Beneath the surface, World War I does not lend itself to the easy moralizing of World War II. Far from a democratic Entente facing off against an authoritarian and expansionist Central Powers, a prefiguring of World War II, at its inception the war pitted a variety of aggressive, militaristic European empires against each other. Suffrage was wider in Germany and Austria-Hungary was than in Britain, and Russia was the most autocratic state in Europe. And the complicated sequence of events in July 1914 makes any placing of blame far from straightforward. Yet from the immediate close of the war to the present, historiography in both the Entente powers and in Germany has been dedicated to blaming the Central Powers for the war and vindicating the justice of the Entente cause. Perry Anderson provides the way into, and out of, this literature by analyzing the work of six paradigmatic historians from the major powers. Each one of these chapters is a classic New Left Review-type essay, combining close-individual biography with wider political and intellectual context. Particular highlights of the book are chapters on Luigi Albertini, who as an Italian newspaper baron and politician helped both engineer Italy's entry into the war and wrote its first major history after Mussolini forced his retirement; Christopher Clark, whose "Sleepwalkers" is the definitive account of the "how" of the July Crisis, but not of the why; and Paul Schroeder, who is well known for his masterpiece "The Transformation of European Politics," but who in Anderson's accounting provided the best structural account of the "why" (the displacement of the consensual diplomacy of the Concert of Europe by aggressive realpolitik) in less well known writings throughout his career. Anderson keenly draws attention to the contingencies and unpredictability of 1914, which make any singular placing of blame on Germany and Austria-Hungary impossible, but more importantly he emphasizes the structural nigh-inevitability (Anderson occasionally equivocates here) of the war. The rise of aggressive, zero-sum imperialism, in the Balkans and abroad, and the breakdown of the consensual diplomatic norms of the concert of Europe, made conflict between the powers a matter of time. No power was innocent in plotting aggressive territorial aggression or in recklessly provoking diplomatic crises throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries. And while Germany and Austria-Hungary possessed the initiative for most of July 1914, Austria's desperate ultimatums to Serbia occurred in a context shaped by Italy, France, and Russia's longstanding desire to eliminate it as a great-power.
1914 is perhaps the greatest diplomatic failure of the modern era, and without understanding its real causes it's impossible to learn the right lessons. The post-1945 international order, rooted in international cooperation effected via norms-based institutions, was a product of the very hard learning of the previous 30 years. The EU, NATO, and US hegemony especially after the Soviet Union's collapse were distinct advances in preserving international peace and justice through order, but ones easily threatened by the US's own irresponsibility. Only emphasizing the need for American policymakers today to learn from both their immediate past and the deeper past of global diplomacy if we are to face the challenges of today and the future.