With this third edition of Nelson Goodman's The Structure of Appear ance, we are pleased to make available once more one of the most in fluential and important works in the philosophy of our times. Professor Geoffrey Hellman's introduction gives a sustained analysis and appreciation of the major themes and the thrust of the book, as well as an account of the ways in which many of Goodman's problems and projects have been picked up and developed by others. Hellman also suggests how The Structure of Appearance introduces issues which Goodman later continues in his essays and in the Languages of Art. There remains the task of understanding Good man's project as a whole; to see the deep continuities of his thought, as it ranges from logic to epistemology, to science and art; to see it therefore as a complex yet coherent theory of human cognition and practice. What we can only hope to suggest, in this note, is the b. road Significance of Goodman's apparently technical work for philosophers, scientists and humanists. One may say of Nelson Goodman that his bite is worse than his bark. Behind what appears as a cool and methodical analysis of the conditions of the construction of systems, there lurks a radical and disturbing that the world is, in itself, no more one way than another, nor are we. It depends on the ways in which we take it, and on what we do.
Henry Nelson Goodman was an American philosopher, known for his work on counterfactuals, mereology, the problem of induction, irrealism, and aesthetics.
This is not an easy book. Most people would hate it after the first 30 pages. I can’t imagine why you would read it unless it was assigned as a college requirement, but I’m glad I stuck with it. The Structure of Appearance fits into my reading theme regarding perception, time and the structure of reality. It describes philosophy in a logical and mathematical way via isomorphism and structural mapping. Everything is defined by relations. Qualia are not little intrinsic atoms with preexisting meaning. They are positions in a network of similarities, differences, and transitions. Their very identity is structural. It is all relative to each other, but in the precise, mathematical sense of being relationally defined. There is no final, absolute ontology. There is no universal truth. He inherently rejects platonism/archetypal truth. It fits very well into structural realism in physics, though Goodman’s pluralism is talking about art, semiotics, culture. It matches the other books I’ve been reading about science and the world: Einstein: no absolute space or time, only relations between different fields. Bohm: no isolated particles, only differences in global dynamics. Rovelli: no absolute properties, only systematic relations. Buber: there’s no isolated self, only reality that shows up in relation (I/Thou vs. I/It). Goodman: no absolute objects, only structures imposed by symbolic systems. It slots well into Gödel’s incomplete theorem, which I’ve been obsessed with lately. Both Gödel and Goodman would agree there’s really no final/closed/self sufficient system or theory that is going to capture everything. Gödel proves this mathematically. Goodman argues this philosophically, also via math and logic. Which is weird, because Gödel was a platonist.