More than twenty years ago, as a very young man, I traveled in Ukraine. In one place, the local authorities were excavating a mass grave from the 1930s. Hundreds of skeletons, men and women, many with flesh and clothes still attached, had been laid out on wooden platforms, for attempted identification before reburial. If you looked, it was easy to see the cause of each person’s death—a square hole in the head. Why square? Because the Communists had hammered in a railroad spike. Why does this matter? Because what screams from every page of this book of Antifa apologetics is that the author, Mark Bray, and his compatriots, today’s direct ideological successors of those murderers, want to do the same to you.
Bray, who works as a “part-time lecturer” at Rutgers University, and who was a sometime organizer of Occupy Wall Street back in 2009, published this book in 2017. No surprise, he claims relevancy for his book based on a supposed surge in fascism due to Trump’s election. But it was only this past summer, with the rise of Antifa to prominence during the nationwide BLM-led Floyd Riots, that this book really became relevant. It is the only book-length treatment of modern organized left-wing violence directed against the Right, and although it is tendentious in the extreme, reading it is very instructive. (I bought it used, naturally, so that Bray didn’t get a cent from my purchase.)
My first purpose is to understand the violence generated by Antifa. I mean not the fact of violence itself, which (and what should be the immediate response to it) is a tactical question, not difficult to understand. What I want to explore is the thought that drives that violence. And then I want to comprehend how that violence is organized, how it is funded, and how it interlocks with the broader Left ecosystem of today. Bray’s book, the goal of which is to justify the works of Antifa, not to man but to his political allies who have yet to fully publicly embrace violence, is a useful place to start this exploration, though we will have to go well beyond it.
The author begins, as we can all agree is necessary, with a definition of fascism, which he says is “difficult to pin down.” He endorses a lengthy definition offered by Robert Paxton, a historian of Vichy France: “a form of political behavior marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working in uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion.” This may be a good description of 1930s and 1940s fascism, or it may not be, but no matter, since Bray never recurs to any aspect of this definition. Rather, in practice throughout the book, fascism is implicitly, and often explicitly, defined as any effective opposition to whatever the demands of the modern Left are at any given time. And the more effective opposition is, the more fascist it is.
To his credit, Bray admits this. He seems personally offended by dissembling about his real goals, yet realizes it is necessary, which gives his book a schizophrenic feel. We should reject needing a “finely-tuned” analysis of fascism, he tell us. We should understand the term is actually “a moral signifier that those struggling against a variety of oppressions have utilized to highlight the ferocity of the political foes they have faced.” The key is “solidarity with all those who suffer and struggle.” In other words, the only thing is the victory of the Left, and anyone who opposes that, is fascist.
As I say, this is a book of apologetics, directed primarily at normies. (Keith Ellison, the former Congressman who is currently the Attorney General of Minnesota, was famously photographed endorsing this book.) The chief hurdle Bray faces in this endeavor is that he completely endorses the violent silencing of all opposition to the Left, yet knows that sells poorly in normie America, and to normies, you look bad when your own supposed definition of fascism centers on how fascists “abandon democratic liberties” and use “redemptive violence,” yet both those are the core of your own self-definition. Bray wrote this book in an attempt to square this circle. He doesn’t succeed, because not even God can square a circle. The result is instead protean word salad, where Bray returns again and again to halfheartedly trying to show that Antifa is something other than merely joint action to violently suppress all opposition to the Left, and fails. Then he gives up, and admits his project.
We will step backward into history in a moment, but the Left here, by opposition to which fascism is defined, is the modern Left—just as radical as the 1930s Communist-dominated Left of the West, but having little in common with it other than its basic premises and utopian vision. The focus today is any form of supposed “oppression,” which, as the late Roger Scruton pointed out, is the bedrock of all modern leftism. Although the modern Left pays lip service to economic oppression, the almost sole focus of the 1930s hard Left, there is no actual concern whatsoever in this book for the urban “worker,” much less the rural proletariat in flyover country, or the struggling lower-middle and middle class. Despite frequent obligatory references to “the workers,” what comes through loud and clear is that Antifa, just like the modern Left as a whole, is a movement of the elite, not the proletariat. Bray uses as the meat of much of his book anecdotes and quotes taken from Antifa pseudo-soldiers around the world; none of them, as far as can be determined, is a worker in the traditional sense. Almost certainly most or all of them are upper-middle class in background and work, if they work, in some nonprofit-type job aligned with their politics. Bray is part of the fraternity, as he gladly admits, and his own background is, naturally, of this type.
The author begins with the past. He is very offended that historians have treated anti-fascist movements since the 1930s as “marginal,” and that not a single academic book has been written about them in eighty years. Rather like the Freemasons retconning history to show how very relevant they have been since Hiram Abiff, Bray tries to show how various fringe leftist groups since 1945 have all been part of a loose-knit pursuit of the ultimate goal of total Left domination. To this end, we are first given a somewhat confused, but generally accurate, if highly selective, history of Europe between 1900 and 1945, as it relates to militant left-wing movements. Spain in the 1930s gets a lot of ink—Bray accurately points out that Franco was not by any definition a fascist, but he doesn’t understand that when Franco took over the Falange, it was to make it Francoist, not to make Francoism fascist, and that his idea that Franco’s Spain was fascist as a result is silly. But of course it’s not silly, if you realize that “fascist” means “effectively opposing the Left”—Franco was the master at that, which is why he is so hated today by the global Left, even though he died nearly fifty years ago.
Bray next spins his wheels trying to show Antifa was relevant, or even existed, after 1945 until well into the twenty-first century. He fails, being reduced to sputtering about Enoch Powell and Jean-Marie Le Pen. Yes, in the late 1960s and through the 1970s, Left political violence was very prominent (though who remembers the Red Brigades today?), but it was directed at the mainstream political establishment, not the Right, which in Europe and America was essentially non-existent (except for Italy, where there was an operating extreme right-wing that fought back against the Left). Still, it was during this period that the “black bloc” street fighting tactics used by Antifa today developed, a combination of monochromatic dress designed to conceal individual identities, various forms of armor, and coordinated assaults using a front-line of more sympathetic people, often women, backed by weapon-wielding men (though as we’ll see, there is no real toughness there). The phalanx, of course, has long been known to be an effective method of ground assault, and is even more so against those who are forbidden to fight back effectively, and concealing identity has long been known to be useful both to avoid the consequences of one’s actions and to encourage violence, since it accelerates the mob mentality Gustave Le Bon analyzed in The Crowd. In the context of Western democracies, where governments are broadly on the side of the Left and so will not mow them down with machine guns, the black bloc was a genius turn.
However, none of these people from past decades have anything to do with today’s Antifa, despite Bray’s attempts to draw out a hidden line. Flailing away, Bray gives us endless pages talking about fights over the past three decades among skinheads and soccer hooligans brawling in punk rock clubs and around stadiums. None of this has real political content; it is all simply the bad behavior that young men get up to in any society where their drives and talents are not recognized and channeled. It’s an updated (and deracinated) version of Martin Scorsese’s Gangs of New York. You can see this from an anecdote Bray tells—how some “Nazi” skinheads were persuaded to become “Antifa” skinheads. This is a very old phenomenon, young men switching from Communism to the far Right, and vice versa. It is a symptom of search for meaning and purpose in the world, nothing more, with no political meaning whatsoever.
In America, Bray traces modern Antifa back to the late 1980s Minneapolis group Anti-Racist Action. Supposedly they were organized to fight the Klan, but it’s quite clear this was just another fringe group formed out of the skinhead music scene, looking for meaning and a bonding mechanism. (When Bray refers to nonexistent “major Midwest Klan rallies in the 1990s” being the spur, you know the lies are multiplying.) In an exception from the general rule, this group was well organized and politically somewhat adept, and spread to other music scenes in a few other urban areas, in a decentralized and somewhat splintered manner. (They did have “four points of unity,” including “reproductive freedom,” again showing zero concern for the actual economic concerns of the workers they professed to admire.) But none of this was of any importance or relevance at all for decades, and it all received the public notice it deserved, which was none—although, to be sure, allies sympathetic to these far-left types were spending these decades seizing all the levers of American power. There just wasn’t any role for or relevancy of Antifa in those decades; the Left was steadily winning everything it wanted, and a few skinhead types searching for personal meaning were of no importance, whatever their personal delusions of grandeur.
All this changed in 2008, as the arrow of history began to waver in its leftward travel. The catamite Right suddenly lost much of its relevancy, and the Tea Party arose. Although it was quickly and successfully destroyed, it heralded the new age of the Right, as the Republican Party began to fragment, and effective opposition to the Left’s march through the institutions appeared on the horizon. Right-wing political movements grew even more in Europe, sometimes based around economic and class concerns, sometimes based on opposition to unbridled immigration and the crime and cultural destruction that overran countries in its wake. To Bray, of course, all these effective movements are literal Nazis—what they say is beside the point, because he knows they are Nazis, because they must be Nazis, according to Bray’s ideology. Most of all, the mainstream Left began to fear that something more was needed to maintain and extend their grip on power—a fear that reached fever pitch in 2016.
Having trudged through this history-by-anecdote, we now get to the meat of this book, which is its apologetics. Bray’s goal is to justify any level of violence necessary to accomplish the goal of total Left victory. He prefers this to be calibrated, for public relations reasons, and to begin with as much suppression of Right speech without actual killing as possible. His case study for this is the Antifa riot that prevented Milo Yiannopoulos from speaking at Berkeley in early 2017. Yiannopoulos’s sin was being effective at organizing the rising Right, that is, people other than Jeb Bush and Mitt Romney, among the young. Bray offers a kaleidoscopic array of justifications for why not only Yiannopoulos, but anyone who is “fascist,” that is, anyone who does, or might, effectively oppose Left power, should be denied any freedom of speech, through unlimited violence if necessary. First, Mussolini and Hitler gained power legally, so that risk is present today in America, at least until full Left hegemony is attained. Second, nobody took Mussolini and Hitler seriously until it was too late; that mistake should not be made again. Third, rank-and-file leftists are more finely attuned to the dangers of fascism than their supposed leaders, so anything they do must be endorsed (as must also be anything endorsed by their leaders). Fourth, the Right has learned to use propagandistic imagery in the same way as the Left; this cannot be permitted, because it is effective. Fifth, “it doesn’t take that many fascists to make fascism,” so any silencing of a fascist is a major victory, justifying the action.
Thus, Bray states explicitly he rejects free speech as a value. “Instead of privileging allegedly ‘neutral’ universal rights, anti-fascists prioritize the political project of destroying fascism and protecting the vulnerable regardless of whether their actions are considered violations of the free speech of fascists or not.” What is “vulnerable”? Well, the only example of the danger of Yiannopoulos given is that when he arrived on a campus, “a trans student named Barbara was so terrified she fled campus for a day.” Also, Nazis! They’re everywhere!
You see, “free speech” doesn’t exist. “Black Lives Matter protests have been brutally suppressed.” (He gives no example of this fantasy.) . . . . [Review continues as first comment.]