Il problema dell'autorità politica: Un esame del diritto di obbligare e del dovere di obbedire

by Michael Huemer

Modern states commonly deploy coercion in a wide array of circumstances in which the resort to force would clearly be wrong for any private agent. What entitles the state to behave in this manner? And why should citizens obey its commands? This book examines theories of political authority, from the social contract theory, to theories of democratic authorization, to fairness- and consequence-based theories. Ultimately, no theory of authority succeeds, and thus no government has the kind of authority often ascribed to governments.

The author goes on to discuss how voluntary and competitive institutions could provide the central goods for the sake of which the state is often deemed necessary, including law, protection from private criminals, and national security. An orderly and livable society thus does not require acquiescence in the illusion of political authority.

Genres: Philosophy, Politics, Nonfiction, Economics, Political Science, History, Psychology

579 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 2012

Reviews

[Tyler · Rating 5 out of 5]

Simply put; this is the best book I've ever read.

This book will not convince the ideological dogmatism that has sunken in the mind of young liberals. However, it will convince the people that are intellectually honest with themselves. I've read 3 books on anarcho-capitalism (Tannehill's, The Market For Freedom, Friedman's, The Machinery of Freedom, and Rothbard's, For A New Liberty) and this is by far the absolute best. Accepting that the fact that the question normative ethics has not yet been settled (normative ethics is the branch of ethics in which examines questions like, "what is good?" and "what is the standard of right and wrong?"), he rather relies on intuitive beliefs that most people hold. The book is divided into different parts:

why the social contract is not valid (Locke, Nozick, etc), why the hypothetical social contract is false (Rawls, Cohen), why consequentialism and the doctrine of fairness are false (utilitarians), the psychology of authority (drawing on empirical tests done, including the famous Stanford Prison experiment and the Milgram experiment), in the absence of government (answering questions on helping the poor, paternalism, etc), examining social theories (examining theories of human nature, for instance), predation (why countries and people are less likely to be predatory than they used to be. Also, countering Hobbesian theories of government), how society could look like (for instance, how the justice and police systems may look like), on foreign aggression (why it's less likely than an anarchist society would be attacked), and, lastly, a very, very optimistic view on why anarcho-capitalism may come some time in the future.

Huemer does a flawless (if there are any flaws, I must have accidentally overlooked them) job on countering typical theories (social contract theories), why government is harmful (relying on ethical intuitions, as well as public choice theory) and gives a tour de france counter-argument to many criticisms of anarcho-capitalism (including why anarcho-capitalists may have a good counter to foreign aggression, and gives empirical data as to why these anarchists may not even need it. He also explains why the likes of Tyler Cowen and Robert Nozick are wrong to assume that private security agencies may be warring, create cartels, or come to form a monopoly). All-in-all, this is the best book on political philosophy that I've ever read. Nozick, watch out. If enough people read this book, Dr. Huemer will be considered the foremost leader on libertarian political philosophy.

[Vidur Kapur · Rating 3 out of 5]

I enjoyed this book. The author, Michael Huemer, comprehensively surveys the various arguments against his viewpoint, seeking out the strongest counter-arguments and fair-mindedly considering them. However, if one does not accept Huemer's meta-ethical views, namely his stance of ethical intuitionism, it is more difficult to agree with his conclusions. For someone who follows 'common sense morality', and relies heavily upon their ethical intuitions, the book makes a fairly solid case for anarchism.

Nevertheless, moral intuitions are highly inconsistent and often contradictory, and have been shown to be unreliable by moral psychologists. Thus, when Huemer comes up against the best counter-arguments to anarcho-capitalism, he often resorts to dismissing them using the 'demandingness objection'.

For example, when considering the Argument from Equality for democracy, which states that democracy should be maintained because it involves equally considering the interests of others, he calls it "absurdly demanding", because it implies that we ought to equally consider the interests of all people, which in turn would imply that he should donate each spare $50 he has to a cost-effective charity fighting global poverty, rather than on his personal consumption. Utilitarians, including myself, would in fact endorse this admittedly counter-intuitive conclusion, yet because of his reliance upon moral intuitions, he can dismiss it. Thus, from a utilitarian or consequentialist perspective, Huemer has not made the case against political authority.

Similarly, in his actual discussion of consequentialism, Huemer claims that although consequentialists could make the argument that some forms of government lead to the best overall consequences, and that general obedience to the law is therefore required to ensure that the government does not fall, it is not the case that any individual citizen is required to obey the law, because they will each not have any influence on whether the government does fall. Yet, in this account, Huemer neglects to take into account expected consequences, or expected utility. Whilst it is true that it is highly improbable that any one individual's disobedience will have an impact on whether the government falls, there is still a non-zero probability of it having an impact. And, because the impact would be very large, potentially leading to chaos, when we multiply the probability with the impact, it still means that utilitarians and consequentialists in general should obey the law in most cases.

Relatedly, in his discussion of rule consequentialism, which states that we should follow moral rules such as obeying laws because they lead to the best consequences overall, Huemer argues that if everyone were to become a philosopher, people would starve, but presumably that does not mean that everyone should follow the rule 'do not become a philosopher'. Again, however, on a utilitarian or consequentialist viewpoint, something like this could be the case (perhaps not with philosophy, but utilitarians do generally try to choose careers in which they can maximise their direct positive impact on the world or earn a lot of money to donate to effective charities - see the organisation 80,000 hours, for instance). Even if we use the rule 'become a philosopher if not too many people are doing so', this may still not be analogous to the rule 'break the law if not too many people are doing so', because many people break minor laws anyway today, and moral laws shouldn't be broken anyway.

It is the case, however, that even if utilitarianism can successfully defend the prospect of political authority, it may still be the case that an anarcho-capitalist society would lead to the best consequences overall, from a utilitarian standpoint.

This brings us to Part 2 of the book, where Huemer sketches out what an anarcho-capitalist society might look like, mainly focusing on private security firms and arbitration firms which would supposedly keep people secure. One big problem, of course, is that these firms may simply go to war with each other, but Huemer argues that because it would not be profitable for them to do so, it is unlikely that they would. This conclusion is highly questionable though, given our experience with various competing and warring Mafia groups throughout history and their protection rackets. Furthermore, it relies upon the notion that humans are rational agents in a free-market, when evidence from behavioural economics suggests that they clearly are not.

Nonetheless, Huemer has another response, namely that even if the prospect of war between private companies is plausible in an anarcho-capitalist society, the intensity and destructiveness of such wars would be markedly smaller than the intensity and destructiveness of wars conducted by states today. On this point, though, Huemer fails to comprehensively review all of the government alternatives: whilst he cites evidence from the United States demonstrating that a lot of money is wasted on the military and on war, it's not the case that all states engage in wars: Denmark and Switzerland, for instance, spend very little on their respective militaries and rarely engage in wars.

This, along with other concerns such as the amount of poverty and inequality (both of opportunity and income) in such a society, would lead a utilitarian to favour a social democracy such as those in Scandinavia which have relatively successfully fused together the best of socialism and capitalism, as opposed to an anarcho-capitalist society.

Overall, then, I cannot be said to have been convinced by this book, and even from an idealistic perspective, I would much prefer another type of anarchist society - an anarcho-communist, or libertarian socialist, society. Such a society would not come about unless we acquire a post-scarcity world, or unless everyone suddenly becomes pure utilitarians who equally consider the interests of all sentient beings, but it is still the ideal, from a utilitarian perspective.

As a side note, Huemer's discussion of authority and how easily humans succumb to mindlessly obeying authority was very interesting, and he himself seems like someone who takes his morality very seriously, especially considering the fact that he seems to donate a fair bit to effective, Give Well-recommended charities.

[Alex MacMillan · Rating 1 out of 5]

This definitive treatise of anarcho-capitalist philosophy was a disappointment, as I quickly spotted gaps and unreasonable assumptions within its major premises that were never addressed or acknowledged. The ideological belief that government's innately coercive behavior is entirely illegitimate, and that all human relationships should be ruled by unanimous voluntary consent of the parties involved, rests on a naive and flawed conception of individual rights and liberties.

When the individual is an always-reasonable philosophical abstraction, as is the case in this book's many hypotheticals, perhaps political authority has no rational basis. Naive over-reliance on abstraction, however, is at odds with not only all human history but also evolutionary psychology: strong individual identities have so far thrived only as creations of strong states, with anarchy in practice only quickly returning to violent, insular, and decidedly non-capitalist government via hunter-gatherer (e.g. The Rule of the Clan; Noble Savages; The Walking Dead). Evolutionary pressures mandate that the individual identities and rights of Aristotle's "political animals" can only exist within the context of group memberships (family, nation-state, occupation, socioeconomic status, sports fandom, etc.). In the real world, individuals rarely make contractual decisions without considering how their compromises with third parties will affect their in-groups as well. Therefore, although they may sometimes act wrongfully, governments can legitimately exist as third party brokers, using laws to balance our individual wants with the needs of our group identities, in a manner that private actors cannot wholly accomplish (without using coercion, thereby restoring government to wherever anarchy took root).

Once you accept the notion of group identities coexistent with individual rights (as the author's sole focus on individuals-only social contract theory and consequentialism fails to recognize), you can also acknowledge that group membership is sometimes not just voluntary. In a manner similar to membership in a family, membership in a nation-state is (for most people) an ascribed status. Indeed, citizenship in almost all nations is typically based upon fixed racial or ethnic membership – that is to say, most countries are groupings where every fellow citizen is one's distant genetic relative (e.g. The Ethnic Phenomenon; The Origins of Virtue). Government paternalism, done for the benefit of the genetic in-group it serves and protects, can be legitimate in the same manner that a parent may discipline and prioritize its children over others. The government represents your extended family, which has a unique biological stake in your ability to flourish within the society it maintains. The fact that there are good and bad parents does not mean that parenthood therefore lacks political authority without the child's consent to whatever action his parent(/government) takes.

[Dave Burns · Rating 5 out of 5]

Chapter 6 is worth the price of the book. In chapter 6, Huemer examines the attitudes of philosophers and ordinary people toward authority in light of recent developments in psychology such as the Milgram experiment, Stockholm syndrome, status quo bias, cognitive dissonance, etc. Just as Milgram's subjects gave in to authority figure and then rationalized their behavior, philosophers devised theories to rationalize the state. This chapter surprised me with its originality and persuasiveness. The book deserves maximum stars just for this chapter.
In chapters 2-5, he attacks existing philosophical justifications of political authority, social contract, hypothetical social contract, democracy, consequentialism, etc. This discussion engaged me and fascinated me. I found it quite persuasive. In chapter 7 Huemer ties it together. 8-12 apparently describe how the world might work if Huemer's ideas about political authority took hold. (This topic has been covered in numerous other books, such as Machinery of Freedom by David Friedman, and I haven't read these chapters yet.) In chapter 13, Huemer sketches how the transition to such a world might happen.
I hope this book gets the attention it deserves. If so it may eclipse Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia as the foremost work of libertarian political philosophy.
Huemer has a video on YouTube where he summarizes the major ideas from the book. He also did a fascinating TED talk about political irrationality.

[Jeffrey Howard · Rating 5 out of 5]

Michael Huemer should be one of the more often referenced luminaries of the 21st century defenders of individual liberty, free markets, and voluntary association.

He provides a cool, and intellectually honest defense of a stateless society. "I argue that the eventual development of an anarcho-capitalist order, while not inevitable, is neither impossible nor exceedingly improbable."

After taking on the theoretical, consequential and psychological problems with authority, he turns to his defense of a "society without authority." He does not skirt away from the difficult to solve pragmatic challenges to the philosophy of a stateless society. He faces them head-on: predatory nature of humanity, individual security, criminal justice and dispute resolution, war and societal defense, and eventually the move from democracy to anarchy.

This book is best suited for a lower-level graduate course in political philosophy. It is the ideal tool for winning over the mind of a thoughtful or well-informed skeptic of individual liberty.

Huemer is less of the eternal optimist as Jeffrey Tucker--and less poetic--in his presentation of anarchism but his hope for the future still shines through. "I have written as if the world's march toward democracy will continue, with all authoritarian governments ultimately destined to fall. This is not inevitable...The most salient and important trend that stands out in any study of the intellectual history of the past 2000 years must surely be the gradual accretion of knowledge and the corresponding move from worse ideas to better ideas. The process is of course not monotonic--there are cases of stagnation and regression--but the undeniable difference between humanity's knowledge today and its knowledge 2000 years ago is staggering."

Huemer shares the same disdain for The State as Murray Rothbard, and the same distrust in government monopoly as David Friedman, but he convinces others of the need for a post-government society using diplomacy, humility, and meticulous argument. His argument against statism (and its illusion of authority) with two points: 1) "The democratic process fails to ground authority, as one typically does not acquire a right to coerce someone merely because those who want one to coerce the victim are more numerous than those who want one to refrain...The appeal to the obligations to promote equality and to respects others' judgment fails for several reasons, including that these obligations are not strong enough to override individuals' rights." 2) "Institutions of authority are extremely dangerous, and the undermining of trust in authority is therefore highly socially beneficial."


There are more moral, economic, social, pragmatic, and equitable ways for individuals to organize. Huemer provides a way forward away from statism that makes voluntarism seem more attainable than ever before--even if a "society without authority" remains a few centuries into the future.

[Jonathan Rothschild · Rating 3 out of 5]

Given that so many reviewers felt this to be the best book they have ever read in political philosophy, I feel compelled to explain why I gave it a less-than-stellar rating. I will not give the main outline of the book as many others have done so. I will limit my remarks to the weaknesses I found in the author's arguments.

I found that the author's arguments display an overreliance on:

1. competitive markets as the best solution to societal arrangements. Yet the author never touches on the problem of market failures. Take, for example, pollution. Markets have not been able to adequately address this issue; this is why we have an existential crisis evolving with respect to climate change. Traditionally, the way to correct for market failures has been for regulation by government. If there is no government, then how will market failures be addressed?

2. a view of the person as a largely rational, self-interested agent. Yet modern political philosophy has moved beyond this caricature to develop much more nuanced views of what constitutes a person. (Even mainstream economics, which uses models based on rational expectations, recognizes that these are useful for explaining some behaviours but do not fully reflect what the fulll complexity of human behaviour. For example, behavioural economics emphasizes the non-rational dimension to human behaviour, yet without developing any theory of what constitutes a person.)

3. common sense or intuitions about ethics. Yet the whole reason for the field of ethics is that moral judgments are usually anything but commonsensical. What the author proposes as moral intuitions may only be his own (Western) biases that he is attributing to all "intelligent" human beings. One's intuitions are a product of where and when one was raised. (Note that the author steers clear of any contentious, at least in Western culture, ethical questions such as the moral status of abortion. He admits that this is a good example where one's intuitions are of no help. More generally, the author steers clear of any moral questions where Judaeo-Christian religions have strong views. It is not clear where religion fits into his anarcho-capitalistic framework, if indeed there is any room for religious views at all.)

4. property rights as a given which does not need to be justified. Yet, within any political framework, rights need to be established (and based on a conception of the person in which such rights are key to understanding what makes for a person). Furthermore, in the absence of a central authority (usually government) to ensure the protection of rights, it is difficult to understand which rights should be recognized and protected.

5. on examples of bad government policies taken from the US experience. Yet there are many examples of good government policies (with respect to judicial and penal systems, to take but one area that the author focuses on) in other liberal democracies that illustrate how the US experience could be considered an exception and thus should not be relied on for most of the anecdotal evidence he uses to generally discard government policy as being misguided.

[Tommy · Rating 2 out of 5]

The strongest section in here is on the psychological aspect of obedience and why people follow commands from authority but this isn't a pure political issue since no one thinks you can abolish authority but the issue is the determination of what's legitimate authority. He wants all agents (be it government, corporate or an actual person) to be treated and held to the same standards as if they were the same thing but it should be obvious that soulless entities don't feel guilt and can only have anything like morality imposed upon them. If you start by defining legitimacy and coercion in such a fashion that it's only coercion when someone is forced to share if they have everything but not coercion when someone is forced to do something just because they have notting obviously you are favouring people and since such distributional issues exist a consensus isn't really possible since we're going to be thinking about obligations and duties all very differently.
When it comes to the bugaboo of taxation of all that supposedly worthless fiat currency it's not really necessary for funding anything the governments printing press can't, it's just an operational necessity for draining spending power out of the economy which must occur somehow when inflation is kicking in. Criminals must operate differently since they don't have that monopoly privilege and that's an important difference. When you pay the price for justice it matters what currency it's in.

There are many cases in which we cannot tell whether a law is just or unjust; justice is a difficult subject. What ought we to do then? In cases where we do not know whether the law is just, we will simply not know whether it is permissible to break that law. I can say nothing here that will cause readers to be able to know in all cases what is just or what they ought to do. My only advice for such situations is that one do further research on the topic (perhaps in the ethical and political philosophy literature) and then exercise one’s best judgment.
To some, this view will be unsatisfying. A more satisfying view would be one that provides a simple, more or less mechanical rule for what to do in all cases. For instance, if we could say, ‘When in doubt, always obey the law’, many would find this a more satisfying position than the position that we sometimes cannot tell whether we should obey the law or not.

This isn't depoliticizing anything.

[Luke Simpson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Really good introduction to anarcho-capitalist ideas. The book is divided into two parts. In part one, Huemer argues that political authority is an illusion, that is, that governments do not actually have some special authority to coerce their citizens to do whatever they want them to do, and associated with that, citizens do not actually have any obligation to obey the governments ruling over them. This leaves open the possibility that governments are nevertheless desirable to have by virtue of producing better living conditions than an anarchistic society could hope to achieve. In part two, however, Huemer argues that a society with no government could potentially work as well or better than a governed society.

I found the arguments compelling and well supported by empirical evidence and by the arguments of other thinkers. Highly recommended.

[Adrián Sánchez · Rating 5 out of 5]

Me tardé más de lo pensado en leer este libro porque le puse más dedicación y estuve revisando la mayoría de las fuentes en las que se exponen uno de los mejores argumentos sobre el Anarcocapitalismo, la obra incluye los respectivos análisis sobre los fundamentos del Estado moderno, el contrato social tradicional y el moderno así como otras posturas más consecuencialistas y utilitaristas del mismos, también realiza un análisis exhaustivo sobre el comportamiento derivado de la autoridad y su efecto en las víctimas, esta parte fue más pesada porque incluye fuentes de estudios empíricos en el tema y su revisión aunque provechosa fue difícil de ejecutar, luego revisa muchos buenos argumentos en contra del anarquismo que vienen desde las implicaciones de la naturaleza humana e incluso el comportamiento, las implicaciones y costos sobre agentes de guerra.

Pienso que es uno de los libros que deben ser una referencia principal si se quiere explorar tal filosofía política en la que por lo general abundan muchos hombres de paja realizados por sus detractores, en cual la raíz del mismo argumento es el propio escepticismo a la autoridad política.

[Steve · Rating 3 out of 5]

First half of the book explains why the author thinks that there is no moral justification for government. Second half of the book explains how a society without government could function. Some of this is intriguing, some is obvious, some impractical. The second half of the book sketches how 'law and order' might work without government, and why a military might not be necessary, but there's not even the briefest attempt to explain how things like roads and water supplies would be dealt with. Some is explained clearly with good thought experiments, but much of it is repetitive and humorless. Anyway, moral or not, government isn't going anywhere within our lifetimes, or within the lifetimes of our great-grandchildren either. So I guess I'm a bit more interested in what can be done to improve government.

[Javier Piquero · Rating 5 out of 5]

Manual sobre filosofía política anarquista muy completo y recomendable para abrir los ojos y salir del engaño colectivo que supone el estado y de como este, más que beneficioso, es dañino para la sociedad en todos los sentidos.

[Daniel Moss · Rating 5 out of 5]

Absolutely masterful.

[Artūrs Kaņepājs · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author argues convincingly that we feel and assign undue authority to the state. I was left with the impression that a system where even police and the judiciary system is privately managed should be tried as an experiment on a small scale.

That said, there could be major risks associated with weak or non-existent state. First, the powerless would be jeopardized. In particular, regulations that limit the exploitation of the voiceless, ie animals, would be weakened. Also, social polarization could increase. Without overarching democratic institutions, the have-nots would have even less ability to get basic justice and security. This could end up in a humanitarian crisis.

Second, large-scale coordination is necessary to address externalities that can pose existential risks. For example, as more and more people become able (competent and having the resources) to produce extremely harmful and contagious pathogens, the subset of those individuals who are able and willing also increases. Global cooperation of some sort is necessary to address threats like these.

It's nearly impossible to judge beforehand whether there is a decent chance to avoid large scale suffering and existential risks under extremely decentralized systems. But if there is, the author's proposals could indeed lead to a more just society. The question is, who will be the first peoples to try this out on their own skin.

[Liquidlasagna · Rating 3 out of 5]

great flaws but highly interesting criticisms in places

[Lord_Humungus · Rating 4 out of 5]

*Political authority (hereafter, just ‘authority’) is the hypothesized moral property in virtue of which governments may coerce people in certain ways not permitted to anyone else and in virtue of which citizens must obey governments in situations in which they would not be obligated to obey anyone else. Authority, then, has two aspects:   (i)   Political legitimacy: the right, on the part of a government, to make certain sorts of laws and enforce them by coercion against the members of its society – in short, the right to rule.  (ii)  Political obligation: the obligation on the part of citizens to obey their government, even in circumstances in which one would not be obligated to obey similar commands issued by a nongovernmental agent. If a government has ‘authority’, then both (i) and (ii) exist: the government has the right to rule, and the citizens have the obligation to obey.*


El autor, Michael Huemer, es un anarquista confeso desde la primera página, así que la pregunta principal que me hacía al comenzar el libro es cuándo empezarían las tonterías.

Empiezan relativamente tarde. El autor monta un ataque contra las teorías del contrato social que -a la espera de leerme "A Theory of Justice", de [[John Rawls]]-, me pareció muy efectivo.

Las tonterías empiezan en el capítulo contra las teorías consecuencialistas. Son las que dicen básicamente lo que yo pienso: que el Estado provee bienes que no podrían existir sin él: los más importantes son la coordinación, la defensa militar, y la persecución del crimen.

Primero ataca el problema de la redundancia individual (5.1.4): aunque una persona deje de obedecer la ley, eso no provocaría el colapso del gobierno. Este ataque es absurdo por parte de alguien que defiende el anarquismo, es decir, que defiende que *todos* dejemos de obedecer.

Después ataca (5.2) el consecuencialismo de la regla (uno debe actuar siguiendo reglas que, si se adoptasen generalmente, tendrían las mejores consecuencias). Él dice que eso depende del caso: es cierto que no debemos pisar el cesped, porque si todo el mundo lo pisara, se estropearía; pero no es cierto que sea inmoral meterse a profesor de filosofía, aunque si todo el mundo lo hiciera nos moriríamos de hambre. Este ataque se deja sin culminar, porque el cese de la obediencia al Estado es como el ejemplo del césped, no como el ejemplo del profesor de filosofía.

En el 5.3 ataca el concepto de la ecuanimidad (fairness). El Fair Play no es un argumento consecuencialista. El argumento viene a decir que si todos están achicando agua para que la barca no se hunda, aunque tu ayuda no sea estrictamente necesaria, sería *injusto* que tú no colaboraras. Aquí Huemer ya va muy perdido, porque el Estado es como el ejemplo del césped: si pisásemos todos el césped éste se estropearía; no es que sea injusto para los demás que pises el césped (a no ser que identifiques justicia y bien), sino que no hay que pisar el césped porque si todo el mundo lo hiciera, las consecuencias serían negativas.

5.3.2, "obedience as the cost of political goods": aquí está la "chicha"

*The appeal to the good consequences of government fails to ground authority because an individual’s obedience to the law has no impact on the state’s ability to provide those benefits, and an agent’s provision of large overall benefits does not confer on the agent an entitlement to coerce others to obey the agent’s commands independent of the content of those commands.*

Huemer dice que uno está obligado a contribuir a achicar agua en la barca que se hunde, porque achicar está causalmente conectado con el bien que se busca (sobrevivir), pero no está obligado a rezar a Poseidón o a preparar un sandwich porque otro lo diga. Uno está obligado a pagar impuestos para los bienes "hard" del gobierno (defensa, ley, coordinación), pero no para perseguir la droga, prohibir la marihuana, prohibir ejercer de abogado sin título, o comprar una hora laboral por debajo de $7.25, o comprar sexo por cualquier cantidad, o vender comida empaquetada sin especificar las calorías, o vender estevia como "aditivo alimentario" en lugar de como "complemento dietético". Así que las obligaciones políticas no son contenido-independientes: uno debe examinar el contenido de cada ley particular para determinar si la conducta que impone contribuye de verdad a la provisión de bienes políticos importantes antes de decir si uno tiene una razón basada en la ecuanimidad para obedecer esa ley. Pero nótese que a ciertos bienes producidos por el Estado, que Huemer cree que son muy importantes (defensa, persecución del crimen y coordinación con reglas comunes) no se los ataca en esta sección. Él dice que no es necesario el Estado para proveerlos, pero deja la "prueba" de eso a la Segunda Parte del Libro, y como la Segunda Parte, en mi opinión, falla, el argumento se derrumba. Pero me sigue impresionando el argumento de "¿de verdad crees que el Estado tiene derecho a coaccionarte para pagar impuestos so pena de acabar en prisión, para gastárselos en obligar a las empresas a especificar las calorías en los envases?"

5.3.3 Political obligation for dissenters
¿Tiene uno la obligación de ayudar en proyectos a los que uno sinceramente se opone, aunque no tenga razón? ¿Es injusto que no ayude, si la materia es razonablemente discutible? Lo que yo creo: claro que no es injusto, pero el Estado debe obligarte a ayudar de todos modos, pues no puede distinguir a los que se oponen sinceramente de los free-riders.

5.3.4 Particularity and the question of alternative goods: "it is not wrong to evade one's taxes to send the money to charity; indeed, doing so is praiseworthy". Yo esto no lo discuto, siempre que uno esté seguro de que ese dinero realmente es más útil en la charity, algo de lo que Huemer está muy seguro, pero yo, no.

5.4.1 A consequentialist account of legitimacy: "*normally, it is wrong to threaten a person with violence to force compliance with some plan of yours. This is generally true even if your plan is mutually beneficial and otherwise morally acceptable*" (hace una excepción a esto en caso de emergencia: "it is permissible to coerce a person or violate a person's property rights, provided that doing so is necessary to prevent something *much* worse from happening". Así que "the state's legitimate powers must be highly specific and content-dependent: the state may coerce individuals only in the minimal way necessary to implement a correct (or at least well-justified) plan for protecting society from the sorts of disasters that allegedly would result from anarchy". Nótese que aquí se defiende un estado mínimo, pero no la anarquía.

5.4.3. Supremacy (esta parte está mal en el formato epub, pero bien en el pdf)
El estado no tiene derecho de supremacía. Si es moral que pueda en algunas circunstancias usar la coacción, ¿por qué es inmoral que lo haga un individuo o entidad privada, en las mismas circunstancias?

En la parte II se describe una sociedad anarquista.

La protección policial la efectuarían agencias privadas, y si hubiera conflicto, este se resolvería por agencias de arbitraje privadas.

No queda muy claro cómo funcionaría la "jurisdicción" de las agencias privadas. En la actualidad, el Estado tiene jurisdicción sobre todo el territorio. ¿Quién me protegería cuando cambio de barrio? ¿Cuando cambio de calle? Un guardaespaldas que me siga siempre es demasiado caro. ¿Y si mi comunidad de vecinos elige a una compañía, pero dos vecinos quieren otra? Menudo follón.

¿Y si hay conflictos entre agencias?

*Suppose Jon accuses Sally of stealing his cat. He informs his security agency of the theft and asks them to retrieve the cat. But Sally notifies her security agency that Jon is attempting to steal her cat and asks them to defend the cat. If Jon and Sally patronize the same security agency, this agency may hire an arbitration company to determine to whom the cat belongs, so that the agency may decide whose claim to enforce. If Jon and Sally patronize different agencies, the two agencies will jointly select an arbitration company, with the understanding that both will accept the verdict of the arbitrator.*

Vale. Y si no se ponen de acuerdo en qué arbitrator elegir, ¿entonces qué pasa?

Huemer cree que las guerras entre agencias de seguridad privadas serían raras:

*But war is, putting it mildly, expensive. If a pair of agencies go to war with one another, both agencies, including the one that ultimately emerges the victor, will most likely suffer enormous damage to their property and their employees. It is highly improbable that a dispute between two clients would be worth this kind of expense. If at the same time there are other agencies in the region that have not been involved in any wars, the latter agencies will have a powerful economic advantage. In a competitive marketplace, agencies that find peaceful methods of resolving disputes will outperform those that fight unnecessary battles. Because this is easily predictable, each agency should be willing to resolve any dispute peacefully, provided that the other party is likewise willing.*

*If a rogue protection agency decides to buck the trend by supporting criminals, it
will find itself locked in perpetual and hopeless conflict with far more profitable and numerous protection agencies financed by noncriminal customers.

En su descripción de la arcadia anarquista, Huemer olvida que los mercados no son de competencia perfecta, y éste es el error básico del libro, que lo permea todo. El mercado libre tiene fallos. La competición entre agencias no aseguraría la Arcadia, igual que la competición entre empresas hoy en día tampoco lo hace. El mundo actual no es un infierno precisamente porque las empresas están reguladas por un poder mayor y no pueden hacer lo que quieran. ¿Qué impediría que poderosas y ricas empresas contratasen a agencias de seguridad malvadas locales para deshacerse de personas molestas que hubieran contratado agencias de seguridad benignas pero poco poderosas? Esto ya sucede actualmente como consecuencia de las fuerzas del mercado y en presencia del Estado. Con más razón sucedería si no hubiera Estado.

Otro presupuesto de Huemer son los derechos, especialmente el derecho a la propiedad privada, que da por hecho, sin justificarlos en otros principios más fundamentales.

De momento creo que el libro lo hace bien negando que exista derecho a la coacción para lograr objetivos no esenciales. Pero nada más.

[Luca Marco · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very good book. I quite like the approach of common sense morality applied to governments policy. It really does show how truly wrong the State is. However, I do think that the author many times concedes too much to the contrarian position and occasionally comes of as a consequentialist himself, where he argues that in some instances government could be justified. I still give it a 5 star rating because the chapter about government psychology is based af and the author's sympathy for civil disobedience is something I agree with a lot. On the other hand, he relies heavily on dilemma situations and weird examples.

[Nick Geiser · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a systematic criticism of the concept of political authority, which Huemer analyzes as 1) a power to create duties and 2) a right to coerce. Part I attempts to show that the state has no power to create duties, while Part II attempts to show that the state has no right to coerce. The two parts of the book really are separable, and you can accept the conclusions of each part without accepting the other. For example, you could believe that there is not duty to obey the state, but that there should be states that they may coerce people to do certain things. This position is also consistent with believing that a much better society would be stateless. This position is known as "philosophical anarchism." You could also believe that states have no right to coerce, but that we have a duty to obey them. I don't know of many people who hold this view, but it is a logically consistent one.

Part I is a philosophical reconstruction and response to the dominant theories of political obligation (i.e. a duty to obey the state). Part II relies on empirical research and social science to argue that states lack a right to coerce by showing how many state functions could be carried out by individuals or private organizations. For my part, I regard the conclusions of Part I as decisive and Part II as plausible.

One of the great virtues of this book is its methodology. The best philosophical argument starts from simple, widely-shared premises and generates surprising, unexpected conclusions (think Peter Singer's "Famine, Affluence, and Morality"). Rather than start with a particular political theory, Huemer starts from a set of very plausible intuitions. This is a welcome reprieve from a lot of contemporary political theory, which starts from within a very particular research program.

[Henrik · Rating 5 out of 5]

I really enjoyed this book. It is the first book on political philosophy I've read so wasn't sure what to expect but it is easy to read and not dependent on any (abstract) theory. The author discusses the problem of political authority in a 'common sens' setting and how and why anarcho-capitalism might be a better alternative. If, like me, you think anarcho-capitalism sounds ridiculous, this is the book for you. It is one of those rare books that might radically change your perspective (you won't look at a goverment quite the same way again). One thing lacking is a discussion of these societies in relation to global threats. One thing that goverments (and perhaps even larger structures) could be good for is working to meet scenarios of global impact (asteroid, climate change).

[Joseph · Rating 4 out of 5]

There is nothing particularly exciting about Huemer's style of writing. You have got to want this knowledge in order to enjoy this book. That being said, I really enjoyed his book. The section on the Psychology of Authority is simply fantastic.

For the armchair anarchist I still prefer Rose's The Most Dangerous Superstition, but Huemer's text definitely makes you look more respectable.

[Eric Pavao · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent. I can't recommend this book enough.

[Andreas Bodemer · Rating 2 out of 5]

Huemer makes a well crafted argument for Anarcho-Capitalism--one that I don't buy.

Still, it was provocative, and it challenged me. So, I have respect for the author and his arguments.

[Marco · Rating 5 out of 5]

In this book, Michael Huemer aims to address one of the central questions of political philosophy: is there a legitimate source for the authority of a government? That question can be dismembered in two parts: first, whether there is a justification that allows government to impose to its subjects laws, even when they don't automatically follow from moral duties; second, whether the subjects have a duty to obey the laws created by the state.

Huemer dedicates the first chapter to an exploration of that question, by exploring the limitations usually established on political authority and delimiting the distinctive features of political authority. He also states his strategy: to start from (relatively) accepted concepts instead of applying a specific theoretical framework as a basis for his criticism of political authority.

In chapter 2, the author discusses the traditional theories of social contract. He divides the traditional contractualist accounts of political authorities: explicit versions, that refer to an actual contract accepted by the citizens as the source of authority, and implicit theories, which define certain social behaviours as implicit acceptance of a social contract. Explicit theories, such as the Lockean vision, are given an analysis that, while brief, is still enough to show their shortcomings, especially in the inter-generational question. The author then changes his focus to the analysis of implicit social contract theories, arguing that the claims of an implicit acceptance of the social contract fail to meet the criteria usually established for valid consent (for example, the existence of a reasonable opt-out as an alternative to the acceptance of the contract).

An alternate model of social contracts forsakes the question of an actual contract altogether, basing political authority on the hypothesis that "individuals *would* consent to the state under certain hypothetical conditions.". Chapter 3 is dedicated to the analysis of such models, popularized by Rawls, Scanlon and others; there, the author argues that switching from actual to hypothetical consenting fails to provide a justification for political authority, since it falls short of the usual criteria for consent. This is due, in part, to the fact that rational disagreement is possible even if one accounts for all differences motivated by circumstances, as argued by Berlin (value pluralism) and others.

After presenting his arguments that neither actual nor hypothetical consent provide an adequate source for political authority, the book then switches its focus to the idea that, even if it is not possible to obtain the consent of every citizen, the will of a majority is by itself strong enough to generate obligations to the whole of the population. Chapter 4, therefore, deals with deliberative democracy, that, while having many merits -- especially when compared with other proposed models of government --, still fails to offer an acceptable basis for either political obligation or political legitimacy.

Chapter 5 addresses consequentialist narratives of political authority. While those narratives manage to justify some (but not even most) of the roles claimed by the state (especially security and justice), they nevertheless fail to provide the context-independent and comprehensive basis required for authority, while also failing to make a solid claim for the monopolies of the state. If something has consequences good enough to justify the state acting in a certain way, consequentialist narratives do not establish beyond doubt that a non-state actor could not achieve the same goals. For example, a government would have no legitimacy to prevent a NGO from punishing criminals, provided it follows the same laws and procedures that the state would follow; arguing that the state has unique prerogatives, here, would be circular reasoning, since that's what one intends to establish in the first place.

After pointing the weaknesses on the traditional philosophical accounts of political authority, the author then follows with the best chapter on the book: a survey of what psychological science can tell us about political authority. Through references to many known (and studied) psychological phenomena, it shows that our political intuitions are subject to many cognitive biases that can make people liable to accepting otherwise illegitimate authority. Based on this, and on his ethical intuitionism, the author claims that the conclusions of the previous chapters show that political authority lacks the solid grounding usually associated with it. Here I must make a special mention of Huemer's discussion of the formal aspects of authority, a topic sadly ignored by much of the libertarian literature.

Given that the first chapters present a serious case against political authority, an obvious question follows: "if that holds, then what?"
Chapter 7 begins to answer that question, by addressing what a state could legitimately do and how it can act. It also addresses how government agents and other citizens could act against unjust state action -- considering both non-violent and violent resistance -- and answers some possible objections against such courses of resistance.

After establishing that the usual accounts of political authority lack the solidity that would be necessary to justify the extent of the powers conferred upon the modern national state, the second part of the book is dedicated to the exploration of how a society without political authority could function. It begins with Chapter 8, where some of the relevant criteria for the evaluation of social models are discussed. Based on the analysis done until this point, the author establishes a simplified model of human nature as a starting point for his analysis: humans are approximately rational (despite their biases, they usually act in a way consistent with their goals an beliefs), relatively selfish (that is, not entirely devoid of morality and bonds with other people) and aware of their environment. The chapter finishes with a discussion of utopianism and realism, setting for Part II the aim of establishing a realist market anarchist framework.

Chapter 9 discusses the problem of political predation, opposing Hobbes's claim that the government would provide protection from the "war of all against all". To make his point, Huemer argues that not only the absence of a state would not turn interpersonal violence into a rational choice (especially when one takes into account cultural factors), but also that states give means for oppression. For totalitarian states, the latter claim is pretty straightforward; one could spend a life enumerating the cases of dictators using the machinery of government for their own enrichment. Based on the insights of Public Choice theory, the author takes the claim further, by arguing that even democracies can be tools for predation, be it from majorities against minorities, from voters against non-voters or from special interest groups with disproportionate influence. To make things worse, the usual mechanisms that democracies use to prevent such risks -- activism, media exposition, and constitutional checks -- fail to prevent the misuse of political authority; they may mitigate the problem, but not eliminate it altogether.

The following chapters discuss how a market anarchist society could provide security and justice to its citizens. Huemer's answer to that involves a system of private protection agencies to provide physical and material security to its clients, and arbitration firms to solve disputes between individuals and between companies. Such businesses, unlike their government counterparts, would not have a monopoly; instead, they would compete in the market for clients, which could choose services more adequate to their needs. The barriers for entrance in such markets would be very small (for example, forming a local militia or being recognized locally as a fair judge); since it would not be feasible to maintain a monopoly, the companies would need to be more responsive to their clients, therefore providing services more adequate to the needs and means of customers. Since reputation would play an important role in such markets, companies would have economical stimuli to be as transparent and fair as possible, in order to retain their clients.

A major objection to such a scheme comes from the possibility of conflict between protection agencies; in fact, authors have claimed that such a fragmentation of power would make conflict more likely. While Chapter 10 argues that protection agencies would not have incentives to fight one another, Chapter 12 presents a more significant response to the such objections, pointing out that the smaller scale of those agencies would result in less destructive conflicts than the ones between militarized states. More than that: the author points out how the needs of "national defence" proposed by realist literature in fact may lead to increased security risks, and how even societies without standing armies could resist an invasion through non-violent resistance or guerilla warfare. The chapter also proposes conditions in which a market anarchist society could peacefully thrive, inspired on Kant's "democratic peace". While the chapter addresses many of the theoretical questions of international security, it understate some of the threats, such as the massive cost imposed upon civilians by even a successful guerilla campaign, and the relevance of weapons of mass destruction, which can increase considerably the potential harm that comes from a conflict.

Chapter 13 presents a feasible, if optimistic, model for transition: the emergence of competing, viable alternatives to essential state functions, followed by bottom-up privatization fueled by cultural change. The optimism is based on a certain -- and debatable -- view of human progress; that view, however, falls short of the error of treating progress as a linear, inevitable historical process. The book ends with a summary of the main points of both parts, concluding that not only political authority is not as solid as usually thought, but it is also unnecessary for the functioning of society.

The book is at its best while dismantling the justificatory discourses of political authority, presenting not only a tight argumentation but also solid real-world evidence. When the book moves into the positive aspect of its proposal, the problems begin to appear: not that the arguments get any less solid, but they leave many open questions, especially in practical terms. While that's a reflex both of the priorities of libertarian scholarship and the speculation inherent to the exploratory purpose of Part II, Huemer's interdisciplinary approach is very instructive, both in its strengths and its weaknesses, by showing a mostly cohesive framework that can be improved. Combined with the power of Part I, this makes "The Problem of Political Authority" a very instructing book and a must-read for a general perspective on contemporary market anarchist thought.

[Niklas · Rating 5 out of 5]

Michael Huemer did change multiple of my deeply held believes, most importantly he Weber-Hobbesian (tragic) account of the necessity of state authority.

It was interesting to go on such a mind-bending journey into my own belief system and why I took the Hobbes-Weber view for granted for as long as I've been thinking about political philosophy.

Michael Huemer is the great destroyer among philosophers of our age.

His method comes off as innocent and unseeming: 1) inquire our intuitions, why we think this is the right thing to do in this situation? 2) ask the reader: why not? why is it that we tolerate actions by the state that we would deem immoral if private actors were to do them? 3) choose the least controversial among these intuitions as the initial candidates for the correct theory of authority. 4) what do the most common theories of political authority have to say about it, what justifies state authority?

He finds that the theories that justify state authority are faulty. It's mesmerising to learn just how these theories (e.g. Rawls, Habermas) have permeated our thinking (at least mine), and I've never thought to question them. The book is delivering these "aha" moments continuously.

He convinced me almost in every single point, his moral philosophy and economic reasoning are impeccable. And I believe it can be quite convincing to the uninitiated reader or someone who is not already a libertarian - precisely because the way Huemer argues is exactly the opposite of what you'd expect to read from someone who takes an extreme position: he doesn't ask the reader to believe any extreme assumptions, he argues from common-sense morality that anyone could agree to.

It may be too much to expect from someone who doesn't believe that markets are a good instrument for social cooperation to not initially distrust his economic reasoning - but if anything could convince someone to re-think deeply held believes, it's reading Michael Huemer.

The only area where I'm not fully convinced is national defence and especially international relations between states - I find his treat of this subject too short and ahistorical to be convincing.

[Sam · Rating 5 out of 5]

a very cogent and cohesive defense of anarchism. it's split into two halves: the first demonstrates anarchism as a more just system (thus defending philosophical anarchism) whereas the second part tries to show the practical viability of anarchism (political anarchism.) less capitalistic anarchists would probably frown at huemer's optimism for markets in the second half, but the first half is some very strong stuff that is hard to dismiss.

what distinguishes huemer is his approach to political philosophy. rather than postulate what the best kind of state is, huemer begs the question of why we should obey a state at all. he uses a bunch of examples to show that all the powers and rights we ascribe to the state could never be used to justify similar actions by private individuals (or groups.) it's emphasized that every law is backed up by coercion and violence (if you disobey the state all the way, what happens?), and so presumptively those actions are morally suspect. huemer spends chapter by chapter in the first half breaking down theories of political authority, showing that social contract theory, consequentialism, fairness, and democracy are all insufficient to justify the state's actions.

the style here is refreshingly clear. huemer explicitly uses a common-sense approach to ethics, using appeals to intuition in his examples to show the limits of our principles. that we shouldn't use violence on each other is a basic ethic, but huemer shows how far we can take that principle by using it to justify complete disobedience towards the state.

admittedly, i came into this book knowing some of the key arguments and sympathizing with huemer's philosophical bent. still, i think this is a very strong defense of anarchist and libertarian principles. it would be easy to dismiss huemer outright, as it is for any anarchist, but i would be curious to see a reasoned response to the arguments he makes here. regardless, this book is a unique perspective on politics, and i think a well-rounded thinker would do well to consider it.

[Robert Jere · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book questions the very popular idea that government (at least a liberal democratic one) has the right to use force against people, and the people have a corresponding duty to obey it's orders. The book is organised in two parts, the first part deals with the ways in which the authority of the government is usually justified. The second part is a treatise on how an anarcho-capitalist society could work.
Since my political views are almost identical to those of the author, i found most of the book uncontroversial. I have read several ideas on political theory but the one in this book is the best yet. The author, unlike most libertarian/political theorists, does not use any metaethical theory to ground his politics. He simply asks the reader whether a certain behavior of the government that we take for granted would be tolerated from a non-governmental agency. While this method seems rather benign, it leads to very radical conclusions.
There are several things that i found underwhelming about the book. The first is that it is too centered on the USA for a book on political philosophy. The second thing is a chapter on the psychology of authority. While i admit that human beings are biased in ways that are beneficial to government authority, I found the use of results from psychology experiments rather dubious. Some of those experiments border on pseudoscience.
As a whole, this is my new favorite political philosophy book. And I found that it makes the strongest case yet for political anarchy and against state authority.

[Carl · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of my favorite books of all time. If you're skeptical or dismissive of anarchy, this book is for you. Huemer does a fantastic job of both giving statist views their due and also addressing the flaws in their viewpoints. He provides many theoretical moral dilemmas to help point out why political authority is illegitimate. He also provides many real world examples of the atrocities committed in the name of political authority (Holocaust, My Lai Massacre, etc)

Huemer goes over many studies that help explain the prevailing attitudes about the legitimacy of political authority and the tendency towards conformity (Milgrim Experiments, Asch Experiments, Stanford Prison Experiments, etc).

Huemer also dedicates an entire chapter on the Psychology of Authority, which is one of the best chapters. In this chapter he goes over the many symbols (capitol buildings intended to make citizens feel small, placement of a judge's seat in a courtroom, height of ceilings in capitol buildings, uniforms adorned by government officials like police officers uniforms, a judge's robe, etc) and rituals (the pledge of allegiance, the national anthem, swearing in of a president, standing up when a judge enters a courtroom, etc).

I plan on re-reading this book at some point to help make it a reference tool for myself.

[Miguel Garzón · Rating 2 out of 5]

Interesante al principio, decayendo pronto para ser un tedioso e inacabable muestrario de argumentos similares o repetidos en base a analogías forzadísimas. Me gustan los juegos mentales, pero la predilección de la filosofía contemporánea por huir de la complejidad usando las mitologías del lenguaje es molesta. La interacción humana es muy diversa para afrontarla con ejemplos simplones.

Y en fin...el libertarismo. No le niego capacidad evocadora y también creo en que el Estado moderno tiende a caer en autoritarismos cotidianos inaceptables. No obstante, construir una utopía en la que la sociedad será dirigida por si misma en base a acuerdos voluntarios y un orden espontáneo que coordinará a millones de personas me parece muy ingenuo y, mucho peor, un inalcanzable que requeriría más pronto que tarde innumerables pequeñas coacciones más lamentables que las que se pretenden reparar.

Como panfleto con ideas claras y argumentos de principio podría haber funcionado (conmigo). Su millón de páginas de ejemplos insustanciales me han acabado hastiando. Rescato su reflexión acerca de la autoridad y las posturas humanas frente a ella, meritoria.

Como última nota perversa no estará de más hacer notar que el autor es profesor de una universidad pública.

[Frederik · Rating 4 out of 5]

Huemer argues that states are illegitimate and we should let the market rule instead. If you think that sounds crazy, you should read the book, because it really isn't.
I see two big problems with the account in this book
(1) Huemer seems to think that property rights as we know them from our society today are basically legitimate. He doesn't defend this and I think it is wrong. Property rights are a kind of authority that needs to be justified like state authority. Like state demands, property rights are coercive. If I don't pay rent, at some point people will show up and force me to leave.
(2) Huemer doesn't address markets failures. In his utopia there are no externalities, no public goods ect. To me, this seems like a big problem for the anarcho-capitalism dream. But to be fair, these problems are also very hard. It's not like the governments of today are doing a good job of solving them.

But still a very thought provoking book that I would recommend to everyone interested in political philosophy

[Scythan · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the second recent book I've read on the concept of questioning political authority: the first one I read was Larken Rose's "The Most Dangerous Superstition". That one hit me in the gut, causing a paradigm shift that may be permanent. Since no book can cause that again (on this topic), I had less of a visceral reaction this time, but I fully believe that this book's arguments are much more clearly and logically laid out, and done in a way less likely to provoke emotional defensiveness from people who are invested in the status quo. I did find the theory section somewhat dry, and for a while I was worried that the analysis would continue in the trajectory of (seemingly) more abstraction and less practicality, but the rest of the book definitely made up for it, so push through if you are wavering for that reason. I really like how the author lays out possible ways for gradually transitioning to a more anarchist political environment, without hand-waving it away by assuming everyone will "smarten up" at the same time.

[J.A. Pipes · Rating 5 out of 5]

It is refreshing to read the work of another anarchist (there are so few of us around) and hear them advocating for the same ideas that you have supported for years. Michael Huemer does a good job of laying out a logical argument for why anarchism (more specifically, anarcho-capitalism) is and should be a valid alternative to centralized government. My only critique would be that early on in the book he seems to flirt with the idea that one of the purposes of the justice system is punishment of the offender. While that is certainly a feature of our current justice system, it shouldn't be, and I would have expected a more strenuous declaration of such, but it never seemed to appear.

I hope that others (besides anarchists) will give this book a try and expose themselves to the ideas it contains. While this is what I would call a scholarly effort, heavily footnoted, it is still approachable for the average reader (I think this was the author's intent) and would make an excellent entry point into this area of political philosophy.