The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell

by Erik C. Banks

In the early twentieth century, Ernst Mach, William James, and Bertrand Russell founded a philosophical and scientific movement known as 'neutral monism', based on the view that minds and physical objects are constructed out of elements or events which are neither exclusively mental nor physical, but rather neutral between the two. This movement offers a unified scientific outlook which includes sensations in human experience and events in the world of physics under one roof. In this book Erik C. Banks discusses this important movement as a whole for the first time. He explores the ways in which the three philosophers can be connected, and applies their ideas to contemporary problems in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science - in particular the relation of sensations to brain processes, and the problem of constructing extended bodies in space and time from particular events and causal relations.

Introduction. An overview of realistic empiricism
1. Mach: physical elements
2. Mach: philosophy of psychology
3. William James' direct realism: a reconstruction
4. Russell's neutral monism: 1919–1927
5. Enhanced physicalism
6. The problem of extension: a constructivist program
Appendix: an outline of realistic empiricism.

Genres: Philosophy

226 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2014

About the author

Erik C. Banks is Professor of Philosophy at Wright State University, with a focus in history and philosophy of science. He also has interests in history of physics, American literature, languages, fine art, Kant and science fiction. His first book Ernst Mach's World Elements appeared in 2003 and his second book The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell: Neutral Monism Reconceived appeared in 2014.

Reviews

[Erik · Rating 5 out of 5]

Links:

Interview with New Books in Philosophy
http://newbooksinphilosophy.com/2015/...

http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=8ZYo4wRGpig

Press Piece from WSU:
http://webapp2.wright.edu/web1/newsro...

Research Presentation at WSU:
http://corescholar.libraries.wright.e...

External reviews from:

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/55816-the-rea...

Journal of Consciousness Studies
http://philpapers.org/rec/JONROE-2

Journal of the History of Philosophy
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal...

Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/...

http://philpapers.org/rec/SHATRE

Cambridge Humanities Review
http://blogs.some.ox.ac.uk/jcr/files/...

Review in Synthesis (in Italian)
http://www.syzetesis.it/documenti/arc...

HOPOS
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/...
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Errata:

Acknowledgements: Harald Atmanspacher and Hartmann Roemer.
1. Page 3: Change Russell (1921) to Russell (1927).
2. Page 182: Change "two dimensional" either to "one dimensional" or "two directional." Arrgh embarrassing.
3. Chapter Four: Russell's articles "On the Nature of Acquaintance" were written in 1913 as part of his unpublished Theory of Knowledge manuscript and published in 1914 in the Monist. Monist articles should be referenced as 1914 and The whole TOK manuscript should be referenced as Russell 1913/1984, Collected Papers Vol. 7).
4. One other embarrassing error, the Bohr-Sommerfeld quantum condition should be that the cyclic integral of the momentum p and generalized coordinate q should be equal to nh. I put h-bar.

More as I find them.

[Christopher · Rating 4 out of 5]

By "realistic empiricism" what is meant is in relation to "scientific realism." I find this name appropriate in that sense but a lot of people coming to this book are bound to misread it, so I thought I would bring this up at the top.

Banks states in his introduction that he thinks this book would be best appreciated by naturalist philosophers and scientists with interests in the philosophy and history of science. I am neither of these things, and this book is not meant for a general audience, so I may have to reread it a few times to decide how onboard I am for these arguments. However, it is very rigorous and detailed in its argumentation and I see no obvious flaws or criticisms that aren't addressed. Basically, my head hurt while I was reading it, which is a sign you are reading good philosophy.

The arguments about an empiricism based on Mach's views and "enhanced physicalism" I am skeptical about but the argument for "neutral monism" in philosophy of mind is as good as any theory that is out there.