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Bush at War #3
State of Denial
Bob Woodward's third # 1 New York Times bestseller on President George W. Bush's wars tells the detailed, behind-the-scenes story of how the Bush administration failed to tell the truth about the Iraq War.
576 pages, Paperback
First published September 30, 2006
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2439 people want to read
About the author
Bob Woodward
107 books3,232 followersLibrarian Note: There is more than one author by this name in the Goodreads database.
Robert "Bob" Upshur Woodward is an assistant managing editor of The Washington Post. While an investigative reporter for that newspaper, Woodward, working with fellow reporter Carl Bernstein, helped uncover the Watergate scandal that led to U.S. President Richard Nixon's resignation. Woodward has written 12 best-selling non-fiction books and has twice contributed reporting to efforts that collectively earned the Post and its National Reporting staff a Pulitzer Prize.
Robert "Bob" Upshur Woodward is an assistant managing editor of The Washington Post. While an investigative reporter for that newspaper, Woodward, working with fellow reporter Carl Bernstein, helped uncover the Watergate scandal that led to U.S. President Richard Nixon's resignation. Woodward has written 12 best-selling non-fiction books and has twice contributed reporting to efforts that collectively earned the Post and its National Reporting staff a Pulitzer Prize.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 242 reviews
April 19, 2007
Well, Woodward certainly got some of the inside skinny, but for my money, Fiasco is a much better book - better writing, clearer timeline, more complete look at all the players involved, esp. military (although I like how obsessed Woodward is with blaming everything on Rumsfeld!). This book feels like a giant apology/"don't blame me!" for Woodward's uncritical support of the administration in the run-up to the war.
March 6, 2008
I read this book remarkably quickly (for me), it really drives at a great pace, and it isn't hard to follow. You have to play close attention to the names of all the people, but enough of them have already been in the news that it isn't all that hard. It's just tough to figure out which general is which sometimes.
Unbelievable, some of the sequences of events which Woodward writes about. He had exhaustive interviews with just about everyone in the Bush administration and with so many generals, and he has a wealth of information. The passages about the decision to dissolve the Iraqi Army right after the invasion, and the de-Baathification stuff, are still kind of incredible, especially when you realize, as you read, that there WERE people, several people, telling the administration that this was a terrible idea. Living through it back then, reading in the newspapers, we didn't really get a lot from the dissenters, but they did exist, and they knew we were making mistakes.
The main thing I got out of this, beyond anything else, was what a terrible mistake Rumsfeld turned out to be. Over and over again, Woodward gives us examples of Rumsfeld fighting with other members of the administration (powell and rice), micromanaging everyone, refusing to let the generals speak to the president except through him, and refusing to admit it when anything goes wrong. And trying to shift blame for everything onto other people. If only Bush had installed someone else in that position at the start, or had just fired him, but he was totally unwilling to do that. I think as president, if you are installing a cabinet member that you know you will be incapable of firing (because you feel intimidated by their experience maybe), you are in a lot of trouble.
Unbelievable, some of the sequences of events which Woodward writes about. He had exhaustive interviews with just about everyone in the Bush administration and with so many generals, and he has a wealth of information. The passages about the decision to dissolve the Iraqi Army right after the invasion, and the de-Baathification stuff, are still kind of incredible, especially when you realize, as you read, that there WERE people, several people, telling the administration that this was a terrible idea. Living through it back then, reading in the newspapers, we didn't really get a lot from the dissenters, but they did exist, and they knew we were making mistakes.
The main thing I got out of this, beyond anything else, was what a terrible mistake Rumsfeld turned out to be. Over and over again, Woodward gives us examples of Rumsfeld fighting with other members of the administration (powell and rice), micromanaging everyone, refusing to let the generals speak to the president except through him, and refusing to admit it when anything goes wrong. And trying to shift blame for everything onto other people. If only Bush had installed someone else in that position at the start, or had just fired him, but he was totally unwilling to do that. I think as president, if you are installing a cabinet member that you know you will be incapable of firing (because you feel intimidated by their experience maybe), you are in a lot of trouble.
August 12, 2011
State of Denial is not a book about the Iraq war. It is a book about the Bush administration’s handling of the Iraq war. Woodward uses his legendary though diminished access to the presidency to paint a picture of the Whitehouse that was disorganized, divided, and ultimately dysfunctional. Rather than pursue a general thesis condemning the administration, Woodward takes a chronological narrative style focusing on characters and interactions which serves to provide an interesting angle.
This focus allows for true gems to come out, like the trepidations of W’s family or Whitehouse humor such as this example this conversation between Bush and Jay Garner:
On the way out, Bush slapped Garner on the back.
“Hey wanna do Iran”
“Sir, the boys and I talked wand we want to hold out for Cuba. We think the rum and cigars are a little better, and the women are a little prettier”
Bush laughed “You got it, you got Cuba” Pg. 224
Woodward also tries to let the story tell itself as much as possible. The few examples of author commentary usually come refuting statements made by Rumsfield, and only in the form of different interviewees that disagreed. This refrain is a refreshing step back from authors with blatant agendas.
The style can be frustrating at times as this book does not attempt provide a complete picture of the Iraq war. Woodward only talks about key figures such as Nuri al Maliki only through the lenses of those like Condollezza Rice, and key events such as Abu-Gharib or Samarra receive no more than a paragraph of coverage. In the end, the quality of the work on the administration more than outweighs the books shortcomings, and should be on the must read list of anybody looking to further understand the administration or the war in Iraq.
This focus allows for true gems to come out, like the trepidations of W’s family or Whitehouse humor such as this example this conversation between Bush and Jay Garner:
On the way out, Bush slapped Garner on the back.
“Hey wanna do Iran”
“Sir, the boys and I talked wand we want to hold out for Cuba. We think the rum and cigars are a little better, and the women are a little prettier”
Bush laughed “You got it, you got Cuba” Pg. 224
Woodward also tries to let the story tell itself as much as possible. The few examples of author commentary usually come refuting statements made by Rumsfield, and only in the form of different interviewees that disagreed. This refrain is a refreshing step back from authors with blatant agendas.
The style can be frustrating at times as this book does not attempt provide a complete picture of the Iraq war. Woodward only talks about key figures such as Nuri al Maliki only through the lenses of those like Condollezza Rice, and key events such as Abu-Gharib or Samarra receive no more than a paragraph of coverage. In the end, the quality of the work on the administration more than outweighs the books shortcomings, and should be on the must read list of anybody looking to further understand the administration or the war in Iraq.
November 1, 2023
Probably the best in the Bush at War series so far.
October 10, 2016
This book can be read in many ways, as a historical novel, a stylized piece on recent history (1999 - 2006) or even as a management case study. Consider the Bush cabinet, made up of hard working, brilliant men and women with stellar records, exceptional work habits who nonetheless failed miserably when put in action.
An inexperienced Bush lacked the confidence to rein in the oversized personalities of Rumsfeld and Cheney, instead he seemed to trust whatever he was told. Powell turned out to be too diffident to intervene in a timely manner and Rice proved ineffective in the NSC with a somewhat better record in the State Department. Bremmer styled himself Viceroy sidelining all the work done by the Garner's reconstruction team till then and proved to be unanswerable to anyone but Bush himself who rarely pressed him in the crucial few months just after Saddam's regime fell.
Rumsfeld provides a classic case study in micromanagement and god disease. Rumsfeld entered as Secretary of Defense with a clear agenda of reforming, streamlining and speeding up the military for the 21st century. He rejected the Powell doctrine of overwhelming force instead opting for a doctrine that minimized the number of troops used. However, in this reformist crusade, he met continual resistance. He attacked this like a bulldozer, trampling over or sidelining dissent and people who could standup to him. As a result, as the Iraqi insurgency grew and Rumsfeld increasingly seemed to lose grip on the reality of the situation (watch The Unknown Known by Errol Morris for this), there was no one who could stop him or even tell him how wrong he was. The voice of the military had been neutered.
We see here the genesis of the tragedy that consumed the nation of Iraq. Since the book stops at 2006, we don't see the effect of Petreus's surge strategy or the rise of ISIS, but Woodward's interview access to many of the key figures does give one an overall feel for the key personalities who played a part in Iraq and what shaped their decisions.
An inexperienced Bush lacked the confidence to rein in the oversized personalities of Rumsfeld and Cheney, instead he seemed to trust whatever he was told. Powell turned out to be too diffident to intervene in a timely manner and Rice proved ineffective in the NSC with a somewhat better record in the State Department. Bremmer styled himself Viceroy sidelining all the work done by the Garner's reconstruction team till then and proved to be unanswerable to anyone but Bush himself who rarely pressed him in the crucial few months just after Saddam's regime fell.
Rumsfeld provides a classic case study in micromanagement and god disease. Rumsfeld entered as Secretary of Defense with a clear agenda of reforming, streamlining and speeding up the military for the 21st century. He rejected the Powell doctrine of overwhelming force instead opting for a doctrine that minimized the number of troops used. However, in this reformist crusade, he met continual resistance. He attacked this like a bulldozer, trampling over or sidelining dissent and people who could standup to him. As a result, as the Iraqi insurgency grew and Rumsfeld increasingly seemed to lose grip on the reality of the situation (watch The Unknown Known by Errol Morris for this), there was no one who could stop him or even tell him how wrong he was. The voice of the military had been neutered.
We see here the genesis of the tragedy that consumed the nation of Iraq. Since the book stops at 2006, we don't see the effect of Petreus's surge strategy or the rise of ISIS, but Woodward's interview access to many of the key figures does give one an overall feel for the key personalities who played a part in Iraq and what shaped their decisions.
November 2, 2007
I guess I should have given it more than two stars, because it functions well as a simple straightforward (somewhat) objective journalistic account of who said what to whom (at least that they later felt comfortable repeating to Bob Woodward) in the White House's decision to go to and continue war in Iraq. However, the bias does show through, sometimes to the right, like when he refers to the Brookings Institute as a "left-wing think tank," and then not even two pages later, refers to the RAND corporation as a "think tank." Later the bias leans in a slightly different direction (Woodward does actually use the word "Fearmongering" in reference to Bush's 2004 campaign) which is not surprising, since the book probably took some years to finish.
I suppose I would rather see Woodward doing the same kind of investigative journalism he did during the '70s, instead of, in passing reference to the events of 9-11, just saying "everyone is intimately familiar with the events of that day," and then moving on, as if there were nothing to discuss, or briefly acknowledging, in listing Kerry's post-election options, that he had the option of challenging "voting irregularites" in Ohio. Nothing more is said. I guess that's Greg Palast's job now.
If you care about really getting to the bottom of Bush's climb to power, do not waste your time with this book. If all you want is what at times amounts to little more than White House gossip, this is the book for you. Just please keep in mind that Woodward's embedded nature within the White House makes it impossible for him to report anything truly damaging, but at the same time still doesn't give him access to the kind of information or conversations that would shed real light on the situation.
I suppose I would rather see Woodward doing the same kind of investigative journalism he did during the '70s, instead of, in passing reference to the events of 9-11, just saying "everyone is intimately familiar with the events of that day," and then moving on, as if there were nothing to discuss, or briefly acknowledging, in listing Kerry's post-election options, that he had the option of challenging "voting irregularites" in Ohio. Nothing more is said. I guess that's Greg Palast's job now.
If you care about really getting to the bottom of Bush's climb to power, do not waste your time with this book. If all you want is what at times amounts to little more than White House gossip, this is the book for you. Just please keep in mind that Woodward's embedded nature within the White House makes it impossible for him to report anything truly damaging, but at the same time still doesn't give him access to the kind of information or conversations that would shed real light on the situation.
October 24, 2008
Woodward continues his excuse-making for Bush here, portraying him as not being fully informed by his underlings. But he also shows Bush to be uninterested in information that does not support his pre-conceived notions. He shows him yet again to be a very incurious person content to be a cheerleader, doling out pablum with no real content. Rumsfeld is shown in all his glory as an evil, Machiavellian inside player, incredible in his ability to do exactly what he pleases despite the overt directives from Bush. Rummy’s fondness for snowflakes is given a full airing. Rumsfeld is a virtual mill of paper that cascades from his office to everyone who reports to him and many who do not. Each piece of paper is a question from Rummy and is unsigned, so he can deny responsibility for it. But every recipient knows the source. Woodward shows the frustration of all who have ever worked for this guy. There is much on the military leaders, both in the field and in the NSC. He clearly spoke with many, many players on this stage, and has their takes of events splayed across the pages of the book.
April 28, 2023
This is a review of the audiobook, not the hardcover. This is the 3rd book in Bob Woodward's series "Bush at War". The focus is primarily on how Iraq was managed after the initial successful toppling of Saddam Hussein. Woodward describes the lack of leadership across agencies: NSC, Defense, State, CIA and how this also leads to a lack of accountability. Condi Rice is described as weak based on interviews, Rumsfeld as both controlling and unwilling to be accountable, Bush as steadfast but not willing to change course or review decisions given a belief that what they were doing was right. Cheney misleads but largely has very little role in Iraq post invasion and the CIA's role is more on execution. The mistakes that were made around disbanding the army and de-Bathification are also highlighted and Bremmer is made the scapegoat as though he made these decisions unilaterally and ran things without Whitehouse consultation. What comes out through the book is lipstick on a pig: a grand vision for democracy and the betterment of the Middle East with a 'free Iraq' but a significantly disfunctional government and delusion and denial at the results and escalating violence escalated through the decisions the United States made, the lack of plans going in and the lack of a coherent strategy and goal once Saddam was no longer in power.
Woodward starts with Bush as Governor of Texas and explains how he chose certain members of his cabinet. He knew Condi Rice early and she informed him on foreign affairs during his campaign: he admitted he didn't know foreign policy. Rumsfeld (Navy, Prev. Chief of Staff, Prev. Sec Defense) impressed Bush although Bush Sr. did not like Rumsfeld. Andrew Card (Prev. Asst. Chief of Staff for Bush Sr) was loyal. After he was elected, Woodward explains trepidation from the army about Rumsfeld and his controlling style and how he built his own group to 'micromanage' the Pentagon. Initially he was upset after daily morning meetings that Colin Powell (with his military relationships) had more intel than he did. Rumsfeld had to change his support staff when he's told that a one star general won't get support from four star generals. He receives personnel recommendations from Stephen Herbits. Herbits recommends Richard Myers for Head of Joint Chiefs given his war experience versus Vern Clark who was a strategic thinker for transformation. Myers never challenges Rumsfeld. Jay Garner was chosen to lead the planning for post Iraq and was described as not understanding politics but worked in earnest. He had proposed leaders from positions in Iraq and Rumsfeld recommended all Defense Department names. The story continues with Garner not gaining enough traction and the recommendation of Bremmer to run the interim government until elections. Bremmer was supported by Herbitz and Dick Armitage and had worked with Kissinger. Woodward digs into the decision to disband the Iraqi army and de-Baathification strategies which ended up putting hundreds of thousands of soldiers on the street without paychecks and ultimately contributed to the insurgency and deteriorating security situation. It was Bremmer's signature but appears he was supported by the Whitehouse. Jay Garner did not agree with this but never fully voices his concern to the President, but he does to Rumsfeld who doesn't raise. Further focus was made on Bush and Cheney mentioning definitive WMD in Iraq in the lead up but transitioning to WMD programs being found as the rationale for toppling Saddam. Interagency problems / not facilitated by Rice and issues between NSC, CIA, Department of Defense and State. Lack of accountability. Lack of strategy. Bush did not curb this disfunction and did not prod with questions. Violence continues to raise month over month with attacks growing every month from a growing insurgency. Bremmer was a micromanager. Bremmer didn't want to turn over control to Iraqis as quickly compared to Rumsfeld, RIce and Bush. Woodward recounts events like Abu Graib, Saddam's sons being killed, Iraqi women visiting Bush at the white house, Faluja, 9-11 Commission Report, John Kerry's close race with Bush in 2004. Saddam, its determined, tried to make it look like he had WMD less to stave off a war and more to keep Kurds and Shittes in line. In June of 2004, Allawi is elected, Bremmer leaves and Negroponte steps in as head of US presence with division of accountability with new General Casey who replaced General Franks. Negroponte gives Casey 2bn out of 3bn budget. Lack of strategy and goals has people starting to talk about body counts: failed metric of Vietnam. NSC does assessments: one stated biggest need from military was for translators. David Kay, who issues report on WMD, says Rice worst national security advisor because didn’t vet Tenet slam dunk. After the 2004 election, Bush cries when Kerry concedes. He proceeds to bring in Alberto Gonazalez for Attn. General, Rice as Secretary of State, keeps Rumsfeld although Card said to remove, keeps Card despite him wanting to resign. Brings in Porter Goss for CIA. Assigns Negroponte to Head National Intelligence with Khalizad to head embassy and US leadership in Iraq. Mosul blows up around this time with significant fighting. Decide to hold January 2005 elections despite violence. Bush gets advice from Chuck Hagel, Henry Kissinger and former Secretaries of State but always resolves to stay the course. Bush Sr. apparently, via Brent Scowcroft was not pleased with Iraq, thought Rice was weak, thought Cheney was off and that Hadley didn't stand up nor did Richard Myers. December election, 70% of Iraqis including Sunnis vote and IMF gives loan and positive outlook. Then in Jan 2006 Shitte shrine bombed and sectarian violence starts again. The book ends with Woodward's comments on Bush that he never grasps the failure of Iraq.
Woodward starts with Bush as Governor of Texas and explains how he chose certain members of his cabinet. He knew Condi Rice early and she informed him on foreign affairs during his campaign: he admitted he didn't know foreign policy. Rumsfeld (Navy, Prev. Chief of Staff, Prev. Sec Defense) impressed Bush although Bush Sr. did not like Rumsfeld. Andrew Card (Prev. Asst. Chief of Staff for Bush Sr) was loyal. After he was elected, Woodward explains trepidation from the army about Rumsfeld and his controlling style and how he built his own group to 'micromanage' the Pentagon. Initially he was upset after daily morning meetings that Colin Powell (with his military relationships) had more intel than he did. Rumsfeld had to change his support staff when he's told that a one star general won't get support from four star generals. He receives personnel recommendations from Stephen Herbits. Herbits recommends Richard Myers for Head of Joint Chiefs given his war experience versus Vern Clark who was a strategic thinker for transformation. Myers never challenges Rumsfeld. Jay Garner was chosen to lead the planning for post Iraq and was described as not understanding politics but worked in earnest. He had proposed leaders from positions in Iraq and Rumsfeld recommended all Defense Department names. The story continues with Garner not gaining enough traction and the recommendation of Bremmer to run the interim government until elections. Bremmer was supported by Herbitz and Dick Armitage and had worked with Kissinger. Woodward digs into the decision to disband the Iraqi army and de-Baathification strategies which ended up putting hundreds of thousands of soldiers on the street without paychecks and ultimately contributed to the insurgency and deteriorating security situation. It was Bremmer's signature but appears he was supported by the Whitehouse. Jay Garner did not agree with this but never fully voices his concern to the President, but he does to Rumsfeld who doesn't raise. Further focus was made on Bush and Cheney mentioning definitive WMD in Iraq in the lead up but transitioning to WMD programs being found as the rationale for toppling Saddam. Interagency problems / not facilitated by Rice and issues between NSC, CIA, Department of Defense and State. Lack of accountability. Lack of strategy. Bush did not curb this disfunction and did not prod with questions. Violence continues to raise month over month with attacks growing every month from a growing insurgency. Bremmer was a micromanager. Bremmer didn't want to turn over control to Iraqis as quickly compared to Rumsfeld, RIce and Bush. Woodward recounts events like Abu Graib, Saddam's sons being killed, Iraqi women visiting Bush at the white house, Faluja, 9-11 Commission Report, John Kerry's close race with Bush in 2004. Saddam, its determined, tried to make it look like he had WMD less to stave off a war and more to keep Kurds and Shittes in line. In June of 2004, Allawi is elected, Bremmer leaves and Negroponte steps in as head of US presence with division of accountability with new General Casey who replaced General Franks. Negroponte gives Casey 2bn out of 3bn budget. Lack of strategy and goals has people starting to talk about body counts: failed metric of Vietnam. NSC does assessments: one stated biggest need from military was for translators. David Kay, who issues report on WMD, says Rice worst national security advisor because didn’t vet Tenet slam dunk. After the 2004 election, Bush cries when Kerry concedes. He proceeds to bring in Alberto Gonazalez for Attn. General, Rice as Secretary of State, keeps Rumsfeld although Card said to remove, keeps Card despite him wanting to resign. Brings in Porter Goss for CIA. Assigns Negroponte to Head National Intelligence with Khalizad to head embassy and US leadership in Iraq. Mosul blows up around this time with significant fighting. Decide to hold January 2005 elections despite violence. Bush gets advice from Chuck Hagel, Henry Kissinger and former Secretaries of State but always resolves to stay the course. Bush Sr. apparently, via Brent Scowcroft was not pleased with Iraq, thought Rice was weak, thought Cheney was off and that Hadley didn't stand up nor did Richard Myers. December election, 70% of Iraqis including Sunnis vote and IMF gives loan and positive outlook. Then in Jan 2006 Shitte shrine bombed and sectarian violence starts again. The book ends with Woodward's comments on Bush that he never grasps the failure of Iraq.
September 3, 2019
Exhaustive indictment of Bush's failure in Iraq
There is a sense in reading this long book that the overall import of the Bush administration's efforts in Iraq are lost in the thicket of the words, lost among the turf wars and the personality clashes, among the intense concentrations on each individual action or speech, each personnel change and the myriad events on the ground. But Woodward's title makes it clear what has happened: the Bush administration through flawed (or lack of) foresight, ignorance and confused execution perpetuated upon the United States and the world one of the worse foreign policy blunders ever by an American president and then wrapped itself in a cocoon of denial.
The text runs 491 pages. It could be shorter. Woodward worked mostly on "background," that is, with the understanding that the information could be used but the source would not be identified by name. President Bush, who had been interviewed four times for Woodward's previous books, did not allow an interview for this book. Woodward's last interview with Bush was in 2003. Cheney also declined to be interviewed. Other officials, mostly notably Rumsfeld spoke on record. Woodward recorded the interviews which accounts for the numerous quotes in the text.
Rumsfeld is the chief villain, omnipresent, cajoling, bullying, denying, obscuring, getting his way, micromanaging, at it 14 hours a day, seven days a week, the ultimate ivory tower bureaucratic drunk with his power and lost in the trees and the weeds.
Condi Rice is off to the side, behind Bush listening, listening, enigmatic, reminding me somehow of Shakespeare's Iago.
Bush is the action guy, the decider, as he likes to think of himself. He glad hands people and needles them, asks about their accent or where they went to school, dreams up nicknames, disparages, rides roughshod and gets people to justify his agenda. And denies, denies, denies, because to Bush to admit error is to give comfort to your enemies.
In the background is Dick Cheney, the puppeteer masterminding the whole disaster. He occasionally comes forward to further some bold-faced lie.
The disconnect between reality and the neocon dream is stunning. All these self-important types in the DOD and the Bush White House running around deciding the fate of millions of people and spending hundreds of billions of dollars appeared as children playing some kind of game unsupervised by adults. Only Powell in the state department seemed to have any sense of history or moral responsibility, and sadly he became just a tool in the process because he could not help but be the good soldier and obey the commander in chief. Woodward quotes Michigan Senator Carl Levin as saying "Powell had the potential to change the course here...He's the only one who had the potential to." Levin apparently believed that the war might have been avoided had Powell threatened to resign in protest. He was a powerful figure at that time and now is ultimately a tragic character.
Also tragic is the behind the scenes part played by Henry Kissinger who occasionally came to the White House to give advice to Bush 43. For inexplicable reasons the president admired him even though Kissinger's policies failed in Vietnam and even though several decades later he still refuses to accept blame for that failure. To him it was a matter of not getting enough support from the American public, from the press and from Congress. He believes if we had maintained our resolve we would have "won" in Vietnam.
"Victory over the insurgency is the only meaningful exit strategy" (p. 408) is Kissinger's position on Iraq, which has become Bush's position. But the only realistic way to win a war against an insurgency (other than through killing most or all of them) is to win the hearts and minds of the people. We haven't done that. It's too vast a project to even contemplate, which is why most authorities are opposed to "nation building." It would take too long and require the kind of soft force that we have yet to develop: peace corps types, translators, educators, media and advertising people, engineers and technicians, economists, bankers, agriculturalists, even sociologists, and the recruitment of a sizeable percentage of the population. It would require a security force several times the size of the military that we presently have in Iraq to protect the soft force. It would require a virtual army of nation-building people versed in nation-building skills. You don't use infantrymen to build nations.
By the time we get to 2005 (the book went to press around July 2006) Condi Rice, now Secretary of State, is presenting a condition for success in Iraq. It consists of "breaking and neutralizing the insurgency, keeping Iraq from becoming a significant base for terrorism, demonstrating some democratic process, and turning the corner fiscally and economically." (p. 417) Ironically, all of these conditions (with the exception of the vague "demonstrating some democratic process") prevailed in Iraq before we invaded!
Woodward makes it clear that Bush is responsible for the war. He wasn't brainwashed by Wolfowitz or Cheney. He had his own reasons to invade: to go one up on his father; to run in 2004 as a wartime president (something his father failed to do and was not reelected); to show his macho; to let the generals play with and test their hi-tech toys; to exhaust the treasury; to keep the oil flowing...etc. Bush is the frat boy at sixty. Clever, shrewd, shallow and untouched by the harm that he does to others.
--Dennis Littrell, author of “The World Is Not as We Think It Is”
There is a sense in reading this long book that the overall import of the Bush administration's efforts in Iraq are lost in the thicket of the words, lost among the turf wars and the personality clashes, among the intense concentrations on each individual action or speech, each personnel change and the myriad events on the ground. But Woodward's title makes it clear what has happened: the Bush administration through flawed (or lack of) foresight, ignorance and confused execution perpetuated upon the United States and the world one of the worse foreign policy blunders ever by an American president and then wrapped itself in a cocoon of denial.
The text runs 491 pages. It could be shorter. Woodward worked mostly on "background," that is, with the understanding that the information could be used but the source would not be identified by name. President Bush, who had been interviewed four times for Woodward's previous books, did not allow an interview for this book. Woodward's last interview with Bush was in 2003. Cheney also declined to be interviewed. Other officials, mostly notably Rumsfeld spoke on record. Woodward recorded the interviews which accounts for the numerous quotes in the text.
Rumsfeld is the chief villain, omnipresent, cajoling, bullying, denying, obscuring, getting his way, micromanaging, at it 14 hours a day, seven days a week, the ultimate ivory tower bureaucratic drunk with his power and lost in the trees and the weeds.
Condi Rice is off to the side, behind Bush listening, listening, enigmatic, reminding me somehow of Shakespeare's Iago.
Bush is the action guy, the decider, as he likes to think of himself. He glad hands people and needles them, asks about their accent or where they went to school, dreams up nicknames, disparages, rides roughshod and gets people to justify his agenda. And denies, denies, denies, because to Bush to admit error is to give comfort to your enemies.
In the background is Dick Cheney, the puppeteer masterminding the whole disaster. He occasionally comes forward to further some bold-faced lie.
The disconnect between reality and the neocon dream is stunning. All these self-important types in the DOD and the Bush White House running around deciding the fate of millions of people and spending hundreds of billions of dollars appeared as children playing some kind of game unsupervised by adults. Only Powell in the state department seemed to have any sense of history or moral responsibility, and sadly he became just a tool in the process because he could not help but be the good soldier and obey the commander in chief. Woodward quotes Michigan Senator Carl Levin as saying "Powell had the potential to change the course here...He's the only one who had the potential to." Levin apparently believed that the war might have been avoided had Powell threatened to resign in protest. He was a powerful figure at that time and now is ultimately a tragic character.
Also tragic is the behind the scenes part played by Henry Kissinger who occasionally came to the White House to give advice to Bush 43. For inexplicable reasons the president admired him even though Kissinger's policies failed in Vietnam and even though several decades later he still refuses to accept blame for that failure. To him it was a matter of not getting enough support from the American public, from the press and from Congress. He believes if we had maintained our resolve we would have "won" in Vietnam.
"Victory over the insurgency is the only meaningful exit strategy" (p. 408) is Kissinger's position on Iraq, which has become Bush's position. But the only realistic way to win a war against an insurgency (other than through killing most or all of them) is to win the hearts and minds of the people. We haven't done that. It's too vast a project to even contemplate, which is why most authorities are opposed to "nation building." It would take too long and require the kind of soft force that we have yet to develop: peace corps types, translators, educators, media and advertising people, engineers and technicians, economists, bankers, agriculturalists, even sociologists, and the recruitment of a sizeable percentage of the population. It would require a security force several times the size of the military that we presently have in Iraq to protect the soft force. It would require a virtual army of nation-building people versed in nation-building skills. You don't use infantrymen to build nations.
By the time we get to 2005 (the book went to press around July 2006) Condi Rice, now Secretary of State, is presenting a condition for success in Iraq. It consists of "breaking and neutralizing the insurgency, keeping Iraq from becoming a significant base for terrorism, demonstrating some democratic process, and turning the corner fiscally and economically." (p. 417) Ironically, all of these conditions (with the exception of the vague "demonstrating some democratic process") prevailed in Iraq before we invaded!
Woodward makes it clear that Bush is responsible for the war. He wasn't brainwashed by Wolfowitz or Cheney. He had his own reasons to invade: to go one up on his father; to run in 2004 as a wartime president (something his father failed to do and was not reelected); to show his macho; to let the generals play with and test their hi-tech toys; to exhaust the treasury; to keep the oil flowing...etc. Bush is the frat boy at sixty. Clever, shrewd, shallow and untouched by the harm that he does to others.
--Dennis Littrell, author of “The World Is Not as We Think It Is”
June 17, 2010
There were four Woodward books focusing on the Iraq War and the Bush Administration, and this is by far the best of the four. (I did read the fourth installment "The War Within" before this one, coincidentally.) The descriptions of Rumsfeld, Rice, Cheney, and Powell are enlightening and in many cases, disturbing. And the overall mind-set, that the Iraq War was a defensive response to 911, among the civilian AND military leaders during the first six years of the new century is revealing and alarming. This might be my favorite Woodward book.
September 6, 2010
Part III of Woodward's 4-part series, Bush At War. The degree to which Bush policies for post war Iraq lacked strategy is astonishing. An incredible example of how bright people, when they don't work together as a team and focus narrowly on their own preconceived notions, can create incredible chaos.
October 2, 2007
Shocking. Depressing. Illuminating.
May 12, 2010
There's a circle of Hell reserved for the Bush administration. That is all.
August 10, 2022
"Victor Hugo is a madman who thinks he is Victor Hugo," as the saying goes, and that means George W. BUSH thinks he is ... President??
"I didn't need his permission," he says to the author, recounting a conversation with Colin POWELL, and the subtext/implication is: You got that right.. He was born to Bush, born to lead, and the whole implication through the whole book is: It's too late to go back now!
When did this get started?? Well, with Washington crossing the Delaware, and a limited number of archetypes that are in everyone's heads:
- Hannibal riding through the mountains on elephants;
- Lincoln's Gettysburg address;
- F.D.R. saying, "The only thing we have to fear is ... fear itself!!!"
- D-Day.
Etc.
Meantime, what you get here are the Keystone KOPS -- "I thought you put the peanut butter in the BACKSEAT!!!" This is a war as run by Moe and CURLY -- "NUMBUTS!!!" Pass blame all around, and pretend to be impressed by somebody else, notably offstage. That's pretty much how it goes.
Here's an example:
"Have you seen this?" he asked.
He showed Hughes a one-page document, an English translation of directive that had been issued by the headquarters of the Mukhabarat, Saddam's intelligence service.
The memo listed 11 things that the Mukhabarat would do "in the event, God forbid, of the fall of our beloved leader." Each local Baath cell, each squad of Fedayeen, and each individual Mukhabarat agent would be responsible for assassinating collaborators, burning the ministry build ings, looting, burning public documents-doing things that would lead to chaos. It said nothing about sectarian violence, nothing about exploit ing the divisions among Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis. It said that it would be up to all the independent agents of the Baath Party to figure out how to raise hell if Saddam's government fell.
Hughes was stunned. He saw that the U.S. and coalition forces were up against a lot more than they had imagined.
In his book, Bremer recalled being shown a similar document, but not for another three months, in late July or early August. Dated January 23, 2003, the Mukhabarat memo Bremer was shown was addressed "To All Offices and Sections," and offered a contingency plan for what to do if the country were invaded. "Burn this office," the memo began, and continued on to describe a strategy of "sabotage and looting" and ordering subordinates to "scatter agents to every town. Destroy electric power stations and water conduits. Infiltrate the mosques, the Shiite holy places."
IOW: They don't plan for things, do we don't have to plan, either! But what happens when they do plan for things ... ?? (This is not dissimilar to every American's problem to admit other countries exist, including Europe -- see Pulp FICTION -- that every kid growing up in the '80s as a teen knew was the case. This is the difference between Gregg ARAKI, who's Asian, and probably had to explain to people he's not Chinese (Jackie CHAN wasn't happy about being offered the part of a Japanese guy in the Burt REYNOLDS star-studded vehicle, Cannonball RUN, but it'd put his face in front of American audiences, so he took it -- still, it took until Rumble in the BRONX), and Seth ROGEN, born ten years later and who gets STONED a lot, who had to assassinate the one tin-pot dictator you really shouldn't do that to, who then attacked Sony™ while Mr. Rogen blamed the fates or nobody telling him because he couldn't think of anything better that day -- OTHER COUNTRIES ARE REAL!!! THEY ARE!!!). You get a mess -- and everybody's shocked.
(As in his Trump book(s), Woodward mentions the Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (McMaster) that was supposed to have shaken the whole world ... about how the military's refusal to pipe up in the face of their "not getting it" civilian overseers led to the quagmire, with McNamara riding roughshod over tough, experienced generals because they let him, the military tendency to keep a "stuff upper lip" coming not the least but in handy. Who's to say it's not nonrequired?)
Like this book ... one of Woodward's finest, and that's saying something. (It only takes a lifetime of experience ... ) Huh.
Watch out ...
"I didn't need his permission," he says to the author, recounting a conversation with Colin POWELL, and the subtext/implication is: You got that right.. He was born to Bush, born to lead, and the whole implication through the whole book is: It's too late to go back now!
When did this get started?? Well, with Washington crossing the Delaware, and a limited number of archetypes that are in everyone's heads:
- Hannibal riding through the mountains on elephants;
- Lincoln's Gettysburg address;
- F.D.R. saying, "The only thing we have to fear is ... fear itself!!!"
- D-Day.
Etc.
Meantime, what you get here are the Keystone KOPS -- "I thought you put the peanut butter in the BACKSEAT!!!" This is a war as run by Moe and CURLY -- "NUMBUTS!!!" Pass blame all around, and pretend to be impressed by somebody else, notably offstage. That's pretty much how it goes.
Here's an example:
"Have you seen this?" he asked.
He showed Hughes a one-page document, an English translation of directive that had been issued by the headquarters of the Mukhabarat, Saddam's intelligence service.
The memo listed 11 things that the Mukhabarat would do "in the event, God forbid, of the fall of our beloved leader." Each local Baath cell, each squad of Fedayeen, and each individual Mukhabarat agent would be responsible for assassinating collaborators, burning the ministry build ings, looting, burning public documents-doing things that would lead to chaos. It said nothing about sectarian violence, nothing about exploit ing the divisions among Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis. It said that it would be up to all the independent agents of the Baath Party to figure out how to raise hell if Saddam's government fell.
Hughes was stunned. He saw that the U.S. and coalition forces were up against a lot more than they had imagined.
In his book, Bremer recalled being shown a similar document, but not for another three months, in late July or early August. Dated January 23, 2003, the Mukhabarat memo Bremer was shown was addressed "To All Offices and Sections," and offered a contingency plan for what to do if the country were invaded. "Burn this office," the memo began, and continued on to describe a strategy of "sabotage and looting" and ordering subordinates to "scatter agents to every town. Destroy electric power stations and water conduits. Infiltrate the mosques, the Shiite holy places."
IOW: They don't plan for things, do we don't have to plan, either! But what happens when they do plan for things ... ?? (This is not dissimilar to every American's problem to admit other countries exist, including Europe -- see Pulp FICTION -- that every kid growing up in the '80s as a teen knew was the case. This is the difference between Gregg ARAKI, who's Asian, and probably had to explain to people he's not Chinese (Jackie CHAN wasn't happy about being offered the part of a Japanese guy in the Burt REYNOLDS star-studded vehicle, Cannonball RUN, but it'd put his face in front of American audiences, so he took it -- still, it took until Rumble in the BRONX), and Seth ROGEN, born ten years later and who gets STONED a lot, who had to assassinate the one tin-pot dictator you really shouldn't do that to, who then attacked Sony™ while Mr. Rogen blamed the fates or nobody telling him because he couldn't think of anything better that day -- OTHER COUNTRIES ARE REAL!!! THEY ARE!!!). You get a mess -- and everybody's shocked.
(As in his Trump book(s), Woodward mentions the Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (McMaster) that was supposed to have shaken the whole world ... about how the military's refusal to pipe up in the face of their "not getting it" civilian overseers led to the quagmire, with McNamara riding roughshod over tough, experienced generals because they let him, the military tendency to keep a "stuff upper lip" coming not the least but in handy. Who's to say it's not nonrequired?)
Like this book ... one of Woodward's finest, and that's saying something. (It only takes a lifetime of experience ... ) Huh.
Watch out ...
August 15, 2023
This wild, whimsical novel follows the misadventures of a wacky presidential administration and its extra wacky war in Iraq. It is the sequel to these two other books which are sober by comparison, “Bush at War” which is about George W. Bush standing at a podium and “Plan of Attack” which is about throngs of George W. Bush and the Bush elite forces attacking bookshop patrons from their wicked hall of mirrors EEK! scary. Woodward’s cast of characters is varied, eccentric, and tremendously funny! Also his plot is ingeniously twisty and convoluted and twisty, like a pretzel! A pretzel! YOU ARE RIGHT IN THE WHITE HOUSE ON THE FLOOR MAKING DECISIONS ON THE FLOOR! Interviews with cats like Donald Rumsfeld, who using his BIG WASHINGTON DICK repeatedly shocks BWood like a stripper at the Vatican or some shit, offer ample oppportunity for the comedy of errors weaved by Fred “Chuckles” Woodward, who one time found out about that thing. My favorite part is when the celebrated Washington Post reproter promises Vice President Don “Iron Wand” Cheney that he won’t print his comments in the paper he works for (which shall remain anonymous by reason of legality and stuff) AND HE WILL SAVE THEM FOR BESTSELLING BOOK! And check this: When you pick the book up (assuming you don’t drop it – IT’S HEAVY) and the author is prattling on and on with this history of Middle Earth claptrap, don’t worry! Because it all gets pretty entertaining soon enough! Stick with this one; you won’t regret it! Also read the endnotes they are a riot.
As a writer, Woodward is probably the coldest, most detached narrator of anything in the universe; and have you heard him talk? I hope to god he doesn’t read his own audiobooks. But after the WAAY overlong recap of his last two books, this becomes a really good and incisive and even entertaining book. I know by now it’s pretty old but only one of the libraries in the system ordered a copy and it took ten million years for the waiting list to reach me. But let’s speak to the real experts:
My review on Bush at War, Part 3, June 5, 2007
A Kid’s Review
This book was okay. The book was not that great, only because i really do not like president Bush Slaughter as our president. I really do not agree with the whole war thing going on in Iraq. The book was pretty percise with it’s points, and pretty much right no target with its ideas.
PS: THere should be State of Denial video game!
As a writer, Woodward is probably the coldest, most detached narrator of anything in the universe; and have you heard him talk? I hope to god he doesn’t read his own audiobooks. But after the WAAY overlong recap of his last two books, this becomes a really good and incisive and even entertaining book. I know by now it’s pretty old but only one of the libraries in the system ordered a copy and it took ten million years for the waiting list to reach me. But let’s speak to the real experts:
My review on Bush at War, Part 3, June 5, 2007
A Kid’s Review
This book was okay. The book was not that great, only because i really do not like president Bush Slaughter as our president. I really do not agree with the whole war thing going on in Iraq. The book was pretty percise with it’s points, and pretty much right no target with its ideas.
PS: THere should be State of Denial video game!
January 30, 2020
This final book of his trilogy of Bush at War details the disastrous invasion of Iraq which at time of this review, continues to drag the US in the quagmire that is nation building in Iraq. Painted a dysfunctional Bush Admin where too much politics is played within the national security apparatus and no one to push back on Rumsfeld. 2 key points in light of the Trump Admin -- the Bush II Admin had the best foreign policy and military braintrust to count on and still failed -- what chance the idiots pretending to be the brains of the Trump Admin? Second, even for the Bush Admin, much of Year 3 and 4 of his first term was focused on re-election, what chance that any meaningful policies can come out of any US Admin particularly one as divisive as this current one that everything is done to maximise chance of re-election? Read Killing of Sulaimen of Iran, Middle East plan etc etc
January 30, 2019
State of Denial by Bob Woodward is when the disaster that was the Iraq War becomes apparent. Bush at War was vital for understanding the initial war on terror, and Plan of Attack was like watching a slow-moving train-wreck (or maybe watching the Titanic heading out of port and into the North Atlantic). State of Denial is the payoff, and a terrible one at that. It is less instrumental than the prior two, but it remains important to possessing a view of the Iraq War that is not prone to caricature. I highly recommend it, even if the narrative falls into backbiting and recrimination as the players who would have been eager to father success, now fight to ensure that defeat is an orphan.
89/100
89/100
November 16, 2020
White House or Animal House?
Written by Mandi Chestler on September 18th, 2007
Book Rating: 4/5
Bob Woodward's 3rd installment in the Bush at War series provides a deeply disturbing picture of George the Second's disfunctional administration. These guys should be leading toga parties, not the "free world." Woodward's somewhat gossipy look at the personalities, behaviors and decisions of the worst president and White House administration in the history of the United States is entertaining, yet distressing. After listening to this audio book, one thought came to mind: to paraphrase a famous quote from National Lampoon's Animal House, "we screwed up, we trusted these clowns!"
March 9, 2025
It is interesting to sometimes read a book about current event well after the book is published. State of Denial is about the Iraq War, and I read it about 20 years after it was published. I'm struck by how consistently the US government got it wrong. We were wrong about the existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); we always underestimated what it was going to take to quell the uprising following the military victory; and President Bush and most of his senior people never developed a coherent strategy. Almost no one in this book comes off well, except David Kay, the WMD expert and Philip Zelikow, a friend and counselor to Condoleezza Rice.
January 3, 2022
The final book closed the controversy on the Iraq War. Woodward stated the events of who were involved in the decision-making and advices, who had active roles, what went wrong and what happened. The surprise in the book which grasped the interest was the involvement of Henry Kissinger. It was answered in the later part of what were his insights about this war. WMD was never found but in defense, Bush said Saddam was close in creating one. Was the act justified against a tyrrant or was there an ulterior motive much greater to what was claimed? You decide.
June 19, 2020
Woodward gets inside access but like mist of what I have read by him it reads like a book by committee or dictation since so much wirk is usually done by assistants and researchers. And also because so much of his work (including this one) is written about very current events, many still on going, there isn't a finality to the ending.
But if you know that going in and keep it in mind there's usually plenty to hold your interest.
But if you know that going in and keep it in mind there's usually plenty to hold your interest.
June 23, 2016
In terms of the groundwork that went into this book it was excellent. Woodward did some serious research and talked to officials from every level it seems. As always he is an excellent reporter. But, he is a very poor analyst. As a reporter he has the luxury of not needing to offer an alternative. This book is filled with side critiques and digs but the combination of them is a little mystifying. For example, he spends much of the book making oblique criticisms of Bush for not being involved enough and not changing things in the bureaucracy. Then when Bush is involved, Woodward is quick to criticize him for being involved, saying disparagingly that Bush was playing General or playing case officer.
Woodward's treatment of Rumsfeld is similarly puzzling. We hear that such and such General didn't like Rumsfeld, or Rumsfeld shot down this good idea that would have helped. But, Woodward never talks about what Rumsfeld was actually doing or fighting for in the bureaucracy, just that a lot of people disagreed with him. Woodward badly made me want to read Rumsfeld's book just so I have an alternative account. I don't think that Woodward understands Rumsfeld either really. I think he dislikes him and is suspicious of him but he never shows even a glimmer of what Rumsfeld's real motivations are. If I were to go purely by this book, piecing together Woodward's criticisms than Rumsfeld was deliberately sabotaging the Iraq war effort. I think even Rumsfeld's most virulent critics wouldn't say that.
That's the thing though with Woodward's books (and most reporting for that matter), he doesn't NEED to have a cohesive alternative to anything. He just makes disconnected jabs and criticisms that when taken together amount to a confusing mess theoretically.
Another glaring example is his account of the disagreements about withdrawing troops. Woodward tells us about the courageous Congressman from Pennsylvania (Murtha I think) who proposes a bill to withdraw troops. When the bill is defeated Woodward praises Murtha effusively for being so connected and knowing what's right. In fact anytime any of the central players proposes withdrawing in any form, they are seen as a ray of hope. So, is Woodward saying we should just withdraw immediately? A little at a time? Train and then leave? Its not very clear. Just that Bush inc. are wrong.
For Woodward it comes down to the following assumptions, and he is emblematic of how most people in the press handled the Iraq war:
-The Iraq war was a mistake and should not have happened because no weapons of mass destruction were found after the invasion.
-The Bush administration should not hope for success or be publicly optimistic
I know many had these views and for understandable reasons but its frustrating to me to not hear the other side. Having read Pres. Bush's and Vice Pres. Cheney's books I do have some idea about how they would respond. I think their explanations have merit but Woodward gives them little credence. Bush would say that the Commander in Chief had to show resolve for the sake of the troops and for the allies. Vice Pres. Cheney would say that 9/11 was a call for a war broader than Afghanistan. A war against networks of terror. Controversial, yes but worth discussion other than just a derisive acknowledgment.
You know reflecting on it, in some ways Iraq draws those same Vietnam lines that are familiar even to those of us who didn't live through it. Some Americans see the horrendous cost of war and just despair. Woodward is one of those. His despair and his frustration are inarticulate though. Others think we can succeed and offer various alternatives--All while heroic people are dying. I lean more towards the "various alternatives" side but I relate a lot to the despair. War is terrible, even just to those on the sidelines not to mention those brave and good souls who put themselves in harm's way for a higher cause.
Woodward's books demonstrate to me how complex the Iraq war was-- How many levels of coordination, policy and assumptions there were at work. He also makes me pretty pessimistic about the vast bureaucracies that make up the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. The coordination between the State Dept. and the Defense Department seems an eternal problem regardless of who is running the show. The turf wars, complex chains of command, and risk averse nature of bureaucracies are extremely difficult to navigate. The processes of creating and implementing policy are both cumbersome and disconnected from one another. The Joint Chiefs relationship with the Secretary of State is poorly defined and seems almost programmed to cause tension. This was very interesting to read about.
Overall well worth a read for someone ignorant of the Iraq war (as I am). A great general guide to what happens. Definitely more to read and lots of perspectives to consider. For example just after this book I would like to read more about Jay Garner's and Jerry Bremer's time as heads of state in Iraq, General Franks' time as CENTCOM commander and definitely Rumsfeld who seems to be a major center of gravity in the whole thing but who Woodward doesn't seem to understand. I think we'll be puzzling over the Iraq war for decades to come. This has been a helpful and informative account.
Woodward's treatment of Rumsfeld is similarly puzzling. We hear that such and such General didn't like Rumsfeld, or Rumsfeld shot down this good idea that would have helped. But, Woodward never talks about what Rumsfeld was actually doing or fighting for in the bureaucracy, just that a lot of people disagreed with him. Woodward badly made me want to read Rumsfeld's book just so I have an alternative account. I don't think that Woodward understands Rumsfeld either really. I think he dislikes him and is suspicious of him but he never shows even a glimmer of what Rumsfeld's real motivations are. If I were to go purely by this book, piecing together Woodward's criticisms than Rumsfeld was deliberately sabotaging the Iraq war effort. I think even Rumsfeld's most virulent critics wouldn't say that.
That's the thing though with Woodward's books (and most reporting for that matter), he doesn't NEED to have a cohesive alternative to anything. He just makes disconnected jabs and criticisms that when taken together amount to a confusing mess theoretically.
Another glaring example is his account of the disagreements about withdrawing troops. Woodward tells us about the courageous Congressman from Pennsylvania (Murtha I think) who proposes a bill to withdraw troops. When the bill is defeated Woodward praises Murtha effusively for being so connected and knowing what's right. In fact anytime any of the central players proposes withdrawing in any form, they are seen as a ray of hope. So, is Woodward saying we should just withdraw immediately? A little at a time? Train and then leave? Its not very clear. Just that Bush inc. are wrong.
For Woodward it comes down to the following assumptions, and he is emblematic of how most people in the press handled the Iraq war:
-The Iraq war was a mistake and should not have happened because no weapons of mass destruction were found after the invasion.
-The Bush administration should not hope for success or be publicly optimistic
I know many had these views and for understandable reasons but its frustrating to me to not hear the other side. Having read Pres. Bush's and Vice Pres. Cheney's books I do have some idea about how they would respond. I think their explanations have merit but Woodward gives them little credence. Bush would say that the Commander in Chief had to show resolve for the sake of the troops and for the allies. Vice Pres. Cheney would say that 9/11 was a call for a war broader than Afghanistan. A war against networks of terror. Controversial, yes but worth discussion other than just a derisive acknowledgment.
You know reflecting on it, in some ways Iraq draws those same Vietnam lines that are familiar even to those of us who didn't live through it. Some Americans see the horrendous cost of war and just despair. Woodward is one of those. His despair and his frustration are inarticulate though. Others think we can succeed and offer various alternatives--All while heroic people are dying. I lean more towards the "various alternatives" side but I relate a lot to the despair. War is terrible, even just to those on the sidelines not to mention those brave and good souls who put themselves in harm's way for a higher cause.
Woodward's books demonstrate to me how complex the Iraq war was-- How many levels of coordination, policy and assumptions there were at work. He also makes me pretty pessimistic about the vast bureaucracies that make up the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. The coordination between the State Dept. and the Defense Department seems an eternal problem regardless of who is running the show. The turf wars, complex chains of command, and risk averse nature of bureaucracies are extremely difficult to navigate. The processes of creating and implementing policy are both cumbersome and disconnected from one another. The Joint Chiefs relationship with the Secretary of State is poorly defined and seems almost programmed to cause tension. This was very interesting to read about.
Overall well worth a read for someone ignorant of the Iraq war (as I am). A great general guide to what happens. Definitely more to read and lots of perspectives to consider. For example just after this book I would like to read more about Jay Garner's and Jerry Bremer's time as heads of state in Iraq, General Franks' time as CENTCOM commander and definitely Rumsfeld who seems to be a major center of gravity in the whole thing but who Woodward doesn't seem to understand. I think we'll be puzzling over the Iraq war for decades to come. This has been a helpful and informative account.
December 19, 2017
Tediosa narración sobre los entresijos de la ocupación iraquí que no lleva a ninguna conclusión palpable. Quiere ser demasiado condescendiente con la administración Bush como para terminar de apuntar a los responsables. Promete demasiado y se desinfla.
January 18, 2019
The final chapter in the Bush at War series for Woodward. It ends the way it began, showing how the few who were in charge had no idea what they were doing, and refusing to accept it as fact. If only egos could be tamed.
August 7, 2019
If true, it is a confirmation of the evilness of Rumsfeld, the criminal naivety of Bremer and the lack of leadership on Bush's part, turning Iraq into the debacle it became. Having watched it unfold while it happened, reading the gritty details is especially painful.
May 26, 2021
Not Woodward's best work, but solid, nonetheless...the evidence he provides draws readers to the logic conclusion that many in the public held at that time and today, which remains that we went to war in Iraq under false pretenses, and got thousands of innocents killed.
July 13, 2022
Saddam Hussein was a vile monster. The Iraqi population was oppressed. But freedom can mean different things in different contexts and Iraq isn't Washington. Yet out of the chaos in DC came chaos in Baghdad.
March 3, 2024
Depressing read
Next to the Vietnam War, the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath were the most serious foreign policy mistakes in our nation's history. How some of those mentioned in this book can sleep at night is beyond me.
Next to the Vietnam War, the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath were the most serious foreign policy mistakes in our nation's history. How some of those mentioned in this book can sleep at night is beyond me.
March 8, 2020
Very good. Very detailed. Learned why I never liked Donald Rumsfeld!!
March 15, 2022
Difficult to follow because of so many people referred to throughout the book. Informative and gives a good historical account of how incompetent Donald Rumsfeld was.
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