Hanley does sort of a textual analysis of Smith’s “Theory of Moral Sentiments.” He pulls out a key sentence or two from Smith, and then follows it with his, Hanley’s, own modernizing language of the same. This is then followed by two or three pages of discussion of how what Smith said back in the 1700s is relevant to us now. Hanley follows this format, chapter by chapter and, in the end, one has a fairly good idea of what Smith was all about as far as his theory of moral sentiments is concerned.
I found this rendering - both the substance and the format - of Smith painful. It is an idealization of Smith’s theory to make him relevant to the problems of today. The book reconciles pure self-interest and the problems attendant thereto with other-regarding behavior, and we mental people then attempt to put this ideal into place. What we come up with is personal happiness that is combined with social harmony. It is the best of both worlds. Everything is hunky dory, but it ignores some crucial understandings of evolutionary science that make claims for Smith and Hanley’s moral ideal a non-starter.
Hanley begins by noting Smith’s foundational point that we naturally pursue our own self interest. It is man’s nature to do so, and it is “right that it should be so.” Since this leads to people bumping into each other, it’s a problem for social order. Hanley’s next chapter addresses that concern by noting that we are not only self-interested, but that we are also interested in others” and the next several chapters describe Smith and Hanley’s view about how much our own happiness is tied to the happiness of others. It is this tie that keeps our self-interest in check, and preserves social order while at the same time providing for the economic well-being of everyone.
This is Smith’s, and Hanley’s, argument in essence. The rest of the book is filled out with all the caveats, nuances, etc., two of which are important to highlight. First, in examining our own behavior, we should take the position of the “impartial spectator.” Then we see we are not so special because everyone is in the same situation. There’s a fundamental equality that we come to know and respect. In looking at our own behavior impartially in this manner, we can see when the pursuit of self-interest can be done without harming the self-interest of others, but most importantly, we can see when we need to restrict our self-interest because of the negative impacts on others. We do pleasures in moderation because we are under the control of self-command. As Hanley summarizes, one martini is better than zero or two.
Second, the distinctive trait of humans is their imagination. Whereas bodily needs are limited, their wants/desires soar with imagination. Imagination emancipates mind from the body and puts human want/desire into unlimited territory. This is a problem for social harmony, but also it enables us to take the perspective of the impartial spectator so that we can see the impact of our behavior on others. Knowing when we go into the others’ space makes us able at the same time to restrict our own behavior. Mind is Plato’s mind, secularized. It sits as the charioteer in control of the passions (i.e., of self-interest).
Smith was a voice for his time. He articulated well the self-motivating energy that went into early capitalist economics and the overall benefits that came with that. Smith was also aware of the dangers that accompanied unbridled self-interest and made a reasonable attempt - through his observations on our sympathetic relations with others - to keep a check on unbridled self-interest. But Hanley’s attempt to update Smith and make him current - applicable - is misguided. We’ve had a long exposure to the motivations that underlie capitalist economics and we know well its soft underbelly. Human nature is not a unified entity as Smith and the author would have it. We are gradations of intensity. Some are more rawly self-interested than others; some are more socially respectful than others. Both are consistent with the variability that comes with Darwin’s theory of evolution. Most fall along the continuum between these twin poles of human nature (Hanley denies this variability - we are all more or less the same and it is nurture [“habit, custom and education”] that makes us different). Combine highly self-interested motivation with high capacity (skill, intelligence) and a full-suite of deceit and manipulation that can go along with that, and the social harmony ideal of Smith goes out the window. The self-interested take off in terms of wealth, power, and status that Smith acknowledges. Those who are socially sensitive and play by the rules get the hind tit or are forced, by situational dynamics, to play the same game in order not to fall behind. And then the great unravelling occurs.
To make his Smithian ideal work, Hanley has to put the mind in control to do good things and not do bad things. Whereas Smith lodges self-interested and other-regarding behavior in human nature, that’s pretty much it for Hanley. Mind takes it from there, and tells the body - regardless of the deterministic values it embeds in “human nature” - what to do. We keep self-interest in check and promote other-regarding behavior. Good luck on that front. How one minimizes selfishness and maximizes benevolence if one is not motivated to do either is neither a question Hanley asks nor addresses.
In the end, Hanley says we are to mold ourselves into “wise and virtuous” beings who set before ourselves a standard of excellence, which is the “minimization of selfishness and the maximization of benevolence.” Now he is on a roll. He gradually builds this perfection pitch into a divine crescendo. Like Plato, we are to seek perfection knowing that we will always come short. Hanley puts Socrates forward as one such model because of his supreme self-command regarding the acceptance of his own death. Hanley acknowledges that Smith himself was otherwise less than smitten with Socrates, but then tells us that, given how others view Socrates, Smith was probably wrong on that front. Actually, Smith was probably quite right on his view of Socrates who was an obnoxious agenda-pusher for a divine truth and was highly intolerant of those who saw the world differently. Hanley then pulls out his ace in the whole, Jesus, who was the ultimate model for his “minimize selfishness, maximize benevolence” mantra. This is Smithian virtue. And from Jesus, Hanley takes us to his climax point that the love of virtue leads to religious beliefs. Hanley, quoting Smith, writes that we in some sense '“cooperate with the Deity, and...advance as far as our power the Plan of Providence,”' to which Hanley adds that “The end of our goodness thus isn’t simply our own happiness but the promotion of the happiness of all, and thereby God’s will, here on earth.”
Hanley, thus, wraps up his book into one tidy package. He turns Smith’s this-world utopia into a religious utopia. But the hope-for justice that might come from the existence of that other-world is fruitless. That other-world doesn’t exist or, if it does, it doesn't care. It’s a this-world only that meaningfully exists and for that, Hanley’s Smithian world that counts on benevolence to effectively counter unregulated, capitalist self assertion is forever hopeless. A hefty dose of realism is needed in our assessment of human nature(s) and for that we need to look at who we really are. Where Hanley goes high, we need to go low and see ourselves for who we really are as fully-empowered biological beings, many of whom could care less, really, about the welfare of others or the good of the whole. In the 2016 election meddling, Obama tells Putin to "cut it out" as if a plea of this sort is all that was needed. Yes, there’s ample good will and benevolence - a point that Darwin made when discussing what made us good tribal members - but that’s the stuff for suckers unless or until we come to understand that only countervailing power works to preserve the order and harmony that is Hanley’s ideal. It is Neibuhr without the God stuff.
The book is laid out in near-Reader’s Digest, pop psychology format that is, superficially, thoughtful. “Want to be happy?...Feel less hate and more love,” as if the mind commands the feelings, and not - per Smith's good friend Hume - the other way around. It was a format that I found quickly tiring. About half way through, I decided that I could predict his line of thought by simply reading his opening quotation and the first and last paragraphs, and I could skip the filler in between. Throughout, there are some sloppy thinking instances that drove me nuts. Thus, for example, he writes of Hume that religious beliefs for people are “out of fear, or because they are anxious and worried,” as if anxiety and worry are not variations of fear. Since anger and hatred are negative emotions for the self and others, we should suppress them in all instances he says except for when the innocent are harmed and need to be protected. Well, obviously, hatred (dislike) and anger (action because there is dislike) are problems, but they are not as Hanley implies, bad per se. In fact, they are absolutely critical emotions involved with our own self-defense - sticking up for ourselves and not only to be employed for the innocent. As for God, Hanley just slips into his largely academic account of Smith that, as a factual statement, God exists. “Who then is God, and what role does he play in our lives,” he asks. His partial answer is that “It would of course take a theologian to do justice to this question….” Really? Talk about pre-empting the field. Hume for one had plenty to say on this topic, which Hanley discusses somewhat fully. Evolutionary science might have a thing or two to say about religion (solving the twin survival problems of needing to live forever and fearing not living forever). And, in his attempt to walk that fine line that separates the inner-directed from the other-directed person - and this centers on what Smith means that we “should be lovely” to become "beloved” - Hanley writes of the “Off-Duty” section in the weekend edition of the Wall Street Journal that “I adore “Off Duty,” partly because it gives me something to talk about at parties, but mostly because if offers an unparalleled window onto how we in advanced commercial societies envision the accoutrements of the good life.” That strikes me as being horribly other-driven. Finally, the book could use some refinement editing. There are more than a few hagiographical references that put Smith into an overly exceptional status. Smith, he says for example, has “the unique ability to see both sides,” as if other thoughtful writers/thinkers/philosophers do not. And an editor would surely limit his use of the word “here.” They are found on almost every page, used as landing ledges for his various thoughts, to catch a breather before moving on.