It is salutary to contrast the two great disquisitions on the perennial theme of friendship that have come down to us from antiquity, at the hands, respectively, of Aristotle, the quintessential Greek philosopher, and of Cicero, the greatest of the Roman rhetoricians and orators. Aristotle’s, in the eighth and ninth books of the Nicomachean Ethics and in the seventh book of the Eudemian Ethics, is, as one could expect, far the more theoretical. He distinguishes friendships by the principal good upon which they are based, or those due to excellence, to usefulness and to pleasantness. Now, certainly, Aristotle is under no illusion that the noblest kind of friendship consists in that between equals, founded on mutual respect and directed to contemplation, what is the activity in accord with man’s proper excellence and conducive to complete happiness. All the same, though, something seems to be missing. For, as is known, among the pagan Greeks morality was not bound up so tightly with religion, the way it is for us who derive our inheritance from Jewish monotheism. Cicero’s Roman practicality and patriotic piety, on the other hand, imbue his view of friendship in his dialogue De amicitia with a higher ethical ideal.
Let us document our contention from the primary texts. First off, Cicero echoes Aristotle’s judgment that ‘Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in excellence; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good in themselves’ (1156b6-10), all the while implicitly reserving friendship only to the first of Aristotle’s categories (see p. 127). Indeed, Cicero roundly dismisses as inferior the friendship of utility or of pleasure:
The oftener, therefore, I reflect on friendship the more it seems to me that consideration should be given to the question, whether the longing for friendship is felt on account of weakness and want, so that by the giving and receiving of favors one may get from another and in turn repay what he is unable to procure of himself; or, although this mutual interchange is really inseparable from friendship, whether there is not another cause, older, more beautiful, and emanating more directly from Nature herself. For it is love [amor], from which the word “friendship” [amicitia] is derived, that leads to the establishing of goodwill….Wherefore it seems to me that friendship springs rather from nature than from need, and from an inclination of the soul joined with a feeling of love rather than from calculation of how much profit the friendship is likely to afford. (pp. 137-139)
Aristotle—what is of interest—neglects to define what friendship is. Here, Cicero supplies a definition more all-encompassing that what, one suspects, Aristotle could entertain:
For friendship is nothing else than an accord in all things, human and divine, conjoined with mutual goodwill and affection, and I am inclined to think that, with the exception of wisdom, no better thing has been given to man by the immortal gods. (p. 131)
As, after all, Aristotle limits the friends’ relation to what they share, namely, excellence of character and contemplation, but Cicero sees it as extending to ‘all things, human and divine’ and, as we have seen in our immediately preceding review of Cicero’s De officiis, for Cicero this must mean not solely the life of leisure and research (the value of which he respects no less than Aristotle), but primarily the active life of men engaged in public affairs on behalf of their country. Hence, one should not be surprised that Cicero engages real practical issues faced by friends as they make their way through life, such as whom to befriend, how far the limits of friendship extend, under what conditions friendship can be broken off, what a friend may rightly demand and the like. In this vein, the following two quotations:
In short: there is but one security and one provision against these ills and annoyances, and that is, neither to enlist your love too quickly nor to fix it on unworthy men. Now they are worthy of friendship who have within their own souls the reason for their being loved. A rare class indeed! And really everything splendid is rare, and nothing is harder to find than something which in all respects is a perfect specimen of its kind. But the majority of men recognize nothing whatever in human experience as good unless it brings some profit and they regard their friends as they do their cattle, valuing most highly those which give hope of the largest gain. Thus do they fail to attain that loveliest, most spontaneous friendship, which is desirable for itself; and they do not learn from their own experience what the power of such friendship is and are ignorant of its nature and extent. For everyone loves himself, not with a view of acquiring some profit for himself from his self-love, but because he is dear to himself on his own account; and unless this same feeling were transferred to friendship, the real friend would never be found; for his is, as it were, another self. (pp. 187-189)
Therefore, among men like those just mentioned, friendship offers advantages almost beyond my power to describe. In the first place, how can life be what Ennius calls “the life worth living”, if it does not repose on the mutual goodwill of a friend? What is sweeter than to have someone with whom you may dare discuss anything as if you were communing with yourself? How could your enjoyment in times of prosperity be so great if you did not have someone whose joy in them would be equal to your own? Adversity would indeed be hard to bear, without him to whom the burden would be heavier even than to yourself….I am not now speaking of the ordinary and commonplace friendship—delightful and profitable as it is—but of that pure and faultless kind, such as was that of the few whose friendships are known to fame. For friendship adds a brighter radiance to prosperity and lessens the burden of adversity by dividing and sharing it. (pp. 131-133).
Here, incidentally, Cicero contradicts Spinoza, who, in the latter books of the Ethics discusses human affairs from a dismayingly reductive and utilitarian perspective; for Spinoza, ‘love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause’ (Book 3, Proposition 13). Along such lines, granted, we could limn the transactional view of friendship common among businessmen of all ages, including our own, but scarcely what Cicero means by the term. No wonder, then, that the pantheist Spinoza seems to recommend a retreat from intercourse with other men in order to seek solace in a refined, disinterested and dispassionate ‘amor Dei intellectualis’. Could, one might well want to ask here, Spinoza really ever have enjoyed any significant affective relationship with another human being, such as what anyone other than him would call a friendship? It seems rather doubtful. Why then were all the Germans—Lessing, Herder, Novalis etc.—so enamored with Spinoza? Leave this as an aside, and back to Cicero:
For to the extent that a man relies upon himself and is so fortified by virtue and wisdom that he is dependent on no one and considers all his possessions to be within himself, in that degree is he most conspicuous for seeking out and cherishing friendships. (pp. 141-143)
Thus the greatest advantages will be realized from friendship, and its origin, being derived from nature rather than from weakness, will be more dignified and more consonant with truth. For on the assumption that advantage is the cement of friendships, if advantage were removed friendships would fall apart; but since nature is unchangeable, therefore real friendships are eternal. (p. 145)
Therefore let this law be established in friendship: neither ask dishonorable things, nor do them, if asked. (p. 151)
Therefore let this be ordained as the first law of friendship: Ask of friends only what is honorable; do for friends only what is honorable and without even waiting to be asked; let zeal be ever present, but hesitation absent; dare to give true advice with all frankness; in friendship let the influence of friends who are wise counselors be paramount, and let that influence be employed in advising, not only with frankness, but, if the occasion demands, even with sternness, and let the advice be followed when given. (pp. 155-157)
Nothing of the sort could be found in Aristotle’s theoretical analysis of friendship. Clearly, what lends urgency to Cicero’s account is a deeply felt commitment to virtue and to public service unknown to Aristotle but first nature to a Roman citizen. Let us exemplify the point with a further string of quotations from Cicero:
But, since, as I said before, virtue knits friendship together, if there should be some exhibition of shining virtue to which a kindred spirit may attach and adjust itself, then, when that happens, love must needs spring forth….And what if I also add, as I may fairly do, that nothing so allures and attracts anything to itself as likeness does to friendship? Then it will surely be granted as a fact that good men love and join to themselves other good men, in a union which is almost that of relationship and nature. (p. 161)
And again, it seems to me at any rate, that those who falsely assume expediency to be the basis of friendship, take from friendship’s chain its loveliest link. For it is not so much the material gain procured through a friend, as it is his love, and his love alone, that gives us delight; and that advantage which we derive from him becomes a pleasure only when his service is inspired by an ardent zeal. And it is far from being true that friendship is cultivated because of need; rather, it is cultivated by those who are most abundantly blessed with wealth and power and especially with virtue, which is man’s best defense; by those least in need of another’s help; and by those most generous and given to acts of kindness. (p. 163)
Friendship was given to us by nature as the handmaid of virtue, not as a comrade of vice; because virtue cannot attain her highest aims unattended, but only in union and fellowship with another. Such a partnership as this, whether it is, or was, or is yet to be, should be considered the best and happiest comradeship along the road to nature’s highest good. In such a partnership, I say, abide all things men deem worthy of pursuit—honor and fame and delightful tranquility of mind; so that when these blessings are at hand life is happy, and without them, it cannot be happy. (p. 191)
Virtue, my dear Gaius Fannius, and you, my dear Quintus Mucius, Virtue, I say, both creates the bond of friendship and preserves it. For in Virtue is complete harmony, in her is permanence, in her is fidelity; and when she has raised her head and shown her own light and has seen and recognized the same light in another, she moves towards it and in turn receives its beams; as a result love or friendship leaps into flame; for both words are derived from a word meaning “to love” [amor]. But love is nothing other than the great esteem and affection felt for him who inspires that sentiment, and it is not sought because of material need or for the sake of material gain….But inasmuch as things human are frail and fleeting, we must be ever on the search for some persons whom we shall love and who will love us in return; for if goodwill and affection are taken away, every joy is taken from life. (pp. 207-209)
Hence, we have amply illustrated Cicero’s high estimate of friendship. For him the following anecdote—what for Aristotle must appear nonsensical in light of his views on contemplation in the seeming absence of human interrelationships as man’s telos—will be very appropriate:
True, therefore, is that celebrated saying of Archytas of Tarentum, I think it was—a saying which I have heard repeated by our old men who in their turn heard it from their elders. It is to this effect: “If a man should ascend alone into heaven and behold clearly the structure of the universe and the beauty of the stars, there would be no pleasure for him in the awe-inspiring sight, which would have filled him with delight if he had had someone to whom he could describe what he had seen”. Thus nature, loving nothing solitary, always strives for some sort of support, and man’s best support is a very dear friend. (p. 195)
Thus, Cicero. Let us try to bring him forward to the context of our day, when, sad to say, one must doubt whether the Ciceronian ideal continues to enjoy very much cultural currency anymore, in an environment dictated by all-enveloping materialism and consumerism. Anyone who has attended an Ivy League university will be familiar with the type, the careerist so keen on getting ahead that, practically speaking, between professional duties and family responsibilities to his wife and children, he has no time left in which to cultivate friendship. Perhaps, one will be welcome to visit once or twice a year for old times’ sake to reminisce on the past. Isn’t there more to life than this? Yes, what this reviewer sees as the ideal in friendship is not just wasting time together once in a while but concerted action towards something greater than oneself, what is comprehended under that untranslatable German verb, handeln. Such memorable friendships are few and far between; one recalls, say, Goethe and Schiller’s Weimar classicism, or the symphilosophieren among the close circle at Jena who made up the movement of early German Romanticism. What is at stake in this? For Fichte, what grounds self-consciousness and awakens one to freedom is a summons [Aufforderung] that issues from other rational subjects. Without this necessary condition, one would never attain to existence as a human being.
A final apposite reflection. In all the passages quoted above, is not Cicero unwittingly penning the very description of Jesus, the one before all others most capable of and desirous of friendship? For, in the following magnificent gospel verses from his farewell discourse to his disciples at the Last Supper, Jesus declares something altogether unheard of elsewhere in all mankind’s annals and scriptures throughout recorded history, that God himself wishes to befriend us and entrusts to us the summons to bring about the reign of the kingdom of heaven on earth:
This is my commandment: love one another, as I have loved you. No one can have greater love than to lay down his life for his friends. You are my friends, if you do what I command you. I shall no longer call you servants, because a servant does not know his master’s business; I call you friends, because I have made known to you everything I have learnt from my Father. You did not choose me, no, I chose you; and I commissioned you to go out and to bear fruit, fruit that will last; so that the Father will give you anything you ask him in my name. My command to you is to love one another. (John 15:12-17)