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Taking Back Control?: States and State Systems After Globalism
Taking back control? States and state systems after globalization
The era of hyperglobalization once hailed as the 'end of history' was characterised by boundless capitalist expansion. The neoliberal revolution gave rise to a politics of scale aimed at the centralization and unification of states and state the replacement of national with global governance or, in Europe, of the nation-state with a supranational superstate, the European Union.
The 'New World Order' proclaimed by the United States in the wake of the Soviet collapse proved to be ungovernable by democratic means. Instead, it was ruled through a combination of technocracy and mercatocracy, failing spectacularly to provide for political stability, social legitimacy and international peace. Marked by a series of economic and institutional crises, hyperglobalization gave rise to various kinds of political countermovements that rebelled against and ultimately stopped the upward transfer of state authority in its tracks.
This book analyses the ongoing tug-of-war between the forces of globalism and democracy, of centralization and decentralization, and unification and differentiation of states and state systems, and how they are tied to the advance of global capitalism and the prospects for its social and democratic regulation.
Exploring the possibility for states and the societies they govern to take back control over their collective fate, the book is an attempt at a renewed theory of the state in political economy. Inspired by the work of Karl Polanyi and John Maynard Keynes, it discusses the potential outlines of a state system allowing for democratic governance within and peaceful cooperation between sovereign nation-states.
The era of hyperglobalization once hailed as the 'end of history' was characterised by boundless capitalist expansion. The neoliberal revolution gave rise to a politics of scale aimed at the centralization and unification of states and state the replacement of national with global governance or, in Europe, of the nation-state with a supranational superstate, the European Union.
The 'New World Order' proclaimed by the United States in the wake of the Soviet collapse proved to be ungovernable by democratic means. Instead, it was ruled through a combination of technocracy and mercatocracy, failing spectacularly to provide for political stability, social legitimacy and international peace. Marked by a series of economic and institutional crises, hyperglobalization gave rise to various kinds of political countermovements that rebelled against and ultimately stopped the upward transfer of state authority in its tracks.
This book analyses the ongoing tug-of-war between the forces of globalism and democracy, of centralization and decentralization, and unification and differentiation of states and state systems, and how they are tied to the advance of global capitalism and the prospects for its social and democratic regulation.
Exploring the possibility for states and the societies they govern to take back control over their collective fate, the book is an attempt at a renewed theory of the state in political economy. Inspired by the work of Karl Polanyi and John Maynard Keynes, it discusses the potential outlines of a state system allowing for democratic governance within and peaceful cooperation between sovereign nation-states.
547 pages, Kindle Edition
Published November 19, 2024
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August 29, 2025
Anyone remember ‘The New World Order’? I recall that phrase cropping up everywhere in the early 1990s. It came out of George Bush senior’s administration around the time of the collapse of the Soviet empire and the lead-up to the first Gulf War. This was also the time of Francis Fukuyama’s epochal ‘The End of History and the Last Man’, which posited that history, understood as the evolution of ideological systems, had reached its culmination in Western liberal democracy combined with market economics.
That era marked the high-point of what German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck, in this masterful volume, describes as hyper-globalisation, an era of boundless capitalist expansion and the global dominance of neoliberalism as an ideology. The argument was that the nation state would give way to global ‘governance’ and a ‘liberal rules-based international order’. In reality, writes Streeck, this was an expression of US hegemony in a what had suddenly become a unipolar world. Scale was everything. Technocracy, the rule by elites, replaced democracy and societies were to be embedded in global economic ‘realities’ rather than economies being embedded in societies and subject to local laws..
The problem was that this ‘new world order’, imposed from above, proved to be ungovernable and undemocratic. The ideology reached its end-point with the global financial crisis of 2008. Technocracy and ‘meritocracy’ as a justification for inequality robbed countries of their political stability and social legitimacy. People were disenfranchised by excessively mobile capital, which robbed governments of their discretion to rule in the interests of their populations.
Since that implosion in 2008, Streeck writes, the world has been in a stalemate. The dominant operating system collapsed. Globalisation and neoliberalism have failed, but there is nothing to replace them. The Brexit referendum and the rise of Trump and authoritarian ‘strong men’ are inevitable symptoms of the system’s breakdown. As for the 2020 pandemic, this just reinforced the illusion about the efficiency of globalisation and the danger of relying on ‘just-in-time’ supply chains .
“The politics of the New World Order undermined the historical compromise between capitalism and democracy by setting in motion a deep transformation of democratic institutions and practices,” Streeck writes. “This excluded growing sections of the population of capitalist democracies from the democratic class struggle by removing the capitalist economy from the reach of democratic politics.”
“But the attempt to merge the world into an all-encompassing, unified political economy governed by universal norms and values rather than by local politics stirred up powerful popular resistance that proved invincible, in spite of the application in various parts of the globe of inordinate military force.”
As suggested by the title of the book, ‘Taking Back Control? States and State Systems After Globalism’, Streeck argues not for a more socialist form of globalism but for deglobalised systems of production, marked by shorter supply chains and smaller, more governable states. The rejection of globalisation does not mean the end of internationalism but is a recognition of the realities of global diversity and the need for cooperation amid difference, not forcing US exceptionalism on the rest of us.
Throughout the book, Streeck draws on the influential ideas of two of the greatest 20th century thinkers on political economy - the Englishman John Maynard Keynes and the Austro-Hungarian intellectual Karl Polanyi, whose classic book ‘The Great Transformation’ was published the same year as his ideological opposite Friedrich Hayek’s ‘The Road to Serfdom’. It was Polanyi who foresaw the likely failures of wide-eyed universalism after WWII and instead pleaded for small scale regionalism, marked by peaceful coexistence of diverse regimes.
As we clearly move from a unipolar to a multipolar world (despite the sabre rattling against China by a failed US state under Trump), it is this vision of cooperation within revived nation states shorn of imperialist intentions that I find more persuasive.
It should be clear to anyone at this point that neoliberalism and the era of unfettered capitalism has come an end. Countries like Australia must reclaim their own sovereignty and stop looking to a global hegemon for security against imagined enemies. Capitalism cannot exist for long without democracy.
That era marked the high-point of what German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck, in this masterful volume, describes as hyper-globalisation, an era of boundless capitalist expansion and the global dominance of neoliberalism as an ideology. The argument was that the nation state would give way to global ‘governance’ and a ‘liberal rules-based international order’. In reality, writes Streeck, this was an expression of US hegemony in a what had suddenly become a unipolar world. Scale was everything. Technocracy, the rule by elites, replaced democracy and societies were to be embedded in global economic ‘realities’ rather than economies being embedded in societies and subject to local laws..
The problem was that this ‘new world order’, imposed from above, proved to be ungovernable and undemocratic. The ideology reached its end-point with the global financial crisis of 2008. Technocracy and ‘meritocracy’ as a justification for inequality robbed countries of their political stability and social legitimacy. People were disenfranchised by excessively mobile capital, which robbed governments of their discretion to rule in the interests of their populations.
Since that implosion in 2008, Streeck writes, the world has been in a stalemate. The dominant operating system collapsed. Globalisation and neoliberalism have failed, but there is nothing to replace them. The Brexit referendum and the rise of Trump and authoritarian ‘strong men’ are inevitable symptoms of the system’s breakdown. As for the 2020 pandemic, this just reinforced the illusion about the efficiency of globalisation and the danger of relying on ‘just-in-time’ supply chains .
“The politics of the New World Order undermined the historical compromise between capitalism and democracy by setting in motion a deep transformation of democratic institutions and practices,” Streeck writes. “This excluded growing sections of the population of capitalist democracies from the democratic class struggle by removing the capitalist economy from the reach of democratic politics.”
“But the attempt to merge the world into an all-encompassing, unified political economy governed by universal norms and values rather than by local politics stirred up powerful popular resistance that proved invincible, in spite of the application in various parts of the globe of inordinate military force.”
As suggested by the title of the book, ‘Taking Back Control? States and State Systems After Globalism’, Streeck argues not for a more socialist form of globalism but for deglobalised systems of production, marked by shorter supply chains and smaller, more governable states. The rejection of globalisation does not mean the end of internationalism but is a recognition of the realities of global diversity and the need for cooperation amid difference, not forcing US exceptionalism on the rest of us.
Throughout the book, Streeck draws on the influential ideas of two of the greatest 20th century thinkers on political economy - the Englishman John Maynard Keynes and the Austro-Hungarian intellectual Karl Polanyi, whose classic book ‘The Great Transformation’ was published the same year as his ideological opposite Friedrich Hayek’s ‘The Road to Serfdom’. It was Polanyi who foresaw the likely failures of wide-eyed universalism after WWII and instead pleaded for small scale regionalism, marked by peaceful coexistence of diverse regimes.
As we clearly move from a unipolar to a multipolar world (despite the sabre rattling against China by a failed US state under Trump), it is this vision of cooperation within revived nation states shorn of imperialist intentions that I find more persuasive.
It should be clear to anyone at this point that neoliberalism and the era of unfettered capitalism has come an end. Countries like Australia must reclaim their own sovereignty and stop looking to a global hegemon for security against imagined enemies. Capitalism cannot exist for long without democracy.
February 1, 2026
I am quite perplexed by this book. It is impressive how much I agree with the thought process of this beautiful volume, but at the same time, I arrive at a completely different conclusion. The reason for my skepticism relies upon the way the author treats his subjects. While I agree with the reasons why a neoliberal hyper-globalism cannot exist or, better put, cannot sustain itself in our world as it is (and for the better), and while I find fascinating this anti-correlation between globalism and democracy, because yes, you did convince me that it is impossible to have globalism within the mesh of democracy; at the same time, I found all the premises and the beautiful digressions just a tool to justify his extremist views regarding not only neoliberalism but the European Union too. The problem for me is that the narrative is hardly appropriate to suggest any wrongdoing of the institution per se; at best, it can only express the manipulative form of the writer’s narration.
1. There is not a single positive thing expressed by this work regarding the EU. This already finds me in quite a state of disbelief because, as someone may say, even the worst criminal has done something good. For Wolfgang, this doesn't look like the case.
2. While the author has no problem in pointing out all the reasons why the Union will fall and has to fall, he indulges himself too much in his own take of an European cooperative, confederated nation-state relationship without even pointing out the hurdles that sustaining a system like this post-neoliberalism and globalism will have to endure. The only challenges he poses are about the difficulty of the mission to achieve this framework, not a critique of his own take.
3. While I do understand that an author is not obliged by anyone to have an antithesis to his own work, I do appreciate some intellectual honesty to at least show the reader that he is aware of the limits or objections to his view.
4. While I do understand his point regarding the reasons why the EU was a mistake and why it won't work, it perplexes me that the logical conclusion for him is not to take this valid criticism and reshape or improve the existing model, but instead to completely overhaul the structure, getting rid of it (with the obvious implications it will cause) and then reconstructing it completely from zero. This doesn't look right to me. Because while the writer has no problem in showing how neoliberalism is not the only path but that we can in fact do an inverse process to a nation-state system, he also points out each step the Union is taking to be more technocratic and less democratic (like it's the only direction possible), without even questioning the possibility of an inversion of the process within the Brussels institutions, one where the EU has the opportunity to become more democratic. But for the author, it looks like that is not possible. Only destruction is the viable solution.
5. It also puzzles me the way the author chooses to describe the EU based on the narrative that he is trying to give. Sometimes the organization is just a "Germanic Empire" through which Berlin expresses its power, sometimes it's a multifaceted entity used by national politics to impose what's best for them, and some other times the EU is just a technocratic machine for neoliberal independence from democratic power. While I can imagine how an artificial narration over this would look coherent, I do have to say that, at least from my point of view, there is no cohesion in his vision of what the EU truly is, if not just a noun upon which to unleash his hate toward the institution.
6. While he admits some problems to the U.S. federal system, which can (I guess now) be considered democratic, for the author, a federalized EU won't be as democratic (or even worse), he claims it won't even happen because the U.S. (in comparison) is united at least by language after a unification made in blood. Not only would I even dare to say that before recent legal debates, there was no official language of the U.S., at least de jure and that pretty much any nation-state was "forged" by blood, but his reasons why the EU can or cannot be federalized are arbitrary. There is no reason why a nation has to identify simply by its language nor that an unification through blood is the only way to create a national identity. In fact, it won't be wrong to consider a possible nation based solely by its history or culture (which for sure in Europe are closer to each other than any other country outside the continent). Beside that, even if there is not yet a European sentiment, this doesn't mean that it cannot exist. If the European polycentric communitarian system should work on the basis of mutual cooperation, it will also need a common point of view or even common objectives, something hard to achieve without some shared sentiment. Also the writer indirectly express how it is not possible, based on the fact that yet, no European sentiment has been achieved, to have a federal Europe. But is not necessary to have a national sentiment before the state is even born. It's infamous the Italian saying: "We made Italy, now we have to make Italians." If perhaps we agree on a nation-state system, we should also agree on the arbitrary state of national identity and its construction.
7. Going back to the problems of a system like the one the author proposes, while he explains why our society today is doomed. He doesn't spend a single moment to express how, in fact, a multicentric European system could deal with the superpowers of the post-neoliberal age. The author doesn't even argue what kind of political power a middle state can have over the imperialistic interests of any other superpower. He does try to explain how his system would face global problems like climate change. But, even if he points out correlation between globalism and the increase of CO2, it's also important to understand that as much globalism needs an international order to express its neoliberalism, the same can be said for the opposite. How can we deal with global problems when a country that doesn't cooperate? How can we do it in a coherent way without any centrality or conformation to some universal standard if multilateral agreement can't have some power or authority over a sovereign nation? Wolfgang's system doesn't answer that, but instead it deviates from it. In fact all his analysis over what a polycentric system can do for global problems, can be expressed (and I also believe, achieved) in the same way to our society today without a need for small-statism, but at best with less globalism. The problem for me is that while he proved (at least to me) that globalization ≠ democratization and that globalization = global problems, this doesn't mean that we can't achieve less globalization with a redesign of the existing system. With this, I'm not saying that a federalized EU would be the solution, but that if we have to seriously take into consideration the author's suggestion for an alternative approach, then it should only be right to talk about those kind of problems.
Why then give 3 stars if I do have so many complaints about this book?
The reason lies in the quality of the dissertation being made. While all my objections still hold true, his analysis of the neoliberal system post-Cold War, its intrinsic problems, and the richness of his analysis of an alternative solution of the EU, as well as the plentiful critiques of it, are still very valid. It would be a disservice not reading one of the most critical texts on globalization and the EU institution without taking it seriously, apart from the problems I've mentioned.
1. There is not a single positive thing expressed by this work regarding the EU. This already finds me in quite a state of disbelief because, as someone may say, even the worst criminal has done something good. For Wolfgang, this doesn't look like the case.
2. While the author has no problem in pointing out all the reasons why the Union will fall and has to fall, he indulges himself too much in his own take of an European cooperative, confederated nation-state relationship without even pointing out the hurdles that sustaining a system like this post-neoliberalism and globalism will have to endure. The only challenges he poses are about the difficulty of the mission to achieve this framework, not a critique of his own take.
3. While I do understand that an author is not obliged by anyone to have an antithesis to his own work, I do appreciate some intellectual honesty to at least show the reader that he is aware of the limits or objections to his view.
4. While I do understand his point regarding the reasons why the EU was a mistake and why it won't work, it perplexes me that the logical conclusion for him is not to take this valid criticism and reshape or improve the existing model, but instead to completely overhaul the structure, getting rid of it (with the obvious implications it will cause) and then reconstructing it completely from zero. This doesn't look right to me. Because while the writer has no problem in showing how neoliberalism is not the only path but that we can in fact do an inverse process to a nation-state system, he also points out each step the Union is taking to be more technocratic and less democratic (like it's the only direction possible), without even questioning the possibility of an inversion of the process within the Brussels institutions, one where the EU has the opportunity to become more democratic. But for the author, it looks like that is not possible. Only destruction is the viable solution.
5. It also puzzles me the way the author chooses to describe the EU based on the narrative that he is trying to give. Sometimes the organization is just a "Germanic Empire" through which Berlin expresses its power, sometimes it's a multifaceted entity used by national politics to impose what's best for them, and some other times the EU is just a technocratic machine for neoliberal independence from democratic power. While I can imagine how an artificial narration over this would look coherent, I do have to say that, at least from my point of view, there is no cohesion in his vision of what the EU truly is, if not just a noun upon which to unleash his hate toward the institution.
6. While he admits some problems to the U.S. federal system, which can (I guess now) be considered democratic, for the author, a federalized EU won't be as democratic (or even worse), he claims it won't even happen because the U.S. (in comparison) is united at least by language after a unification made in blood. Not only would I even dare to say that before recent legal debates, there was no official language of the U.S., at least de jure and that pretty much any nation-state was "forged" by blood, but his reasons why the EU can or cannot be federalized are arbitrary. There is no reason why a nation has to identify simply by its language nor that an unification through blood is the only way to create a national identity. In fact, it won't be wrong to consider a possible nation based solely by its history or culture (which for sure in Europe are closer to each other than any other country outside the continent). Beside that, even if there is not yet a European sentiment, this doesn't mean that it cannot exist. If the European polycentric communitarian system should work on the basis of mutual cooperation, it will also need a common point of view or even common objectives, something hard to achieve without some shared sentiment. Also the writer indirectly express how it is not possible, based on the fact that yet, no European sentiment has been achieved, to have a federal Europe. But is not necessary to have a national sentiment before the state is even born. It's infamous the Italian saying: "We made Italy, now we have to make Italians." If perhaps we agree on a nation-state system, we should also agree on the arbitrary state of national identity and its construction.
7. Going back to the problems of a system like the one the author proposes, while he explains why our society today is doomed. He doesn't spend a single moment to express how, in fact, a multicentric European system could deal with the superpowers of the post-neoliberal age. The author doesn't even argue what kind of political power a middle state can have over the imperialistic interests of any other superpower. He does try to explain how his system would face global problems like climate change. But, even if he points out correlation between globalism and the increase of CO2, it's also important to understand that as much globalism needs an international order to express its neoliberalism, the same can be said for the opposite. How can we deal with global problems when a country that doesn't cooperate? How can we do it in a coherent way without any centrality or conformation to some universal standard if multilateral agreement can't have some power or authority over a sovereign nation? Wolfgang's system doesn't answer that, but instead it deviates from it. In fact all his analysis over what a polycentric system can do for global problems, can be expressed (and I also believe, achieved) in the same way to our society today without a need for small-statism, but at best with less globalism. The problem for me is that while he proved (at least to me) that globalization ≠ democratization and that globalization = global problems, this doesn't mean that we can't achieve less globalization with a redesign of the existing system. With this, I'm not saying that a federalized EU would be the solution, but that if we have to seriously take into consideration the author's suggestion for an alternative approach, then it should only be right to talk about those kind of problems.
Why then give 3 stars if I do have so many complaints about this book?
The reason lies in the quality of the dissertation being made. While all my objections still hold true, his analysis of the neoliberal system post-Cold War, its intrinsic problems, and the richness of his analysis of an alternative solution of the EU, as well as the plentiful critiques of it, are still very valid. It would be a disservice not reading one of the most critical texts on globalization and the EU institution without taking it seriously, apart from the problems I've mentioned.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
December 7, 2025
Opnieuw een urgent boek, dat flink aanzet tot nadenken en dat ook somber stemt. Wolfgang Streeck is socioloog en beschrijft in dit boek de meest wenselijke wereldorde die na de afgang van het neoliberalisme nodig is. Zijn focus ligt daarbij op Europa. Niet als grootmacht, maar juist als mogelijkheid het anders te doen. Streeck is geen fan van de Europese Unie, die hij vooral ziet als neoliberaal vehikel en als na-apen van de VS (jaren '90 stijl). Het streven naar meer internationalisme en grotere staatsvormen zijn volgens hem slecht voor de democratie en voor de samenleving. Streeck pleit voor terugkeer naar kleinere staten die in goede afstemming en harmonie samenleven en -werken. Met als voorbeeld de allereerste Europese samenwerking direct na de Tweede Wereldoorlog en ook de huidige samenwerking van Scandinavische landen in de Nordic Council. Europa zien als één groot Rijk is een doodlopende weg met een grote muur aan het eind. Streeck wil terug naar Keynes en Polanyi en de afspraken van Bretton Woods, maar dan passend in de huidige samenleving. Minder grote staten, minder megabedrijven, weg met hyperglobalisatie, meer samenwerking van autonome staten.
Pittig boek, complexe materie, veel economie voor een socioloog. Toch heel interessant om kennis te nemen van dit pleidooi en om hierover na te denken. Zouden ze ook in Den Haag en Brussel moeten doen.
Helaas concludeert Streeck dat de oorlog in Oekraïne het realisme van zijn pleidooi geen goed doet. Ook vreest bij een tweede verkiezing van Trump, hoewel hij ook niets op heeft met de koers van de Democraten onder Biden. Het boek is vlak voor de herverkiezing van Trump geschreven. Hoe snel een boek als dit ingehaald wordt door de tijd. Ik zou graag nog een hoofdstuk toegevoegd zien over 2024 en 2025.
Pittig boek, complexe materie, veel economie voor een socioloog. Toch heel interessant om kennis te nemen van dit pleidooi en om hierover na te denken. Zouden ze ook in Den Haag en Brussel moeten doen.
Helaas concludeert Streeck dat de oorlog in Oekraïne het realisme van zijn pleidooi geen goed doet. Ook vreest bij een tweede verkiezing van Trump, hoewel hij ook niets op heeft met de koers van de Democraten onder Biden. Het boek is vlak voor de herverkiezing van Trump geschreven. Hoe snel een boek als dit ingehaald wordt door de tijd. Ik zou graag nog een hoofdstuk toegevoegd zien over 2024 en 2025.
February 1, 2026
Streeck offers, perhaps, one of the clearest critiques of the neoliberal-imperialist present. As for 'taking back control', well ... perhaps a new cultural revolution?
"Cultural revolutions of this kind have been known to take place; they are sparked by social movements that, in moments of collective effervescence – an exuberant feeling of community – spread or revive moral attitudes that, once internalised and identified with, can be betrayed only on pain of self-contempt, for reasons of rational self-interest. Social movements provide societies with ideas about themselves and identities; they run their course at the level of society, not the state, but if they become strong enough, they set objectives for and limits to state action; they produce an emotional normativity, a contagious passion transferable to others, one that is better than anything else at fomenting and stimulating the engagement of the many for a common goal" (p.358).
"Cultural revolutions of this kind have been known to take place; they are sparked by social movements that, in moments of collective effervescence – an exuberant feeling of community – spread or revive moral attitudes that, once internalised and identified with, can be betrayed only on pain of self-contempt, for reasons of rational self-interest. Social movements provide societies with ideas about themselves and identities; they run their course at the level of society, not the state, but if they become strong enough, they set objectives for and limits to state action; they produce an emotional normativity, a contagious passion transferable to others, one that is better than anything else at fomenting and stimulating the engagement of the many for a common goal" (p.358).
February 16, 2025
A compelling argument against furthering upward integration and centralisation; the administration of such governance would ultimately be highly technocratic, only serving to remove popular forces further away from democratic institutions than they already are.
Additionally reiterates the usual arguments against economic globalisation in a succint and well-researched manner.
Additionally reiterates the usual arguments against economic globalisation in a succint and well-researched manner.
February 21, 2025
For political nerds, boring for casual readers
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