moderna, molto specializzata senza dubbio, ma moderna.
Quando nelle scuole italiane si parla della WWII in genere ci si limita a poche ore (2 o 3) di lezione in quinta superiore, ed in genere la visione è estremamente limitata alla guerra dell'Italietta piccola, naif e un poco troppo ignorante. Se va bene, come capitò a me (ma col prof di Italiano e Latino, che da giovane sacerdote la guerra l'aveva vista da entrambe le parti visto che traduceva le lettere dei prigionieri di guerra tedeschi in inglese e poi viceversa) la visuale si allarga all'Europa intera e al bacino del Mediterraneo.
In realtà, ma in genere un ragazzo lo scopre dai colossal di guerra, che in questi ultimi anni sembrano aver ricevuto nuova linfa vitale, la WWII ha avuto tanti teatri e quello europeo è stato solo uno dei due principali. Personalmente sono sempre rimasto molto più affascinato dal teatro del Pacifico, nonché da teatri secondari come la frontiera indo-birmana o la guerra dei sottomarini nell'Atlantico.
Qui, in questo poderoso volume che bisogna maneggiare con cautela, perché così tante pagine in brossura hanno la tendenza ad aprirsi in due blocchi nel centro, ho trovato tutto quello che cercavo. Inoltre la visione della guerra da parte dell'autore, che vi ha partecipato attivamente, e la sua presa di coscienza di alcune situazioni, lo pone sopra le parti.
Pertanto salta agli occhi, a chi ricorda le ore di storia alla scuola superiore, la piccola parte che l'Italia e i suoi fronti hanno avuto, e questo dovrebbe anche far aprire gli occhi a certi assurdi nostalgici o neo nostalgici di quel fottuto ventennio che ci ha portato in questo carnaio senza avere la più pallida idea di quello che si stava facendo.
Unica pecca è la disposizione delle carte geografiche: secondo me ne servivano di più e in qualche caso andava anticipata la loro posizione rispetto al testo.
December 19, 2023
Per come è scritto meriterebbe cinque stelle. Però pesa molto il fatto che l'autore abbia una prospettiva anglocentrica e certe analisi non siano sopravvissute alla prova del tempo. Tutto ciò è comprensibile, considerando che il libro è stato scritto da un ufficiale inglese poco dopo, se non durante, i fatti narrati.
Comunque si tratta della bibbia strategica della seconda guerra mondiale. Le capacità che ha l'autore di analizzare e sviscerare semplicemente le condotte strategiche è fenomenale e rapisce. Così come lo stile di scrittura scorrevole e uniforme. Non è facile tenere il filo degli eventi di tutti i teatri di operazioni, ma il libro risulta ben ordinato e lineare.
Un capolavoro per me.
Comunque si tratta della bibbia strategica della seconda guerra mondiale. Le capacità che ha l'autore di analizzare e sviscerare semplicemente le condotte strategiche è fenomenale e rapisce. Così come lo stile di scrittura scorrevole e uniforme. Non è facile tenere il filo degli eventi di tutti i teatri di operazioni, ma il libro risulta ben ordinato e lineare.
Un capolavoro per me.
January 9, 2022
Is there such a thing as the perfect one-volume history of World War II? Probably not. That said, while this one isn’t perfect by any measure, it’s quite good in that if you read it, you’ll learn things you never knew about the war.
Since a Brit wrote the book, you can rightly assume that he’s going to take a Britain-centric view of the war, and he does. I think the Pacific war gets largely short shrift in this book. Unforgivably, the Holocaust gets almost no mention at all; at the very least, I was left to wonder whether the author harbored some antisemitic views. No one can prove that conclusively by reading the book, but for an event such as the Holocaust to get virtually no attention in a book that purports to be a comprehensive history of the war is hard to grasp, to say the least. Oddly enough, the allied invasion at Normandy merits a relatively small amount of space, too. I’m not sure what that’s about.
If you read this, and you should assuming you have an interest in military history and particularly that of World War II, don’t go into it with the expectation that you’ll be treated to history the way an American author might guide you. U.S. authors seem good at picking out four or five individuals who represented four or five items on which the historian wants to focus, then humanizing that focus by telling the story of Private Smith. In other words, American historians strive to put the human face on the otherwise stark dates and times of the event. You won’t get that from this history. The author doesn’t attempt to teach you what happened through the eyes of Private Smith. Instead, you get a dense but readable account of battles and decisions and the impact of those battles and decisions on other parts of the war effort. Chapter 17, which looks at Pearl Harbor and the Japanese conduct of the war in the hours and days immediately following it, is highly readable, but not because the author focuses on a sailor on the U.S.S. Arizona. He shows you the events of the time chronologically, but his writing style is decisive if not tight, and your mind won’t wander as you move through those events.
Sadly, I think he bogs down hard-core here when he describes the fighting in North Africa.
To his credit, the author is pretty even handed of his criticism of both American and British leaders. He seems to favor the leadership style of George S. Patten, and he treats you to what felt like a full-on rant about how unnecessary the use of atomic weaponry against Japan was. I don’t pretend to be a historian, but I found his arguments hollow and largely unconvincing.
Since a Brit wrote the book, you can rightly assume that he’s going to take a Britain-centric view of the war, and he does. I think the Pacific war gets largely short shrift in this book. Unforgivably, the Holocaust gets almost no mention at all; at the very least, I was left to wonder whether the author harbored some antisemitic views. No one can prove that conclusively by reading the book, but for an event such as the Holocaust to get virtually no attention in a book that purports to be a comprehensive history of the war is hard to grasp, to say the least. Oddly enough, the allied invasion at Normandy merits a relatively small amount of space, too. I’m not sure what that’s about.
If you read this, and you should assuming you have an interest in military history and particularly that of World War II, don’t go into it with the expectation that you’ll be treated to history the way an American author might guide you. U.S. authors seem good at picking out four or five individuals who represented four or five items on which the historian wants to focus, then humanizing that focus by telling the story of Private Smith. In other words, American historians strive to put the human face on the otherwise stark dates and times of the event. You won’t get that from this history. The author doesn’t attempt to teach you what happened through the eyes of Private Smith. Instead, you get a dense but readable account of battles and decisions and the impact of those battles and decisions on other parts of the war effort. Chapter 17, which looks at Pearl Harbor and the Japanese conduct of the war in the hours and days immediately following it, is highly readable, but not because the author focuses on a sailor on the U.S.S. Arizona. He shows you the events of the time chronologically, but his writing style is decisive if not tight, and your mind won’t wander as you move through those events.
Sadly, I think he bogs down hard-core here when he describes the fighting in North Africa.
To his credit, the author is pretty even handed of his criticism of both American and British leaders. He seems to favor the leadership style of George S. Patten, and he treats you to what felt like a full-on rant about how unnecessary the use of atomic weaponry against Japan was. I don’t pretend to be a historian, but I found his arguments hollow and largely unconvincing.
July 12, 2013
Good overview of WWII. Liddell Hart provides a broad coverage of the major campaigns with enough detail to entice the reader while providing the stratagems for the thinker. A classic author and strategists providing a classic work.
September 25, 2021
I’ve read lots of WWII books but never a comprehensive account of the entire war that focused on military strategy and tactics rather than personal accounts. I picked it because BH Liddell Hart is considered one of the foremost military historians and strategists of the 20th century.
Several lessons I learned or understood better after finishing:
1. Everyone blew it lots of times—it’s almost like the outcome was determined by who made the fewest major strategic errors. Hitler could’ve easily finished off Britain after Dunkirk if he hadn’t been so suspicious of Russia and turned his attention East. And he could have held out longer in 1944-45 if he hadn’t been suckered into sending so many divisions to North Africa and later Italy. Churchill, despite all his strengths, made some major strategic mistakes and meddled way too much, especially in North Africa and Greece. He unnecessarily provoked Hitler into invading Poland by supporting Poland without any ability to actually back it up, and provoked the takeover of Norway by openly exploring plans for Britain to do it. The Allies probably could have ended the war by the Fall of 1944 had they raced into the Ruhr, where much of Germany’s war-making industry was located and which was largely unprotected (Hart offers some interesting explanations for why they didn’t, and dispels the myth that the failure was purely because they split the forces between Montgomery and Patton to keep both sides happy).
2. Hitler was strangely reluctant to invade Britain and didn’t want to wound their pride. He considered Britain an important stabilizing force in the world.
3. I loved this brilliant assessment of Britain’s situation and attitude after Dunkirk, which is part criticism and part praise:
“But the British people took little account of the hard facts of their situation. They were instinctively stubborn and strategically ignorant. Churchill’s inspiring speeches helped to correct the depression of Dunkirk, and supplied the tonic the islanders wanted. They were exhilarated by his challenging note, and did not pause to ask whether it was strategically warranted.
“Deeper than the influence of Churchill was the effect of Hitler. His conquest of France and near approach to their shores aroused them as no earlier evidence of his tyranny and aggressiveness had done. They reacted once again in their long-bred way—intent to keep their teeth in Hitler’s skin at any cost. Never was their collective characterization as a bulldog so clearly demonstrated, and justified, in all its sublime stupidity.”
4. The Allies’ strategic bombing of Germany was misguided and didn’t actually do much to damage German morale. It became much more useful in 1944-45 when the bombing became much more precise and focused on German war production rather than the indescriminate targeting of civilian populations.
5. The use of the atomic bomb against Japan was almost certainly not necessary to win the war. This was an epiphany for me, but it probably shouldn’t have been. Japan’s shipping—on which it was totally dependent— had been nearly entirely destroyed, its industries wrecked, morale seriously damaged by the firebombing of Tokyo and other cities, and Japanese leadership had been trying for months to tell Russian emissaries that it wanted peace. Hart suggests several factors explain why peace hadn’t been reached before August 1945—Japan’s odd political structure was slow to make surrender their national policy, Stalin really wanted to get in on the action before Japan surrendered to enhance their position in the Far East, and so wasn’t motivated to accept Japanese overtures, and the Allies insisted on “unconditional surrender” which Hart suggests was sort of an uncessary technicality. He says we could have had the same outcome but empowered the voices in Japan seeking peace had we allowed the emperor to retain sovereignty, which Truman acceded to anyway after the bombings. And as to why the bombs were used despite the fact that Japan probably would have surrendered anyway, some of the most influential American and British military and diplomatic voices were determined to use the bomb after having spent so much money and time on it. He also offers evidence that even though we could have simply waited a little longer—with no more loss of Allied lives—just simply waited for Japan’s lack of food and raw materials to produce their surrender, Allied leadership was deeply concerned about Russia entering the Eastern war and wanted to preclude that as quickly as possible.
I’ve always been skeptical of claims about those last two points—that the strategic bombing of Germany and the use of the atomic bomb were mistakes—because those points are usually made by people arguing that those actions were unethical or immoral under any circumstances. Hart focuses on the military necessity, and I think that’s a much stronger point. The ethics and morality of the actions are less clear to me, and I’m still not comfortable condemning either action in hindsight.
Several lessons I learned or understood better after finishing:
1. Everyone blew it lots of times—it’s almost like the outcome was determined by who made the fewest major strategic errors. Hitler could’ve easily finished off Britain after Dunkirk if he hadn’t been so suspicious of Russia and turned his attention East. And he could have held out longer in 1944-45 if he hadn’t been suckered into sending so many divisions to North Africa and later Italy. Churchill, despite all his strengths, made some major strategic mistakes and meddled way too much, especially in North Africa and Greece. He unnecessarily provoked Hitler into invading Poland by supporting Poland without any ability to actually back it up, and provoked the takeover of Norway by openly exploring plans for Britain to do it. The Allies probably could have ended the war by the Fall of 1944 had they raced into the Ruhr, where much of Germany’s war-making industry was located and which was largely unprotected (Hart offers some interesting explanations for why they didn’t, and dispels the myth that the failure was purely because they split the forces between Montgomery and Patton to keep both sides happy).
2. Hitler was strangely reluctant to invade Britain and didn’t want to wound their pride. He considered Britain an important stabilizing force in the world.
3. I loved this brilliant assessment of Britain’s situation and attitude after Dunkirk, which is part criticism and part praise:
“But the British people took little account of the hard facts of their situation. They were instinctively stubborn and strategically ignorant. Churchill’s inspiring speeches helped to correct the depression of Dunkirk, and supplied the tonic the islanders wanted. They were exhilarated by his challenging note, and did not pause to ask whether it was strategically warranted.
“Deeper than the influence of Churchill was the effect of Hitler. His conquest of France and near approach to their shores aroused them as no earlier evidence of his tyranny and aggressiveness had done. They reacted once again in their long-bred way—intent to keep their teeth in Hitler’s skin at any cost. Never was their collective characterization as a bulldog so clearly demonstrated, and justified, in all its sublime stupidity.”
4. The Allies’ strategic bombing of Germany was misguided and didn’t actually do much to damage German morale. It became much more useful in 1944-45 when the bombing became much more precise and focused on German war production rather than the indescriminate targeting of civilian populations.
5. The use of the atomic bomb against Japan was almost certainly not necessary to win the war. This was an epiphany for me, but it probably shouldn’t have been. Japan’s shipping—on which it was totally dependent— had been nearly entirely destroyed, its industries wrecked, morale seriously damaged by the firebombing of Tokyo and other cities, and Japanese leadership had been trying for months to tell Russian emissaries that it wanted peace. Hart suggests several factors explain why peace hadn’t been reached before August 1945—Japan’s odd political structure was slow to make surrender their national policy, Stalin really wanted to get in on the action before Japan surrendered to enhance their position in the Far East, and so wasn’t motivated to accept Japanese overtures, and the Allies insisted on “unconditional surrender” which Hart suggests was sort of an uncessary technicality. He says we could have had the same outcome but empowered the voices in Japan seeking peace had we allowed the emperor to retain sovereignty, which Truman acceded to anyway after the bombings. And as to why the bombs were used despite the fact that Japan probably would have surrendered anyway, some of the most influential American and British military and diplomatic voices were determined to use the bomb after having spent so much money and time on it. He also offers evidence that even though we could have simply waited a little longer—with no more loss of Allied lives—just simply waited for Japan’s lack of food and raw materials to produce their surrender, Allied leadership was deeply concerned about Russia entering the Eastern war and wanted to preclude that as quickly as possible.
I’ve always been skeptical of claims about those last two points—that the strategic bombing of Germany and the use of the atomic bomb were mistakes—because those points are usually made by people arguing that those actions were unethical or immoral under any circumstances. Hart focuses on the military necessity, and I think that’s a much stronger point. The ethics and morality of the actions are less clear to me, and I’m still not comfortable condemning either action in hindsight.
November 26, 2021
Brilliant analysis. Detailed, impeccable, but makes for hard reading. This is a classic account of World War 2 which is frequently cited. If you want an optimal reading experience, make sure to read this with a map.
Lately there has been escalating threats and tension in the South China Sea and Taiwan, which makes one scared, and what better way to think about it than to read some books about war, the decisions that were made by the leaders, the battles, strategies, and so on.
Key takeaways:
1. Lack of firmness in a country's policy can be disastrous
This is clear in how World War 2 started. While it is undeniable that Hitler's policy of aggression is detrimental to peace, Hart blamed British government's sudden reversal of policy, from appeasement to threat. The British government was accomodating early on when Hitler occupied Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. Suddenly, Britain decided that things cannot go on like this and made a sudden reversal. This reversal is so sudden as to shock Hitler and his government. Before, British government seemed to be accomodating of Germany's expansion, "surely they'll relent again?" Instead, Britain promised Poland that they would declare war on Germany if Germant attacked. This promise, according to Hart, was a blunder considering that Britain (and its ally France) can't fulfill this promise due to distance and lack of battle readiness in its army. On the other hand, Hitler wanted to continue expanding his territories and made the deduction that Britain won't go to war without Russia's backing, which is why Hitler signed a non aggression pact. When Hitler eventually invaded, it's too late for Britain to go back from its promise without losing face. At the end, Britain's sudden policy reversal provided the spark of a great bomb, due to lack of firmness in deciding their policy. Obviously, there are many other root causes, such as Germany's humiliation after losing World War 1, and fascism's inherent tendency of militant expansion, which brings me to my next point.
2. Fascist countries have a tendency for militarism, quick expansion, and collapse due to centralized decision making
It is intriguing how similar Hitler's Germany is to countries lead by strong men today, like Putin's Russia and Xi's China. Under good leadership they can be wonderful opportunities for directing national policy. However, Hitler's Germany is dictated by an expansionist thirst due to Hitler's policy of lebensraum. Hitler's intention is to not to be involved in any war until 1945, realizing that Germany's industry and weapon are not ready for war. However, his grave miscalculation resulted in a world war. It's the same thing with Putin and Xi, I see a kind of expansionist thirst.
3. Some of the greatest military victories are not as planned as they look
Hitler's brilliant victory over France is based on an accident. His army's plan of attacking France (similar to the Schlieffen plan) fell to Belgium. As a result, Hitler has to change his plan, which works wonderfully. At the end, Hitler adopted a new unexpected plan of breaking through from Ardennes. That, coupled with France and Britain's decision to send a huge army to counter Germany's expected attack from Belgium actually is a blessing for Germany.
Strategically, Hitler's victory against France might be bad news for the world because it prolonged the war.
4. Hitler blundered by attacking Russia
This has been a common agreement of historians. Why did Hitler repeat Napoleon's mistake in 1812? Hitler's reason is that he was intending to end the war by befriending Britain after he defeated France. That is why he let the British soldier escape from Dunkirk. However, since that didn't go according to plan, and his air attack against Britain didn't work either, he decided to strike Russia first, considering that Russia's existence will never let Germany in peace. Hart argues that had Hitler stuck to his guns in attacking and isolating Britain, Britain has little chance of survival.
5. Even after that Russia blunder, Hitler still has chances of winning the war
Hart argues that Hitler has a good chance of beating Russia had he let Guderian's tank unit move straight to Moscow, instead of waiting infantry to catch up to complete a pincer movement to trap Russian soldiers. Furthermore, Hitler poured too much resources into attacking Stalingrad. Those resources could be put into better use had he invest it in the Meditteranean sea, conquering Malta and pushing Britain out of Egypt and Suez.
6. Eventually, the Allies's bigger resources decided the war
Since Germany has been boggled in a battle of attrition across 3 frontiers without any decisive result, eventually she has problems with replenishment of her resources. That combined with America's entry into the war due to Japan's attack decided the war.
7. Germany has brilliant commanders who were prevented to make good decisions due to Hitler's autocratic decision making
Hart pointed out that master commanders like Manstein and Rommel have amazing abilities, constantly triumphing although grossly outnumbered. However, Hitler's hands on approach often ordered the Germans to not retreat when it is tactically necessary to retreat works to their detriment. That is completely different with Allied commanders. Montgomery, Bradley, and others often had local autonomies to take their own decision. Hitler himself was not stupid, for a corporal in World War 1 he was surprisingly intelligent. This is shown when Hitler correctly predicted that the Allies will land in Normandy in 1944, when his other generals such as Runstedt predicted Calais and other more predictable places. Hitler's reasoning is smart too. However, this sharpness is undone by his stubbornness of not pouring reserves when the Allies predictably landed on Normandy, because Hitler believed that the Allies will land an even bigger army in Calais.
Hitler's stubbornness in spite of all the evidence against his belief repeats over and over again across the other frontier, resulting in horrendous and unnecessary losses. The rest of the book, especially the post 1943 era makes a depressing reading. The ending is so predictable but it's painful to read - Hitler self destructing, the Allies exerting its full muscle to out-produce the Axis powers.
8. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor might have been a brilliant masterstroke
Many historians these days argue that Pearl Harbour is a grave mistake in that it reversed the American pacifist public opinion into that preferring war. However, the truth might have been slightly more complicated. The attack was Japan's brilliant Admiral Yamamoto's idea. Even without the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan's plan of attacking Phillipines will eventually bring America into the war.
9. The atomic bomb might have been unnecessary
Japan was already defeated and surrounded. Although dropping the atomic bomb might have saved lives, the true reason behind dropping the bomb is that many people behind America's government think that they've spent 2 billion dollars on the Manhattan project. Surely the atomic bomb has to be used so that the money doesn't go to waste?
Overall, a difficult read with all the war tactics. However, Liddell Hart's judgment makes an instructive reading!
Lately there has been escalating threats and tension in the South China Sea and Taiwan, which makes one scared, and what better way to think about it than to read some books about war, the decisions that were made by the leaders, the battles, strategies, and so on.
Key takeaways:
1. Lack of firmness in a country's policy can be disastrous
This is clear in how World War 2 started. While it is undeniable that Hitler's policy of aggression is detrimental to peace, Hart blamed British government's sudden reversal of policy, from appeasement to threat. The British government was accomodating early on when Hitler occupied Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. Suddenly, Britain decided that things cannot go on like this and made a sudden reversal. This reversal is so sudden as to shock Hitler and his government. Before, British government seemed to be accomodating of Germany's expansion, "surely they'll relent again?" Instead, Britain promised Poland that they would declare war on Germany if Germant attacked. This promise, according to Hart, was a blunder considering that Britain (and its ally France) can't fulfill this promise due to distance and lack of battle readiness in its army. On the other hand, Hitler wanted to continue expanding his territories and made the deduction that Britain won't go to war without Russia's backing, which is why Hitler signed a non aggression pact. When Hitler eventually invaded, it's too late for Britain to go back from its promise without losing face. At the end, Britain's sudden policy reversal provided the spark of a great bomb, due to lack of firmness in deciding their policy. Obviously, there are many other root causes, such as Germany's humiliation after losing World War 1, and fascism's inherent tendency of militant expansion, which brings me to my next point.
2. Fascist countries have a tendency for militarism, quick expansion, and collapse due to centralized decision making
It is intriguing how similar Hitler's Germany is to countries lead by strong men today, like Putin's Russia and Xi's China. Under good leadership they can be wonderful opportunities for directing national policy. However, Hitler's Germany is dictated by an expansionist thirst due to Hitler's policy of lebensraum. Hitler's intention is to not to be involved in any war until 1945, realizing that Germany's industry and weapon are not ready for war. However, his grave miscalculation resulted in a world war. It's the same thing with Putin and Xi, I see a kind of expansionist thirst.
3. Some of the greatest military victories are not as planned as they look
Hitler's brilliant victory over France is based on an accident. His army's plan of attacking France (similar to the Schlieffen plan) fell to Belgium. As a result, Hitler has to change his plan, which works wonderfully. At the end, Hitler adopted a new unexpected plan of breaking through from Ardennes. That, coupled with France and Britain's decision to send a huge army to counter Germany's expected attack from Belgium actually is a blessing for Germany.
Strategically, Hitler's victory against France might be bad news for the world because it prolonged the war.
4. Hitler blundered by attacking Russia
This has been a common agreement of historians. Why did Hitler repeat Napoleon's mistake in 1812? Hitler's reason is that he was intending to end the war by befriending Britain after he defeated France. That is why he let the British soldier escape from Dunkirk. However, since that didn't go according to plan, and his air attack against Britain didn't work either, he decided to strike Russia first, considering that Russia's existence will never let Germany in peace. Hart argues that had Hitler stuck to his guns in attacking and isolating Britain, Britain has little chance of survival.
5. Even after that Russia blunder, Hitler still has chances of winning the war
Hart argues that Hitler has a good chance of beating Russia had he let Guderian's tank unit move straight to Moscow, instead of waiting infantry to catch up to complete a pincer movement to trap Russian soldiers. Furthermore, Hitler poured too much resources into attacking Stalingrad. Those resources could be put into better use had he invest it in the Meditteranean sea, conquering Malta and pushing Britain out of Egypt and Suez.
6. Eventually, the Allies's bigger resources decided the war
Since Germany has been boggled in a battle of attrition across 3 frontiers without any decisive result, eventually she has problems with replenishment of her resources. That combined with America's entry into the war due to Japan's attack decided the war.
7. Germany has brilliant commanders who were prevented to make good decisions due to Hitler's autocratic decision making
Hart pointed out that master commanders like Manstein and Rommel have amazing abilities, constantly triumphing although grossly outnumbered. However, Hitler's hands on approach often ordered the Germans to not retreat when it is tactically necessary to retreat works to their detriment. That is completely different with Allied commanders. Montgomery, Bradley, and others often had local autonomies to take their own decision. Hitler himself was not stupid, for a corporal in World War 1 he was surprisingly intelligent. This is shown when Hitler correctly predicted that the Allies will land in Normandy in 1944, when his other generals such as Runstedt predicted Calais and other more predictable places. Hitler's reasoning is smart too. However, this sharpness is undone by his stubbornness of not pouring reserves when the Allies predictably landed on Normandy, because Hitler believed that the Allies will land an even bigger army in Calais.
Hitler's stubbornness in spite of all the evidence against his belief repeats over and over again across the other frontier, resulting in horrendous and unnecessary losses. The rest of the book, especially the post 1943 era makes a depressing reading. The ending is so predictable but it's painful to read - Hitler self destructing, the Allies exerting its full muscle to out-produce the Axis powers.
8. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor might have been a brilliant masterstroke
Many historians these days argue that Pearl Harbour is a grave mistake in that it reversed the American pacifist public opinion into that preferring war. However, the truth might have been slightly more complicated. The attack was Japan's brilliant Admiral Yamamoto's idea. Even without the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan's plan of attacking Phillipines will eventually bring America into the war.
9. The atomic bomb might have been unnecessary
Japan was already defeated and surrounded. Although dropping the atomic bomb might have saved lives, the true reason behind dropping the bomb is that many people behind America's government think that they've spent 2 billion dollars on the Manhattan project. Surely the atomic bomb has to be used so that the money doesn't go to waste?
Overall, a difficult read with all the war tactics. However, Liddell Hart's judgment makes an instructive reading!
June 24, 2018
What a ride! This is a 700+ page, exhaustively researched and almost painfully detailed, account of every last corner of WW2, written by possibly the period's most distinguished historian.
From this dispassionate academic angle, even the famous actions look completely different, and the big victories and defeats look way less organised and more chaotic. And it's only through examining many actions that's it's possible to get a handle on Rommel's genius, for example, or the strengths and weaknesses of the Montgomery or Patton.
The main picture that emerges is how small seemingly irrelevant events can have such a huge effect on something as enormous as this war. It would only have taken a handful of decisions taken differently to prevent the whole thing, for example, or shorten it by almost a year, or keep the Russians out completely.
Finally, with the war as it stands, it's quite clear that the Hitler lost his war by refusing to let his military do its job. The mistake of dictators since time immemorial. Left to their own devices, the German generals could have ground the Allies to a stalemate from which suing for peace would be the only option. Rather sobering.
From this dispassionate academic angle, even the famous actions look completely different, and the big victories and defeats look way less organised and more chaotic. And it's only through examining many actions that's it's possible to get a handle on Rommel's genius, for example, or the strengths and weaknesses of the Montgomery or Patton.
The main picture that emerges is how small seemingly irrelevant events can have such a huge effect on something as enormous as this war. It would only have taken a handful of decisions taken differently to prevent the whole thing, for example, or shorten it by almost a year, or keep the Russians out completely.
Finally, with the war as it stands, it's quite clear that the Hitler lost his war by refusing to let his military do its job. The mistake of dictators since time immemorial. Left to their own devices, the German generals could have ground the Allies to a stalemate from which suing for peace would be the only option. Rather sobering.
September 15, 2017
Bütünüyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın askerî yönü üzerine yoğunlaşan, enfes bir çalışma. Her ne kadar güncel bilgilerle hazırlanan ve daha iyi olarak nitelendirilebilecek çalışmalar olsa da günümüzde, Liddell Hart'ın İkinci Dünya Savaşı Tarihi, uzun yıllar boyunca tarihçilerden İkinci Dünya Savaşı meraklılarına kadar birçok grup ve birey tarafından referans olarak kullanıldı, kullanılmaya devam da edilmekte.
Kerim Bağrıaçık'ın çevirisinin kalitesini de söyledikten sonra değerlendirmeyi bir uyarıyla kapatayım; her ne kadar yeni baskısı daha kaliteli bir şekilde yapılsa da, gri kapaklı ve ciltli baskıdan uzak durunuz, durduğu yerde paramparça olma özelliğine sahip çünkü. İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları'na yakışmayan bir baskı kalitesi, en azından benim edindiğim kopyada öyleydi.
Kerim Bağrıaçık'ın çevirisinin kalitesini de söyledikten sonra değerlendirmeyi bir uyarıyla kapatayım; her ne kadar yeni baskısı daha kaliteli bir şekilde yapılsa da, gri kapaklı ve ciltli baskıdan uzak durunuz, durduğu yerde paramparça olma özelliğine sahip çünkü. İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları'na yakışmayan bir baskı kalitesi, en azından benim edindiğim kopyada öyleydi.
October 20, 2012
a classic depiction of the modern war.2
learned a lot of hitlers tactics nd his mistakes which backfired
came to know dat WW-2 was not jus about hitler nd germany it was more about bravity of allied forces nd especially russia nd britain
A new general who jumped on watchlist is rommel will read more about him...
exact stats on number of aircraft used etc nd manpower used is more enthrilling especially in battle of britain.pearl harbour nd battle of statlingrad
learned a lot of hitlers tactics nd his mistakes which backfired
came to know dat WW-2 was not jus about hitler nd germany it was more about bravity of allied forces nd especially russia nd britain
A new general who jumped on watchlist is rommel will read more about him...
exact stats on number of aircraft used etc nd manpower used is more enthrilling especially in battle of britain.pearl harbour nd battle of statlingrad
May 31, 2010
I got & read this book when it first came out. It was much anticipated as
Hart was quite the respected historian. Obviously 713 pages isn't really
that much for all of WW2, so it's a high level perspective and a good
basis for knowledge.
June 3, 2013
Although author Hart is (deservedly) opinionated, this is an authoritative history of the second world war and the first such broadly sketched history I'd ever read, everything else having been restricted either to a theatre or a particular campaign.
December 26, 2018
Detailed history of ww2. Recommend to read
December 24, 2021
Liddell Hart's look at strategic issues of World War Two! Scattered through the book are not only the references to his interviews with German commanders post war (which became his book 'The Other Side of the Hill'), but also numerous occasions when he was consulted by senior figures on both sides before and during the war (obviously only allies during). Clearly he was indeed recognized widely as a brilliant expert on all matters military.
This book though, like the companion volume on the First World War sits clearly in realm of strategy (as opposed grand strategy; or grand tactics or tactics - which are only touched upon - for example Rommel's mastery of the used of anti tank guns alongside of his Panzers). Throughout it gives a strategic assessment of plans and their outcomes. It makes pretty interesting reading and the book is long enough already, but it would have been good to delve a little more into tactics.
Hart also gives extensive critical commentary of individuals - not sparing Churchill or Montgomery but there are a number others where it would interesting to get more of an overall assessment - for example Eishenhower and Roosevelt, or whether O'Conner of early Western Desert fame measured up to overall blitzkrieg standards. Overall from a military point of view Hart has considerable sympathy for the axis and certainly give them more credit that the allies. It is certainly admirable how small numbers of Germans managed to achieve so much both on attack and in defense compared with inadequacies of vast British or American forces in other circumstances.
Even the Japanese get a quite sympathetic hearing, but it is puzzling and left unresolved just why they changed from a dynamic force that swept all before them (Malaya and Singapore) to become such cannon fodder towards the end - especially in the air? At least with the collapse of Germany on all fronts we see them being stretched too thin, but only the unconvincing argument of inadequately trained pilots is given to explain the disproportionate losses in the Pacific battles.
Political concerns and influences are usually only mentioned in so far at they impacted on strategic decisions. There are the occasional quip how outcomes are sometimes determined by unconscionable factors (the German commander in the Bulge distracted by a pretty captured nurse) yet ideology and political considerations weigh much more heavily on outcomes and effort than is given credit. It is Napoleon's "in war moral is to the physical as three parts out of four" . However these are not issues where Hart has his expertise and those areas it is pretty hard to challenge him.
One topic that does take this factor into account and also applies his strategic assessment alongside - is his assertion that the use of the atomic bomb was wrong and unnecessary, as Japan was already ready to surrender.
This book though, like the companion volume on the First World War sits clearly in realm of strategy (as opposed grand strategy; or grand tactics or tactics - which are only touched upon - for example Rommel's mastery of the used of anti tank guns alongside of his Panzers). Throughout it gives a strategic assessment of plans and their outcomes. It makes pretty interesting reading and the book is long enough already, but it would have been good to delve a little more into tactics.
Hart also gives extensive critical commentary of individuals - not sparing Churchill or Montgomery but there are a number others where it would interesting to get more of an overall assessment - for example Eishenhower and Roosevelt, or whether O'Conner of early Western Desert fame measured up to overall blitzkrieg standards. Overall from a military point of view Hart has considerable sympathy for the axis and certainly give them more credit that the allies. It is certainly admirable how small numbers of Germans managed to achieve so much both on attack and in defense compared with inadequacies of vast British or American forces in other circumstances.
Even the Japanese get a quite sympathetic hearing, but it is puzzling and left unresolved just why they changed from a dynamic force that swept all before them (Malaya and Singapore) to become such cannon fodder towards the end - especially in the air? At least with the collapse of Germany on all fronts we see them being stretched too thin, but only the unconvincing argument of inadequately trained pilots is given to explain the disproportionate losses in the Pacific battles.
Political concerns and influences are usually only mentioned in so far at they impacted on strategic decisions. There are the occasional quip how outcomes are sometimes determined by unconscionable factors (the German commander in the Bulge distracted by a pretty captured nurse) yet ideology and political considerations weigh much more heavily on outcomes and effort than is given credit. It is Napoleon's "in war moral is to the physical as three parts out of four" . However these are not issues where Hart has his expertise and those areas it is pretty hard to challenge him.
One topic that does take this factor into account and also applies his strategic assessment alongside - is his assertion that the use of the atomic bomb was wrong and unnecessary, as Japan was already ready to surrender.
October 10, 2024
Es una de esas lecturas que hacía tiempo no abordaba. Requiere concentración, paciencia y tiempo para asimilar completamente todo el contenido, pero después de 12 días, resulta totalmente satisfactorio y aporta muchos detalles nuevos sobre un tema que me interesa.
No estamos ante otra historia común sobre la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Se trata de un clásico del género, encargado al autor a finales de los años 40, pero no publicado hasta 1970, tras su fallecimiento. Inédito hasta ahora en español, Arzalia Ediciones ha realizado un gran trabajo para presentarlo en nuestra lengua con algunas mejoras que permiten una mejor comprensión.
No se trata de un libro generalista sobre la Segunda Guerra Mundial, sino de una obra centrada principalmente en la historia militar. Exceptuando una introducción sobre los hechos y causas del conflicto, el libro no aborda discusiones políticas, negociaciones o campos de exterminio, sino exclusivamente temas relacionados con el ámbito militar.
El libro fue escrito por un militar, uno de los primeros teóricos que reflexionó sobre el uso de los tanques y las fuerzas motorizadas durante el período de entreguerras. Estos conocimientos influyen significativamente en su análisis de las diferentes campañas de la Segunda Guerra Mundial.
El libro sigue un orden cronológico, aunque en ocasiones los eventos se superponen. Está dividido en capítulos dedicados a acciones bélicas concretas o teatros de operaciones específicos. Por ejemplo, tras explicar hechos ocurridos en Rusia, puede retroceder en el tiempo para abordar sucesos en Italia o el Pacífico.
El autor no actúa como un historiador tradicional, sin mantener una postura del todo neutral. Expone los hechos y los planes iniciales de las operaciones militares, y es aquí donde su formación militar le permite analizar los numerosos errores cometidos en la mayoría de las campañas sin importar la nacionalidad.
El autor es extraordinariamente lúcido en su análisis, señalando errores cometidos por todos los bandos, con especial enfasis por los militares y el gobierno británico. Argumenta con claridad su visión, criticando la falta de perspectiva de los altos mandos de los distintos ejércitos frente a la nueva guerra mecanizada. Según su parecer, al inicio de la guerra solo algunos jóvenes oficiales alemanes supieron utilizar esta estrategia, lo que les permitió tantas conquistas, contrastándolo con la inoperancia de Francia e Inglaterra en esos inicios.
Con la ventaja de haber podido entrevistar a muchos generales alemanes al finalizar la guerra, para hablar de temas militares, utiliza parte de este material para citar literalmente el pensamiento de estos, así como también utiliza partes de las memorias de Churchill y algún otro personaje importante para exponer pensamientos y opiniones directas por parte de todos los implicados.
Es difícil que una obra de este tipo pueda abarcar todos los aspectos de las operaciones militares, dada su complejidad. Aunque el libro cubre ambos teatros de operaciones, el europeo-africano recibe mayor atención, probablemente debido al conocimiento directo del autor.
El autor da especial importancia a momentos clave del conflicto, como la batalla de El Alamein, donde destaca la estrategia y liderazgo de Rommel. No duda en señalar las debilidades tácticas de las potencias aliadas, subrayando la falta de coordinación y visión estratégica. Por otra parte es llamativo que Hart no otorgue el mismo énfasis a batallas como la de Kursk, considerada por muchos la más grande de blindados en la historia, remarcando el interés personal del autor por la figura de Rommel.
La edición en castellano es excelente, con más de 50 mapas rediseñados (muy superiores a los de la edición inglesa), y un impecable trabajo editorial. Esta obra se convierte en una referencia esencial sobre un período muy documentado, pero ofrece una perspectiva divergente respecto a las opiniones predominantes del siglo XX. Actualmente algunos historiadores con una mirada más profunda en el tiempo, sin el sesgo de ser un conflicto tan cercano, empiezan a mostrar opiniones que el autor expuso desde que finalizó el conflicto.
Sé que esta lectura no será del interés de muchos de los que siguen a este cronista. Sin embargo, para quienes sí les apasiona el tema, o conocen a alguien que disfrute de la historia militar, este libro será un regalo fantástico.
No estamos ante otra historia común sobre la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Se trata de un clásico del género, encargado al autor a finales de los años 40, pero no publicado hasta 1970, tras su fallecimiento. Inédito hasta ahora en español, Arzalia Ediciones ha realizado un gran trabajo para presentarlo en nuestra lengua con algunas mejoras que permiten una mejor comprensión.
No se trata de un libro generalista sobre la Segunda Guerra Mundial, sino de una obra centrada principalmente en la historia militar. Exceptuando una introducción sobre los hechos y causas del conflicto, el libro no aborda discusiones políticas, negociaciones o campos de exterminio, sino exclusivamente temas relacionados con el ámbito militar.
El libro fue escrito por un militar, uno de los primeros teóricos que reflexionó sobre el uso de los tanques y las fuerzas motorizadas durante el período de entreguerras. Estos conocimientos influyen significativamente en su análisis de las diferentes campañas de la Segunda Guerra Mundial.
El libro sigue un orden cronológico, aunque en ocasiones los eventos se superponen. Está dividido en capítulos dedicados a acciones bélicas concretas o teatros de operaciones específicos. Por ejemplo, tras explicar hechos ocurridos en Rusia, puede retroceder en el tiempo para abordar sucesos en Italia o el Pacífico.
El autor no actúa como un historiador tradicional, sin mantener una postura del todo neutral. Expone los hechos y los planes iniciales de las operaciones militares, y es aquí donde su formación militar le permite analizar los numerosos errores cometidos en la mayoría de las campañas sin importar la nacionalidad.
El autor es extraordinariamente lúcido en su análisis, señalando errores cometidos por todos los bandos, con especial enfasis por los militares y el gobierno británico. Argumenta con claridad su visión, criticando la falta de perspectiva de los altos mandos de los distintos ejércitos frente a la nueva guerra mecanizada. Según su parecer, al inicio de la guerra solo algunos jóvenes oficiales alemanes supieron utilizar esta estrategia, lo que les permitió tantas conquistas, contrastándolo con la inoperancia de Francia e Inglaterra en esos inicios.
Con la ventaja de haber podido entrevistar a muchos generales alemanes al finalizar la guerra, para hablar de temas militares, utiliza parte de este material para citar literalmente el pensamiento de estos, así como también utiliza partes de las memorias de Churchill y algún otro personaje importante para exponer pensamientos y opiniones directas por parte de todos los implicados.
Es difícil que una obra de este tipo pueda abarcar todos los aspectos de las operaciones militares, dada su complejidad. Aunque el libro cubre ambos teatros de operaciones, el europeo-africano recibe mayor atención, probablemente debido al conocimiento directo del autor.
El autor da especial importancia a momentos clave del conflicto, como la batalla de El Alamein, donde destaca la estrategia y liderazgo de Rommel. No duda en señalar las debilidades tácticas de las potencias aliadas, subrayando la falta de coordinación y visión estratégica. Por otra parte es llamativo que Hart no otorgue el mismo énfasis a batallas como la de Kursk, considerada por muchos la más grande de blindados en la historia, remarcando el interés personal del autor por la figura de Rommel.
La edición en castellano es excelente, con más de 50 mapas rediseñados (muy superiores a los de la edición inglesa), y un impecable trabajo editorial. Esta obra se convierte en una referencia esencial sobre un período muy documentado, pero ofrece una perspectiva divergente respecto a las opiniones predominantes del siglo XX. Actualmente algunos historiadores con una mirada más profunda en el tiempo, sin el sesgo de ser un conflicto tan cercano, empiezan a mostrar opiniones que el autor expuso desde que finalizó el conflicto.
Sé que esta lectura no será del interés de muchos de los que siguen a este cronista. Sin embargo, para quienes sí les apasiona el tema, o conocen a alguien que disfrute de la historia militar, este libro será un regalo fantástico.
August 30, 2019
Sir Basil Liddell Hart was a widely respected and influential journalist, teacher, military historian and student of strategy and tactics. He enjoyed the friendship and correspondence of key figures of his era, and his thoughts on military tactics were much sought after. In preparing this history and other books he also had the advantage of having interviewed soldiers and commanders who fought on both sides of the second World War and taking careful notes of those conversations while the events were still fresh in their minds.
Liddell Hart's history covers the entire war in considerable detail, from the events leading to it as well as its aftermath. If I had to criticize the work I would point out my own failing in sometimes not following his detailed accounts of battles and campaigns as closely as I might. His writing is scholarly and understated, and his insights and criticism of historical figures and the decisions they made thought-provoking. Liddell Hart felt that the war could have been avoided by wiser and earlier intervention on the part of England and France. He points out military blunders on Hitler's part: bowing to the Luftwaffe during the English retreat to Dunkirk rather than using tanks in their pursuit; wasting troops and supplies in Tunisia; not having a plan for the invasion of the British Isles; attacking Russia thereby opening a second front; underestimating the gasoline requirements of his mechanized war machine; stubbornly refusing to allow tactical retreats by his generals; maintaining too wide a front to be intelligently defended. The Allies also receive their share of intelligent criticism. England and France failed to appreciate the tremendous capacity of a fully mechanized army. Poland and France, having more divisions than Germany at the outbreak of the war, were too slow to convert to modern warfare, Poland actually using mounted cavalry to defend against panzers. Britain's theoretical belief in the unstoppable power of bombing led to ineffective bombing runs and tremendous loss early in the war. Eisenhower unwisely took gas rations from Patton and sent them to Montgomery, who was less effective. The Allies' insistence on unconditional surrender forestalled the end of the war when there were factions within both Germany and Japan who might have been willing to negotiate a peace. Japan might have surrendered without the use of the atomic bomb, given that the island nation's supplies were cut off, her navy all but decimated, and the threat of Russia moving into Manchuria.
HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR is well-written, copiously illustrated with maps, detailed in its description of the ebb and flow of military campaigns, and thought-provoking in its analysis of the politics of the time.
Liddell Hart's history covers the entire war in considerable detail, from the events leading to it as well as its aftermath. If I had to criticize the work I would point out my own failing in sometimes not following his detailed accounts of battles and campaigns as closely as I might. His writing is scholarly and understated, and his insights and criticism of historical figures and the decisions they made thought-provoking. Liddell Hart felt that the war could have been avoided by wiser and earlier intervention on the part of England and France. He points out military blunders on Hitler's part: bowing to the Luftwaffe during the English retreat to Dunkirk rather than using tanks in their pursuit; wasting troops and supplies in Tunisia; not having a plan for the invasion of the British Isles; attacking Russia thereby opening a second front; underestimating the gasoline requirements of his mechanized war machine; stubbornly refusing to allow tactical retreats by his generals; maintaining too wide a front to be intelligently defended. The Allies also receive their share of intelligent criticism. England and France failed to appreciate the tremendous capacity of a fully mechanized army. Poland and France, having more divisions than Germany at the outbreak of the war, were too slow to convert to modern warfare, Poland actually using mounted cavalry to defend against panzers. Britain's theoretical belief in the unstoppable power of bombing led to ineffective bombing runs and tremendous loss early in the war. Eisenhower unwisely took gas rations from Patton and sent them to Montgomery, who was less effective. The Allies' insistence on unconditional surrender forestalled the end of the war when there were factions within both Germany and Japan who might have been willing to negotiate a peace. Japan might have surrendered without the use of the atomic bomb, given that the island nation's supplies were cut off, her navy all but decimated, and the threat of Russia moving into Manchuria.
HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR is well-written, copiously illustrated with maps, detailed in its description of the ebb and flow of military campaigns, and thought-provoking in its analysis of the politics of the time.
December 5, 2025
A very sober account of WW2. A stark difference from the documentaries/movies I grew up watching on TV. Hart for the most part takes interest only in the tactics and strategy, less in the dramatics or narrative of war. It can definitely be dry, and I had to take about a two week break; it is still well worth the time it takes to read
Every history author definitely has their personal interests that affect what they focus on, and Hart is no stranger to this. He extensively covers the campaigns in Africa and Italy while barely covering the invasions of Normandy, Iwa Jima , and Okinawa. I would say it’s his love of mechanized armor warfare(which he repeatedly reminds us that he advised for throughout the book)
that does this, and his idea that the war was decided by the time these latter events happened. Nonetheless it was a welcome difference from what I’m used to on WW2 coverage.
Overall a great book to learn that Hitler was just as idiotic as he was despicable; if your generals try to overthrow you multiple times you’d think he get the hint. His large early military successes are due primarily to Guderain who he then restrains multiple times after the fact. Then in the latter stages he refuses for tactical withdrawals for some idiotic Nazi reasoning which I would blame for their complete defeat. The Japanese, and Italians fall for similar foolhardy ideas that totalitarianism seems to instill— refusing any retreat or making unnecessary offensive attacks for “honor” or to save from embarrassment. Either way once America and the USSR got fully up to their manufacturing potential the war was won for the allies. It was really amazing to see the stark differences in ability’s of the USSR and the US compared to every other power at the time.
The only bias I see present is his need to garner fear of the USSR something many WW2 writers of the time fall victim to. While this doesn’t make him understate the vast importance of the Russian’s in victory. I think at times he tries to make the reader more ready to forgive the German’s. I think this is most clearly seen in his complete omittance of the Holocaust from the book, but he also does not include many of the other civilian tragedies of war. However I think if you write about WW2 you need to include something about the holocaust to get an understanding of the Nazi psyche/depravity especially at the end of the war.
Final note: I very much appreciate him not having a boner for England like a lot of English history writers tend to have. That was much appreciated
Every history author definitely has their personal interests that affect what they focus on, and Hart is no stranger to this. He extensively covers the campaigns in Africa and Italy while barely covering the invasions of Normandy, Iwa Jima , and Okinawa. I would say it’s his love of mechanized armor warfare(which he repeatedly reminds us that he advised for throughout the book)
that does this, and his idea that the war was decided by the time these latter events happened. Nonetheless it was a welcome difference from what I’m used to on WW2 coverage.
Overall a great book to learn that Hitler was just as idiotic as he was despicable; if your generals try to overthrow you multiple times you’d think he get the hint. His large early military successes are due primarily to Guderain who he then restrains multiple times after the fact. Then in the latter stages he refuses for tactical withdrawals for some idiotic Nazi reasoning which I would blame for their complete defeat. The Japanese, and Italians fall for similar foolhardy ideas that totalitarianism seems to instill— refusing any retreat or making unnecessary offensive attacks for “honor” or to save from embarrassment. Either way once America and the USSR got fully up to their manufacturing potential the war was won for the allies. It was really amazing to see the stark differences in ability’s of the USSR and the US compared to every other power at the time.
The only bias I see present is his need to garner fear of the USSR something many WW2 writers of the time fall victim to. While this doesn’t make him understate the vast importance of the Russian’s in victory. I think at times he tries to make the reader more ready to forgive the German’s. I think this is most clearly seen in his complete omittance of the Holocaust from the book, but he also does not include many of the other civilian tragedies of war. However I think if you write about WW2 you need to include something about the holocaust to get an understanding of the Nazi psyche/depravity especially at the end of the war.
Final note: I very much appreciate him not having a boner for England like a lot of English history writers tend to have. That was much appreciated
August 30, 2022
This extraordinary book is unlike any history I’ve ever read. I picked up this volume entirely by chance, and it’s something I wouldn’t typically care much about. Yet it’s well worth reading. The author, B. H. Liddell Hart (“Basil,” according to his wife, who wrote the foreword after his passing), has seemingly mastered every detail of every major and perhaps every minor battle over the course of the war, not to mention the precipitating strategies from prior conflicts. While for me the details of how various battles play out can become a bit mind-numbing after a while, Liddell Hart’s vigorous prose and blunt opinions make this “official history”—commissioned in 1947 but not published until after his death in 1970–almost subversively delightful to read. The bumbling of what he often calls “the home Government” is a frequent target of his scorn. Churchill’s calls for troops to fight “to the bitter end” and “for the honor of the British empire” are met by his observation that “The morale of the men in the fighting line was not raised by the sight of black smoke clouds billowing up behind them, from burning oil tanks. Nor did it encourage them to know they were doomed to death or captivity.” Always cleareyed in his assessment of leaders, he coolly notes the missed opportunities and poor judgments from both the political and military leaders that led to so many undesirable consequences. This book does not address the human costs of the war or even Hitler’s treatment of the Jews; it is solely focused on the specific details of the strategic and tactical aspects of the war as Liddell Hart was able to dissect, often by learning from the participants—including imprisoned German leaders and their families, which is discomforting even if the result is an account that widens the perspective that we normally see to include the thinking of our opponents. I’d recommend it to anyone who feels (as I do) unfamiliar with much beyond the heroics I’ve been told over the years by Hollywood and television. This book is remarkable piece of scholarship that tells a tragic and necessary story of how the world came to this unprecedented crisis.
September 23, 2022
【2022Book15】Finished the journey of reading Liddell Hart's 700-page "History of the Second World War" with a speed of 10 pages daily. As a fan of military history, I feel my understanding of World War II is not so shallow now. This book presents the entire process of World War II from a big-picture perspective, including the high-level commanders' motivations behind military actions and these actions' strategic significance. On the one hand, it allowed me to understand the position and role of those famous battles in the big scene. On the other hand, it also filled the holes in my knowledge of many less famous battlefields, such as France, North Africa, Burma, and Italy. However, I personally feel that this book is too focused on Europe, and the Pacific War is written relatively briefly. And the chapters about the two-side attack on Germany delivered by the Allies and Russians in 1944-45 are quite hard to read if you are unfamiliar with the map.
One point that deeply impressed me is that human life is so cheap in such a catastrophe. For example, at the end of March 1945, Montgomery crossed the Rhine with overwhelming forces. In the process, 40 people of the US Ninth Army were killed, and the description in the book is "barely forty men killed." I think 40 unnatural deaths would certainly not be described as "barely" in peacetime, and the word "only/barely" is used before hundreds or thousands of casualties in this book. Germany surrendered less than 45 days later, but these 40 people failed to see it. As individuals, all they got were horrible deaths only.
One point that deeply impressed me is that human life is so cheap in such a catastrophe. For example, at the end of March 1945, Montgomery crossed the Rhine with overwhelming forces. In the process, 40 people of the US Ninth Army were killed, and the description in the book is "barely forty men killed." I think 40 unnatural deaths would certainly not be described as "barely" in peacetime, and the word "only/barely" is used before hundreds or thousands of casualties in this book. Germany surrendered less than 45 days later, but these 40 people failed to see it. As individuals, all they got were horrible deaths only.
March 24, 2021
First read around 1980 but dipped into many times since.
At the time of it's publication this was probably the best overall account of the WWII. It is now considerably dated both due to subsequent information availability and in and emphasis on different aspects of the conflict. Even in the original edition it can be argued there are errors and omissions. One reviewer has pointed out a total lack of reference to Hitler's 'final solution' and as an Australian I find his treatment of the pacific war far too superficial. Of course some omissions are beyond Harts ability at the time he was writing: an obvious example is the key role of Ultra in many aspects and incidents in the War. I won't go on but for areas of the war where I have read widely there seem to often be factual errors and disagreements with majority contemporary opinion. However, even where general opinion is against Hart, e.g. the Atomic bombing of Japan, Hart's counter view as a respected scholar is worth considering.
Having said all that this is no doubt a classic with much value to students of the War and I admit that I'm yet to read a single volume account that I'm satisfied with. Perhaps the War is just too big to be properly reported and analysed in one volume no matter hoe fat? 3 stars
At the time of it's publication this was probably the best overall account of the WWII. It is now considerably dated both due to subsequent information availability and in and emphasis on different aspects of the conflict. Even in the original edition it can be argued there are errors and omissions. One reviewer has pointed out a total lack of reference to Hitler's 'final solution' and as an Australian I find his treatment of the pacific war far too superficial. Of course some omissions are beyond Harts ability at the time he was writing: an obvious example is the key role of Ultra in many aspects and incidents in the War. I won't go on but for areas of the war where I have read widely there seem to often be factual errors and disagreements with majority contemporary opinion. However, even where general opinion is against Hart, e.g. the Atomic bombing of Japan, Hart's counter view as a respected scholar is worth considering.
Having said all that this is no doubt a classic with much value to students of the War and I admit that I'm yet to read a single volume account that I'm satisfied with. Perhaps the War is just too big to be properly reported and analysed in one volume no matter hoe fat? 3 stars
December 16, 2014
History of the Second World War.
This book is great. I liked this book so much. It interested me so much I just couldn’t stop reading it. Even through this book was over 700 pages I still read it over 600 in 3 days. That is how much I liked this book. It was a part of history that no one who was in it or was alive during that era that is still alive now will forget. The war cost the lives of 48 million people. The Nazi’s or Germans killed 6 million Jews, and 5 Million other people who Hitler did not approve of. They started the war by invading Poland on September 1, 1939, early in the morning. On September 3, 1939 England and France declared war on Germany. The Americas wanted to stay out of the war until December 7, 1941 “A date which will live in infamy”. On that day Japan Without warning they attacked the naval base in Honolulu, Hawaii. The next day President FDR said that December 7, 1941 was “a date which will live in infamy”. Then the United States of America declared war on Japan, Italy, and Germany. On June 4, 1944 The Allies began the invasion of Northern France nicknamed “D-Day”. When Hitler found out about the invasion he was not happy. He decided to take out his anger on the Jews and The other “undesirables”. He started murdering more Jews and The other “undesirables” of Europe. He and Goering along with Himmler and Goebbels started murdering all the Jews and other “undesirables” That they could find.
The next part is that while Hitler and his Nazi’s where murdering Jews, the German army was dominating the Continent of Europe. After Invading Czechoslovakia the Germans targeted Poland. After invading Poland on September 1, 1939 Germany started the deadliest war in history World War 2. 2 days after Germany invaded Poland on September 3, 1939 England and France declared war on Germany. In the 1940’s Germany invaded Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and The Netherlands were all conquered by the Germans in the war. During the war the Germans murdered more than 6 Million Jews, Slavs, Homosexuals, Catholics and all political opponents hundreds of thousands were executed, millions were tortured. Millions were murdered in gas chambers, some were hung. One of the Nazi’s victims was a little girl named Anne Frank. Anne Frank and her family hid from the Nazi’s for two years hiding in an annex in Holland. The Nazi’s killed millions of people in the years of the war. At the end of the war the full horrors of Nazi rule revealed. The allies found these camps. Inside these camps there were bodies stacked on top of each other. At that moment the allies discovered that the Nazi’s murdered more than 6 million Jews during the war. The Nazi’s also murdered more than 6 million other “undesirables” of Europe, Gipseis, Homosexuals, Catholics, Slavs, and all political opponents. They did some murderous things on the eastern front in The Soviet Union. There they murdered millions of Russian men, women, and children during their invasion.
During the war the Nazi’s started to invent powerful weapons. They invented the V-1, and the V-2 Rocket. During the Nazi invasion of Britain the Germans used the V-1 Rocket first to defeat the RAF. But after that did not work the Germans decided to use the V-1 Rocket to scare the civilians instead. Then the Germans invented the V-2 Rocket to do even more damage to the Britain population. It destroyed the Britain city’s and the England people’s homes. Winston Churchill the Prime Minster of England decided to take the battle to the enemy. The RAF did their own night time bombing raids of their own on Berlin, Germany. He was not as ruthless as Hitler. Hitler did not last the entire war, on April 30, 1945 Adolf Hitler Committed Suicide in his underground bunker beneath the ruins of Berlin, Germany.
After Hitler committed suicide, The Germans decided that they could not win this war without their leader. The German army finally surrendered to the Allies on May 5, 1945. On May 8, 1945 Germany officially surrendered to the Allies. Nazi Germany was finally defeated. Only after the Allies defeated Nazi Germany was the real truth of Nazi rule revealed. During the war the Nazi’s murdered more than 6 million Jews. The Nazi’s had set up death camps though out Europe. The most deadly of these camps was Auschwitz. Auschwitz was a deadly death camp.
After the war ended the Allies decided to hunt down Nazi war criminals. The Allies sorted out their prisoners by having them raise their arms because the SS wear a special tattoo under one arm which shows their blood group though useful when wounded. As the Allies looked for SS officers, the British captured the Chief of the SS Heinrich Himmler. In 1945 after having been searched he swallowed a cyanide vile concealed in his mouth. The Nazi minster of propaganda Joseph Goebbels was being hunted. To avoid capture Goebbels committed suicide.
Hermann Goering Marshall of the Reich and number two of the regime is captured. As he imagines he’ll be able to deal with the Allies. He holds a press conference in front of ten cameras on of which is a color camera. Rudolph Hess went to Scotland in 1938 on a peace mission, he has spent the war in jail.
Dr. Josef Mengele the Nazi doctor and murder at Auschwitz is so close to being captured by the Allies. He manages to flee to South America where he will live for the rest of his life. He goes to live in Argentina where he will die of old age. He stays under his real name.
Anne Frank a little girl who her and her family hid from the Nazi’s for two years in Holland. She and her family were captured by the Nazi’s because the betrayal of their informant. The frank family was sent first to Auschwitz and then to Bergen-Belsen death camp. Anne Frank died in Bergen- Belsen on May 5, 1945 just 3 days before Germany surrendered.
Adolf Eichmann the murder at a lot of death camps. He managed to hide from punishment until 1960. In 1960 Eichmann was found in South America his was captured. He was jailed. Then he was put on trial. Over the years the Allies executed over 500 Nazi war criminals.
This book is great. I liked this book so much. It interested me so much I just couldn’t stop reading it. Even through this book was over 700 pages I still read it over 600 in 3 days. That is how much I liked this book. It was a part of history that no one who was in it or was alive during that era that is still alive now will forget. The war cost the lives of 48 million people. The Nazi’s or Germans killed 6 million Jews, and 5 Million other people who Hitler did not approve of. They started the war by invading Poland on September 1, 1939, early in the morning. On September 3, 1939 England and France declared war on Germany. The Americas wanted to stay out of the war until December 7, 1941 “A date which will live in infamy”. On that day Japan Without warning they attacked the naval base in Honolulu, Hawaii. The next day President FDR said that December 7, 1941 was “a date which will live in infamy”. Then the United States of America declared war on Japan, Italy, and Germany. On June 4, 1944 The Allies began the invasion of Northern France nicknamed “D-Day”. When Hitler found out about the invasion he was not happy. He decided to take out his anger on the Jews and The other “undesirables”. He started murdering more Jews and The other “undesirables” of Europe. He and Goering along with Himmler and Goebbels started murdering all the Jews and other “undesirables” That they could find.
The next part is that while Hitler and his Nazi’s where murdering Jews, the German army was dominating the Continent of Europe. After Invading Czechoslovakia the Germans targeted Poland. After invading Poland on September 1, 1939 Germany started the deadliest war in history World War 2. 2 days after Germany invaded Poland on September 3, 1939 England and France declared war on Germany. In the 1940’s Germany invaded Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and The Netherlands were all conquered by the Germans in the war. During the war the Germans murdered more than 6 Million Jews, Slavs, Homosexuals, Catholics and all political opponents hundreds of thousands were executed, millions were tortured. Millions were murdered in gas chambers, some were hung. One of the Nazi’s victims was a little girl named Anne Frank. Anne Frank and her family hid from the Nazi’s for two years hiding in an annex in Holland. The Nazi’s killed millions of people in the years of the war. At the end of the war the full horrors of Nazi rule revealed. The allies found these camps. Inside these camps there were bodies stacked on top of each other. At that moment the allies discovered that the Nazi’s murdered more than 6 million Jews during the war. The Nazi’s also murdered more than 6 million other “undesirables” of Europe, Gipseis, Homosexuals, Catholics, Slavs, and all political opponents. They did some murderous things on the eastern front in The Soviet Union. There they murdered millions of Russian men, women, and children during their invasion.
During the war the Nazi’s started to invent powerful weapons. They invented the V-1, and the V-2 Rocket. During the Nazi invasion of Britain the Germans used the V-1 Rocket first to defeat the RAF. But after that did not work the Germans decided to use the V-1 Rocket to scare the civilians instead. Then the Germans invented the V-2 Rocket to do even more damage to the Britain population. It destroyed the Britain city’s and the England people’s homes. Winston Churchill the Prime Minster of England decided to take the battle to the enemy. The RAF did their own night time bombing raids of their own on Berlin, Germany. He was not as ruthless as Hitler. Hitler did not last the entire war, on April 30, 1945 Adolf Hitler Committed Suicide in his underground bunker beneath the ruins of Berlin, Germany.
After Hitler committed suicide, The Germans decided that they could not win this war without their leader. The German army finally surrendered to the Allies on May 5, 1945. On May 8, 1945 Germany officially surrendered to the Allies. Nazi Germany was finally defeated. Only after the Allies defeated Nazi Germany was the real truth of Nazi rule revealed. During the war the Nazi’s murdered more than 6 million Jews. The Nazi’s had set up death camps though out Europe. The most deadly of these camps was Auschwitz. Auschwitz was a deadly death camp.
After the war ended the Allies decided to hunt down Nazi war criminals. The Allies sorted out their prisoners by having them raise their arms because the SS wear a special tattoo under one arm which shows their blood group though useful when wounded. As the Allies looked for SS officers, the British captured the Chief of the SS Heinrich Himmler. In 1945 after having been searched he swallowed a cyanide vile concealed in his mouth. The Nazi minster of propaganda Joseph Goebbels was being hunted. To avoid capture Goebbels committed suicide.
Hermann Goering Marshall of the Reich and number two of the regime is captured. As he imagines he’ll be able to deal with the Allies. He holds a press conference in front of ten cameras on of which is a color camera. Rudolph Hess went to Scotland in 1938 on a peace mission, he has spent the war in jail.
Dr. Josef Mengele the Nazi doctor and murder at Auschwitz is so close to being captured by the Allies. He manages to flee to South America where he will live for the rest of his life. He goes to live in Argentina where he will die of old age. He stays under his real name.
Anne Frank a little girl who her and her family hid from the Nazi’s for two years in Holland. She and her family were captured by the Nazi’s because the betrayal of their informant. The frank family was sent first to Auschwitz and then to Bergen-Belsen death camp. Anne Frank died in Bergen- Belsen on May 5, 1945 just 3 days before Germany surrendered.
Adolf Eichmann the murder at a lot of death camps. He managed to hide from punishment until 1960. In 1960 Eichmann was found in South America his was captured. He was jailed. Then he was put on trial. Over the years the Allies executed over 500 Nazi war criminals.
April 27, 2024
Because I've read so much about World War II, I generally have no need to read books such as this: books that cover the entire war. But this has been on my bookshelf for years and I finally decided to read it.
It is a very well-done very high-level account of the war. It covers all aspects of combat from September 1, 1939, to the Japanese surrender. Politics and diplomacy are touched on only briefly. Anyone who is looking for a starting place when learning about the war would be well-served to read this.
If I had read this book without knowing who wrote it, I would have assumed a Brit wrote it based on the relative thinness of the coverage of the Pacific theater. Combat in the Philippines is covered in a few pages, Pelileu isn't mentioned at all, the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway are dismissed in paragraphs, as is the strategic bombing of Japan while Burma and North Africa get multiple chapters. This is a minor quibble.
The book is quite light on notes. There are no photographs and few maps, but the maps included are clear and easy to comprehend. There is a short bibliography and two indexes.
It is a very well-done very high-level account of the war. It covers all aspects of combat from September 1, 1939, to the Japanese surrender. Politics and diplomacy are touched on only briefly. Anyone who is looking for a starting place when learning about the war would be well-served to read this.
If I had read this book without knowing who wrote it, I would have assumed a Brit wrote it based on the relative thinness of the coverage of the Pacific theater. Combat in the Philippines is covered in a few pages, Pelileu isn't mentioned at all, the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway are dismissed in paragraphs, as is the strategic bombing of Japan while Burma and North Africa get multiple chapters. This is a minor quibble.
The book is quite light on notes. There are no photographs and few maps, but the maps included are clear and easy to comprehend. There is a short bibliography and two indexes.
August 3, 2020
A very broad overview of the military events of World War II with the strategic insight of someone who knows how this game is played. The best part is the epilogue, but does require reading the rest of the book to fully appreciate it.
It's a long book and can take a while to read but there's a lot of insight to be gained from it. In particular, regarding human arrogance an failure on both sides that unnecessarily extended "the unnecessary war" and led inexorably to the cold war that followed. It also highlights that ultimately all wars are wars of attrition. The nature of the war moved dramatically away from a local squabble when the deep pockets of the Soviet Union and the United States were brought in. Finally, as you'd expect from Liddell Hart, there's lots of attention paid to the role of strategy (as opposed to grand strategy and tactics). This attention can provide insights into aspects of various part of our lives.
It's a slog but definitely worth reading. I learned things that I definitely hadn't picked up from other sources.
June 24, 2025
Great read for a strategic overview of the military elements of World War Two. Liddell Hart’s prominent position as a military theoretician at the time gave him access to British decision makers both before and during the war - there are frequent footnotes citing requests for his opinion from government and military figures. He also had the opportunity to speak to German generals as they were held as prisoners of war, to gain their perspective fresh at the conclusion of the war.
My only criticism is that the book is lopsided in places - the Eastern front is typically quickly skipped through, whilst a significant amount of space is devoted to the North African campaign. This is likely due to Liddell Hart having edited Rommel’s papers, giving him more insight these battles and a quite transparent sympathy for Rommel.
My only criticism is that the book is lopsided in places - the Eastern front is typically quickly skipped through, whilst a significant amount of space is devoted to the North African campaign. This is likely due to Liddell Hart having edited Rommel’s papers, giving him more insight these battles and a quite transparent sympathy for Rommel.
February 23, 2025
Comentarios
Me encantó la reseña de las acciones en África del Norte y la campaña italiana, sobre todo por la admiración que tuvo hacia el general Rommel, así mismo detalla con mucha claridad la guerra en el Pacifico, quizá donde no se aclara es al final con el lanzamiento de la bomba atomica,donde creo las 2 razones que argumenta no me parecen suficientemente solidas,creo tambien que evita abundar en las batallas finales y la toma de Berlin,creo que es el mejor libro que he leído sobre el conflicto mundial, aunque me hubiera gustado que hubiera escrito un poco más sobre el final de la guerra en Alemania, leí hace mucho el libro sobre el Mariscal Rommel que preparó con el hijo de este y desde entonces he sido ferviente admirador de sus botas
Me encantó la reseña de las acciones en África del Norte y la campaña italiana, sobre todo por la admiración que tuvo hacia el general Rommel, así mismo detalla con mucha claridad la guerra en el Pacifico, quizá donde no se aclara es al final con el lanzamiento de la bomba atomica,donde creo las 2 razones que argumenta no me parecen suficientemente solidas,creo tambien que evita abundar en las batallas finales y la toma de Berlin,creo que es el mejor libro que he leído sobre el conflicto mundial, aunque me hubiera gustado que hubiera escrito un poco más sobre el final de la guerra en Alemania, leí hace mucho el libro sobre el Mariscal Rommel que preparó con el hijo de este y desde entonces he sido ferviente admirador de sus botas
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