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The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb
Examines the U.S. plan to end the Second World War by invading Japan
For more than a half century scholars and nonscholars alike have debated the ethics of dropping the atomic bomb, but rarely have they studied the American plan to invade Japan, the alternative to using the bomb to end the Second World War. Widely held beliefs about the strength of Japanese forces and the projected loss of American lives have been invoked to justify the decision to drop the bomb. John Ray Skates, however, argues that the invasion plan, code named Operation Downfall, until now has not been sufficiently studied to allow such a justification. In The Invasion of Japan he remedies that shortcoming and disputes many myths that have grown up around the plan.
For more than a half century scholars and nonscholars alike have debated the ethics of dropping the atomic bomb, but rarely have they studied the American plan to invade Japan, the alternative to using the bomb to end the Second World War. Widely held beliefs about the strength of Japanese forces and the projected loss of American lives have been invoked to justify the decision to drop the bomb. John Ray Skates, however, argues that the invasion plan, code named Operation Downfall, until now has not been sufficiently studied to allow such a justification. In The Invasion of Japan he remedies that shortcoming and disputes many myths that have grown up around the plan.
304 pages, Paperback
First published March 1, 2000
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
July 24, 2025
I had been meaning to read this book for a long time, as I have never been convinced that the proposed invasion of Japan would have been the bloodbath that the popular imagination believes.
This book was a complete vindication of that suspicion, and is well-worth the read for anybody interested in the Pacific War, in the surrender of Japan, or in the way plans are conceived and implemented.
The author details many different proposals on how to defeat Japan, and here we find a sort of interesting parallel to the war in Europe where Marshall advocated a blow to the heart in France, and in the Pacific he was the strongest and most consistent supporter for the invasion of Japan.
King and the Navy in a way play the part of Churchill and the British. Like them King believed in a peripheral strategy to whittle away Japan's economy and resources.
King wanted to take Taiwan, Korea, Shandong, and other positions around the Yellow Sea to tighten the blockade and strategic bombing of the Japanese Home Islands. He believed, as did Leahy, that Japan could be defeated in this way without invasion.
Marshall and MacArthur, understandably given the failure of this strategy in Europe against Germany, did not think it would suffice and strongly argued for a direct attack on Kyushu and Honshu.
This was the genesis for Operation Downfall, split into Olympic (Kyushu) and Coronet (Honshu). These were to be two massive amphibious operations intended to knock Japan out of the war.
There are many interesting asides here too, such as the proposed participation of Allies like the British and the Soviets. Of interest here in the American fear that even if Honshu fell the Japanese military would continue to fight in mainland Asia. The Soviet entry was intended to preclude this.
Skates's thesis is essentially that Truman and Stimson self-servingly inflated the losses that would be sustained in an invasion of Japan to justify their use of the atomic bomb. Skates sagaciously points out that their figures of a million or half a million are vague and nebulous. Do they mean Japanese losses and American losses? Just American losses? What percentage of KIA or wounded?
They just say a million casualties to provoke an emotional response, which is extremely effective. Nonetheless it is not convincing. MacArthur and Nimitz estimated far fewer casualties than this, and did not believe that Japan had either the ability or the intention to wage a guerrilla.
A postwar study cited by Skates concluded that even Olympic probably would not have been necessary, but if it went ahead then Japan would have lost without needing to carry out Coronet.
Skates uses Japanese sources to show that Japan was staking everything in a forward defense of the beaches in Kyushu and, while this might have been very costly, the Americans would have won.
He notes that the Japanese were unable to move forces effectively due to the American supremacy at sea and in the air, so Japan could not reinforce threatened beaches. Many of the troops were underequipped and poorly-trained.
Perhaps the most fascinating section for me personally was the one involving Operation Starvation, the use of sea mines against Japanese harbors. This operation proved wildly successful in completely arresting all movement by sea, even coastal shipping. This inspired Pocket Money in Vietnam and is worth studying as a potential future strategy in a naval war.
Skates says that one weapon the Japanese put desperate faith in was the kamikaze, but as the aircraft had to be dispersed, making a concentrated attack would have been difficult, and many of the planes may well have been destroyed on the ground by American air power. The kamikazes were, perhaps, a less serious threat than many supposed.
It was a surprise to me that Skates cited Huber's paper on Operation Pastel, which concluded that the deception had mostly succeeded. I was surprised because Skates writes that it did not. Yet Skates admits that Japan diverted forces to places like Shikoku and Nagoya in fear of American attacks here, so which is it? Did Pastel deceive the Japanese or didn't it?
Having read a few works on military deception, just about all of the deception campaigns in the Second World War, and many other modern wars, succeeded. So I was not surprised to find Huber conclude that Pastel succeeded too, but Skates says it did not and this would be an interesting outlier of American deception failing.
The author goes into some detail about the geography of the Kanto Plain and Kyushu, and the difficulties the Americans would have had to face on the latter island. All of the landing areas and the troops intended for them are discussed in detail, with the overwhelming conclusion that they would have completely succeeded.
Skates devotes a chapter to discussing the proposed redeployment from Europe, which was a confusing mess as the US Army attempted to demobilize at the same time, sending many European veterans home based on a point system.
This caused delays and the loss of many valuable troops, so that even many veterans in the Pacific would be sent home. The Americans, then, would have been largely inexperienced.
But despite this, and despite the Japanese concentration on southern Kyushu, the author concludes that Olympic would have succeeded and that the losses would not have been devastating. MacArthur predicted casualties to be similar to the operations for Luzon, Normandy, and Okinawa.
These were heavy by American standards, but certainly nowhere near the hundreds of thousands.
The final chapter argues that the planners never viewed the situation in a zero-sum fashion. When they decided to use the bomb they hoped that a series of shocks to Japan would force her surrender. The two major shocks were Soviet entry and the destruction of the Kwantung Army during August Storm, and the atomic bombs.
But the American leadership did not rule out invading Japan if that was necessary, and in fact the invasion was approved. Fortunately, at the last moment, it was not necessary and instead MacArthur carried out Operation Blacklist, the peaceful occupation of Japan by the US Army.
As this has been a major controversy in WWII historiography, and as the use of the atomic bomb has been debated since it was dropped, I would suggest this book is almost required reading. It is the only work that delves into the actual plans to invade Japan and their chances of success.
Even if you disagree with the author's conclusion it is necessary information.
This book was a complete vindication of that suspicion, and is well-worth the read for anybody interested in the Pacific War, in the surrender of Japan, or in the way plans are conceived and implemented.
The author details many different proposals on how to defeat Japan, and here we find a sort of interesting parallel to the war in Europe where Marshall advocated a blow to the heart in France, and in the Pacific he was the strongest and most consistent supporter for the invasion of Japan.
King and the Navy in a way play the part of Churchill and the British. Like them King believed in a peripheral strategy to whittle away Japan's economy and resources.
King wanted to take Taiwan, Korea, Shandong, and other positions around the Yellow Sea to tighten the blockade and strategic bombing of the Japanese Home Islands. He believed, as did Leahy, that Japan could be defeated in this way without invasion.
Marshall and MacArthur, understandably given the failure of this strategy in Europe against Germany, did not think it would suffice and strongly argued for a direct attack on Kyushu and Honshu.
This was the genesis for Operation Downfall, split into Olympic (Kyushu) and Coronet (Honshu). These were to be two massive amphibious operations intended to knock Japan out of the war.
There are many interesting asides here too, such as the proposed participation of Allies like the British and the Soviets. Of interest here in the American fear that even if Honshu fell the Japanese military would continue to fight in mainland Asia. The Soviet entry was intended to preclude this.
Skates's thesis is essentially that Truman and Stimson self-servingly inflated the losses that would be sustained in an invasion of Japan to justify their use of the atomic bomb. Skates sagaciously points out that their figures of a million or half a million are vague and nebulous. Do they mean Japanese losses and American losses? Just American losses? What percentage of KIA or wounded?
They just say a million casualties to provoke an emotional response, which is extremely effective. Nonetheless it is not convincing. MacArthur and Nimitz estimated far fewer casualties than this, and did not believe that Japan had either the ability or the intention to wage a guerrilla.
A postwar study cited by Skates concluded that even Olympic probably would not have been necessary, but if it went ahead then Japan would have lost without needing to carry out Coronet.
Skates uses Japanese sources to show that Japan was staking everything in a forward defense of the beaches in Kyushu and, while this might have been very costly, the Americans would have won.
He notes that the Japanese were unable to move forces effectively due to the American supremacy at sea and in the air, so Japan could not reinforce threatened beaches. Many of the troops were underequipped and poorly-trained.
Perhaps the most fascinating section for me personally was the one involving Operation Starvation, the use of sea mines against Japanese harbors. This operation proved wildly successful in completely arresting all movement by sea, even coastal shipping. This inspired Pocket Money in Vietnam and is worth studying as a potential future strategy in a naval war.
Skates says that one weapon the Japanese put desperate faith in was the kamikaze, but as the aircraft had to be dispersed, making a concentrated attack would have been difficult, and many of the planes may well have been destroyed on the ground by American air power. The kamikazes were, perhaps, a less serious threat than many supposed.
It was a surprise to me that Skates cited Huber's paper on Operation Pastel, which concluded that the deception had mostly succeeded. I was surprised because Skates writes that it did not. Yet Skates admits that Japan diverted forces to places like Shikoku and Nagoya in fear of American attacks here, so which is it? Did Pastel deceive the Japanese or didn't it?
Having read a few works on military deception, just about all of the deception campaigns in the Second World War, and many other modern wars, succeeded. So I was not surprised to find Huber conclude that Pastel succeeded too, but Skates says it did not and this would be an interesting outlier of American deception failing.
The author goes into some detail about the geography of the Kanto Plain and Kyushu, and the difficulties the Americans would have had to face on the latter island. All of the landing areas and the troops intended for them are discussed in detail, with the overwhelming conclusion that they would have completely succeeded.
Skates devotes a chapter to discussing the proposed redeployment from Europe, which was a confusing mess as the US Army attempted to demobilize at the same time, sending many European veterans home based on a point system.
This caused delays and the loss of many valuable troops, so that even many veterans in the Pacific would be sent home. The Americans, then, would have been largely inexperienced.
But despite this, and despite the Japanese concentration on southern Kyushu, the author concludes that Olympic would have succeeded and that the losses would not have been devastating. MacArthur predicted casualties to be similar to the operations for Luzon, Normandy, and Okinawa.
These were heavy by American standards, but certainly nowhere near the hundreds of thousands.
The final chapter argues that the planners never viewed the situation in a zero-sum fashion. When they decided to use the bomb they hoped that a series of shocks to Japan would force her surrender. The two major shocks were Soviet entry and the destruction of the Kwantung Army during August Storm, and the atomic bombs.
But the American leadership did not rule out invading Japan if that was necessary, and in fact the invasion was approved. Fortunately, at the last moment, it was not necessary and instead MacArthur carried out Operation Blacklist, the peaceful occupation of Japan by the US Army.
As this has been a major controversy in WWII historiography, and as the use of the atomic bomb has been debated since it was dropped, I would suggest this book is almost required reading. It is the only work that delves into the actual plans to invade Japan and their chances of success.
Even if you disagree with the author's conclusion it is necessary information.
September 18, 2024
How it might have ended. Thank you Harry Truman.
October 29, 2020
Highly detailed and one of those books that while a bit dry informs a reader a great deal. Mr Skates easily refutes both the "it was a war crime to nuke" AND the "it'll cost us a 1/2 million casualties to crush the Japanese" schools of thought too.
Had read it years ago and after recent posts I'd seen on FB and Quora about the use of nukes to end WW2 in Japan w/all the attendant revisionism made me want to recheck things.
Basically this book goes through all the planning pre nuke. The costs of the various amphib ops prior to the orders to prepare for the invasion of Japan and the Japanese preparation for their defense. One thing I'd forgotten was that the Japanese command had figured out where the invasion would come (Kyushu) and when (early fall 45 at the latest). They'd planned on using everything available w/the hope of either repulsing the invasion or making it so costly that the US would take terms of surrender rather than the unconditional surrender the FDR & Truman administrations demanded.
The numbers involved were immense, even more than Normandy inc the UK, Oz, Canada, and NZ tho no Allied troops were to be in the actual first wave of troops landing. The numbers/classes of ships being gathered were staggering as were the aircraft. The book also details the other alternatives to an invasion before anyone knew of the nuclear bombs which included continual fire bombings, stepped up naval bombardments, and a total naval blockade.
The problem for the planners was the demand by the US government and Joint Chiefs was that the war HAD to end w/in a year of the VE Day. Simply put the worry was that US civil morale was ebbing especially after the losses from Okinawa and other late war amphib ops. So given the lead time for any of the non invasion alternatives had plus the massive Japanese civilian losses predicted by starvation/continual bombing/shelling, the invasion came to be looked at as the less costly.
Had read it years ago and after recent posts I'd seen on FB and Quora about the use of nukes to end WW2 in Japan w/all the attendant revisionism made me want to recheck things.
Basically this book goes through all the planning pre nuke. The costs of the various amphib ops prior to the orders to prepare for the invasion of Japan and the Japanese preparation for their defense. One thing I'd forgotten was that the Japanese command had figured out where the invasion would come (Kyushu) and when (early fall 45 at the latest). They'd planned on using everything available w/the hope of either repulsing the invasion or making it so costly that the US would take terms of surrender rather than the unconditional surrender the FDR & Truman administrations demanded.
The numbers involved were immense, even more than Normandy inc the UK, Oz, Canada, and NZ tho no Allied troops were to be in the actual first wave of troops landing. The numbers/classes of ships being gathered were staggering as were the aircraft. The book also details the other alternatives to an invasion before anyone knew of the nuclear bombs which included continual fire bombings, stepped up naval bombardments, and a total naval blockade.
The problem for the planners was the demand by the US government and Joint Chiefs was that the war HAD to end w/in a year of the VE Day. Simply put the worry was that US civil morale was ebbing especially after the losses from Okinawa and other late war amphib ops. So given the lead time for any of the non invasion alternatives had plus the massive Japanese civilian losses predicted by starvation/continual bombing/shelling, the invasion came to be looked at as the less costly.
May 2, 2024
I found this book endlessly fascinating. It's as plain and straightforward as the title. Within the book you learn about the very concrete plans and activities that were leading up to the Nov 1, 1945 invasion of the Japanese mainland via the southern island of Kyushu. Again, what makes this interesting is that it wasn't hypothetical-- the plans were well thought out, documented with the people and equipment allocated and being positioned.
I found the book itself to be very enjoyable-- but its more of a classroom lecture than a Malcom Gladwell kind of read. You learn about the context and constraints of the time period leading up to the invasion. Then you learn about the five men who would be most responsible. Then you learn about the situation the Japanese found themselves in. The author, chapter by chapter, reveals the state of the chessboard and leads you to the moment where the game was about to be played.
I plan on visiting Kyushu and seeing the specific invasion sites that are documented. The book is detailed enough to tell you what part of the beach was intended to be the main landing area, who was going to land there and what their objectives were and the challenges they'd face. Should be interesting to see it in person.
I found the book itself to be very enjoyable-- but its more of a classroom lecture than a Malcom Gladwell kind of read. You learn about the context and constraints of the time period leading up to the invasion. Then you learn about the five men who would be most responsible. Then you learn about the situation the Japanese found themselves in. The author, chapter by chapter, reveals the state of the chessboard and leads you to the moment where the game was about to be played.
I plan on visiting Kyushu and seeing the specific invasion sites that are documented. The book is detailed enough to tell you what part of the beach was intended to be the main landing area, who was going to land there and what their objectives were and the challenges they'd face. Should be interesting to see it in person.
February 14, 2016
This book (which is very good and very detailed) is about the proposed invasion of the Japanese mainland during World War II, something that was actually planned out and ready to be used, only to be stopped by the surrender of Japan after the atomic bombing of two of the country's cities.
Again, as with other books, I will only note some of the highlights.
The book talks about the mining campaign and just how successful that was, even though it's something that most people are not familiar with. The book notes that in May, 1945, more Japanese shipping was sunk by mines than by submarines. The program basically blocked off almost all the Japanese ports, and the program was extended into Korea to block Japanese shipping there.
One of the programs that was not used, but was considered as a possibility, was a program to spray the Japanese rice crops with chemicals that would kill them, cutting down the already low amount of food available to the Japanese.
A program I hadn't seen discussed elsewhere was Project Aphrodite, or Weary-Willie. Old B-17's that had been pretty much used up would be loaded with explosives and flown by remote control to dive into enemy targets that were too tough for regular bombing to destroy. The program never really got very far.
Another program was the JB-2, which was really a modified version of the German V-1 buzz bomb. The plan was to launch 48 of these each day for sixty days, but that program was also stopped when it was decided that the targets within range had already been pretty much destroyed by the fire-bombing campaign. However, the program could still have been used on days of bad weather when regular planes couldn't fly, but the JB-2s could.
A program for the use of poison gas was also readied for Operation Olympic, the gas to be used against Japanese troops held up in caves.
The book goes into the subject of just why such weapons were going to be used, relating this, basically, to how much hatred there was of the Japanese during that time. The Japanese atrocities during the war, and just the fact that they continued to fight and kill so many Americans when it was obvious to everyone that they were going to lose the war, caused a lot of Americans to believe that anything was justified as far as defeating the Japanese went.
The book discusses Operation Olympic in detail, but it also discusses the Japanese plan to meet that attack, noting that the Japanese already pretty well knew where the attacks would come and in what strengths, and they had tried to prepare their defenses accordingly.
The book, and other sources, holds that the deadliest weapon the Japanese had at this point in the war was the use of kamikazes, including planes, boats, subs, humans carrying bombs, etc. Should the invasion have occurred, there is no doubt that the intensity of the kamikaze attacks would have been greater than anything seen so far in the war.
The attacks were going to be mainly on the transports carrying the troops rather than the ships, thinking that this approach would kill the most men the quickest. The Japanese had planned to use around 5,000 kamikaze planes during the first ten days of the invasion alone. They also had around 2,000 small suicide boats, called shinyo. They had lots of midget submarines in addition to the boats. American planners figured they could lost perhaps 20% of their forces even before they managed to set foot on Japanese soil, the kamikaze attacks would have been so strong.
The book also talks about the oka bombs, or baka bombs, the rocket-propelled suicide craft. They had the advantage of incredible speed, making them much, much harder to shoot down once they were on target, but they had the major disadvantage of having to be carried into battle by large planes called Bettys, and those planes were relatively slow and fairly easy to shoot down.
The Japanese would also have regular attack planes in their defense, hoping that the combination of those with kamikaze planes would inflict major losses on the Americans.
As far as the issue of use of civilians goes, the book holds that the plan was to evacuate civilians to rear areas, and just use civilians in construction, supply and agricultural uses.
The book presents its analysis of the overall situation of the possible results of an invasion. It says that, although the plans on paper for Japan were very good, that the actual plans were not complete by the time of the projected invasion, and that “communication, supplies, and transportation were woefully inadequate.”
The roads in the area were not prepared for military traffic. Many of the bridges were of logs, and the railroads could have been neutralized by bombing any of the many tunnels that they went through. There was not an adequate supply of ammunition. The American bombardment and bombing prior to the actual invasion could have made things so bad as far as transportation and communication goes that the Japanese might not have been able to move units into areas where they were needed.
The book also holds that civilians would not have been used as suicide squads or bamboo-wielding troops.
The book holds that the dead would have been 15,000 to 20,000 American troops, plus another 50,000 or so wounded. The book also says that if Operation Olympic had been successful, Operation Coronet, the invasion of the Tokyo area, would not have been necessary as the Japanese would have surrendered or, if it did take place, it would not have been very bad since the Japanese would not have had any resources left, having planned to use all their military and kamikaze might in Kyushu.
Again, as with other books, I will only note some of the highlights.
The book talks about the mining campaign and just how successful that was, even though it's something that most people are not familiar with. The book notes that in May, 1945, more Japanese shipping was sunk by mines than by submarines. The program basically blocked off almost all the Japanese ports, and the program was extended into Korea to block Japanese shipping there.
One of the programs that was not used, but was considered as a possibility, was a program to spray the Japanese rice crops with chemicals that would kill them, cutting down the already low amount of food available to the Japanese.
A program I hadn't seen discussed elsewhere was Project Aphrodite, or Weary-Willie. Old B-17's that had been pretty much used up would be loaded with explosives and flown by remote control to dive into enemy targets that were too tough for regular bombing to destroy. The program never really got very far.
Another program was the JB-2, which was really a modified version of the German V-1 buzz bomb. The plan was to launch 48 of these each day for sixty days, but that program was also stopped when it was decided that the targets within range had already been pretty much destroyed by the fire-bombing campaign. However, the program could still have been used on days of bad weather when regular planes couldn't fly, but the JB-2s could.
A program for the use of poison gas was also readied for Operation Olympic, the gas to be used against Japanese troops held up in caves.
The book goes into the subject of just why such weapons were going to be used, relating this, basically, to how much hatred there was of the Japanese during that time. The Japanese atrocities during the war, and just the fact that they continued to fight and kill so many Americans when it was obvious to everyone that they were going to lose the war, caused a lot of Americans to believe that anything was justified as far as defeating the Japanese went.
The book discusses Operation Olympic in detail, but it also discusses the Japanese plan to meet that attack, noting that the Japanese already pretty well knew where the attacks would come and in what strengths, and they had tried to prepare their defenses accordingly.
The book, and other sources, holds that the deadliest weapon the Japanese had at this point in the war was the use of kamikazes, including planes, boats, subs, humans carrying bombs, etc. Should the invasion have occurred, there is no doubt that the intensity of the kamikaze attacks would have been greater than anything seen so far in the war.
The attacks were going to be mainly on the transports carrying the troops rather than the ships, thinking that this approach would kill the most men the quickest. The Japanese had planned to use around 5,000 kamikaze planes during the first ten days of the invasion alone. They also had around 2,000 small suicide boats, called shinyo. They had lots of midget submarines in addition to the boats. American planners figured they could lost perhaps 20% of their forces even before they managed to set foot on Japanese soil, the kamikaze attacks would have been so strong.
The book also talks about the oka bombs, or baka bombs, the rocket-propelled suicide craft. They had the advantage of incredible speed, making them much, much harder to shoot down once they were on target, but they had the major disadvantage of having to be carried into battle by large planes called Bettys, and those planes were relatively slow and fairly easy to shoot down.
The Japanese would also have regular attack planes in their defense, hoping that the combination of those with kamikaze planes would inflict major losses on the Americans.
As far as the issue of use of civilians goes, the book holds that the plan was to evacuate civilians to rear areas, and just use civilians in construction, supply and agricultural uses.
The book presents its analysis of the overall situation of the possible results of an invasion. It says that, although the plans on paper for Japan were very good, that the actual plans were not complete by the time of the projected invasion, and that “communication, supplies, and transportation were woefully inadequate.”
The roads in the area were not prepared for military traffic. Many of the bridges were of logs, and the railroads could have been neutralized by bombing any of the many tunnels that they went through. There was not an adequate supply of ammunition. The American bombardment and bombing prior to the actual invasion could have made things so bad as far as transportation and communication goes that the Japanese might not have been able to move units into areas where they were needed.
The book also holds that civilians would not have been used as suicide squads or bamboo-wielding troops.
The book holds that the dead would have been 15,000 to 20,000 American troops, plus another 50,000 or so wounded. The book also says that if Operation Olympic had been successful, Operation Coronet, the invasion of the Tokyo area, would not have been necessary as the Japanese would have surrendered or, if it did take place, it would not have been very bad since the Japanese would not have had any resources left, having planned to use all their military and kamikaze might in Kyushu.
January 23, 2021
Fact based opinion without shading detailing the plans and anticipated outcomes of Olympic and Coronet. A bit dry at places and the font was smaller than I prefer. Would have been 5 stars if there had been maps placed appropriately and generously to support the text.
September 1, 2020
Good information. Take with a grain of salt, but useful to have in your head.
August 12, 2010
A well-researched analysis of how the Pacific War could've ended--- with the invasion of Japan in two stages, Olympic in autumn 1945 and then the climactic Coronet in early spring 1946. Good use of both the plans for the Allied invasion (all-US for Olympic on Kysuhu), US plus Commonwealth for Coronet on Honshu and Ketsu-Go, the Japanese counter-plan. A book that dismisses many myths about the planned invasion while still leaving no doubt as to how terrifying Operation Downfall would've been.
August 25, 2016
The author wrote this book in order to inform the reader. This book was slightly boring, however in reading it I learned alot about WWII. This book was told through a series of events that were in chronological order.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews