July 1914: Countdown to War

by Sean McMeekin

About the Book: July 1914: Countdown to War A Groundbreaking New History of the Catastrophic Month, 99 Years Ago, When A Political Assassination Triggered The Worlds Bloodiest Conflict Yet Known On 28 June 1914 Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo. A little over a month later the world was engulfed in the bloodiest conflict mankind had ever seen. How did such tragedy unfold so quickly? The outbreak of the First World War was a drama never surpassed. One hundred years later, the characters still seem larger than life: Archduke Franz Ferdinand, brooding heir to the Habsburg throne; the fanatical Bosnian Serb assassins who plot to murder him; Conrad and Berchtold, the Austrians who exploit the outrage; Kaiser Wilhelm and Bethmann Hollweg, backing up the Austrians; Sazonov, Russian Foreign Minister, trying to live down a reputation for cowardice; Poincare and Paleologue, two French statesmen who urge on the Russians; and not least Winston Churchill, who, alone among Cabinet officials in London, perceives the seriousness of the situation in time to take action. July 1914 tells the story of Europes countdown to war through the eyes of these men, between the bloody opening act on 28 June 1914 and Britains final plunge on 4 August, which turned a European conflict into a world war. The outbreak of war was no accident of fate. Individual statesmen, pursuing real objectives, conjured up the conflict- in some cases by conscious intention. While some sought honourably to defuse tensions, others all but oozed with malice as they rigged the decks for war. Dramatic, inevitably tense and almost forensically observed, Sean McMeekins unique book retells the story of that cataclysmic month, making clear as never before who was responsible for the catastrophe. You will never think the same way again about the origins of the First World War. About the Author: Sean McMeekin Sean McMeekins books include The Berlin-Baghdad Express, The Ottoman Empire and Germanys Bid fo

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War I, War, Politics, Military History, Military Fiction

560 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2013

About the author

Sean McMeekin is an American historian, focused on European history of the early 20th century. His main research interests include modern German history, Russian history, communism, and the origins of the First and Second World Wars and the roles of Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

He has authored eight books, along with scholarly articles which have appeared in journals such as Contemporary European History, Common Knowledge, Current History, Historically Speaking, The World Today, and Communisme. He is currently Francis Flournoy Professor of European History and Culture at Bard College.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Realizing the error, [Oskar] Potiorek ordered the driver to turn back just as they rounded the sharp corner in front of the spice emporium. After hitting the brakes, the [Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s] chauffeur struggled for a fatal moment before he could shift the car into reverse gear. Gavrilo Princip thus found his target sitting motionless for a period of two or three seconds, just 2.5 meters (about 8 feet) away, with Count Harrach – acting as bodyguard – marooned helplessly on the wrong side of the car. Stepping in to point-blank range, Princip fired two shots with his Browning pistol. The first pierced Franz Ferdinand’s neck and the second [his wife] Sophie’s abdomen…Asked by Count Harrach whether he was badly injured, the archduke replied, with all the reserve expected of a Hapsburg, ‘It is nothing.’ As both he and his wife slowly expired, Ferdinand repeated again and again, each time more softly than the last: ‘It is nothing…’”
- Sean McMeekin, July 1914: Countdown to War

Years ago, back when my wife was pregnant with our first child (of an eventual four), it occurred to me – not unreasonably – that the contours of my life were about to alter drastically. All the free time that I had (and boy, looking back, did I have a lot of free time) was about to disappear. This gave me the rather romantic notion of the Last Subject. The concept was simple. I would choose one last thing to learn about, as though I’d never have the chance to learn anything again. (Other than how to swaddle, change diapers, mix formula, cry in the dark, etc.). I chose the First World War. At the time, the centenary was still years away, but already a glut of new books was being published. If I was going to get into the First World War, there was no better time.

So, I jumped into the Great War – and fatherhood – headfirst.

Like I said: that was years ago. That first baby has been born and can now sass me back (as well as read on her own), and she has been joined by others, as I mentioned above. It is now absolutely clear that I needn’t have worried about never reading another book. Frankly, it’s about the only thing I can still do around the house that projects a positive image. (So long, drinking, violent movies, video games, and eating handfuls of shredded cheese while standing in front of an open refrigerator). I have also continued to learn, and not just about diapers and crying in the dark and separating children from their pacificers, but about how fast humans grow, and how fast money leaves.

While I question many of the choices and ideas of that old self of mine, the self before kids and crushing responsibility, I have no qualms about finally attempting to grapple with World War I. Of all the historical events I have studied, it has been among the most fruitful.

The First World War is simply a massive world-historical upheaval that killed millions, wounded millions more, scarred a like number, crumbled empires, redrew boundaries, set the stage for a second, bigger war, and also seeded cultural clashes – such as those in the Middle East – that are with us to this very day, over a hundred years after the last guns fell silent. Part of the reason I stayed so long away from this conflict was that it felt too much. It was too big and too complex and too impossible to grasp. I didn’t know where to start.

Well, it’s best to start at the beginning. Thankfully, in dealing with World War I, the beginning might be the most taut, exciting part.

Sean McMeekin’s July 1914: Countdown to War covers the period from the June 28, 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo to the August 4, 1914 invasion of Belgium by Germany, by which point Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Russia, Great Britain, and Serbia were all at war. In McMeekin’s hands, this fraught handful of weeks is transformed into a galloping diplomatic thriller featuring a cast of colorfully-named, woefully out-of-their-depths characters.

There are a lot of moving pieces to this tale, but McMeekin has constructed an efficient machine.

Everything about July 1914 is reader friendly. There is a dramatis personae; there is a timeline of events; the chapters are carefully broken down so as to maintain the chronology; and the prose is wonderfully clear. This is all very important because the shuttle-diplomacy taking place after the June 28 assassination of Franz Ferdinand is head spinning. New students of the war are bound to go cross-eyed trying to keep the personages straight. You are required to remember that Paléologue is France’s ambassador to Russia, while Pourtalès is Germany’s ambassador to Russia. After you replace memories of your childhood pets with that tidbit, take a breath, because now you’ve got to keep Szápary and Szögyény separate and distinct.

This probably sounds like I’m selling you The July Crisis for Dummies. I’m not. July 1914 is a sophisticated book, with a very specific point of view. Among historians, determining the chief instigator of World War I is something of a parlor game, a bit like Clue. Was it Austria-Hungary in the billiards room with a shabby ultimatum? Was it France, in the kitchen, with her blind-obedience to her treaty with Russia? Was it Great Britain, in the conservatory, turning a continental skirmish into a worldwide cataclysm?

Just about every book you read on the subject chooses a culprit. Germany has always been a fashionable choice – especially after World War II – though she has fallen a bit out of vogue, if only because being a contrarian is a good way to sell books. Austria-Hungary is also given a great deal of negative credit for her bumbling, stumbling ways. (Her failings are almost too numerous to count).

Here, McMeekin argues that a huge measure of culpability lies with the Russians. Sazonov, Russia’s inconstant foreign minister, decided to respond militarily to the July Crisis before Serbia responded to Austria’s ultimatum. The finance minister was ordered to repatriate funds in Germany, while the chief of staff was directed to prepare for mobilization. Before either Serbia or Austria mobilized, Tsar Nicholas II signed off on the Period Preparatory to War, giving the Russians a head-start on mobilization.

The decision for European war was made by Russia on the night of 29 July 1914, when Tsar Nicholas II, advised unanimously by his advisers, signed the order for general mobilization. General mobilization – as he knew, as Sazonov knew, as Schilling knew; as Krivoshein, Rodzianko, and Duma leaders knew; as Sukhomlinov, Yanushkevitch, and Dobrorolskii knew – meant war. So clearly did the tsar know this that, on being moved by a telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm II, he changed his mind. “I will not be responsible for a monstrous slaughter” is the key line to the entire July crisis, for it shows that the tsar, for all his simplicity – or expressly because of his guileless, unaffected simplicity – knew exactly what he was doing when he did it. He knew exactly what he was doing when he did it again, sixteen hours later, after agonizing all day about it. Sazonov knew it, which is why he told Yanushkevitch to “smash his telephone” so that the tsar could not change his mind again.

It makes sense that McMeekin would push this particular viewpoint, because his area of expertise is Russia and the Soviet Union, of which he has written several other books. That said, there is more than enough blame to go around, and McMeekin spreads it like jam during an enlightening epilogue filled with strong, reasoned judgments. There is no right or wrong answer. Any choice can be supported. That’s what makes the argument so much fun. (At least that’s what I tell myself, when I try to get others to join the debate).

World War I can be a hugely complicated subject. Just take another look at the block-quote just above. Look at those names! And that’s just a tiny sampling of the illustrious list of characters who nudged the earth towards war in 1914. It’s intimidating. Still, the only way you learn – as I tell those aforementioned kids of mine – is to start. Once you start, familiarity follows, and pretty soon you’ll know Sazonov like a friend, and probably have a poster of Yanushkevitch above your bed. If you’re thinking of tackling the vast subject of the First World War, July 1914 is an excellent way to begin your journey.

[Brett C · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was an excellent day-to-day look at what historians have called the July Crisis. Before this, all I knew was Archduke Ferdinand's assassination triggered the war—end of story. Sean McMeekin did a superb job of putting all the pieces together. The opening prologue was 20-pages of precipitating events leading to the his assassination in Sarajevo, 28 June 1914.

The Austrian response was to launch an all-out investigation and intervention into what they deemed as Serb government-sponsored terrorism aimed at subverting both Austrian and German existence (pg. 98). Through Count Hoyos' mission to Berlin the German government pledged aid to the brotherly Austria-Hungary on 6 July with the blank check statement "Germany will stand at our side unequivocally, even if our operations against Serbia will bring our the great war. Germany advises us to strike at once." (pg. 108). The ultimatum was officially served to the Serbian government on 23 July with a 48-hr reply. At the same time, Russia's commitment to aid Serbia indirectly brought France to mobilize a defense posture. In a meeting from 20-23 July, the Franco-Russian alliance was cemented: the alliance, Nicholas II proclaimed, had worked to safeguard "the equilibrium and the peace of Europe." Expressing the hope that "the ties that bind us will grow ever tighter." (pg. 150)

Germany became a driving force that pushed for war:

While Bethmann [German Chancellor] and the kaiser both bore heavy responsibility for having encouraged Austrian recklessness...in signing the blank check, both men had known they were risking war if Russia intervened on Serbia's behalf. pg. 253

British neutrality remained as long as it could until 29 July. Foreign Minister Grey of Britain was the mediator by hosting a four-power conference but was unsuccessful. They were drawn into the war as a last ditch effort to maintain the peace.

If an armed Austro-Russian clash over Serbia drew France and Germany into a European War, "the British Government would be forced into taking rapid decisions. In this case it would not do to stand aside and wait."pg. 279

The state players of Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, Russia, and eventually Britain fell into declared war. Diplomatic deception, agendas, mobilizations to bluff military might, and political arrogance eventually brought war. The concluding chapter summarizes how war between the nations was inevitable. Sean McMeekin presented long-term structural factors, degrees of responsibility, and clashes of diplomatic power put Europe on a catastrophic collision course. There was so much to this book and I learned a great deal!

I would highly recommend this to anyone interested in seeing how the First World War kicked off. The narrative was well-written, well-researched, and written in an engaging manner that kept me interested the whole time. Thanks!

[Jill H. · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book covers in detail the weeks in July and August, 1914, when Europe was spiraling toward a world war and the destruction of a way of life. The spark, of course, was the assassination, in Serbia, of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the ancient Hapsburg throne ruling the Austro/Hungarian Empire. But, as most readers of WWI history know, this was not necessarily the reason for the war and that the original plan for retaliation was the concept of a regional war in which Austria/Hungary could crush Serbia, their long-time enemy. However, things began to go awry when old treaties, partnerships and guarantees raised their heads and Germany, France, Russia, and Britain were soon involved in a rush of "diplomacy" which would be to the advantage of each of the major powers. Just as you would not trust a man holding a gun to your head, the diplomats and foreign ministers of each country could not be trusted either. They were either incompetent, liars, or had ulterior motives. The blunders and miscommunications are chilling.....the peace of the world was at stake and the various governments were like sleepwalkers, stumbling forward recklessly.
In an Epilogue, the author outlines where blame for WWI should be fixed and why. An excellent history of the events leading up to the horror that was The Great War.

[Geevee · Rating 5 out of 5]

In this well-written and highly researched book Professor McMeekin sets a detailed yet very readable account of the days in July that led to the start of the First World War.

Responsibility is a complex one that still stirs today academic arguments and emotion in people. I had read something of the lead up through Barbara Tuchman's excellent writing but mostly in wider histories, especially when studying this period as a young soldier, but that always quickly led to the early actions of the war and how armies performed.

In this account the author kept me completely interested as the events and diplomatic discussions unfolded. He sets out a well reasoned commentary to this and of course it is far more complex than the simple Austria and Serbia started it and German pushed for war and started it by mobilising first and aggressive moves into other countries.

Germany as the defeated nation - and pariah following 1945 - is the easy target in staking blame as historians and others have done since 1919. Yet things are far from being as simple as that, especially in the complex world of early 20th century European relations and nations involved.

The Russians have a large bearing as indeed do France; along of course with Austria and Serbia. Ideas may have been for a localised war with Serbia but those plans and moves soon tumbled to the abyss as decisions and diplomacy (read for this lies, obfuscation, disinterest, pleading and even tears) rolled the great powers to war as agreements, treaties and strategies bound them to each other or saw them detach and move allegiance.

The depth of detail using research into dusty diplomatic archives made for a intriguing and riveting read. It was fascinating to see that records are so rich and yet in key places there are gaps notably within French and Russian accounts. I was also unaware that Russia commenced mobilisation before others with their Period Preparatory to War - in modern marketing terms a "soft mobilisation" - which was in effect mobilisation by another name as they took control of transport, logistics and recall of men to barracks with deployments of active units to the German and Austrian frontiers.

This book adds a level of background and detail, and for many new discussion I would suspect, to the events leading directly to those cemeteries, monuments and memorials now dotted throughout Europe and elsewhere in the world where names are now recorded having died because diplomacy failed and started the war to end all wars.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

July 1914: Countdown to War, by Sean McMeekin, is an interesting look at the spiraling circumstances that led to the First World War in August 1914. The crisis kicked off with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, by a Serbian terrorist group, while he was on tour of recently annexed Sarajevo, Bosnia. This group was armed and supported by some elements of the Serbian high command, and thus was semi-state sponsored. Obviously pretty angry about being attacked by a terrorist group, Austria-Hungary sought war. Germany supported a quick war with Serbia, as it would allow for a quick strike against Russia, Serbia's Great Power ally. Russia was also in an alliance with France, and France supported by Great Britain (known as the Triple Entente). Germany and Austria-Hungary found support in Constantinople (Ottoman Empire) and Sofia (Bulgaria) as well as Rome (Italy, on paper at least).

All of this basic information is well known to most. However, McMeekin takes a deeper look at the diplomatic, military and political pressures each state was facing. He chronicles the diplomatic cables, meetings and minutes of the build up for war, and paints a picture more grey than the Black and White version of WWI most learn in a history textbook, ie. Austria-Hungary and Germany were the two worst offenders. McMeekin posits that diplomatic incompetence from all of the involved states was largely to blame, as well as war hawk parties in Russia, Austria-Hungary and France (as well as Serbian extremists, of course). McMeekin is highly critical of the German, Austrian and British diplomatic efforts to prevent a larger war.

Germany did not wish to engage in a Europe-wide war, as cables, minutes and other sources show. Kaiser Wilhelm II and Germany's Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (Bethmann) were eager to either localize the incident in the Balkans, or isolate Russia and France from Britain. However, poor strategic planning, poor military planning and a lack of coordination between Berlin and Vienna led to a confusing show from the German high command. Austria-Hungary, the biggest belligerent in the War's inception, was eager to fight Serbia, but not so much for Russia or France. Their bald-faced diplomatic maneuverings included lying to Germany about the delivery of the Serbian Ultimatum (they had told Germany it was yet to be sent, when indeed it had been sent), creating said Ultimatum with the objective that it would be rejected, and neglecting to mobilize troops against Russia, even though Russia had begun mobilization themselves. Finally, France, who was split between War Hawks and Doves, and suffering from a political scandal, was eager to involve Britain in the war, and therefore began withholding critical information that could have saved Europe from the War by leading to increased pressure for a negotiated settlement from Britain. Russia's early mobilization was not communicated to France's ally, nor was the fact that France and Russia had been preparing for mobilization weeks before the crisis began to spiral out of control.

McMeekin's book is an excellent look at all of the political maneuvers, the backstabbing, the lying and the diplomatic shenanigans that led Europe to War in 1914. He places blame on all parties, whether theirs was a sin of omission, or a sin of commission. Even though some of the reasons behind the conflict are understandable, it is clear that the statesmen of Europe at the time should have taken greater care to avoid a conflict that would eventually kill millions of people and lead to the destruction of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires, and the creation of zones of nationalism and religious tensions that persist to this day. British blustering and dithering, French Machiavellian politics, Russian warmongering, Austro-Hungarian aggression, Serbian terrorism and German incompetence are all present.

A small criticism would be McMeekin's use of conjecture. He takes a number of wild guesses at discussions that were held where the minutes and transcripts were either lost or destroyed. It is interesting to guess, but does not help the narrative.

However, July 1914 is a refreshing look at the run-up to WWI, with a cast of politicians and diplomats that are either working really hard to start or stop a conflict. The tension of this period is palpable, and the "What if..." moments in the book are worth exploring as a lesson in history. This book offers excellent insight, is well sourced and researched, and is a refreshing take on a war many in modern times associate closely with WWII 30 years later, and largely look at in similar terms (German world domination, Allies vs. Axis etc.). Worth your time if you enjoy reading about WWI or are interested in politics and diplomacy.

[happy · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this book Mr McMeekin gives us almost an hour by hour account of the events between the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne in Sarajevo in June to the break out of war in August. He looks at the diplomacy, the personalities, and the events surrounding the march to war.

Starting with his account of the assassination, the author looks at what was happening in all the major capitols of Europe. From the Austrians desire to use the assassination as an excuse to knock Serbia down a peg or two, the Russians determination to be the savior of the Slavs, and the rest of Europe’s original oh hum reaction to the death.

The picture he paints in not a pretty one. None of the various powers were willing to be completely honest with their nominal allies let alone their prospective enemies, at some points telling outright lies. As the professionals in the various foreign ministries are making their cases and preparations for war, the heads of state are to some extent kept in the dark as the preparations are kicked off – esp Germany and Russia

In looking at the attitudes of the various governments, Germany, even after the “Blank Check” given to Austria is looking for if not a way out, at least a way to localize the war. However, they are never willing rescind that check. She is also portrayed as so desperate to limit the war that as the mobilizations begin, she is always 3 or 4 days behind the Russian and the French, much to the dismay of Moltke and the General Staff. The Austrians are so determined for war, that the fail to tell their one ally the whole story. They then lie to them when questioned about diplomatic efforts to secure other nations in the area permission or at least neutrality. Yet at the same time unwilling to mobilize against a possible war with Russia. England and France are portrayed as countries so wrapped up in their local concerns that the possibility of war doesn’t rise in both the public and gov’t view until quite late in the process. The British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, comes off really poorly. He seems almost not to know what is going on, almost up till war is declared, giving mixed signals to both France and Germany.

The last chapter of the book is Mr. McKeekin’s view of who was responsible and if the war could have been avoided. His conclusions on both run counter to the accepted conventional wisdom.

In conclusion, I found this a very readable account of the events leading up to hell that was WW I – 4+ stars.

[Nancy · Rating 4 out of 5]

I'm bumping up my rating slightly, as this is a fascinating account of the back-and-forthing among the various government officials and diplomats in the month after the assassination. McMeekin's timetables, his pinning down of who said what and when, his delineations of the personalities involved are important and illuminating.

However, McMeekin has an ax to grind and grind it he does. If there were a drinking game devolving on various forms of the phrase "But Russia mobilized first," the reader would be blotto. Well, of course Russia, given its size and infrastructure issues (communication, transportation and supply), mobilized first. It had to. "Waiting and seeing" was not a good option for Russia. It's easy for the country which could mobilize fastest to wait until last and then play the blame game. This was a minor point at best and McMeekin ascribes far too much importance to it.

He even ends up contradicting himself. At one point he says that no one was backing down in the runup to the war, since they all thought they could win it. Truth, I think. But by the end, he says that Germany knew it would lose and that it had to be dragged kicking and screaming into the conflict. And that's just silly, IMO. Aside from the question of its motives which is definitely open for debate (the question of an offensive war v. a defensive war will never be settled), not only did Germany think it could win the war, it came close to winning on occasion and as late as the spring offensive in 1918.

The wrap-up was just embarrassing. McMeekin discusses sins of omission and sins of commission and the degree of guilt involved. He comes off like a seven-year old being prepared for his first confession. He would have been better served by repeating his major points and letting the matter of blame resolve itself. Plenty of blame to go around.

However, when the book was good it was excellent indeed and important reading for what happened in getting from Point A(ssassination) to Point B(ellicosity).

[Anthony · Rating 4 out of 5]

One Month of Anxiety.

Sean McMeekin has proved himself to be a solid historian with Stalin’s War, The Russian Revolution and The Ottoman Endgame. Although I accept not everyone is a fan of him. His expertise lies in Russian and First World War history. July 1914: Countdown to War falls solidly into another scholar success. The book centres around the complex chain reaction of events which took Europe to war in that faithful summer. Starting with the famous Sarajevo murders to the first fighting McMeekin takes the reader on a journey across the European courts and parliamentary chambers as each realised their anxieties and aims. Each country distrustful of the other, unsure of who will do what and at the same time trying to avoid a full European conflict; this is a story of tragedy.

The outbreak of WWI is complicated albeit extremely famous. But when the text under headlines is read, there is a lot that went on in that fateful month that is unknown. Furthermore, the intentions of those taking the actions is even less understood. McMeekin’s research here is meticulous. To pinpoint when a telegram was sent or received, what each person at the end of it was doing at the time, why delays and confusion were subsequently caused and what they meant by their words used is mapped out with precision in this book. Some may call this tedious, but it is central to how European fell into war in 1914.

The term ‘Sleepwalkers’ is used in Christopher Clark’s amazing book on the causes of the Great War. For me McMeekin reaffirms this point, although there is of course blame to be had, it is spread around. No one person carries the burden. More to the point, this is causes through mistakes and blunder in an exhaustive and high pressure environment, rather than a warmongering intention. For example, he shows how Kaiser Wilhelm II and Tsar Nicholas II did not want to fight a war. But through the technology available at the time, information was slow and difficult to pass across the huge distances. The real meaning of what others said or the time scales given had a huge impact on the others actions. Both were under huge pressure from their ministers and allies. Sir Edward Grey is as much to ‘blame’ as the two monarchs above, again not because he wanted war or was deliberately misleading, but because of what he (mistakingly) failed to disclose about British intentions. All major countries faced the dilemma of having to wait for reconciliation versus having to act quickly, as not to be caught out.

The armchair historian with hindsight will often blame one party or another for the star. McMeekin has shown to me, things were much more complicated in reality. There were so many opportunities for all players, from
H.H. Asquith, Grey, Raymond Poincarè, Sergi Sazonov to Conrad von Hötzendorf and Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg amongst others to avert the war, but through the tragedy of history it appears everyone missed the chance or made the wrong decisions.

This book is important for the student of history or diplomacy. One must never forget and learn from these lessons. Over 100 years later we are still learning, but learn we must. The First World War is one of the most important events in history, it has changed the world and it’s memory carries on. The suicide of Europe is an understatement to describe the events that followed. Does the book revolutionise how we think about the causes of the war? No, but it catalogues and contextualises what happened which is really refreshing and important. It also pushes away from the tired narrative that Germany bears the soul blame, although as I have said above it is not completed exonerated.

[Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Confusion, complexity, duplicity, incompetence, rigidity… all are on display in this detailed description of the events that lead to the First world War. The main actors were unsure of themselves, even uncertain of their level of authority and in many cases were simply following a political or military script. It is incredible that supposedly sane men could feel powerless to stop the machinery of war which they knew would be catastrophic. This event was preventable as the author demonstrates but human failures were just too numerous to escape the worst case scenario.

[Jim Coughenour · Rating 4 out of 5]

Sean McMeekin's clear account of the confused commencement of World War I makes for grim, occasionally entertaining, often hectic reading. It's still almost impossible to understand how deliberately the diplomats of Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France and England managed to provoke each other into a war that would cost them everything. The barbarous mismanagement of the war itself is another story – July 1914 is enough in itself.

A couple comments about the beginning and the end. The first chapter is dedicated to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by the Serbian Gavrilo Princep – and it is a dark comedy indeed, a kind of Keystone Cops conspiracy in which everyone acted as stupidly as possible. McMeekin traces each step of the assassination-that-almost-didn't-happen, each more ludicrous and improbable than the last until the final moment when the Archduke's automobile took a wrong turn right into the gun-sight of the surprised Serbian – although it's left to Max Hastings in his new book Catastrophe 1914 to provide a cruel capsule summary:

Franz Ferdinand was not much loved by anyone save his wife… The Emperor Franz Joseph resented his nephew; others considered him an arrogant and opinionated martinet. Franz Ferdinand's ruling passion was shooting: he accounted for some 250,000 wild creatures to his own gun, before ending his days in Gavrilo Princip's threadbare little gamebag.

And so it all began.

McMeekin's final chapter "Epilogue: The Question of Responsibility" will no doubt be the most remarked-upon aspect of his history. In brief – everyone was responsible, although

it is important to keep degrees of responsibility in mind. Sins of omission are lesser ones than sins of commission; likewise, actions are not equivalent to the reactions they occasion. Above all, intentions are important, but the hardest to divine, because we cannot peer into men's hearts.

McMeekin apportions blame perspicuously. The surprise (although not for anyone who's read the previous 25 chapters) is that the Russians win the prize for ensuring that the conflagration occurred. For those of us used to blaming the Germans, McMeekin concludes that "So far from 'willing the war,' the Germans went into it kicking and screaming as the Austrian noose snapped shut around their necks." This is a tonic perspective although, as McMeekin makes clear, in July 1914 everyone involved behaved badly indeed. Come August, the slaughter started in earnest.

[John · Rating 3 out of 5]

"July 1914" is an excellent, day-by-day account of the diplomatic and internal events that unfolded between the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, and the commencement of the First World War at the beginning of August.

An American historian who teaches in Istanbul, as well as the author of the interesting The Berlin-Baghdad Express, Sean McMeekin moves beyond the stereotypical account of World War I as being solely the fault of Germany and instead considers the actions of all of the major powers.

In McMeekin's telling, France and Russia deserve much more blame for the outbreak of a world war than they traditionally have received. Russia's decision to order a general mobilization at the end of July is what elevated a potentially local conflict (Austria-Hungary wanted to retaliate against Serbia without having to fight Russia) into a European one. France supported this decision, albeit tacitly and in ways designed to bring about British entry into a war. In fact, France hoped to take advantage of the fact that British leaders had paid little attention to the European situation due to internal political divisions and the all-consuming nature of the debate and crisis associated with Irish Home Rule.

Germany's major sin, meanwhile, was violating Belgium's neutrality in order to attack France -- a decision made once it was clear that Russia and France had both mobilized against Germany and that a two-front war was imminent. And Germany found itself in that situation because bad diplomatic calls in Berlin allowed Germany to get dragged into a war brought about by its Austro-Hungarian ally.

McMeekin is an excellent writer who clearly explains complicated information and is willing to challenge "received" wisdom. In that respect, he belongs to a generation of historians who are reevaluating and reinterpreting a great deal of World War I scholarship, while at the same time drawing inspiration from that scholarship, most popularly, Barabara Tuchman's The Guns of August.

At the same time, the sheer amount of detail in the book sometimes can be overwhelming and can cloud out the overarching narrative. For that reason, this book is not for casual readers. Readers with an interest in World War I, as well as a working knowledge of the July crisis, however, will find this book to be well worth their time.

Bottom line: this book deserves three stars for casual readers, four stars for World War I fans.

[Trevor Seigler · Rating 4 out of 5]

Call it the Curse of Barbara Tuchman, but I've long been obsessed with the outbreak of the First World War. In many ways, it's almost a real-life unsolved mystery of who exactly wanted this worldwide war, who stood to benefit (almost no one, as it turned out), and who suffered the most (how much time ya got for me to list?). And the thing is, the repercussions of what began over the assassination of the heir to the throne of a long-forgotten European power lost to the strands of memory are with us to this very day. Modern history, up to and including our present moment, begins with the murder of Franz Ferdinand in the streets of Sarajevo in 1914, and the subsequent moves and counter-moves that triggered one of the most bloody and inconclusive conflicts in world history.

"July 1914: Countdown to War," by Sean McMeekin, is another of the many books I've read on this topic, and it benefits by being fast-paced. Much like "The Guns of August," "July 1914" proposes to cover only the opening salvos of the war (in this case, of the diplomatic variety) as the repercussions from Ferdinand's assassination spread across Europe. We see the wizened, ancient Austria-Hungary seek revenge against her neighbor Serbia, believed to be the instigator of the plot or at least its facilitator. We see Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany, a land of martial pride but fears about a two-front war, dragged into supporting her ally Austria-Hungary, and we see Tsarist Russia, which (according to this book) was actually mobilizing her armies for a war against both Central Powers well before they had in turn mobilized against her. And we also see France and Britain, allied with Russia and each unsure if they really want to have this war (the French seeing red for the theft of Alsace-Lorraine after the Franco-Prussian War, while England is in a naval rivalry with Germany). It's all a series of mistakes, miscommunications, and missed opportunities to avert a catastrophe of epic proportions.

The prose style here is very good, I'm not familiar with this author's work but he makes a very compelling narrator for the events of that traumatic month in world history. This is the first I've heard of Russia beginning her mobilization of troops well before the Central Powers, so I'm not sure how much stock I put in it, but history is often always more complicated than the first few drafts of it would suggest. I've long been of the opinion that all sides of WWI (except for the late-coming American effort) have more than enough blame to share for the outbreak and sustained slaughter of four years of trench warfare, but "July 1914" does a good job of making clear just how shared that blame was. Sins of omission count as well as sins of commission, and each side has a few of each type to their credit (or debit, if you will).

This is a fast-paced, compelling book that maybe doesn't reach the heights of other WWI-outbreak books that I've read ("The Guns of August" is a classic, but don't skip "The Sleepwalkers" if you get a chance to read it), but it's in the discussion for thought-provoking works that continue to examine the ramifications of those pivotal days between the death of Franz Ferdinand and the outbreak of European (and eventually worldwide) warfare. I recommend it.

[Denise · Rating 4 out of 5]

Detailed and surprisingly gripping, this meticulously reconstructed day-to-day account of the internal discussions, diplomatic maneuvers and other events between the key government players and decision makers involved in the outbreak of World War I from the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Serbia on 28 June to Britain's declaration of war on 4 August 1914 made for fascinating reading and adds a lot of nuance to the question of who was to blame for the four years of devastation that followed.

[Linda Gee · Rating 4 out of 5]

A detailed account of the July Crisis and the decisions made that led to the First World War. Sometimes, the number of names mentioned can be difficult to keep track of, but overall, it's a good read. Sad to think about the years that would await these leaders and nations once the war began.

[Kimmo Sinivuori · Rating 5 out of 5]

July 1914 is a fast paced thriller about the diplomatic maneuvers that took place between the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo and the outbreak of the Great War. Reading the book was like watching a fast burning fuse and not being able to do anything to stop the powder keg from exploding. The book is full of "if only" moments that excited my imagination.

McMeekin is a brilliant writer and once the book gathers pace in part two where Count Hoyos visits Berlin it is almost impossible to put it down. The book doesn't have any dull moments and on several occasions McMeekin shows that he has a great sense of humor referring to the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia as the worst kept secret in Europe and to the evacuation of the Austrian Embassy in Belgrade as making the speed record for the rupture of diplomatic relations.

It is to the benefit of McMeekin and his readers that almost 100 years have passed since the Great War broke out as it makes it possible to write a history of the war that is not the history of the victors. The book opens up fascinating new perspectives to the direct causes of the Great War. It is a perfect book to read while waiting for the centenary of the War next year.

It is clear that Germany was not the country that wanted war and Kaiser Wilhem was not the bloodthirsty spike helmeted hun that wanted to set Europe ablaze. Germany bears responsibility of course and it is incredible to think today that once Germany started to mobilize there was no way even for the Kaiser to stop the army from crossing the Belgian border three days later. As Chancellor Bethman concluded his speech at the Bundesrat "If the iron dice now must roll, then may God help us."

Germany also bears responsibility for giving the Austrians a blank cheque but it is the Hungarian Minister-president Tisza who is probably the most guilty for the Austrian revenge for the assassination to spiral out of control. However, Tisza didn't do it out of malice but because he was desperate to avoid a war with Serbia. It is ironic that by trying to avoid a local war he set in motion events that led to a world war.

Reading McMeekin one must come to the conclusion that it is Russia that is guilty for the Great War. It is quite clear that Russia was looking for a revanche against Austria and wanted to show to Germans who was the real great power.

However, to me it is France who is the real villain. France was encouraging Russia to mobilize against Germany and start a war so that it would be weakened enough for her to attack and claim back the territories it had lost in the Franco-Prussian war. France played a clever and very unsportsmanlike game which led to the British to believe that Russia was not mobilizing in secret (as it was doing) and that it was actually Germany and Kaiser Wilhem that was preparing for an offensive war.

And the British then? They were sleepwalking. But I think that there is another book about sleepwalking to the Great War that is supposed to be very good and that I need to read.

[Neil Fox · Rating 4 out of 5]

As an avid student of the causes of the Great War, most accounts I have read have centered on the system of alliances, the rise of Nationalism and the arms race as the chief culprits. McMeekin's work is a ground-breaking study into the contribution of the cataclysmic failure of diplomacy as a major cause of why War broke out in August 1914 following the assasination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. He also offers up the intriguing possibility that the War might have been avoided altogether had the Diplomats and Statesmen handled things differently. In doing so he differentiates the more sinister and calculating characters among the Statesmen from the mere bunglers and incompetents.

The most notable thing about McMeekin's intricately researched work is his examination of where the blame actually lies. Conventional historical wisdom has always firmly painted Germany and her ally Austria as the chief belligerents. McMeekin opens up a new intriguing avenue of thought painting Russian and her mercurial foreign minister Sazonov, along with the scheming French President Poincare, as the main protagonists, while Germany and its Kaiser are cast in the unfamiliar light of unwilling and blundering victims dragged into the mire by the ineptitude of her hapless and blundering Austrian allies. Britain meanwhile, chiefly in the form of Foreign Minister Edward Grey, is assigned the part of an indecisive, vascillating party sleepwalking into a War which would claim a generation of its finest young men.

The only point where I would say McMeekin goes overboard in developing his new angle on Germany's motivation and involvement is in his claim that Germany entered the war "knowing they would loose" such was their reluctance and flawed battleplan / mobilization plan. This is bravely at odds with most commentators' views of the aggressive, indestructable warmongering "Blood and Iron" Kaiser and his generals who told their troops in August 1914 that the War would be won by Christmas.

I hope that McMeekins thoughtful and brilliant work provokes a new line of contemporary debate on the origins of a conflict which continues to define the Europe of today.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 5 out of 5]

The question of which country was responsible “the most” for the outbreak of war has been debated for decades but has never really caught my interest. Although Germany was an easy scapegoat, things are not that simple. The Russians bear considerable blame as well. As do the French. But suffice it to say that the “single scapegoat” theory is too cartoonish to be seriously considered.

The book is well-written, superbly researched and gives us a great account of the assassination of Ferdinand and the diplomatic machinations leading up to the outbreak of war. McMeekin shows how the rickety Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires began to make moves that they hoped would be a prelude to a brief, localized conflict.

I also found out that McMeekin’s research at French and Russian archives have almost no records of the activities of their respective diplomats during the whole month of July. Also Russia began mobilizing for war before any of the other powers did, declaring the supposedly “pre-mobilization” Period Preparatory to War, which was just mobilization with another name.

[Siddharth · Rating 4 out of 5]

A gripping account of the diplomatic scramble between European states following the assassination of the Austrian Archduke and the commencement of a catastrophic war a month later.

[Lysergius · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very readable examination of the sequence of events leading up to the First World War. The sins of omission and commission of the various diplomatic services involved are examined in detail and the a clear time line of the mobilisations of the various armies is constructed which leaves no doubt that despite Germany being blamed, as a result of the incursion into Belgium, the true instigators were France and Russia who set out to deceive and obfuscate, and Britain through blindness and incompetence.

A formidable achievement.

[Chad · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have gotten into a bad habit of buying whatever books I want to read on my Goodreads list instead of trying to find available copies from the library. As the books I'm usually interested in are a little more obscure, they often aren't available at the library. Still. I decided to try browsing ebooks available through the library instead of insisting they come from my Want-to-Read list. That's how I came on July 1914: Countdown to War by Sean McMeekin.

The book is kind of a prequel to the events of WWI, documenting the diplomatic machinations before the first shot was even fired. The title itself almost seems to be a play on classic Guns of August, the moment most people associate with the beginning of WWI.

Without looking up more details, how do you picture the beginning of WWI? Who are the "good guys" and "bad guys"? Before reading this book, I knew there was an archduke that was murdered by Serbians. Then the generalization explained in my high school history textbook: this small conflict escalated due to all the international treaties on both sides. This somehow leads to a conflict between Germany (and Austria? But they didn't matter, it was all Germany) and the good guys, Britain, France, Russia, and eventually the US. Germany was the aggressor, because they violated Belgian neutrality to get to France. This led to a miserable 4-5 years of war in the trenches after which the good guys eventually won.

That's the simplified narrative I keep in my head. Which to some extent is correct, but also clearly is biased, as the narrative has been told by the winners.

While McMeekin's book does attempt to answer the quest "Whose fault was it," he doesn't really start analyzing responsibility until the epilogue. The whole of the book is a play-by-play of diplomatic maneuvering. We jump from Vienna to Paris to St. Petersburg to London to Berlin, examining the decisions of heads of state, heads of government, chancellors, foreign ministers, war ministers, and diplomats. The reader has keep track of all the major players on each side. For example, in Germany:

Kaiser Wilhelm II theoretically calls the shots, but is a bit reluctant to go to war and the war hawks think of him as an "old woman."
Bethmann Hollweg is the kaiser's chancellor and has kind of the same relationship with Wilhelm as the prime minister has with the queen of Britain.
The main players from the military are Moltke (chief of staff of the army), Falkenhayn (Prussian minister of war), and Tirpitz (representing the Navy).
Not present in Berlin are Germany's various ambassadors:

Griesinger, ambassador to Serbia
Lichnowsky, ambassador to Britain
Pourtales, ambassador to Russia
Schoen, ambassador to France

Tschirscky, ambassador to Austria-Hungary
Then on the other side, the ambassadors from each of these powers to Germany:

Goschen, British ambassador to Germany

Cambon, French ambassador to Germany
Szogeny, Austrian ambassador to Germany

And that is just for a single power. Keeping track of these while reading is absolutely essential. I would lose track at times, and perhaps it would have been helpful to map these out to keep track of the plot. You will have sentences or paragraphs like this one:

Baron Schoen was instructed to inform the French government that, in response to France's preliminary mobilization preparations, Germany would have to proclaim Kriegsgefahr, which, Schoen was to insist, fell well short of mobilization. More ominously, Pourtales was asked to "please impress on M. Sazonov very seriously that further progress of Russian mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize and that European war could then scarcely be prevented."

And that one is fairly light! I would keep getting certain names mixed up (like Paleologue and Pourtales).

The book is broken into two asymmetrical sections: Part I ("Reactions") and Part II ("Countdown"). Part I, as indicated by the title, covers the reactions of the various world powers to the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary. Essential background knowledge, for sure. Like I said above, I wasn't sure why Archduke Ferdinand was an important player. It turns out Archduke Ferdinand was the successor to the throne of Austria-Hungary (for some reason, I associated an archduke with religion, like an archbishop?). So definitely an important player, and perhaps makes clearer why this could potentially result in war. It's hard to think of an equivalent today, as we don't have hereditary forms of government. In America, the closest thing I can think of is the assassination of Kamala Harris.

McMeekin does a great job in this section in establishing the major events of the day, like you were reading the daily newspapers. For instance, we may not remember in 10 years from now some of the major headlines now ("heat wave in the Pacific Northwest" for instance going on right now). He also does a great job at trying to establish personalities and relationships between major players. Getting this set up in Part I helps set the flow for the rest of the book.

I was surprised at how long Part II was compared to Part I? But that must be intentional. Part II is much different. Each chapter essentially represents a day in July, a countdown to war that starts in August. You will probably get events in Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburg and Belgrade in a single chapter, so it can get confusing.

What are the main takeaways?

The first is that: Germany can't be painted unilaterally as "the bad guy." We probably feel that way now because The U.S. fought on the side of the Allies, and the later events of WWII seem much more black and white. McMeekin doesn't try to point blame at a single player, and he does still hold Germany responsible for two big mistakes: (1) giving Austria-Hungary a blank check for retaliation against Serbia without establishing any type of constraints and (2) violating Belgian neutrality. But his final diagnosis-- in fact, the last line of the book-- is so far from "willing the war," the Germans went into it kicking and screaming as the Austrian noose snapped shut around their necks.

McMeekin seems to hold Russia as the most culpable when it comes to WWI. In his Epilogue, he states, The decision to European war was made by Russia on the night of 29 July 1914, when Tsar Nicholas II advised unanimously by his advisers, signed the order for general mobilization. While Austria was still wanting to try to "localize" the response to Serbia, Russia was the first great power to get involved and thus sparked a world war. Russia also seems to have been very sneaky in how it portrayed this initial response. It started pre-mobilizing without letting anyone know, essentially starting the dominos as other powers had to respond in turn.

There are other centers of blame as well-- McMeekin paints Austria-Hungary inept in its diplomatic response, and Britain wanted to appear neutral as long as possible while secretly favoring France and Russia.

An interesting re-evaluation of history.

[Simon · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fascinating and generally clear (certainly much more so to the reader than to those at the highest governmental levels in Europe in the month covered by the book). McMeekin is out to break the limited view that Germany alone bears guilt for the outbreak of war, and succeeds. The "villains" in the book are Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, and Berchtold, his Austro-Hungarian counterpart. But even Serbia comes in for it, and Grey emerges as a very limited player in terms of intelligence and initiative. McMeekin can't really answer why Berchtold and Bethmann plumped so heavily for war (the volte face is too sudden to be easily explicable, and the results for their nations too outside what they had hoped for, i.e. wars with Russia and Britain), and I also disagree with at least one of his ultimate conclusions, i.e. that Germany began the war knowing she would lose it. But he is fascinating in his dissection of the events that took place during July, 1914, with a jeweler's eye for important, illuminating details.

A minor quibble? A better editor might have prevented him from overusing certain words within the same paragraph, and corrected the very minor occasional mistake -- the daughters of Nicholas II were not "archduchesses". There is also a tendency to use modern terms like "summit meeting" that jars.

But these are very minor points. Overall, a significant contribution to the literature about the immediate approach of World War I.

[Shawn · Rating 5 out of 5]

Perhaps I'm becoming weak-minded, but I found McMeekin's arguments for primary Russian and French guilt for the war even more convincing than (just seven months ago) I found Max Hasting's arguments for primary German responsibility in Catastrophe, 1914. The most important basis for McMeekin's claim is probably the fact that both Russia and France mobilized before Germany (in the case of Russia,five days before) in the full knowledge that mobilization inevitably meant war. But of course he finds plenty of blame to go around, from Austria's dithering, to Britain's and Germany's almost unbelievable diplomatic incompetence.

The blame game, however, is really just a brief epilogue. The rest of the book recounts in great (but to me at least, riveting) detail the efforts and actions of diplomats, heads of state and military men in the period from the Archduke's assassination on June 28 through Germany's invasion of Belgium on August 4.

[Sean Leas · Rating 3 out of 5]

A fascinating read on a day by day blow of the course of events in July 1914 leading up to World War I. This book is well researched albeit a little dryly written.

[Jim Dodd · Rating 5 out of 5]

I just finished reading a history of the Thirty-Years War which was the beginning of the end of Imperial Europe. So, I figured I would read something about World War I which was the end of the end of Imperial Europe. This book is an excellent introduction to the complexities of this event. McMeekin does a thorough job of taking you into the mindset and agenda of each country and the people who led those countries.

Starting with the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand on June 28th, 1914 it walks through each of the ensuing days, right up to the first shots being fired on August 4th, leading ultimately to the death of 9 million people and the devastation of much of Europe. It was so horrifying that people naively thought this would be the last war. Ah...so cute.

What is so engrossing about this book is that you realize that your understanding of why it happened is probably all wrong. Sure there were alliances between countries which ultimately dragged the Great Powers of France, Germany, Russia and Britain into the war, but how it really happened is actually much more complex and disturbing.

The book points out there were three major factors beyond the military alliances that caused this to happen.

First, since each of the Great Powers (except France) was some form of constitutional monarchy (the last vestiges of Imperial Europe), and they lacked a "single voice", a "single point of contact". Each country had a Monarch, a foreign minister/secretary, and ambassadors who were all running "open loop" saying things, promising things, and claiming things which were not in sync with the other representatives of their government. Oddly, it was the promises of neutrality and a strong desire to avoid war intermittently communicated by each country, interleaved by vague threats which lead other countries to make decisions which were truly stupid. If each country would have had a clear message (e.g. "Don't do that or we will definitely declare war"), the war would not have happened. It was the vacillating and building of false hopes which lead everyone down the path to war.

Second, the lines of communication were actually pretty bad. Telegraphs were a mature technology (they even had smatterings of radio communication). You would imagine that sending an urgent message from say Berlin to Paris would take perhaps an hour (assuming relays and a sense of urgency). Not true, it would take upwards of 24 hours. A message would be crafted by 8 or 10 people. Then it would be encrypted so nobody else could read it. Then someone would have to travel from the Palace to the telegraph office in Berlin, and the message would be sent to a telegraph office in Paris, which would then be sent over to the German embassy in Paris. Next, they would have to decrypt it, translate it from German to French, and then walk it over to the French Government offices. Imagine trying to communicate delicate diplomacy with a lag time of 24 hours. By the time you saw one message, you'd already sent two others in the other direction which made the message you receive pointless, or perhaps confusing. Dumb.

And finally third, there were clearly a subset of people in each government who wanted war. The monarchs did NOT want war. But, people they trusted kept lying or misleading the monarchs in an attempt to push to the brink war. Mostly this was done because they felt that war NOW was better than war LATER and the assassination of the Archduke was a good excuse. Many felt that Europe was in a unstable state, and war was the natural way to settle the political issues and distrust. To their credit, Kaiser Wilhelm, King George V, and Czar Nicholas II all clearly knew that war would be very bad. To their discredit, none of them felt empowered to drive to a diplomatic solution. They kept relying on their foreign minister/secretary and military leaders to do this, and they simply did not try very hard.

The book is a masterpiece of historical research. He goes back to original sources, government documents, telegrams, personal diaries, and the piles of bureaucratic detritus that all governments create.

It is written very well. You are pulled along from one event to the next and you feel a palpable sense of urgency and impending doom. It is also disturbing that a handful of people (perhaps 12) were responsible for the deaths of so many.

At the end, the author makes a very valid assertion that war was not inevitable. If just a few things had been different, if any one of the Great Powers had simply said, "Let's sit down and hash this would right now." probably the war would not have happened. And he makes a credible argument that probably no world war would have ever happened. It was a terrible combination of incompetence, technological problems, and a few stupid people which caused it. I tend to think people are always stupid and war was probably inevitable, but it is interesting to think how different the world would be.

A good read!

[Peter Corrigan · Rating 5 out of 5]

I read this superb book over the course of the same period (July) in 2021 simply to put myself in the same mind and time frame as the title of the book relates. Of course June 28, 1914 lit the fuse and diplomacy sputtered into early August but it was the month of July in which the crucial decisions were taken. Barbara Tuchman may have had the Guns of August but Sean McMeekin has the Words of July. And lo, 107 years later and it is STILL the Russians! At least that is the ultimate conclusion of his deeply researched history on the events of that fateful month. It is time that will forever live in a sort of hazy dream when the Old World that was fading anyway suddenly immolated itself in an orgy of destruction that arguably was the beginning of the end of Western Civilization. Rarely in human history has anything so insane occurred over such meaningless differences. Societies willing to sacrifice their youth in such vast quantities may not not deserve to survive. Perhaps it takes an older person to see that, yet there were plenty of those in 1914, most of the diplomats and leaders in fact. And still they persisted in carrying out the madness. And it was the Tsar of Russia, the ill-fated and feckless Nicholas II who both saw it and enabled it. His quote that 'I will not be responsible for a monstrous slaughter' was perhaps the least accurate and most poignant of the entire affair, especially as he was thus responsible for the extinction of himself and his entire family just four short years later. McMeekin's conclusion in the final chapter on 'The Question of Responsibility' pins first blame for the war on Russia, specifically the night
of July 29, 1914 when the Tsar signed the order for general mobilization. The Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov deserves the deepest of opprobrium as he was behind much of the duplicity that led to war, including the 'partial' mobilization that preceded all other countries by at least three days. One can only hope that he and his family suffered bitterly for his actions. Of course, no one come off as blameless and perhaps the order of guilt from this reading might rank as: Russia, France, Austria, Germany, Britain. Clearly, the standard Anglo-American version of German war guilt was not deserved but their own blundering diplomacy and even honesty made them a simple scapegoat for much of history. Altogether this is a brilliant retelling with scrupulous attention to primary sources and recent secondary accounts as well.

[Liviu · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very detailed account of the slide into the war that changed everything, emphasizing, on the one hand, the almost inexorable chain of events that led to the war once the Austrian-Hungarian empire felt confident that it will be backed by Germany if they push to punish Serbia for its part in the assassination of the heir, while the Russian foreign minister who ultimately had the most influence in setting Russian policy, and who felt tricked and betrayed some years ago by the Austrians in the so-called Bosnian crisis, had no intention to let this happen again, so was willing to push hard for war the moment Austria-Hungary pressed Serbia, and the French prime minister was a helpless pacifist overwhelmed by domestic events and by the bellicose president who wanted revenge on Germany, the German chancellor was incapable of doing much, though he knew in his bones that war will be a disaster, while the British government was split between mostly timid isolationists and a few bellicose voices like Churchill who were in minority but were more forceful and on the other hand that all of the above were choices made by people with too much power and too little understanding.

It didn't help that the supposed all-powerful rulers of Russia and Germany, Nicky and Willy as they styled themselves in the desperate telegrams they sent one another on the eve of the war, were weak personalities, one completely dominated by his ministers (and unluckily without the one moderating influence of the peasant miracle healer Rasputin who understood that war meant disaster, but who was recovering from being shot in an assassination attempt - and who would be murdered later in the war by bellicose members of the nobility under the aegis of the British secret service for his continued opposition to the war), the other full of inferiority complexes and incapable of coordinating his (despised) chancellor and his military who didn't particularly want this war now and then, but who had a timetable and a plan that needed to be followed if it seemed inevitable...

And so like an avalanche that seems unstoppable, the "will be finished by Christmas" war that will change everything, started, though again as the author makes it clear, all came from choices from men with power playing with fire, fire that will burn most of them by the end...

[Peter Harrison · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read this book immediately after finishing AJP Taylor's "The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918", and it made such an interesting contrast. Taylor's older work is old-fashioned but, especially in the segment on the approach to the First World War, brings a focus on the long term structural changes driving the continent to war, in particular the growth of German economic power and the developing competition for "spheres of influence" and colonies.

By contrast McMeekin zeroes right in on the month from the assassination of Franz Ferdinand to the start of the war with the German invasion of Belgium and France. If there is a strength to this it allows you to follow the detailed diplomatic back and forth through a day-by-day timeline. But it creates a huge weakness where throughout McMeekin can only see the actions of individual monarchs, politicians, and diplomats. He reinforces this in the conclusion where he assigns "war guilt" based on the mistakes made by the individuals involved during the month of crisis in July 1914. Of course it's obvious that people like Berchtold and Sazonov made critical errors, but I find Taylor's analysis of the underlying mechanisms driving towards general European war far more convincing. McMeekin specifically thinks through some "counterfactuals" to argue that war was not inevitable and that contingency ruled the accident of war. While war was clearly not "inevitable", I think his refusal to countenance any structural causation is a huge flaw.

Finally, and rather pettily, I know he's American, but McMeekin refers through to "England" when the government he's describing was British. You'd think he might notice this when he ascribes so much of the British government's failure to its obsession with the state of Ireland. It's a minor point, but it speaks to a failure to take notice of the detail, which in a book driven by attention to the almost hour-by-hour description is worrisome.

[Aditya Kelkar · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is the first book I’ve read about WWI, and boy did I make the right choice! Really puts all the diplomatic, strategic and political events in context with the trigger event in Sarajevo. War stories are always exciting, but describing the pre-war events, discussions and machinations so clearly and yet making them so absorbing is the ultimate achievement of the author. Kudos!

[Ediz Çandır · Rating 5 out of 5]

Avusturya-Macaristan veilahtının öldürülmesinden 1. Dünya Savaşının başlamasına kadar geçen bir aylık süreyi, savaşın taraflarının eylemleri üzerinden anlatan ayrıntılı bir çalışma. Önlenebilir bir savaşın, politik ihtiraslar ve ihmaller eşliğinde göz göre göre nasıl geldiğini anlamak için okunabilir.

[Yogesh Wadhwa · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent dramatization of that scenario that captured, very, very briefly, how some of the big power hungry countries reacted that led to the First World War...

Excellent if you are looking to dig more on this chapter of history