Roger Scruton was a conservative philosopher and this is his lament of a vanished England, swept aside by fast food franchises and equal rights legislation. Whatever your views on conservativism, or Scruton himself, it's hard not to be impressed by the scale of the inquiry: there is religious radicalism, gothic revivalism, nation building, the cult of the amateur eccentric, public schools, lawn tennis and as many quotes from famous authors are you could hope to find in a dedicated anthology. But as well as historical survey, plotted according to black spots in need of urgent restoration, this is also quite a bit of autobiography. England: An Elegy, through guarded recollection and all too brief confession, charts the course of conservative in the making. Scruton, we learn, was not born into privilege. Growing up, he seems to have suffered from a family almost comically unsuited to his natural bookishness. His father is depicted as the textbook example of a working class philistine, bemused by education and trendy notions of self-improvement, while his grandfather, a drunk and a layabout, is suggested as someone who can only have grunted when Roger finally gets receives confirmation by letter of his acceptance into grammar school. All the elements then, for an outsider to become a born again Englishman, adopting tradition with all the fanatical elitism of someone eager to fit in where a Lancashire lad would ordinarily be discouraged, if not for belonging to the same class, then belonging to the wrong time period. Since as it transpires, the world of polished manners and panelled drawing rooms he yearns for is long gone, having died out sometime in the early 30s. Thus begins a lifelong obsession with a bygone era inaccessible to all living persons, not just Scruton, and a rather long, drawn out mourning for its all too brief existence as a cultural phenomena, which neatly brings us to the writing of this book.
The problem with this text, as a chronicle of pre-Americanised England, is its inability to see past its longing for what, for many, were the harsh realities of a far less enlightened age. Scruton is free to believe in the fairplay of the great schools, the sanity of rectors and choirmasters, since he never had to live through under their tyranny. In some parts of the country, the old ways of life go on, and there's little to show Scruton has bothered to speak to those presently affected by the remnants of the antiquated institutions. But that is at least in keeping with the meaning of an elegy. An elegy doesn't necessarily have to play fair with the truth. The real issue with Scruton's programme is that it is also a programme for cultural revival - making the case for reinstituting the old discarded traditions - and here Scruton is least convincing because, as a philosopher, he has that typically self-defeating tendency to abstract to general principle. What we need to know is why English traditions are better than French traditions, Italian or Somalian traditions but, instead, Scruton argues for tradition as an abstract idea, making the case for obeying custom by making a virtue out of obedience and ignoring the inherent value of the custom itself. It makes for a poor use of the philosophical apparatus. Arguments are general when they should be particular, metaphysical when they should be historical, and we know that Scruton is rationalising when he thinks he is reasoning because he has already given us the real motives for all his cultural pretentions at the start.
In fact, you can't help but feel such defenses would have been more persuasive by dispensing with academic procedure altogether, particularly in light of the autobiographical details in the introduction, where the indignity of social exclusion, not the inherent worth of tradition, is revealed as the real source of fascination with social forms typically associated with the elite. But a overly generalised argument can still serve as a fair generalisation on its own terms, so it's worth examining the argument for traditionalism more closely. As far as it goes, the argument isn't bad. What Scruton is saying is, I think, is that tradition, as realised through institutions, provides a far more stable framework for social cohesion than the loose set of principles that we are otherwise make do with. Drawing on legalistic definitions of personhood, Scruton attempts to secure social institutions as persons. In this way, much as corporations can enjoy rights typically ascribed to people, so public institutions can insist on their own status as legal persons, with all the special treatment that goes with a fully fledged package of rights. A spinoff of this is that positions of power (being personages in themselves) cannot be undermined with bad management or personal profiteering. For Scruton, social positions, persisting far longer than any single life, always outrank the individual. Hence, it doesn't matter that the Queen is an ass or the prime minister incompetent; that's just the kind of slapdash stewardship that can be easily rectified by the interjection of a more committed, perhaps even more submissive, public servant. Because we should remember that just as we have an obligation to obey authority, so those who occupy the roles of state have a duty to observe the norms of office. Obedience to the demands of social station works both ways.
Yet as egalitarian as this all seems, it's not clear how this justifies certain social roles in the first place (why have a Queen or PM atall?) and why exactly this personification of social station is necessary for us to take our institutional representatives seriously. It might be helpful to personify England as John Bull, since no one can really say who or what a country is - especially problematic when you are trying to get people to fight for it in a foreign land. But when it comes to our public representatives, their purpose is hard to mistake. Even the Queen, as abstract as she might appear, has specific duties, like opening parliament, just as judges have cases to hear, the prime minister a mandate to execute. And in these properly representative cases, we would no doubt feel more secure, not less, if we didn't encounter any signs of personality. Our faith in institutions, after all, consists in the fact that they are not like persons; they are impersonal, and because they are impersonal they are impartial, which is exactly why we trust them. The person reviewing our case in court will give us a fair trial because he is acting on principle, not just because we are his younger brother. The chairman of the committee will do what's best for the club, and not what he thinks will attract the attention of his glamorous secretary. The coveted roles of society are set up so they won't, in theory at least, be easily overruled by the sudden whims of personality.
But to this obvious objection, Scruton has a ready answer. Reason, not sentiment, is the defining characteristic of personality, so none of the above counter examples, all involving some degree of personal inclination, count against his thesis. We are thinking of personhood in terms of temperament. Actually, we should be thinking of the self as something essentially rational and impartial. But the problem is, apart from being a rather restricted view of personality, the definition doesn't align with Scruton's definition that comes later. In a chapter entitled 'English Character', Englishness is otherwise defined by its "coolness", "loyalty", "selfless concern" - traits that tellingly bypass the critical faculties and which sound like they could just as well belong to animals, an unfortunate symmetry that does harm to another related part of Scruton's thesis. Because as well as showing that institutional bodies are persons and therefore rational because persons themselves are rational, the other purpose of securing man as rational is to establish a strict divide between society and nature, civilisation and the lawlessness of the swamp. This is presumably to ensure that the bloodsports carried out and enjoyed by the elite, tacitly supported by Scruton, are morally vindicated. But leaving aside the fact that it isn't true that animals can't reason (recent research says they can), and overlooking the point that many humans can't reason at all (making them no less worthy of compassion) the insistence on reason as the crux of personality leads to absurd consequences - it produces the result that a constitutional body can be a person, but a wily, skittish fox can't, a wild, capricious stallion can't, but an empty, poorly-managed parliament can, and so even if Scruton can resolve the conflict of wanting personhood as rationality but English personality as temperament, any definition which asks us to embrace institutions more vigorously than flesh and blood creatures has surpassed human possibly and can probably be rejected as impractical outright.
None of these arguments, it should be restated, tell us anything about English tradition; they are general arguments for conservatism as transmitted by institutions. There’s no reason why we can’t do Englishness without this strange crystallisation of social norms, or English conservatism without the interference of state. Scruton is much closer to the spirit of England when he depicts it as a kind of heighted theatre, roles as roleplay rather than a straightjacket in which the individual must suppress their individual identity for the more pressing demands of office. On the middle classes aping the aristocracy he says: "By imitating this class, you entered it, since it was in itself a work of the theatrical imagination. And because theatre is also a form of distancing, which creates an impassable barrier between the actor and his audience, the English were especially good at it. Everywhere the middle classes strove to ape the manners of their 'betters', adopting the customs, vocabulary and accent that seemed to them to be proper to the gentry".
This is as good a depiction of the middle classes as you're likely to find. Scruton is right to see the culture as transmitted by a changeling middle class, with elitism as a crucial fiction employed to fight off feelings of inferiority. Scruton is also on the mark when he emphasises the self-conscious self-awareness of these theatrics. The problem is that Scruton wants it both ways: he wants elitism as a gentle jest, the aspiring classes roleplaying as aristocrats, but then roles as real occupations, not so much enlightened play as official stations administrated under oath. That's fine as far as it goes, it's just that Scruton doesn't take the time to make the distinction from role to role. Clearly, some roles, like being a parent or a politician, are essential for the functioning of society whereas others, like being a dandy or the village eccentric, are obviously frivolous. But because Scruton never takes the time to clarify the difference, he continually confuses the two, leading him to treat the disappearance of tweedy eccentrics as catastrophic a loss as if all the policemen suddenly vacated their roles, all the mothers overnight abandoned their children. While, admittedly, it is sad that eccentrics aren't as flamboyant as they once were, there is no comparison between the abandonment of style and the abolishing of social station. Even if we were to make being an amateur intellectual or country squire professions in themselves, with their own escutcheons and designated dress, we would then lose the crucial sense of play that animates and preserves them; since as Scruton himself points out, the whole point of Englishness is the conscious, not entirely serious sense, of performance that goes with it, that our costumes are costumes and not the uniforms of the totalitarian state - that we are a country where even the Queen might make fun the crown jewels, lest she attract the designs of a far less charitable form of public scepticism.
Yet, we might ask, why should Englishness be defined by the prejudices of hereditary wealth anyway? Can't culture be more than the middle classes striving "to ape the manners of their betters"? What you notice, throughout the book, is the absence of the arguably more vital counterculture of the more industrious working classes. Nowhere do we find any of the below floor backroom stuff that got on without getting the diploma, the unaffected masses who made their mark and filled their pockets without some smug, sexually questing mentor around to offer an inflected note of advice. The impression you get is of a fixed trajectory, with all culture, practically by definition, striving upwards. If we are to create anything worthwhile, so the argument seems to go, we must ape our social superiors, for culture arises out of subservience to patrician norms, no matter how mindlessly dictated, with the cunning caveat that they must be tied to institutions to be credible - the universities and colonial outposts that allowed men to pontificate at leisure, cocooned from the noisy antics of the outside world marching for its rights. But this too, like the personification of public bodies, leads to weird, counterintuitive results. We can have radical stuff like Wilde and Carroll because that grew out of Oxford quads; we can have the socialism of Orwell since it developed out of his time at Eton, but we cannot have the fairly mild, more politically conservative output from the likes of Blyton, DIckens and Waugh because all that developed off-campus, away from the Gothic cloisters which creak with brogue and reverberate with timid, donnish giggles. The cult of ancestry, inevitably, conflicts with the abiding values of tradition, and again, Scruton fails to show why he should be able to have it both ways.
On the whole, this is a book where the arguments rarely hang together. Too often claims unravel into unmanageable contradictions, and the central conceit of an England somehow still extant in spite of abandoning its certainties isn't really worth scrutinising. Perhaps unexpectedly for a philosopher, Scruton is far better by subterfuge than via direct debate. It is when he forgets his strict intellectual prospectus and ferments his passions that he is able to escape from the set course tyranny of his fanaticism and produce something that actually looks worth preserving. At his best, Scruton uses his talents to paint a picture of his native landscape infinitely more convincing, a landscape enriched with a subtle palette of words which are forever "blessing" the uplands, "nestling" the whitewashed cottages and refectories, religiously “redeeming” the essential lawlessness of nature, as in: “the sense of ownership which redeemed the accidents of nature” or: “refectories, monastic halls and libraries, all set within a close where grass and trees and houses nestled in quasi-rural calm.” The value of this kind of writing is that it goes along quietly polishing everything it touches, from tarnished reputations to faded institutions, touching and sanctifying even the most despotic areas of public life, from the almost eradicated clergy to the scattered remains of the aristocracy. In a very English way, Scruton succeeds in subtley where a harsh, unforgiving rationalism almost inevitably fails. That these are images and sensations mostly sourced second hand, from softfocus writers like Betjeman and Hardy, scarcely matters -being unable to look nature head on has never been part of the English repertoire anyway. Being at least one remove from reality, without falling into a reverie more typical of the hot tempered inhabitants of the temperate zones, is what makes us the strange sentimental sorts we are.
But it is in the final chapter, ‘The Forbidding of England', that argument makes a comeback. Reality, having reared its head as a political urgency, can apparently no longer be kept at bay. Poetry must cede to diatribe; the case for England made directly. To those who've followed the news over the past few years, much of the territory will be familiar: people can't say they're English anymore; suburban homeowners are persecuted for flying the flag; the EU undermines national sovereignty and our contributions go toward helping countries beyond hope. But it's not just the EU. Scruton also worries that we are becoming homogenous, that multinational hotels cheapen the landscape and drive out b&bs, that the faceless corporations whose highrises loom over our cities add nothing to our culture. While the anti-EU part of the message is now a settled matter, the anti-globalist stance is still very much a live issue, and if it’s here that Scruton wants to make a last stand against modernity, the premise isn't entirely ridiculous. Arguably, we have lost something in the unquestioning adoption of global values, where most of what’s left of public debate is conducted according to the whooping emotionalism of US television, where a ‘City gent’ is much more likely to wear a lanyard than a tie, and where every office looks like an anonymous airport lounge, there is a case for rolling back the clock, even if not quite as far as Scruton would like it.
Unfortunately, having ignored most of the modern world for most of the book, Scruton cannot make much of his closing argument. This is as much a failure of an inadequately explored conception of tradition as an insubstantial investigation of modernity. The two-sided nature of tradition, much less the non-Englishness of it, is never fully reconciled. Yes, tradition is, like the persistence of species, the stuff that resists change because it cannot be improved. But it's also the stuff that we forget about and allow to grow mouldy The truth is, for all the exceptional culture we’ve produced, much of it wasn’t very good. As soon as people got a taste for overseas consumables, they rightly donated all the knicknacks and drab engravings to the local hospice. The last century was as much a long awaited clearout of the junk in the attic as anything. But there is an argument that, in our hurry, we threw out much that had real, lasting, practical value. What we want to know then is which of our customs were valuable, which are better left in the past, and which are best left to the specialists. Until we can answer that question, this could really be an elegy of anywhere, and the likelihood is that what was really special about tradition, was that it belonged to the past - a barrier as impassable as the fences and hedgerows that divide the fields, the distinctions of wealth and class, and all the other litanies of a conservatism beautifully conveyed but ultimately inadequately defined.