What do you think?
Rate this book
為什麼我們需要政治哲學？如何對政府公權力設限？意見分歧的人們能否共存？當代自由主義名家談和諧社會的關鍵思考
他是這個時代最好的政治哲學家之一！
──史丹佛大學政治哲學教授萊夫．韋納
★與《正義論》羅爾斯齊名 當代政治哲學名家著作首度在台問世★
★美國文理科學院人文及藝術領域院士、法蘭西學院哲學大獎獲獎者、高達美獎得主★
陳嘉銘（中研院人文社會科學研究中心副研究員）、葉浩（國立政治大學政治學系副教授）
──專文導讀（按姓氏筆畫排序）
當我們共處於充滿歧見的社會，如何共好、共榮？
政治源於衝突，關鍵不是在其中追求良善，真正該關注的是公權力的正當性。
▍本書特色
政治哲學的核心大多被認為是社會正義與分配問題。拉莫爾反對此類政治哲學觀點，轉而將重點移到對公權力正當性的討論上。強調如果我們無法在社會議題上形成共識，那麽唯一的解方就是合法化政治權力的行使。
拉莫爾的思想被認為是政治現實主義，其主張意見相左是政治生活中不可避免的現況。他也批評當前政治哲學早已偏離現實，必須重新回到這個分歧的現實上，合法性的討論才會有建設性。
本書作者拉莫爾為當代自由主義名家，曾獲法國科學哲學院大獎、美國藝術與科學院士、高達美獎。因其關於政治自由主義以及道德哲學和哲學史等主題的著作而聞名。與約翰．羅爾斯同為政治自由主義的捍衛者，對道德哲學的發展頗具貢獻。
本書堅守政治哲學為獨立研究領域，著重探討其中的「基於理性的意見分歧」，推出後廣受好評，獲《道德哲學期刊》、《聖母大學哲學評論》等媒體與學界矚目讚譽。
──史丹佛大學政治哲學教授萊夫．韋納
★與《正義論》羅爾斯齊名 當代政治哲學名家著作首度在台問世★
★美國文理科學院人文及藝術領域院士、法蘭西學院哲學大獎獲獎者、高達美獎得主★
陳嘉銘（中研院人文社會科學研究中心副研究員）、葉浩（國立政治大學政治學系副教授）
──專文導讀（按姓氏筆畫排序）
當我們共處於充滿歧見的社會，如何共好、共榮？
政治源於衝突，關鍵不是在其中追求良善，真正該關注的是公權力的正當性。
▍本書特色
政治哲學的核心大多被認為是社會正義與分配問題。拉莫爾反對此類政治哲學觀點，轉而將重點移到對公權力正當性的討論上。強調如果我們無法在社會議題上形成共識，那麽唯一的解方就是合法化政治權力的行使。
拉莫爾的思想被認為是政治現實主義，其主張意見相左是政治生活中不可避免的現況。他也批評當前政治哲學早已偏離現實，必須重新回到這個分歧的現實上，合法性的討論才會有建設性。
本書作者拉莫爾為當代自由主義名家，曾獲法國科學哲學院大獎、美國藝術與科學院士、高達美獎。因其關於政治自由主義以及道德哲學和哲學史等主題的著作而聞名。與約翰．羅爾斯同為政治自由主義的捍衛者，對道德哲學的發展頗具貢獻。
本書堅守政治哲學為獨立研究領域，著重探討其中的「基於理性的意見分歧」，推出後廣受好評，獲《道德哲學期刊》、《聖母大學哲學評論》等媒體與學界矚目讚譽。
- GenresPolitics
Published February 29, 2024
1 person is currently reading
54 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
August 9, 2022
Agree to disagree — What is Political Philosophy? (Charles Larmore)
Eminently readable, Larmore argues that political philosophy is not simply applied moral philosophy but is fundamentally about legitimacy and coercion. Following, this, he explains and fortifies “political liberalism” — liberalism defined politically rather than as an expression of ideal (moral) theory. This will be familiar to readers of post-Theory Rawls, and Larmore goes some way to extract out the moral character of his liberal conception of legitimacy.
Here I briefly summarise the main argument around political liberalism, on my reading, and then I will discuss some key points.
Larmore starts with what he terms the “circumstances of politics” — that there is fundamental and endemic reasonable disagreement over the right and good. Since conceptions of distributive justice hinge on the right and good it does not seem to be a sensible philosophical grounding for a state given the circumstances. We must still, however, live together somehow — that is, attain conditions of order and cooperation. This is Bernard Williams’s “first political question” — the first task of a state is to ensure these conditions, and that requires authoritative rules, not ideal justice. This solution — Leviathan, I suppose — requires legitimation.
As an aside, reasonable disagreement is an epistemic argument (and also a historical fact). Larmore holds that people exercising their capacities for reason in good faith will arrive at different conclusions about the right and good. Contra the general understanding that “reason” leads to convergence (related to the Aristotelian or ethics-centred ideal approach Larmore opposite to political realism), even epistemically virtuous people can reach different conclusions. This is because everyone has different background beliefs, interests, sense of salience or weighting criteria. I find this argument convincing.
A state is legitimate when people largely believe it has a claim on their allegiance — that is, it is entitled to enact laws governing their conduct. It needs to provide a legitimation story. Indeed it generates an obligation for citizens to abide these laws. Here Larmore makes a helpful distinction between authority and legitimacy, though I prefer to use the terms perceived and actual legitimacy. Authority (perceptions of legitimacy) is a precondition for legitimacy — necessary but not sufficient. This is, I think, an important point that Larmore helpfully pounds into our head via repetition and rewording throughout the book. Fundamentally, while perceived legitimacy (authority, normative) provides a modus vivendi it is a fragile one. A state cannot rely merely on perceptions for sustainable rule. Indeed, authority enforced via coercion (per Williams “one lot of people terrorising another lot of people”) — a “might makes right” form of enforcement — “only compounds the problem” of order and cooperation. On my reading, the key here is that actual as opposed to perceived or coerced legitimacy enables more complex forms of social order.
But what is legitimacy? Following Rawls and contra Williams, Larmore extracts the essential moral content from the liberal principle of legitimacy. That is, fundamental principles are legitimate only if those they bind can (not necessarily do) see reason from their perspective (not necessarily the same reasons) to accept them. This is based in what Larmore calls a principle of respect for persons, Kantian (and Rawlsian) in character: treating people as ends not merely means. That is, to respect someone requires that fundamental political principles be justifiable to them, from their perspective. This is where Larmore departs from political realism — yes, the fundamental question of political philosophy is legitimacy and authority, but (contra realists) it has a (limited) moral anchor.
I think this might be read as slightly paternalistic (could see reason does not necessarily imply does or will see reason), but the notion of respect has many desirable properties. One, it carries no individualistic content (that motivates classical liberalism) — so we take seriously that individualism is something that people may reasonably disagree with. Second, it requires, given exactly this point, that these subjects of reasonable disagreement play no role in the fundamental political principles. It entails, for example, that the procedures for deciding higher-level policies (e.g. distributive justice) be subject to thick democratic norms. This notion of respect has a deeper validity than even fundamental constitutional principles, and may be the point where some people disagree with Larmore. When he asks the question — what exactly justifies this principle of respect — he provides no answer and states that one may not exist. I agree that respect seems to be a powerful and overriding moral principal in and of itself.
Respect is load-bearing. It defines the extent of exclusions of a (politically) liberal state: those who do not accept the principle of respect are included only to the extent that we counterfactually hold that they actually accept it. A clear example: those that hold that God’s will overrides respect for persons should have no say in what the fundamental terms of society are. But they should be included to the extent that we counterfactually assume that they do respect others. Larmore notes that this is unique to political liberalism. The exclusion is “not regrettable, but necessary”.
This is a simplified summary of the core argument on my reading. I’ll now discuss some thoughts I had while reading.
First, the distinction between authority (perceived legitimacy) and (actual) legitimacy is enlightening. If we understand legitimacy as underpinning order and the terms of cooperation (obviously required for a safe and fulfilling life) then perceptions without serious acceptance are vulnerable. The example running though my head was the Arab spring — states had perceived legitimacy (albeit they were not liberal), meaning they were more vulnerable to “perception shocks”. That is, social media and coordinated mass protest made it understood that many people did not in fact believe the government to be legitimate. The governments certainly did have a “might makes right” attitude to authority which proved to be fragile.
Second, I thought it would be helpful to have a section or even chapter on where reasonable disagreement may break down. Recall that Larmore’s notion of reasonableness requires some degree of good faith or sincerity. It seems to me that mis- and dis-information and the general loss of epistemic trust puts this somewhat idealised epistemic notion at risk. Clearly this presents a philosophical problem, not just an actual one. If people are no longer reasonably disagreeing but unreasonably so, how can a state legitimate itself other than by force?
Thirdly, and relatedly, I think Larmore should have spent a bit more time discussing how legitimacy may break down. He notes that legitimacy needs to be continually reasserted — that is, the first political question is never answered for all eternity. He also dedicates a few pages to recent challenges political liberalism faces, notably globalisation, climate change, and capitalism generally. Indeed he seems to come out against the common view that liberalism and capitalism are joined at the hip — “I consider capitalism’s insatiable pursuit of economic growth .. to constitute in the long run a mortal danger for the workability of liberal principles, if not indeed for the future of mankind itself.” I find myself nodding in agreement, and I suppose this is the work for conceptions of distributive justice (of course, delineated by legitimacy — “justice understood politically”).
Finally, a note on prose. I found the book to be conversational and highly readable, although Larmore does have a penchant for somewhat long and unwieldy sentences. The structure is logically sensible and although some readers may consider it repetitive I think it works in favour of the argument. The concepts are not simple and I did appreciate Larmore beating me over the head from time to time with a reiteration of some concept or argument. The book is helpful, clear, precise, and I strongly recommend it.
Eminently readable, Larmore argues that political philosophy is not simply applied moral philosophy but is fundamentally about legitimacy and coercion. Following, this, he explains and fortifies “political liberalism” — liberalism defined politically rather than as an expression of ideal (moral) theory. This will be familiar to readers of post-Theory Rawls, and Larmore goes some way to extract out the moral character of his liberal conception of legitimacy.
Here I briefly summarise the main argument around political liberalism, on my reading, and then I will discuss some key points.
Larmore starts with what he terms the “circumstances of politics” — that there is fundamental and endemic reasonable disagreement over the right and good. Since conceptions of distributive justice hinge on the right and good it does not seem to be a sensible philosophical grounding for a state given the circumstances. We must still, however, live together somehow — that is, attain conditions of order and cooperation. This is Bernard Williams’s “first political question” — the first task of a state is to ensure these conditions, and that requires authoritative rules, not ideal justice. This solution — Leviathan, I suppose — requires legitimation.
As an aside, reasonable disagreement is an epistemic argument (and also a historical fact). Larmore holds that people exercising their capacities for reason in good faith will arrive at different conclusions about the right and good. Contra the general understanding that “reason” leads to convergence (related to the Aristotelian or ethics-centred ideal approach Larmore opposite to political realism), even epistemically virtuous people can reach different conclusions. This is because everyone has different background beliefs, interests, sense of salience or weighting criteria. I find this argument convincing.
A state is legitimate when people largely believe it has a claim on their allegiance — that is, it is entitled to enact laws governing their conduct. It needs to provide a legitimation story. Indeed it generates an obligation for citizens to abide these laws. Here Larmore makes a helpful distinction between authority and legitimacy, though I prefer to use the terms perceived and actual legitimacy. Authority (perceptions of legitimacy) is a precondition for legitimacy — necessary but not sufficient. This is, I think, an important point that Larmore helpfully pounds into our head via repetition and rewording throughout the book. Fundamentally, while perceived legitimacy (authority, normative) provides a modus vivendi it is a fragile one. A state cannot rely merely on perceptions for sustainable rule. Indeed, authority enforced via coercion (per Williams “one lot of people terrorising another lot of people”) — a “might makes right” form of enforcement — “only compounds the problem” of order and cooperation. On my reading, the key here is that actual as opposed to perceived or coerced legitimacy enables more complex forms of social order.
But what is legitimacy? Following Rawls and contra Williams, Larmore extracts the essential moral content from the liberal principle of legitimacy. That is, fundamental principles are legitimate only if those they bind can (not necessarily do) see reason from their perspective (not necessarily the same reasons) to accept them. This is based in what Larmore calls a principle of respect for persons, Kantian (and Rawlsian) in character: treating people as ends not merely means. That is, to respect someone requires that fundamental political principles be justifiable to them, from their perspective. This is where Larmore departs from political realism — yes, the fundamental question of political philosophy is legitimacy and authority, but (contra realists) it has a (limited) moral anchor.
I think this might be read as slightly paternalistic (could see reason does not necessarily imply does or will see reason), but the notion of respect has many desirable properties. One, it carries no individualistic content (that motivates classical liberalism) — so we take seriously that individualism is something that people may reasonably disagree with. Second, it requires, given exactly this point, that these subjects of reasonable disagreement play no role in the fundamental political principles. It entails, for example, that the procedures for deciding higher-level policies (e.g. distributive justice) be subject to thick democratic norms. This notion of respect has a deeper validity than even fundamental constitutional principles, and may be the point where some people disagree with Larmore. When he asks the question — what exactly justifies this principle of respect — he provides no answer and states that one may not exist. I agree that respect seems to be a powerful and overriding moral principal in and of itself.
Respect is load-bearing. It defines the extent of exclusions of a (politically) liberal state: those who do not accept the principle of respect are included only to the extent that we counterfactually hold that they actually accept it. A clear example: those that hold that God’s will overrides respect for persons should have no say in what the fundamental terms of society are. But they should be included to the extent that we counterfactually assume that they do respect others. Larmore notes that this is unique to political liberalism. The exclusion is “not regrettable, but necessary”.
This is a simplified summary of the core argument on my reading. I’ll now discuss some thoughts I had while reading.
First, the distinction between authority (perceived legitimacy) and (actual) legitimacy is enlightening. If we understand legitimacy as underpinning order and the terms of cooperation (obviously required for a safe and fulfilling life) then perceptions without serious acceptance are vulnerable. The example running though my head was the Arab spring — states had perceived legitimacy (albeit they were not liberal), meaning they were more vulnerable to “perception shocks”. That is, social media and coordinated mass protest made it understood that many people did not in fact believe the government to be legitimate. The governments certainly did have a “might makes right” attitude to authority which proved to be fragile.
Second, I thought it would be helpful to have a section or even chapter on where reasonable disagreement may break down. Recall that Larmore’s notion of reasonableness requires some degree of good faith or sincerity. It seems to me that mis- and dis-information and the general loss of epistemic trust puts this somewhat idealised epistemic notion at risk. Clearly this presents a philosophical problem, not just an actual one. If people are no longer reasonably disagreeing but unreasonably so, how can a state legitimate itself other than by force?
Thirdly, and relatedly, I think Larmore should have spent a bit more time discussing how legitimacy may break down. He notes that legitimacy needs to be continually reasserted — that is, the first political question is never answered for all eternity. He also dedicates a few pages to recent challenges political liberalism faces, notably globalisation, climate change, and capitalism generally. Indeed he seems to come out against the common view that liberalism and capitalism are joined at the hip — “I consider capitalism’s insatiable pursuit of economic growth .. to constitute in the long run a mortal danger for the workability of liberal principles, if not indeed for the future of mankind itself.” I find myself nodding in agreement, and I suppose this is the work for conceptions of distributive justice (of course, delineated by legitimacy — “justice understood politically”).
Finally, a note on prose. I found the book to be conversational and highly readable, although Larmore does have a penchant for somewhat long and unwieldy sentences. The structure is logically sensible and although some readers may consider it repetitive I think it works in favour of the argument. The concepts are not simple and I did appreciate Larmore beating me over the head from time to time with a reiteration of some concept or argument. The book is helpful, clear, precise, and I strongly recommend it.
May 7, 2021
Larmore attempts to offer something of a compromise between political realism and political liberalism. He argues that liberalism is a response to the fact of reasonable disagreement, the fact that people will often disagree when they reason about complex religious, ethical, and political questions. In this, he agree with realists that the focus on politics is legitimacy, the question of how coercion can be justified, rather than the nature of the good, virtue, or social justice. But he diverges with Bernard Williams and other realists in arguing that legitimacy must be based upon the idea of a Kantian notion respect.
Essentially, Larmore argues that coercion is legitimate when it is such that persons could consent to if from their perspective, given that they also respect other community members. And the reason why this is the criterion of legitimacy is that persons ought to be respected. Oddly Larmore says,
"I have been arguing that the liberal conception of political legitimacy rests on the idea of respect for persons. But what, one may ask, is the source of the validity of that idea itself? What, in other words, are the deeper values or principles on which it in turn rests? I do not have an answer to this question."
So he offers an account of liberalism whereby coercion is legitimate because it is based upon the prejudice of the ruling class. This seems to support the claim of any number of anti-liberal critics. Despite, his protestations Larmore's position seems in essentials to be identical to that of the later Rawls (see especially "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory"). But it also seems to fail as a form of realism. This is because Larmore conflates the normative and positive notions of legitimacy, despite his painstaking efforts to separate these notions. He argues that states must attain legitimacy if they are to govern. And he also argues that legitimacy involves not merely the acceptance of some regime but the acceptance of the regime as having a right to govern. From this he concludes that states must show themselves to have the right to govern. But this clearly does not follow. What states must do is make people think that they have the right to govern. Further argument is needed to show that the moral notions concerning respect are relevant to the question of states' ability to govern effectively.
In other words, just because (a) states face the problem of pluralism and normative disagreement and (b) legitimacy purports to appeal to genuine normative standards, it doesn't follow that states have any reason to be interested in embodying those standards in order to govern effectively. All it shows is that states must make people think that they rightfully govern.
Larmore could address these two limitations by drawing upon Hegel. It would not be implausible to read the Phenomenology of Spirit as a complex argument to the effect that norms of mutual respect, or recognition, are essential to having determinate conceptual content. Brandom has recently developed this argument at length. Likewise, Hegel can be read as arguing that societies that lack norms of mutual respect are inherently unstable (even if this instability may become apparent only after a substantial period of time). This would connect respect with stable governance linking Larmore's sympathies with Williams' realism with his adherence to Rawls' Kantian conception of the person.
Despite these drawbacks Larmore's book is interesting and insightful.
Essentially, Larmore argues that coercion is legitimate when it is such that persons could consent to if from their perspective, given that they also respect other community members. And the reason why this is the criterion of legitimacy is that persons ought to be respected. Oddly Larmore says,
"I have been arguing that the liberal conception of political legitimacy rests on the idea of respect for persons. But what, one may ask, is the source of the validity of that idea itself? What, in other words, are the deeper values or principles on which it in turn rests? I do not have an answer to this question."
So he offers an account of liberalism whereby coercion is legitimate because it is based upon the prejudice of the ruling class. This seems to support the claim of any number of anti-liberal critics. Despite, his protestations Larmore's position seems in essentials to be identical to that of the later Rawls (see especially "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory"). But it also seems to fail as a form of realism. This is because Larmore conflates the normative and positive notions of legitimacy, despite his painstaking efforts to separate these notions. He argues that states must attain legitimacy if they are to govern. And he also argues that legitimacy involves not merely the acceptance of some regime but the acceptance of the regime as having a right to govern. From this he concludes that states must show themselves to have the right to govern. But this clearly does not follow. What states must do is make people think that they have the right to govern. Further argument is needed to show that the moral notions concerning respect are relevant to the question of states' ability to govern effectively.
In other words, just because (a) states face the problem of pluralism and normative disagreement and (b) legitimacy purports to appeal to genuine normative standards, it doesn't follow that states have any reason to be interested in embodying those standards in order to govern effectively. All it shows is that states must make people think that they rightfully govern.
Larmore could address these two limitations by drawing upon Hegel. It would not be implausible to read the Phenomenology of Spirit as a complex argument to the effect that norms of mutual respect, or recognition, are essential to having determinate conceptual content. Brandom has recently developed this argument at length. Likewise, Hegel can be read as arguing that societies that lack norms of mutual respect are inherently unstable (even if this instability may become apparent only after a substantial period of time). This would connect respect with stable governance linking Larmore's sympathies with Williams' realism with his adherence to Rawls' Kantian conception of the person.
Despite these drawbacks Larmore's book is interesting and insightful.
August 26, 2022
Charles Larmore is, besides John Rawls, one of the main proponents of political liberalism. In this book which features three essays, Larmore develops and defends a "realist" approach to political philosophy that makes legitimacy of coercive action by the state, rather than social justice, the foundational issue. He proposes a liberal theory of legitimacy along these lines that emphasizes the requirement for the state to put forward principles that every reasonable person has reasons to accept from their own perspective.
While I'm convinced by Larmore's realist approach and his related conception of the political (which is very different from Rawls's), I've found part of the book confused and confusing. The discussion of the concepts of authority and legitimacy in chapter 2 is especially unsatisfactory in this regard. In comparison, David Estlund does a far more convincing job in his book "Democratic Authority" on this issue. This is nonetheless a valuable contribution to the literature and an interesting, though demanding, read.
While I'm convinced by Larmore's realist approach and his related conception of the political (which is very different from Rawls's), I've found part of the book confused and confusing. The discussion of the concepts of authority and legitimacy in chapter 2 is especially unsatisfactory in this regard. In comparison, David Estlund does a far more convincing job in his book "Democratic Authority" on this issue. This is nonetheless a valuable contribution to the literature and an interesting, though demanding, read.
June 18, 2025
در میانه جنگ :(
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews