Alongside Saint Thomas Aquinas, the thought of Saint Augustine stands as one of the central fountainheads of not only theology but Western social and political theory. In the twentieth century especially, Augustine has been pivotal to the development of modern and contemporary political and social construction. Schools of Augustinianism proliferated, especially in French, German, and English, and debated critical questions around the relationship of the church and state, war, justice, ethics, virtue, and the life of citizenship, interpreted through a lens provided by Augustine. Political Augustinianism examines these modern political readings of Augustine, providing an extensive account of the pivotal French, British, and American strands of interpretation. Fr. Michael J. S. Bruno guides the reader through these modern strands of interpretation, examines their historical, theological, and socio-political context, and discusses the hermeneutical underpinnings of the modern discussion of Augustines social and political thought.
A bit dense but very informative and enjoyable to read. I would recommend you have some background in St. Augustine’s thought before reading, as I myself had trouble interpreting some of the passages. Highly recommend!
Political Augustinianism is a remarkably helpful summary of the most important and influential interpretations of Augustine's political thought. Michael Bruno canvasses a wide array of twentieth- and twenty-first-century scholars, from Gustave Combès and Henri-Xavier Arquillière to Robert Dodaro and Eric Gregory, to identify hermeneutical trends, conflicts, contradictions, and conclusions in the rich field of political Augustinian studies. Given Bruno’s learned discussion of dozens of commentators, Political Augustinianism is equally helpful to the novice in search of a primer and the seasoned scholar who needs a refresher on one or several of the thinkers Bruno discusses. As such, Political Augustinianism is a massive achievement.
Whereas Bruno summarizes the distinctive interpretations of various commentators in the first four chapters of Political Augustinianism, he pivots to a meta-interpretive analysis in the final chapter. Crucially, Bruno observes that while some interpreters strive to understand what Augustine actually meant in his particular historical and theological context, others seek to determine the truth of his claims vis-a-vis contemporary social and political experience. Bruno notes that, in reality, these hermeneutical trends are necessarily interlinked: “How one interprets Augustine’s writings will obviously influence and determine the subsequent application of his thought” (226). Nevertheless, this distinction is helpful insofar as most interpreters will favor one hermeneutical trend over the other. Ultimately, Bruno insists that “from a theological perspective, the interpretation of Augustine’s corpus necessarily precedes and lays the foundation for the subsequent application of principles drawn from his work in order to answer modern questions” (227). Contemporary Augustinian ethicists and political theorists would thereby do well to attend to the particularities of historical theological interpretations of Augustine.
In another helpful distinction, Bruno identifies a pessimistic and an optimistic hermeneutical disposition in the Augustinian scholars under review. The pessimists, Bruno explains, understand Augustine to reject the function of the state in its classical ideal. The state cannot, on this interpretation, establish the conditions necessary for the individual to attain their final end in God. The most pessimistic pessimists even maintain that, for Augustine, Christianity cannot have much of a positive impact on public life. The optimists, on the other hand, identify in Augustine a more robust relationship between the life of the Church and the broader political culture. While it is clear, as R. A. Markus has shown, that Augustine rejected the Christian triumphalism of Constantinianism, he may not have held such a low view of the state as the pessimists would have us believe. For Bruno, the pessimistic strand of interpretation corresponds more closely with Augustine’s own views. “Augustine’s pessimism towards political structures is consistent with his anthropology, as the sinfulness of the human condition is necessarily reflected in the human community, and is only remedied by the supernatural order of grace” (235). Nevertheless, he also states that “Augustine cannot be called purely a pessimist on the political and social realm because of the continual prospect of conversion and the social benefit brought about by the practice of Christian virtue. . . . While Augustine’s vision is certainly marked by a strong pessimism, it is not and cannot be completely pessimistic precisely because of the prospect of grace’s work within the human soul” (237).
Bruno offers here a balanced assessment with which it is hard to take issue. Readers of Augustine’s political thought will know that it is immensely difficult to systematize his non-systematic theology of politics, scattered across dozens of letters, sermons, and treatises. Still, I wonder if Bruno sides a bit too closely with the pessimists. It is possible to preserve Augustine’s eschatological vision, which Bruno appropriately insists one must, and maintain that the Bishop of Hippo understood the Church to play a robust role in the transformation of the world in cooperation with grace. While the ultimate horizon of Augustine’s political thought was certainly the transcendent city of God at the end of time, his theology of politics still bears upon the necessary goods of earthly political life in several salient ways relevant to our troubled times.