Engineers Of Victory - The Problem Solvers Who Turned The Tide /anglais

by Paul Kennedy

'Engineers of Victory' is an account of how the tide of technology was turned against the Nazis by the Allies in the Second World War.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War II, Military Fiction, Military History, War, Science

480 pages, Paperback

First published March 13, 2012

About the author

Paul Michael Kennedy is a British historian specialising in the history of international relations, economic power and grand strategy. He has published prominent books on the history of British foreign policy and Great Power struggles.

Reviews

[Nick · Rating 2 out of 5]

One of the more mis-titled books in recent memory and one of the more disappointing. The writer indicates that the engineering feats cannot be vioewed in a vaccuum and that some background is needed. Fair enough. Unfortunately, what you get for the rest of the book is almost entirely background and not particularly good background, either. Most of his sources are over a decade old an he ends up spouting conventional wisdom, regardless of whether it has much foundation or not. And the amount of detail about the "engineers" is rather sparse.

For instance, in disussing the solutions to the U-Boat threat, the book jacket, itself, boasts of the invention of the cavity magnitron. In the entire first chapter, this so-called vitally important invention (and it was) is described in two paragraphs. I didn't expect to get a technical manual but something a bit more than a paragraph is warranted.

And so it goes, throughout the book. The book isn't terrible; neither is it enlightening. you can get more, and better, information in a number of sources.

If you must read this, get it from the library.

[Jonny · Rating 4 out of 5]

Taking into account the Allies overcoming of five problems in the mid-war years 1943-44 that allowed for the successful conclusion of the Second World War, this is an interesting take on the period.

First of all, while engineering does have it's place within the narrative, this is not a nuts and bolts title; the majority of the engineering is in the more abstract "to plan or do something in a skillful way". As such, the book is more about how weapons systems were integrated into working tactical systems than the description of how there was any one 'war winning' weapon within each theatre.

The book examines the height of the Battle of the Atlantic, focusing on the battles of March 1943 and how these became the killing ground of 'Black May'; then moves on to the turning around of the USAAF fortunes in the skies over Europe in the period, covering the nadir of the dual Schweinfurt missions in August and October 1943, and the tortured development of the P-51, a contributing factor in the defeat of the Luftwaffe. After this, there is an examination of the development of strategy and tactics to defeat the German forces on land, looking at the learning curves experienced by both the Allies and the Soviets (including an examination of the T-34 that is equally as interesting as the development of the Mustang). The following chapter brings the preceding threads together, looking at the development of amphibious tactics in the Mediterranean and European theatres, and the final chapter expands further on this too look at the way the American forces expanded (literally) on these in the immense spaces of the Pacific. This chapter includes an interesting look at the development of the Seebees and the B-29.

All in all, although it's ground that's been tread individually a number of times, I've never seen all these threads brought together and tied in at an operational level, and it's a good jumping off point for further reading.

[Boudewijn · Rating 2 out of 5]

An analysis of the problems that the Allies faced in the defeat of the Axis powers, how these problems were solved by small groups of individuals and institutions, both civilian and military, succeeded in enabling their political masters to achieve victory in the critical middle years of the Second World War.

At the Casablanca Conference of January 1943, the Allies created a blueprint for the defeat of the Axis powers and defined five military-operational problems that needed to be solved in order to reach the defeat. Those five problems were the safe convoying merchant ships across the oceans, landing on an enemy-held shore in Europe (Operation Overlord), grappling with the Wehrmacht's armored-warfare techniques (the defeat of the Americans at Battle of the Kasserine Pass was still fresh in the memory), reaching aerial dominance in Western Europe (as a prerequisite for the invasion) and the defeat of the Japanese.

This book is an analysis on how this grand strategy is achieved with the explicit claim that victories cannot be understood without a recognition of how those successes were engineered, and by whom. The book is structured in 5 chapters, each dealing with one of the five operational problems that the Allies faced in 1943.

[Mason Barge · Rating 2 out of 5]

I'm sorry to give this book two stars, since it is both amiable and revolves around questions that are interesting to me, but it consists of paragraph after paragraph of broad statements with an unfortunate lack of content.

Here, I'll grab a random paragraph:

"Nonetheless, the warding off of a submarine attack and the destruction of the attackers had to be done through technology, that is, by defensive and offensive weapons platforms. It was true, obviously, in all theaters of war and at all times, but it is astonishing how much much the exigencies of total war, and the terrible importance of winning the Battle of the Atlantic to both sides, led in the single year . . . "

Well, I'm tired of typing. Now that might sound like the introduction to an interesting chapter describing one or more specific aspects of the technology: how it worked, how it was deployed, the history of its creation, etc., but it isn't. The specifics never come.

I seriously recommend that you save your money on this one; there are way too many good books about WW2.

[Jonathan · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'm a big fan of Paul Kennedy. I have read and enjoyed his previous works on power politics, diplomacy and strategy, including his highly praised "The Rise And Fall Of The Great Powers." So, when I saw that he had decided to focus his formidable talents to the Second World War and using an unconventional approach, I was thrilled. Nonetheless, upon finishing this work, I have to say that I found it disappointing. While Professor Kennedy certainly seems to have taken the time to master all of the latest and best books on World War II, and, unlike many academic historians, was not ashamed to admit that he used (and enjoyed!) the vast literature of illustrated books of weaponry, usually demoted to the interest of "history buffs," he actually seems not to have much that is original or insightful to add to our knowledge of that conflict. He is certainly right to stress the role of what he calls "middle management" in the solving of tactical problems or the introduction of potentially decisive weapon systems (such as the P-51 Mustang) and the importance of the interrelationships of the various far-flung theaters of war, but most of this has already been said by various historians. I am fortunate enough to have been able to read many of the works he quotes, so I have to say that almost every insight Kennedy proposes, has already been made known to the interested scholar, or even a "buff." He himself admits that most of those middle managers are unknown to us, and probably always will be, so even the title is a bit of a misnomer, although the issues that they wrestled with are famous to those who study WWII. If you are already familiar with the great campaigns, battles and leaders of that war, this book while it is certainly a pleasurable read, doesn't have that much to offer.

[Mal Warwick · Rating 5 out of 5]

What use is history?

This question has been kicked around for centuries, but I’m not certain that those who venture opinions about it have bothered to ask a follow-up question: What do you mean by history?

Most of what we’re force-fed in school — even, all too often, in university courses — consists primarily of a recitation of “facts” (dates, names, events, trends). To make matters worse, those facts typically revolve around the reigns of kings and the battles they fought. That sort of “history” is not only boring, it’s essentially useless.

To be truly useful, I believe, a work of history must be informed with deep knowledge of a particular event or period of time and include some judicious analysis of what’s most important about it, so I can understand why things happened as they did — and cull lessons from the experience that will help me make more intelligent judgments in the future.

Engineers of Victory, Paul Kennedy’s penetrating study of what mattered most in World War II, is precisely that sort of book.

Why and how did the Allies win World War II?

Unlike the superb story-telling about the war in Rick Atkinson’s brilliant trilogy and other books that bring the period back to life but offer few if any judgments, Kennedy’s work — in a single volume, after all — sifts through the accumulated evidence in official records and memoirs and the opinions of other leading historians to arrive at conclusions about why and how the Allies really won the war. It’s fascinating — and, in the end, it’s useful, because there are lessons to be learned about management and leadership that can be applied in so many other spheres of work as well as military planning.

Kennedy focuses on the period from the beginning of 1943 until the middle of 1944, during which the Allies turned the tide in the war and set a course for victory. He explains what happened then, and why, concentrating on five strategic campaigns: the Allies’ desperate and protracted effort to clear the North Atlantic of German submarines; the Russians’ monumental resistance to the Nazi invasion (occupying three-quarters of Germany’s troops); the war in the air in both Europe and the Pacific; the Allies frequent use of amphibious landings in both theaters; and the strategy employed both in Russia and the Pacific to take advantage of German and Japanese overextension.

Some of Kennedy’s judgments challenge the conventional wisdom about the conduct of the war:

** For example, was the breaking of the Germans’ Enigma code the “secret weapon” that won the war, as so much popular historical writing has suggested in recent years? No way! The Ultra project, as the Allies called it, made a valuable contribution by eavesdropping on the German general staff, especially in the late stages of the war, but it was far from decisive.

** Was the US and British strategic bombing of Germany’s cities the key to victory? Not at all. In fact, Kennedy and many others, including some senior commanders in the air war, judged the strategic bombing an utter failure.
Did General Douglas MacArthur win the war in the Pacific? No. While MacArthur’s drive from the far south to the Philippines and points north chewed up enormous numbers of Japanese troops, the winning strategy of the US rested more squarely on Admiral Chester Nimitz, driving from Hawaii to capture Japan’s island outposts and provide a platform for the B-29 bombers to attack the Japanese homeland.

** Was the American entry into the war in Europe the decisive factor in the Allies’ victory, as so many of my countrymen seem to think? Perhaps not. The war in Europe was won on the plains of European Russia and in the North Atlantic sea lanes, Paul Kennedy suggests. Clearly, the phenomenal output weapons and ammunition by US factories and the addition of millions of American soldiers to the front lines were strategic factors. But it was Soviet Russia who ultimately won the ground war against Hitler and the US and Britain together who won the war on the seas and in the air.

However, digging a little deeper, the true cause of the loss of the war by the Axis (principally Germany and Japan) was their territorial overextension — in other words, they bit off more than they could chew. Hitler’s thrust so deeply into Russia was ultimately the death knell for the Nazi regime, as was the Japanese militarists’ foolish expansion throughout China and in South Asia as far as the borders of India. Neither country possessed the resources to defend all that territory.

Another clearly significant factor was micromanagement of the war from Berlin and Tokyo by Hitler and Japan’s Imperial War Cabinet. Again and again, decisions made by those at the top — based on rigid ideology or flaring tempers — hindered the Axis generals’ management of the war at the front. (While Churchill constantly intervened in military decision-making, he proved to be a supremely talented strategist and was usually proved right. Roosevelt trusted his generals and admirals.)

So, who was it who really won the war?

The thesis of Engineers of Victory is that subordinate officers were the ultimate architects of their militaries’ successes. These were the men whose brilliant inventions of new weaponry, detection technology, or organizational design accounted for the breakthroughs in the field:

** The test pilot who insisted on installing the newest and most powerful Rolls-Royce engine in the poorly performing P-51 Mustang fighter plane, eventually bringing it into service on the front and delivering a devastating blow to the Luftwaffe.

** The major general whose seemingly whimsical inventions to turn his tanks into mine-sweepers helped make possible the Allies breakthrough from the Normandy beaches.

** The admiral who persuaded FDR to allow him to establish the Construction Battalions (CBs or SeeBees) within the US Navy, a force that played such a critical role in the Allies’ many amphibious landings, including Normandy.

** The graduate students whose breakthrough on sonar technology played such a large role in enabling the Allies to destroy the Nazis’ U-boat fleet and free the North Atlantic for the merchant marine to save Britain from starvation.

** The admiral who was the organizational genius under Dwight Eisenhower, designing and coordinating the Normandy invasion on five beaches simultaneously with significant problems at only one.

These are just a few of the many fascinating vignettes in Engineers of Victory. For any student of military history — or anyone who seeks to understand the most consequential event of the 20th century and the largest event in all human history — this book is a must read.

[Michael Burnam-Fink · Rating 2 out of 5]

Engineers of Victory is an immensely frustrating book. Brilliantly conceived and written by an author who is obviously a talent, it nonetheless fails to address to its thesis or contribute to scholarship.

Kennedy's thesis is that WW2 was won in those critical months between the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 and early 1944. More specifically, it was won by "Organizers", men at the middle levels of the military, government, and vital industries who invented new weapons systems, sent them into the field, and used them to defeat the Nazis and Imperial Japan. He takes as his case studies the Battle of the Atlantic, strategic bombing in Europe, the rollback of Blitzkrieg on the Eastern Front, the amphibious assaults in the Mediterranean and at Normandy, and the logistical and naval victory in the Pacific. There's nothing to argue with there: Clearly something did happen between the dark days of the early war and the triumphant conquests of 1945, and looking at the causal factors as a matter of organization, rather than the psychology of great men (FDR, Eisenhower, and Churchill. Always Churchill) or the superiority of a certain weapon over a comparable model (M4 Sherman vs Panther vs T-34, Go!) is an neat take. After all, it's like Napoleon (supposedly) said: "Amateurs study strategy. Professionals study logistics" (and procurement, and maintenance, and training...).

All the pieces of a really interesting story are there, but Kennedy fails to connect them, or even bring in his anonymous organizers. For a book that alleges to valorize the unsung heroes in the middle, it mentions shockingly few of them. For example, the Battle of the Atlantic would be a great place to talk about Alfred Loomis of the MIT Radiation Laboratory and centimeter radar, or Patrick Blackett's work on operational research in anti-air and anti-sub warfare, along with strategic bombing. Blackett gets one mention in the context of the Casablanca Conference (Roosevelt and Churchill again), and the MIT Radiation Lab isn't mentioned at all.

Omission of vital details are constant. It seems like wherever there's a chance to dive deeply into a topic, and the men and women who organized the Allied victory, the book bounces off and away into a digression of something that we've heard 100 times before on a History Channel documentary. This is a popular book and I don't expect heavy theory, but a passing mention of the literature on organization or innovation would be nice, or perhaps positing this book as a vindication of Robert Merton's sociology of science, and its position that only liberal democracies could take full advantage of science and technology. I'm not even an expert on WW2, and I feel like I could put together a more insightful book on the subject talking about radar-assisted naval gunfire, logistics in distant theaters, and special operations missions as starting points, and then blending in some STS and strategic theory. I expect a history of this caliber to offer a deep dive into new material, or a broad synthesis of exist evidence in favor of some novel insight, or at least to satisfactorily meet its thesis, and Engineers of Victory does none of that. It's downright embarrassing.

[S. Shelton · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kenny posits that there were five key tactics to the Allied victory in World War II.
1. How to Get Convoys Safely Across the Atlantic
2. How to Win Command of the Air
3. How to Stop a Blitzkrieg
4. How to Seize an Enemy Shore
5. How to Defeat the “Tyranny of Distance.”

Kennedy discusses, at great length, the singular elements in each item: intelligence, technology, tactical and long-term strategies, planning, and the civilian and military scientist and engineers who fashioned new weapons to counter the enemy’s initial advantage, and the verve of military leaders.

In item one, for example, Kennedy avers that victory over the Kriegsmarine’s U-boats—the scourge of the North Atlantic—sinking merchantmen at an alarming rate and practically serving the life line to an isolated and embattled Great Brittan was a combination of several factors: long-range aircraft with new anti-submarine weapons, cryptographers at Bletchley Park who broke the German Navy’s Enigma code, the Hedgehogs multiple mortar weapon system, advanced and more powerful dept-charges, introduction of Jeep aircraft carriers with their anti-submarine aircraft, and other items all combined to defeat the U-boat menace in the North Atlantic.

In item two, Kennedy details the appalling loses of the Eight Air Force’s B-17 and B-24 bombers in their 1943 daylight raids on the Third Reich—each aircraft with a ten-man crew. For example, on the raids on the ball-bearing factories in Schweinfurt in October 1943, on just one day the Luftwaffe’s experienced pilots shot down sixty of our bombers—a staggering loss rate of twenty percent. Dozens of other aircraft were badly damaged and limped home to their airfields in England—almost all with severely wounded airmen. For the experienced Luftwaffe pilots the Schweinfurt raids were a “turkey shoot”—some aces had over one-hundred kills at war’s end. Simply, the United States Army Air Corps did not have a long-range fighter aircraft that could escort our bombers to their targets and return and to fend the Luftwaffe.

Meantime, the North American Company produced the P-51 fighter, powered by the Alison V1710 engine. At best, the Allison-powered P-51 was marginally satisfactory as a low-altitude interceptor. A Royal Air Force test pilot flew the P-51 and recognized its superior aerodynamics and very low drag. He recommended that the Rolls Royce Merlin V-12, in-line, liquid cooled 1,500 horsepower engine be installed in the aircraft. Viola! History was made. Now the high-altitude P-51, fitted with two, 108 gallon drop tanks, escorted our bombers all the way to Berlin. The slaughter of the B-17s ceased and the Luftwaffe fighter pilots suffered appalling loses.

For a comprehensive understanding of this excellent book, the reader must have an in-depth knowledge of World War II, a worldwide atlas stored in the mind, and a compelling appetite to ferret the myriad details of the five key battles of the last world war. Clearly, Engineers of Victory is not for the average reader. This book is more appropriate as a textbook for the military academies or a war college, or for academic researchers.

[Brian · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book was a disappointment to me. I was looking for a book that would delve into topics like the use of operations research, the strategic bombing campaign survey, and the USAAF team in the Pacific that would result in the Whiz Kids of the 60's. Kennedy groups a series of Allied innovations around a group of challenges, such as winning the war in the Atlantic, storming an enemy held shore, and solving the challenge of distance in the Pacific. I think it's an interesting way to look at the war, but I think his discussion is often superficial and lacks depth. The chapters feel like a set of anecdotes strung together, and the analysis of impact and events is often oversimplified. It's an okay book, but I expected much more.

[Kay · Rating 4 out of 5]

Painstakingly argued, authoritative, original, and engrossing, this is the sort of book that I could read again soon and still profit from. (Which means, of course, that I couldn't digest everything on the first reading -- but that's my failing, not the author's.)

As many others have commented, the focus here is less on engineers than on how Allied and Axis strategies changed (or didn't) in response to problems and failures. The five central problems Kennedy examines are interlocking pieces of a puzzle: how to get convoys safely across the Atlantic, how to win command of the air, how to stop a blitzkreig, how to seize an enemy-held shore, and how to defeat "the tyranny of distance."

As Kennedy points out repeatedly, the solving of each of these problems increased the ability to solve the others. In the final analysis, the Allies' "war-making systems that contained impressive feedback loops, flexibility, a capacity to learn from mistakes, and a 'culture of encouragement'" assured their victory.

At times Kennedy seemed to downplay the importance of WWII intelligence, which was a disappointment for me as I've long been fascinated by the topic. However, he made a good case that "victory went to the side with the smartest and most powerful weaponry, not the one with the better decrypts."

The chapter I enjoyed the most was the one I knew the least about -- the aerial war. In fact, this chapter so inspired me that I took a trip to the Smithsonian Air & Space Museum shortly after I finished the book to look at the WWII-era planes. I'd been there before -- several times -- but after Kennedy's account I viewed the B-29 Superfortress, P-38 Lightning, Focke-Wulf 190 and other aircraft with new interest. But it was the Rolls Royce Merlin 61 engine sitting unobtrusively in a display case of engines that I viewed with most respect.

Kennedy's book bristles with statistics, many impressive and some surprising. I learned, for example, that "in late 1943, new airfields were opening up every six days across the topographically convenient flatlands of East Anglia," a fact which explains something that puzzled me years ago when we lived in Cambridge: there seemed to be disused airfields scattered everywhere in the surrounding countryside.

Books I admire invariably send me on a quest to find out more about the subject. This one, I have to say, has more than succeeded as I now have dozens of new books in my "to read" wishlist concerning WWII. (By the way, if anyone out there can recommend a good book on the convoy battles in the Atlantic, I'd appreciate it.)

[Nooilforpacifists · Rating 4 out of 5]

Miss-titled, and Kennedy doesn't know submarines (which hinders his first 75 pages), but after that, decent work. Kennedy not a 5 star writer. See Blackets's War for a similar work.

[DeAnna Knippling · Rating 4 out of 5]

The engineers, inventions, and process improvements that helped the Allies win WWII.

This was solidly written. I think my only problem with it was that I wanted it to be about twice as long and get into more detail; it felt like a lot of the statements weren't necessarily well backed up in this book. The author referred a lot to other works that he seemed to assume I read, or other bits of history that I was supposed to have known or at least not questioned, which was frustrating. (For example the various types of British WWII planes and why certain types were assumed to be so important--he gave the explanation of why people were wrong about the relative importance of certain planes, but not why certain planes were assumed to be so important in the first place!)

I was hoping for a book about how the victory in WWII was engineered from a strategic standpoint; this was a book about engineering problems during WWII. So this was not the book I was expecting, but certainly a good read, with a lot of insight--just not as much context as I wanted.

I would not recommend this as a book for readers not steeped in the lore of WWII, but if you have basic reading done in the period it's probably a great book. WWII just isn't my period, and I felt a bit adrift here.

[Christopher · Rating 4 out of 5]

For us armchair generals/historians who have become used to reading books where great generals and/or their ground-pounding foot soldiers are glorified, this book's overall theme may come as a shock to us: the victories of the generals and soldiers wouldn't have been possible without the "problem-solvers" and the technologies and tactics they developed to overcome the great battlefield problems of World War II. Mr. Kennedy tackles these problems and their solutions in a balanced, holistic (that is a term he uses) approach that shows where tech and know-how to defeat the Axis powers came from. Although highly analytical, Mr. Kennedy never loses sight of a good story and how they support his overall thesis, so you will rarely be bored reading this. It also is great at giving readers a larger sense of the problems that military planners faced during the war as Mr. Kennedy meticulously breaks down each of WWII's five major "problems" and shows how they were overcome. In a way, it puts into the head of a WWII general better than any biography ever could. The only problem I had with this book was that there weren't any ONE easily identifiable person or tech that turned the tides of battle. Mr. Kennedy, instead, talks about all the factors that combined to solve problems inherent in such things as amphibious warfare and control of the sea and skies. Thus, it may be difficult for average readers at first to understand what Mr. Kennedy is getting at. In the end though, this book is a much-need, and much-welcomed, addendum to every WWII history and memoir you've ever read as it shows you how innovation was nurtured and allowed to flourish in order to win the most destructive war in human history. I highly recommend this book to all WWII history buffs who are looking for something a little different to read.

[Sebastián Jaén · Rating 1 out of 5]

I think the book is very disappointing because it focuses a lot on the background of the battles and very little in the engineering solving problem. At the same time the reading is dense and full of unnecessary historical details. There is no account of how the engineers gathered and solve the challenges presented by war. In the book, the solutions appear, but the author does not explain how they got the work done.

There is no doubt the author is an erudite in the topic. However, the book is not what its tittle tells. I stopped reading it.

[Casey · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good book, providing a series of vignettes on major technical and operational innovations made by the Allies to attain victory in WWII. As with all of Paul Kennedy’s works, the joy of the book isn’t so much the content in and of itself, but his conversational method of delivery. Reading it feels less like reading a book and more like attending a seminar lecture. He seems to know the questions that would be asked and provides just enough “side-bars” to keep your attention.
The book cover five major developments in WWII: defeating the U-Boats, gaining air dominance for European strategic bombing, defeating Germany’s armor advantage, honing Allied amphibious skills, and overcoming the Pacific’s vast distances. The history behind these issues are presented, the problems the Allies faced are outlined, and the solutions arrived at are dismantled. The “Engineers” of the title are not specific inventors or Generals, but rather the un-sung “middle managers” whose individual works combined to create the various system of systems which brought victory.
The work very much stresses that the period early-1943 to mid-1944 was a hotbed of military innovation for the Allies, across both spectrums of military technology and operational process. Though I was not fully convinced of the innovative nature of this particular period (I think brute application of existing tools and actions may be as important as shepherding forward new developments), Kennedy’s writing style and ability to coherently link far-ranging thoughts make a very strong case for an innovative ‘golden age.’
I did feel that parts of the book felt forced. My impression is that a few vignettes were readily constructed for the thesis (primarily the maritime ones) and that others had to be strenuously made to fit (the aviation and land based ones). But, even when forced, the vignettes are all enjoyable to read and very educational.
A bit of icing on the cake, Kennedy continues his practice of giving commentary style endnotes and footnotes. Not only do you get the references for the presented material, you also get a quick rating and background on the sources. That is, far and away, one of my favorite things to see in a book.
Highly recommended for those wanting to better understand the technical developments and procedural updates made by the Allies in the middle years of WWII.

[Peter Corrigan · Rating 3 out of 5]

I have a read a lot of books on WW2, quite a lot. So I was a little reluctant to embark on what looked to be yet another 'victory lap' by the western world and this nearly 70 years after. Hasn't it all been said before, ad infinitum? Winners like to dwell on their best days and this book does that but quite effectively. For someone who knew very little about the war this would be a really good introduction into the major facets of the erstwhile struggle and some of the key reasons why the Allies won and how they did that. The development and employment of military technology (hence 'Engineers' in the title) is meant to be the focus of the work but it is really more of an overview of the grand strategy of the Allies in both Europe and Asia with a sporadic focus on certain inventions and innovations. He tends to gloss over the most obvious explanation for the outcome of course, which is that Germany and Japan were run by a mad man in one case and an emperor who was ignorant and powerless (and dictatorship with very limited imagination). Moreover they were utterly dwarfed in population and industrial resources by the lineup against them. All the cool inventions discussed in the book like radar (10-cm, miniaturized), better aircraft engines (Merlin engine in the P-51), intelligence (Ultra, Magic, etcc.), superior tank chassis (T-34), long-range bombers (B-29), etc. simply speeded up the inevitable process. Once Hitler faced the USSR and the USA it was game over and the rest is sort of detail and Japan would be swamped by US industry in any case. Not to say it is not an interesting and well done book--the maps are excellent and instructive and his analysis especially of the British viewpoint and unique contributions are interesting. I do think he understates or at least fails to explain the importance (or lack thereof) of Ultra and for a book written this far after the war that is a serious weakness. But of course could easily be a book in its own right. That is also true of any one of the big 5 developments that he cites as being the keys to victory.

[Bernhard · Rating 3 out of 5]

As an engineering student I picked this up hoping to see some writing about technical things and how they worked, I was disappointed. While this book contains a lot of interesting fact and thoughts about ww2, it doesn't go into much detail about how the engineers actually worked and how they achieved what they did. Most of the time the book is just taking about grand strategy. Still a good book, even if I found the title misleading.

[Marcia · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is fabulous for anyone who wants to know "How did they do it?" I loved the way the author structured the information in terms of several significant problems to solve. It not only talks about the technological breakthroughs, but also what it took to organize victory.

[Jordan Schneider · Rating 5 out of 5]

I read a lot of books about WWII and yet I am not an uncle. Why do I keep coming back to the most painful period of the 20th century? For starters, it’s the fulcrum of modern history. Almost every major recent political, economic, and cultural development can trace its roots back to the war. The war touches every facet of the human experience and can be interpreted through every conceivable discipline. Further, understanding its broad strokes unlocks enormous and tangled debates that loom large around the world.

Historians still grapple over the central question of why the Allies won the war. After all, in 1942 Hitler was at the gates of Moscow while Japan had conquered Singapore and was threatening Australia and India. By 1944, however, the Red Army was marching to Berlin and the Japanese empire had lost its fleet.


The Axis in 1942 scared freedom shitless. Blue is bad here. http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/h...
To explain this most dramatic of reversals, most scholars look to great battles (Kursk and Stalingrad, Midway) and specific technological innovations (Enigma, the T-34). Or they abstract away the military history and focus instead on the Allies’ collective advantage in productive capacity.

Historian Paul Kennedy in Engineers of Victory tries to integrate all three approaches by focusing on what may be the war’s least sexy angle — its middle managers. The Allied “problem solvers,” he contends, outclassed their Axis counterparts.

the creation of war-making systems that contained impressive feedback loops, flexibility, a capacity to learn from mistakes, and a ‘culture of encouragement’…that permitted the middlemen in this grinding conflict the freedom to experiment, to offer ideas and opinions, and to cross traditional institutional boundaries…. [T]he successful systems were so because they possessed smarter feedback loops between top, middle, and bottom; because they stimulated initiative, innovation, and ingenuity; and because they encouraged problem solvers to tackle large, apparently intractable problems.

Kennedy makes a compelling case for why these logistical and technological innovations were critical. He is much less strong on how they happened in the first place. The only dependent variables he provides credible explanations for are the roles of the heads of state. Churchill, having spotted the importance of air power and “land ships” even before WWI, ran the most impressive technological incubator relative to the resources at his disposal. Stalin, after purging nearly all of his Red Army officers, deferred to the generals he left alive once the Germans invaded. And FDR’s similar hands off approach created the Mustang and the atom bomb. On the other side, Hitler micromanaged his way into technological waste like the wonderweapons. Kennedy convincingly demonstrates that the Japanese didn’t innovate but doesn’t have a particularly good read on why.


V2 bomb — a waste.
Unfortunately, Kennedy doesn’t really get into the guts of these loops. Even without Hitler’s interference, the Nazis clearly had plenty of engineering brilliance at their disposal and Japan industrialized far faster than any country had. What allowed the Allied middle-managers to work better together? What permitted their flexibility and ‘culture of encouragement’ to flourish? Kennedy puts Soviet innovation on the same level as British and American (I’ll grant him that for operational tactics — shoutout to Deep Battle — but less so for technological innovation) so he can’t fall back on the “free societies give you a marketplace of ideas” thesis.

I think Kennedy doesn’t have a detailed enough understanding of the engineering to follow the minutes of the 1940s version of a daily scrum and compare working styles across the major powers. Even on the most accessible archives of the UK and American ones his narratives tries not to but gives the impression that individual genius and happenstance, not feedback loops, drove improvement. A collaboration with a historically-minded management consultant or technologist would have served him well. Allied problems solvers pulled off the most impressive logistic feats (D-Day) and technological innovations (atom bomb) the world has ever seen. This book doesn’t quite tell us why and make good on its promise to give readers timeless lessons.

Another interesting extension would have been to look at what the Axis was doing right before 1942. Surely there must have been some impressive feedback loops running through the 20s and 30s and into the war that created such a powerful Wehrmacht from a broken German Imperial army and a Japanese modern military that before the 1860s was rocking samurai swords. In terms of operational successes some of the most dramatic came in the invasion of France, in the early days of Operation Barbarossa, and feats like Pearl Harbor and the capture of Singapore.

His five chapters walk through different theaters. His first, on the Battle of the Atlantic, is the most impressive. American and British inventors cross-pollinated each other to create sonar, better depth charges, “hedgehog guns,” long-range aircraft, homing torpedoes...etc. Mid-level officers teamed up to devise optimal convoy arrangements. These innovations for Kennedy far outstrip the impact that Turing and Co. had on the campaign — as they allowed the Allies not just to dodge but to defeat the submarines. The problem solvers knew they were doing something right when their combined inventions prompted Nazi Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz to message to his fleet in 1943, “if there is anyone who thinks that combating convoys no longer possible, he is a weakling and no true u-boat captain.”


Convoy to Capetwon, November 1941
His Battle of Britain chapter also excels. Less impressive are Kennedy’s takes on Soviet innovations on the eastern front and Japanese stagnation. Perhaps due to a lack of archival access, he wasn’t able to convey the dynamics of Soviet production and innovation. As some historians have now started to do really impressive work digging into Japanese wartime archives, it’s less easy to excuse Kennedy’s hand waving especially as he surely has the resources and cache to attract capable translators and graduate students around the world.

Kennedy knows better than to just look to technology to explain the war’s outcome. He adds to his thesis the “role of geography” and leaders’ relative levels of appreciation of its power. On these classic questions of geopolitics Engineers of Victory is less original but really excels. Its focus on the operational level of war really plays out how the different theaters interacted and why Nazi and Japanese hyperactivity on multiple fronts from 1940–42 stretched resources thin. If you accept Tim Snyder’s recent thesis from Black Earth that a geography-based ideology drove Hitler more than anything else, ironically the man most focused on geography was also the one who most misunderstood it.

I really liked Kennedy’s walk-through of the trade-offs facing the Allies when considering the four different approaches to shrinking the Japanese empire (through Burma, the Philippines, over the Himalayas and into China, and through the Marshall Islands).


Which arrow to choose?
My hot take: the three massive blunders that led the war down the path it took (ignoring everything before, say, 1934) of initial Axis success followed by total defeat were 1. One part American isolationism, two parts French blowing their chances to invade after the Ruhr, and four parts British willful ignorance of Hitler’s rising threat and Chamberlain’s criminal diplomatic maneuvering, 2. Hitler’s decision to invade Russia and operational errors in its execution (a close run thing that the engineers may have influenced), and 3. The Japanese talking themselves into awaking a giant their smartest leaders knew they could never defeat.

I also like Andrew Roberts’ thesis that many of Hitler’s errors were rooted in ideology. For instance, maybe he would’ve gotten the atomic bomb before the West…but only if he didn’t alienate or kill all his brilliant German Jewish scientists who ended up joining the Manhattan project. He kept overreaching because of ideology. Then again, you can also argue that he only rises to power in the domestic sphere and grows the Third Reich to the size it gets in 1940–1 through seemingly insane decisions (like nearly invading Czechslovakia — a move his generals thought was so crazy the had resolved to coup if it happened) that only a megalomaniac would have had the nerve to pull off. Certainly it takes megalomaniac to throw away the position he was sitting in in 1941 and roll the dice yet again with an invasion of the USSR — the biggest blunder that led to his downfall. [Tim Snyder is very good on Roberts’ counterfactuals here.]

So who should read this? Folks who want a novel take on WWII operational history and folks who want a really good overview of geopolitical questions and how the different theaters interacted with each-other. But be wary if you think you want takeaways to apply the Allies’ ‘secrets of success’ to your professional pursuit.

[Mr.R.E.Wiggins · Rating 2 out of 5]

An interesting lateral viewpoint on what factors contributed to victory - He uses the word 'engineering' in the sense 'the action of working artfully to bring something about', 'in a way that is clever or skilful and also cunning' - so it is more than innovative technology.
In the chapter on 'How to stop a blitzkrieg' he has a section headed ‘The curious case of the T-34' in which he traces the development of the tank against the background of its performance and utility being lauded by many as the greatest tank of all time. In its final incarnation in the war as T-34-85 Kennedy states that it was 'virtually unstoppable', but he states that 'none of that later history means the T-34 was a wonder weapon, something in a class of its own as soon as it appeared on the battlefield in July 1941'.
I would like to take issue with that last observation in the light of the experiences of Heinz Guderian (an early pioneer and advocate of the "blitzkrieg" approach) as reported by him in his book 'Panzer Leader' published in 1952 and later issued as a Classic Penguin - ISBN 976-0-141-04285-5) - a reference that Kennedy did not cite in his book.
Guderian had no doubt about the effectiveness of the T34 during the Russian campaign in 1941 as shown by the following extracts from his book:
July 1941 - An attack by Russian tanks and aircraft on the Beresina crossing at Borissov. The attacks were beaten off .. but not before a considerable impression had been made on the 18th Panzer Divisions; this was hardly surprising since here, for the first time, the enemy employed his T34 tank, a tank against which our guns at that time were largely ineffective. (Page 162)

October 6 4th Panzer Group was attacked by Russian tanks to the south of Mzensk and went through bad hours. This was the first occasions on which the vast superiority of the Russian T34 to our tanks became plainly apparent. The division suffered grievous casualties. (Page 233)

October 9 The 4th Panzer Divion's task.. was to take Mzensk. Descriptions of the quality and, above all, of the new tactical handling of the Russian tanks was very worrying. Our defensive weapons available at that period were only successful against the T34 when the conditions were unusually favourable. The short-barrelled 75 mm gun of the Panzer IV was only effective if the T34 were attacked from the rear; even a hit had to be scored on the grating above the engine to knock it out. (Page 234/5)

October 11 Numerous Russian T34's went into action and inflicted heavy losses on the German tanks. Up to this time we had enjoyed tank superiority, but from now on the situation was reversed. I made a report on this...I described in plain terms the marked superiority of the T34 to our Panzer IV.....I concluded by urging that a commission be sent immediately to my sector of the front, and that it consist or representatives of the Army Ordnance Office, the Armaments Ministry, the tank designers and the firms that built the tanks. I also requested rapid production of a heavy anti-tank gun with sufficient penetrating power to knock out the T34. (Page 238)

November ...our 37 mm anti-tank gun had proved ineffective against the T34. (Page 248)

These preceding observations by Guderian clearly contradict the aforementioned statement by Kennedy in his book for this period of the war.

[Marvin Goodman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Gosh, I toyed with the idea of giving my first five star review to this, so completely satisfied with it was I. But then I started to think about the list of books that would be on my five-star list, and didn't want to dilute them with a moment of hysteria.

But I'll give it an unabashed four stars largely because, as I said, it so thoroughly met my expectations. With "Engineers" in the title, I expected to read something that discussed these wartime innovations from an engineering perspective, featuring discussions of problem analytics, available technology and the need for it to evolve, trial and error, and so on. I was not disappointed by Kennedy, who thankfully had the patience (not to mention a patient editor) to weave each of these chapters gradually, providing a thorough understanding of the problem that each of these inventions ultimately targeted and then patiently explaining the dynamics of innovation, including the hurdles and back-steps, and ultimately analyzing why they were successful, and how they changed the balance of power. That thorough, measured treatment alone would have been enough for me, and given this book a three and a half star review.

What blasted this book out of the pleasantly workmanlike and informative, and into truly eye-opening, paradigm-busting work that it is, were two things:

1. Weaving these individual stories of innovation into a cohesive whole
2. Debunking much of the conventionally held wisdom about wartime innovation

First the weaving: Kennedy makes a point of stating that none of these things - while seeming to be individual problems with individual solutions - was truly developed in isolation, or singly contributed to Allied victory in WWII. While occurring at different times during the conflict, and directly impacting different locales, their broader effects could be felt throughout the arena. Solving a crippling problem in locale would allow Allied planners to shift resources to affect a completely different locale. War movies and individual narratives tend to place too great an importance on a particular place or event. While undeniably important to those participants, it's rare that we get the opportunity to assess the war from such a macro perspective, and it's really interesting to do so.

And the debunking. I get that people are proud of their contribution to the war, and I get that they're colored by their particular experience (because of where they fought or lived) but it's always been a bit frustrating to hear someone extoll the virtue of one particular wartime innovation, and brashly proclaim it to be the "reason we won the war." If you're a macro thinker, you know that that's rarely the case. But, it just doesn't sound as impressive to the masses to say that "this was an extremely important innovation that - taken together with some similarly important innovations, countless brave soldiers, occasionally brilliant leadership and a resilient home front, helped spur the Allies on to victory." That appeals to ME, obviously, but it doesn't make for very successful sound bytes.

[Tech Historian · Rating 3 out of 5]

Badly researched history.

I must admit, I started with a bias predisposed to like this book. Yet I was profoundly disappointed - in some chapters the author simply failed do sufficient research, in others he simply got the facts wrongs (other reviews have pointed out that no, the Seabees didn't build the Mulberry Harbors.)

One of the main arguments of the book is that in five crucial areas (convoys, command of the air, Blitzkreieg, etc.) it wasn't just one event or one technology that solved the problem it was many. Yet in chapter 2, "How to Win the Command of the Air" the author says the air war over Europe was won by the P-51 Mustang and the Merlin engine. That is so profoundly wrong as to be embarrassing.

There's no doubt the P-51 Mustangs were a critical part of winning the air war. However, the reality is that British and American bombers were destroyed by both flak (anti-aircraft guns,) and fighters. Depending on the phase of the air war, more were lost to flak and at other times fighters.

By 1943 the German air defense system had evolved into an integrated electronic air defense network. It's early warning network consisted of 250 long-range radars and had feeds from German signal intelligence. There was a dense network of 1,000 short-range radars all feeding the equivalent of a modern air traffic control system. The air defense system controlled 15,000 radar-guided flak (anti-aircraft guns,) that used 5,000 radars. It also controlled all German fighters by vectoring them into the bomber streams using 1,500 Ground Controlled Intercept radars. And German night fighters who went after the British had onboard air-to-air radar.

The U.S. and British thought the best way to degrade the German Air Defense system was to jam and confuse it. The British and American both set up R&D labs to do this. The British led the way with their Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE). The American lab, with 800 people was innocuously called the Harvard Radio Research Lab. They both developed chaff (mechanical means to confuse German radars) and electronic jammers - 24,000 of which were built and installed on American and British bombers. By the time the P-51 had come on the scene British and American planes were carrying advanced electronic warfare equipment to defeat and degrade the German air defense systems.

It's understandable that bomber crews seeing P-51's destroy enemy fighters became convinced this is how we won the air war over occupied Europe. In contrast, Jammers and chaff doing their job by making flak and air intercepts ineffective could only be understood via operational analysis (which showed that they did work.) The P-51's _were_ a crucial part of gaining air superiority over Europe. But to write a history of the air war over Germany claiming that they were _the_ reason is simply flawed history.

This just isn't a bad book, it does damage to the real history of World War II.

[Jan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Paul Kennedy explores two fundamental military relationships in this book. That of organisation, doctrine and materiel plus the ageless military principle of the coordinated application of forces. He does that with the well-travelled and explored background of the Second World War and claims to focus on the less well known individuals and organisations that provided either materiel like the P-51 fighter, the B-29 bomber, the T-34 tank, organizations such as the US Seabees and the Allied U-boat defence or the US Marine Corps doctrine for amphibious assault. But he fails. His heartfelt interest is with the grand strategic sweep and perspective and where the reader expect in-depth and coherent research into the nuts and bolts, Kennedy lapses into anecdotes and dramatic accounts of battles.

As a result the book is more a slightly differently structured general history of WW2 and not what it intends to be. But still an entertaining, occasionally enlightening read.

[Jackson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Among the millions of pages written evaluating the Allied victories in WWII, Paul Kennedy's "Engineers of Victory" is somewhat unique. Kennedy focuses on what we might call "middle management" - not the overall strategic plans, or the heroics of individuals or units, but the people and the innovations that made the strategic plans possible. The launching point for the book is the January 1943 Casablanca conference between Churchill and Roosevelt, where the Allies hammered out their grand strategy for defeating the Axis: (1) win control of the Atlantic so that convoys could safely bring supplies and personnel to the UK; (2) win command of the skies over west-central Europe, to prepare for invasion and target German manufacturing; and (3) force a mass landing onto the defended European coast and take the land war to Germany, while (4) maintaining pressure on Japan in the East. "Engineers of Victory" is the story of the intermediate advances that made these goals possible.

I generally enjoyed this book, finding it well researched and interesting. However, Kennedy definitely gets bogged down in places. Each chapter is longer than it needs to be, because Kennedy winds up repeating material and ideas that he has already covered.

Chapter 1 covers the Atlantic supply chain. German U-Boats, armed with excellent intelligence and hunting in packs, were sinking hundreds of thousands of tons of cargo each month. The key mid-level developments that tipped the battle for the Atlantic in favor of the Allies were:
a) The recognition that avoiding U-boat wolf packs was not a viable strategy. Convoys would have to plan to fight. This gave Allied command a clear focus.
b) Technological improvements ("very long range" (VLR) B-24 Liberators, fast escort carriers, 10 cm radar, Hedgehog grenades, better depth charges and arial homing torpedoes) increased the Allies' chances both of finding and destroying U-boats.
c) Intelligence improvements in code-breaking led to better planning and detection.

Chapter 2 focuses on the fight for Allied air superiority over Europe. Achieving air superiority was essential to protect the eventual invasion of Europe. But it was also necessary for strategic bombing, the (probably flawed) theory that an enemy could be driven to surrender simply due to mass destruction of critical infrastructure. After winning the Battle of Britain, the Allies attempted strategic bombing of many targets in Germany. However, these efforts were incredibly costly in terms of lives and planes lost and had little effect to show for it. Here, the primary solution was technological: the development of the P-51 Mustang, a long-range fighter that was superior to the Luftwaffe's fighter defenses, allowed the bombers to get through with much higher success rates. After that, large-scale bombing offered cascading benefits, as the loss of fuel shipping and refining capacity curtailed the number of airplanes Germany could send aloft.

The P-51 Mustang was a serendipitous invention. Designed to work with an Allison V-1710 engine, the Mustang underperformed. But with a Rolls-Royce Merlin engine, its handling and performance drastically improved.

Chapter 3 deals with the Soviet Union's response to the German invasion. The particular question here is, how did the Soviets stop the previously undefeated Blitzkrieg? The well-known part of the answer is that the Soviets won by geography. Despite losing repeatedly, they always had more land to fall back to, and could continue to move manufacturing further east. The less well-known part is the eventual development of effective T-34 tanks. The early iterations were drastic failures, but the T-34 (built from American plans) was eventually refined into a fast and effective weapon. The T-34 was never the equal of the newest German Panthers, but getting the kill ratios down from 1:10 or 1:5 meant that the eventual press of numbers against German divisions fighting on three fronts would be sufficient for Soviet victory.

Chapter 4 highlights the central problem of D-Day: how can an invading army successfully land and establish a foothold on shores that are defended by a well-prepared enemy? The Allies had some key early failures, which they learned from. Some of the eventual key developments:
1) Effective interservice command structures that could coordinate activities between Army, Navy, Air Force (or equivalent), and Marines. This included dedicated ships for commanding officers, as having the command staff pulled away from the invasion because the cruiser they are on has to go fight the enemy fleet is a critical failure.
2) Novel, often weird weapons systems, such as "Hobart's Funnies" or custom-built landing vehicles.
3) Exceptional logistics planning. This includes coordinating aerial support, directing ships and troops, and managing supply chains.

In Chapter 5, Kennedy reviews the "tyranny of distance", and how the Allies (primarily the United States) had to overcome the vast distances involved in fighting across the Pacific theater. Part of the reason for the US success in the East was that Japan had the wrong focus. The US was committed to winning the sea war and clawing out footholds island by island. Japan, in contrast, was content to conquer and create its defensive perimeter while focusing most of its attention on land campaigns in China. The ultimate prize was the Marianas. Once those islands were held by the US, the SeaBees were able to build air fields that could accommodate the new B-29 Superfortress bombers. The B-29s could strike mainland Japan from altitudes that Japanese fighters couldn't reach.

[Sepp · Rating 2 out of 5]

Lots of background repeating and emphasizing that some things couldn't be done without engineering achievements but less details than I'd wanted. How many times can one iterate that Mustang P-51 story was half-miracle... Author enjoys his writing too much, the end of the book was constant "yes, you told that already"

Make the book 2x shorter and it's easily 4 stars.

[Steve Chilton · Rating 2 out of 5]

Disappointing, and didn't deliver on the title. There weren't really any interesting revelations on engineering ingenuity. Even his definition of engineer left me wanting, often meaning managers or strategists. Nevertheless, some aspects of the war that I wasn't aware of were covered and increased my knowledge somewhat.

[Daniel · Rating 5 out of 5]

I give the book five stars, mainly for readability. When I can get through such a thick and factually dense book in as little time and with minimal attention drift, I know I'm reading an author who can write. Yes, I agree with the other reviewers who decry the somewhat misleading title - it isn't mainly about "engineering" in the strict sense that an actual engineer might expect, as it's equally about mid-level management, organization, and liaison - and the book is rather light on technical details. But the subject matter is vast, and the details are readily available in Wikipedia articles on virtually every device, event, battle, place, and person mentioned in the book. Thus I don't think this book suffers much from failing to quadruple its own size with the details. The relatively non-self-contained nature of the book might be annoying for readers of a paper copy without ready access to a library or the Web - but anyone who can complain about a book on Goodreads can surely access the Web.

I only noticed one error of fact, where Kennedy refers in passing to the Aleutian Islands of Attu and Kiska as "atolls." I'm pretty sure coral doesn't grow at 51-52 degrees north latitude, as corals are confined to tropical and subtropical waters.

I think Kennedy might have slightly over-concluded from the importance of the North American P-51 Mustang in the Allies' defeat of the Luftwaffe. While the Mustang undoubtedly was decisive in that defeat, and its development is a classic story of serendipitous invention, Kennedy writes about it as though no other aircraft could possibly have done the job. That isn't quite right, as efforts were underway to extend the range of the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt, as Kennedy himself acknowledges. According to Wikipedia, "With increases in fuel capacity as the type was refined, the range of escort missions over Europe steadily increased until the P-47 was able to accompany bombers in raids all the way into Germany." While the P-51 certainly had its strengths, it's not clear that the job of wrecking the Luftwaffe couldn't have been done with further improvements to the P-47. Even if the P-51 was more efficient, building a few thousand more P-47s wouldn't have been a problem for American industry.

Furthermore, the Grumman Corporation was developing an even more advanced fighter aircraft, the F7F Tigercat. It was faster than the P-51, with a better climb rate, comparable range, and more powerful guns, although as a larger aircraft I imagine it was less maneuverable. It didn't see combat in WWII as Grumman was building it for the US Navy for the most obvious deployment to the Pacific Theater. Its large size and weight would have restricted it to the Midway class aircraft carriers, with the lead ship of that class only being commissioned just after the war ended. Plus the US Navy had things well in hand by 1944 with its existing aircraft types. However, a land-based version would have made obvious sense for the European Theater. As it used two of the same Pratt & Whitney R-2800 double Wasp engines as the P-47, in theory it could have been developed as early. As to why nobody thought to build a comparable machine for the USAAF I have no idea. In the event, the P-51 happened to get developed in time to take the war to the Luftwaffe, but that certainly wasn't the only way things could have played out.

Kennedy's Conclusion chapter nicely ties the whole book together. In hindsight, it does seem baffling that the Japanese and Germans didn't sieze the critical Allied bases of Gibraltar, Malta, and Pearl Harbor in the early phase of the war when they seemed to hold all the cards. Imagine how many more people would have died had the Axis been more competent.

[William Troy · Rating 5 out of 5]

I was pleasantly surprised by this book. When I started reading it I was unsure of its premise. I thought it was going to be about individual engineers who the author thought designed victory in World War II. Author Paul Kennedy fooled me. He did include specific people who designed products that contributed significantly to victory but more importantly he placed those products in context and explained that victory was achieved through a myriad of functions and products. As he states on page 212, "...the historian who emphasizes any one of these aspects distorts the larger, holistic account" (Kennedy, p. 212). Strategic bombing enthusiasts stress that the bombing campaign against Germany won the war almost single-handedly (my emphasis). Whereas, it wasn't until the long range P-51 fighter escorted bombers over Germany and back did the bombing campaign really made significant headway against strategic targets. The production of the P-51 alone was not significant until British test pilot Ronnie Harker flew it and recommended the Rolls-Royce Packard Merlin engine replace the original one. Also, long range fuel tanks has to be created and added to give it the range. The Allies had to create air superiority over the Luftwaffe before a cross-channel landing could be made in Normandy. Landing craft had to be designed for the amphibious assaults the Allies would make and the Higgins boat designed by Andrew Higgins fit the bill. Higgins had to get past Navy reluctance and the USMC helped do that. The F6F Hellcat by Grumman Aerospace accounted for 75% of all aerial victories by the Navy in the Pacific but without the production of aircraft carriers that wouldn't have happened. without the specifically designed and created Naval logistics fleet support vessels, the Navy would not have been able to overcome the incredible distances of the Central Pacific Campaign. In other words, one has to view the victory holistically rather than concentrate on one aspect of victory. Mr. Kennedy modifies a Churchill quote to read, "...the Second World War was won by the, "intelligent application" of superior force" (Kennedy, p. 363). He also states that without bold and worthy leadership, a large enterprise is likely to fail. He credits, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin and castigates the leadership of the Axis powers as limited in scope and ability. In summary the author states, "None of this can be done by the chiefs alone, however great their massive energy. There has to be a support system, a culture of encouragement, efficient feedback loops, a capacity to learn from setbacks, an ability to get things done. And all this must be done in a fashion that is better than the enemy's. That is how wars are won" *Kennedy, p. 372). Concentrating on one aspect of the victory limits the real success story. Think holistically! Read this book!

[Christopher L. · Rating 3 out of 5]

I have to say this volume was hit and miss for me.

I did enjoy Dr. Kennedy's premise of "looking under the hood" at various conflicts during the war, rather than just taking the more normal broad brush approach of walking through high level strategies and their outcomes... as a result, for me, there were real insights as to how a particular front was turned around to the allies' favour. I also liked the considerable effort made to be balanced - there simply were no wonder weapons developed by one person from one country as some sometimes wish to attest. It just rings true that a lot of hard graft, insight and collaboration across many discplines, people and nations went into creating the war winning weapons systems Dr. Kennedy describes.

Finally on the positive side, I do enjoy books which challenge me to think again - I find that general histories of the war understandably tend to look at bits of the conflict in relative isolation. Here Dr. Kennedy has, through the approach he has taken, been able to stich together the impact from various theatres of conflict which in turn allows one to reconsider the whole - so for me, one of the major insights from this book would be the evidence that maybe Britian's role in much of the conflict, at all sorts of levels, was more crucial than the recent rash of WW2 histories currently suggest.

I did, however, struggle with Dr. Kennedy's writing style which felt a little repetitive in forcing home various points - fine for hung over graduates in a lecture hall, but I can generally pick up the import of a message by the second time of reading. At times I almost had the sense that I was reading a series of separate scholastic papers subsequently moulded together to make the whole - perhaps poor editorial? I also became concerned that the book may have been a litte wobbly on facts, especially those around D-day and the Mulberry harbours. The final thing which frustrated me a little was that after some quite masterful scene setting, especially the chapters dealing with the Battle of the Atlantic, the Air War in Europe and the conflict in the Pacific, the nitty gritty details around the actual inventions and innovations required to provide the war winning weaons systems felt a little glossed over.

I really wanted to like this book more but perhaps that is just an issue of style - I have to say that there is no doubt that this books makes for stimulating reading and so I can easily recommend it to others.

[Charles Inglin · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author gives an overview of major aspects of World War II and discusses the technical problems that had to be solved to achieve victory, and the people, many relatively unknown, who made it possible. Often, personal relationships were instrumental in getting things done. For example, the creation of the Naval Construction Battalions, which were critical to building the infrastructure needed for the advance across the Pacific was directed by Ben Moreel, the only non-combat naval officer to achieve admiral rank during the war. Moreel was a talented engineer who joined the Navy during WWI and became acquainted with Franklin Roosevelt. In 1937 FDR appointed Moreel, a civilian again, chief of the Bureau of Docks and Yards and also chief engineer of the Navy in 1937. Moreel pushed the construction of repair facilities at Pearl Harbor that turned out to be vital for repairing damaged ships after the surprise attack and during the war. Moreel also conceived of the naval construction battalions and with FDR's backing and returning to active duty created and led the organization.

Another example was the P-51 Mustang. Originally designed to meet a British requirement. the P-51 had lackluster high altitude performance and would have been relegated to a ground attack role except for Rolls Royce test pilot Ronnie Harker being asked to evaluate it. Harker decided it needed a better engine. Rolls Royce engineer Witold Challier calculated the probably performance with the Rolls Royce Merlin engine. Rolls Royce general manager E.W. Hives took the idea to Air Marshall Sir Wilfrid Freeman, RAF head of supply, who ordered five aircraft converted and tested. The tests were successful but adoption ran into a roadblock from competing demands for resources and a "not invented here" attitude in the USAAF. It took the efforts of the US ambassador, the assistant air attache, FDR adviser Harry Hopkins and a number of other well connected individuals, as well as the disastrous Schweinfurt raids, to get the USAAF to accept the P-51, which would turn out to be critical to the bombing campaign because of it's long range combined with excellent performance.

A good read for students of World War II interested in the story behind the combat.