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Modern War Studies
Spetsnaz: A History of the Soviet and Russian Special Forces
In January 1951, Lieutenant Evgeniy Borisov was sent to the headquarters of the Soviet 5th Army in Spassk-Dalnii, a small city in the Russian Far East. Borisov was there on a secret mission. Together with his superior, Major Rusinov, his job was to establish the 91st Special Forces Company. The 91st was to be one of forty-six similar units spread out across the Soviet Union. The new forces were called “spetsnaz”—short for spetsnialnoe naznachenie, which translates to “special purpose.”
In Spetsnaz, Tor Bukkvoll presents the first in-depth history of the Soviet, and, later, Russian special operations forces from their establishment until today. He focuses on three broad Soviet and later Russian thinking on the use of special operations forces; the actual process of constructing these forces and how this was facilitated or hampered by other agencies of the Soviet and Russian states; and the use of these forces in combat.
Bukkvoll uses a variety of sources, but the most important are the recollections of former spetsnaz soldiers and officers themselves, which allow Bukkvoll to present the history of these forces as the men of spetsnaz see and have seen it. Bukkvoll also draws upon observations and judgments from other parts of the Soviet and Russian militaries, from a number of KGB sources, and from independent Russian experts and journalists.
Spetsnaz is essential reading for anyone interested in special operations forces or Russian military history.
In Spetsnaz, Tor Bukkvoll presents the first in-depth history of the Soviet, and, later, Russian special operations forces from their establishment until today. He focuses on three broad Soviet and later Russian thinking on the use of special operations forces; the actual process of constructing these forces and how this was facilitated or hampered by other agencies of the Soviet and Russian states; and the use of these forces in combat.
Bukkvoll uses a variety of sources, but the most important are the recollections of former spetsnaz soldiers and officers themselves, which allow Bukkvoll to present the history of these forces as the men of spetsnaz see and have seen it. Bukkvoll also draws upon observations and judgments from other parts of the Soviet and Russian militaries, from a number of KGB sources, and from independent Russian experts and journalists.
Spetsnaz is essential reading for anyone interested in special operations forces or Russian military history.
306 pages, Hardcover
First published December 12, 2024
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January 14, 2025
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
В целом, книга довольно неплохая, но я бы не сказал что книга ориентирована на среднестатистического читателя, в том смысле, что книга будет интересна только тем, кто сильно интересуется российскими военизированными структурами к каким можно отнести Spetsnaz. К безусловным плюсам книги можно отнести глубину материала и не академический текст (книга написана достаточно доступно для любого читателя). В книге читатель встретит не только историю создания и развития сначала советского, а позже и российского спецназа, но и самые громкие мероприятия, проводимые преимущественно за пределами СССР, как например военные операции в Афганистане и Пакистане. Можно даже сказать, что в некотором смысле книга имеет две составляющие, где в первой даётся историческая справка, включая бюрократические процедуры связанные с формирование спецназа, а во второй те военные операции, в которых участвовал спецназ. Во втором случаи книга становится более живой и интересной, но как только автор начинает описывать бюрократические события из жизни спецназа как организации, то тут уже становится довольно скучно. Так как меня совершенно не интересует тема особых военных групп, то и читать книгу мне было не очень-то и интересно. Поэтому я определённо могу утверждать, что эта книга понравится только тем, кто сильно увлечён жизнью различных подобных государственных военных структур. Глубина исследования данного автора может стать для таких читателей большим плюсом, а простота текста обеспечит лёгкость и быстроту чтения. К тому же на данную тему книг не так много, поэтому и выбор не особо и большой.
Как я понял из книги, роль спецназа заключается в частности в работе в тылу противника и эта работа связана с операциями по максимальной дестабилизации силы и возможностей противника, так же как и ликвидация высокопоставленны лиц противника, как это хорошо было показано на примере операции спецназа в Афганистане по ликвидации тогдашнего президента.
The other spetsnaz missions were not forgotten, but, according to Pavel Golitsyn, to educate a spetsnaz mobilization reserve of experts in partisan warfare indeed became very important.
<…>
In addition to foreign-language training, a further measure to ensure that spetsnaz would be able to communicate with partisans in capitalist countries was to take advantage of the few cases where those partisans spoke a language close to the mother tongue. Thus, ethnic Azeri and Gagauz spetsnaz would in case of war be sent into Turkey to create partisan units there, and ethnic Tadjik spetsnaz would be ready for Afghanistan and Iran.
<…>
Taking all these developments together, one can suggest that army spetsnaz over the 20 years prior to the war in Afghanistan gradually moved from being typical special operations forces to becoming something closer to elite light infantry.
Помимо эпохи Советского Союза, книга рассматривает операции спецназа и Российской Федерации, где особую роль играет война в Чечне. Моё внимание привлекли даже не действия спецназа, а та политика федерального центра, с помощью которой Кремль смог «усмирить» Чечню. Возможно, если бы не случился февраль 2022 года, данное замечание автора осталось бы незамеченным, но сегодня нижеследующее объяснение победы Кремля над Чечнёй может многое сказать о возможных будущих планах Путина в отношении Украины, а возможно даже и не только Украины. Речь идёт о практике использования самих чеченцев в силовом усмирении Чечни уже в эпоху Путина.
According to a thorough and careful study by Jason Lyall, the use of ethnic Chechens instead of ethnic Russians for mop-ups decreased the number of resulting attacks on federal forces by 40 percent.
Not only was the civilian population more pacified by the fact that those who came into their homes were ethnic Chechens; these soldiers also handled themselves better than the Russians. At least one extrajudicial killing took place in 25 percent of the Russian operations. The same figure for the Chechen operations was 12 percent. Theft of civilian property was reported after 18 percent of the Russian mop-ups. This compared with only 3 percent after the Chechen mop-ups. Furthermore, Lyall also demonstrates that, when Russians and Chechens conducted these operations together, the results were the same as if the Russians had done it alone.
Интересно, будет ли подобная политика использоваться и по отношению к украино-российскому кризису или Кремль придумает что-то новое? В любом случаи данный подход показал свою эффективность. Впрочем, нечто похожее использовали и американцы в Афганистане, однако в отличие от путинской России у них в итоге ничего не получилось.
Так как книга была издана в разгар российско-украинской войны, автор не смог пройти вниманием роль спецназа в украинском кризисе. В книге даётся довольно интересный взгляд на роль российского спецназа в Крыму (однако тут ничего нового мы не найдём, кроме общеизвестной информации о «зелёных человечках» которые препятствовали работе прежней власти), а также в российском вторжении в Украину в феврале 2022 года, когда спецназ так же активно использовался, но как отмечает автор, использовался совсем не так как должно использовать эту структуру согласно самой её сути.
However, he was shocked to learn that neither Berkut nor Alpha were ready to take part in any form of armed action. Berkut, according to Radchenko, claimed unpreparedness. Alpha simply said they would not join.
<…>
During the course of their days in the Ukrainian capital, Kyivan demonstrators came to see the Crimean Berkut as almost unbelievably brutal. The latter, however, claimed that the brutality had come from the demonstrators’ side.
По поводу первых дней военного наступления России, автор так же отмечает примечательные вещи, но так же довольно известные. В частности, мировые СМИ писали о нерациональном использовании спецназа в боях за контроль над Киевом. Действительно, очень странно выглядит вся эта операция первого месяца. Либо сама миссия оказалась изначально невыполнимой либо были допущены ошибки в планировании всей этой операции, что может говорить о том, что Путин решил начать это своё СВО без какой-либо многолетней подготовки (не то что я выражаю сожаление по поводу провала наступления на Киев, а просто отмечаю факт провала).
The largely bloodless annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the demonstrations of power by the SSO in Syria probably lifted the spirits of many spetsnaz operators. However, the failures and deaths in Ukraine, first at Hostomel and then at many others places, after February 2022 may already have seriously undermined that mood. Regardless of which side emerges victorious in Ukraine, Russia will be weakened militarily as a country for years because of this war. If that reduced conventional military capability is combined with a continuation of the fight against the West, Russia is likely to rely even more than before on nuclear weapons for deterrence and on gray-zone/hybrid warfare for offensive purposes. The potentially catastrophic losses by Spetsnaz GRU and the SSO in Ukraine after February 2022, however, will likely have severely undermined the capacity for the latter type of operations. True, the potential return of Vympel to such missions, as well as the formation of new Russian private military companies, may compensate somewhat. Still, in the long run the main issue to resolve for spetsnaz is likely to be whether the disastrous experiences in Ukraine will induce changes that finally lets these forces become the special operations forces they always have seen themselves to be.
Тоже интересное замечание автора.
In general, the book is pretty good, but I would not say that the book is oriented to the average reader, in the sense that the book will be interesting only to those who are strongly interested in Russian paramilitary structures to which can be considered Spetsnaz. The depth of the material and the non-academic text (the book is written in a rather accessible way for any reader) can be attributed to the unconditional pluses of the book. In the book, the reader will find not only the history of the creation and development of the Soviet and later Russian Spetsnaz but also the most high-profile events conducted mainly outside the USSR, such as military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. One can even say that, in a sense, the book has two components where in the first one, the historical background is given, including bureaucratic procedures related to the formation of the Special Forces, and in the second one, those military operations in which the Special Forces participated. In the second case, the book becomes livelier and more interesting, but as soon as the author starts describing bureaucratic events from the life of Spetsnaz as an organization, it becomes quite boring. Since I am not at all interested in the topic of special military groups, I was not very interested in reading the book. Therefore, I can definitely say that this book will appeal only to those who are very interested in the life of various such state military structures. The depth of this author's research can be a big plus for such readers, and the simplicity of the text will ensure easy and quick reading. In addition, there are not so many books on this topic, so the choice is not particularly large.
As I understood from the book, the role of Special Forces is to work in the rear of the enemy, and this work is associated with operations for destabilization the strength and capabilities of the enemy, as well as the elimination of high-ranking officials of the enemy, as it was well illustrated by the example of Special Forces operation in Afghanistan to eliminate the then president.
The other spetsnaz missions were not forgotten, but, according to Pavel Golitsyn, to educate a spetsnaz mobilization reserve of experts in partisan warfare indeed became very important.
<…>
In addition to foreign-language training, a further measure to ensure that spetsnaz would be able to communicate with partisans in capitalist countries was to take advantage of the few cases where those partisans spoke a language close to the mother tongue. Thus, ethnic Azeri and Gagauz spetsnaz would in case of war be sent into Turkey to create partisan units there, and ethnic Tadjik spetsnaz would be ready for Afghanistan and Iran.
<…>
Taking all these developments together, one can suggest that army spetsnaz over the 20 years prior to the war in Afghanistan gradually moved from being typical special operations forces to becoming something closer to elite light infantry.
In addition to the Soviet Union, the book examines the operations of special forces in the Russian Federation, where the war in Chechnya plays a special role. My attention was drawn not even to the actions of the special forces but to the policy of the federal center, with the help of which the Kremlin was able to “pacify” Chechnya. Perhaps, if February 2022 had not happened, this remark of the author would have remained unnoticed, but today, the following explanation of the Kremlin's victory over Chechnya can say a lot about Putin's possible future plans for Ukraine, and perhaps not only for Ukraine. It is about the practice of using Chechens themselves in the forceful subduing of Chechnya in the Putin era.
According to a thorough and careful study by Jason Lyall, the use of ethnic Chechens instead of ethnic Russians for mop-ups decreased the number of resulting attacks on federal forces by 40 percent.
Not only was the civilian population more pacified by the fact that those who came into their homes were ethnic Chechens; these soldiers also handled themselves better than the Russians. At least one extrajudicial killing took place in 25 percent of the Russian operations. The same figure for the Chechen operations was 12 percent. Theft of civilian property was reported after 18 percent of the Russian mop-ups. This compared with only 3 percent after the Chechen mop-ups. Furthermore, Lyall also demonstrates that, when Russians and Chechens conducted these operations together, the results were the same as if the Russians had done it alone.
I wonder whether a similar policy will be used in relation to the Ukrainian-Russian crisis or whether the Kremlin will come up with something new. In any case, this approach has shown its effectiveness. However, something similar was used by the Americans in Afghanistan, but unlike Putin's Russia, they failed in the end.
Since the book was published in the midst of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the author could not ignore the role of special forces in the Ukrainian crisis. The book gives a rather interesting look at the role of Russian special forces in Crimea (but there is nothing new here, except for the well-known information about “little green men” who prevented the work of the former government), as well as in the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, when the special forces were also actively used, but as the author notes, they were used in a different way than this structure should be used according to its very essence.
However, he was shocked to learn that neither Berkut nor Alpha were ready to take part in any form of armed action. Berkut, according to Radchenko, claimed unpreparedness. Alpha simply said they would not join.
<…>
During the course of their days in the Ukrainian capital, Kyivan demonstrators came to see the Crimean Berkut as almost unbelievably brutal. The latter, however, claimed that the brutality had come from the demonstrators’ side.
Regarding the first days of Russia's military offensive, the author also notes some notable things but also quite well-known. In particular, the world media wrote about the irrational use of special forces in the battles for control over Kiev. Indeed, the whole operation of the first month looks very strange. Either the mission itself turned out to be initially unfeasible, or there were mistakes in the planning of the whole operation, which may suggest that Putin decided to launch his SMO without any years of preparation (not that I am regretting the failure of the Kiev offensive, but just noting the fact of failure).
The largely bloodless annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the demonstrations of power by the SSO in Syria probably lifted the spirits of many spetsnaz operators. However, the failures and deaths in Ukraine, first at Hostomel and then at many others places, after February 2022 may already have seriously undermined that mood. Regardless of which side emerges victorious in Ukraine, Russia will be weakened militarily as a country for years because of this war. If that reduced conventional military capability is combined with a continuation of the fight against the West, Russia is likely to rely even more than before on nuclear weapons for deterrence and on gray-zone/hybrid warfare for offensive purposes. The potentially catastrophic losses by Spetsnaz GRU and the SSO in Ukraine after February 2022, however, will likely have severely undermined the capacity for the latter type of operations. True, the potential return of Vympel to such missions, as well as the formation of new Russian private military companies, may compensate somewhat. Still, in the long run the main issue to resolve for spetsnaz is likely to be whether the disastrous experiences in Ukraine will induce changes that finally lets these forces become the special operations forces they always have seen themselves to be.
It's also an interesting observation by the author.
В целом, книга довольно неплохая, но я бы не сказал что книга ориентирована на среднестатистического читателя, в том смысле, что книга будет интересна только тем, кто сильно интересуется российскими военизированными структурами к каким можно отнести Spetsnaz. К безусловным плюсам книги можно отнести глубину материала и не академический текст (книга написана достаточно доступно для любого читателя). В книге читатель встретит не только историю создания и развития сначала советского, а позже и российского спецназа, но и самые громкие мероприятия, проводимые преимущественно за пределами СССР, как например военные операции в Афганистане и Пакистане. Можно даже сказать, что в некотором смысле книга имеет две составляющие, где в первой даётся историческая справка, включая бюрократические процедуры связанные с формирование спецназа, а во второй те военные операции, в которых участвовал спецназ. Во втором случаи книга становится более живой и интересной, но как только автор начинает описывать бюрократические события из жизни спецназа как организации, то тут уже становится довольно скучно. Так как меня совершенно не интересует тема особых военных групп, то и читать книгу мне было не очень-то и интересно. Поэтому я определённо могу утверждать, что эта книга понравится только тем, кто сильно увлечён жизнью различных подобных государственных военных структур. Глубина исследования данного автора может стать для таких читателей большим плюсом, а простота текста обеспечит лёгкость и быстроту чтения. К тому же на данную тему книг не так много, поэтому и выбор не особо и большой.
Как я понял из книги, роль спецназа заключается в частности в работе в тылу противника и эта работа связана с операциями по максимальной дестабилизации силы и возможностей противника, так же как и ликвидация высокопоставленны лиц противника, как это хорошо было показано на примере операции спецназа в Афганистане по ликвидации тогдашнего президента.
The other spetsnaz missions were not forgotten, but, according to Pavel Golitsyn, to educate a spetsnaz mobilization reserve of experts in partisan warfare indeed became very important.
<…>
In addition to foreign-language training, a further measure to ensure that spetsnaz would be able to communicate with partisans in capitalist countries was to take advantage of the few cases where those partisans spoke a language close to the mother tongue. Thus, ethnic Azeri and Gagauz spetsnaz would in case of war be sent into Turkey to create partisan units there, and ethnic Tadjik spetsnaz would be ready for Afghanistan and Iran.
<…>
Taking all these developments together, one can suggest that army spetsnaz over the 20 years prior to the war in Afghanistan gradually moved from being typical special operations forces to becoming something closer to elite light infantry.
Помимо эпохи Советского Союза, книга рассматривает операции спецназа и Российской Федерации, где особую роль играет война в Чечне. Моё внимание привлекли даже не действия спецназа, а та политика федерального центра, с помощью которой Кремль смог «усмирить» Чечню. Возможно, если бы не случился февраль 2022 года, данное замечание автора осталось бы незамеченным, но сегодня нижеследующее объяснение победы Кремля над Чечнёй может многое сказать о возможных будущих планах Путина в отношении Украины, а возможно даже и не только Украины. Речь идёт о практике использования самих чеченцев в силовом усмирении Чечни уже в эпоху Путина.
According to a thorough and careful study by Jason Lyall, the use of ethnic Chechens instead of ethnic Russians for mop-ups decreased the number of resulting attacks on federal forces by 40 percent.
Not only was the civilian population more pacified by the fact that those who came into their homes were ethnic Chechens; these soldiers also handled themselves better than the Russians. At least one extrajudicial killing took place in 25 percent of the Russian operations. The same figure for the Chechen operations was 12 percent. Theft of civilian property was reported after 18 percent of the Russian mop-ups. This compared with only 3 percent after the Chechen mop-ups. Furthermore, Lyall also demonstrates that, when Russians and Chechens conducted these operations together, the results were the same as if the Russians had done it alone.
Интересно, будет ли подобная политика использоваться и по отношению к украино-российскому кризису или Кремль придумает что-то новое? В любом случаи данный подход показал свою эффективность. Впрочем, нечто похожее использовали и американцы в Афганистане, однако в отличие от путинской России у них в итоге ничего не получилось.
Так как книга была издана в разгар российско-украинской войны, автор не смог пройти вниманием роль спецназа в украинском кризисе. В книге даётся довольно интересный взгляд на роль российского спецназа в Крыму (однако тут ничего нового мы не найдём, кроме общеизвестной информации о «зелёных человечках» которые препятствовали работе прежней власти), а также в российском вторжении в Украину в феврале 2022 года, когда спецназ так же активно использовался, но как отмечает автор, использовался совсем не так как должно использовать эту структуру согласно самой её сути.
However, he was shocked to learn that neither Berkut nor Alpha were ready to take part in any form of armed action. Berkut, according to Radchenko, claimed unpreparedness. Alpha simply said they would not join.
<…>
During the course of their days in the Ukrainian capital, Kyivan demonstrators came to see the Crimean Berkut as almost unbelievably brutal. The latter, however, claimed that the brutality had come from the demonstrators’ side.
По поводу первых дней военного наступления России, автор так же отмечает примечательные вещи, но так же довольно известные. В частности, мировые СМИ писали о нерациональном использовании спецназа в боях за контроль над Киевом. Действительно, очень странно выглядит вся эта операция первого месяца. Либо сама миссия оказалась изначально невыполнимой либо были допущены ошибки в планировании всей этой операции, что может говорить о том, что Путин решил начать это своё СВО без какой-либо многолетней подготовки (не то что я выражаю сожаление по поводу провала наступления на Киев, а просто отмечаю факт провала).
The largely bloodless annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the demonstrations of power by the SSO in Syria probably lifted the spirits of many spetsnaz operators. However, the failures and deaths in Ukraine, first at Hostomel and then at many others places, after February 2022 may already have seriously undermined that mood. Regardless of which side emerges victorious in Ukraine, Russia will be weakened militarily as a country for years because of this war. If that reduced conventional military capability is combined with a continuation of the fight against the West, Russia is likely to rely even more than before on nuclear weapons for deterrence and on gray-zone/hybrid warfare for offensive purposes. The potentially catastrophic losses by Spetsnaz GRU and the SSO in Ukraine after February 2022, however, will likely have severely undermined the capacity for the latter type of operations. True, the potential return of Vympel to such missions, as well as the formation of new Russian private military companies, may compensate somewhat. Still, in the long run the main issue to resolve for spetsnaz is likely to be whether the disastrous experiences in Ukraine will induce changes that finally lets these forces become the special operations forces they always have seen themselves to be.
Тоже интересное замечание автора.
In general, the book is pretty good, but I would not say that the book is oriented to the average reader, in the sense that the book will be interesting only to those who are strongly interested in Russian paramilitary structures to which can be considered Spetsnaz. The depth of the material and the non-academic text (the book is written in a rather accessible way for any reader) can be attributed to the unconditional pluses of the book. In the book, the reader will find not only the history of the creation and development of the Soviet and later Russian Spetsnaz but also the most high-profile events conducted mainly outside the USSR, such as military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. One can even say that, in a sense, the book has two components where in the first one, the historical background is given, including bureaucratic procedures related to the formation of the Special Forces, and in the second one, those military operations in which the Special Forces participated. In the second case, the book becomes livelier and more interesting, but as soon as the author starts describing bureaucratic events from the life of Spetsnaz as an organization, it becomes quite boring. Since I am not at all interested in the topic of special military groups, I was not very interested in reading the book. Therefore, I can definitely say that this book will appeal only to those who are very interested in the life of various such state military structures. The depth of this author's research can be a big plus for such readers, and the simplicity of the text will ensure easy and quick reading. In addition, there are not so many books on this topic, so the choice is not particularly large.
As I understood from the book, the role of Special Forces is to work in the rear of the enemy, and this work is associated with operations for destabilization the strength and capabilities of the enemy, as well as the elimination of high-ranking officials of the enemy, as it was well illustrated by the example of Special Forces operation in Afghanistan to eliminate the then president.
The other spetsnaz missions were not forgotten, but, according to Pavel Golitsyn, to educate a spetsnaz mobilization reserve of experts in partisan warfare indeed became very important.
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In addition to foreign-language training, a further measure to ensure that spetsnaz would be able to communicate with partisans in capitalist countries was to take advantage of the few cases where those partisans spoke a language close to the mother tongue. Thus, ethnic Azeri and Gagauz spetsnaz would in case of war be sent into Turkey to create partisan units there, and ethnic Tadjik spetsnaz would be ready for Afghanistan and Iran.
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Taking all these developments together, one can suggest that army spetsnaz over the 20 years prior to the war in Afghanistan gradually moved from being typical special operations forces to becoming something closer to elite light infantry.
In addition to the Soviet Union, the book examines the operations of special forces in the Russian Federation, where the war in Chechnya plays a special role. My attention was drawn not even to the actions of the special forces but to the policy of the federal center, with the help of which the Kremlin was able to “pacify” Chechnya. Perhaps, if February 2022 had not happened, this remark of the author would have remained unnoticed, but today, the following explanation of the Kremlin's victory over Chechnya can say a lot about Putin's possible future plans for Ukraine, and perhaps not only for Ukraine. It is about the practice of using Chechens themselves in the forceful subduing of Chechnya in the Putin era.
According to a thorough and careful study by Jason Lyall, the use of ethnic Chechens instead of ethnic Russians for mop-ups decreased the number of resulting attacks on federal forces by 40 percent.
Not only was the civilian population more pacified by the fact that those who came into their homes were ethnic Chechens; these soldiers also handled themselves better than the Russians. At least one extrajudicial killing took place in 25 percent of the Russian operations. The same figure for the Chechen operations was 12 percent. Theft of civilian property was reported after 18 percent of the Russian mop-ups. This compared with only 3 percent after the Chechen mop-ups. Furthermore, Lyall also demonstrates that, when Russians and Chechens conducted these operations together, the results were the same as if the Russians had done it alone.
I wonder whether a similar policy will be used in relation to the Ukrainian-Russian crisis or whether the Kremlin will come up with something new. In any case, this approach has shown its effectiveness. However, something similar was used by the Americans in Afghanistan, but unlike Putin's Russia, they failed in the end.
Since the book was published in the midst of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the author could not ignore the role of special forces in the Ukrainian crisis. The book gives a rather interesting look at the role of Russian special forces in Crimea (but there is nothing new here, except for the well-known information about “little green men” who prevented the work of the former government), as well as in the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, when the special forces were also actively used, but as the author notes, they were used in a different way than this structure should be used according to its very essence.
However, he was shocked to learn that neither Berkut nor Alpha were ready to take part in any form of armed action. Berkut, according to Radchenko, claimed unpreparedness. Alpha simply said they would not join.
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During the course of their days in the Ukrainian capital, Kyivan demonstrators came to see the Crimean Berkut as almost unbelievably brutal. The latter, however, claimed that the brutality had come from the demonstrators’ side.
Regarding the first days of Russia's military offensive, the author also notes some notable things but also quite well-known. In particular, the world media wrote about the irrational use of special forces in the battles for control over Kiev. Indeed, the whole operation of the first month looks very strange. Either the mission itself turned out to be initially unfeasible, or there were mistakes in the planning of the whole operation, which may suggest that Putin decided to launch his SMO without any years of preparation (not that I am regretting the failure of the Kiev offensive, but just noting the fact of failure).
The largely bloodless annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the demonstrations of power by the SSO in Syria probably lifted the spirits of many spetsnaz operators. However, the failures and deaths in Ukraine, first at Hostomel and then at many others places, after February 2022 may already have seriously undermined that mood. Regardless of which side emerges victorious in Ukraine, Russia will be weakened militarily as a country for years because of this war. If that reduced conventional military capability is combined with a continuation of the fight against the West, Russia is likely to rely even more than before on nuclear weapons for deterrence and on gray-zone/hybrid warfare for offensive purposes. The potentially catastrophic losses by Spetsnaz GRU and the SSO in Ukraine after February 2022, however, will likely have severely undermined the capacity for the latter type of operations. True, the potential return of Vympel to such missions, as well as the formation of new Russian private military companies, may compensate somewhat. Still, in the long run the main issue to resolve for spetsnaz is likely to be whether the disastrous experiences in Ukraine will induce changes that finally lets these forces become the special operations forces they always have seen themselves to be.
It's also an interesting observation by the author.
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