The War for Ukraine: Strategy and Adaptation Under Fire

by Mick Ryan

The Russo-Ukraine War is a vital learning opportunity for military strategists across the globe. The first and clearest lesson to be gleaned from it is the soundness of a military’s strategy and the nimbleness with which it can adapt to unforeseen circumstances are the two most important factors in deciding victory or defeat. The War for Ukraine analyzes the war through these twin lenses of strategy and adaptation, detailing how each army has succeeded or failed to plan for and adapt to this twenty-first century war.  

Author Mick Ryan examines the foundations of Ukrainian and Russian strategy for their ongoing war, looking back over several decades to reveal how both sides have evolved their military strategy and force structure. Each has undertaken institutional-level reforms of their military and national security enterprises in the decade leading up to this war. But because the emergent behavior of military forces after fighting begins cannot be fully predicted, these prewar reforms only constitute a starting point for adaptation during the war. Part I of the book covers the role of strategic leadership, with a focus on evolution of strategy since February 2022. From there, the second part of the book delves into how the Ukrainians and Russians have adapted their tactics, organizations, operational approaches, and strategic foundations for war-making throughout the conflict.  

Central to this discussion are the ways that, regardless of cutting-edge technology, human elements have remained a crucial deciding factor in Ukraine. Ryan shows how good leadership allows a nation to navigate the ambiguity and uncertainty of conflict, while poor leadership leaves it vulnerable to surprises. Likewise, The War for Ukraine offers case studies of the importance of an institution’s ability to nurture and reward human learning as it relates to combat. The book provides strategists, policymakers, and military leaders with a basis from which to plan for constant adaption in military organizations. General readers of contemporary global conflict will also find The War for Ukraine of great interest. 

Genres: History, Military Fiction, Russia, Military History, Nonfiction, Politics, Ukraine

354 pages, Kindle Edition

First published August 13, 2024

Reviews

[Dmitry · Rating 1 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

Забавно, что эту книгу я читал одновременно с книгой Hubris: The Origins of Russia's War Against Ukraine, которая, по сути, является проводником пророссийского взгляда на российско-украинский кризис, т.е. нынешней российской пропагандой. Книга The War for Ukraine так же является пропагандой, но уже украинской. Как и в отношении книги Hubris: The Origins of Russia's War Against Ukraine, я не имею ничего против российской или украинской пропаганды, но вот только такие книги нужно раздавать совершенно бесплатно, благодаря чему люди не только сэкономят деньги, но и будут знать, что они читают пропаганду той или иной стороны.

Эту книгу написал отставной генерал и поэтому можно предположить, что в своих взглядах он "прост и прямолинеен как солдат", но я с таким подходом не соглашусь. Даже типичный вояка понимает, что нынешняя ситуация в Украине на поле боя скорее напоминает Первую Мировую войну, а не конец Второй Мировой, т.е. что ситуация скорее патовая, нежели Украина уверенно побеждает Россию. Однако в книге мы найдём настолько оптимистические утверждения, что кажется, что либо человек живёт в совсем другой реальности либо что он без передышки смотрит "Телемарафон".

What might a larger concept of a Ukrainian victory look like? I propose that there are six components: (1) defeating Russia in Ukraine, (2) obtaining security guarantees for the future of Ukraine, (3) economic aid and prosperity, (4) reconstruction, (5) social reintegration, and (6) justice.
A final and separate aspect of an enduring peace must be that Russia eschews imperial or colonial strategic culture.
<...>
Therefore, while that is in progress, the Ukrainians will need to work toward the six components of victory.
<...>
Therefore, as it has been doing since the beginning of the war, Ukraine must continue to fight to push all Russian forces from its territory. This includes Crimea and the Donbas. The Ukrainian 2023 offensives are part of this effort.

Если летом 2022 года многие действительно верили, что Украина вот-вот разгромит российские войска и выйдет к границам 1991 года, то в конце 2024 года таких оптимистов практически не осталось. Именно поэтому возникает вопрос, зачем писать в книге нереалистические утверждения, если на поле боя ситуация выглядит ровно противоположным образом? Мне могут возразить, сказав, что Зеленский только об этом и говорит, что означает, что у правительства Украины есть некий план, согласно которому вполне реально разбить российскую армию и выйти к границам 1991 года. Вполне возможно такой план и есть, но это только план, а реальность совершенно другая. Возможно, стоило бы отставному генералу - автору этой книги - подходить с более реалистической позиции, оставив перечисленные шесть пунктов в качестве "самого наилучшего исхода". Как говорится, "надейся на лучшее, а готовься к худшему". Но нет, автор на полном серьёзе предлагает список из шести пунктов в 2024 году, когда страны Запада чуть ли не открыто заявляют, что они не заинтересованы в разгроме России и победе Украины, т.е. что их устраивает формула "Украина не должна проиграть, а Россия не должна выиграть".

Тема низкого морального духа российской армии и высокого морального духа украинского народа - тема, поднимаемая почти каждым общественным деятелем, журналистом, политиком и пр. лицами, раздающими интервью. И если в 2022 году это действительно выглядело как чудо, то сегодня данная тема потеряла свою актуальность и более того, она ничего не значит.

These actions in the physical world have had an impact on the moral and intellectual components of Russian fighting power. Russian morale is corroded because of its battlefield defeats, supply challenges, and withdrawals in the face of Ukrainian pressure at Kyiv and Kharkiv. Russian human wave tactics have also had an impact. The Yevgeny Prigozhin mutiny of June 2023 will also have had a significant bearing on Russian morale in Ukraine.

Вот уже заканчивается третий год войны, а нам рассказывают о том, насколько высок боевой дух украинской армии и насколько низок он у россиян. Проблема тут в том, что моральный дух не сильно влияет на исход военного противостояния. Я не думаю, что этот фактор вообще стоит рассматривать в ситуации, когда две армии ведут боевые действия, как не думаю, что моральный дух был особо высок у солдат в Первую Мировую войну. Но главное даже не это. Главное то, у кого больше войск и снарядов. Это хорошо видно на примере подавления Чехословацкого и Венгерского восстания, а также расстрел рабочих в Новочеркасске. Что объединяет эти три события? Сила советской армии и слабость сопротивляющихся в трёх вышеназванных примерах. Каким бы сильным не был бы моральный дух сопротивляющегося, но если перед ним соперник который в разы превосходит его, то никакой высокий моральный дух просто не поможет. Я с 2022 года слышу, что моральный дух российской армии слаб как никогда, однако "они всё прут и прут". Как это тогда объяснить, если не тем фактом, что моральный дух является второстепенным фактором, важным, пожалуй, лишь в компьютерных играх.

Как и с книгой Hubris: The Origins of Russia's War Against Ukraine, я прочитал лишь четверть книги, ибо суть обеих книг мне понятна, и, следовательно, нет смысла тратить своё время на дальнейшее чтения. В обсуждаемой книге я остановился там, где автор сравнивает двух лидеров - Зеленского и Путина. Именно в этот момент я понял, что и речи не может идти об объективном исследовании ситуации.

Вот что пишет автор про Зеленского:

Zelenskyy has demonstrated, and continued to hone, his skill in this area. Few leaders have the capacity to consistently master the right language for a given moment, while also ensuring the right audiences are engaged, or inspired, by the key messages of a speech. During the war, Zelenskyy has often been compared with Britain’s prime minister in World War II, Sir Winston Churchill.

А вот какой образ автор создал Путину:

Whereas Zelenskyy has demonstrated austerity and empathy during the war, Putin has shown neither. During a large war rally in March 2022, Putin wore an expensive Italian puffer jacket that cost roughly twenty-five times the average annual Russian’s salary. These clothing choices were designed not only to solidify his status as a strong leader but also to combat information operations portraying Russia as a poor country. Regardless of the intentions surrounding Putin’s fashion choices, they do send a message about how separate—and distanced—he is from the Russian

И далее:

For Zelenskyy, leaders like Reznikov, Umerov, Zaluzhnyi, and Syrskyi are (or have been) valuable advisers who inform (and at times privately challenge) Zelenskyy’s decisions. They can also be trusted to execute their duties and “get on with the job” without constant reference back to their president.

(Особо смешно читать это после эпопеи с Залужным...)

Nothing could be further from this model than that in contemporary Russia. Putin is the key decision-maker, and all power of the state resides in him. To quote Mark Galeotti again, “Others in Russia are just extensions of Putin’s will.

Да, можно ненавидеть Путина и лепить из него какого угодно уродливого и тупого карлика, вот только в таком случаи не нужно презентовать свою книгу в качестве независимого анализа. Дело не в том, что бы создать образ "злого" или "хорошего" лидера той или иной страны, а дело в том, чтобы отобразить реальность такой, какова она есть. Путин сделал уже так много негативного, что его образ уже не спасти, однако зачем создавать из него слабого и неумного лидера? Если он такой, то кем в таком случаи являются лидеры Западных стран, которые то ли боятся этого "недотёпу" то ли просто не хотят чтобы страна под руководством этого "слабого лидера РФ" развалилась то ли имеют другие виды на Россию, нежели Зеленский. Короче, если подходить к анализу двух личностей, то делать это нужно объективно, а не рисовать одного - вторым Черчиллем, в то время как другого - героем повестей Диккенса. Это просто глупо и не профессионально. Даже для отставного военного. Такой подход простителен "Телемарафону", но не эксперту со стороны.

Короче, книга рисует карикатуру, как на Путина, так и на Россию, проблема только в том, что в реальности решают, как говорил Наполеон, большие батальоны, ибо Бог на их стороне. То же самое и в этой ситуации. Можно сколько угодно смеяться над слабым моральным духом российских солдат или над одеждой Путина или над его окружением, но если при этом противоположная сторона отступает, тогда все подобные разговоры превращаются в тупой и жалкий трёп. Это как с Майклом Наки, который на протяжении нескольких лет рассказывал про беспробудное пьянство в российской армии, наркоманию, отказников, сотнями сбегающих с поля боя, но если это никак не соотносится с реальностью, т.е. если это не имеет влияния на ситуацию на поле боя или если ситуация строго обратная тому что рассказывает пропаганда, то впору задуматься, а стоит ли ей доверять? Конечно, украинцам приятнее слушать условного Майкла Наки, нежели Алексея Арестовича или Андрея Баумейстера (или хотя бы Дацюка, Олега Хомяка или Юрия Романенко), но, если не случится чуда (или то, что предсказывает Игорь Липсиц), не окажутся ли все те люди что слушают пропаганду перед лицом уродливой, но реальности?

It's funny that I read this book at the same time as Hubris: The Origins of Russia's War Against Ukraine, which, in fact, is a guide to the pro-Russian view of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, i.e., the current Russian propaganda. The War for Ukraine is also propaganda, but Ukrainian propaganda. As with Hubris: The Origins of Russia's War Against Ukraine, I have nothing against Russian or Ukrainian propaganda, except that such books should be given away for free so that people not only save money but also know that they are reading propaganda from one side or the other.

This book was written by a retired general and therefore one might assume that he is “simple and straightforward as a soldier” in his views, but I would disagree with this approach. Even a typical soldier realizes that the current situation in Ukraine on the battlefield resembles World War I rather than the end of World War II, i.e., that the situation is more of a stalemate than Ukraine confidently defeating Russia. However, in the book, we will find such optimistic statements that it seems that either the person lives in a completely different reality or that he is watching Telemarathon without a break.

What might a larger concept of a Ukrainian victory look like? I propose that there are six components: (1) defeating Russia in Ukraine, (2) obtaining security guarantees for the future of Ukraine, (3) economic aid and prosperity, (4) reconstruction, (5) social reintegration, and (6) justice.
A final and separate aspect of an enduring peace must be that Russia eschews imperial or colonial strategic culture.
<...>
Therefore, while that is in progress, the Ukrainians will need to work toward the six components of victory.
<...>
Therefore, as it has been doing since the beginning of the war, Ukraine must continue to fight to push all Russian forces from its territory. This includes Crimea and the Donbas. The Ukrainian 2023 offensives are part of this effort.

If, in the summer of 2022, many people really believed that Ukraine was about to defeat Russian troops and come to the borders of 1991, at the end of 2024, there are almost no such optimists left. That is why the question arises: why write unrealistic statements in the book if the situation on the battlefield looks exactly the opposite? One might argue that this is all Zelensky is talking about, which means that the government of Ukraine has some kind of plan, according to which it is quite realistic to defeat the Russian army and reach the borders of 1991. There may well be such a plan, but it is only a plan, and the reality is completely different. Perhaps the retired general - the author of this book - should have taken a more realistic approach, leaving the six points listed as the “best possible outcome”. As the saying goes, “Hope for the best but prepare for the worst.” But no, the author seriously proposes a list of six points in 2024, when Western countries almost openly declare that they are not interested in the defeat of Russia and the victory of Ukraine, i.e., that they are satisfied with the formula “Ukraine should not lose and Russia should not win”.

The topic of the low morale of the Russian army and the high morale of the Ukrainian people is a topic raised by almost every public figure, journalist, politician, etc. And if in 2022 it really looked like a miracle, today, this topic has lost its relevance and means nothing.

These actions in the physical world have had an impact on the moral and intellectual components of Russian fighting power. Russian morale is corroded because of its battlefield defeats, supply challenges, and withdrawals in the face of Ukrainian pressure at Kyiv and Kharkiv. Russian human wave tactics have also had an impact. The Yevgeny Prigozhin mutiny of June 2023 will also have had a significant bearing on Russian morale in Ukraine.

It is already the end of the third year of the war, but they tell us how high the morale of the Ukrainian army is and how low it is among the Russians. The problem here is that morale does not have much influence on the outcome of a military confrontation. I don't think this factor should be considered at all in a situation where two armies are fighting, just as I don't think morale was particularly high among soldiers in the First World War. But that's not even the point. The main thing is who has more troops and shells. This is clearly seen in the suppression of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian uprising, as well as the shooting of workers in Novocherkassk. What unites these three events? The strength of the Soviet army and the weakness of the resisters in the three examples above. No matter how strong the morale of the resister may be, if he is facing an opponent who is many times superior to him, no amount of high morale will help. I've been hearing since 2022 that the morale of the Russian army is weaker than ever, yet “they just keep coming”. How can this be explained then, if not by the fact that morale is a secondary factor, important perhaps only in computer games?

As with Hubris: The Origins of Russia's War Against Ukraine, I read only a quarter of the book, for the essence of both books is clear to me, and therefore there is no point in wasting my time reading further. In the book under discussion, I stopped where the author compares the two leaders - Zelensky and Putin. It was at this point that I realized that there is no question of an objective study of the situation.

Here is what the author writes about Zelensky:

Zelenskyy has demonstrated, and continued to hone, his skill in this area. Few leaders have the capacity to consistently master the right language for a given moment, while also ensuring the right audiences are engaged, or inspired, by the key messages of a speech. During the war, Zelenskyy has often been compared with Britain’s prime minister in World War II, Sir Winston Churchill.

And this is the image the author has created of Putin:

Whereas Zelenskyy has demonstrated austerity and empathy during the war, Putin has shown neither. During a large war rally in March 2022, Putin wore an expensive Italian puffer jacket that cost roughly twenty-five times the average annual Russian’s salary. These clothing choices were designed not only to solidify his status as a strong leader but also to combat information operations portraying Russia as a poor country. Regardless of the intentions surrounding Putin’s fashion choices, they do send a message about how separate—and distanced—he is from the Russian

And further:

For Zelenskyy, leaders like Reznikov, Umerov, Zaluzhnyi, and Syrskyi are (or have been) valuable advisers who inform (and at times privately challenge) Zelenskyy’s decisions. They can also be trusted to execute their duties and “get on with the job” without constant reference back to their president.

(It's especially funny to read this after the Zaluzhny epic...).

Nothing could be further from this model than that in contemporary Russia. Putin is the key decision-maker, and all power of the state resides in him. To quote Mark Galeotti again, “Others in Russia are just extensions of Putin’s will.

Yes, you can hate Putin and mold him into any kind of ugly and stupid dwarf, but in such a case, you should not present your book as an independent analysis. The point is not to create an image of an “evil” or “good” leader of this or that country but to portray reality as it is. Putin has already done so many negative things that his image cannot be saved, but why make him a weak and unintelligent leader? If he is like that, then who are the leaders of Western countries who are either afraid of this “underdog” or simply do not want the country to collapse under the leadership of this “weak leader of the Russian Federation” or have other views on Russia than Zelensky? In short, if you analyze two personalities, you should do it objectively, not paint one as a second Churchill while the other is a hero of Dickens' novels. That's just stupid and unprofessional, even for a retired military man. Such an approach is forgivable for Telemarathon but not for an expert from the outside.

In short, the book draws a caricature of both Putin and Russia; the only problem is that, in reality, it is the big battalions that decide, as Napoleon said, because God is on their side. The same is true in this situation. You can laugh all you want at the low morale of Russian soldiers or Putin's clothes or his entourage, but if the other side backs down, then all such talk turns into stupid and pathetic trash talk. It's like Michael Nucky, who for several years has been telling about rampant drunkenness in the Russian army, drug addiction, and refuseniks fleeing the battlefield by the hundreds, but if it doesn't correlate with reality, i.e., if it does not affect the situation on the battlefield or if the situation is exactly the opposite of what propaganda tells us, then one has to wonder whether it's worth trusting. Of course, Ukrainians would rather listen to Michael Nucky than Alexey Arestovich or Baumeister (or at least Datsyuk, Oleg Khomyak, or Yuriy Romanenko), but unless a miracle happens (or what Igor Lipsits predicts), won't all those people who listen to propaganda find themselves facing an ugly but realistic reality?

[Dale · Rating 5 out of 5]

I read this book straight through and will probably go back to it several times. Full of lessons learned. The author does not just highlight successes and failures on his own, but shapes the judgement referring to other military writers. An effective technique and ensures a robust bibliography.

[Grant · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ryan provides a thoughtful study of the Russo-Ukrainian War focused, as he indicates, on how the two powers develop and implement strategy and how they have adapted to the unexpected realities of warfare. Ryan judges the Ukrainians more favorably in both categories, though he notes that the Russians only have to be good enough, not necessarily better, to win, given the disparity in resources.

[Alexandre · Rating 4 out of 5]

4,5/5

leitura essencial para qualquer estudante de estratégia, relações internacionais e assuntos militares. o livro aborda os primeiros doze meses da invasão em grande escala da ucrânia pela rússia, assim como as estratégias de ambos os estados e como estas evoluíram a nível táctico e operacional. de igual modo, enfatiza o cariz humano da estratégia e como a adaptação rápida às circunstâncias molda o desempenho das forças armadas no terreno. é também dada atenção às mais recentes inovações tecnológicas como o recurso a drones, à inteligência artificial ou o desenvolvimento de mísseis de longa distância, sem cair no erro de os rotular de wunderwaffen.

é muito claro de que lado o autor está e talvez a sua recusa em adotar uma neutralidade encapotada que conduza a argumentos reciclados do kremlin esteja na base de algumas críticas negativas aqui. contudo, a sua análise é sóbria e honesta e reconhece falhas no desempenho ucraniano onde elas existem, como a persistência de hábitos organizacionais provenientes do legado soviético ou a contraofensiva falhada de 2023.

[Liquidlasagna · Rating 1 out of 5]

unusual viewpoints

a few might like the leadership-strategy angle

doomed to be an obscurity
rather superficial and lightweight in places
for dealing with the early parts of the war and the lessons learned

It is like a book on lessons to learn from World War II before Dunkirk

and the not so subtle 'adapt or die' concept reformulated into the term

adaption battle

..........

If you're the type that likes to see how forces and command structures adapt quickly in the first nine seconds of World War III, and don't care about the next 3 billion years of that war, it might get your mild interest

just a dull teaching text on being flexible with military strategy

personally I think the Army in Kiev are excellent in tactics (merely experience in the Donbass) and stink at strategy
and my bet is on France 1940 for the win
and all in with Steiner on Berlin 1945

[In 1953, Steiner was recruited by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to found the Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde (Society for Defense Studies), composed of former German military officers, as a propaganda tool and a military think tank for West German rearmament]

[Timur · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's okay. If you are as obsessed with the Russia-Ukraine war as I am, you probably won't find a lot of new information. However, it provides a good overview of approximately first two years of the war, focusing on the differences in the command structures of the primary participants and how these affect their ability to adapt as the war drags on.

Unfortunately, there are clear biases, which are not surprising considering the author's background. These biases detract from the factual accuracy. The author's confidence in the superiority of modern Western military thinking and NATO's army structure raises questions, especially given that these doctrines have so far failed to provide the AFU with the necessary edge. He explains it with the little time that was given to AFU to adapt to this change, but personally I don't buy this.

[Jeff · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent analysis of the first 18 months of the war in Ukraine.

I've been looking for a good book on the history of this war for some time. I'm still looking. However, I came across Mr. Ryan's book. Rather than writing a history, Mr. Ryan takes a high-level view of the conflict and conducted a thorough analysis of its first 18 months from a strategic viewpoint. He compares and contrasts actions with the works of some impressive strategic thinkers. By this, his book stands out from other books on the war.

The book is well researched and makes it subject clear understandable to all readers. I highly recommend it to anyone who wishes to understand modern warfare and its implications on our national security.

[Chris Borden · Rating 3 out of 5]

A bit technical for lay reader.

A good summation and critique of
The assumptions, strategies, tactics and adaptations of both Russia and Ukraine from February 2022 through (at the time) ongoing summer 2023 Ukrainian offensive. I would have liked for it to have included recent events.

I did appreciate how Gen Mick explains how the 2014
Limited Russian invasion helped prepare Ukraine for the 2022 invasion.

This book reinforces a lesson of history that authoritarian leader often won’t abide dissension or disappointing events. Xi Jinping will be no different.
Yet millions of lives pay for their hubris.

[Rick Davis · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mick Ryan's book is an in-depth and well referenced study of how adaptation has been applied in the Russo-Ukraine war by both the Russians and Ukrainians. I gleaned many lessons from the book including leadership, cultural change, adapting to rapidly changing circumstances, and more. As a retired fire department battalion chief, I am still heavily involved with teaching in the fire service and I found multiple lessons and examples that can be applied to fire departments and firefighting. These lessons can also be applied to business and other organizations.

[Paul · Rating 3 out of 5]

A pretty sound analysis of how Ukrainian and Russian military and political strategies have adapted and fared in practice during the invasion. The story is incomplete of course, being published back in 2024, and many of the bedrock assumptions underpinning the analysis have now been thrown out the window!

Quite stilted in presentation, reads like a conference paper that needs to qualify and quote the definition of even the most banal term, and Clausewitz gets cited far too often! Saved by the quality and depth of the content.

[Eric Johnson · Rating 5 out of 5]

While this book only covers the war from the start to 2023, it is a good resource to understand the basics of the current conflict in Ukraine. It highlights the successes and failures of both Ukraine and, especially, Russia's handling of the war that is still dragging on. I would say it's not exhaustive (it only covers the period up to 2023), but it does provide a sense of what has happened during that time and offers insights for the future.

[J Gat · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mick Ryan’s The War for Ukraine is an extremely well researched and written piece on RUS and UKR strategies and adaptations during the illegal invasion of Ukraine.

Well worth reading for any soldier, strategist, or enthusiast of Ryan’s.

[Thor Toms · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great book. Editing could have been better. Numerous errors with dates on references and dates of events.