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Law's Empire
With the incisiveness and lucid style for which he is renowned, Ronald Dworkin has written a masterful explanation of how the Anglo-American legal system works and on what principles it is grounded. Law’s Empire is a full-length presentation of his theory of law that will be studied and debated―by scholars and theorists, by lawyers and judges, by students and political activists―for years to come.
Dworkin begins with the question that is at the heart of the whole legal in difficult cases how do (and how should) judges decide what the law is? He shows that judges must decide hard cases by interpreting rather than simply applying past legal decisions, and he produces a general theory of what interpretation is―in literature as well as in law―and of when one interpretation is better than others. Every legal interpretation reflects an underlying theory about the general character of Dworkin assesses three such theories. One, which has been very influential, takes the law of a community to be only what the established conventions of that community say it is. Another, currently in vogue, assumes that legal practice is best understood as an instrument of society to achieve its goals. Dworkin argues forcefully and persuasively against both these he insists that the most fundamental point of law is not to report consensus or provide efficient means to social goals, but to answer the requirement that a political community act in a coherent and principled manner toward all its members. He discusses, in the light of that view, cases at common law, cases arising under statutes, and great constitutional cases in the Supreme Court, and he systematically demonstrates that his concept of political and legal integrity is the key to Anglo-American legal theory and practice.
Dworkin begins with the question that is at the heart of the whole legal in difficult cases how do (and how should) judges decide what the law is? He shows that judges must decide hard cases by interpreting rather than simply applying past legal decisions, and he produces a general theory of what interpretation is―in literature as well as in law―and of when one interpretation is better than others. Every legal interpretation reflects an underlying theory about the general character of Dworkin assesses three such theories. One, which has been very influential, takes the law of a community to be only what the established conventions of that community say it is. Another, currently in vogue, assumes that legal practice is best understood as an instrument of society to achieve its goals. Dworkin argues forcefully and persuasively against both these he insists that the most fundamental point of law is not to report consensus or provide efficient means to social goals, but to answer the requirement that a political community act in a coherent and principled manner toward all its members. He discusses, in the light of that view, cases at common law, cases arising under statutes, and great constitutional cases in the Supreme Court, and he systematically demonstrates that his concept of political and legal integrity is the key to Anglo-American legal theory and practice.
470 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1986
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About the author
Ronald Dworkin
66 books157 followersRonald Dworkin, QC, FBA was an American philosopher of law. He was a Jeremy Bentham Professor of Law and Philosophy at University College London, Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law at New York University, and has taught previously at Yale Law School and the University of Oxford. An influential contributor to both philosophy of law and political philosophy, Dworkin received the 2007 Holberg International Memorial Prize in the Humanities for "his pioneering scholarly work" of "worldwide impact." His theory of law as integrity is amongst the most influential contemporary theories about the nature of law.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 35 reviews
January 20, 2016
Though undoubtedly a classic in contemporary jurisprudence, Dworkin's Law's Empire suffers from trying to make his argument superficially attractive than logically sound per se. At many stages, he abuses the technique of taking a fundamentally controversial assumption and prefacing it with 'as shown' or 'as we have seen' when such showing or sight has been in the best interpretation obscure, and in the worst completely absent.
With that said, there are many areas in which the book excels. His criticism of legal positivism (building on Taking Rights Seriously), and Hart's version in particular, is often insightful, though unfortunately it is submitted he provides nothing better as a replacement. Often, analogies are used to illustrate obscure points well (the parallel drawn between legal interpretation and literary criticism in chapter 2 is nothing short of beautiful), though as touched on above, perhaps this skill could have been used to a greater extent to show exactly where certain points were coming from.
Therefore, while Dworkin is probably wrong, and his argument fails in several places, this is a text which is a worthwhile read, if for no other reason than to provoke the reader to think. To dismiss it as awful or irrelevant because of its flaws is naive; it is no better than to dismiss Austin's (at the time) revolutionary take on the law because it has since been improved upon. A provision of perspective is useful, and although I, along with likely most readers, am not drawn away from positivist convention, this book remains a classic.
With that said, there are many areas in which the book excels. His criticism of legal positivism (building on Taking Rights Seriously), and Hart's version in particular, is often insightful, though unfortunately it is submitted he provides nothing better as a replacement. Often, analogies are used to illustrate obscure points well (the parallel drawn between legal interpretation and literary criticism in chapter 2 is nothing short of beautiful), though as touched on above, perhaps this skill could have been used to a greater extent to show exactly where certain points were coming from.
Therefore, while Dworkin is probably wrong, and his argument fails in several places, this is a text which is a worthwhile read, if for no other reason than to provoke the reader to think. To dismiss it as awful or irrelevant because of its flaws is naive; it is no better than to dismiss Austin's (at the time) revolutionary take on the law because it has since been improved upon. A provision of perspective is useful, and although I, along with likely most readers, am not drawn away from positivist convention, this book remains a classic.
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June 9, 2022The first book I can remember abandoning. RD writes more clearly than other legal philosophers I have read. I don't find his arguments unusually weak. However, the book did nothing to shake my impression that the field is just confused moral philosophy (which itself I find a confused field).
I remain deeply sceptical of any argument which can't be summarised in a few sentences. It seems only natural that in a long book like this, chock-full of intricate claims, one should disagree with a good number of those claims. RD makes more claims I find plausible than do many philosophers. Nonetheless, when the whole book is the argument, built up step-by-step, one need only disagree with one step for the whole thing to fall apart. I gave it chances. It happened to be the feeble discussion of art interpretation that made me throw in the towel.
When one disagrees with a single step in such an 'argument book', the rest of the book becomes almost worthless. At least, its interest becomes only sociological or historical, if it's influential. (This factor means that I might someday drag myself back.) The experience of reading such a book is dissonant to the point of deafening.
I simply don't think that book-length prose is a good medium for argumentation. I wish universities and scholars would agree.
I have seen many people endorse books like this without qualification. It would seem to follow either that they are not paying attention, or that they are completely dogmatic in support of their authors. Neither is encouraging.
I'll stick to literature for a bit: a happy realm where these towering problems seem smaller.
I remain deeply sceptical of any argument which can't be summarised in a few sentences. It seems only natural that in a long book like this, chock-full of intricate claims, one should disagree with a good number of those claims. RD makes more claims I find plausible than do many philosophers. Nonetheless, when the whole book is the argument, built up step-by-step, one need only disagree with one step for the whole thing to fall apart. I gave it chances. It happened to be the feeble discussion of art interpretation that made me throw in the towel.
When one disagrees with a single step in such an 'argument book', the rest of the book becomes almost worthless. At least, its interest becomes only sociological or historical, if it's influential. (This factor means that I might someday drag myself back.) The experience of reading such a book is dissonant to the point of deafening.
I simply don't think that book-length prose is a good medium for argumentation. I wish universities and scholars would agree.
I have seen many people endorse books like this without qualification. It would seem to follow either that they are not paying attention, or that they are completely dogmatic in support of their authors. Neither is encouraging.
I'll stick to literature for a bit: a happy realm where these towering problems seem smaller.
May 14, 2013
As my professor (Prof. Claire Finkelstein) said, Dworkin's writing is "slippery." Although elegant, Dworkin's interpretive conception of law leaves too much room for error, in my opinion.
Nonetheless, I would certainly say that this is likely required reading for anyone who wishes to understand contemporary American jurisprudence.
Nonetheless, I would certainly say that this is likely required reading for anyone who wishes to understand contemporary American jurisprudence.
November 13, 2023
the people following my reviews on this hellsite are not interested in my understandings of legal philosophy but on the off chance that you are...you can skip this one!
admittedly my prof did not have us read like 100 pages of this so maybe the true insight is in pages 300-400, but otherwise ronnie lost the plot wayyy early on and never picked it back up
admittedly my prof did not have us read like 100 pages of this so maybe the true insight is in pages 300-400, but otherwise ronnie lost the plot wayyy early on and never picked it back up
May 3, 2018
Read this as part of our law faculty reading group. We met monthly and Fred Geddicks led discussions. Dworkin provides a liberal's con law theory answer to conservatives' Originalism. I recommend if you have someone like Fred (a Constitutional law expert) to lead you through the book.
October 5, 2013
Well, I didn't understand this. No, I sure did not.
Law's Empire is repeatedly cited for a couple of key takeaways in secondary literature. I actually am not sure that I would have divined those takeaways from the actual text.
One thing that kept happening Law's Empire was that Dworkin would finish a package and conclude that he had made a very large point. If the point were made, I would agree it would be very large. But it never quite seems to get there. And yet Dworkin's argument is based on assuming all of these building blocks are themselves built.
Also, it takes an astonishing leap and tries to solve, essentially, every legal dispute. And it' snot really clear that it is a real method. Sometimes Dworkin suggests he's being descriptive of what actually happens. If that's the case that every judge is necessarily Judge Hercules unless they are willfully defying what it means to be a judge, no?
Still, like many of the "great" books there are a lot of fascinating insights and interesting sentences tucked into the nooks and crannies so it can still be useful to us folks who are as dense as the reading material.
Law's Empire is repeatedly cited for a couple of key takeaways in secondary literature. I actually am not sure that I would have divined those takeaways from the actual text.
One thing that kept happening Law's Empire was that Dworkin would finish a package and conclude that he had made a very large point. If the point were made, I would agree it would be very large. But it never quite seems to get there. And yet Dworkin's argument is based on assuming all of these building blocks are themselves built.
Also, it takes an astonishing leap and tries to solve, essentially, every legal dispute. And it' snot really clear that it is a real method. Sometimes Dworkin suggests he's being descriptive of what actually happens. If that's the case that every judge is necessarily Judge Hercules unless they are willfully defying what it means to be a judge, no?
Still, like many of the "great" books there are a lot of fascinating insights and interesting sentences tucked into the nooks and crannies so it can still be useful to us folks who are as dense as the reading material.
July 8, 2012
Chapters 2 and 7 are worth reading, the main idea being that judges should interpret law in a way that creates the least contradictions in itself. The rest...meh. A lot of economic talk from a guy who doesn't get economics.
October 8, 2013
Must-read for all who want to be active citizens. However, it represents an intellectual complexity that might be cumbersome for those who have little knowledge of law. This is not because of terminology but of the pace and complexity of structuring both legal and logical arguments.
January 17, 2022
3.5 stars. This book gives an illuminating view of the difficulties of legal interpretation and adjudication, and for that aspect I would give it 5 stars.
I also think he is totally right about his claims that Law, at least from the perspective of judges, is a discourse/interpretative tradition, as opposed to a rulebook or a sham. He proposes an interpretation of this discourse which he calls "Law as Integrity", whereby judges ought to interpret the Law as following from coherent principles of justice. But I am less sure of the actual coherence of this tradition, the purity of judicial intentions, and the way in which "Law as Integrity" is claimed to follow from abstract principles of Justice and Fraternity.
My main complaint, however, is that I do not think Dworkin sufficiently justified his theory of interpretation, which he calls "constructive interpretation" and I might call "charitable interpretation". I would summarize this as saying "the best interpretation of the social practice of the interpretation of social practices is that interpretation should seek to find the principles which best explain the social practice as well as those principles which show those social practices in the best light". I hope the convoluted beginning of that summary conveys how I felt about his principle! His argument for this principle I would also (uncharitably) summarize as "look within yourself, you know it to be true, I hope"!
This rosy view of interpretation was presumably derived from his desire to defend Law's Empire, i.e. to defend the unity and coherence of America's legal institutions against those who would seek to say that they are fundamentally unprincipled, unjust, or based on contradictory principles. He clearly believes that such views would threaten the legitimacy of law and the integrity of the political community. For example, he throws some red-baiting remarks at the Critical Legal Theorists, who he accuses of being political subversives developing "a new mystification in service of undisclosed political goals"!
I also think he is totally right about his claims that Law, at least from the perspective of judges, is a discourse/interpretative tradition, as opposed to a rulebook or a sham. He proposes an interpretation of this discourse which he calls "Law as Integrity", whereby judges ought to interpret the Law as following from coherent principles of justice. But I am less sure of the actual coherence of this tradition, the purity of judicial intentions, and the way in which "Law as Integrity" is claimed to follow from abstract principles of Justice and Fraternity.
My main complaint, however, is that I do not think Dworkin sufficiently justified his theory of interpretation, which he calls "constructive interpretation" and I might call "charitable interpretation". I would summarize this as saying "the best interpretation of the social practice of the interpretation of social practices is that interpretation should seek to find the principles which best explain the social practice as well as those principles which show those social practices in the best light". I hope the convoluted beginning of that summary conveys how I felt about his principle! His argument for this principle I would also (uncharitably) summarize as "look within yourself, you know it to be true, I hope"!
This rosy view of interpretation was presumably derived from his desire to defend Law's Empire, i.e. to defend the unity and coherence of America's legal institutions against those who would seek to say that they are fundamentally unprincipled, unjust, or based on contradictory principles. He clearly believes that such views would threaten the legitimacy of law and the integrity of the political community. For example, he throws some red-baiting remarks at the Critical Legal Theorists, who he accuses of being political subversives developing "a new mystification in service of undisclosed political goals"!
March 20, 2021
I read this book for class. I liked some parts of it, like the idea of law as interpretation, and the amount of work Dwarkin put into representing law through the interpretation of art and literature. Dwarkin has a very pleasing style of writing, he uses words in a non mechanical way, unlike Hart, who's book The Concept of Law, which we also read for class, was rather sterile.
I will say that the reason I gave this 3/5, rather than 2/5, is because I don't think one can say there is not politics involved in law making. Such a great point cannot be given a low opinion, when I think the idea that law is interpretive, and the middle ground of integrity between pragmatism (the progressive position) and conventionalism (the conservative position) is a great compromise. There is an emphasis on making sure the laws of are justified by the community, which Dwarkin has described as a type of natural law theory. Being stone cold analytical about morality, I never thought I would agree with a natural law theorist, but if it were a matter of preference, I would opt for an interpretive practice which has a democratic element. An element which reflects people, not law as some sort of universal idea that we found through contemplation.
Democracy is not built into the fabric of the universe, but it is a great compromise between barbarism and totalitarianism. It does not yield the best results, but since we cannot just find the philosopher kings and have them run society, it makes sense to have balances in power between these two extremes of barbarism and totalitarianism. It makes sense to put ideas to the test in (I hate this term) "marketplace of ideas." This does not mean I think the US is a real democracy ;)
I will say that the reason I gave this 3/5, rather than 2/5, is because I don't think one can say there is not politics involved in law making. Such a great point cannot be given a low opinion, when I think the idea that law is interpretive, and the middle ground of integrity between pragmatism (the progressive position) and conventionalism (the conservative position) is a great compromise. There is an emphasis on making sure the laws of are justified by the community, which Dwarkin has described as a type of natural law theory. Being stone cold analytical about morality, I never thought I would agree with a natural law theorist, but if it were a matter of preference, I would opt for an interpretive practice which has a democratic element. An element which reflects people, not law as some sort of universal idea that we found through contemplation.
Democracy is not built into the fabric of the universe, but it is a great compromise between barbarism and totalitarianism. It does not yield the best results, but since we cannot just find the philosopher kings and have them run society, it makes sense to have balances in power between these two extremes of barbarism and totalitarianism. It makes sense to put ideas to the test in (I hate this term) "marketplace of ideas." This does not mean I think the US is a real democracy ;)
October 16, 2018
A towering, and often fun, jurisprudential odyssey. Dworkin presents arguments on both sides of the aisle as strongly as they can be phrased, steelmanning even his vilest of opponents. Never did he present a weak argument, only to tear it to shreds. Instead, he carefully crafted opposing positions, making his task all the more harrowing. It is this intellectual honesty on Dworkin's part that has helped propel this work into the upper ranks of jurisprudential literature.
June 29, 2019
Dworkin’s work is one of the most important and studied books on jurisprudential philosophy. It looks at what is law, why judges interpret the law as they do, and the merits of various approaches using a model case and persona judges. So why three stars? This book needs a Virgil to guide you through the arguments and issues. It’s incredibly dense and difficult to read. Alone, it is three stars. With a guide, likely five.
September 13, 2024
As the author writes, the law "is a distinct question for each reader". I am sure this is true, which means that it is hardly possible to agree on all the points of law. But even when disagreeing with Ronald Dvorkin, it is always fascinating to see how he builds the tree of his brilliant and creative reasoning.
Great book for every lawyer.
Great book for every lawyer.
August 9, 2022
Brilliantly written and enjoyable to read, but disappointed that most of the serious philosophical claims were loosely argued. In particular, discussion of legal positivism drifted carelessly between the semantic and metasemantic levels.
November 7, 2023
Read for my PHILOSOPHY OF LAW class, but highly readable discussion of Dworkin's philosophy.
he offers highly readable text, criticisms of positivism, pragmatism and conventionalism as legal theories, as well as his own theory of law as integrity.
he offers highly readable text, criticisms of positivism, pragmatism and conventionalism as legal theories, as well as his own theory of law as integrity.
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July 24, 2020قرأت الست الفصول الأولى فقط.
May 4, 2021
read up to ch. 6, temporarily done for now
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December 16, 2021Wordy, gummy, sticky reading, with blocks of text, and dull and blunted sentences. But it was an interesting read.
January 30, 2025
Takie se
December 20, 2025
incredibly dense, challenging yet rewarding.
June 2, 2016
Upon initial reading I found it to be quite engaging, discussing the various disagreements about what law is and various jurisprudential theories. The use of case studies at the beginning was really quite engaging. Moreover, Dworkin is very good at summarising other opposing jurisprudential theories. However, my initial enthusiasm wore down after entering the second chapter. Dworkin seems to struggle immensely as to what he is trying to say about interpretive concepts and goes off on a tangent that was quite distressing to read. Although not all of his book falls down in this way, it is a regular occurrence and I find it to make the content barely accessible at times, even for the most academic minds. I don't profess to be a genius, but I am reasonably astute. Nevertheless, entire sections of the book completed alluded me to the point of being nonsensical. My only comfort in response to this is that my law lecturers frequently express to me that I should not assume such a book is written well and makes sense all the time as the writer is struggling to convey their ideas. As such, I cannot wholeheartedly state I would recommend the book to read for pure pleasure because it causes you to grapple with some very complex ideas. However, it is probably an interesting read for a budding philosopher who perhaps may appreciate the more subtle intricacies of the subject matter that were lost on my good self!
October 5, 2014
这本书我读过中文译本，也读过英文原版。从语言风格上来讲，相较于哈特教授《法律的概念》它的表达更为通俗易懂。这本书挑战了哈特的法实证主义理论，证明了“法律原则”与“法律规则”的共存。但它的“唯一答案”的结论对大多数法律人来说有些不可理解。中国政法大学的刘星教授在自己的著作《法律是什么》中总结到：“哈特理论的终点是德沃金理论的起点”。
I have read the Chinese translated form of this book as well as the original edition. In term of the language, this book is easier to understand compare to Hart's The Concept of Law. This book challenge Hart's legal positivism, proves that the coexisting of legal rules and legal principles. However, it's "only answer" conclusion is probably not understandable for most of lawyers. Liu Xing, the professor of Chinese University of Political Science and Law, concluded in his What is Law "Where Hart ends, Dworkin Begins".
I have read the Chinese translated form of this book as well as the original edition. In term of the language, this book is easier to understand compare to Hart's The Concept of Law. This book challenge Hart's legal positivism, proves that the coexisting of legal rules and legal principles. However, it's "only answer" conclusion is probably not understandable for most of lawyers. Liu Xing, the professor of Chinese University of Political Science and Law, concluded in his What is Law "Where Hart ends, Dworkin Begins".
April 7, 2015
Quite readable, but the concepts are deep. Dworkin is a philosopher, and to fully understand his theories of law requires a good bit of work, and a decent understanding of the law and of philosophy. I enjoyed his style of writing: deep but conversational, academic but accessible. And I found myself more and more drawn to his theories the more I studied him. He certainly challenges the status-quo theory of Positivism, which is much needed. Too many accept legal positivism too readily.
January 16, 2017
Although I did doggedly read this book cover to cover, I was probably neither the right audience nor in the right time of my life to appreciate it. Dworkin draws a long argument about the obligation of judges to base their reasoning on the thinking of past judges so as to avoid sudden aberrations and to show respect for the social governing concept of common law. Whether he needed more than 300 pages to do this, I leave this for others more freshly read to decide.
December 9, 2008
Interesting and well written book on legal theory, though I think he's wrong.
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September 23, 2010Law's Empire (Legal Theory) by Ronald Dworkin (2003)
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November 7, 2010unique way of thinking
June 9, 2011
If I had not read some of Dworkin's later work, this book would have convinced me that he was a complete fool.
April 22, 2012
Dworkin's definitive book. It's really good. Forced me to realize that a fairly significant critique I had of him was unfounded.
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October 5, 2013Back on the shelf without a complete dissection. Dworkin is one dense dude. Apparently there is a slimmer tome that explains this and other texts. gonna check it out.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 35 reviews