A new narrative and analytic history of the twenty U.S. Army divisions that fought in the Pacific War.
Despite the prevailing view that the Marine Corps bore the brunt of the fighting in the Pacific War, the men of the US Army played a decisive role in the conflict. Indeed, GIs did most of the war’s heavy lifting on the ground by conducting more amphibious assaults and prosecuting more operations than the Marines. By the end of the war there were 1.77 million U.S. Army troops in the Pacific and Asia, compared to the USMC’s 484,000. The Pacific was as much the Army’s war as the fighting in the European theater. The U.S. Army deployed twenty combat divisions to fight in the Pacific, including famous ones such as the 1st Cavalry Division and the 25th “Tropic Lightning” Division. Most were infantry, and included Regular, National Guard and draftee divisions.
The divisions were deployed and maneuvered by theater, field army, and corps commanders around the Pacific’s geostrategic chessboard to battle and defeat the Japanese. The Army may have wanted its divisions to be interchangeable and uniform, but this proved impossible. Their quality and performance depended upon their resources, the geography and terrain on which they fought, experience, leadership, and organizational culture. Historians, though, have made little effort to examine their records in a systematic way before now. In addition, almost all of the Army’s divisions, some after admittedly rocky starts, became units capable of winning their engagements. Indeed, not a single Army division fighting the Japanese during the American counteroffensive across the Pacific was completely destroyed in combat. Whatever problems these divisions faced tended to grow out of the society that produced them, not fundamental flaws in Army doctrine. This is a tribute to the Army as a whole and to the twenty divisions that the Army deployed against the Japanese.
This new history uses a narrative approach to describe and analyze each division's history, characteristics, and battles during the conflict, concluding with an assessment of their battlefield records, taking into account the innumerable factors affecting their combat performance.
A solid and short history of the U.S. Army divisions in World War II in the Pacific. I do find it interesting that so many of the divisions sent to the Pacific were from the National Guard - 9 out of 20. Was General Marshall saving his best divisions for the war against Germany? The stated rationale was that they were available, but they all had had problems with poor officers, internal politics, and mediocre training. Would the Buna campaign have gone better if he had sent the 1st Infantry Division to the Southwest Pacific rather than the National Guard 32nd Infantry Division? As a Marine I have no doubt that that Marine Divisions were the best in the Pacific. The 1st Marine Division, magnificent in its baptism of fire at Guadalcanal, shared many of the characteristics of the Army divisions that did poorly in their first combat experiences - full of many reservists and fresh recruits and only recently organized
Taaffe is right in recognizing that the Army does not get enough credit for the war in the Pacific. While the Marines generally fought in many relatively tough but short invasions, the Army fought in long and equally tough campaigns in New Guinea, Leyte, Luzon, and Okinawa.
For an expanded look at the Army in the Pacific, read John McManus’ U.S. Army in the Pacific War trilogy.
I absolutely loved reading this book- although I am rating it down a full point for the weakness of its map game. Stephen R Taaffe, an academic and military historian of the Pacific War investigates and rates the 20 US Army Divisions that were used in the Pacific, rating both the formations and their commanders as they sprawled across the Islands the Japanese held. He starts with an explanation of the US army as a whole, with its Regular Divisions, National Guard formations, and newer directly raised draftee units. While units were generally professionalised before being sent overseas, with less competent officers replaced by regulars when possible, this was not always a uniform process. Taaffe then gives us the basic history of each campaign the Army fought , the divisions that fought it, and how they fared. It's important stuff, especially for those who may have thought of the US Pacific effort as a Navy and Marines show.
About Half a million Marines fought in the Pacific War, the Army sent almost two million. A good part of that was the massive US Army Air Corps effort, before the Air Force was on its own, but a good amount of those men were in Infantry and Cavalry Divisions .New Guinea and the Philippines were almost exclusively Army campaigns, but there are also places like Saipan where the GIs fought alongside the USMC. Taaffe explains how Marine and army doctrines could vary, and how this sometimes caused interservice friction. It's a really interesting book, covering some parts of the war that are less well known.
There are some adult themes, but few graphic violence passages, so this is a fine book for the Junior Reader over about 11/12 years. For the Gamer/Modeler/Military Enthusiast, this book opens up some areas for exploration that might have been ignored. The Gamer gets a number of less well know Island landings and battles outlined for future study-although the weak maps are a drawback. The Modeler will get a lot of build and diorama ideas- although some colour references will also be needed. The Military Enthusiast gets a new lens with which to view the Pacific War- the US army view- and how it differed from that of the Navy and other allies. It's a very compelling story, well told, that will appeal to general audience reader as well.