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Z-sukupolvi - Venäjän fasistiset nuoriso- ja lapsisotilaat
Kuinka Venäjä aivopesee lapsiaan kannattamaan hyökkäyssotaa ja myötäilemään hallinnon fasistisia oppeja?
Ian Garnerin teos paljastaa Venäjän synkän todellisuuden ja pimeän tulevaisuuden. Nuorten sukupolvi on väkivaltaisempi ja aatteellisempi kuin maassa on koskaan ennen nähty.
Sodanaikainen Venäjä hukkuu fasistisiin symboleihin. Innokkaat patriootit hyökkäävät toimittajia, oppositioaktivisteja ja kaikkia heitä vastaan, joita epäillään isänmaan pettureiksi. Nettitrollit yllyttävät kansalaisia liittymään joukkoon. Valtion televisio pelottelee katsojia tekaistuilla uutisilla Venäjän vastaisista salaliitoista ja kansanmurhapyrkimyksistä. Lapsisotilaat marssivat ylpeinä Punaisen torin poikki.
Tätä on Venäjä 2020-luvulla: raivon ja nationalististen valheiden maa, jossa teeskentely ja rikotut lupaukset ovat elämäntapa ja tuhoa ennustava ajattelu vallalla.
"Järkyttävä tutkimus Venäjän nuorison valtaisasta tuesta fasismin väkivallalle ja ideologialle – ja siitä, miten Putin on käyttänyt tätä hyväkseen." – Financial Times
Ian Garner on historioitsija ja Venäjän kulttuurin ja sotapropagandan tutkija. Hän on valmistunut tohtoriksi Toronton yliopistosta vuonna 2017 opiskeltuaan sitä ennen Bristolinyliopistossa ja Pietarin valtion konservatoriossa.
Ian Garnerin teos paljastaa Venäjän synkän todellisuuden ja pimeän tulevaisuuden. Nuorten sukupolvi on väkivaltaisempi ja aatteellisempi kuin maassa on koskaan ennen nähty.
Sodanaikainen Venäjä hukkuu fasistisiin symboleihin. Innokkaat patriootit hyökkäävät toimittajia, oppositioaktivisteja ja kaikkia heitä vastaan, joita epäillään isänmaan pettureiksi. Nettitrollit yllyttävät kansalaisia liittymään joukkoon. Valtion televisio pelottelee katsojia tekaistuilla uutisilla Venäjän vastaisista salaliitoista ja kansanmurhapyrkimyksistä. Lapsisotilaat marssivat ylpeinä Punaisen torin poikki.
Tätä on Venäjä 2020-luvulla: raivon ja nationalististen valheiden maa, jossa teeskentely ja rikotut lupaukset ovat elämäntapa ja tuhoa ennustava ajattelu vallalla.
"Järkyttävä tutkimus Venäjän nuorison valtaisasta tuesta fasismin väkivallalle ja ideologialle – ja siitä, miten Putin on käyttänyt tätä hyväkseen." – Financial Times
Ian Garner on historioitsija ja Venäjän kulttuurin ja sotapropagandan tutkija. Hän on valmistunut tohtoriksi Toronton yliopistosta vuonna 2017 opiskeltuaan sitä ennen Bristolinyliopistossa ja Pietarin valtion konservatoriossa.
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First published May 1, 2023
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About the author
Ian Garner
2 books12 followersThere is more than one author with this name on Goodreads; see also: Ian Garner
Ian Garner is a historian and translator of Russian war propaganda.
He has written/been interviewed for the Washington Post, Rolling Stone, New York Times, BBC, CBC, CTV, ABC, YLE, Radio Canada, Mashable, Dainik Bhaskar, VICE News, Times Radio, and more.
His academic work focuses on Soviet and Russian literary and cultural representations of war. In his own words: "I am on a mission to illuminate the hidden sides of Soviet and Russian life - a world of thoughts and feelings hidden behind closed doors and the Iron Curtain - through engaging wider western audiences in recent academic discoveries."
His work has been featured in numerous publications and showcased in talks at universities, museums and conferences in North America, Europe and Russia.
He completed his PhD at the University of Toronto in 2017 after studying at the University of Bristol (England) and St. Petersburg State Conservatory (Russia).
Ian Garner is a historian and translator of Russian war propaganda.
He has written/been interviewed for the Washington Post, Rolling Stone, New York Times, BBC, CBC, CTV, ABC, YLE, Radio Canada, Mashable, Dainik Bhaskar, VICE News, Times Radio, and more.
His academic work focuses on Soviet and Russian literary and cultural representations of war. In his own words: "I am on a mission to illuminate the hidden sides of Soviet and Russian life - a world of thoughts and feelings hidden behind closed doors and the Iron Curtain - through engaging wider western audiences in recent academic discoveries."
His work has been featured in numerous publications and showcased in talks at universities, museums and conferences in North America, Europe and Russia.
He completed his PhD at the University of Toronto in 2017 after studying at the University of Bristol (England) and St. Petersburg State Conservatory (Russia).
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 34 reviews
June 8, 2023
A remarkable and fundamental study of the fascist ideologies of modern day Russia.
The author has absolutely no illusions regarding the current reality and does not go into defending, which in my mind is extremely refreshing, or sugarcoating thoughts of those, who are pro-war and anti-Ukraine.
The book is well organized, divided into logical sections and the origins of fascism in Russia are outlined in great detail. At the end of the book, Garner offers suggestions on how to combat totalitarian regimes and “undo” the propaganda endured by populations, bringing up the assimilation of North Koreans in South Korean society as an example.
I definitely will be recommending this book to all of my non-Ukrainian friends and colleagues in order for them to understand the current status quo and have no delusions regarding modern-day Russian ideology.
The author has absolutely no illusions regarding the current reality and does not go into defending, which in my mind is extremely refreshing, or sugarcoating thoughts of those, who are pro-war and anti-Ukraine.
The book is well organized, divided into logical sections and the origins of fascism in Russia are outlined in great detail. At the end of the book, Garner offers suggestions on how to combat totalitarian regimes and “undo” the propaganda endured by populations, bringing up the assimilation of North Koreans in South Korean society as an example.
I definitely will be recommending this book to all of my non-Ukrainian friends and colleagues in order for them to understand the current status quo and have no delusions regarding modern-day Russian ideology.
December 7, 2023
A sobering study of just how thoroughly propagandized Russian youth are in the cult of hate and death. A must-read for anyone trying to understand the magnitude of what Ukraine is fighting.
October 21, 2023
Ian Garner, neste seu livro, “Geração Z. Entre a juventude fascista da Rússia”, mostra-nos uma Rússia saída de um império regional, e após um breve período de desorientação e deslumbramento pelo ocidente e pelas novidades com que o capital se maquilhava, optou por direcionar a sociedade para recuperar o orgulho perdido.
Em 23 de Fevereiro de 2012, no estádio Luzhniki, durante as comemorações do Dia de Defesa da Pátria Vladimir Putin proferiu um discurso perante uma multidão empolgada e inebriada com a grandeza da sua pátria. Neste discurso o líder afirmou que a sociedade russa necessitava de uma terapia que englobasse os seus principais sectores definidores da nacionalidade russa –a sua cultura e história. Para recuperar a glória ida era necessário uma revolução cultural que começasse nas escolas e envolvesse toda a sociedade e conseguisse dessa forma o renascimento de uma Rússia perdida. Estavam lançadas as fundações dos objectivos do Kremlin no seu módulo Putin 2.0. Nesta versão as liberdades individuais deram lugar a uma cultura militarista e totalitária, o oposto do breve período de liberdade pessoal e ideológica que até aí se tinha vivido. O colectivo deixava de ser o conjunto dos indivíduos e passava para o conjunto das unidades cuja união em “facho” permitiria a força e resiliência da nação reunida em torno do seu líder.
Num segundo momento, em 9 Maio de 2012, o regime congregou e institucionalizou um vasto leque de comemorações já existentes, num único e grandioso evento que ficou conhecido como a “Parada do Regimento Imortal”. Esta parada chega a envolver mais de 12 milhões de russos, que de várias formas, na rua, em casa, nas redes sociais exaltam uma memória partilhada do passado. Estas comemorações podem ser perspectivada na tradição transhumanista do cosmismo russo. Ao promover-se uma exultação do passado através de exposição de símbolos em que cada russo individualmente celebra os seus antepassados, permite-se dessa forma recordar todos aqueles que contribuíram para a glória da nação perdida em 1991. É como se estes antepassados não tivessem morrido e, celebrantes e celebrados vivessem em comunhão perpétua. É uma linguagem e um ritual mítico e religioso partilhado em que as antigas gerações são elevadas à categoria de ícones. É uma manifestação junta as “unidades” presentes e as do passado num único “facho” de glória em torno de um líder que encarna a glória passada e o mito dos dias em que em exultação o nirvana será atingido.
Mas esta celebração não é apenas uma manifestação nostálgica de saudade. Com ela pretende-se exaltar os sacrifícios dos antepassados durante a 2ª guerra mundial, e inculcar essa glorificação messiânica no inconsciente coletivo do povo russo. Pretende-se com ela doutrinar o povo russo e em particular a sua juventude.
Esta cultura revivalista, não se limita aos discursos e às paradas. Ela envolve também a inteligência e o mundo da cultura em muitas manifestações. O cinema é, talvez por depender de dinheiros públicos, talvez porque produtores e realizadores acreditavam nisso, uma das actividades onde este revivalismo histórico é mais marcante. O filme Estalinegrado de 2013 é um exemplo do esforço revivalista e orgulho num passado não muito longínquo. Este filme apresenta numa narrativa de martírio e ressurreição e uma celebração da guerra contra o opressor, o pedófilo, o liberal, o nazi, o liberal, o ocidental, enfim, contra tudo o que não for russo, como o grande desígnio das novas gerações – a geração Z. Através de uma guerra que deve ser encarada como religiosa é proposto que a juventude colabore na salvação da nação e possa encontrar nesse despojamento uma via para a glória e a ressurreição. E todos devem-se preparar para a grande batalha, o grande desígnio da mãe rússia. Era uma cruzada, na rússia do século XXI ser religioso significa ser combatente.
Vladislav Surkov (o principal conselheiro de Putin até 2020 – o Mago do Kremlin) organizou e incentivou muitos destes movimentos Frankenstein em que é notória uma mistura de religiosidade e orgulho nas origens russa e soviética, tudo isto temperado por uma cultura anti-ocidental. A esta nova religião, que se pode chamar “Nova Rússia” aderiram essencialmente os mais jovens, talvez por estarem mais disponíveis para uma ruptura com o vexame ocidental, talvez porque sem memória do passado tinham nesta nova redação da história apenas uma narrativa que sendo apenas do domínio da interpretação não tinha como ser comprovada – não permitia previsões.
Nesta “Nova Rússia”, as claques de futebol (Fratria) eram para os jovens escolas de violência onde era ensinado ortodoxia, misoginia, racismo, nacionalismo, patriotismo e nazismo. E foi neste ambiente que outros movimentos como o “Caminhar Juntos”, e o seu sucedâneo “Nashi” correspondem a uma Komosol criada por Vladislav Surkov, e que este previu que muitos dos jovens formatados neste ambiente – geração Z – poiam, e são-no actualmente, líderes de negócios ou da política. Esses movimentos funcionaram como berçários para o mainstream ideológico e dos actores de uma política anti-ocidental e pró russo agora assumiu o poder e cerrou o “facho” em torno do líder.
Se em 2012, no início do terceiro mandato de Putin se observou uma clara mudança na sociedade e na liderança russa, com afastamento do mundo ocidental e o acentuar de um nacionalismo místico, no que pode ser descrito como um revivalismo de uma “sovietização ortodoxa”, por outro lado, esta deriva já podia também ser intuída nas entrelinhas dos discursos oficiais logo no início do milénio. Já nestas primeiras intervenções era possível entrever nas palavras de Putin um discreto e velado anti-ocidental e uma postura pró Rússia, onde tudo o que não fosse ou falasse russo era ocidental. Reescrevia-se a história e via-se a rússia e o seu povo como os únicos combatentes anti-fascistas da IIGM. Agora, tal como já então se podia advinhar, tudo o que não fosse russo era tomado como “fascista”. Iniciava-se aí uma guerra contra tudo o que não era russo, e para isso era necessário fazer renascer o espírito da IIGM.
É assim que o dia da celebração da IIGM, o dia da vitória é comemorado. Longe de ser uma comemoração de um – nunca mais! –, o dia da vitória é visto como um dia de glória, de um caminho de glória que deve ser sempre repetido para se recuperar a glória antiga e alicerçar novas glórias. É um dia em que se celebra a paz, mas uma paz estranha porque necessita exaltar a guerra para poder ser atingida. Para os russos e a sua actual liderança a melhor forma de se atingir a paz é pela guerra – é claramente um conceito fascista.
Neste seu livro, Ian Garnes mostra-nos de que forma os conceitos de misticismo ortodoxo, temperado de um revivalismo saudosista da era soviética em particular da glória e do império construído após IIGM, têm marcado esta Rússia do 3º milénio, e de que forma a sua juventude têm numa cultura de guerra, sido educada e orientada para a guerra. Revivendo a glória da IIGM, da guerra na Chechénia, da anexação da Crimeia e agora da guerra na Ucrânia (curiosamente varreram da memória os martírios que sofreram no Afeganistão), esta geração Z – geração para a vitória – , num culto de guerra que promete um novo superego que reescreva os conceitos de ética, moral, integridade e integração, de forma a que uma comunidade de unidades não tenha de tomar decisões, e assim se protejam das suas próprias decisões – o “amado líder” sabe o que é melhor para nós.
E para que este novo superego coletivo possa funcionar é necessário que as mentiras tenham mais valor que as verdades. E têm-no porque se adaptam melhor ao mito que entretanto foi criado, divulgado e repetido. O mito pode modificar a realidade e a realidade não pode ser obstáculo ao mito. Se repetido vezes suficientes o mito acaba por ocupar a realidade.
Estas, a fé inabalável num líder autocrático e no mito e as novas narrativas que este permite, a alienação e coaptação da juventude para um futuro assente no passado, são a par da xenofobia contra o ocidente e tudo o que não é russo características que indiscutivelmente definem o actual regime russo como um regime fascista.
E é um regime fascista a que a juventude aderiu através dos movimentos de massas, sejam eles oriundos de claques de futebol, sejam espetáculos onde a cultura pop se mistura com um ambiente carnavalesco com elementos marciais e o mito antiocidental como pano de fundo, ou ainda as redes sociais russas (VK, Telegram, Rossagram, etc), ou meios de comunicação social estatais, tudo ferramentas que dirigentes do Kremlin como Vladislav Surkov e “influencers” não inocentes souberam utilizar para formar e formatar aquela geração Z que agora se encontra a iniciar o seu tirocínio de poder.
Nesta miscelânea Dymytry Medvedev, Vladislav Surkov, Patriarca Cirilo e movimentos nacionalistas de variadíssima índole, aparecem envoltos em xenofobia e misoginia unidos contra esquerda libertária, e ocidente liberal. Nestes confrontos já visíveis em 2008, Putin surgia como o líder superego coletivo a apelar à calma e à moderação.
Putin não caiu no logro de fracturar a sociedade. Esta ainda não estava preparada para o que aí viria. Os superegos colectivos são lentos na sua formatação. É necessário a repetição do mito para que este possa ocupar o lugar da realidade. E Putin aparecia aqui como o elemento moderador. Mas não era uma moderação ingénua, era um colar-se sistemático à perceção da sociedade, para que à medida que Putin fosse radicalizando o seu discurso este pudesse ser acompanhado pela grande maioria, e assim ir formatando um novo superego coletivo.
O superego colectivo corresponde a um conjunto de normas morais e éticas que permitem à sociedade ter coesão e uma noção embrionária de nacional. Estas normas morais e éticas têm valores que sobrelevam o sentimento nacional pela positiva, mas também têm outros que mais exclusivista são definidores de uma noção de pertença pela negativa. Se os primeiros são elementos positivos de uma sociedade que impedem que os impulsos mais individualistas se sobreponham à vontade e interesse coletivo, os segundos, são eventualmente dotados de maior força e menor flexibilidade podendo por isso ser causadores de grandes fracturas na sociedade.
Neste ensaio, Ian Garner, identifica-nos quais as forças que começaram a actuar na sociedade russa e de que forma estes vincos resultaram na formatação de um novo superego coletivo e este num nacionalismo não linear e paradoxal.
Observada de fora, a sociedade russa apresenta-se-nos num emaranhado de voltas e contravoltas, cujo sentido é para nós de leitura e compreensão difíceis. Sem compreendermos os vincos da personalidade coletiva não conseguimos antever os comportamentos. Sem calçarmos as suas botas, as forças que os movem são insondáveis.
E é esta a grande mais-valia do presente livro. Ao fazê-lo, Ian Garner desnuda “pornograficamente” os meandros da sociedade e do poder russo. De que forma estes orientaram a sociedade para que esta sedimentasse num vinco com um superego coletivo que substituísse a realidade pelo mito, o indivíduo pela unidade, a diversidade pela intolerância, a paz pela guerra, e em que ambiente se formataram os futuros líderes, a actual geração Z.
Em 23 de Fevereiro de 2012, no estádio Luzhniki, durante as comemorações do Dia de Defesa da Pátria Vladimir Putin proferiu um discurso perante uma multidão empolgada e inebriada com a grandeza da sua pátria. Neste discurso o líder afirmou que a sociedade russa necessitava de uma terapia que englobasse os seus principais sectores definidores da nacionalidade russa –a sua cultura e história. Para recuperar a glória ida era necessário uma revolução cultural que começasse nas escolas e envolvesse toda a sociedade e conseguisse dessa forma o renascimento de uma Rússia perdida. Estavam lançadas as fundações dos objectivos do Kremlin no seu módulo Putin 2.0. Nesta versão as liberdades individuais deram lugar a uma cultura militarista e totalitária, o oposto do breve período de liberdade pessoal e ideológica que até aí se tinha vivido. O colectivo deixava de ser o conjunto dos indivíduos e passava para o conjunto das unidades cuja união em “facho” permitiria a força e resiliência da nação reunida em torno do seu líder.
Num segundo momento, em 9 Maio de 2012, o regime congregou e institucionalizou um vasto leque de comemorações já existentes, num único e grandioso evento que ficou conhecido como a “Parada do Regimento Imortal”. Esta parada chega a envolver mais de 12 milhões de russos, que de várias formas, na rua, em casa, nas redes sociais exaltam uma memória partilhada do passado. Estas comemorações podem ser perspectivada na tradição transhumanista do cosmismo russo. Ao promover-se uma exultação do passado através de exposição de símbolos em que cada russo individualmente celebra os seus antepassados, permite-se dessa forma recordar todos aqueles que contribuíram para a glória da nação perdida em 1991. É como se estes antepassados não tivessem morrido e, celebrantes e celebrados vivessem em comunhão perpétua. É uma linguagem e um ritual mítico e religioso partilhado em que as antigas gerações são elevadas à categoria de ícones. É uma manifestação junta as “unidades” presentes e as do passado num único “facho” de glória em torno de um líder que encarna a glória passada e o mito dos dias em que em exultação o nirvana será atingido.
Mas esta celebração não é apenas uma manifestação nostálgica de saudade. Com ela pretende-se exaltar os sacrifícios dos antepassados durante a 2ª guerra mundial, e inculcar essa glorificação messiânica no inconsciente coletivo do povo russo. Pretende-se com ela doutrinar o povo russo e em particular a sua juventude.
Esta cultura revivalista, não se limita aos discursos e às paradas. Ela envolve também a inteligência e o mundo da cultura em muitas manifestações. O cinema é, talvez por depender de dinheiros públicos, talvez porque produtores e realizadores acreditavam nisso, uma das actividades onde este revivalismo histórico é mais marcante. O filme Estalinegrado de 2013 é um exemplo do esforço revivalista e orgulho num passado não muito longínquo. Este filme apresenta numa narrativa de martírio e ressurreição e uma celebração da guerra contra o opressor, o pedófilo, o liberal, o nazi, o liberal, o ocidental, enfim, contra tudo o que não for russo, como o grande desígnio das novas gerações – a geração Z. Através de uma guerra que deve ser encarada como religiosa é proposto que a juventude colabore na salvação da nação e possa encontrar nesse despojamento uma via para a glória e a ressurreição. E todos devem-se preparar para a grande batalha, o grande desígnio da mãe rússia. Era uma cruzada, na rússia do século XXI ser religioso significa ser combatente.
Vladislav Surkov (o principal conselheiro de Putin até 2020 – o Mago do Kremlin) organizou e incentivou muitos destes movimentos Frankenstein em que é notória uma mistura de religiosidade e orgulho nas origens russa e soviética, tudo isto temperado por uma cultura anti-ocidental. A esta nova religião, que se pode chamar “Nova Rússia” aderiram essencialmente os mais jovens, talvez por estarem mais disponíveis para uma ruptura com o vexame ocidental, talvez porque sem memória do passado tinham nesta nova redação da história apenas uma narrativa que sendo apenas do domínio da interpretação não tinha como ser comprovada – não permitia previsões.
Nesta “Nova Rússia”, as claques de futebol (Fratria) eram para os jovens escolas de violência onde era ensinado ortodoxia, misoginia, racismo, nacionalismo, patriotismo e nazismo. E foi neste ambiente que outros movimentos como o “Caminhar Juntos”, e o seu sucedâneo “Nashi” correspondem a uma Komosol criada por Vladislav Surkov, e que este previu que muitos dos jovens formatados neste ambiente – geração Z – poiam, e são-no actualmente, líderes de negócios ou da política. Esses movimentos funcionaram como berçários para o mainstream ideológico e dos actores de uma política anti-ocidental e pró russo agora assumiu o poder e cerrou o “facho” em torno do líder.
Se em 2012, no início do terceiro mandato de Putin se observou uma clara mudança na sociedade e na liderança russa, com afastamento do mundo ocidental e o acentuar de um nacionalismo místico, no que pode ser descrito como um revivalismo de uma “sovietização ortodoxa”, por outro lado, esta deriva já podia também ser intuída nas entrelinhas dos discursos oficiais logo no início do milénio. Já nestas primeiras intervenções era possível entrever nas palavras de Putin um discreto e velado anti-ocidental e uma postura pró Rússia, onde tudo o que não fosse ou falasse russo era ocidental. Reescrevia-se a história e via-se a rússia e o seu povo como os únicos combatentes anti-fascistas da IIGM. Agora, tal como já então se podia advinhar, tudo o que não fosse russo era tomado como “fascista”. Iniciava-se aí uma guerra contra tudo o que não era russo, e para isso era necessário fazer renascer o espírito da IIGM.
É assim que o dia da celebração da IIGM, o dia da vitória é comemorado. Longe de ser uma comemoração de um – nunca mais! –, o dia da vitória é visto como um dia de glória, de um caminho de glória que deve ser sempre repetido para se recuperar a glória antiga e alicerçar novas glórias. É um dia em que se celebra a paz, mas uma paz estranha porque necessita exaltar a guerra para poder ser atingida. Para os russos e a sua actual liderança a melhor forma de se atingir a paz é pela guerra – é claramente um conceito fascista.
Neste seu livro, Ian Garnes mostra-nos de que forma os conceitos de misticismo ortodoxo, temperado de um revivalismo saudosista da era soviética em particular da glória e do império construído após IIGM, têm marcado esta Rússia do 3º milénio, e de que forma a sua juventude têm numa cultura de guerra, sido educada e orientada para a guerra. Revivendo a glória da IIGM, da guerra na Chechénia, da anexação da Crimeia e agora da guerra na Ucrânia (curiosamente varreram da memória os martírios que sofreram no Afeganistão), esta geração Z – geração para a vitória – , num culto de guerra que promete um novo superego que reescreva os conceitos de ética, moral, integridade e integração, de forma a que uma comunidade de unidades não tenha de tomar decisões, e assim se protejam das suas próprias decisões – o “amado líder” sabe o que é melhor para nós.
E para que este novo superego coletivo possa funcionar é necessário que as mentiras tenham mais valor que as verdades. E têm-no porque se adaptam melhor ao mito que entretanto foi criado, divulgado e repetido. O mito pode modificar a realidade e a realidade não pode ser obstáculo ao mito. Se repetido vezes suficientes o mito acaba por ocupar a realidade.
Estas, a fé inabalável num líder autocrático e no mito e as novas narrativas que este permite, a alienação e coaptação da juventude para um futuro assente no passado, são a par da xenofobia contra o ocidente e tudo o que não é russo características que indiscutivelmente definem o actual regime russo como um regime fascista.
E é um regime fascista a que a juventude aderiu através dos movimentos de massas, sejam eles oriundos de claques de futebol, sejam espetáculos onde a cultura pop se mistura com um ambiente carnavalesco com elementos marciais e o mito antiocidental como pano de fundo, ou ainda as redes sociais russas (VK, Telegram, Rossagram, etc), ou meios de comunicação social estatais, tudo ferramentas que dirigentes do Kremlin como Vladislav Surkov e “influencers” não inocentes souberam utilizar para formar e formatar aquela geração Z que agora se encontra a iniciar o seu tirocínio de poder.
Nesta miscelânea Dymytry Medvedev, Vladislav Surkov, Patriarca Cirilo e movimentos nacionalistas de variadíssima índole, aparecem envoltos em xenofobia e misoginia unidos contra esquerda libertária, e ocidente liberal. Nestes confrontos já visíveis em 2008, Putin surgia como o líder superego coletivo a apelar à calma e à moderação.
Putin não caiu no logro de fracturar a sociedade. Esta ainda não estava preparada para o que aí viria. Os superegos colectivos são lentos na sua formatação. É necessário a repetição do mito para que este possa ocupar o lugar da realidade. E Putin aparecia aqui como o elemento moderador. Mas não era uma moderação ingénua, era um colar-se sistemático à perceção da sociedade, para que à medida que Putin fosse radicalizando o seu discurso este pudesse ser acompanhado pela grande maioria, e assim ir formatando um novo superego coletivo.
O superego colectivo corresponde a um conjunto de normas morais e éticas que permitem à sociedade ter coesão e uma noção embrionária de nacional. Estas normas morais e éticas têm valores que sobrelevam o sentimento nacional pela positiva, mas também têm outros que mais exclusivista são definidores de uma noção de pertença pela negativa. Se os primeiros são elementos positivos de uma sociedade que impedem que os impulsos mais individualistas se sobreponham à vontade e interesse coletivo, os segundos, são eventualmente dotados de maior força e menor flexibilidade podendo por isso ser causadores de grandes fracturas na sociedade.
Neste ensaio, Ian Garner, identifica-nos quais as forças que começaram a actuar na sociedade russa e de que forma estes vincos resultaram na formatação de um novo superego coletivo e este num nacionalismo não linear e paradoxal.
Observada de fora, a sociedade russa apresenta-se-nos num emaranhado de voltas e contravoltas, cujo sentido é para nós de leitura e compreensão difíceis. Sem compreendermos os vincos da personalidade coletiva não conseguimos antever os comportamentos. Sem calçarmos as suas botas, as forças que os movem são insondáveis.
E é esta a grande mais-valia do presente livro. Ao fazê-lo, Ian Garner desnuda “pornograficamente” os meandros da sociedade e do poder russo. De que forma estes orientaram a sociedade para que esta sedimentasse num vinco com um superego coletivo que substituísse a realidade pelo mito, o indivíduo pela unidade, a diversidade pela intolerância, a paz pela guerra, e em que ambiente se formataram os futuros líderes, a actual geração Z.
September 28, 2023
Thought-provoking and extensively documented, where the book falls short is in its constant repetition of the same concept chapter after chapter. Good introduction, interesting conclusions, the rest could have been significantly shortened, thus strengthening the message.
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Stimolante e ampiamente documentato, il punto in cui il libro non è all'altezza è la sua costante ripetizione dello stesso concetto capitolo dopo capitolo. Buona introduzione, conclusioni interessanti, il resto avrebbe potuto essere notevolmente abbreviato, rafforzando così il messaggio.
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Stimolante e ampiamente documentato, il punto in cui il libro non è all'altezza è la sua costante ripetizione dello stesso concetto capitolo dopo capitolo. Buona introduzione, conclusioni interessanti, il resto avrebbe potuto essere notevolmente abbreviato, rafforzando così il messaggio.
November 7, 2023
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Разрушенный мир, разбитые лбы
Разломанный надвое хлеб
И вот кто-то плачет, а кто-то молчит
А кто-то так рад, кто-то так рад
Изначально я подумал, что это, скажем так, одновременно обычная и довольно специфическая литература, которая была написана в рамках продолжающейся войны. Однако чем дальше я читал, тем больше понимал, что моё первое впечатление об этой книге ошибочное. Не пытается автор показать Россию как фашистское государство. Дело всё в том, что автор просто решил срубить бабла. Да, на самом деле всё довольно банально.
Сегодня выпускать книги, объясняющие российско-украинский конфликт, финансового выгодно. И что самое главное, для этого не нужно сильно стараться и быть экспертом. Что я ожидал найти в этой книге? Анализ такой страты как «молодые люди в России от 16 до 25», к примеру. А что я получил в реальности? Истории нескольких дурачков, которые либо просто глупы, либо делают это за деньги. Чтобы было понятно, о чём я говорю, можно привести пример с американским расистским движением KKK. Представьте себе, что приезжает некий российский журналист в Америку, чтобы взять интервью у нескольких членов KKK, после чего выпускает книгу, в которой все молодые американцы рисуются сторонниками этого самого движения. Автор этой книги сделал примерно то же самое. В книге мы встречаем истории (нескольких) людей, которые откровенно ненавидят Украину и украинцев, а также людей нетрадиционной ориентацией, либералов и пр. Т.е. это истории людей, которые либо сознательно поверили государственной пропаганде в силу своего слабого образования (отсутствия умения критические мыслить), либо играют роль людей поверивших в неё (т.е. делают это за деньги). Автор, конечно, не говорит, что все молодые люди такие, но именно так книга и воспринимается.
В книге присутствуют либо те, кто радикален и поддерживает государственную пропаганду либо сторонники Алексея Навального (правда о них, автор очень скупо пишет (вскользь), стараясь больше внимания уделить другой стороне). Тут нет середины, т.е. нет в книге молодых людей, которые бы не поддерживали ни тех, ни других, а это и есть большинство российского народа (последние опросы показывают, что именно в среде молодых людей больше всего сторонников прекращения войны, а главными приверженцами войны до победного конца, являются пожилые люди, которые как раз и являются главной аудиторией российского телевидения). На самом деле людей открыто поддерживающих путинскую власть не так и много. Все эти провластные движения типа «Наши», «Идущие вместе» и пр., это всё PR проекты, т.е. мероприятия которых посещает оплачиваемая публика (люди ходили на эти мероприятия как на работу, ради денег). В России не так много искренних сторонников Путина (думаю, их в районе 15-20%). Большинство – аполитично. Это было давно известно, что российское общество аполитично. Оно смотрит на оппозицию как на городских сумасшедших, которые пытаются пробить головой бетонную стену, а на других, как на сотрудников государственных организаций, т.е. не как на идейных людей, а как на наёмных сотрудников. Есть исключения, да, но их очень и очень мало. Однако автор, намеренно манипулируя читателем, и хочет представить это ничтожное меньшинство в качестве большинства. Если бы это было так, то в России многие бы ходили с Z символами, но этого не происходит. Нужно очень постараться, чтобы найти человека, который по своим идейным соображениям нацепил бы на себя Z символику. Государственные организации заставляют своих сотрудников надевать Z символы, так же как государственный транспорт заклеен Z буквами, но обычные люди этого почти не делали и не делают. Читая книгу, возникает ощущение, что большинство россиян (не только молодые люди), носят Z символику, но это не так.
Что в итоге? В итоге, очевидно, что автор взял интервью у нескольких молодых россиян, которые поддерживают Путина и представил их в качестве большинства. Автор пишет, что государственная пропаганда присутствует везде и что от неё не укрыться. Автору следовало прочитать замечательную книгу «Это было навсегда, пока не кончилось» (Everything was Forever, Until it was No More: The Last Soviet Generation) в которой автор как раз и объясняет отношения людей к советской пропаганде, включая лозунги, статьи в газете «Правда» и пр. То же самое происходит и в России, т.е. пропаганда есть и её много, но большинство её просто не замечает. Россия – аполитичная и атеистическая страна («Практикуют свою религию среди «православных» лишь 1,4% (посещают службы не реже раза в неделю) и ещё 2% посещают службы 2-3 раза в месяц»). Увы, но автор этого не понял или не захотел понять.
И последнее. Никогда не забывайте, что сказал один француз, который посетил Россию при Николае I: «Россия – страна фасадов». Не принимайте фасад за реальность.
Initially, I thought it was, shall we say, both ordinary and specific literature that was written as part of an ongoing war. However, the further I read, the more I realized that my first impression of this book was wrong. The author does not try to show Russia as a fascist state. The point is that the author just decided to make some money. Yes, it's quite banal.
Today, it is financially profitable to publish books explaining the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. And most importantly, you don't have to try hard or be an expert to do it. What did I expect to find in this book? An analysis of such a stratum as "young people in Russia from 16 to 25", for example. And what did I get in reality? The stories of a few fools who are either just stupid or do it for the money. To make it clear what I am talking about, we can use the example of the American racist movement KKK. Imagine that a Russian journalist comes to America to interview several members of the KKK and then publishes a book in which all young Americans are portrayed as supporters of this very movement. The author of this book did roughly the same thing. In the book, we meet the stories of (several) people who openly hate Ukraine and Ukrainians, as well as people of non-traditional sexual orientation, liberals, and so on. I.e., these are stories of people who either deliberately believed the state propaganda due to their poor education (lack of critical thinking skills) or play the role of people who believe it (i.e., they do it for money). Of course, the author does not say that all young people are like this, but that is how the book is perceived.
In the book, there are either those who are radicalized and support state propaganda or supporters of Alexei Navalny (though about them, the author writes very sparingly (in passing), trying to pay more attention to the other side). There is no middle ground, i.e., there are no young people in the book who would not support either of them, and this is the majority of the Russian people (recent polls show that it is among young people that the most supporters of ending the war are the most numerous, while the main supporters of the war to a victorious end are the elderly, who are precisely the main audience of Russian television). In fact, there are not many people who openly support Putin's government. All these pro-government movements like "Nashi," "Coming Together," etc., are PR projects, i.e., events attended by the paid public (people went to these events as a job, for the money). There are not many sincere supporters of Putin in Russia (I think they are in the region of 15-20%). The majority are apolitical. It has long been known that Russian society is apolitical. It (the society) looks at the opposition as urban lunatics trying to break through a concrete wall with their heads and at others as employees of state organizations, i.e., not as ideological people but as hired employees. There are exceptions, yes, but they are very few. However, the author deliberately manipulates the reader and wants to present this tiny minority as the majority. If this were true, then many people in Russia would be walking around with Z symbols, but this is not the case. One would have to try very hard to find a person who would put Z symbols on himself for ideological reasons. Government organizations force their employees to wear Z symbols, just as government transport is plastered with Z letters, but ordinary people hardly ever do it. Reading the book, one gets the impression that most Russians (not only young people) wear Z symbols, but this is not the case.
What's the bottom line? The author interviewed a few young Russians who support Putin and presented them as the majority. The author writes that state propaganda is everywhere and that there is no hiding from it. The author should have read the wonderful book "Everything Was Forever, Until it was No More: The Last Soviet Generation," in which the author explains people's attitudes towards Soviet propaganda, including slogans, articles in Pravda, etc. The same thing happens in Russia, i.e., there is propaganda and a lot of it, but most people do not notice it. Russia is an apolitical and atheistic country ("Only 1.4% of "Orthodox" practice their religion (attending services at least once a week) and another 2% attend services 2-3 times a month"). Alas, but the author did not realize this or did not want to realize it.
One last thing. Never forget what a Frenchman who visited Russia under Nicholas I said: "Russia is a country of facades." Do not mistake the facade for reality.
Разрушенный мир, разбитые лбы
Разломанный надвое хлеб
И вот кто-то плачет, а кто-то молчит
А кто-то так рад, кто-то так рад
Изначально я подумал, что это, скажем так, одновременно обычная и довольно специфическая литература, которая была написана в рамках продолжающейся войны. Однако чем дальше я читал, тем больше понимал, что моё первое впечатление об этой книге ошибочное. Не пытается автор показать Россию как фашистское государство. Дело всё в том, что автор просто решил срубить бабла. Да, на самом деле всё довольно банально.
Сегодня выпускать книги, объясняющие российско-украинский конфликт, финансового выгодно. И что самое главное, для этого не нужно сильно стараться и быть экспертом. Что я ожидал найти в этой книге? Анализ такой страты как «молодые люди в России от 16 до 25», к примеру. А что я получил в реальности? Истории нескольких дурачков, которые либо просто глупы, либо делают это за деньги. Чтобы было понятно, о чём я говорю, можно привести пример с американским расистским движением KKK. Представьте себе, что приезжает некий российский журналист в Америку, чтобы взять интервью у нескольких членов KKK, после чего выпускает книгу, в которой все молодые американцы рисуются сторонниками этого самого движения. Автор этой книги сделал примерно то же самое. В книге мы встречаем истории (нескольких) людей, которые откровенно ненавидят Украину и украинцев, а также людей нетрадиционной ориентацией, либералов и пр. Т.е. это истории людей, которые либо сознательно поверили государственной пропаганде в силу своего слабого образования (отсутствия умения критические мыслить), либо играют роль людей поверивших в неё (т.е. делают это за деньги). Автор, конечно, не говорит, что все молодые люди такие, но именно так книга и воспринимается.
В книге присутствуют либо те, кто радикален и поддерживает государственную пропаганду либо сторонники Алексея Навального (правда о них, автор очень скупо пишет (вскользь), стараясь больше внимания уделить другой стороне). Тут нет середины, т.е. нет в книге молодых людей, которые бы не поддерживали ни тех, ни других, а это и есть большинство российского народа (последние опросы показывают, что именно в среде молодых людей больше всего сторонников прекращения войны, а главными приверженцами войны до победного конца, являются пожилые люди, которые как раз и являются главной аудиторией российского телевидения). На самом деле людей открыто поддерживающих путинскую власть не так и много. Все эти провластные движения типа «Наши», «Идущие вместе» и пр., это всё PR проекты, т.е. мероприятия которых посещает оплачиваемая публика (люди ходили на эти мероприятия как на работу, ради денег). В России не так много искренних сторонников Путина (думаю, их в районе 15-20%). Большинство – аполитично. Это было давно известно, что российское общество аполитично. Оно смотрит на оппозицию как на городских сумасшедших, которые пытаются пробить головой бетонную стену, а на других, как на сотрудников государственных организаций, т.е. не как на идейных людей, а как на наёмных сотрудников. Есть исключения, да, но их очень и очень мало. Однако автор, намеренно манипулируя читателем, и хочет представить это ничтожное меньшинство в качестве большинства. Если бы это было так, то в России многие бы ходили с Z символами, но этого не происходит. Нужно очень постараться, чтобы найти человека, который по своим идейным соображениям нацепил бы на себя Z символику. Государственные организации заставляют своих сотрудников надевать Z символы, так же как государственный транспорт заклеен Z буквами, но обычные люди этого почти не делали и не делают. Читая книгу, возникает ощущение, что большинство россиян (не только молодые люди), носят Z символику, но это не так.
Что в итоге? В итоге, очевидно, что автор взял интервью у нескольких молодых россиян, которые поддерживают Путина и представил их в качестве большинства. Автор пишет, что государственная пропаганда присутствует везде и что от неё не укрыться. Автору следовало прочитать замечательную книгу «Это было навсегда, пока не кончилось» (Everything was Forever, Until it was No More: The Last Soviet Generation) в которой автор как раз и объясняет отношения людей к советской пропаганде, включая лозунги, статьи в газете «Правда» и пр. То же самое происходит и в России, т.е. пропаганда есть и её много, но большинство её просто не замечает. Россия – аполитичная и атеистическая страна («Практикуют свою религию среди «православных» лишь 1,4% (посещают службы не реже раза в неделю) и ещё 2% посещают службы 2-3 раза в месяц»). Увы, но автор этого не понял или не захотел понять.
И последнее. Никогда не забывайте, что сказал один француз, который посетил Россию при Николае I: «Россия – страна фасадов». Не принимайте фасад за реальность.
Initially, I thought it was, shall we say, both ordinary and specific literature that was written as part of an ongoing war. However, the further I read, the more I realized that my first impression of this book was wrong. The author does not try to show Russia as a fascist state. The point is that the author just decided to make some money. Yes, it's quite banal.
Today, it is financially profitable to publish books explaining the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. And most importantly, you don't have to try hard or be an expert to do it. What did I expect to find in this book? An analysis of such a stratum as "young people in Russia from 16 to 25", for example. And what did I get in reality? The stories of a few fools who are either just stupid or do it for the money. To make it clear what I am talking about, we can use the example of the American racist movement KKK. Imagine that a Russian journalist comes to America to interview several members of the KKK and then publishes a book in which all young Americans are portrayed as supporters of this very movement. The author of this book did roughly the same thing. In the book, we meet the stories of (several) people who openly hate Ukraine and Ukrainians, as well as people of non-traditional sexual orientation, liberals, and so on. I.e., these are stories of people who either deliberately believed the state propaganda due to their poor education (lack of critical thinking skills) or play the role of people who believe it (i.e., they do it for money). Of course, the author does not say that all young people are like this, but that is how the book is perceived.
In the book, there are either those who are radicalized and support state propaganda or supporters of Alexei Navalny (though about them, the author writes very sparingly (in passing), trying to pay more attention to the other side). There is no middle ground, i.e., there are no young people in the book who would not support either of them, and this is the majority of the Russian people (recent polls show that it is among young people that the most supporters of ending the war are the most numerous, while the main supporters of the war to a victorious end are the elderly, who are precisely the main audience of Russian television). In fact, there are not many people who openly support Putin's government. All these pro-government movements like "Nashi," "Coming Together," etc., are PR projects, i.e., events attended by the paid public (people went to these events as a job, for the money). There are not many sincere supporters of Putin in Russia (I think they are in the region of 15-20%). The majority are apolitical. It has long been known that Russian society is apolitical. It (the society) looks at the opposition as urban lunatics trying to break through a concrete wall with their heads and at others as employees of state organizations, i.e., not as ideological people but as hired employees. There are exceptions, yes, but they are very few. However, the author deliberately manipulates the reader and wants to present this tiny minority as the majority. If this were true, then many people in Russia would be walking around with Z symbols, but this is not the case. One would have to try very hard to find a person who would put Z symbols on himself for ideological reasons. Government organizations force their employees to wear Z symbols, just as government transport is plastered with Z letters, but ordinary people hardly ever do it. Reading the book, one gets the impression that most Russians (not only young people) wear Z symbols, but this is not the case.
What's the bottom line? The author interviewed a few young Russians who support Putin and presented them as the majority. The author writes that state propaganda is everywhere and that there is no hiding from it. The author should have read the wonderful book "Everything Was Forever, Until it was No More: The Last Soviet Generation," in which the author explains people's attitudes towards Soviet propaganda, including slogans, articles in Pravda, etc. The same thing happens in Russia, i.e., there is propaganda and a lot of it, but most people do not notice it. Russia is an apolitical and atheistic country ("Only 1.4% of "Orthodox" practice their religion (attending services at least once a week) and another 2% attend services 2-3 times a month"). Alas, but the author did not realize this or did not want to realize it.
One last thing. Never forget what a Frenchman who visited Russia under Nicholas I said: "Russia is a country of facades." Do not mistake the facade for reality.
December 29, 2023
You can't paint a picture of Russian fascism without mentioning that so-called "Russian liberals" are basically the same. Nothing about Navalny and his "rodents", or "sandwich", or his homophobic and racists stupidity. Or the fact that Navalny's crew of "good Russians" opened offices in occupied Crimea. It's not hard to find evidence - it's basically on YouTube and in any Russian opposition interview.
Also, no mentions of Russian fascists outbursts before Putin, nothing real about Tuzla Island, or the Georgian war in 1992-1993, and the first war in Chechnya is downgraded, because it was before Putin, so doesn't fit the narrative "Putin and his propaganda are to blame".
Other than whitewashing Russian "liberals", it's a great dive into cruel and ill Russian society. Highly recommend, but take the naïve ideas such as "talking with Russians" for what they are.
Also, no mentions of Russian fascists outbursts before Putin, nothing real about Tuzla Island, or the Georgian war in 1992-1993, and the first war in Chechnya is downgraded, because it was before Putin, so doesn't fit the narrative "Putin and his propaganda are to blame".
Other than whitewashing Russian "liberals", it's a great dive into cruel and ill Russian society. Highly recommend, but take the naïve ideas such as "talking with Russians" for what they are.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
August 8, 2025
2,5 za dużo powtarzania, dziwny język
May 9, 2024
A depressing piece of work, yet important. It illustrates through real people the transformation of different archetypes. Rational, smart human beings being systemically molded into racist, homophobic, xenophobic and violent facists.
The books strength is its flaw. It explores individual journeys into a dark place or silent submission. It zooms out at times to give context but does not outline statistics or data often. I am sure these operations have been monitored and tracked, when did they peak? Are they growing? How effective have they been according to measurable statistics?
It leaves the reader informed but in a sense of frustration and even despair. Long after the dictator is gone, these kids brought up on a brainwashed agenda will live in their venomous fairytale, contrary to empirical reality and observable facts lacking decency or compassion for those they have been thought to hate. The last chapters tactics for overcoming this are hopeful imo, not that I have anything better to offer or many of us would like to play psychologist to the sick f**ks this book explores.
The books strength is its flaw. It explores individual journeys into a dark place or silent submission. It zooms out at times to give context but does not outline statistics or data often. I am sure these operations have been monitored and tracked, when did they peak? Are they growing? How effective have they been according to measurable statistics?
It leaves the reader informed but in a sense of frustration and even despair. Long after the dictator is gone, these kids brought up on a brainwashed agenda will live in their venomous fairytale, contrary to empirical reality and observable facts lacking decency or compassion for those they have been thought to hate. The last chapters tactics for overcoming this are hopeful imo, not that I have anything better to offer or many of us would like to play psychologist to the sick f**ks this book explores.
March 12, 2025
it was good but kinda oddly structured. the views provided seemed pretty narrow and there wasn't much focus on more open minded russian perspectives which i feel would have been pretty interesting. overall it was fairly good all though i do wonder if it might be slightly biased
October 30, 2023
Full review here: https://dearstrangethings.substack.co...
July 9, 2025
Published just a year after russia's genocidal invasion of Ukraine, this book seeks to explain how and why russians - specifically young russians - have been so easily and willingly drawn into the fascist and downright apocalyptic reality that putin's regime has been fostering for over twenty years.
Garner's perspective is that of an educated outsider. His knowledge of and immersion in the russian culture and everyday life are very clear, and as someone who's grown up close to that world (if not directly in it), I can vouch for the accuracy and authenticity of his accounts.
russia's war on everything "non-russian," i.e. feminism, multiculturalism, and LGBTQ rights is explored through the stories of young russians on both sides of this ideological war.
There is a considerable lack of nuance that makes the book if not one-sided, but - for lack of a better word - oversimplified. Aleksei Navalny's own racist and ethno-fascist roots are not mentioned, for instance. Neither are the russian opposition's more problematic aspects.
Russia's war on Ukraine is the focus of this book, of course, but aside from russia's invasions of Chechnya and Georgia, there is no mention of the fact that russia's imperial ambitions - their goal to "reclaim" the Soviet territories encompass not just Ukraine, but Kazakhstan, and other neighbouring republics.
Russia's portrait of an ethnofascist dictatorship is an accurate one, but the ethnic and cultural diversity - itself a result of russia's centuries old practice of settler colonialism - is not given its due time or nuance. Garner fails to interrogate the fact that russia has been sending conscripts from the colonised republics to "spare" the ethnic russian men. There is no mention of the growing opposition in said colonised republics.
Still, this book is a good introduction to the topic of russia's warmongering ideology. Take it as an introduction course and not an exhaustive account.
(I understand the irony of posting this review on the Soviet V-day).
Garner's perspective is that of an educated outsider. His knowledge of and immersion in the russian culture and everyday life are very clear, and as someone who's grown up close to that world (if not directly in it), I can vouch for the accuracy and authenticity of his accounts.
russia's war on everything "non-russian," i.e. feminism, multiculturalism, and LGBTQ rights is explored through the stories of young russians on both sides of this ideological war.
There is a considerable lack of nuance that makes the book if not one-sided, but - for lack of a better word - oversimplified. Aleksei Navalny's own racist and ethno-fascist roots are not mentioned, for instance. Neither are the russian opposition's more problematic aspects.
Russia's war on Ukraine is the focus of this book, of course, but aside from russia's invasions of Chechnya and Georgia, there is no mention of the fact that russia's imperial ambitions - their goal to "reclaim" the Soviet territories encompass not just Ukraine, but Kazakhstan, and other neighbouring republics.
Russia's portrait of an ethnofascist dictatorship is an accurate one, but the ethnic and cultural diversity - itself a result of russia's centuries old practice of settler colonialism - is not given its due time or nuance. Garner fails to interrogate the fact that russia has been sending conscripts from the colonised republics to "spare" the ethnic russian men. There is no mention of the growing opposition in said colonised republics.
Still, this book is a good introduction to the topic of russia's warmongering ideology. Take it as an introduction course and not an exhaustive account.
(I understand the irony of posting this review on the Soviet V-day).
February 26, 2025
"The youngest Russians are being brought up in a war cult that ritually celebrates the wars of the past, the war of the present and the eternal war between Russia and its Other. Theirs is an isolated, parallel existence fuelled by domestic industry and social media platforms, state-surveillance and education, and perpetuated by their social media-using peers and parents. It's a world of fairy tale, myth, messianism, latent rage, resentment, and racial and ethnic hatred built on layers of illusion: the illusion of a real, functioning state; the illusion of successful war; the illusion that the war imitates a holy war of the past..."
One of the things that baffles many people is how we got to this point in history. A point where a major European power has once again launched a brutal and unprovoked war of destruction against its neighbour. Not only this, but a good proportion of that country's population don't just support their leader in doing so, but do so aggressively. Putin's destruction of Ukraine was long planned, as examined here and elsewhere Putin long ago stated an aim to restore the glory of Imperial Tsarist Russia, in this he has been encouraged by the Orthodox Church and Russian nationalists such as the writer Solzhenitsyn and the Eurasianist, Dugin. Putin's attitude towards Ukrainians has moved from their being Russians in all but name to a people and culture which must be destroyed.
In "Z Generation" Ian Garner looks at what has been happening in Putin's Russia in recent decades. He notes the gradual eradication of independent media, of political opposition and attacks on and the silencing of targeted minorities - the "un-Russian" Other. Those who refuse to be co-opted, an act made nice and easy as well as attractive given the penalties for acting otherwise, must be destroyed. We can see in retrospect a clear and steady shift from an authoritarian to a fascist state. As all such states know it is the young who they need to secure their future, their minds are unpolluted and can be moulded into the ideological leader worshiping fanatics such a state needs to maintain its power, obey without question and die in its eternal wars. Garner uses multiple case studies and careful analysis of recent event to show how fascism has stolen the minds of much of Russia's young.
One of the things that comes out of this book is how fascism under Putin has become fun. While conventional state media in Russia has concentrated on bamboozling and terrifying the adult population with its tales of Nazi hordes at the borders and with the reassuring potential destructive power of Russia's nuclear arsenal against the NATO enemy, social media has been effectively recruited to the cause of Russia's fascist youth. After a number of false, but essentially effective, starts the Putin youth movement seems to have become a fun, self-generating and reproducing, online phenomenon.
In its latest iteration 'The Youth Army' directly prepares the young to "fight for Russia". Initiates are "morally and physically drilled, attendees graduate from the program ready to enter society with a nationalist mindset that promotes Orthodoxy, fear of the West and a positive relationship with the state and the army" all successfully dressed up in "a culture of fun". By 2019 the Youth Army had 380 thousand child members aged 7 to 18 years (mostly, Garner notes, from poorer regions), the state's aim is for 3.25 million members by 2030. With smart uniforms, exciting summer camps, regular drilling and social gatherings, the Youth Army is a place to make friends and find purpose - especially for those in areas desolate from decades of neglect.
Since the full scale invasion of Ukraine the state has doubled down on its engagement with the young whose bodies it needs to feed its war machine. Garner states: "The real action selling the war to the young isn't taking place on state media. It's online. Across Russian social media and in Russian cities, Russians have been playing out their own performance of war support. They share photos that combine the heroes of the present and past wars, hand-drawn memes that depict the "ghosts" of World War II fighting in today's Ukraine, videos of troops singing tsarist era religious songs set to juxtaposed images of the past and present..." all liked, shared in the social media world. Added to this are youngsters' personnel profiles where they share pictures of themselves in their Youth Army uniforms, with their friends, and expressing their love for Putin, Orthodoxy and Russia, reproducing and creating anew, unprompted now, the state's propaganda.
"From the comfort of their adolescent bedrooms, children can play at being fascists, hooligans, and things the Putin regime has always courted (...) In snatches of performed violence scrolled past on feeds, shared by friends, carried out by peers, a whole generation can learn to harden themselves, remake their identity, and attack those who don't follow the mob."
As Garner clearly shows "Putin's Russia has bolted the fascist dream onto a distinctly modern culture". "We ignore Russia's militarised youth at our peril" Garner states "Russia's fascism problem won't go away on its own." . Tackling the popular mindset in Russia will not be easy, many approaches, as experts quoted in this book state, are likely simply to reinforce the recipient's view that Russia is surrounded by enemies who want to destroy it. There is a need for "...methodically constructing different architectures of reality on the few positive foundations that Russian extremism has left behind, then it's up to individuals to take small steps towards inhabiting one of the myriad different, non-violent realities.". It is through social media in particular that a potential Achilles heel exists that can be exploited to reverse fascism. Most important is the role of anti-Putin Russians, the real pro-Russians who want to save their country from the dictatorial oligarchic hell into which it has been dragged by Putin. In this respect electronic "jaw jaw" is infinitely cheaper and more vital than "war war" as it is in the mind that attitudes must be changed and from which peace can be built. This book is ".....a call to action for citizens across the world who are seeing many of the same dangerous identity-forming processes unfold in their own societies", words more prophetic than we could have probably imagined when this book was published. An essential and highly enlightening read.
"By dying for the motherland, Youth Army boys can become saintly figures. They can enter the world of heroism embodied in the images, stories, films and memes the government has conjured up over the last two decades."
One of the things that baffles many people is how we got to this point in history. A point where a major European power has once again launched a brutal and unprovoked war of destruction against its neighbour. Not only this, but a good proportion of that country's population don't just support their leader in doing so, but do so aggressively. Putin's destruction of Ukraine was long planned, as examined here and elsewhere Putin long ago stated an aim to restore the glory of Imperial Tsarist Russia, in this he has been encouraged by the Orthodox Church and Russian nationalists such as the writer Solzhenitsyn and the Eurasianist, Dugin. Putin's attitude towards Ukrainians has moved from their being Russians in all but name to a people and culture which must be destroyed.
In "Z Generation" Ian Garner looks at what has been happening in Putin's Russia in recent decades. He notes the gradual eradication of independent media, of political opposition and attacks on and the silencing of targeted minorities - the "un-Russian" Other. Those who refuse to be co-opted, an act made nice and easy as well as attractive given the penalties for acting otherwise, must be destroyed. We can see in retrospect a clear and steady shift from an authoritarian to a fascist state. As all such states know it is the young who they need to secure their future, their minds are unpolluted and can be moulded into the ideological leader worshiping fanatics such a state needs to maintain its power, obey without question and die in its eternal wars. Garner uses multiple case studies and careful analysis of recent event to show how fascism has stolen the minds of much of Russia's young.
One of the things that comes out of this book is how fascism under Putin has become fun. While conventional state media in Russia has concentrated on bamboozling and terrifying the adult population with its tales of Nazi hordes at the borders and with the reassuring potential destructive power of Russia's nuclear arsenal against the NATO enemy, social media has been effectively recruited to the cause of Russia's fascist youth. After a number of false, but essentially effective, starts the Putin youth movement seems to have become a fun, self-generating and reproducing, online phenomenon.
In its latest iteration 'The Youth Army' directly prepares the young to "fight for Russia". Initiates are "morally and physically drilled, attendees graduate from the program ready to enter society with a nationalist mindset that promotes Orthodoxy, fear of the West and a positive relationship with the state and the army" all successfully dressed up in "a culture of fun". By 2019 the Youth Army had 380 thousand child members aged 7 to 18 years (mostly, Garner notes, from poorer regions), the state's aim is for 3.25 million members by 2030. With smart uniforms, exciting summer camps, regular drilling and social gatherings, the Youth Army is a place to make friends and find purpose - especially for those in areas desolate from decades of neglect.
Since the full scale invasion of Ukraine the state has doubled down on its engagement with the young whose bodies it needs to feed its war machine. Garner states: "The real action selling the war to the young isn't taking place on state media. It's online. Across Russian social media and in Russian cities, Russians have been playing out their own performance of war support. They share photos that combine the heroes of the present and past wars, hand-drawn memes that depict the "ghosts" of World War II fighting in today's Ukraine, videos of troops singing tsarist era religious songs set to juxtaposed images of the past and present..." all liked, shared in the social media world. Added to this are youngsters' personnel profiles where they share pictures of themselves in their Youth Army uniforms, with their friends, and expressing their love for Putin, Orthodoxy and Russia, reproducing and creating anew, unprompted now, the state's propaganda.
"From the comfort of their adolescent bedrooms, children can play at being fascists, hooligans, and things the Putin regime has always courted (...) In snatches of performed violence scrolled past on feeds, shared by friends, carried out by peers, a whole generation can learn to harden themselves, remake their identity, and attack those who don't follow the mob."
As Garner clearly shows "Putin's Russia has bolted the fascist dream onto a distinctly modern culture". "We ignore Russia's militarised youth at our peril" Garner states "Russia's fascism problem won't go away on its own." . Tackling the popular mindset in Russia will not be easy, many approaches, as experts quoted in this book state, are likely simply to reinforce the recipient's view that Russia is surrounded by enemies who want to destroy it. There is a need for "...methodically constructing different architectures of reality on the few positive foundations that Russian extremism has left behind, then it's up to individuals to take small steps towards inhabiting one of the myriad different, non-violent realities.". It is through social media in particular that a potential Achilles heel exists that can be exploited to reverse fascism. Most important is the role of anti-Putin Russians, the real pro-Russians who want to save their country from the dictatorial oligarchic hell into which it has been dragged by Putin. In this respect electronic "jaw jaw" is infinitely cheaper and more vital than "war war" as it is in the mind that attitudes must be changed and from which peace can be built. This book is ".....a call to action for citizens across the world who are seeing many of the same dangerous identity-forming processes unfold in their own societies", words more prophetic than we could have probably imagined when this book was published. An essential and highly enlightening read.
"By dying for the motherland, Youth Army boys can become saintly figures. They can enter the world of heroism embodied in the images, stories, films and memes the government has conjured up over the last two decades."
January 26, 2024
“Whither, then, are you speeding, o Russia of mine?” asked the author Nikolay Gogol at the end of his nineteenth-century Russian-language epic Dead Souls.” According to Ian Garner, nowhere good.
The ideological deconstruction and reconstruction of youth identity in Russia is a marked danger in the longevity of Russia conflict with the West, Garner does a fine job highlighting this with evidence and vinaigrettes throughout.
4 stars just because if an additional chapter could be added on how Prigozhins death affected this ideological construction, this book would be absolutely five stars, no comments.
The ideological deconstruction and reconstruction of youth identity in Russia is a marked danger in the longevity of Russia conflict with the West, Garner does a fine job highlighting this with evidence and vinaigrettes throughout.
4 stars just because if an additional chapter could be added on how Prigozhins death affected this ideological construction, this book would be absolutely five stars, no comments.
December 17, 2023
It is a very good book for the most part. A thorough, personalised descent into the depths of Russian indoctrination and fascism.
However there is one aspect that I feel would have been fascinating to have explored more - the internal imperialism and fascism towards non-white, non-ethnic Russians. It is touched upon very briefly, but never in sufficient detail. More specifically, how this internal fascism is squared with the reliance of Russian army upon non-white, non-ethnic Russians to maintain its numbers.
However there is one aspect that I feel would have been fascinating to have explored more - the internal imperialism and fascism towards non-white, non-ethnic Russians. It is touched upon very briefly, but never in sufficient detail. More specifically, how this internal fascism is squared with the reliance of Russian army upon non-white, non-ethnic Russians to maintain its numbers.
July 12, 2025
Summary
Z Generation gives a valuable insight into the worldview of a group of young Russians with whom most Western readers are not familiar, but the book's value is poisoned by its author's refusal to engage with his subjects in good faith.
Pages are devoted to head scratching about the question of how intelligent, thoughtful, well-educated young Russians could possibly embrace nationalism, religiosity, and Putinism. I scratch my head at the idea that Dr. Garner, obviously intelligent and liberal-minded, spent years in conversation with those Russians yet still found himself unable to comprehend their point of view.
Examples
Dr. Garner admits that he is "flummoxed by the non-sequiturs and illogicalities of the fascist world," especially this "fascist" idea: "waging war and carrying out violence is perceived as an entirely logical way to end war and stop violence." I wonder whether Dr. Garner would agree with the America First isolationists of 1939–41. Was American intervention in the Second World War not an "entirely logical way" to end Hitler's war and stop Nazi violence?
When Alina, a young Russian woman, tells Dr. Garner that a Russian doctor who left Russia to treat Ukrainians is "a traitor," Dr. Garner opines that Alina's worldview "permits no nuance, flexibility, or comprehension of alternate points of view." But what evidence supports that conclusion? It seems like Dr. Garner concluded that Alina cannot comprehend alternate points of view because Alina disagrees with Dr. Garner's point of view. In other words, it is not Alina who does not comprehend alternate points of view; it is Dr. Garner.
I recognize that my reading is ungenerous: I realize that waging war to end war is paradoxical on its face and that Alina's worldview is narrow-minded. But Dr. Garner is ungenerous to his subjects, so I am disinclined to be generous to him.
An Alternate Point of View
I believe Dr. Garner and I agree it is important to understand alternate points of view. I fear, however, that a Russian reading Z Generation will find therein proof positive that the West despises and belittles Russia, and thus that Russians need muscular Putinism to assert Russia's place in the sun.
Indeed, Dr. Garner mocks Second World War veterans who volunteered to speak to Russian students: "The really unfortunate were treated to dreary yarns told by aging veterans." Imagine you are a young Russian patriot and this is how a Western expert—a Professor of Russian Studies—describes your grandparents, who fought and died to protect Russia from becoming German *lebensraum*. Would you not conclude that Putin is telling you the truth about the West? "See—Westerners do despise us!"
It is a tragically missed opportunity that, in spite of his excellent mini-history of the humiliating 1990s and the national renaissance that Russians enjoyed in the 2000s under Putin's leadership, Dr. Garner displays little sympathy for his subjects' worldview. He could facilitate dialogue in service of mutual understanding; instead, Dr. Garner wages a self-righteous rhetorical war.
Conclusion
I give Z Generation 3 stars because I think it is worth reading, but the intelligent reader must beware the author's deep bias against his subjects' worldview—a bias which I suspect someone of Dr. Garner's intelligence and liberal-mindedness could have overcome. Unfortunately, he instead closed his heart and mind to the possibility of understanding young Russians' point of view.
Z Generation gives a valuable insight into the worldview of a group of young Russians with whom most Western readers are not familiar, but the book's value is poisoned by its author's refusal to engage with his subjects in good faith.
Pages are devoted to head scratching about the question of how intelligent, thoughtful, well-educated young Russians could possibly embrace nationalism, religiosity, and Putinism. I scratch my head at the idea that Dr. Garner, obviously intelligent and liberal-minded, spent years in conversation with those Russians yet still found himself unable to comprehend their point of view.
Examples
Dr. Garner admits that he is "flummoxed by the non-sequiturs and illogicalities of the fascist world," especially this "fascist" idea: "waging war and carrying out violence is perceived as an entirely logical way to end war and stop violence." I wonder whether Dr. Garner would agree with the America First isolationists of 1939–41. Was American intervention in the Second World War not an "entirely logical way" to end Hitler's war and stop Nazi violence?
When Alina, a young Russian woman, tells Dr. Garner that a Russian doctor who left Russia to treat Ukrainians is "a traitor," Dr. Garner opines that Alina's worldview "permits no nuance, flexibility, or comprehension of alternate points of view." But what evidence supports that conclusion? It seems like Dr. Garner concluded that Alina cannot comprehend alternate points of view because Alina disagrees with Dr. Garner's point of view. In other words, it is not Alina who does not comprehend alternate points of view; it is Dr. Garner.
I recognize that my reading is ungenerous: I realize that waging war to end war is paradoxical on its face and that Alina's worldview is narrow-minded. But Dr. Garner is ungenerous to his subjects, so I am disinclined to be generous to him.
An Alternate Point of View
I believe Dr. Garner and I agree it is important to understand alternate points of view. I fear, however, that a Russian reading Z Generation will find therein proof positive that the West despises and belittles Russia, and thus that Russians need muscular Putinism to assert Russia's place in the sun.
Indeed, Dr. Garner mocks Second World War veterans who volunteered to speak to Russian students: "The really unfortunate were treated to dreary yarns told by aging veterans." Imagine you are a young Russian patriot and this is how a Western expert—a Professor of Russian Studies—describes your grandparents, who fought and died to protect Russia from becoming German *lebensraum*. Would you not conclude that Putin is telling you the truth about the West? "See—Westerners do despise us!"
It is a tragically missed opportunity that, in spite of his excellent mini-history of the humiliating 1990s and the national renaissance that Russians enjoyed in the 2000s under Putin's leadership, Dr. Garner displays little sympathy for his subjects' worldview. He could facilitate dialogue in service of mutual understanding; instead, Dr. Garner wages a self-righteous rhetorical war.
Conclusion
I give Z Generation 3 stars because I think it is worth reading, but the intelligent reader must beware the author's deep bias against his subjects' worldview—a bias which I suspect someone of Dr. Garner's intelligence and liberal-mindedness could have overcome. Unfortunately, he instead closed his heart and mind to the possibility of understanding young Russians' point of view.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 24, 2025
Jeśli szukacie reportażu, który wyjaśni Wam na czym polega teraźniejszy rosyjski faszyzm oraz prześledzi jego podwaliny dla obecnej sytuacji to jest ten trop. Książka na przykładzie młodych ludzi pokazuje jak ewoluowało podejście do rosyjskiego nacjonalizmu od schyłku lat 80-tych, przez krwiożercze lata transformacji, pierwszą złotą dekadę rozwoju, aż po przejęcie Krymu. Autor pokazuje demona, którym jest rosyjski car. Wyłania się bardzo przerażający obraz gwałtu i przemocy. Nie dziwi czemu ludzie tak nie przepadają za Rosją, gdyż jej skrajny nacjonalizm ma bardzo pobrużdżoną twarz. I chciałoby się zaprzeczyć, jednak nie można, bo prawda jest widoczna jak na dłoni...wnikliwa, dogłębna analiza zła, systemu wspierającego wynaturzenia i humanitarną degrengoladę.
Autor bierze na cel sposób, w którym putinowska Rosja używa swojej siły do tłumienia głosu mniejszości, wspiera destrukcyjne zachowania, by osiągnąć swoje cele. Brutalna w swojej prawdzie.
Opowiada o tym jak współcześnie social media tworzą nowych akolitów, i grupy wyznania putinowskiego, oparte na obronie przed trawionym zarazą zachodzie, walką z pe.ofilią, wszystko podlane propagandą religii prawosławnej, która jako jedyna stoi na straży prawa i porządku. Młodzi ludzie przekuwają nauki konserwatyzmu i ślepej wiary we własne państwo w nowoczesne treści i dzięki temu szerzą kult państwa, które tworzy nowy ład w opozycji do liberalnych zatrutych wartości.
Autor przedstawia sylwetkę pokolenia Z, które reprezentowane przez Junarmię zrzesza dzieci i młodzież wychowywaną w patriotycznym duchu nacjonalistycznej wizji Rosji jako czwartego Rzymu. Nie da się ukryć, że skojarzenia są oczywiste z inną armią, której podwaliny tworzyły indoktrynację w czasach drugiej wojny światowej.
Mocna lektura. Polecam.
Dziękuję wydawnictwu za egzemplarz książki.
Autor bierze na cel sposób, w którym putinowska Rosja używa swojej siły do tłumienia głosu mniejszości, wspiera destrukcyjne zachowania, by osiągnąć swoje cele. Brutalna w swojej prawdzie.
Opowiada o tym jak współcześnie social media tworzą nowych akolitów, i grupy wyznania putinowskiego, oparte na obronie przed trawionym zarazą zachodzie, walką z pe.ofilią, wszystko podlane propagandą religii prawosławnej, która jako jedyna stoi na straży prawa i porządku. Młodzi ludzie przekuwają nauki konserwatyzmu i ślepej wiary we własne państwo w nowoczesne treści i dzięki temu szerzą kult państwa, które tworzy nowy ład w opozycji do liberalnych zatrutych wartości.
Autor przedstawia sylwetkę pokolenia Z, które reprezentowane przez Junarmię zrzesza dzieci i młodzież wychowywaną w patriotycznym duchu nacjonalistycznej wizji Rosji jako czwartego Rzymu. Nie da się ukryć, że skojarzenia są oczywiste z inną armią, której podwaliny tworzyły indoktrynację w czasach drugiej wojny światowej.
Mocna lektura. Polecam.
Dziękuję wydawnictwu za egzemplarz książki.
March 25, 2025
Early in the book we go over the happy pedagogic tale of Ivan the Dick Cutter, who has gained repute for severing off phalluses of war prisoners. He is intent on proudly continuing this tradition by very publicly training his child to be a sadist. This man has naturally been selected by the government of Russia to go from school to school showing kids videos of actual combat.
The book goes over previous pro-Kreml youth organizations such as Walking Together and Nashi.
The main beef is the youth army, looking to recruit one fifth of Russia's school children by 2030, which is training children to be soldiers against the Evil(tm)(c) West both on land and on the Internet. The entire thing seems rather turbo-fascist in nature.
Currently, Russia's internet targeting the youth is heavily propagandized in case anyone was hoping the propaganda only found the elderly watching TV and reminiscing of the glories of the Soviet Union. Those people also get a mention in the book, but no - the children are being
very systematically indoctrinated into what seems to be a plan to start a massive war, to collapse totally, or to incite a revolution and a reform if we lived in a world where people recognized evil and rebelled against evil (perhaps we do).
What gets a worthwhile mention is the low self-esteem of the Russian identity. What is to fix that?
Youth army also gives a sense of belonging and a sense of purpose. Who else is selling those these days?
A question that rises is this: would I have been a most loyal member of the Russian youth army, perhaps even dreaming of becoming an officer, or would I have chosen to quietly go the other way, or even rebelled against the growing fascism?
The book goes over previous pro-Kreml youth organizations such as Walking Together and Nashi.
The main beef is the youth army, looking to recruit one fifth of Russia's school children by 2030, which is training children to be soldiers against the Evil(tm)(c) West both on land and on the Internet. The entire thing seems rather turbo-fascist in nature.
Currently, Russia's internet targeting the youth is heavily propagandized in case anyone was hoping the propaganda only found the elderly watching TV and reminiscing of the glories of the Soviet Union. Those people also get a mention in the book, but no - the children are being
very systematically indoctrinated into what seems to be a plan to start a massive war, to collapse totally, or to incite a revolution and a reform if we lived in a world where people recognized evil and rebelled against evil (perhaps we do).
What gets a worthwhile mention is the low self-esteem of the Russian identity. What is to fix that?
Youth army also gives a sense of belonging and a sense of purpose. Who else is selling those these days?
A question that rises is this: would I have been a most loyal member of the Russian youth army, perhaps even dreaming of becoming an officer, or would I have chosen to quietly go the other way, or even rebelled against the growing fascism?
January 29, 2025
Overall, the book is worth reading, especially for those unfamiliar with the depth of Russian propaganda. Ian Garner provides valuable insights into how the Kremlin manipulates younger generations through digital platforms, fostering nationalism and militarism. However, I found the book lacking a strong historical background, particularly in terms of imperialism and the long-standing nation-building process that shaped Russia's current state.
There is ample evidence from ambassadors, messengers, and travelers who visited the Muscovite state since the 16th century, describing its barbaric way of life and treatment of other nations. To this day, that barbarism has only been adapted to the 21st century. While Garner focuses on the mechanics of propaganda, a deeper historical context would have provided a clearer picture of why these narratives persist.
Now, after 500 years, are we just going to create a 'backfire effect,' as the book suggests? Who will actually do that? Who will manage it? And more importantly, who will allow it to happen? These are the real questions we should be asking.
Inside Russia many nations remain enslaved - will we create an alternative reality for them?
And lastly, S-sarcasm: Let us, Ukrainians, first finish a hot war, then we’ll move on to the next stage - how to deal with psychopaths in a civilized way. Only after that, we can start the process of turning Russians into human beings!
There is ample evidence from ambassadors, messengers, and travelers who visited the Muscovite state since the 16th century, describing its barbaric way of life and treatment of other nations. To this day, that barbarism has only been adapted to the 21st century. While Garner focuses on the mechanics of propaganda, a deeper historical context would have provided a clearer picture of why these narratives persist.
Now, after 500 years, are we just going to create a 'backfire effect,' as the book suggests? Who will actually do that? Who will manage it? And more importantly, who will allow it to happen? These are the real questions we should be asking.
Inside Russia many nations remain enslaved - will we create an alternative reality for them?
And lastly, S-sarcasm: Let us, Ukrainians, first finish a hot war, then we’ll move on to the next stage - how to deal with psychopaths in a civilized way. Only after that, we can start the process of turning Russians into human beings!
July 28, 2023
I began Z Generation with high hopes but ultimately came away unsatisfied. Garner has certainly done a lot of research on the performative fascism you see among young Russians and if you're not familiar with it, it's some pretty sick stuff. But in the end he's unable to prove his thesis that Moscow is preparing a generation of fascist warriors. By Garner's own admission, the Russian state is too decrepit to manage anything as organized as the Hitler Youth. You're left with the impression that Russian parents are signing their kids up for military camps and so on for the same reason they got them into the Young Pioneers- it's a way to get ahead. Also all this militarism has not resulted in a surge of volunteers to go fight in Ukraine. On the contrary- the government is recruiting convicts.
June 21, 2024
A good examination of the ideology Putin is trying to teach Russia's youth. If you keep up with the war, you will know most of this and occasionally see this in your feed or dashboard. The book then provides one way to try to battle it but I'm not sure I'm entirely convinced by it. Given the kids are stuck in that society, some occasional health messaging may not help (which he acknowledges). Also, my concern is ending the war and I'm sure it will push them to being "apolitical" which will let the invasion continue. In general, the book examines a very particular phenomenon so it's not really representative of Russia's youth in general due to how hard the search into that demographic is currently in Russia.
March 12, 2025
/Audiobook/
This is a very interesting insight into the youth of Russia and why they are such supporters of Putin and the war in Ukraine. The author had close contact and interviews with many young people to get into their mindset.
He also dives into how social media is amplifying the effect and how the state is taking advantage of that to guide and control their people. It's rather terrifying to be honest, what people believe, how strongly they are, and how happy they are to share it outside.
I think it's valuable to read to understand the mentality of the country and the people and how they got to that and what it might mean for the future. And why the enemy Ukraine and Europe is fighting is so much bigger and scarier.
This is a very interesting insight into the youth of Russia and why they are such supporters of Putin and the war in Ukraine. The author had close contact and interviews with many young people to get into their mindset.
He also dives into how social media is amplifying the effect and how the state is taking advantage of that to guide and control their people. It's rather terrifying to be honest, what people believe, how strongly they are, and how happy they are to share it outside.
I think it's valuable to read to understand the mentality of the country and the people and how they got to that and what it might mean for the future. And why the enemy Ukraine and Europe is fighting is so much bigger and scarier.
August 25, 2023
A remarkable book about an underresearched topic. Very compelling narratives from the half dozen protagonists in the book and their slow descent into Russia's authoritarian ideology. Many times I slapped my head and wondered why the world did not see Russia's recent agressions coming.
What I found lacking in this book was a theoretical framework for assessing what was going on: e.g. the word "fascism" is used very often without a robust set of arguments. There are also quite some quotes without reference.
What I found lacking in this book was a theoretical framework for assessing what was going on: e.g. the word "fascism" is used very often without a robust set of arguments. There are also quite some quotes without reference.
February 26, 2024
It was especially hard to read this book, not only because of the content of it and how depressing it is, but also because of Navalny's murder halfway through. Garner takes special care to make you understand exactly how unrelenting and unnerving the brainwashing that a state such as Russia performs on its citizens.
There's no easy solution, nor a fast one, but the author does not pretend there is one either. It's just a bad situation and he describes it. Though he does offer his own potential solution, he only barely seems to believe in it.
There's no easy solution, nor a fast one, but the author does not pretend there is one either. It's just a bad situation and he describes it. Though he does offer his own potential solution, he only barely seems to believe in it.
July 30, 2024
Somewhat hastily put together (the author, for example, does not elaborate on some historical events, which would totally support his point), and quite repetitive in its message, but useful nonetheless. Whenever and however this war ends, the world must be ready to deal with the generation of young fascist ᵣussians who have known no other world but ₚutin’s ruscism breeding ground.
August 23, 2023
Η συστηματική φασιστοποίηση της ρωσικής νεολαίας μέσω social media, η νέα πατρίδα-θρησκεία-οικογένεια του Πούτιν που δημιουργεί ένα death cult που όλο και μεγαλώνει και θα μας απασχολεί για πολλά πολλά χρόνια. Σοκαριστικό βιβλίο.
March 6, 2024
Tämä kirja olis varmaankin kaivannut vähän tanakampaa toimituksellista otetta. Voihan se olla että olen itse sekava mutta välillä eksyin ihan kokonaan enkä pysynyt lauseissa mukana. Vai onko se suomennos kysymys. Rönsyilevyys ei ole kääntäjän vika kuitenkaan.
April 4, 2024
Good book about the new Russian state sanctioned fascism and how the cobquest of the web space has substituted the streets, in fascism quest for power. But this book is a little bit too alarmist and repetitive for my taste
October 13, 2024
Pani mõtlema sellest, kust jookseb ajupesu ja väärtuskasvatuse piir.
Meeldis, et lõpus oli natuke lehekülgi pühendatud ka küsimusele, et mida nendega tulevikus teha, et olukorda parandada, kui Putin kunagi kaotama peaks.
Eesti keeles, kuid Goodreads ei tea seda väljaannet.
Meeldis, et lõpus oli natuke lehekülgi pühendatud ka küsimusele, et mida nendega tulevikus teha, et olukorda parandada, kui Putin kunagi kaotama peaks.
Eesti keeles, kuid Goodreads ei tea seda väljaannet.
May 16, 2023
What a riveting look at the ways that Purim’s young are looking at life today. A must read!!
August 6, 2023
Largely garbage but shows the urgent need to finally start deconstructing the academy
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