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Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary
Zhou Enlai, the premier of the People's Republic of China from 1949 until his death in 1976, is the last Communist political leader to be revered by the Chinese people. He is considered "a modern saint" who offered protection to his people during the Cultural Revolution; an admirable figure in an otherwise traumatic and bloody era. Works about Zhou in China are heavily censored, and every hint of criticism is removed—so when Gao Wenqian first published this groundbreaking, provocative biography in Hong Kong, it was immediately banned in the People's Republic. Using classified documents spirited out of China, Gao Wenqian offers an objective human portrait of the real Zhou, a man who lived his life at the heart of Chinese politics for fifty years, who survived both the Long March and the Cultural Revolution not thanks to ideological or personal purity, but because he was artful, crafty, and politically supple. He may have had the looks of a matinee idol, and Nixon may have called him "the greatest statesman of our era," but Zhou's greatest gift was to survive, at almost any price, thanks to his acute understanding of where political power resided at any one time.
345 pages, Hardcover
First published October 30, 2007
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November 7, 2020
Please beware about what type of book you're reading before you start reading it. This book tries to glorify (with reason) Zhou en Lai's life and work just to use it fanatically to criticize Chairman Mao and China in general. Meaning, this book tries to do the last thing Zhou ever wanted, so for me, honestly, I think the title should be less hypocritical, because it is. There is no point to glorify someone during 400 pages, to reach a conclusion such as "Zhou really tried to be a good guy but he couldn't". I'm sorry Mr.Gao, but Zhou really was a distinct human being, that never wished to see his life written by someone like you.
If Mr.Gao really had access to official documents of the government, I don't see why he criticizes the cultural revolution in such a superficial, fanatical way, I would like to read more detailed information, and not only someone's wrath, because the Cultural Revolution was bad to his Mom, I'm sorry that it was, but it's not the full extent of it...
In the beginning, there's some nice narrative about Zhou's early life (that's the only reason I gave it 2 stars), but from the moment Mao shows up, the book is just about how bad Mao and Jiang were to Zhou. Nothing, but nothing else.
Honestly, I'm not writing this just because of my political beliefs, I'm writing this because the book really is opportunistic and does a bad job to deliver a biography about such a special character that is Zhou En Lai. Also, the timing about when the book is written it clearly defines what the book is trying to do, attacking China from afar, if Tiananmen (also, not a black and white issue, Mr.Gao) never had happened, this book would have been published in and only in China. So hence, the opportunism again.
It is never a waste of time to read something with what someone disagrees, in the end, that's why I'm writing this review, so I can make it clear that I'm not (only) talking about my political beliefs, but above all, the quality of what Mr.Gao's proposed to deliver.
If Mr.Gao really had access to official documents of the government, I don't see why he criticizes the cultural revolution in such a superficial, fanatical way, I would like to read more detailed information, and not only someone's wrath, because the Cultural Revolution was bad to his Mom, I'm sorry that it was, but it's not the full extent of it...
In the beginning, there's some nice narrative about Zhou's early life (that's the only reason I gave it 2 stars), but from the moment Mao shows up, the book is just about how bad Mao and Jiang were to Zhou. Nothing, but nothing else.
Honestly, I'm not writing this just because of my political beliefs, I'm writing this because the book really is opportunistic and does a bad job to deliver a biography about such a special character that is Zhou En Lai. Also, the timing about when the book is written it clearly defines what the book is trying to do, attacking China from afar, if Tiananmen (also, not a black and white issue, Mr.Gao) never had happened, this book would have been published in and only in China. So hence, the opportunism again.
It is never a waste of time to read something with what someone disagrees, in the end, that's why I'm writing this review, so I can make it clear that I'm not (only) talking about my political beliefs, but above all, the quality of what Mr.Gao's proposed to deliver.
November 29, 2015
The author, Gao Wenqian, was the official biographer of Premier Zhou in the 70s and worked in the Party Central Research Office for Documentation. He concludes in this unofficial biograph (English translation published 2007) that Zhou "intended to be a good person, but failed," that "his life story conveys the tragedy of the Chinese Communist political system." Along the way, he quotes Deng Xiaoping's typically inscrutable comment: "Without the Premier, the Cultural Revolution would have been much worse. And without the Premier, the Cultural Revolution wouldn't have dragged on for such a long time."
The crucial enigma of Zhou's relationship with Mao runs through this book but the explanation does not do it justice. Does it help to be told that Zhou had a "servant mentality"? Or that Gao "attributes [Zhou's deep- seated inability to to take existential risks and had a psychological need to be another leader's number two] to his childhood with two adoring mothers (biological and adoptive) who lack an active father." (Andre Nathan in the "Introduction.") This is the sort of babbling that gives psycho-history a bad name.
But though the analysis is weak, this book is full of interesting facts: that in the 20s, both the Communists and the Nationalists wished to use Zhou's clear gifts; the former made him their director of propaganda and the latter the commissar of Jiang Kaishek's Whampoa Academy. Zhou would be found repeatedly trying to mediate between parties or factions that were bent on each other's destruction - the Nationalists versus the Communists, Mao and the peasant revolution versus the Comintern influenced "regular" Communists, Mao and his increasingly active detractors during the Great Leap Forward, Mao versus Liu Shaoqi (president of China from 1959 to 1968), Mao versus Lin Biao (who had led the victorious Red Army into Beijing in 1949 and invented the Little Red Book in 1969), Mao against himself.
When Lin Biao died in a plane crash, the author informs us that the pilot had been shot while everyone else on board had died of smoke inhalation. There is a ring of authenticity to this report. We are also shown how Zhou mourned the passing of his one-time protege at Whampoa.
Zhou was forced to choose many times in his career and it may be argued that he seemed to have always chosen self-preservation. But he did not live the easy life of a sycophant and he lived long enough to enunciate the "Four Modernizations" that Deng built upon. If Zhou chose to play Apollo to Mao's Dionysius, he suffered for it but also achieved something in return.
The crucial enigma of Zhou's relationship with Mao runs through this book but the explanation does not do it justice. Does it help to be told that Zhou had a "servant mentality"? Or that Gao "attributes [Zhou's deep- seated inability to to take existential risks and had a psychological need to be another leader's number two] to his childhood with two adoring mothers (biological and adoptive) who lack an active father." (Andre Nathan in the "Introduction.") This is the sort of babbling that gives psycho-history a bad name.
But though the analysis is weak, this book is full of interesting facts: that in the 20s, both the Communists and the Nationalists wished to use Zhou's clear gifts; the former made him their director of propaganda and the latter the commissar of Jiang Kaishek's Whampoa Academy. Zhou would be found repeatedly trying to mediate between parties or factions that were bent on each other's destruction - the Nationalists versus the Communists, Mao and the peasant revolution versus the Comintern influenced "regular" Communists, Mao and his increasingly active detractors during the Great Leap Forward, Mao versus Liu Shaoqi (president of China from 1959 to 1968), Mao versus Lin Biao (who had led the victorious Red Army into Beijing in 1949 and invented the Little Red Book in 1969), Mao against himself.
When Lin Biao died in a plane crash, the author informs us that the pilot had been shot while everyone else on board had died of smoke inhalation. There is a ring of authenticity to this report. We are also shown how Zhou mourned the passing of his one-time protege at Whampoa.
Zhou was forced to choose many times in his career and it may be argued that he seemed to have always chosen self-preservation. But he did not live the easy life of a sycophant and he lived long enough to enunciate the "Four Modernizations" that Deng built upon. If Zhou chose to play Apollo to Mao's Dionysius, he suffered for it but also achieved something in return.
February 24, 2023
Zhou Enlai, the longtime (and long-suffering) Premier under Mao Zedong is primarily remembered in the United States as Henry Kissinger's sparring partner in negotiating the historic visit of Richard Nixon to China in 1972, breaking almost a quarter century of diplomatic silence between the two countries. But Zhou was a key figure in the beginnings of the Chinese Communist Party, its subsequent wars against both Japan and the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, helping Mao to eventually become ruler of China.
Gao Wenqian, a Chinese historian, had access to secret documents in the CCP archives, and eventually managed to leave China after the Tiananmen Square massacre. But he could not take any of the archival materials with him, or makes copies of them, due to the strict secrecy in which the Party operates. It has an image of Zhou that it wishes to keep intact: that of a perfect man, someone who was selfless and helped lead China forward. It is to Gao's credit here that he sets out neither to defend Zhou nor vilify him. For years, he had to make his notes on index cards and send them with friends or family who were going out of the country, so he could have these notes to make use of once he left China.
Zhou is a difficult man to get a read on. On one hand, he managed to save people from dire straits during the hideous Cultural Revolution that Mao launched in the 1960s. Zhou often went out on a limb to protect longtime associates from decades past, people who had truly done nothing wrong and had been either fully or mostly supportive of the mercurial Mao. But he didn't go too far, always remembering to cover his own flank before doing anything. And that is the crux of the man: he would do the right thing, until he wouldn't. He would help some people, then criticize and pile onto others. He would debase himself to Mao, yet then work behind the scenes to soften or slow down his directives.
The result, at least for me, is that I neither liked nor disliked Zhou. He never seriously challenged Mao or the disastrous directives that he would issue. He allowed himself to be vehemently criticized by Mao's last wife, the vindictive Jiang Qing, and others. He also - as pretty much everyone except Mao did - engaged in "self-criticisms" where he he attacked himself for past transgressions. These misdeeds could be decades old. Oftentimes, there were no misdeeds. People simply fell out of favor with Mao (the reason could be anything, if there even was a reason) and thus they had to "confess" to doing something that they know they never did. Can you imagine living in such a society? All at the whim of a lunatic?
Much of the book focuses on the Cultural Revolution and the fallout from it. While it had largely ended by the time of Zhou's death in January 1976 (Mao died eight months later), the cataclysmic changes that it wrought in Chinese society were still being felt. Many top Party officials were purged. Some were imprisoned, some left for dead, some were most likely murdered; others were sent into exile. Mao kept Zhou around because, as Premier, he needed him to run the day-to-day activities of the government. But Mao never let Zhou rest, constantly criticizing him, often obliquely as that was his operating style.
Gao starts the book with the Nixon visit, then goes back to Zhou's early years when he traveled to Britain and France. While this was a good start (the ending was also fine, with Gao describing Zhou's long battle with bladder cancer and Mao's inhumane decision to deny surgery when it could have saved Zhou's life), overall I did not care for the book. Gao takes Zhou's story into WWII, when China is occupied by Japan. Then suddenly we are at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, twenty-five years later. Gao skipped the late 1940s through the early 1960s, which included the horrible Great Leap Forward (another instance of Mao terrorizing and inflicting widespread misery on the Chinese people). It is difficult to accept this as a full biography when a crucial chunk of Zhou's life is missing. The establishment of the PRC (People's Republic of China) and then the Great Leap Forward were significant events, and Zhou was a high level figure during both. Their omission greatly reduces the scope of this book.
Another issue that I had was that this book seemed less biography and more general history of the years that it covered. Oftentimes Zhou disappears almost completely from the narrative; at other times he is a fringe player to the proceedings. Gao spends many pages writing about Mao's numerous attempts to sow dissension and confusion amongst his top officials. While having context is important, I thought that Gao all too frequently went too deep into someone else's struggle, with Zhou only being brought in towards the end. This happened with Lin Biao and Liu Shaoqi, both of whom Mao got rid of after naming each man as his successor. These sections were much more about Mao's actions, rather than anything that Zhou did or did not do.
Perhaps some of this may be due to the translation into English. In a note at the end of the book, the translators acknowledge that they had removed some of the work contained in the original version that had more to do with 20th century Chinese politics. Either they removed too much (such as the entire decade of the 1950s) or they didn't remove enough. Another possible factor is that, even though Gao had more access to CCP archives than most people, there may have been - and probably were - files that he was not privy to. Or, some documents could have been destroyed at Mao's instructions, or perhaps by someone else who disliked Zhou or simply did not want his story to be told.
Regardless of the reason, this did contribute to an overall antiseptic feeling while reading. Very little of Zhou's personal life is covered. Again, that may be due to factors beyond the control of the author. I suspect he did the best he could considering the restraints under which he had to operate. Also, considering that the original Chinese version was immediately banned in China, it is a wonder that he was able to gather enough material to write a book at all.
In the end it was hard to feel much sympathy for Zhou despite his final years of physical pain while simultaneously enduring attacks from Jiang Qing and others at Mao's direction. Zhou was one of the enablers who allowed Mao to become and remain a brutal dictator. No matter what moves Zhou made to help individual people at crucial times, one cannot wipe away the stench of him so often doing Mao's bidding, even if it did help him stay alive longer than most of his contemporaries.
Grade: C
Gao Wenqian, a Chinese historian, had access to secret documents in the CCP archives, and eventually managed to leave China after the Tiananmen Square massacre. But he could not take any of the archival materials with him, or makes copies of them, due to the strict secrecy in which the Party operates. It has an image of Zhou that it wishes to keep intact: that of a perfect man, someone who was selfless and helped lead China forward. It is to Gao's credit here that he sets out neither to defend Zhou nor vilify him. For years, he had to make his notes on index cards and send them with friends or family who were going out of the country, so he could have these notes to make use of once he left China.
Zhou is a difficult man to get a read on. On one hand, he managed to save people from dire straits during the hideous Cultural Revolution that Mao launched in the 1960s. Zhou often went out on a limb to protect longtime associates from decades past, people who had truly done nothing wrong and had been either fully or mostly supportive of the mercurial Mao. But he didn't go too far, always remembering to cover his own flank before doing anything. And that is the crux of the man: he would do the right thing, until he wouldn't. He would help some people, then criticize and pile onto others. He would debase himself to Mao, yet then work behind the scenes to soften or slow down his directives.
The result, at least for me, is that I neither liked nor disliked Zhou. He never seriously challenged Mao or the disastrous directives that he would issue. He allowed himself to be vehemently criticized by Mao's last wife, the vindictive Jiang Qing, and others. He also - as pretty much everyone except Mao did - engaged in "self-criticisms" where he he attacked himself for past transgressions. These misdeeds could be decades old. Oftentimes, there were no misdeeds. People simply fell out of favor with Mao (the reason could be anything, if there even was a reason) and thus they had to "confess" to doing something that they know they never did. Can you imagine living in such a society? All at the whim of a lunatic?
Much of the book focuses on the Cultural Revolution and the fallout from it. While it had largely ended by the time of Zhou's death in January 1976 (Mao died eight months later), the cataclysmic changes that it wrought in Chinese society were still being felt. Many top Party officials were purged. Some were imprisoned, some left for dead, some were most likely murdered; others were sent into exile. Mao kept Zhou around because, as Premier, he needed him to run the day-to-day activities of the government. But Mao never let Zhou rest, constantly criticizing him, often obliquely as that was his operating style.
Gao starts the book with the Nixon visit, then goes back to Zhou's early years when he traveled to Britain and France. While this was a good start (the ending was also fine, with Gao describing Zhou's long battle with bladder cancer and Mao's inhumane decision to deny surgery when it could have saved Zhou's life), overall I did not care for the book. Gao takes Zhou's story into WWII, when China is occupied by Japan. Then suddenly we are at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, twenty-five years later. Gao skipped the late 1940s through the early 1960s, which included the horrible Great Leap Forward (another instance of Mao terrorizing and inflicting widespread misery on the Chinese people). It is difficult to accept this as a full biography when a crucial chunk of Zhou's life is missing. The establishment of the PRC (People's Republic of China) and then the Great Leap Forward were significant events, and Zhou was a high level figure during both. Their omission greatly reduces the scope of this book.
Another issue that I had was that this book seemed less biography and more general history of the years that it covered. Oftentimes Zhou disappears almost completely from the narrative; at other times he is a fringe player to the proceedings. Gao spends many pages writing about Mao's numerous attempts to sow dissension and confusion amongst his top officials. While having context is important, I thought that Gao all too frequently went too deep into someone else's struggle, with Zhou only being brought in towards the end. This happened with Lin Biao and Liu Shaoqi, both of whom Mao got rid of after naming each man as his successor. These sections were much more about Mao's actions, rather than anything that Zhou did or did not do.
Perhaps some of this may be due to the translation into English. In a note at the end of the book, the translators acknowledge that they had removed some of the work contained in the original version that had more to do with 20th century Chinese politics. Either they removed too much (such as the entire decade of the 1950s) or they didn't remove enough. Another possible factor is that, even though Gao had more access to CCP archives than most people, there may have been - and probably were - files that he was not privy to. Or, some documents could have been destroyed at Mao's instructions, or perhaps by someone else who disliked Zhou or simply did not want his story to be told.
Regardless of the reason, this did contribute to an overall antiseptic feeling while reading. Very little of Zhou's personal life is covered. Again, that may be due to factors beyond the control of the author. I suspect he did the best he could considering the restraints under which he had to operate. Also, considering that the original Chinese version was immediately banned in China, it is a wonder that he was able to gather enough material to write a book at all.
In the end it was hard to feel much sympathy for Zhou despite his final years of physical pain while simultaneously enduring attacks from Jiang Qing and others at Mao's direction. Zhou was one of the enablers who allowed Mao to become and remain a brutal dictator. No matter what moves Zhou made to help individual people at crucial times, one cannot wipe away the stench of him so often doing Mao's bidding, even if it did help him stay alive longer than most of his contemporaries.
Grade: C
August 10, 2022
a thought-provoking review of Zhou Enlai and his conflicted relationship with Mao Zedong ... Zhou is presented as well-motivated but not courageous or strong enough to oppose Mao even when he knows Mao is destroying the new China he very much wants to build ... this is the conflicted Zhou I am hoping to capture in my in-progress historical novel built around the events which led to the visit of Richard Nixon to China in 1972 ... two excerpts capture aspects of Zhou's dilemma
... During one of Zhou’s many meetings with the Red Guards in September 1966, someone suddenly shouted out, “Down With Liu Shaoqi!” Others took up the cry. Zhou turned his back to the audience as a clear indication of his disapproval without making a single comment that would allow someone to record “heretical words.” He refused to rejoin the discussion until all the shouting had ceased. Then, invoking Party history that few in the room probably understood, Zhou noted that comrades who had committed mistakes in the Party line were still genuine revolutionaries and certainly could never be branded as counterrevolutionaries.
... Zhou was going to have to make a choice between his conscience and his political survival. ... he finally decided to make the big break with Liu and endorse the so-called criminal materials compiled by Jiang Qing and her relentless gang. “Enlai signed off on the documents used to expel Liu Shaoqi from the Party,” Zhou’s widow confided to the author Han Suyin nine years after her husband’s death. “Can we just simply apologize for this? The whole affair caused Enlai so much pain. But he had no choice,” she told Han Suyin. “He did it for the benefit of the whole picture.” ... Zhou was more than aware that Mao had made his premier’s attitude toward the Liu case another test of his loyalty. The harangues by Jiang Qing were actually communiqués from Mao.
... During one of Zhou’s many meetings with the Red Guards in September 1966, someone suddenly shouted out, “Down With Liu Shaoqi!” Others took up the cry. Zhou turned his back to the audience as a clear indication of his disapproval without making a single comment that would allow someone to record “heretical words.” He refused to rejoin the discussion until all the shouting had ceased. Then, invoking Party history that few in the room probably understood, Zhou noted that comrades who had committed mistakes in the Party line were still genuine revolutionaries and certainly could never be branded as counterrevolutionaries.
... Zhou was going to have to make a choice between his conscience and his political survival. ... he finally decided to make the big break with Liu and endorse the so-called criminal materials compiled by Jiang Qing and her relentless gang. “Enlai signed off on the documents used to expel Liu Shaoqi from the Party,” Zhou’s widow confided to the author Han Suyin nine years after her husband’s death. “Can we just simply apologize for this? The whole affair caused Enlai so much pain. But he had no choice,” she told Han Suyin. “He did it for the benefit of the whole picture.” ... Zhou was more than aware that Mao had made his premier’s attitude toward the Liu case another test of his loyalty. The harangues by Jiang Qing were actually communiqués from Mao.
August 22, 2021
[2.5 stars rounded up to 3]
It falls short as a biography about Zhou, since a great deal of its contents are instead dedicated to Mao, Lin Biao, and other CPC figures. This book also suffers from a severe citation problem in which claims throughout the book are not cited where they appear but compiled into one long bibliography at the end. It is hard to understand this authorial choice.
Gao is not at all subtle about his ideological stance on the GPCR, Mao, or 中国特色社会主义 in general. At one point he calls Zhou's commitment to socialism "unexamined," but I find it difficult to believe that a man as intelligent, shrewd, and honorable as Zhou Enlai would have risked his life again and again for beliefs he did not sincerely hold. And although I can agree with Gao on more than a few of his criticisms, the overtly anticommunist slant of his writing made this book harder to appreciate. In my opinion, Zhou's increasingly vexed relationship with Mao deserved more nuance, especially prior to the GPCR. I also think Zhou himself would object to the title of this book and its "great man theory" approach to history.
Ultimately, the portrayal of Zhou as a practical, enigmatic, and heroic figure in modern Chinese history rings true. Having spent time in China, I have observed that popular opinion of Zhou remains high. I think most readers, whatever their personal politics, can find something to admire in him.
It falls short as a biography about Zhou, since a great deal of its contents are instead dedicated to Mao, Lin Biao, and other CPC figures. This book also suffers from a severe citation problem in which claims throughout the book are not cited where they appear but compiled into one long bibliography at the end. It is hard to understand this authorial choice.
Gao is not at all subtle about his ideological stance on the GPCR, Mao, or 中国特色社会主义 in general. At one point he calls Zhou's commitment to socialism "unexamined," but I find it difficult to believe that a man as intelligent, shrewd, and honorable as Zhou Enlai would have risked his life again and again for beliefs he did not sincerely hold. And although I can agree with Gao on more than a few of his criticisms, the overtly anticommunist slant of his writing made this book harder to appreciate. In my opinion, Zhou's increasingly vexed relationship with Mao deserved more nuance, especially prior to the GPCR. I also think Zhou himself would object to the title of this book and its "great man theory" approach to history.
Ultimately, the portrayal of Zhou as a practical, enigmatic, and heroic figure in modern Chinese history rings true. Having spent time in China, I have observed that popular opinion of Zhou remains high. I think most readers, whatever their personal politics, can find something to admire in him.
January 23, 2014
The title is somewhat misleading, as this biography focuses on the last decade of Zhou's life rather than his revolutionary career pre-1949. If you are at all interested in learning more about Zhou, Mao, and the Cultural Revolution this is well worth reading, however. I teach about China post-1949 for the IB Diploma History course and this confirmed my overall impression of Zhou as one of the most decent and smartest of the old CCP cadres. There is much to admire in his deft ability to read and adapt to the changing political winds and his resilience in surviving Mao's many attacks and vendettas. He personally did much to save the lives of many during the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution, while at the same time he is also taken to task for never openly defying Mao and standing up to his ruthlessness. The Great Helmsman's refusal to allow Zhou to have treatment for his cancer while it was still treatable and the petty grudges he held against him dating back to the 1930s despite Zhou's years of loyal and devoted service say as much about Zhou as they do about Mao.
May 2, 2021
This was a well-documented and well-researched biography on one of the most prominent figures from the Peoples' Republic of China. Chou En-lai (as I was taught in school) did many things to keep afloat the country as the Mao regime came to its end. I was captivated throughout this book.
September 6, 2016
Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary, by Wenqian Gao is a biographical look at Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong's right hand man throughout much of China's post-revolutionary history. Zhou was an enigmatic politician, always looking to balance sides, build bridges and mend fences. He was also shrewd and sly, engaging in whatever political moves were necessary to survive and promote the internal stability of China's CCP.
The biography chronicles Zhou's early life with his family, which was stable and happy although he lacked a father figure. His education in France, a hotbed of Chinese revolutionaries during the early 20th century is chronicled, as well as his brief stay in Japan (another hotbed for revolutionary figures) as he pursued an education in politics and revolutionary doctrine. His work for the early Communists in China is touched upon, as he became a mediator between the Nationalist and Communist factions during their united front against Japan in WWII. When the Nationalist government began to crack down on Communists in China, Zhou moved to Shanghai to begin an urban uprising, which did not succeed. He eventually joined Mao in Jiangxi. The next bit up to the Communist victory in 1949 is glossed over quickly in this biography.
From their, the meat and bones of the book is revealed. Gao focuses heavily on Zhou Enlai's political career from the 1960's until his death from cancer in 1976. Zhou was a central party manager, adept at Party organization, logistics and personal interactions. This made him a natural number 2 to Mao, as he was adept and useful, but politically savvy enough to take blame, offer self-criticism and toe the Party line when needed. This served Zhou well during the political purges of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Bao during this decade. Zhou's star began to wane, however, when he gained much international acclaim for his work in the Nixon visit and subsequent warming of relations between the US and China. Zhou's acclaim meant Mao's concern, as Mao was quick to squash any threat to his own power and his plans for succession (as was evident in his purges of Liu and Lin, both at one time his chosen successor). Zhou was different in that he was ready to take the blame, and knew Mao so well that he could accurately predict the best form of self-criticism needed to appease Mao. Even so, Mao bid his time, and eventually pounced with the help of his wife, Jiang Qing, and Qing's political cadre known as the Shanghai gang or the Gang of Four. Zhou, who was able to survive multiple purges and the Cultural Revolution, was sidelined in his later years, as Mao increasingly promoted Deng Xiaoping to be the next successor (although characteristically, would turn on him too). Zhou perished in 1976, still the Premier of China, but constantly on the defense against Mao and his wife. He died trying to promote Deng, who he saw eye to eye with in terms of economic reforms, but still singing the praises of Mao, as was characteristic.
Gao's biography was a wonderful read in many ways. Gao states that Zhou was both an enabler for Mao's worst totalitarian excesses, by constantly acquiescing to Mao, and also a cushion for some of his worst decisions, as Zhou constantly protected old party cadre's who were being purged, and desperately tried to protect as many as he could during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Zhou could read the political winds in the CCP like a master sailor, and knew when to support someone, when to promote someone, and when to denounce them. He was tasked with promoting the stability of the CCP during his Premiership, and did so with Machiavellian brutality, and tactful and artful diplomacy, all while conforming to a Taoist style ideal of constant devotion and obedience to the "Emperor", "even when the Emperor is errant, the minister must be loyal." Only in his final days did he try and make amends to those whom he had wronged during the struggle meetings of the Cultural Revolution or the purges. Zhou carried massive amounts of guilt and regret, but was a realist in terms of politics. He always tried to balance the excesses of Mao with the well-being of the CCP and the Chinese state as a whole. He did what it took, even if it was personal debasement, betrayal or grandiose self-criticism and humiliation. He suffered his final days being denied treatment by Mao, and died in extreme agony, reportedly shouting "Long Live Mao" as he was wheeled in to surgery.
Gao's take on the political situation in China at this time is fascinating. He offers a blow-by-blow account of the political struggles for power in the CCP, and Mao and Zhou's brilliant political maneuverings as one sought ultimate power and the other tried to keep his head above the water. Gao, however, has two large flaws in the narrative - mostly in the books organization. His use of sources, although detailed in the index, are poor throughout the text. He does not cite anything in the body text at all, instead opting for a bibliography in the back. This lack of in text citations is detrimental, as one has to keep flipping here and there to check facts. It also effects the second flaw. Gao uses many deterministic statements throughout the book, and refutes commonly held beliefs for historical fact recently made available through archival sources. The lack of proper in text citations makes this difficult to refute, but leaves one skeptical. China has become famous for historical revisionism, but Gao's sourcing and lack of citations makes it difficult to enjoy the books deterministic streak, and leaves one reaching for the salt grains - so to speak.
Still, Gao's book is a really interesting look at the inner workings of the CCP through a biographical account of one of China's lasting historical figures, Zhou Enlai. His life was fascinating and monumental in Chinese history, and his impact on China, whether good, bad, or balanced, is still considerably important. Although suffering from some citation flaws that leaves the information presented slightly suspect, the book is entertaining to a high degree due to the inside look at China's political history in the 1960's and 1970's. I would recommend this book for those interested in Chinese history and politics, flaws aside, as something worth reading for an alternative look at this period in history.
The biography chronicles Zhou's early life with his family, which was stable and happy although he lacked a father figure. His education in France, a hotbed of Chinese revolutionaries during the early 20th century is chronicled, as well as his brief stay in Japan (another hotbed for revolutionary figures) as he pursued an education in politics and revolutionary doctrine. His work for the early Communists in China is touched upon, as he became a mediator between the Nationalist and Communist factions during their united front against Japan in WWII. When the Nationalist government began to crack down on Communists in China, Zhou moved to Shanghai to begin an urban uprising, which did not succeed. He eventually joined Mao in Jiangxi. The next bit up to the Communist victory in 1949 is glossed over quickly in this biography.
From their, the meat and bones of the book is revealed. Gao focuses heavily on Zhou Enlai's political career from the 1960's until his death from cancer in 1976. Zhou was a central party manager, adept at Party organization, logistics and personal interactions. This made him a natural number 2 to Mao, as he was adept and useful, but politically savvy enough to take blame, offer self-criticism and toe the Party line when needed. This served Zhou well during the political purges of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Bao during this decade. Zhou's star began to wane, however, when he gained much international acclaim for his work in the Nixon visit and subsequent warming of relations between the US and China. Zhou's acclaim meant Mao's concern, as Mao was quick to squash any threat to his own power and his plans for succession (as was evident in his purges of Liu and Lin, both at one time his chosen successor). Zhou was different in that he was ready to take the blame, and knew Mao so well that he could accurately predict the best form of self-criticism needed to appease Mao. Even so, Mao bid his time, and eventually pounced with the help of his wife, Jiang Qing, and Qing's political cadre known as the Shanghai gang or the Gang of Four. Zhou, who was able to survive multiple purges and the Cultural Revolution, was sidelined in his later years, as Mao increasingly promoted Deng Xiaoping to be the next successor (although characteristically, would turn on him too). Zhou perished in 1976, still the Premier of China, but constantly on the defense against Mao and his wife. He died trying to promote Deng, who he saw eye to eye with in terms of economic reforms, but still singing the praises of Mao, as was characteristic.
Gao's biography was a wonderful read in many ways. Gao states that Zhou was both an enabler for Mao's worst totalitarian excesses, by constantly acquiescing to Mao, and also a cushion for some of his worst decisions, as Zhou constantly protected old party cadre's who were being purged, and desperately tried to protect as many as he could during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Zhou could read the political winds in the CCP like a master sailor, and knew when to support someone, when to promote someone, and when to denounce them. He was tasked with promoting the stability of the CCP during his Premiership, and did so with Machiavellian brutality, and tactful and artful diplomacy, all while conforming to a Taoist style ideal of constant devotion and obedience to the "Emperor", "even when the Emperor is errant, the minister must be loyal." Only in his final days did he try and make amends to those whom he had wronged during the struggle meetings of the Cultural Revolution or the purges. Zhou carried massive amounts of guilt and regret, but was a realist in terms of politics. He always tried to balance the excesses of Mao with the well-being of the CCP and the Chinese state as a whole. He did what it took, even if it was personal debasement, betrayal or grandiose self-criticism and humiliation. He suffered his final days being denied treatment by Mao, and died in extreme agony, reportedly shouting "Long Live Mao" as he was wheeled in to surgery.
Gao's take on the political situation in China at this time is fascinating. He offers a blow-by-blow account of the political struggles for power in the CCP, and Mao and Zhou's brilliant political maneuverings as one sought ultimate power and the other tried to keep his head above the water. Gao, however, has two large flaws in the narrative - mostly in the books organization. His use of sources, although detailed in the index, are poor throughout the text. He does not cite anything in the body text at all, instead opting for a bibliography in the back. This lack of in text citations is detrimental, as one has to keep flipping here and there to check facts. It also effects the second flaw. Gao uses many deterministic statements throughout the book, and refutes commonly held beliefs for historical fact recently made available through archival sources. The lack of proper in text citations makes this difficult to refute, but leaves one skeptical. China has become famous for historical revisionism, but Gao's sourcing and lack of citations makes it difficult to enjoy the books deterministic streak, and leaves one reaching for the salt grains - so to speak.
Still, Gao's book is a really interesting look at the inner workings of the CCP through a biographical account of one of China's lasting historical figures, Zhou Enlai. His life was fascinating and monumental in Chinese history, and his impact on China, whether good, bad, or balanced, is still considerably important. Although suffering from some citation flaws that leaves the information presented slightly suspect, the book is entertaining to a high degree due to the inside look at China's political history in the 1960's and 1970's. I would recommend this book for those interested in Chinese history and politics, flaws aside, as something worth reading for an alternative look at this period in history.
September 26, 2021
Recommended.
Biography of Zhou Enlai, but also covers the formation of CCP, the White Terror, the rise of Mao, the Chinese Communist Revolution, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the sidelining of Liu Shaoqi, the flight of Lin Biao, and the return (and purging and then return again) of Deng Xiaoping. So it's a good book to learn about modern Chinese political history as well.
Author takes a view that Zhou was a moderating force to Mao (e.g. he tried to protect many of the old cadres of the CCP that would've been or were targets of the Cultural Revolution; later he was a force supporting economic modernisation as opposed to continued political campaigns).
So it was interesting to read about all the politicking. How does one become a moderating force to the supreme leader of an authoritarian state? The flattery and self-criticisms. The tragedies of not being able to save your allies and ultimately the tragedy of being denied early treatment for his own bladder cancer - eventually leading to his death.
Biography of Zhou Enlai, but also covers the formation of CCP, the White Terror, the rise of Mao, the Chinese Communist Revolution, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the sidelining of Liu Shaoqi, the flight of Lin Biao, and the return (and purging and then return again) of Deng Xiaoping. So it's a good book to learn about modern Chinese political history as well.
Author takes a view that Zhou was a moderating force to Mao (e.g. he tried to protect many of the old cadres of the CCP that would've been or were targets of the Cultural Revolution; later he was a force supporting economic modernisation as opposed to continued political campaigns).
So it was interesting to read about all the politicking. How does one become a moderating force to the supreme leader of an authoritarian state? The flattery and self-criticisms. The tragedies of not being able to save your allies and ultimately the tragedy of being denied early treatment for his own bladder cancer - eventually leading to his death.
May 10, 2013
It appears that once the revolutionaries took hold of China, they had no idea what to do with it. In the absence of any program for bettering the country, Mao chose a legacy of power and adulation over one of public works. The result was a wholly dysfunctional bureaucracy where participants schemed not for corner offices, but for their lives. This book documents those internal battles.
Unless you have some background in this, not all the dynamics will be accessible. What is clear to the general reader is that at the core was the insatiable ego of the revolution's presumed hero.
The Author's Note tells about the brave people who helped to assemble this book, bringing notes from China index card by index card. The list of sources shows the impressive primary materials that were used. You also learn of the author's mother, herself a victim of the Cultural Revolution, who despite being harassed, encouraged him to write this book.
The title is misleading. This is not a bio of Zhou, there are pages and pages where he is hardly mentioned. The subtitle is strange since the author says he is trying to show Zhou as not the perfect man he is thought in some quarters to be. While not the main subject, Zhou is an organizing personality for this story, since he is, perhaps, the only enabler of Mao who could have done him in.
The big mid-twentieth century revolutions, China, Russia and Cuba ended in similar ways. The revolutionaries who put their lives on the line to remove autocracies easily surrendered those same dictatorial reins to their victorious generals. The generals had psychopathic needs for power and could not tolerate anything but a cadre of enablers. Fresh from fighting horrific revolutions they were inured to bloodshed and suffering and saw them as legitimate political tools. Perhaps these are the mindsets it takes to wage a revolution against a despot, but as history shows, they are disastrous in running a country.
Unless you have some background in this, not all the dynamics will be accessible. What is clear to the general reader is that at the core was the insatiable ego of the revolution's presumed hero.
The Author's Note tells about the brave people who helped to assemble this book, bringing notes from China index card by index card. The list of sources shows the impressive primary materials that were used. You also learn of the author's mother, herself a victim of the Cultural Revolution, who despite being harassed, encouraged him to write this book.
The title is misleading. This is not a bio of Zhou, there are pages and pages where he is hardly mentioned. The subtitle is strange since the author says he is trying to show Zhou as not the perfect man he is thought in some quarters to be. While not the main subject, Zhou is an organizing personality for this story, since he is, perhaps, the only enabler of Mao who could have done him in.
The big mid-twentieth century revolutions, China, Russia and Cuba ended in similar ways. The revolutionaries who put their lives on the line to remove autocracies easily surrendered those same dictatorial reins to their victorious generals. The generals had psychopathic needs for power and could not tolerate anything but a cadre of enablers. Fresh from fighting horrific revolutions they were inured to bloodshed and suffering and saw them as legitimate political tools. Perhaps these are the mindsets it takes to wage a revolution against a despot, but as history shows, they are disastrous in running a country.
May 25, 2021
作者所用的原始材料都很珍貴，可能很多材料是到現在依然沒有解密的，作者因為之前的工作之便可以接觸到，這對完整的正確的把握歷史至關重要。但是作者對於材料的引用感覺不是那麼嚴謹，不太便於後來者引用。相比很多史學家述而不論，點到為止，本書作者做了大篇幅的論述和點評，但是反而顯得有點主觀。還有是在史觀上，就算毛澤東和周恩來是君臣的關係，作者確實也是按照君臣來做的論述，但是我的私心還是希望作者在論述中能利用這麼好的材料突破這種君臣之道的論述。
February 28, 2023
书为晚年周，其实是毛林邓斗，在这其中周扮演的角色是“既减轻了历史灾难，又延长了历史灾难”。周一辈子以“君不仁臣不可以不忠”来自我约束，然而周一辈子推崇的“保持晚节”问题其实也是毛在五十年代提出并不断提醒党内高干的（无耻的是毛提出任何限制都是只约束别人不约束自己）。“中共党内对毛泽东奉行君臣之道的这种搞法，根子还在延安整风。”
August 13, 2011
This was an excellent book and provided a lot of insight to the political situation in China during the Cultural Revolution. The author drew from the still-sealed state archives and, I'd say that the book's content is as authoritative as possible. Basically, the idea of Zhou Enlai as having nothing to do with the Cultural Revolution- while obviously false when considered in light of Mao's obvious reliance upon him for keeping control of the country and managing foreign relations- is still something of a myth that surrounds the conflicted legacy of a man faced with a singular situation.
Perhaps the most interesting parts to me were the biographical details and revelations of the early history of Zhou Enlai's involvement in the CCP. The First United Front Era, which ended when Chiang Kai Shek brutally turned on the Communists and massacred them after they had delivered Shanghai to the KMT government under Zhou Enlai's command was shocking, but the revelations concerning Mao's political infighting are nothing if not astonishing. Far from marking any ideological goal, the Cultural Revolution was launched solely to destroy Liu Shaoqi's faction and return sole control of the country to Mao after he had lost (some) power following the Great Leap Forward. This book reveals Mao Zedong to be (in my opinion) possibly the most cunning and devious political figure in modern history, carefully shaping and testing his subordinates in order to ensure his solitary command of the country. The extent of his actions- which include the well-known purge of Shaoqi and Peng Dehuai- also includes significant responsibility for Lin Bao's 'defection'. While not speculating too much about the cause of Lin Bao's plane crash (except to discount that he had ordered the plane to be intercepted by the air force), Wenqian relates how Mao had essentially forced Lin Bao into a corner which precipitated a coup attempt that nearly succeeded. Throughout, Zhou Enlai tries to manage the worst of Mao (and his genuinely awful wife, Jiang Qing) but still cooperates, following to the last his decision during the Yanaan period to support Mao above all other contenders for power. Additionally, the book provides a much more full explanation of Deng Xiaoping's rise within the party and subsequent, multiple purges- why, after all, bring Deng back to prominence if his economic views were antithetical to Mao's? The answer, as Wenqian relates, is that Deng's return to power was part of Mao's balancing the scales of political upheaval as Mao's own disciple in order to ensure the Great Helmsman's grip on power.
A great read, fairly quick, although some of the extra material for the English version begs to be more fleshed out- no good book about the first generation of leaders in post-1911 China should lack at least a few chapters on the 1920s-1930s.
Perhaps the most interesting parts to me were the biographical details and revelations of the early history of Zhou Enlai's involvement in the CCP. The First United Front Era, which ended when Chiang Kai Shek brutally turned on the Communists and massacred them after they had delivered Shanghai to the KMT government under Zhou Enlai's command was shocking, but the revelations concerning Mao's political infighting are nothing if not astonishing. Far from marking any ideological goal, the Cultural Revolution was launched solely to destroy Liu Shaoqi's faction and return sole control of the country to Mao after he had lost (some) power following the Great Leap Forward. This book reveals Mao Zedong to be (in my opinion) possibly the most cunning and devious political figure in modern history, carefully shaping and testing his subordinates in order to ensure his solitary command of the country. The extent of his actions- which include the well-known purge of Shaoqi and Peng Dehuai- also includes significant responsibility for Lin Bao's 'defection'. While not speculating too much about the cause of Lin Bao's plane crash (except to discount that he had ordered the plane to be intercepted by the air force), Wenqian relates how Mao had essentially forced Lin Bao into a corner which precipitated a coup attempt that nearly succeeded. Throughout, Zhou Enlai tries to manage the worst of Mao (and his genuinely awful wife, Jiang Qing) but still cooperates, following to the last his decision during the Yanaan period to support Mao above all other contenders for power. Additionally, the book provides a much more full explanation of Deng Xiaoping's rise within the party and subsequent, multiple purges- why, after all, bring Deng back to prominence if his economic views were antithetical to Mao's? The answer, as Wenqian relates, is that Deng's return to power was part of Mao's balancing the scales of political upheaval as Mao's own disciple in order to ensure the Great Helmsman's grip on power.
A great read, fairly quick, although some of the extra material for the English version begs to be more fleshed out- no good book about the first generation of leaders in post-1911 China should lack at least a few chapters on the 1920s-1930s.
January 30, 2015
This book is an edited translation of a Chinese book written by a Chinese historian (Gao Wenqian is the former official biographer of Zhou Enlai at the Chinese Communist Party Central Research Office for Documentation and director of the Zhou Enlai Research Group. He left China after the Tienanmen massacre and now lives in Queens, New York). So it can be a hard book to follow, even for someone interested in Red Chinese history, as a lot of things are taken for granted by the writer and others are written in what can only be described as "Chinese fashion". There is little attempt to explain what the Chinese revolution was (or was not) or to try to explain what drove the senior leaders of the Chinese communist party (beyond the usual factional struggles) and little or not overview of the events that were taking place as these struggles unfolded at the top. But it is still a fascinating book, rich in detail and well worth reading. The details are the key here; if you are not much into contemporary Chinese history and the characters that played big roles in it, then this may not be the book for you, but if you are, then it is a must read. For example, the day to day uncertainty and drama in the senior echelons of the People's Republic is richly detailed (especially in the last section about the Cultural revolution and it's aftermath)and it can be perspective-altering. And my impression that Zhou was close to Deng and saved or rehabilitated him is corrected: the role of Mao in bringing Deng back into power (before kicking him out, not too effectively, one last time) and Deng's unwillingness to speak directly against Mao even after he had dismantled Maoism are an interesting little tidbit...one among many.
Another interesting tidbit: the use of the phrase "see the big picture and AGE GRACEFULLY" as applied to comrades being told not to make waves and to go along with the helmsman's latest insanity. Very Chinese. At least to my ears :)
Another interesting tidbit: the use of the phrase "see the big picture and AGE GRACEFULLY" as applied to comrades being told not to make waves and to go along with the helmsman's latest insanity. Very Chinese. At least to my ears :)
September 6, 2009
After reading the Author's Notes, I found out that this book is banned in China. So being a guest of the People's Republic of China, I will avoid making any comments about the Cultural Revolution, as it's bad manners to suggest criticism of it or the former Chairman.
That said, this book is ultimately about the title man, Zhou Enlai--premier of China. He is a complicated man, and life required him to make complicated decisions. I believe he received criticism regarding some of those decisions as they effected specific people rather badly. However, if one looks at the bigger picture, he made choices (some can call selfish ones) in order to survive and live to serve another day. Thus, he was able to help a greater amount of people, which was his life's work--helping his fellow countrymen.
However, you choose to see his life, I think you can agree that he was one of the great statesmen of history, joining the ranks of Benjamin Franklin and William Churchill. He not only had to survive the political infighting within his country, but he had to survive "Cold War" politics internationally. And to that effect, he became well-regarded both by his countrymen and the international scene. One can argue that China would not be where it is today without this man.
To understand modern China, one must read this book. Not so you can become a fan of Zhou Enlai (although I did become one), but to appreciate where China was, what it went through, and how it came to be what it is today. They were turbulent times but China is a nation built on survivors. And Zhou helped laid a solid foundation for this country to rebuild on.
One can only hope that future Chinese generations have their own "Zhou". They would be in good hands, if they did.
That said, this book is ultimately about the title man, Zhou Enlai--premier of China. He is a complicated man, and life required him to make complicated decisions. I believe he received criticism regarding some of those decisions as they effected specific people rather badly. However, if one looks at the bigger picture, he made choices (some can call selfish ones) in order to survive and live to serve another day. Thus, he was able to help a greater amount of people, which was his life's work--helping his fellow countrymen.
However, you choose to see his life, I think you can agree that he was one of the great statesmen of history, joining the ranks of Benjamin Franklin and William Churchill. He not only had to survive the political infighting within his country, but he had to survive "Cold War" politics internationally. And to that effect, he became well-regarded both by his countrymen and the international scene. One can argue that China would not be where it is today without this man.
To understand modern China, one must read this book. Not so you can become a fan of Zhou Enlai (although I did become one), but to appreciate where China was, what it went through, and how it came to be what it is today. They were turbulent times but China is a nation built on survivors. And Zhou helped laid a solid foundation for this country to rebuild on.
One can only hope that future Chinese generations have their own "Zhou". They would be in good hands, if they did.
May 4, 2008
The author of this book, Gao Wenqian, was in charge of official research on Zhou Enlai for the Chinese National Archives during the 1980's. After the Tiananmen Square incident, Gao became disillusioned with the Communist Party and left China for the US. He smuggled out his notes, and used them to write this biography of Zhou Enlai. (Zhou was the Premier (i.e., Prime Minister) of China from 1949 until his death in 1976.)
The book is not a comprehensive biography of Zhou, and instead focuses mostly on Zhou during the Cultural Revolution. (1966-1976) Because Gao had access to government documents and had interviewed government officials from that era, he is able to give an unusually in-depth look into the power struggles at the top of the CCP/PRC leadership.
The only real downside to this book is that it assumes that the reader has some knowledge of modern Chinese history. However, a half hour spent reading about modern Chinese history should provide sufficient background knowledge.
The book is not a comprehensive biography of Zhou, and instead focuses mostly on Zhou during the Cultural Revolution. (1966-1976) Because Gao had access to government documents and had interviewed government officials from that era, he is able to give an unusually in-depth look into the power struggles at the top of the CCP/PRC leadership.
The only real downside to this book is that it assumes that the reader has some knowledge of modern Chinese history. However, a half hour spent reading about modern Chinese history should provide sufficient background knowledge.
June 5, 2009
This is a very interesting fragment of history. A researcher in the Chicom central archives, with full access to many top secret documents has written a book about the second most famous Chicom revolutionary. The complex character that emerges evokes the same ambivalent feelings as other not-completely evil men who served evil masters. Through the whole book the evil nature of Mao Tsedong shines through. Zhou helped to save many people from destruction in the Cultural revolution and tried to preserve as much of China's economy as he could from the insanity of the radicals but he did it by engaging in a kind of mandarin servility to a man he could see was sacrificing millions of lives and the happiness of an entire nation to his personal whims and jealousies. In the end Mao murdered Zhou by not allowing his cancer to be treated because he was worried that if Zhou out lived him he would reverse the Cultural Revolution. This book is a well-written narrative and a good read for anyone interested in China.
October 26, 2013
Zhou Enlai was a much more complex actor in China's tumultuous existence under Mao than I previously had thought. Although he did a lot of good for the people and protecting China's cultural history, I feel that Zhou's conscious decisions not to stand up to Mao to protect his position w/in the ruling party, keeping his ability to deflect some of Mao's actions however lead to the rule Mao had for so long over China.
February 10, 2011
Moderately informative, but too much of a re-hashing of well-published info. on the overall Chinese revolutionary era. This English edition of Wenqian's book at first appears to be an expose of Zhou, but there is overemphasis on Mao that leaves one wanting more and deeper insights into the mind of the late Premier. I was disappointed.
January 12, 2022
引用的材料来源广泛，可见作者功力，但有许多“据知情人透露”或者“笔者看过的资料”等无法确定真实性的佐证。相信在未来，公开的资料越来越多，可以对这本书，为这本书的主角做出更为客观的评价。看完以后一则是敬佩，一则是惋惜，也对周恩来，林彪，四人帮，毛泽东这些历史舞台上的主角们在文革中所起的作用有了不少了解。
平心而论，对比墙内外对周的评价，我更加认同作者的观点，这是一个夹在传统中国儒家思想和实事求是的务实主义之间痛苦挣扎的悲剧性人物，但他的死最终开启了中国延误二十年之久的现代化进程，历史与命运可说是非常奇妙的。
平心而论，对比墙内外对周的评价，我更加认同作者的观点，这是一个夹在传统中国儒家思想和实事求是的务实主义之间痛苦挣扎的悲剧性人物，但他的死最终开启了中国延误二十年之久的现代化进程，历史与命运可说是非常奇妙的。
August 18, 2009
This is one of the best biographies that I've read; Zhou Enlai is one of the most fascinating and complex people in modern Chinese history.
November 13, 2020
二度も読む必要がある
March 4, 2023
作者借职务之便，可以接触到中央档案馆的档案，可以采访到许多文革当事人与中共高层，这种经历旁人无法复制，使得此书弥足珍贵。该书夹叙夹议，文字流畅，不做歌功颂德的官样文章，不为尊者讳，还原了一个有血有肉的晚年周恩来，体现了一个历史研究者的良心与道义。
April 19, 2024
Reading this book only emphasized what I've feared and suspected for the past six years: my disillusionment with and departure from Communism is all but terminal. For the life of me, I could never relate to or comprehend the impetus behind the Cultural Revolution. Dare I say, someone like me, fanatically opposed to a cult of personality and "man over party and people" politics, would have been purged more times than Deng Xiaoping—yet, unlike him, there would be no rehabilitation in sight for me, as I would never artfully trade my convictions for political expediency and survival, as Lin Biao, and yes, even Zhou Enlai, did.
The essence of this book can quickly be surmised as: "Without the scheming, power-drunk Chairman Mao Zedong, of course, Zhou Enlai, this great revolutionary, would have transformed China profoundly, both economically and politically." It's not difficult to see and appreciate why the author concludes this and attempts to lead his readers to that narrative. In Zhou Enlai, we see a truly selfless, hardworking, humble, and competent revolutionary—one who, even with the Grim Reaper in sight, while fading off in his deathbed, still requests the Internationale be played to boost his spirits. Admirers and detractors alike, bereft of any bias and motivations, could collectively agree that the man, Zhou Enlai, embodied some of the greatest virtues necessary to be a great humanist/Communist. Yet, the person, Zhou Enlai, tells a completely different story. The distinction I make between Zhou Enlai as a "man" and him as a "person" is critical. Zhou Enlai, as a person—that is, the intimate version of the man known to associates and those who came into contact with him—was undoubtedly a massive disappointment, but only on the revolutionary level. A perfect depiction of this is Deng Xiaoping's back-handed compliment of the man: "Zhou Enlai was the only reason the Cultural Revolution didn't get much worse than it did. His actions neutered the excesses of it and saved countless innocent lives, yet without Zhou Enlai, the Cultural Revolution wouldn't have gotten anywhere in the first place." The apparent contradictory nature of his actions in the Communist Party thus makes Zhou Enlai a complex character, right? Surely, this was the modus operandi of the author. I don't buy into that in the slightest. While casting Zhou as this complex yet endearing personality caught in "no man's land" between acting out his ideals as a truly great ambassador of humanist ethos and having to abdicate his convictions over and over again to appease the precariousness of Maoist politics. Yet, for Chairman Mao, there was no complexity to his character; his power infatuation, insecurities, and obnoxious yearning for dogmatic "rightness" were surely very black and white for all to see.
Zhou Enlai always had a choice. He could have gone the way of the likes of Liu Shaoqi and Peng Dehuai, men who were not intimidated nor scared of confronting and correcting Chairman Mao when he veered off course. To Zhou, his Confucian background obliged him to see the big picture, give in to the whims and games of Mao—to serve China, to serve the party before himself. With that, Zhou Enlai, the ever humble and loyal Comrade, could rebuke Peng Dehuai, whose crime was the rightful denouncement of the catastrophic Great Leap Forward project. Likewise, Liu Shaoqi, whose only crime was fixing the post-Great Leap Forward economy—a feat that, due to his competence and prestige within the party, prompted a paranoid Mao to launch his Cultural Revolution to rid the party of the so-called "capitalist roaders" and "little Khrushchevs in waiting." Zhou Enlai's part? Adding his signature and writing the very report that criticized the capitalist initiatives (the very same initiatives that, at the time, Zhou greatly agreed with) of Shaoqi, thereby, with his power as Premier, doing the desired "dirty work" of Mao. Shaoqi was expelled from the party and quickly rushed to an early grave. The same Shaoqi who proved instrumental in aiding Mao in wrestling power as head of the CCP from Wang Ming and the Soviet-trained Comintern-leaning revolutionaries It was all part of the "big picture" for Zhou. If Shaoqi had to go to save China, so be it. Yet this unleashed the Cultural Revolution, during which Zhou's modulating actions and interventions ensured that instead of the craze and chaos of the whole spectacle consuming itself quickly, the ever-tactful Zhou Enlai, looking at the big picture, ensured the "point of no return" was never reached, thus inadvertently prolonging the Cultural Revolution longer than it could have gone otherwise without him. How many innocent people—men, children, scholars, workers, peasants, and even those like me, who would never promote or celebrate one man (Chairman Mao) over the party and state—would have been purged and sent to an early grave? Is this the essence of the Communism that Zhou Enlai spent 20 years in the wilderness fighting for?
The essence of this book can quickly be surmised as: "Without the scheming, power-drunk Chairman Mao Zedong, of course, Zhou Enlai, this great revolutionary, would have transformed China profoundly, both economically and politically." It's not difficult to see and appreciate why the author concludes this and attempts to lead his readers to that narrative. In Zhou Enlai, we see a truly selfless, hardworking, humble, and competent revolutionary—one who, even with the Grim Reaper in sight, while fading off in his deathbed, still requests the Internationale be played to boost his spirits. Admirers and detractors alike, bereft of any bias and motivations, could collectively agree that the man, Zhou Enlai, embodied some of the greatest virtues necessary to be a great humanist/Communist. Yet, the person, Zhou Enlai, tells a completely different story. The distinction I make between Zhou Enlai as a "man" and him as a "person" is critical. Zhou Enlai, as a person—that is, the intimate version of the man known to associates and those who came into contact with him—was undoubtedly a massive disappointment, but only on the revolutionary level. A perfect depiction of this is Deng Xiaoping's back-handed compliment of the man: "Zhou Enlai was the only reason the Cultural Revolution didn't get much worse than it did. His actions neutered the excesses of it and saved countless innocent lives, yet without Zhou Enlai, the Cultural Revolution wouldn't have gotten anywhere in the first place." The apparent contradictory nature of his actions in the Communist Party thus makes Zhou Enlai a complex character, right? Surely, this was the modus operandi of the author. I don't buy into that in the slightest. While casting Zhou as this complex yet endearing personality caught in "no man's land" between acting out his ideals as a truly great ambassador of humanist ethos and having to abdicate his convictions over and over again to appease the precariousness of Maoist politics. Yet, for Chairman Mao, there was no complexity to his character; his power infatuation, insecurities, and obnoxious yearning for dogmatic "rightness" were surely very black and white for all to see.
Zhou Enlai always had a choice. He could have gone the way of the likes of Liu Shaoqi and Peng Dehuai, men who were not intimidated nor scared of confronting and correcting Chairman Mao when he veered off course. To Zhou, his Confucian background obliged him to see the big picture, give in to the whims and games of Mao—to serve China, to serve the party before himself. With that, Zhou Enlai, the ever humble and loyal Comrade, could rebuke Peng Dehuai, whose crime was the rightful denouncement of the catastrophic Great Leap Forward project. Likewise, Liu Shaoqi, whose only crime was fixing the post-Great Leap Forward economy—a feat that, due to his competence and prestige within the party, prompted a paranoid Mao to launch his Cultural Revolution to rid the party of the so-called "capitalist roaders" and "little Khrushchevs in waiting." Zhou Enlai's part? Adding his signature and writing the very report that criticized the capitalist initiatives (the very same initiatives that, at the time, Zhou greatly agreed with) of Shaoqi, thereby, with his power as Premier, doing the desired "dirty work" of Mao. Shaoqi was expelled from the party and quickly rushed to an early grave. The same Shaoqi who proved instrumental in aiding Mao in wrestling power as head of the CCP from Wang Ming and the Soviet-trained Comintern-leaning revolutionaries It was all part of the "big picture" for Zhou. If Shaoqi had to go to save China, so be it. Yet this unleashed the Cultural Revolution, during which Zhou's modulating actions and interventions ensured that instead of the craze and chaos of the whole spectacle consuming itself quickly, the ever-tactful Zhou Enlai, looking at the big picture, ensured the "point of no return" was never reached, thus inadvertently prolonging the Cultural Revolution longer than it could have gone otherwise without him. How many innocent people—men, children, scholars, workers, peasants, and even those like me, who would never promote or celebrate one man (Chairman Mao) over the party and state—would have been purged and sent to an early grave? Is this the essence of the Communism that Zhou Enlai spent 20 years in the wilderness fighting for?
October 28, 2018
This was a rather strange book. The author was originally commissioned by the Chinese Communist Party to write a (positive) biography of Zhou Enlai, the premiere of China under Mao Zedong. To do so, he was given access to highly classified CCP documents. Instead of writing propaganda, the author decided to "tell the Chinese people the truth about the Cultural Revolution and their beloved Premier". To that end, he smuggled these documents out of China bit by bit on index cards that friends took to America for him, over a period of several years. The author then escaped to America himself, where he completed the Chinese edition of the book. Not surprisingly, it was immediately banned in China, and the author was also banned from returning to China, including to visit his mother on her deathbed.
Despite a rather intrigued premise, I found the book to be underwhelming. Ostensibly a biography of Zhou Enlai "warts and all", the book didn't focus enough on Zhou to really be considered a biography in my opinion - instead it was just yet another book on the Cultural Revolution. In the English edition, a couple of chapters about Zhou Enlai's early life were added. Here the book did read like a biography and I enjoyed this part the most.
For the rest of the book, although there were tidbits here and there I hadn't read in my other books on the Cultural Revolution, mainly it was the same old story that I am already intimately familiar with. One of these tidbits - and the only one I consider worth mentioning - is that apparently all of the Communist Party leadership were addicted to sleeping pills:
Mao: [Mao's nurse] "At nightfall he took his sleeping pills, and then sat down to dinner at eleven. By the time he finished dinner, the pill had begun to take effect, and he slumped over the table in a stupor." Then suddenly he ordered the nurse to telephone Miss Wang Hairong, his grandniece and inside agent at the Foreign Ministry, and muttered the fateful words: "invite the American team to visit." The nurse was in a quandary, because Mao had long ago announced that he was not responsible for anything that he said after he had taken his pills. She decided to wait. But Mao lifted his head off the table demanding to know why the nurse was still there, and repeated his instructions. The nurse reminded Chairman Mao that he had already taken his pills, which usually meant that what he said didn't count. But Mao waved his hand and said firmly, "Yes it counts, every word counts. Go quickly, or it will be too late."
Jiang Qing: A nurse called Zhao Yisi one evening brought in Jiang Qing's usual sleeping pill, which Jiang took in silence. Half an hour later Jiang rang the bell for nurse Zhao: where on earth was her sleeping pill? Zhao pointed out that she'd taken it, but Jiang said she hadn't and insisted on downing a second. The next morning she felt so poorly she could hardly move her limbs. To other staff members she conveyed her conviction that Nurse Zhao was a secret agent sent by Lin Biao's remnants to kill her with an overdose of pills. When an assistant nurse scoffed at the idea, Jiang lunged at her with a pair of scissors. Jiang ordered a long "investigation" of Nurse Zhao in Villa 17 at Fishing Terrace Guesthouse, and the girl lost her nurse's badge and certificate.
Lin Biao: No one will ever know why Lin Biao allowed his wife to lead him to Mountain Sea Gate airport where he boarded the Trident for that fateful flight. Perhaps he fled out of a desire to live, or out of love for his wife and children, whom he wanted to rescue from the ruin that his own actions had brought upon them. Or, it may have been the case that Lin had taken his usual dose of sleeping pills and was in no shape to think clearly or act decisively so late on that fateful evening of September 12.
Zhou Enlai: Zhou, suffering total exhaustion, had just taken sleeping pills when the cable reached him. He was so relieved that he lost control and shouted out, "Crashed to death, crashed to death," and then ran to report the good news in person to Mao, who was still cooling his heels in the Great Hall of the People.
Despite a rather intrigued premise, I found the book to be underwhelming. Ostensibly a biography of Zhou Enlai "warts and all", the book didn't focus enough on Zhou to really be considered a biography in my opinion - instead it was just yet another book on the Cultural Revolution. In the English edition, a couple of chapters about Zhou Enlai's early life were added. Here the book did read like a biography and I enjoyed this part the most.
For the rest of the book, although there were tidbits here and there I hadn't read in my other books on the Cultural Revolution, mainly it was the same old story that I am already intimately familiar with. One of these tidbits - and the only one I consider worth mentioning - is that apparently all of the Communist Party leadership were addicted to sleeping pills:
Mao: [Mao's nurse] "At nightfall he took his sleeping pills, and then sat down to dinner at eleven. By the time he finished dinner, the pill had begun to take effect, and he slumped over the table in a stupor." Then suddenly he ordered the nurse to telephone Miss Wang Hairong, his grandniece and inside agent at the Foreign Ministry, and muttered the fateful words: "invite the American team to visit." The nurse was in a quandary, because Mao had long ago announced that he was not responsible for anything that he said after he had taken his pills. She decided to wait. But Mao lifted his head off the table demanding to know why the nurse was still there, and repeated his instructions. The nurse reminded Chairman Mao that he had already taken his pills, which usually meant that what he said didn't count. But Mao waved his hand and said firmly, "Yes it counts, every word counts. Go quickly, or it will be too late."
Jiang Qing: A nurse called Zhao Yisi one evening brought in Jiang Qing's usual sleeping pill, which Jiang took in silence. Half an hour later Jiang rang the bell for nurse Zhao: where on earth was her sleeping pill? Zhao pointed out that she'd taken it, but Jiang said she hadn't and insisted on downing a second. The next morning she felt so poorly she could hardly move her limbs. To other staff members she conveyed her conviction that Nurse Zhao was a secret agent sent by Lin Biao's remnants to kill her with an overdose of pills. When an assistant nurse scoffed at the idea, Jiang lunged at her with a pair of scissors. Jiang ordered a long "investigation" of Nurse Zhao in Villa 17 at Fishing Terrace Guesthouse, and the girl lost her nurse's badge and certificate.
Lin Biao: No one will ever know why Lin Biao allowed his wife to lead him to Mountain Sea Gate airport where he boarded the Trident for that fateful flight. Perhaps he fled out of a desire to live, or out of love for his wife and children, whom he wanted to rescue from the ruin that his own actions had brought upon them. Or, it may have been the case that Lin had taken his usual dose of sleeping pills and was in no shape to think clearly or act decisively so late on that fateful evening of September 12.
Zhou Enlai: Zhou, suffering total exhaustion, had just taken sleeping pills when the cable reached him. He was so relieved that he lost control and shouted out, "Crashed to death, crashed to death," and then ran to report the good news in person to Mao, who was still cooling his heels in the Great Hall of the People.
April 11, 2018
Interested by East Asian history, especially of the contemporary Cold War. This book definitely called out to me, knowing somewhat of the role the former premier of P.R. China, Zhou Enlai played in the state's foundation with Mao Zedong up to the ping-pong diplomacy he initiated with the U.S. and former president Richard Nixon. I can only imagine if I read the Chinese version how much more we'd learn of Zhou Enlai. Like the short brief on the back cover of the book mentioned, Zhou is indeed a mysterious figure in China, complex but very much complicit in his own way to the devastating Cultural Revolution. I never knew how much factionalism and inner-party feuding did occur during Mao's reign especially the conflicts between Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, and Deng Xiaoping. It's truly a fascinating read, so much so I think on my first day reading it, I had read over 200 pages in one sitting. It's just truly tragic he wasn't as much a rebel as Deng, and never truly spoke out against Mao when the country was falling into chaos and the old cadres were being purged left or right. Even more tragic was Mao's denial of medical treatment for Zhou's malignant tumors because of his hatred of his most loyal servant. I can only imagine had Zhou lived on and was treated right away, he would have gone down as a hero in reforming China and opening it up to the world much sooner than Deng and probably less violently as well. A hypothetical what-if scenario just as many speculated Lenin had he lived on, maybe would have realized the socialist utopia that was envisioned for the Soviet Union instead of the authoritarian Stalinist state that it would have become. I also liked the afterword in that the author informs the reader at the great cost of obtaining this information and sending it over in notecard parcels, being banned from returning to China and seeing his supportive mother before she passed. He went to great lengths to spread the truth of the dark days of China and the life of the premier and for that, I thank the author most sincerely, as this was a wonderful, illuminating read and I'm lucky to be reading it here in the west as a student of international relations and an aspiring diplomat. I only wish the book had maybe touched upon the deaths of his adoptive children by the pro-Jiang Qing faction of the Cultural Revolution and how he may have felt about their passing as I read about it somewhere.
November 29, 2024
Intersting book, in big part because of the background of the author who used to be an official archivist and biographer of the CCP, before exiling himself to the US following the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre. The sources are supposedly mainly documents straight from the CCP secretive archives.
It gives a good quick history of the both China's CCP and key events. The peculiar style of politics of Zhou, very ( if not too) flexible, is well described . The author seem honest about the upsides and downsides of his style of politics and character. The books does not aim to provide a simple enumeration of facts, but do translates intentions and approaches behind the events. Some description is therefore surely subjective, although likely done in good faith.
The story is mostly told through the relationship between Mao and Zhou, forming the narrative core of the book. A lot of Zhou's action were meant to deal about Mao's motivation and paranoia of political competition. As such, the book doesn't dive too much in the daily life of Zhou, his preferences, personal stories or anecdotes. It follows instead closely his political path along the party history, in vast majority dictated by the whims of Mao Zedong and its influence on the CCP. Zhou is the hidden history and will of the CCP, obfuscated by Mao's presence.
For me, the book clarified a lot about the fracture and complicated relationship between the CCP and Comintern representing Russian communism : it wasn't clear for me how much this fracture lead to factions inside the CCP. Zhou Enlai went along the Comintern instructions for a forced alliance with Kuomintang and its focus on controling key cities. Mao on the other hand, opposed it, and lead its own CCP forces from the countryside, which cost him his standing among the party temporarily ( until the Yan'an Rectification Movement). This schism would last a great while, reflected in the purge and ongoing fears of Mao of the reversal of his ideology.
It clarified also the source, motivations and key elements behind the cultural revolution. Prior to this, the movement was to me a diffused whirlwind of events simply motivated by a cult personality. The political struggle at play was not obvious.
Finally, it demonstrate also ththrough Zhou Enlai the collective ambition of the CCP, and that Mao was more of an important political convulsion.
It gives a good quick history of the both China's CCP and key events. The peculiar style of politics of Zhou, very ( if not too) flexible, is well described . The author seem honest about the upsides and downsides of his style of politics and character. The books does not aim to provide a simple enumeration of facts, but do translates intentions and approaches behind the events. Some description is therefore surely subjective, although likely done in good faith.
The story is mostly told through the relationship between Mao and Zhou, forming the narrative core of the book. A lot of Zhou's action were meant to deal about Mao's motivation and paranoia of political competition. As such, the book doesn't dive too much in the daily life of Zhou, his preferences, personal stories or anecdotes. It follows instead closely his political path along the party history, in vast majority dictated by the whims of Mao Zedong and its influence on the CCP. Zhou is the hidden history and will of the CCP, obfuscated by Mao's presence.
For me, the book clarified a lot about the fracture and complicated relationship between the CCP and Comintern representing Russian communism : it wasn't clear for me how much this fracture lead to factions inside the CCP. Zhou Enlai went along the Comintern instructions for a forced alliance with Kuomintang and its focus on controling key cities. Mao on the other hand, opposed it, and lead its own CCP forces from the countryside, which cost him his standing among the party temporarily ( until the Yan'an Rectification Movement). This schism would last a great while, reflected in the purge and ongoing fears of Mao of the reversal of his ideology.
It clarified also the source, motivations and key elements behind the cultural revolution. Prior to this, the movement was to me a diffused whirlwind of events simply motivated by a cult personality. The political struggle at play was not obvious.
Finally, it demonstrate also ththrough Zhou Enlai the collective ambition of the CCP, and that Mao was more of an important political convulsion.
November 2, 2018
Zhou Enlai was a truly remarkable person. The attitude that Gao takes toward him is often unfairly judgmental and even repugnant.
Gao basically betrayed his country, illegally sneaked information out to write this book, got a cushy job in America because of it, and then he complains that the Chinese government will not allow him back in to visit his family. Hello. Can we say "DRAMA QUEEN" at this point?
At one point he has the audacity to say that Zhou followed Mao like "a docile and compliant daughter-in-law". In case Gao missed this fact, Zhou fought continually for over 20 years to help get rid of corruption in his country and attempt to create a just society. By "fought" I mean "fought" with a gun, leading men into battle, getting shot at. Over 20 years. Does that sound like a compliant daughter in law? What right does Gao, who betrayed China, have to speak this way about Zhou? It's unprofessional and just bad writing. It lacks character and judgment - like most of this book.
There are better and more objective biographies about Zhou Enlai out there, please find one.
The fact of the matter was that Zhou Enlai was a tough guy. Even at the end when he was dying of cancer and in extreme pain he kept going and tried to do his job for the people of China.
He was willing to bend and bow sometimes to those who were his superiors in his party to avoid creating conflict. This is a positive quality that folks like Gao exploit to attack people like Zhou. I hate reading garbage propaganda like this book, especially about a guy like Zhou who can teach us a lot about what qualities are necessary in a good leader. Zhou was often selfless - he subordinated his ego to the party because that's what a man of character should do in a revolutionary situation.
Please find a better biography than this.
Gao basically betrayed his country, illegally sneaked information out to write this book, got a cushy job in America because of it, and then he complains that the Chinese government will not allow him back in to visit his family. Hello. Can we say "DRAMA QUEEN" at this point?
At one point he has the audacity to say that Zhou followed Mao like "a docile and compliant daughter-in-law". In case Gao missed this fact, Zhou fought continually for over 20 years to help get rid of corruption in his country and attempt to create a just society. By "fought" I mean "fought" with a gun, leading men into battle, getting shot at. Over 20 years. Does that sound like a compliant daughter in law? What right does Gao, who betrayed China, have to speak this way about Zhou? It's unprofessional and just bad writing. It lacks character and judgment - like most of this book.
There are better and more objective biographies about Zhou Enlai out there, please find one.
The fact of the matter was that Zhou Enlai was a tough guy. Even at the end when he was dying of cancer and in extreme pain he kept going and tried to do his job for the people of China.
He was willing to bend and bow sometimes to those who were his superiors in his party to avoid creating conflict. This is a positive quality that folks like Gao exploit to attack people like Zhou. I hate reading garbage propaganda like this book, especially about a guy like Zhou who can teach us a lot about what qualities are necessary in a good leader. Zhou was often selfless - he subordinated his ego to the party because that's what a man of character should do in a revolutionary situation.
Please find a better biography than this.
March 4, 2023
早前對周恩來的印象，都是間接來自於對毛澤東的閱讀，特別是已過世的史家唐德剛先生的那本《毛澤東專政始末》，他對總理可是抱持著良好評價，以“賢相”之姿立於世，對於“暴君”的胡來都是“相忍為國”，“大局為重”，我委屈求全，好替你收拾殘局，是政壇上的“不倒翁”，“毛一輩子鬥不垮的人”。熟讀歷史的朋友，當然多少對這種說法會有點存疑。前些時候，聽人家介紹這本高文謙的《晚年周恩來》，上網查一下，中國禁書，看到有本二手，立馬就買了。
作者高文謙本來是中共御用文人，負責編撰周恩來官方傳記，89民運時因為同情學生被清算，被迫流亡海外。在書中自述中，其父母輩當年在那段動盪歲月也沒少受苦，雖是黨員，但因為“直言”而被打成右派勞改入獄等。這些經歷與背景多少也會影響作者寫作的立場。不過個人感覺，比起張戎那種極端的做法，高文謙下筆其實倒還算中肯且具說服力。
人無完人，現在把周恩來打造成神壇上供奉的偶像，大概只有一些凡夫俗子才會被愚弄。特別是像傳主這種地位的人，其作為不可能單純，評價也不是非黑即白那麼簡單。不過高文謙筆下的周恩來卻不是中共官方會喜歡的那種基調，他把這位“相忍為國”，“大局為重”的“賢相”、“國之棟樑”，刻劃成被儒家文化薰陶，效力於毛澤東這個獨夫的“忠臣”。從一個有為國為民，不惜犧牲自我委身與暴君周旋的高尚情操之總理，變成一獨夫的純臣，雖不甘同流合污，為虎作倀，但卻也只能被動挨打，處處委曲求全，為其收拾殘局，未能阻止任何悲劇，名大於實的庸臣。這兩個評價看似差之千里，但其實也相去不遠，差別就只在於這一切所為何來。在當時的政治局勢中，打倒毛澤東不是一個現實的可能性，如果想要在其底下能有所作為，勢必要先求不被鬥垮，而這是要付出代價的。觀周恩來這一生，真可謂是苦難重重，他忍了許多人所不能忍，做了許多非常之舉，讀者忍不住想問的是，這一切到底所為何來？是忠君？是愛國？抑或者一切為了黨？而在某些政治環境中，這些是沒有差別的。所以外人才難以窺透周恩來的內心之中，究竟是持怎樣的態度。
有流傳一則故事，曾有人問周恩來該如何評價法國大革命，他回答說：「為時尚早。」或許該怎麼對自己蓋棺論定亦然吧。個人是認為，中共建政以來的一代精英，差不多都給毛澤東這獨夫給糟蹋光了。如果此公死在大錯開始之前，就是不可動搖的神主牌了。接下來不管劉少奇、周恩來、鄧小平等人怎麼鬥爭，或者同舟共濟，我想都不會比歷史上糟糕，歷史也將大大的改寫吧。
不過這也是崇拜精英統治，迷信強人領導的原罪吧。最近看了本雜誌對中共修憲的評論，作者居然說“相信習不會戀棧權力，功成身退”云云，讓我著實目瞪口呆，翻到封面確認自己不是在看黨文宣。都二十一世紀了，居然還有人相信強人會輕易的交出權柄？這種力量向來不是能輕易的賦予跟收回，尤其是像中共這種踏著屍山血海，辛苦鬥爭才能獲取的，即便想要放下屠刀，權力者還得顧慮自己能否順利下庄？活著擔心安全，死後在意名聲。毛澤東多年鬥爭不就為此嗎？難道今天的當權者處境就能比他更好？
今天的事情再次驗證了黑格爾：「歷史給我們唯一的教訓，就是我們無法從歷史中得到任何教訓。」習仲勛生前擔心再出一個毛澤東，但他沒料到最害怕的事情卻出自自己的血脈吧？
周恩來泉下有知，不知當作何感想？
作者高文謙本來是中共御用文人，負責編撰周恩來官方傳記，89民運時因為同情學生被清算，被迫流亡海外。在書中自述中，其父母輩當年在那段動盪歲月也沒少受苦，雖是黨員，但因為“直言”而被打成右派勞改入獄等。這些經歷與背景多少也會影響作者寫作的立場。不過個人感覺，比起張戎那種極端的做法，高文謙下筆其實倒還算中肯且具說服力。
人無完人，現在把周恩來打造成神壇上供奉的偶像，大概只有一些凡夫俗子才會被愚弄。特別是像傳主這種地位的人，其作為不可能單純，評價也不是非黑即白那麼簡單。不過高文謙筆下的周恩來卻不是中共官方會喜歡的那種基調，他把這位“相忍為國”，“大局為重”的“賢相”、“國之棟樑”，刻劃成被儒家文化薰陶，效力於毛澤東這個獨夫的“忠臣”。從一個有為國為民，不惜犧牲自我委身與暴君周旋的高尚情操之總理，變成一獨夫的純臣，雖不甘同流合污，為虎作倀，但卻也只能被動挨打，處處委曲求全，為其收拾殘局，未能阻止任何悲劇，名大於實的庸臣。這兩個評價看似差之千里，但其實也相去不遠，差別就只在於這一切所為何來。在當時的政治局勢中，打倒毛澤東不是一個現實的可能性，如果想要在其底下能有所作為，勢必要先求不被鬥垮，而這是要付出代價的。觀周恩來這一生，真可謂是苦難重重，他忍了許多人所不能忍，做了許多非常之舉，讀者忍不住想問的是，這一切到底所為何來？是忠君？是愛國？抑或者一切為了黨？而在某些政治環境中，這些是沒有差別的。所以外人才難以窺透周恩來的內心之中，究竟是持怎樣的態度。
有流傳一則故事，曾有人問周恩來該如何評價法國大革命，他回答說：「為時尚早。」或許該怎麼對自己蓋棺論定亦然吧。個人是認為，中共建政以來的一代精英，差不多都給毛澤東這獨夫給糟蹋光了。如果此公死在大錯開始之前，就是不可動搖的神主牌了。接下來不管劉少奇、周恩來、鄧小平等人怎麼鬥爭，或者同舟共濟，我想都不會比歷史上糟糕，歷史也將大大的改寫吧。
不過這也是崇拜精英統治，迷信強人領導的原罪吧。最近看了本雜誌對中共修憲的評論，作者居然說“相信習不會戀棧權力，功成身退”云云，讓我著實目瞪口呆，翻到封面確認自己不是在看黨文宣。都二十一世紀了，居然還有人相信強人會輕易的交出權柄？這種力量向來不是能輕易的賦予跟收回，尤其是像中共這種踏著屍山血海，辛苦鬥爭才能獲取的，即便想要放下屠刀，權力者還得顧慮自己能否順利下庄？活著擔心安全，死後在意名聲。毛澤東多年鬥爭不就為此嗎？難道今天的當權者處境就能比他更好？
今天的事情再次驗證了黑格爾：「歷史給我們唯一的教訓，就是我們無法從歷史中得到任何教訓。」習仲勛生前擔心再出一個毛澤東，但他沒料到最害怕的事情卻出自自己的血脈吧？
周恩來泉下有知，不知當作何感想？
January 7, 2019
Zhou Enlai, the former chinese premier, was probably most known to the world as one of the architects of Sino-US normalisation of relation. That is also how I came to know him. Intelligent, charming, and politically astute, he managed to escape the fate that befell people around him, from the times of Chinese Civil War, Great Leap Forward up to the Cultural Revolution, when he came to be consumed by cancer. The most interesting thing to note from this book is his relationship with Mao Zedong. Zhou was more commonly regarded as Mao’s stooge, but the reality is more complex. Mao detested Zhou for threatening his grip on power, yet he relied on Zhou to keep everything going smoothly. Zhou, on the other hand, believed that Mao was wrecking China’s economy over with his political campaigns, but he acknowledged that his own political survival hanged by a thread on Mao’s whim. The more strange thing to happen was Zhou’s vow to be always loyal to Mao, despite Mao repeatedly abusing him, that’s quite strange. But in the end, Zhou won his duel with Mao, with Deng Xiaoping’s ascension to the position of Paramount Leader, shifting the focus of the communist party to economic building, and repudiate the whole legacy of Chairman Mao.
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