How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy

by John J. Mearsheimer, Sebastian Rosato

A groundbreaking examination of a central question in international Do states act rationally?
 
To understand world politics, you need to understand how states think. Are states rational? Much of international relations theory assumes that they are. But many scholars believe that political leaders rarely act rationally. The issue is crucial for both the study and practice of international politics, for only if states are rational can scholars and policymakers understand and predict their behavior.
 
John J. Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato argue that rational decisions in international politics rest on credible theories about how the world works and emerge from deliberative decision‑making processes. Using these criteria, they conclude that most states are rational most of the time, even if they are not always successful. Mearsheimer and Rosato make the case for their position, examining whether past and present world leaders, including George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, have acted rationally in the context of momentous historical events, including both world wars, the Cold War, and the post–Cold War era.  
 
By examining this fundamental concept in a novel and comprehensive manner, Mearsheimer and Rosato show how leaders think, and how to make policy for dealing with other states.

Genres: Politics, International Relations, Nonfiction, History, Political Science, Audiobook, Theory

304 pages, Paperback

Published September 3, 2024

About the author

John Joseph Mearsheimer (1947) is an American political scientist and international relations scholar, who belongs to the realist school of thought. He is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago. He has been described as the most influential realist of his generation.
Mearsheimer is best known for developing the theory of offensive realism, which describes the interaction between great powers as being primarily driven by the rational desire to achieve regional hegemony in an anarchic international system. In accordance with his theory, Mearsheimer believes that China's growing power will likely bring it into conflict with the United States.
Mearsheimer's works are widely read and debated by 21st-century students of international relations. A 2017 survey of US international relations faculty ranks him third among "scholars whose work has had the greatest influence on the field of IR in the past 20 years.

Reviews

[Saman · Rating 2 out of 5]

دولت‌ها چگونه فکر می‌کنند؟/جان میرشایمر، سباستین روزاتو/ترجمه ابوالفضل بازرگان/نشر کتابستان معرفت

جان میرشایمر در این کتاب به مفهوم عقلانیت در سیاست خارجی می‌پردازه. حدود نیمی از کتاب نظریه خودش رو شرح میده و در نیمه دوم از مثال‌های تاریخی زیادی برای نشون دادن نظرش استفاده می‌کنه. آیا نیمه اول کتاب که بحث نظری است سخت خوانه و فقط بچه های روابط بین الملل خونده میتونند بخونند؟نه! به عنوان کسی که روابط بین الملل نخوندم و صرفا به این حوزه ها علاقه مندم، مطالبش سنگین نبود اما خب همونطوری که می‌دونید مباحث نظری، خشک و بی روحه. میرشایمر در پی اثبات این مساله است که دولت‌ها در اکثر اوقات بر خلاف تصور و تبلیغات قدرت‌ها، تصمیمات عقلانی می‌گیرند و خیلی از تصمیمات مهم تاریخ که غیرعقلانی بودن بهشون چسبیده، اتفاقا عقلانی است.او این نکته رو متذکر میشه که اخذ تصمیم عقلانی به این معنی نیست که خروجی کار حتما منفعت داشته و ممکنه تصمیم عقلانی منجر به خروجی نامناسبی بشه، مثالهای زیادی میزنه اما شاید معروفترین مثال که در یکی از آپدیت‌های کتاب هم بهش اشاره کردم عملیات پرل هاربر توسط ژاپنه که او این تصمیم رو عقلانی میدونه.

کتاب میتونست کمتر از تکرار بعضی چیزها استفاده کنه.ظاهرا ابتدا میرشایمر و روزاتو این رو در قالب یک مقاله نوشتند و تصمیم گرفتند بعدش به فرمت کتاب در بیارند.به نظرم این کتاب باید همون مقاله میموند و بهتر میتونست منظورشو برسونه.

مشکل اصلی من با این کتاب برمی‌گرده به اصل اندیشه میرشایمر که سالها در حال توسعه اونه. یعنی رئالیسم در روابط بین الملل.در داخل هم نظریات اون طرفدارانی در برخی کارشناسان به ویژه کارشناسان ثابت صداسیما داره.یک نمونه‌اش مترجم کتاب که سالهاست با هشتگ فقط یک عدد خواستار تولید فقط یک عدد بمب اتمه و معتقده ما اگر بمب اتم داشته باشیم کسی به ایران حمله نمی‌کنه!.اینجا وارد این قضیه نمیخوام بشم. اما یکی از بزرگترین نقدهایی که به رئالیسم در روابط بین الملل وارد میشه اینه که در این دیدگاه به دولت‌ها به عنوان بازیگر اصلی توجه اصلی میشه و نقش سازمانهای غیردولتی رو کم اهمیت میدونند.خب ایران که سالهاست یکی از مسائلی که بهش افتخار میکنه گروهک های نظامی اش در منطقه مثل کتائب و حشدالشعبی و حزب الله و انصارالله و بقیه است و معتقد بودند که اینها بزرگترین بازدارندگی رو برای ایران ایجاد کردند.حرف درستی هم بوده و امروزه میبینیم بعد از تضعیف همین گروهک ها به ایران حمله شد.پس نمیشه فقط روی دولتها تمرکز کرد و به موارد و سازمانهای غیردولتی اشاره نکرد..نقدهای دیگه ای هم وارد میشه به این نظریه که من بیشتر با این نقدها موافقم تا خود نظریه رئالیسم..

[Dana · Rating 4 out of 5]

Overall, I felt like this book was a fine introduction to several rationality theories in terms of states’ foreign policies. This, as one would expect, prompts the authors themselves to dive into highlighting the theoretical framework of their study (which was about half of the book) before demonstrating how their ideas can be used to practically determine the rationality or irrationality of one country’s actions or another’s.

Although I enjoyed the examples provided by the author, at times I felt some of their interpretations of historic events lacked sufficient evidence, and several ideas lacked rationality. Mainly, I found it hard to view historical events in a black-and-white way, such as rational or not rational, and often times thought about why they can’t be both?

Another small critique that I have is that the book focused too much on highlighting the main points of the authors’ opinions through repetition, which made it feel quite monotonous.

[uncooltured · Rating 1 out of 5]

I would rather have to watch princess diaries dubbed in thai for seventeen hours straight than to glance upon something this man has written ever again.

[Jamie O'Brien · Rating 2 out of 5]

I thought this was a largely unnecessary piece of pedagogic fluff. It apparently started life as a highly influential article (which I'm sure was a far more suitable format for its interesting starting assertion) but as a book, it just said the same thing over and over again. Namely:

"Many historians, political scientists, and commentators have argued that XYZ international relations decision was non-rational. These people are wrong. If you look closer at the thinking behind it - i.e. that policymakers thought it would work and they talked about it before doing it - then it was clearly rational."

OR

"Many historians, political scientists, and commentators have argued that XYZ international relations decision WAS rational. These people are wrong. If you look closer at the thinking behind it - i.e. that policymakers were misinformed and didn't discuss it enough beforehand - then it was clearly non-rational."

"Oh, and also, international relations is complex and no-one can possibly know what consequences any decision will ever have anyway."

The last 75 or so pages that break down specific case-studies like German mindset prior to both World Wars, the failure at the Bay of Pigs, and the blundered US invasion of Iraq after 9/11 are interesting in the sense that they provide a simplified overview of these specific events with hindsight, but all it really does is make the point that the ones driving the train are as blind as the rest of us.

[Jamie Bookboy Fitzpatrick · Rating 3 out of 5]

Decent read, I prefer John’s articles to this. Repeats itself and is very boring in the first 100 pages. The second half makes up for it. Worth a read

[Tanner · Rating 3 out of 5]

Audible. Would’ve like less on the academic theory of rationality and more on the actual historical examples/context as well as evidence undergirding key theories.

[Ola Ingebrikt · Rating 3 out of 5]

Klassisk Mearsheimer, Klassisk realisme

Dette er en bok som ikke egner seg til koselesing. Er egentlig bare en lang artikkel og kan sikkert brukes som teoretisk grunnlag i en semesteroppgave i geopolitisk risiko.

Boken tar ikke for seg hvordan stater tenker, men heller hva rasjonalitet betyr på den internasjonale arenaen. Med rasjonalitet menes ikke hvordan statsledere tenker, men hvordan kollektivet av embetsmenn og folkevalgte tar beslutninger. Boka er 2/3 ferdig før eksemplene om statelig rasjonalitet eller irrasjonalitet kommer.

Det argumenteres relativt godt for at USA’s tro på domino-teorien under den kalde krigen ikke var rasjonell siden det aldri har vært noe empiri på at dette faktisk har vært riktig. Japan sitt angrep på USA under andre verdenskrig var rasjonelt og NATOs ekspansjon østover etter 91 er også rasjonelt. Selvfølgelig også Russlands invasjon av Ukraina.

Dårlig bok, bra artikkel

[Christopher · Rating 3 out of 5]

The counter-point to Richard Ned Lebow's Cultural Theory, and ultimately just as much of a mixed bag of correct observations and mythbusting coupled with some questionable suppositions of its own.

Overall, the argument that states are more likely to behave rationally than nonrationally is correct, and the idea of comparing the greater amount of examples of this with the lesser amount of nonrational counterpoints is on point. State rationality should be taken as a default setting if no contrary information is to be found.

BUT

I am not confident that the proportion is overwhelming enough to be complacent about this. Mearsheimer's work itself serves as a counter-point when it comes to his (correct) focus on the Israel Lobby sabotaging rational behavior in Washington DC. That same elite is behind the Iraq, Libya, and Syria interventions as well, all of which strenghtened jihadist power and weakened the American position abroad.

The authors list credible vs non-credible theories early in the work and while for the most part they are correct, placing neoclassical realism in the non-credible camp showed the same strange inconsistency as exists in the prior point about the Israel lobby. It is claimed that neoclassical realism cannot uphold both state survival as the ultimate goal while also allowing for a wide chance of irrationality to take root as this creates a self-contradiction. But neoclassical realism does not contradict itself, stating in effect that boutique ideologies and irrational behavior thrive with ruling cliques for a time but eventually usually give way to survival when the chips are down. America's force posture in the Middle East may be unwise and self-destructive, but it does not threaten its own state survival. This is, perhaps, why it happens. The luxury wars of a complacent power.

This being said, the criteria for what rational vs irrational policy making in uncertain conditions is among the best and most succinct definitions I have come across in a book.

[Özgür · Rating 3 out of 5]

As much as I like Dr. Maersheimer I found the book a bit too diluted. The central theme is foreign policy through “deliberation” , using expected utility maximisation as much as possible with simple probablistic models with heuristics and what if sims but it takes the first half of the book to establish that. Second half has real history examples which has been fun to read. All in all if the process is that simple, the whole FP establishment looks open for disruption via AI.

[Sandra · Rating 2 out of 5]

Incredibly boring and repetitive. Why do we have to have same stuff repeated over and over and over and over and over again?

[Karolina Libront · Rating 2 out of 5]

Repetitive, boring, reaches kind-of-obvious conclusions. It should have been kept as a short crisp article.

[Zack Zeller · Rating 3 out of 5]

A bit repetitive and could’ve served as a long article. Historical context was useful/ interesting when defining state rationality or lack thereof.

**Pre-SIPA read**

[Szymon Sąsiadek · Rating 3 out of 5]

Akademicki język i trochę ciągłe powtarzanie tego samego, szkoda że tak mało przykładów racjonalnego postępowania i nieracjonalnego

[Naveed Bokhari · Rating 3 out of 5]

Overall a well written book, but theoretical debate becomes heavy at times in the first half. The examples quoted are from high profile historical events involving major powers. I wonder if rationality is that much in play in decisions taken by smaller third world countries. Is absence of rational policy making a major reason behind these countries' underdevelopment and poverty?

[Himadri Bose · Rating 4 out of 5]

John Mearsheimer's and Sebastian Rosato's work offers a well-crafted and insightful exploration of a crucial question in international relations: Are states truly rational actors? Does empirical evidence show consistent rationality or non-rationality in state behaviour? This issue is essential for academic study and practical application of international politics. Rosato and his co-author argue that "only if states are rational can scholars and policymakers understand and predict their behaviour."
The book argues that rational decisions in international politics are based on credible theories about how the world operates and result from deliberative decision-making processes. Rosato and Mearsheimer, a staunch advocate of great-power politics, assert that most states are rational. The authors focus on the rationality of the foreign-policy decision-making process (instrumental rationality) rather than its goals or outcomes. They argue that humans are fundamentally theoretical (homotheoreticus), with their understanding of how the world operates, guiding their decisions during crises and formulating grand strategies. They find theories based on "expected utility maximization" flawed in understanding state rationality in international affairs.
According to the authors, most states often act rationally when developing grand strategies and managing crises. They contend that ten cases traditionally viewed as irrational decision-making are examples of rational decision-making. These include America's pursuit of Liberal Hegemony after the Cold War, NATO's expansion post-Cold War, and policies toward Europe after World War II and East Asia after the Cold War. European cases include Germany's decisions to start World War I and invade the Soviet Union during World War II, as well as Japan's decision to attack the US at Pearl Harbour.
However, states do not always act rationally. The authors discuss four cases of "nonrational state behaviour," such as America's Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba in 1961 and its decision to invade Iraq in 2003. In these instances, small groups of high-level officials hijacked the decision-making process, preventing thorough deliberation. Nonrational choices can also result from non-credible or irrational theories like the domino theory, racial theories, and the clash of civilizations or from non-theoretical thinking such as analogies and heuristics. They argue that "the historical record reveals that most states are rational most of the time" and emphasize that rationality should not be conflated with success or morality. Rational policies can sometimes breach widely accepted ethical standards and may be unjust.
Regarding the role of emotions in policymaking, the authors acknowledge that decision-makers are occasionally driven more by emotions than theories. They cite experts like neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, who believes emotions are integral to rational thought, typically working in tandem with reason. However, Mearsheimer and Rosato conclude that such emotional dominance is rare, a point that may not fully align with the evidence. By downplaying emotions in decision-making, they risk echoing traditional international relations theorists who often depicted the state as a purely rational entity, uninfluenced by emotions in its international dealings.
In reality, inter-state dynamics are more complex. States can be rational, self-interested actors, but examining state rationality and egoism reveals a more intricate picture. Understanding the balance between rationality and emotionality in interstate and transnational affairs requires an appreciation of human nature's fundamental tenets, a topic extensively debated throughout history. Philosophers like Aristotle and Plato acknowledged the interplay between reason and emotion, with modern insights from neurobiology and behavioural studies offering a deeper understanding of this relationship. Major historical events cannot be fully understood without recognizing their emotional drivers. Nationalism, for example, is deeply rooted in emotions, influenced by symbols, myths, and perceived historical injustices. Emotional motivations have shaped many geopolitical events, such as Hitler's insistence on signing the 1940 armistice in the exact location of Germany's World War I defeat.
Mearsheimer and Rosato conclude with a somewhat pessimistic view of international relations, but I believe there is room for cautious optimism. Humanity can move towards a more peaceful and prosperous world by mitigating excessive emotionality and extractive egoism in global affairs. This requires breaking away from zero-sum paradigms and embracing pragmatic, win-win competition rooted in Symbiotic Realism and Multi-Sum Security, which account for human nature's neurobiological aspects and our interconnected world. Furthermore, they do not discuss many issues that would make gathering evidence for rational policymaking difficult, such as North Korea, Taiwan, trade protectionism, etc. Their 'Offensive realism' leanings are also front and centre throughout the book.
The book's emphasis on rationality frequently overlooks state actions' ethical and moral implications. A comprehensive understanding of state behaviour must include an analysis of both rationality and the moral and ethical dimensions of decisions, particularly when rational policies lead to unjust or unethical outcomes.
However, "How States Think" is a valuable addition to Mearsheimer's body of work, stressing the importance of not dismissing disliked policies as irrational. However, it is equally important to recognize the central role of emotions and egoism in decision-making, alongwith the interplay of their moral and ethical dimensions.

[J N · Rating 3 out of 5]

Rất khó để nói cuốn sách này của Mearsheimer là hay hay dở bởi nó viết logic theo lý thuyết hiện thực tấn công của M. Chủ nghĩa hiện thực tấn công cho rằng các quốc gia lớn luôn có xu hướng tìm cách gia tăng quyền lực và ảnh hưởng của mình trong một hệ thống quốc tế hỗn loạn và thiếu sự giám sát. M. lập luận rằng quốc gia không chỉ đơn giản là tìm kiếm sự an toàn mà còn theo đuổi sự thống trị trong hệ thống quốc t. Trong một thế giới mà không có cơ quan toàn cầu có thể kiểm soát các hành động của quốc gia, các quốc gia sẽ cố gắng tăng cường quyền lực để đảm bảo an ninh của mình. Điều này có thể bao gồm cả việc "tấn công" vào các quốc gia khác nếu điều đó giúp họ mở rộng phạm vi quyền lực hoặc giảm thiểu sự đe dọa từ các đối thủ. Với M. các quốc gia là các rational actors và đơn nhất khi đưa ra các quyết định liên quan đến hệ thống quốc tế.

Cuốn sách này sẽ được mở đầu bằng việc đánh giá các giả định về tác nhân lý tính (rational actor). Trước nhất, M và cộng sự xem xét lại: Thế nào là lý tính (rational), sau đó, mới chiếu xem thế nào là hành động và suy nghĩ phi lý tính.
“Tính lý tính xoay quanh việc hiểu thế giới nhằm định hướng hành động để đạt được các mục tiêu mong muốn. Trong lĩnh vực chính sách đối ngoại, tính lý tính bao gồm cả các khía cạnh ở cấp độ cá nhân lẫn cấp độ nhà nước. Các nhà hoạch định chính sách mang tính lý tính là những người dựa trên lý thuyết—họ sử dụng các lý thuyết đáng tin cậy để hiểu rõ tình hình hiện tại và quyết định những chính sách tối ưu nhằm đạt được mục tiêu của mình.

Một quốc gia được coi là lý tính nếu quan điểm của các nhà hoạch định chính sách chủ chốt được tổng hợp thông qua một quá trình thảo luận kỹ lưỡng và chính sách cuối cùng dựa trên một lý thuyết đáng tin cậy. Ngược lại, một quốc gia được xem là phi lý tính nếu chiến lược của nó không dựa trên một lý thuyết đáng tin cậy, không có sự thảo luận kỹ lưỡng, hoặc cả hai.”

Nền tảng của M. (cho cả cấp độ cá nhân và quốc gia khi ban hành chính sách đối ngoại) là:
+ Quyết định được cho là lý tính nếu dựa vào lý thuyết lý tính (hợp lý) để nhìn rõ bối cảnh
+ Quyết định sau đó được thảo luận kỹ lưỡng dựa trên tình hình thực tế

Với định nghĩa này về lý tính, M và S đưa ra kết luận, khi xem xét quá trình phát triển của lịch sử thì “các quốc gia thường xuyên hành xử một cách lý tính trong chính sách đối ngoại của mình” hơn là phi lý tính như thường được nghĩ trước đây. Vì M. dựa vào góc nhìn của chủ nghĩa hiện thực tấn công nên về bản chất của các lý thuyết được các nhà hoạch định chính sách sử dụng sẽ vẫn dựa trên góc nhìn hiện thực về môi trường chính trị quốc tế. Vì thế, chính sách đối ngoại của các quốc gia phần lớn được định hướng bởi các tính toán chiến lược dựa trên lợi ích quyền lực và an ninh hơn là các yếu tố mang tính đạo đức hay lý tưởng.

M. phân tích các sự kiện lịch sử để thể hiện lý tính trong việc xây dựng CSĐN, cụ thể là:
+ Đức trong chiến tranh thế giới thứ nhất
+ Nhật Bản những năm 1930 và suốt thời kỳ Trân Châu Cảng
+ Quyết định không cân bằng để chống lại Đức Quốc xã của Anh năm 1938
các trường hợp không lý tính:
+ Quyết định xâm chiếm Iraq của Hoa Kỳ năm 2003
+ Quyết định tham gia vào chiến tranh Nam-Bắc Hàn và chiến tranh tại Việt Nam

Mặc dù M. viết rất hợp lý theo logic của mình nhưng tôi nhận thấy các lập luận của M. thiếu tính thuyết phục bởi như mọi khi, M. xem nhẹ các tổ chức phi nhà nước, phi chính trị trong việc đưa ra các quyết định lý tính của nhóm hoạch định chính sách. Việc lựa chọn một lý thuyết đáng tin cậy cũng như thảo luận sâu sắc rõ ràng là chịu nhiều ảnh hưởng liên quan đến tâm lý người đứng đầu, chính trị nội bộ (Đảng phái), và tình hình kinh tế toàn cầu. Nếu tồn tại một lý thuyết về chủ nghĩa hiện thực tấn công tại Nga, chính quyền Nga có xem xét vấn đề này trên các khía cạnh về kinh tế, liên hệ quốc tế thì Nga đáng lý không lựa chọn chiến tranh nhưng kết quả cuối cùng vẫn không thể diễn ra. Vấn đề ở đây không phải là quá trình đưa ra CSĐN của quốc gia lý tính thì CS của quốc gia đó lý tính mà còn cần xem xét ở cấp độ cá nhân trong việc đại diện quốc gia đưa ra quyết định đó có lý tính hay không. Lúc này, các tác nhân có khả năng tác động với cá nhân này sẽ cần được xem xét. Đồng thời, các yếu tố liên quan đến văn hóa và quan điểm nhìn nhận thế giới cũng là một tác nhân đóng góp vào việc xây dựng CSĐN. Điều này, M. thể hiện có xung đột trong lập luận của mình khi Mỹ đưa quân vào Đông Á, ĐNA cũng như câu chuyện tại Iraq.

Nhìn chung cuốn sách có một số điểm sáng tôi thích. Trong đó có một lập luận rằng, chính trị quốc tế vốn không chắc chắn, nếu không dựa vào một lý thuyết đáng tin làm nền tảng thì rất khó để bắt đầu xem xét hành vi của quốc gia, khó mà truy vấn hành vi của quốc gia cho phù hợp.

Ngoài ra thì tôi chưa thấy đã khi đọc cuốn này lắm! Hơi thiếu thuyết phục trong tình hình chính trị phức tạp như hiện nay bởi việc đơn giản hóa quyết định và hành vi quốc gia.

[Krispy_Pages · Rating 3 out of 5]

“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

These famous words have been reiterated so many times since George Santayana wrote them in 1905 that they have become a cliché. Mark Twain was probably more accurate when he asserted that “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.”

To pick up rhyming schemes, we examine history. And as we examine history, we are puzzled. Why would a nation initiate hostilities against each other fully cognizant of the repercussions? Why would a state choose certain political strategy when it is obvious that utility can’t be maximized? What ruminations went through the minds of the policy makers and rulers? Are their actions to be dismissed as mere folly, or did they stem from an, albeit elusive, valid rationale?

Do states act rationally?

It has become commonplace for American leaders to dismiss their foreign adversaries as “irrational”. At some point over the past twenty-five years, Saddam Hussein, Mahmound Ahmadinejad, Hugo Chavez, Kim Jong-un, and Vladimir Putin, among others, have been branded “irrational”, “illogical”, “crazy”, “delusional”, or “mad”, and in some cases they have been likened to Adolf Hitler, who is often portrayed as the poster child of irrationality.

Whether this imprudent habit is to achieve political propaganda or American leaders truly believe their enemies are most often irrational, their view has vastly influenced the academic circles of traditional international relation.

Yes, I believe by now we have all heard of the Nobel Prize laurate, Daniel Kahneman, and learned that individuals don’t always act rationally, that individuals aren’t first and foremost foresighted utility maximizers, but react to changes in terms of gains and losses. And yes, I have repeated the word individual three times on purpose. But what about a group of individuals? What about a state? So back to the question, the majority of times

Do states act rationally?

How State Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy is a book that argues that, throughout history, states predominantly act rationally. Some of the terrorists, fascists, tyrants, and the seemingly insane decisions they have made were in fact, rational. There were cases where rational decisions led to disastrous outcomes and irrational actions somehow achieved positive results. Outcomes and morality should not be what we define rationality. So what defines political rationality? In defiance of the prevalent doctrine of expected utility maximization, the authors bring to the fore two perspectives in reimagining rationality amidst information scarce environments. They accentuate the importance of leaders guided by theoretical frameworks and prioritizing process over outcomes.

The authors argue that majority of times, states act according to goal and strategic rationality at both individual and collective levels. The goal-rational states are primarily motivated to pursue self-preservation or survival and there are two elements central to their approach: decisions are informed by credible theories and a thorough deliberative process. Credible theory refers to a set of realistic assumptions and causal logics, buttressed by empirical claims with solid historical evidence. Deliberation is characterized as a two-step aggregation process, built upon a robust and uninhibited debate and methodical evaluation of options, leading to a definitive decision. If states deviate from these criteria, they will fall into irrationality.

In the framework presented by Mearsheimer and Rosato, non-rational behaviors are considered as anomalies rather than the norm, typically arising from constraints or unpredictable black swan events in international politics. The subsequent narrative finally delves into the empirical question: "Throughout history, do states consistently act rationally?" Applying their theory to two real-world scenarios—grand strategy and crisis decisions—the authors examined ten historical cases, five for each scenario, traditionally perceived as non-rational, aiming to challenge this perspective. These case studies encompass pivotal moments such as Germany's pre-First World War decisions, Japan's strategic maneuvers in the 1930s culminating in Pearl Harbor, and US actions during both the Cuban Missile Crisis and the post-Cold War NATO expansion. The book also acknowledges instances where state actions deviate from rationality, citing examples like the US-backed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Some of the examples mentioned in the book were intriguing. For example, it is widely believe in the West that Russian president Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine was not a rational act. U.S senator Mitt Romney noted that “by invading Ukraine, Mr. Putin has already proved that he is capable of illogical and self-defeating decisions.” In the current days, the only morally acceptable reason for going to war is self-defence, and from the West’s viewpoint, the invasion of Ukraine was nothing but a war of conquest. So with the “unprovoked” assault, Putin joined a long line of irrational tyrants succumbed to his ego-driven obsession with restoring Russia’s great power.

But in fact, Putin and his advisers did, numerous times, expressed their concern thinking in a straightforward balance of power theory, viewing the West’s efforts to make Ukraine a bulwark on Russia’s boarder as an existential threat that could not be allowed to stand. Putin laid out his theory and logic in a speech explaining his decision for war: “With NATO’s eastward expansion the situation for Russia has been becoming worse and more dangerous by the year…We cannot stay idle and passively observe these developments. This would be an irresponsible thing to do for us….it is a red line which we have spoken about in numerous occasions. They have crossed it.” It is worth noting that Moscow preferred to deal with the growing threat on its borders through aggressive diplomacy, but the United States and its allies were unwilling to accommodate Russia’s security concerns. This being the case, Putin opted for war.

Does this make Putin’s action righteous? No, no one is saying that. But, per theory, he wasn’t irrational.

Please don’t shoot the authors yet. It is not their intention to justify the moral righteousness of any violence. There is a powerful tendency to equate rationality with morality since both qualities are thought to be features of enlightened thinking. Yet, rational decisions in international politics just rests on credible theories about how the world works, what the state is trying to achieve, what were the choices, what could be the repercussions, and emerge from a deliberative decision-making process. All of this means that Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine was rational.

There were other interesting examples laid out throughout the book, and overall I did enjoy reading them. Yet there are still some questionable aspects of this book that I would recommend readers to keep in mind while reading.

Upon initial perusal, the book presents a neat and sweeping theoretical set up with thorough historical analyses. However, upon deeper scrutiny, certain conceptual and empirical deficiencies come to light. Initially, the authors critique a range of theories they deem non-credible, including the clash of civilizations and racial theories. Notably, they scrutinize the audience costs theory, which posits that democratically elected leaders excel at signaling resolve in crises due to public commitment pressures, citing its insufficient empirical backing. Yet, this judgement may overlook recent research suggesting the efficacy of public posturing across various regime types. This is particularly relevant as the book heavily relies on references dating back over a decade, prompting reflection on the evolving nature of credibility and the influence of new evidence. Moreover, it raises a deeper and broader question: Who gets to determine what qualifies as credible? What is deemed credible could be later rendered noncredible as new evidence became available and vice versa. the subjective nature of interpretations, shaped by individual experiences and beliefs, further complicates endeavors to establish intersubjective understanding in such evaluations.

In addition, the book's evidence of certain historical events appears somewhat lacking in strength and depth. Concerns arise from serious misrepresentations of key historical cases, notably Japan's actions from 1937 to 1941. The portrayal of Japan as acting with restraint and reacting to Western external aggression contradicts mainstream historiography, rich in evidence from events like the Mukden incident (1931) and the Marco Polo Bridge incident (1937). Japan's invasion of Manchuria, and the Rape of Nanking, the Nanjing Massacre, where Japan military slaughtered 200,000 Chinese in killing contests and tortured 80,000 women and kids during the war is carved in mainstream historiography, there is broad consensus on how Japan's actions during this period were aggressive and expansionist, driven by its own imperial ambitions. In such cases, it is hard to brushed it off as “self-defence acting with restraint”. Such discrepancies cast some doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the book's arguments.

Overall, it is still an interesting read. It is rare to find political rationality defined in other literature, and I appreciate the authors’ detailed theory-based approach and historical case studies.

[Helen Wu · Rating 1 out of 5]

Issue 1: Very repetitive — the basic premise is that states act rationally.

The same 4-5 axioms are repeated across 200+ pages, whereas the preface contains all the information you need to know.

Issue 2: Not particularly illuminating — the rational actor assumption casts such a wide net that it’s hard to imagine a counterfactual. The book describes two types of rationality: (1) strategic rationality: states use credible theories and deliberative processes to make policy decisions, (2) goal rationality: a state’s principal mission is to survive.

The authors define rational thinking as distinct from an end outcome (e.g., the thought process is entirely separate from whether states come to “correct” or “optimal” or “utility maximizing" decision.)

My response: Surely, any agent with even a modicum of brain cells would fall under this umbrella of “rational?” Only a deranged madman experiencing constant hallucinations would decide to (a) not operate under any logical framework and (b) aim towards self destruction.

Issue 3: Unspecific — The definition of what a “credible theory” can and cannot be feels similarly problematic. A credible theory contains (1) reasonable assumptions, (2) causal mechanisms, and (3) valid empirical evidence (though some counterexamples to the theory can exist??). The book argues that there are some uncredible theories (the kinds that are blatantly disproven, like racial superiority), but apparently, everything from liberalism to realism can earn the label of "credibility."

I don’t necessarily disagree with these definitions, I’m just not sure what positive value they add. If states always operate in a world of radical uncertainty and cannot divine other state’s intentions, then knowing that a state is “rational” is meaningless if: (1) we do not know which credible theory a state plans to follow, (2) whatever theory they choose can lead them to entirely different outcomes, (3) even WITHIN the same theoretical framework, states could STILL justify drastically different policies, (4) states cannot divine the consequences of their decisions before they happen.

In essence, it seems like every course of action in the international sphere (both well and ill-informed) could be justified post-hoc under this or that [insert credible theory here]. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine? Ah, it’s just balance of power politics in a realist landscape. America’s permissive stance towards Chinese economic development? Ah, it’s just pesky liberalism. Trump’s threats to annex Panama? Uhhh, there’s probably some structural theory to explain that too.

To be honest, I don’t see much of a difference between the theory in this book and the traditional neoclassical economic explanation that “different people have different utility curves.” (i.e., the heterogeneous preference orderings of various world leaders and states are what lead them to different outcomes, all of them being subjectively "rational.") In this book, different “credible theories” also are what lead states to different outcomes.

Both the utilitarian and structural realist explanation suffer from the black-box critique that Mearsheimer and Rosato advance themselves. Ergo, their attempt to be logically distinct from the current body of rationalist thought feels imprecise and non-novel. We still don't know why states choose the theories they do. We still don't know how the choice of theory changes the outcome (until after the outcome happens). We still don't know which theory is the best theory.

If rationality is no better than spinning a wheel of justifiable outcomes, what’s even the point of policymaking?

If rationality is incalculable and unquantifiable, why bother?

This entire book could have been a 2 page bullet-point paper. 1.5/5 stars

[Shakeel Mengal · Rating 5 out of 5]

How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy book written by John Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato.

The authors argue in this book that states are frequently sensible, despite mounting criticism. States typically think and act rationally, establishing their foreign policy on well reasoned discussions, they are neither illogical nor reckless. States are rational it does not mean states never make any wrong decision.

Why do states usually make logical foreign policy decision?, authors argue, because dealing with international politics is risky. States function in a system where other states have the ability and desire to seriously harm them and there is no greater authority to defend/protect them. States are also therefore very interested in determining the most effective ways to deal with the issues they face.

Authors argue that whenever the policymakers make any decision, they apply theories , they adopt the theory which is most appeasing and provide more rationale. for example the USA adopted the liberal hegemony theory after the Cold War, which included the, democratic peace theory, economic interdependence theory, and liberal institutionalism theory.

Furthermore, the authors explain what is necessary for the credibility of a theory, where they argue a theory is credible if it helps make sense of complex realities, no theory can explain everything but the credibility of a theory depends upon its assumptions, logics, and evidences.

Authors argue that policymakers create strategies by relying on two major international theories; realism and liberalism (these both theories have been debated for decades). Although realism and liberalism contain different theories because difference in assumptions or reasoning mean that theories within the same tradition can still reach different explanation and predictions.
Major realist theories includes; structural realism, defensive realism, offensive realism, and hegemonic realism theoies. Liberal theories includes; democratic peace, economic interdependence, and liberal institutionalism theories.

Apart from this authors list out a number of noncredible theories, a noncredible theory is a theory which lack in realistic assumptions and has logical inconsistencies in its casual reasoning and lack of significant empirical evidences to support its claim as well. Authors list out some of the theories as noncredible such as Clash of civilization thesis, democratization and war theory, forcible democracy promotion theory, nuclear coercion theory, and domino theory (it was credible in 1950s).

The authors argue that there are some decisions which were taken based on credible theories include; Germany's decision to start WWI, Japanese decision to attack the Pearl Harbor, Germany's decision to invade the Soviet Union, the USA's decision to settle the Cuban Missile crisis, the Soviet Union's decision to invade Czechoslovakia, and American escalation in North Korea and Vietnam. Authors also argue that most states are rational most of the time, which is to say their policies are based on credible theories and results from a deliberative process, yet states do occasionally make nonrational decisions such as, Germany's decision on the risk strategy before WWI, Britain's decision on a Non-Liability strategy before WWII, the USA's decision to invade Cuba and Iraq.

The authors conclude by arguing that states are often logical actors who base their actions on well-researched and thoughtful policymaking. Though it does not ensure peace because rational decisions can justify war as well, this rationality upholds liberalism and realism as legitimate doctrines and enables states to formulate successful foreign policies.

[Terry Tucker · Rating 4 out of 5]

The authors of this book dissect the rationality or nonrationality in decision making in international relations in a crisis and non-crisis mode. They use select historical cases to present their thesis.
The authors use the assertions made by international leaders at the time of the crisis as the framework and foundation for defining what is or is not rational. Examples include the Russian-Ukraine War, Germany's decision to start WW I, Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor, The Cuban Missile Crisis, the US decision to pursue a Cold War Strategy, et. al.

In essence the discussion is whether or not Putin, Hitler, Kennedy, Khrushchev, et. al. used an acceptable and credible model and theory of decision making to arrive at what one would describe as a rational or irrational decision. Some examples of irrational decision making - according to the authors - are Britain's policy of appeasement in 1938 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
For the authors, this debate has profound implications for the study and practice of international politics.

The authors begin this journey by necessarily defining what rational is, what irrational is, and what models of decision making are credible. The authors assess and discuss assumptions that Theory Driven thinking is the hallmark of rationality. That rational thinking equates to morality. That Rational thinking equates to success. That many great powers were assumed to have acted irrationally, when in fact they did not.

The book consists of 9 chapters, extensive notes and an index. Each chapter could be read independently, or one could just continue in logical sequence. In my opinion, Chapters 4, 5, and 6 contain the real content - but only after you have an understanding of the authors definition of strategic realities by reading any one of the following: Chap 1, Chapt2, or Chap3. The authors rely extensively on sources in psychology and philosophy to form their definitions of rational/irrational.

All in all, a good book and one that could be used as a supplementary text to any classes on International Relations, Geopolitics, Military History. Just know that these authors are using an science and academic style of writing - necessarily so - in order to address what many might consider subjective assessments of a state's mode of thinking and how they arrived at those conclusions. Take your time with this book, there is a lot to digest.

[Eugene Kernes · Rating 4 out of 5]

Is This An Overview?
Rationality is a thinking process that attempts to make sense of reality for the pursuit of desired goals. Using credible theories and a deliberation process. Those who are not rational do not base their decisions on credible theories, do not deliberate, or both. Everyone is biased, but credible theories depend on realistic assumptions, are logically consistent, probabilistic, and are subject to evidentiary support. The deliberation process is a systematic method of considering the advantages and disadvantages of alternative options and policies without coercion, deception, or withholding information. A deliberation process that results in a decision being made.

Rationality is not based on outcomes, as rational policymakers can fail to achieve goals due to factors they could not anticipate or control. A prerequisite for rationality, is for states to have their survival as the highest priority. In pursuit of desired goals, states can be rational even as they violate accepted standards of conduct.

International politics is an information-deficient occupation, operating within uncertainty. Policymakers can lack information or lack reliable information about their own state and other states. Policymakers do not have appropriate data on how their people will perform, do not know the effectiveness of their weapons and combat forces. Other states can conceal their capabilities and thinking. Internal and external information limitations inhibit understanding the interactions and outcomes of decisions, which can still be affected by unforeseen factors. Policymakers are rational even though they do not know all possible outcomes.

Caveats?
This book is a defense for rationality, that policymakers generally use credible theories and deliberate before making a decision. Much of the book is about various explanations for rationality, which can sometimes become repetitive, and have some contradictions. A variety of historic examples are used to express how perceived nonrational decisions, were actually rational. The examples are short, which would require the reader to do more research to understand the state.

[Fahad Qazi · Rating 3 out of 5]

“In marked contrast to the emerging conventional wisdom, we find that states are routinely rational. To say a state is a rational actor means that it bases its policies on credible theories and makes decisions through a deliberative policymaking process. By this standard, the historical record reveals that most states are rational most of the time. The consequences are profound. Inside the academy, realism and liberalism are alive and well.6 In the policy world, states have a sound basis for making foreign policy.
One final point is in order. Many scholars associate rationality with interstate peace. Their argument, in brief, is that rationality tells states that security competition and war make little sense and that they have a vested interest in cooperating with each other. Some go so far as to argue that if states routinely employ their powers of reason, war will go the way of other violent “practices that passed from unexceptionable to controversial to immoral to unthinkable to not-thought-about.”7 This perspective confuses rationality with morality. Rational decision makers simply try to figure out the most effective strategy for dealing with other states, and as should be apparent by now, threatening or initiating violence sometimes makes sense. This message is hardly uplifting, but such is the reality of international politics.”

[Defaeco · Rating 1 out of 5]

ChuckIntoTheBin#16:
How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy (2023, Yale University Press)

"The authors focus on the rationality of the foreign-policy decision making process (instrumental rationality), rather than goals or outcomes," "Rational actors often fail [...] because of factors they can neither anticipate nor control [...] If nonrationality is the norm, state behavior can be neither understood nor predicted, and studying international politics is a futile endeavor"

The only thing separating a fourth grader, fresh on his basic critical thinking skills, and the editorial team at Yale University Press before this "masterpiece" hit the shelves, is the former's lack of a corrupting social network and vested interests strong enough to cloud his judgment into publishing something this fallacious, intellectually parochial, and arguably incoherent.

Since when does rationality focus on outcomes? "Rather than"? Do we live on the same planet?
Nonrationality does not imply randomness or unpredictability. Unless you're omniscient or strictly writing perfectly resourced history, I'd argue that 'neither anticipate nor control' implies unpredictability, which situates you in a state of contradiction, in what seems to be a 'futile endeavor' of a book. 1/5.

[Charles Reed · Rating 3 out of 5]

50%

This book is a very long-winded way of explaining that, yes, people think and use rationality to make decisions. If we think of states, unions, nations as a collective organization that's like a business, typically speaking, do they have a reason for doing what they are doing? Or could they come to it using some algorithm or logic? The answer in this is usually yes. That is what the book is about. That is what the entire book is about. It doesn't push on what the reasons were for anything, just was there a reason present? And the answer is usually yes. Wow, that's like the least insightful thing ever. It seems to be a person that has a grammar Nazi tendency saying, what do you mean they didn't have a reason? Of course they had a reason for it. It's like, well, they're acting illogically. No, no, no, you just don't like their logic is what the authors are doing here. It's like, okay, well, semantics. Like, was it a good reason is what the person is asking. But the author is like, no, you have to carry their reason. Yes, they had a reason. You just don't like their reason. It's like, okay?

[Cristian Cristea · Rating 3 out of 5]

The topic is so difficult to grasp that it is very easy to do a mambo jambo out of it. In a purely scholarly fashion the authors remain coherent in their theories but I couldn’t take out very much from their book.

What’s missing: definitions on State. How states think, I understand the authors mean how key policymakers think. A state equals then the person/people running it at a given moment. Democracy is for the naive. The authors see states as empires not as peoples. All is power driven.

Under these circumstances (which might be realistic as the authors quantify themselves), the rational choice needs to be made based on the best theory available. But if that is really how the world works, then it is a miracle we are still around. It’s like giving nukes to kids to play with. Humanity is in its early teens in terms of wisdom.

The authors talk about survival as the ultimate mover in decision making. Again, empire survival. Seems like Hitler’s lebensraum. And actually they kind of justify the invasion of Ukraine in these terms as Russia felt threatened its survival at stake.

I’m afraid that academics got too caught up in their theories.

[Theresa Leone Davidson · Rating 3 out of 5]

I think authors John Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato set out to make this an interesting read but unfortunately fell short, at least for the first half of the book, which was dry to say the least. The question is: do leaders and countries make rational decisions, particularly when it comes to international politics? The assumption is that they do, even if it is only for the sake of their own survival. The second half of the book, made up mostly of case studies, was a lot more interesting as it examines when they do make rational (sane) choices and times when they fall short, particularly in the context of world events, like both world wars. If you are interested in the subject, I would recommend.

[Tyler · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very clearly argued and thoroughly researched. The authors lay out a strong argument and it is eye opening to realize some the status quo for international relations is incorrect or misinformed. Too many determinations of rationality rely on the results or the belief system of the decider. Rather, if we see decisions as rational, by the model the authors lay out, then we would have a better understanding of why countries and the individuals in power mislead those decisions. Then, it would be easier and clearer for how to influence or counter them, if needed.

However, I would not listen to this again, but I would read it. It’s a bit too academic for my taste in audio and reminded me more of a long academic paper or textbook.

[Jack Janzen · Rating 4 out of 5]

The book provides criteria and an analytical methodology for understanding how states make decisions. In that regard the book is useful in evaluating arguments and situations.

I should add that the book's focus is on the decision makers which will generally be a very small number of elite--and may boil down to one person. The book seems to ignore the influence of the vast population of states under the decision makers.

The book maintains that state survival is practically always the top goal but for a state's policy makers on behalf of the state. But that is not the same as survival of the number one decisionmaker and that person's close circle.

[Vincent V · Rating 2 out of 5]

Iraq war = not rational.
Ukraine war = rational.
What's the difference you may ask?
Bush didn't ask for advice and had a bad theory.
Putin (asked for advice?) and had a good theory?

Authors argue that you need:
Good theory + deliberate process to arrive at a good rational state policy.
Rationality isn't about being right, it's about following the process and basing it on top of sound theory...
Who knows what is this sound theory. The authors have subjective biases for some theories and not for others, thus this book isn't worth your time. They really like Realism and say that's the correct one.

[Dave · Rating 3 out of 5]

The first half of the book is very theoretical and provides and describes several frameworks, themes and topics. Sometimes, it was too descriptive and honestly boring. The second half is more interesting because it talks about many instances when states acted rationally and irrationally. In my opinion, I would like to see the two halves combined into each other and when there would be a description of rational behaviour then immediately there would be a real-world example. Otherwise, it is a well-written book.