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The Battle for Moscow
In November 1941 Hitler ordered German forces to complete the final drive on the Soviet capital, now less than 100 kilometres away. Army Group Centre was pressed into the attack for one last attempt to break Soviet resistance before the onset of winter. From the German perspective the final drive on Moscow had all the ingredients of a dramatic final battle in the east, which, according to previous accounts, only failed at the gates of Moscow. David Stahel now challenges this well-established narrative by demonstrating that the last German offensive of 1941 was a forlorn effort, undermined by operational weakness and poor logistics, and driven forward by what he identifies as National Socialist military thinking. With unparalleled research from previously undocumented army files and soldiers' letters, Stahel takes a fresh look at the battle for Moscow, which even before the Soviet winter offensive, threatened disaster for Germany's war in the east.
1 pages, Audio CD
First published December 19, 2014
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About the author
David Stahel
14 books93 followersDavid Stahel was born in Wellington, New Zealand in 1975, but grew up in Melbourne, Australia. He completed an honours degree in history at Monash University (1998), an MA in War Studies at King's College London (2000) and a PhD at the Humboldt University in Berlin (2007). His research focus has centered primarily on the German military in World War II and particularly Hitler's war against the Soviet Union. Dr. Stahel's latest book Operation Typhoon was released by Cambridge University Press in March 2013 and will be followed by another book focusing on German operations on the eastern front in November and early December 1941.
David Stahel completed his undergraduate studies at Monash University and Boston College. He has an MA in War Studies from King's College London and a PhD in 2007 from the Humboldt University in Berlin. His dissertation has been published by Cambridge Military Histories as Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East. He joined the University of New South Wales Canberra in 2012.
Books:
Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge, 2009).
Kiev 1941. Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East (Cambridge, 2012).
(Together with Alex J. Kay and Jeff Rutherford) Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941. Total War, Genocide and Radicalization (Rochester, 2012).
Operation Typhoon. Hitler's March on Moscow (Cambridge, 2013).
Moscow 1941. Hitler's Battle for the Soviet Capital (forthcoming).
David Stahel completed his undergraduate studies at Monash University and Boston College. He has an MA in War Studies from King's College London and a PhD in 2007 from the Humboldt University in Berlin. His dissertation has been published by Cambridge Military Histories as Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East. He joined the University of New South Wales Canberra in 2012.
Books:
Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge, 2009).
Kiev 1941. Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East (Cambridge, 2012).
(Together with Alex J. Kay and Jeff Rutherford) Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941. Total War, Genocide and Radicalization (Rochester, 2012).
Operation Typhoon. Hitler's March on Moscow (Cambridge, 2013).
Moscow 1941. Hitler's Battle for the Soviet Capital (forthcoming).
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May 3, 2021
David Stahel's The Battle for Moscow picks up where Operation Typhoon left, and tells the story of one of the largest, with 2.5 million men involved, battles of WWII.
As Stahel points out, the Wehrmacht’s drive on Moscow was “a human calamity with few precedents in history.” The battle began in October 1941 with the launch of Operation Typhoon, and after a two-week pause in November, continued to the very gates of Moscow by early December.
This offensive, as Stahel reveals in his previous works, was the latest in a whole series of battles that Army Group Center had fought since June 1941, leaving a trail of destruction through central Russia. "Burning villages, the bodies of dead Russian soldiers, the carcasses of dead horses, burned-out tanks, and abandoned equipment were the signposts of our march," wrote one German soldier. Even before the battle of Moscow, the number of death, wounded, and missing on the Soviet, as well as on the German, side counted in millions.
Stahel argues that while the battle for Moscow is hardly an untold story, it often lacks appropriate strategic context. He mentions one Karl-Gottfried Vierkorn, "a famous soldier", whose claim that on December 1 1941 he had seen "the golden towers of the Kremlin, gleaming in the sunlight" reappeared in post-war popular fiction, becoming an increasingly well-known legend, and created the false impression that the German capture of Moscow was really an incredibly narrow failure. In fact, as Stahel reveals, while the German forces did reach the outermost parts of the city, "the only German soldiers who ever saw the Kremlin in the Second World War were being paraded past it as prisoners of war." He effectively dispels the myth that Germany’s 1941 campaign in the east would have been successful if only Army Group Centre could have pressed on a few more kilometres and seized Moscow, and emphasizes instead the actual importance of the battle: Nazi failure at the Soviet capital granted the Red Army its first real victory, allowing a glimmer of hope for the Soviet people and shattering the German army’s myth of invincibility.
Stahel shines new light on the famous battle, proving that the Soviet Union was far from defeat in November and December 1941. In fact, according to him, Moscow's fall was never seriously in question. It was rather Army Group Center that was "tempting fate" by pressing on an offensive that had already ground itself to a halt in October, and was now using up the last of its tragically short reserves of men and supplies just to reach the Soviet capital (to say nothing of conquering it). One German officer explained the transformation of operations in 1941: "We gradually lost the ability to manoeuvre. War became one of linear movement. We did not bother about creating a Schwerpunkt [a concentration of forces]. We were no longer instructed to surprise, outflank and annihilate the enemy. We were told: 'You will hold the front from such a point to such and such a point, you will advance to such a line.'" Acting like battering rams, the panzer divisions brought the army to the very outskirts of Moscow, but - Stahel demonstrates - at the cost of seriously depleting, and completely exhausting, its forces. Moreover, he reveals, the German offensive didn't even come close to besieging the capital, nor did the Germans have the strength to launch even a single attack against it.
David Stahel also examines the careful build-up of Soviet reserves throughout the November fighting. To anyone within the German high command it was simply inconceivable that the Stavka, which was supposed to fight the battle for Moscow "with its last battalion", could possess the strength to hold the weight of Army Group Center at bay, to say nothing of launching its own offensive. Marshal Zhukov, however, told Stalin in mid-November: "We will, without fail, hold Moscow." And this words weren't mere bravado. What was unknown to the German commanders is that in the last week of November the Stavka began transporting five of its new reserve armies, formed behind the Volga River, to the front lines. Stahel underscores that even without those armies, as Colonel-General Halder predicted in a presentation to Hitler on 19 November, the Red Army would number "some 150 divisions along with tenth to thirty tank brigades by 1942." At the same time, the Ostheer [Eastern Army] was predicted to total only about 122 divisions (infantry, motorised, panzer, SS, mountain and security). "The resurgence of the Red Army," Stahel argues, "did not begin in late 1942 or even 1943; it was already underway in late 1941 and, what was worse for the German high command, even with the imposing, yet incomplete, figures before them, they continued to dismiss the concept out of hand as well as its implications." (Furthermore, even if the German command believed that there were no more Soviet reserves left for the defence of Moscow, the battles of early December revealed another form of replacement for the Red Army: British tanks were now reported in increasing numbers, particularly in the area of Reinhardt’s panzer group.)
The German attack maintained its excruciatingly slow progress through sheer grit and strength of will. Interestingly, as Stahel narrates, while personalities would soon clash in the wake of the Soviet offensive, in November and December 1941 the German high command was in a remarkably harmonious period of strategic conformity and collaboration, which, however, fed an insatiable demand for military conquest. Although panzer groups faltered more and more, the demands for even greater conquests did not stop, and the generals responsible for this state of affairs, Stahel argues, weren't driven to it by Hitler only. For example, the Orsha Conference of November 1941 was an entirely army affair, free to determine its own goals independent of the Führer, yet Halder still insisted upon a continuation of the offensive towards Moscow, and was backed by Brauchitsch, Bock, Strauss, Kluge, Hoepner, Reinhardt, and many others. Part of the German motivation, Stahel explains, was the "Marne complex", the myth that the German army could have avoided defeat in the First World War by making one last push towards Paris in 1914. As Colonel Adolf Heusinger stated after the war: "By continuing the attack one hoped to seize Moscow before the onset of winter. One did not want to end up looking back and seeing that five minutes before midnight one had given up."
A final assault on Moscow, many soldiers hoped, might after all decide the war in Germany's favor, as well as provide winter quarters for the men and perhaps even fulfill their biggest wish: to return home for Christmas. "We were still naive enough to believe that since the division had no winter uniforms, it would withdraw from Russia when winter came. Every kind of rumour was spread, but everyone was sure that we would be home by Christmas," recalled Ernst Kern.
Yet, Stahel asserts, even without the presence of the impressive Soviet reserves, the likelihood that weakened German forces could have captured a heavily fortified Soviet capital in costly urban combat must be considered remote. According to him, Zhukov’s offensive on 5 December "did not somehow snatch victory from the very jaws of defeat." Army Group Centre was in grave difficulties even before the new Soviet offensive was launched. Indeed, for a range of reasons that this book explores (logistics, reserves, weather, mobility, equipment, communications, and infrastructure) Army Group Centre’s November plans were wildly optimistic.
Furthermore, David Stahel dismisses German generals' memoirs of the battle, casting it in a completely new light. As he argues, the German failure before Moscow was never the army's blame. The Nazi generals again had found it convenient to blame Hitler, citing his diversion of Army Group Centre into Ukraine, which, they argued, lost vital time. Major-General Günther Blumentritt wrote after the war that in 1941 it was "essential now that Germany’s political leaders should realize that the days of the Blitzkrieg were over." In fact, as Stahel's work shows, it was the military commanders themselves that needed convincing. "There was ample evidence available at the time (and presented to Halder at the Orsha conference) that the wide-ranging offensives and crushing, one-sided battles were no longer to be expected," writes Stahel. ".... Indeed, the most conspicuous absence from the generals’ memoirs in this period is any personal responsibility for the critical decisions of November and early December 1941, in which the failure before Moscow saw the generals playing the leading role with only Hitler’s tacit approval."
The Battle of Moscow is a brilliant history of the battle for the Soviet capital in November and early December. Stahel provides a meticulously detailed account of the Army Group Centre's inner workings – its command structure, decisions, resources, and men. As with his past studies, the author focuses on the panzer divisions, corps, groups, and armies. Aside from archival evidence, the work draws upon many first-person accounts, such as soldier's and officer's letters, diaries, and memoirs. A wonderful read. Highly recommendable.
As Stahel points out, the Wehrmacht’s drive on Moscow was “a human calamity with few precedents in history.” The battle began in October 1941 with the launch of Operation Typhoon, and after a two-week pause in November, continued to the very gates of Moscow by early December.
This offensive, as Stahel reveals in his previous works, was the latest in a whole series of battles that Army Group Center had fought since June 1941, leaving a trail of destruction through central Russia. "Burning villages, the bodies of dead Russian soldiers, the carcasses of dead horses, burned-out tanks, and abandoned equipment were the signposts of our march," wrote one German soldier. Even before the battle of Moscow, the number of death, wounded, and missing on the Soviet, as well as on the German, side counted in millions.
Stahel argues that while the battle for Moscow is hardly an untold story, it often lacks appropriate strategic context. He mentions one Karl-Gottfried Vierkorn, "a famous soldier", whose claim that on December 1 1941 he had seen "the golden towers of the Kremlin, gleaming in the sunlight" reappeared in post-war popular fiction, becoming an increasingly well-known legend, and created the false impression that the German capture of Moscow was really an incredibly narrow failure. In fact, as Stahel reveals, while the German forces did reach the outermost parts of the city, "the only German soldiers who ever saw the Kremlin in the Second World War were being paraded past it as prisoners of war." He effectively dispels the myth that Germany’s 1941 campaign in the east would have been successful if only Army Group Centre could have pressed on a few more kilometres and seized Moscow, and emphasizes instead the actual importance of the battle: Nazi failure at the Soviet capital granted the Red Army its first real victory, allowing a glimmer of hope for the Soviet people and shattering the German army’s myth of invincibility.
Stahel shines new light on the famous battle, proving that the Soviet Union was far from defeat in November and December 1941. In fact, according to him, Moscow's fall was never seriously in question. It was rather Army Group Center that was "tempting fate" by pressing on an offensive that had already ground itself to a halt in October, and was now using up the last of its tragically short reserves of men and supplies just to reach the Soviet capital (to say nothing of conquering it). One German officer explained the transformation of operations in 1941: "We gradually lost the ability to manoeuvre. War became one of linear movement. We did not bother about creating a Schwerpunkt [a concentration of forces]. We were no longer instructed to surprise, outflank and annihilate the enemy. We were told: 'You will hold the front from such a point to such and such a point, you will advance to such a line.'" Acting like battering rams, the panzer divisions brought the army to the very outskirts of Moscow, but - Stahel demonstrates - at the cost of seriously depleting, and completely exhausting, its forces. Moreover, he reveals, the German offensive didn't even come close to besieging the capital, nor did the Germans have the strength to launch even a single attack against it.
David Stahel also examines the careful build-up of Soviet reserves throughout the November fighting. To anyone within the German high command it was simply inconceivable that the Stavka, which was supposed to fight the battle for Moscow "with its last battalion", could possess the strength to hold the weight of Army Group Center at bay, to say nothing of launching its own offensive. Marshal Zhukov, however, told Stalin in mid-November: "We will, without fail, hold Moscow." And this words weren't mere bravado. What was unknown to the German commanders is that in the last week of November the Stavka began transporting five of its new reserve armies, formed behind the Volga River, to the front lines. Stahel underscores that even without those armies, as Colonel-General Halder predicted in a presentation to Hitler on 19 November, the Red Army would number "some 150 divisions along with tenth to thirty tank brigades by 1942." At the same time, the Ostheer [Eastern Army] was predicted to total only about 122 divisions (infantry, motorised, panzer, SS, mountain and security). "The resurgence of the Red Army," Stahel argues, "did not begin in late 1942 or even 1943; it was already underway in late 1941 and, what was worse for the German high command, even with the imposing, yet incomplete, figures before them, they continued to dismiss the concept out of hand as well as its implications." (Furthermore, even if the German command believed that there were no more Soviet reserves left for the defence of Moscow, the battles of early December revealed another form of replacement for the Red Army: British tanks were now reported in increasing numbers, particularly in the area of Reinhardt’s panzer group.)
The German attack maintained its excruciatingly slow progress through sheer grit and strength of will. Interestingly, as Stahel narrates, while personalities would soon clash in the wake of the Soviet offensive, in November and December 1941 the German high command was in a remarkably harmonious period of strategic conformity and collaboration, which, however, fed an insatiable demand for military conquest. Although panzer groups faltered more and more, the demands for even greater conquests did not stop, and the generals responsible for this state of affairs, Stahel argues, weren't driven to it by Hitler only. For example, the Orsha Conference of November 1941 was an entirely army affair, free to determine its own goals independent of the Führer, yet Halder still insisted upon a continuation of the offensive towards Moscow, and was backed by Brauchitsch, Bock, Strauss, Kluge, Hoepner, Reinhardt, and many others. Part of the German motivation, Stahel explains, was the "Marne complex", the myth that the German army could have avoided defeat in the First World War by making one last push towards Paris in 1914. As Colonel Adolf Heusinger stated after the war: "By continuing the attack one hoped to seize Moscow before the onset of winter. One did not want to end up looking back and seeing that five minutes before midnight one had given up."
A final assault on Moscow, many soldiers hoped, might after all decide the war in Germany's favor, as well as provide winter quarters for the men and perhaps even fulfill their biggest wish: to return home for Christmas. "We were still naive enough to believe that since the division had no winter uniforms, it would withdraw from Russia when winter came. Every kind of rumour was spread, but everyone was sure that we would be home by Christmas," recalled Ernst Kern.
Yet, Stahel asserts, even without the presence of the impressive Soviet reserves, the likelihood that weakened German forces could have captured a heavily fortified Soviet capital in costly urban combat must be considered remote. According to him, Zhukov’s offensive on 5 December "did not somehow snatch victory from the very jaws of defeat." Army Group Centre was in grave difficulties even before the new Soviet offensive was launched. Indeed, for a range of reasons that this book explores (logistics, reserves, weather, mobility, equipment, communications, and infrastructure) Army Group Centre’s November plans were wildly optimistic.
Furthermore, David Stahel dismisses German generals' memoirs of the battle, casting it in a completely new light. As he argues, the German failure before Moscow was never the army's blame. The Nazi generals again had found it convenient to blame Hitler, citing his diversion of Army Group Centre into Ukraine, which, they argued, lost vital time. Major-General Günther Blumentritt wrote after the war that in 1941 it was "essential now that Germany’s political leaders should realize that the days of the Blitzkrieg were over." In fact, as Stahel's work shows, it was the military commanders themselves that needed convincing. "There was ample evidence available at the time (and presented to Halder at the Orsha conference) that the wide-ranging offensives and crushing, one-sided battles were no longer to be expected," writes Stahel. ".... Indeed, the most conspicuous absence from the generals’ memoirs in this period is any personal responsibility for the critical decisions of November and early December 1941, in which the failure before Moscow saw the generals playing the leading role with only Hitler’s tacit approval."
The Battle of Moscow is a brilliant history of the battle for the Soviet capital in November and early December. Stahel provides a meticulously detailed account of the Army Group Centre's inner workings – its command structure, decisions, resources, and men. As with his past studies, the author focuses on the panzer divisions, corps, groups, and armies. Aside from archival evidence, the work draws upon many first-person accounts, such as soldier's and officer's letters, diaries, and memoirs. A wonderful read. Highly recommendable.
July 25, 2020
The fourth of five volumes by Dr. Stahel, this work tells the story of Army Group Center's drive on Moscow in November 1941. As conditions worsened, the Wehrmacht found itself stuck as the autumn rains in Russia created its annual mud ("raputitsa"), forcing a suspension of the offensive for two weeks. Finally, the freezing temperatures of the dreaded Russian winter hardened the mud and allowed the attack to continue, only to have to contend with a total lack of winter clothing for the soldiers and equipment for the vehicles. Most ominously was the increasing Soviet resistance as the Germans approached Moscow, and the unseen reserves brought up for the eventual counter-offensive that would begin early in December. Much space in the narrative is given over to the sufferings of the civilians caught behind German lines and the horrible conditions under which the Wehrmacht was forced to fight. Dr. Stahel also keeps the campaign in context ("battles aren't fought in a vacuum" is one of his favorite expressions) by touching on the first military aid arriving from the UK and the USA, examining the morale of the German home front and removing the mask of the "honorable Wehrmacht" by pointing out how the combination of Nazi ideology and brutal conditions turn the Ostheer into a horde of bloodthirsty barbarians. A worthy continuation of a fine series about what can be considered World War II's decisive campaign.
November 18, 2024
Caso de libro de la lógica paradójica y es que cuanto más cerca se está del objetivo más difícil se hace conseguirlo.
Este libro de David Stahel no es tan redondo como los anteriores que he leído de él. Quizás porque está a caballo de “Operación Tifón” y “La retirada de Moscú” hay momentos en que parece que se está estirando el chicle para alcanzar las páginas que justifiquen la publicación del volumen, casi parece que le cuesta alcanzar el Moscú de las páginas. Y aunque por momentos se hace reiterativo hay que reconocer que sigue aportando y dando las justificaciones para argumentar sus ideas, con las que suelo coincidir, partiendo de los documentos originales.
También hay que tener en cuenta que es un libro centrado en el “bando” alemán, poco se menciona la contraparte soviética y esto es un hándicap para el libro, que sería mucho más rico con la visión del otro lado de la colina.
Este libro de David Stahel no es tan redondo como los anteriores que he leído de él. Quizás porque está a caballo de “Operación Tifón” y “La retirada de Moscú” hay momentos en que parece que se está estirando el chicle para alcanzar las páginas que justifiquen la publicación del volumen, casi parece que le cuesta alcanzar el Moscú de las páginas. Y aunque por momentos se hace reiterativo hay que reconocer que sigue aportando y dando las justificaciones para argumentar sus ideas, con las que suelo coincidir, partiendo de los documentos originales.
También hay que tener en cuenta que es un libro centrado en el “bando” alemán, poco se menciona la contraparte soviética y esto es un hándicap para el libro, que sería mucho más rico con la visión del otro lado de la colina.
January 24, 2016
To really appreciate the book you pretty much have to do read all his titles -Barbarossa, Kiev, and Operation Typhoon because he has a couple of main themes he hammers on repeatedly and one book leads to another. I would recommend this for anyone interested in the first year of the Soviet German war as Stahel presents a number of alternate interpretations that differ from earlier histories of the conflict.
January 18, 2024
An improvement from the previous two books.
David Stahel continues his Eastern Front series with this book that covers the end of Operation Typhoon, some 2-3 weeks of fighting that ended to the Soviet counter-offensive in early December. The improvement is that although this book covers a lot shorter time span than his other books, it also feels that the repetition is missing and instead he covers some other aspects of the war while still keeping them relating to the subject. He covers more of the total war waged on both at the front and behind and gets more intimate with the soldiers experiences. The latter helps a lot in explaining why the assault stopped even shorter than the statistics and maps would initially promise. Stahel repeats his main argument, how the operations in eastern front had spent the whole strength of Ostheer and Army Group Centre and this is the second book he makes the argument convincingly.
The biggest caveat in this book is that it lacks statistics and tables, as there is only one table and it's about massacre of Jews. This time it could've really driven home his argument if he would've shown the numbers in a clear form instead of dribbling it into the text. Maps are okay this time, somewhat clearer than before, thought it helps a lot that all the maps are of the same area and there are plenty of them, so it's easy to follow how the operation progressed.
David Stahel continues his Eastern Front series with this book that covers the end of Operation Typhoon, some 2-3 weeks of fighting that ended to the Soviet counter-offensive in early December. The improvement is that although this book covers a lot shorter time span than his other books, it also feels that the repetition is missing and instead he covers some other aspects of the war while still keeping them relating to the subject. He covers more of the total war waged on both at the front and behind and gets more intimate with the soldiers experiences. The latter helps a lot in explaining why the assault stopped even shorter than the statistics and maps would initially promise. Stahel repeats his main argument, how the operations in eastern front had spent the whole strength of Ostheer and Army Group Centre and this is the second book he makes the argument convincingly.
The biggest caveat in this book is that it lacks statistics and tables, as there is only one table and it's about massacre of Jews. This time it could've really driven home his argument if he would've shown the numbers in a clear form instead of dribbling it into the text. Maps are okay this time, somewhat clearer than before, thought it helps a lot that all the maps are of the same area and there are plenty of them, so it's easy to follow how the operation progressed.
May 9, 2020
I received this book as a gift and put off reading it for 16 months. My experience of books on the Eastern Front (with a few exceptions - see Anthony Beevor's Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942–1943 or Guy Sajer's The Forgotten Soldier) is that they read like this:
On November 21, advance units of the LXIII Corps advanced towards [unpronounceable Russian town name] meeting fierce resistance from infantry and anti-tank units of the 562nd division. By the end of the day, 3 kilometers had been wrested and the left flank rested on the [insert unknown to most people river's name].
Then rinse and repeat for page after page after page.
But, Stahel takes an entirely different approach to writing about the campaign that was planned amidst the Russian mud and executed once the ground had frozen. First of all, he 100% demolishes the myth that the battle for Moscow was a near run thing - with the Germans coming so close but ultimately done in by winter and a Russian counterattack. Stahel asserts with plenty of evidence that the attack was doomed from the start but nevertheless initiated as the commanders simply could not conceive of anything other than a German victory through sheer force of will (the pervasiveness of the Nazi ethos throughout the high command).
Stahel also vividly describes the atrocities committed by the Germans against the Soviet civilians in both revenge acts against partisans and as the weather got colder, an animal-like desire for shelter, food, and warmth given that the German supply system had failed to keep up with the advance and German industry wasn't producing what was needed.
The story is told almost 100% from the German side, citing numerous first person accounts of both generals and ordinary soldiers. Only a fraction of the book is devoted to actual operations (with excellent every-other-day maps) so you don't get bogged down in minutia. More attention is spent on the realization by the commanders that their forces were exhausted - a realization that only slowly percolated up back to Berlin. There is quite a lot on the deprivations of the average German soldier, how they communicated it back to the home front, and how even Goebbels realized by monitoring of the mail that morale was suffering at the front - and that the war would not be won in 1941 - with perhaps a political settlement required.
Whenever you read history, especially of disasters, you find passages that resonate in modern times. As I write this, we are two months into Covid-19 here in the US. I quote from p 222 - you can see the obvious parallels:
"The manner in which Hitler and his entourage governed and commanded was bound to stifle gradually every free opinion. Nobody in his surroundings had the courage to put forward his opinions, let alone stand up for them. On the contrary, those who criticized lost their positions, or else fell into disgrace." - Albert Speer, writing after the war but used in reference to the German high command in late November 1941 when it was becoming clear (at least to their immediate commanders) that the German forces were at the end of their rope.
The book is very well-written and moves from topic to topic so the reader is not trapped in the rasputitsa of operational level narrative. There is a good section on lend lease equipment arriving, another good section of the unmet challenges of supply, a really interesting section on a military conference run by Halder to plan the campaign, some bits on the superiority of Russian airpower, and gruesome sections on reprisals and brutality by the German soldiers.
There are a few photos. Very little is told from the Russian side and what is told comes from Zhukov's and other front commander's memoirs, or from the works of Russian propagandist Ilya Ehrenburg. But, the one-sidedness doesn't really detract from the story which is really a story of a deluded group-think on German military commanders/political leadership attempting to accomplish a goal doomed from the start. The hows and whys of that make for an interesting read.
On November 21, advance units of the LXIII Corps advanced towards [unpronounceable Russian town name] meeting fierce resistance from infantry and anti-tank units of the 562nd division. By the end of the day, 3 kilometers had been wrested and the left flank rested on the [insert unknown to most people river's name].
Then rinse and repeat for page after page after page.
But, Stahel takes an entirely different approach to writing about the campaign that was planned amidst the Russian mud and executed once the ground had frozen. First of all, he 100% demolishes the myth that the battle for Moscow was a near run thing - with the Germans coming so close but ultimately done in by winter and a Russian counterattack. Stahel asserts with plenty of evidence that the attack was doomed from the start but nevertheless initiated as the commanders simply could not conceive of anything other than a German victory through sheer force of will (the pervasiveness of the Nazi ethos throughout the high command).
Stahel also vividly describes the atrocities committed by the Germans against the Soviet civilians in both revenge acts against partisans and as the weather got colder, an animal-like desire for shelter, food, and warmth given that the German supply system had failed to keep up with the advance and German industry wasn't producing what was needed.
The story is told almost 100% from the German side, citing numerous first person accounts of both generals and ordinary soldiers. Only a fraction of the book is devoted to actual operations (with excellent every-other-day maps) so you don't get bogged down in minutia. More attention is spent on the realization by the commanders that their forces were exhausted - a realization that only slowly percolated up back to Berlin. There is quite a lot on the deprivations of the average German soldier, how they communicated it back to the home front, and how even Goebbels realized by monitoring of the mail that morale was suffering at the front - and that the war would not be won in 1941 - with perhaps a political settlement required.
Whenever you read history, especially of disasters, you find passages that resonate in modern times. As I write this, we are two months into Covid-19 here in the US. I quote from p 222 - you can see the obvious parallels:
"The manner in which Hitler and his entourage governed and commanded was bound to stifle gradually every free opinion. Nobody in his surroundings had the courage to put forward his opinions, let alone stand up for them. On the contrary, those who criticized lost their positions, or else fell into disgrace." - Albert Speer, writing after the war but used in reference to the German high command in late November 1941 when it was becoming clear (at least to their immediate commanders) that the German forces were at the end of their rope.
The book is very well-written and moves from topic to topic so the reader is not trapped in the rasputitsa of operational level narrative. There is a good section on lend lease equipment arriving, another good section of the unmet challenges of supply, a really interesting section on a military conference run by Halder to plan the campaign, some bits on the superiority of Russian airpower, and gruesome sections on reprisals and brutality by the German soldiers.
There are a few photos. Very little is told from the Russian side and what is told comes from Zhukov's and other front commander's memoirs, or from the works of Russian propagandist Ilya Ehrenburg. But, the one-sidedness doesn't really detract from the story which is really a story of a deluded group-think on German military commanders/political leadership attempting to accomplish a goal doomed from the start. The hows and whys of that make for an interesting read.
March 14, 2020
A much more engaging and academically interesting than 'Operation Typhoon', and especially 'The Battle for Kiev. There is significantly more relevant text and information, in addition to regular maps that actually show all of the events taking place. The thesis that the German high command exhibited a 'Nazi military ideology' is innovative, or at least I had not thought of such a thing before. There are still, however, many issues - one such issue is constantly raising its head with Stahel's book, post-Barbarossa: spelling errors and what I assume are incorrect corrections. There seems to be absolutely no-one checking his work. This is particularly surprising considering all books in this series have been published by Cambridge University Press. I assumed that upon seeing them in the battle for kiev I somehow had a dodgy copy but it is clear that it is throughout the series. Its really shocking how bad it is! I particularly enjoyed pg136’s ‘pubic announcements’ and pg195's ‘salivation of Moscow’, but there are several others that I only seemed to notice in the second half of the book (pg164 - ‘conformation’, Pg 242 ‘under no less that eighteen separate aerial attacks’, Pg300 ‘who would to be driven’, Pg306 ‘hellmich’s 23rd infantry division was Veiel’s 2nd panzer division’. My second issue is that this book still should have been combined with the Operation Typhoon book into a larger text, covering two months and not requiring two sets of fluff and context that have padded out at least 50 pages in each book since the Battle for Kiev. Overall, aside from these criticisms it is an interesting and enjoyable book.
July 25, 2021
Another fine book by Mr. Stahel about the German Army on their push to Moscow. Not only does he bring out General mud and winter, but highlights the German Army's weakness in manpower, terrible intel, hubris, industrial output, and logistic's and the Red Army ability to sit and fight and then attack.. Plenty of maps that covers the attack slow push to Moscow.
June 26, 2025
After looking at the multiple good reviews of this book, I decided to pick it up. I dont have any background knowledge on the Battle and this book was definitely the wrong place to start.
Honestly, what i disliked most about this book was that it seemed so off tangent and filled to the brim with fluff. Stahel spends a large amount of time talking about propaganda, morale, cult of Hitler, the cold but never about the actual battle itself. It was particularly frustrating when he skimmed over the actual battles when this book was supposed to be about the battle, not the entire Nazi empire in November 1941.
Another gripe I have with this book was the number of times it repeated itself. At about the first 100 pages the cold, morale of the german soldiers was greatly detailed and I thought that it was good to understand the enivronment at the time. However, at about 250+ paces it repeats itself and starts talking about the cold again! It really felt like I was wasting my time reading it.
Lastly, the flow of the book was so messy, chapters kept time jumping and area jumping and it got really messy. There was no proper chronological order to things.
I cannot disregard the fact that it is well researched. But the book definitely shouldnt be called the Battle of Moscow due to its lack of focus. Overall it was a frustrating read.
Honestly, what i disliked most about this book was that it seemed so off tangent and filled to the brim with fluff. Stahel spends a large amount of time talking about propaganda, morale, cult of Hitler, the cold but never about the actual battle itself. It was particularly frustrating when he skimmed over the actual battles when this book was supposed to be about the battle, not the entire Nazi empire in November 1941.
Another gripe I have with this book was the number of times it repeated itself. At about the first 100 pages the cold, morale of the german soldiers was greatly detailed and I thought that it was good to understand the enivronment at the time. However, at about 250+ paces it repeats itself and starts talking about the cold again! It really felt like I was wasting my time reading it.
Lastly, the flow of the book was so messy, chapters kept time jumping and area jumping and it got really messy. There was no proper chronological order to things.
I cannot disregard the fact that it is well researched. But the book definitely shouldnt be called the Battle of Moscow due to its lack of focus. Overall it was a frustrating read.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
December 15, 2023
Operation Typhoon ground to a halt on the outskirts of Moscow, undermanned, outgunned, and undersupplied. Facing the overstretched Army Group Centre were Zhukov’s reinforcements fresh from Siberia alongside the determination of the people of Moscow.
David Stahel continues his masterful reassessment of Army Group Centre’s first year on the Eastern Front, already unable to defeat the Soviets in a war of attrition with this history of the Battle of Moscow. Contrary to contemporary sources, this was not the first defeat in the East for the Nazis for as Stahel illuminates throughout his histories, the Nazis through their woeful underestimation of logistics and geography, and their preconceived notions about the Soviet Union, they had lost as soon as they invaded.
Even so, Stahel continues his expert analysis of the logistical problems facing Army Group Centre now compounded by leadership crises and an overzealous propaganda campaign that undermined morale. This volume, perhaps more than any other preceding one, demonstrates the unrelenting hardships of the Eastern Front - the sheer brutality of this war of annihilation.
Focusing on Germans soldiers particularly, they were grossly underprepared for winter and the OKW/OKH continued to ignore the ever-growing problems facing the soldiers as they ran out of food, fuel, ammunition, and lacked winter clothes. Stahel doesn’t engage in whitewashing the Wehrmacht however because despite the hardships they endured, the crimes they committed against the Soviet civilian population, POWs, and Jews are apparent for all to see. Murder, rape, theft, were just the tip of an iceberg of war crimes.
Stahel is a masterful narrator of history and draws from every echelon of the army, from the highest-ranked generals to the lowliest private. There is humanity to be found in the horrors of the Eastern Front but never at the expanse of the true victims of Nazi war crimes.
David Stahel continues his masterful reassessment of Army Group Centre’s first year on the Eastern Front, already unable to defeat the Soviets in a war of attrition with this history of the Battle of Moscow. Contrary to contemporary sources, this was not the first defeat in the East for the Nazis for as Stahel illuminates throughout his histories, the Nazis through their woeful underestimation of logistics and geography, and their preconceived notions about the Soviet Union, they had lost as soon as they invaded.
Even so, Stahel continues his expert analysis of the logistical problems facing Army Group Centre now compounded by leadership crises and an overzealous propaganda campaign that undermined morale. This volume, perhaps more than any other preceding one, demonstrates the unrelenting hardships of the Eastern Front - the sheer brutality of this war of annihilation.
Focusing on Germans soldiers particularly, they were grossly underprepared for winter and the OKW/OKH continued to ignore the ever-growing problems facing the soldiers as they ran out of food, fuel, ammunition, and lacked winter clothes. Stahel doesn’t engage in whitewashing the Wehrmacht however because despite the hardships they endured, the crimes they committed against the Soviet civilian population, POWs, and Jews are apparent for all to see. Murder, rape, theft, were just the tip of an iceberg of war crimes.
Stahel is a masterful narrator of history and draws from every echelon of the army, from the highest-ranked generals to the lowliest private. There is humanity to be found in the horrors of the Eastern Front but never at the expanse of the true victims of Nazi war crimes.
March 30, 2022
Another superb book from one of the best WW2 historians, particularly on the Russian front. This book follows on from his earlier books - Operation Barbarossa and Operation Typhoon.
He explains that, contrary to popular opinion, the Wehrmacht were defeated by the Russians before they reached Moscow. They were defeated not so much by the Russian winter as the enormous reserves of manpower available to the Russians and the Russian soldiers' determination to fight to the death. Incompetent decision-making by the German High Command also helped.
I'm really looking forward to reading his next book - The Retreat From Moscow.
He explains that, contrary to popular opinion, the Wehrmacht were defeated by the Russians before they reached Moscow. They were defeated not so much by the Russian winter as the enormous reserves of manpower available to the Russians and the Russian soldiers' determination to fight to the death. Incompetent decision-making by the German High Command also helped.
I'm really looking forward to reading his next book - The Retreat From Moscow.
January 3, 2025
As with other of Stahel's books, this is a new, refreshing look at the failure of the Wehrmacht in 1941 that does not follow the narrative played by German generals after 1945. Stahel skilfully destroys old myths that Wehrmacht was defeated by an early onset of hard winter, that Sorge saved the Soviet Union, or that Germans managed to reach the suburbs of Moscow and almost captured the city. Instead, we see a portrait of an exhausted and destroyed army led by ideologically-driven generals who lost touch with reality.
July 7, 2024
Brilliant look into a campaign that in reality never happened. This extension of Operation Typhoon was stillborn yet the same generals who later tried to blame others for the failure of Barbarossa were the ones who most vehemently advocated for it. The Battle of Moscow was not a close run thing and Army Group Centre had lost all its striking power by the time the plan was initiated.
January 12, 2022
This being the fourth book of the series was as comprehensive and well researched as the first three. A very thoroughly researched and well written account. I enjoyed it immensely.
July 8, 2024
For me the weakest of the series so far. Practically no details are given for specific battles, and a lot of material on civilian and servicemen suffering is rehashed.
November 29, 2025
The same amazing and detail oriented look on things as the previous books. Opens up new ways of thinking about things that we have canonized years ago in to the war lore (poor choice of word maybe).
May 17, 2025
Stahel's fourth book on the trajectory of German Army Group Center during Operation Barbarossa further advances the claim that the German Army (Heer) was on a downward spiral, even as they drew close to Moscow in November 1941. The book can be recommended for bringing this decline into sharp focus, as well as documenting numerous eye-opening facts to bolster his case. Infantry, motorized and panzer divisions were almost at skeleton strength as the attack reached its zenith in mid- to late-November, with numerous line infantry and panzergrenadier companies down to just a few dozen men, against an authorized strength of over 150 men, and most panzer divisions leading the attack with only 20 to 30 operational tanks.
Besides combat losses, a good proportion of the troops were literally starving, freezing due to the unavailability of winter clothing, and frequently suffering from lice infestation. Stahel documents two divisions, the 23rd Infantry and 10th Panzer, in which battalion-sized units simply refused to attack on 02 December--not surprising given their condition, but the first mention I'd seen of this situation. He also mentions that Guderian, commanding the 2nd Panzer Army, on two occasions communicated to Bock at Army Group Center that he could no longer continue the attack, and promptly blamed his neighboring commander, Kluge of the weakened and overstretched 4th Army, for not providing sufficient flank support. This fact was conveniently omitted from Guderian's memoir.
Stahel also makes clear the improbability of the Germans ever taking Moscow, given how the city was heavily fortified and defended, the VVS (Soviet Air Force) had near-complete air superiority in that region, and that the Soviets had moved forward ten numbered armies for their planned winter counteroffensive, which could be (and were) diverted to collapsing sectors. The frequently-mentioned claim that forward German units could see the spires of the Kremlin, is examined and not found to be backed by factual or credible records at the time.
The narrative takes a few interesting digressions along the way, for example by mentioning how brutal life was for civilians in the occupied territories, having their food and clothing stolen by the Germans, being expelled from their houses in the winter, and being vulnerable to reprisal shootings when partisans attacked units in the German rear. Given the dire state of the average German soldier, while the violence visited on the civilian population remains reprehensible and inexcusable, it can at least be better understood.
Similarly, what became clear is the utter obliviousness of the German leadership to the condition of its units and their men, and their steadfast insistence on continuing an attack that was destined to fail. By pressing forward, Army Group Center was playing into the hands of the Soviets, who were waiting for the attack to exhaust itself before they launched their own counteroffensive that would drive the Germans back from Moscow. This mindset, far from being rational and logical, was delusionary, and was exercised at the highest levels of the German command, irrespective of Hitler's awareness or involvement.
This book, like the others focuses largely on Army Group Center, with the other two Army Groups and the Soviets relegated to the background. The maps are numerous and first-rate in their clarity. In general, it's a strong complement to the previous books in the series and worth reading for the numerous facts which re-orient us to better understand the inevitability of the failure of Army Group Center in the fall and winter of 1941.
Besides combat losses, a good proportion of the troops were literally starving, freezing due to the unavailability of winter clothing, and frequently suffering from lice infestation. Stahel documents two divisions, the 23rd Infantry and 10th Panzer, in which battalion-sized units simply refused to attack on 02 December--not surprising given their condition, but the first mention I'd seen of this situation. He also mentions that Guderian, commanding the 2nd Panzer Army, on two occasions communicated to Bock at Army Group Center that he could no longer continue the attack, and promptly blamed his neighboring commander, Kluge of the weakened and overstretched 4th Army, for not providing sufficient flank support. This fact was conveniently omitted from Guderian's memoir.
Stahel also makes clear the improbability of the Germans ever taking Moscow, given how the city was heavily fortified and defended, the VVS (Soviet Air Force) had near-complete air superiority in that region, and that the Soviets had moved forward ten numbered armies for their planned winter counteroffensive, which could be (and were) diverted to collapsing sectors. The frequently-mentioned claim that forward German units could see the spires of the Kremlin, is examined and not found to be backed by factual or credible records at the time.
The narrative takes a few interesting digressions along the way, for example by mentioning how brutal life was for civilians in the occupied territories, having their food and clothing stolen by the Germans, being expelled from their houses in the winter, and being vulnerable to reprisal shootings when partisans attacked units in the German rear. Given the dire state of the average German soldier, while the violence visited on the civilian population remains reprehensible and inexcusable, it can at least be better understood.
Similarly, what became clear is the utter obliviousness of the German leadership to the condition of its units and their men, and their steadfast insistence on continuing an attack that was destined to fail. By pressing forward, Army Group Center was playing into the hands of the Soviets, who were waiting for the attack to exhaust itself before they launched their own counteroffensive that would drive the Germans back from Moscow. This mindset, far from being rational and logical, was delusionary, and was exercised at the highest levels of the German command, irrespective of Hitler's awareness or involvement.
This book, like the others focuses largely on Army Group Center, with the other two Army Groups and the Soviets relegated to the background. The maps are numerous and first-rate in their clarity. In general, it's a strong complement to the previous books in the series and worth reading for the numerous facts which re-orient us to better understand the inevitability of the failure of Army Group Center in the fall and winter of 1941.
August 8, 2018
In November 1941 Hitler ordered German forces to complete the final drive on the Soviet capital, now less than 100 kilometres away. Army Group Centre was pressed into the attack for one last attempt to break Soviet resistance before the onset of winter. From the German perspective the final drive on Moscow had all the ingredients of a dramatic final battle in the east, which, according to previous accounts, only failed at the gates of Moscow. David Stahel challenges this well-established narrative by demonstrating that the last German offensive of 1941 was a forlorn effort, undermined by operational weakness and poor logistics and driven forward by what he identifies as National Socialist military thinking. With unparalleled research from previously undocumented army files and soldiers' letters, Stahel takes a fresh look at the battle for Moscow, which even before the Soviet winter offensive, threatened disaster for Germany's war in the east.
May 7, 2023
Another excellent book by Stahel. He makes his point very convincingly that the Germans did not "almost" take Moscow, that they lost by the "narrowest of margins " as the standard history goes. The Germans never came close to actually occupying the city and forcing them to surrender.
A book well worth reading for WWII buffs.
Phil Kuhn
A book well worth reading for WWII buffs.
Phil Kuhn
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