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Pride and Fall: The British Army in Afghanistan, 2001–2014
A detailed new account of the British military campaign in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the British Government supported the initial US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and also committed troops to Kabul from 2002 onwards. However, following the expansion of ISAF southwards, Britain was drawn into a lengthy military campaign against a fierce insurgency.
The British commitment to what became known as Operation Herrick saw a battlegroup from the Parachute Regiment deploy to Helmand Province in January 2006 with the hope they could "leave in three years and without firing one shot". The reality was very different. From 2006 through to 2014, a succession of British brigade-sized task forces rotated through Helmand on six-month tours. When they finally withdrew in 2014, British forces had lost 456 killed and over 2,000 wounded, and the Taliban were resurgent.
Sergio Miller served throughout the campaign in Defence Intelligence in Whitehall, and this book is his attempt to answer the many questions surrounding the conflict. Based on the abundant open-source material generated by the war, it is not an analysis of counter-insurgency theories or geopolitical rumination, but the story of the men and women who served.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the British Government supported the initial US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and also committed troops to Kabul from 2002 onwards. However, following the expansion of ISAF southwards, Britain was drawn into a lengthy military campaign against a fierce insurgency.
The British commitment to what became known as Operation Herrick saw a battlegroup from the Parachute Regiment deploy to Helmand Province in January 2006 with the hope they could "leave in three years and without firing one shot". The reality was very different. From 2006 through to 2014, a succession of British brigade-sized task forces rotated through Helmand on six-month tours. When they finally withdrew in 2014, British forces had lost 456 killed and over 2,000 wounded, and the Taliban were resurgent.
Sergio Miller served throughout the campaign in Defence Intelligence in Whitehall, and this book is his attempt to answer the many questions surrounding the conflict. Based on the abundant open-source material generated by the war, it is not an analysis of counter-insurgency theories or geopolitical rumination, but the story of the men and women who served.
592 pages, Hardcover
First published December 3, 2024
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
March 20, 2025
This book is an excellent rejoinder to
Why We Lost,
They both, at their heart, say the same things – the soldiers suffered for the decisions of their political masters. However, Pride and Fall does what Why We Lost failed to do: explaining the political strategic and operational context:
- Was Bin Laden an Al-Qaeda really a threat to UK?
- Did going to Afghanistan reduce that threat. If not, what other purposes were served?
- What was the level of commitment going to be?
- How was the command to be structured
- Counter-insurgency or nation building?
- Why go to Helmand?
- Hold ground or mobile warfare?
By providing an explanation for the how and whys of the individual actions in which UK soldiers fought, the reader gains an understanding in Pride and Fall as to what the sacrifices were for, rather than some nebulous concept of “Washington insiders” in Why We Lost - it adds a layer of identification with those on the front line and close supporting services. The efforts of the Department for International Development are, for lack of a more politic phrase, absolutely savaged in this book.
The campaign is told mostly chronologically, with most political machinations built into the chapters. Towards the end there is a chapter that covers the experience in Helmand generally, such as IED clearing, rations, entertainment, medical services etc. The flow is good with distinct styles identified between the rotating brigades. The actions of the special forces are not covered, other than how they (generally adversely) impacted on the efforts of the main army.
If there is a (minor) weakness, the British style of self-reflection isn’t as open as The Hardest Place. In Pride and Fall there is is far less documentary evidence (and honest appraisals/criticisms) from the commanders. Pride and Fall does view events from a wider scope overall so it is not a major, but it is a reminder that we do not always get every detail of events, even with a relatively in-depth book such as this one.
Pride and Fall leaves with a clear overview of the overstretch of the British Army, which still suffered significant reductions in overall force levels during this period, especially with the implementation of austerity measures. While the style of the campaign does not lend itself to the current vogue of conventional warfare, it still reflects that the rosy picture painted by governments (and commando style books) can be very far from actual experience
- Was Bin Laden an Al-Qaeda really a threat to UK?
- Did going to Afghanistan reduce that threat. If not, what other purposes were served?
- What was the level of commitment going to be?
- How was the command to be structured
- Counter-insurgency or nation building?
- Why go to Helmand?
- Hold ground or mobile warfare?
By providing an explanation for the how and whys of the individual actions in which UK soldiers fought, the reader gains an understanding in Pride and Fall as to what the sacrifices were for, rather than some nebulous concept of “Washington insiders” in Why We Lost - it adds a layer of identification with those on the front line and close supporting services. The efforts of the Department for International Development are, for lack of a more politic phrase, absolutely savaged in this book.
The campaign is told mostly chronologically, with most political machinations built into the chapters. Towards the end there is a chapter that covers the experience in Helmand generally, such as IED clearing, rations, entertainment, medical services etc. The flow is good with distinct styles identified between the rotating brigades. The actions of the special forces are not covered, other than how they (generally adversely) impacted on the efforts of the main army.
If there is a (minor) weakness, the British style of self-reflection isn’t as open as The Hardest Place. In Pride and Fall there is is far less documentary evidence (and honest appraisals/criticisms) from the commanders. Pride and Fall does view events from a wider scope overall so it is not a major, but it is a reminder that we do not always get every detail of events, even with a relatively in-depth book such as this one.
Pride and Fall leaves with a clear overview of the overstretch of the British Army, which still suffered significant reductions in overall force levels during this period, especially with the implementation of austerity measures. While the style of the campaign does not lend itself to the current vogue of conventional warfare, it still reflects that the rosy picture painted by governments (and commando style books) can be very far from actual experience
October 20, 2025
Miller provides a no holds barred insider view of the most lethal and traumatic phase of Britain's military operations in Afghanistan. The butchers Bill of young men and women killed and the thousands of amputee, including many double and even triple, is a constant punctuation throughout this astonishing book. The incompetence and myopia of successive British governments, both Labour and Conservative is mapped out in Great detail. The institutional failure of te Secret Service, the FCO and almost criminal incompetence of DFID makes deeply uncomfortable reading. Senior officers seemed unable to say no to hairbrained schemes and powerless to resist US directives that forced ordinary squadies into impossible situations where they died. a futile campaign with no clear strategy and inevitably, complete failure. a deeply worrying book that bodes Ill for Britians future war fighting capacity.
April 1, 2025
A very detailed book, so not really for the more generally interested, such as I.
Having said that, the book conveys searingly the dire politicking, planning and (often) execution. The multi-national forces and suboptimal (!) organisation comes through very clearly.
The politicians have much to answer for.
BTW, Miller is an excellent speaker. You can hear him at:
https://vimeo.com/1033810710
Having said that, the book conveys searingly the dire politicking, planning and (often) execution. The multi-national forces and suboptimal (!) organisation comes through very clearly.
The politicians have much to answer for.
BTW, Miller is an excellent speaker. You can hear him at:
https://vimeo.com/1033810710
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews