The grand strategy of the Soviet Union

by Edward N. Luttwak

Strategy, politics and economics of the Soviet Union.

Genres: History, Politics, Nonfiction, War, Russia, Soviet Union, Military Fiction

242 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1983

About the author

Edward Nicolae Luttwak is a military strategist, political scientist and historian who has published works on military strategy, history, and international relations. Born in Arad, Romania, he studied in Palermo, Sicily, in England, LSE (BSc) & at Johns Hopkins (PhD). He speaks five languages. He serves or has served as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force; he is/has been an adviser to Treaty Allies of the United States. He is chairman of the board of Aircraft Purchase Fleet Limited (APFL), an aviation lessor, and he founded and directs a conservation cattle ranch in the Bolivian Amazon. He is the author of various
books and more articles including: The Rise of China vs the Logic of Strategy, Coup d'Etat: a practical handbook, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, The Endangered American Dream, and Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy. His books are also published in: Arabic, Chinese (both Beijing simplified and Taipei traditional), Czech, Danish, Dutch, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Indonesian (Bahasa), Italian, Japanese, Korean, Mongolian, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese (and Brazilian Portuguese) Romanian, Russian, Spanish (Castilian, Spain, in Argentina and in Venezuela), Swedish, and Turkish. Before ever writing of strategy and war, he was combat-trained (Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire Light Infantry) and fought as a volunteer or a contractor in several countries on two continents. He likes Hebrew songs and the Greek & Latin classics. His best article is "Homer Inc." in the London Review of Books.

Reviews

[Simon Mee · Rating 3 out of 5]

A common writing trope is to describe two extreme positions then imply your book looks to strike a balance between the two.  Unsurprisingly, The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union holds itself out as the reasoned balance between “The Soviet Union has aggressive intent” vs “The Soviet Union has peaceful intent.” 

The devil, however, is in the details.  Luttwak’s introduction does set the boundaries of the discussion.  The problem is that pretending you are cutting the Gordian rope of binary discussion is there is actually a spectrum of interpretations and holding you lie somewhere between the two extremes is insufficient. The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union is a good book in describing certain issues the Soviet Union faces, but it has aged badly in overstating the Soviet Union’s aggressive intent.  Ironically, it may be closer to accurate with regards to Russia today.    As an example, Luttwak describes the potentially willingness of Soviet leadership to take risk on a conventional war, however subsequent releases of Soviet warplans presumed tactical nuclear weapons would be immediately deployed in Europe, on the presumption NATO would do the same. 

This is not (fully) intended as a criticism of Luttwak’s analysis at the time, as I am not placed to make that, more that it reflects reading the internal machinations of a closed society.  In terms of judging capabilities, we is probably a bit too glowing of the early stages of the Soviet Union’s efforts in Afghanistan and enamoured with the airborne descent on Kabul, which he admits depended on the undermining of internal security forces.  The efforts in 2022 at Hostomel points to the high risk of such activities which, while Luttwak does not ignore, he probably should have cautioned his analysis with more. 

Where The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union remains relevant is the analysis of the Soviet Union as an empire with competing minor nationalities, which appears to still impact Russia’s current population and its future goals.  Luttwak also makes an insightful point in noting that the loose arrangement of counter-alliances surrounding the Soviet Union (including China – damn), acted as both a restraint and a potential source of conflict via a pessimistic power seeking to rebalance things.  

For completeness I did breeze through the war planning scenarios against China (as there is just no practical relevance now) and skimmed the economic/military strength appendices (there almost certainly is more detailed historical analysis available now). 

The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union does make you think about the options available to the Soviet Union, and now Russia, it’s just their leaders were thinking slightly differently. 

[Roger Burk · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book has been lingering on my bookshelf for decades. I finally took it down to see what things looked like in the Andropov era, in the mid 1980s, less than ten years before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The analysis seems careful and mostly objective, though the internal Soviet weaknesses turned out to be even greater than Luttwak imagined. Almost half the book is technical appendices that are not very readable.
 
According to Luttwak, the USSR morphed from an ideological regime to a Russian empire during WWII. In the 1950s and 60s the leadership promised the people that they would overtake the West in economic development, but by the 1970s that hope had evaporated. Lagging economic development and low productivity have made the people restless. Low birth rates are already a problem. The regime has been seeking security through a massive armaments program, consuming far more of the economy than in the West and pursued whether Western arms expenditures are increasing or decreasing. Since the USSR has achieved military superiority, Luttwak expects new military adventures to increase its border buffers, perhaps in northern Norway, eastern Turkey, or western China. "It would be unwise . . . to anticipate a weakening of the country's stature as a very great power, at least for the remnant of this century" (p. 146). "[O]ne day the Soviet order may be swept away . . . . This, however, is unforeseeable" (p. 167).

I think it's natural to compare the current situation of China, which has also become more of an ethnic than an ideological state. China also has a low-birthrate problem, probably more severe than that of the USSR in the 1980s. However, it does not occupy a set of buffer states, and it is not economically backward. It is making a push for military superpower status, but perhaps within what the economy can support.

[Liquidlasagna · Rating 4 out of 5]

Luttwak has long insisted on the necessity of a grand strategy, but he moved beyond preoccupation with military intervention, and started to theorize diplomacy and military alliances.

His Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union (1983) was the first English-language text that recognized the different nationalities that were re-emerging in the USSR and were ignored by both "Kremlinologists" and U.S. intelligence.

Luttwak concluded that the Soviet Union relied entirely on military instruments for its grand strategy.

Luttwak argued that Carl von Clausewitz's warning against aggressive wars was no longer relevant in the post-World War II era. He reasoned that when confronted with weapons of mass destruction, statecraft needed a grand strategy, that is, "the firm subordination of tactical priorities, material ideals, and warlike instincts to political goals".

For Luttwak, grand strategy was no longer a military doctrine, but a political issue, and diplomacy was needed to achieve the security of the state.

[Chris · Rating 4 out of 5]

Probably wrong now that we know more because the archives are open, oh but the analysis is so sublime.