What do you think?
Rate this book
Escaping the Housing Trap: The Strong Towns Response to the Housing Crisis
Housing is an investment. Investment prices must go up. Housing is shelter. When the price of shelter goes up, people experience distress.
This is the housing trap. It’s time to escape. In Escaping the Housing The Strong Towns Response to the Housing Crisis, renowned urbanists Charles (Chuck) Marohn and Daniel Herriges introduce a first-of-its-kind discussion of the tension between housing as a financial product and housing as shelter. This is the key insight that’s been missing from the Housing Crisis Conversation; and the insight that can help cities fight back against the crisis from the bottom-up.
This book offers a serious, yet accessible, history of housing policy in the United States and explains how it led us to this point in where we face a market that is rigged against people who, only a few decades ago, could have been homeowners or stable, long-term rentals.
Only local change, on a neighborhood or city-wide scale, can begin to restore balance to the housing market.
Escaping the Housing Trap is the must-read resource for everyone with a stake in the future of housing in America—and that means everyone. Readers will
Discussions of housing as an investment and how the country's neighborhoods are being transformed by the introduction of large amounts of investment Explorations of housing as shelter, including discussions of zoning policy and NIMBYism A comprehensive overview of the Strong Towns approach to solving the American housing crisis
This is the housing trap. It’s time to escape. In Escaping the Housing The Strong Towns Response to the Housing Crisis, renowned urbanists Charles (Chuck) Marohn and Daniel Herriges introduce a first-of-its-kind discussion of the tension between housing as a financial product and housing as shelter. This is the key insight that’s been missing from the Housing Crisis Conversation; and the insight that can help cities fight back against the crisis from the bottom-up.
This book offers a serious, yet accessible, history of housing policy in the United States and explains how it led us to this point in where we face a market that is rigged against people who, only a few decades ago, could have been homeowners or stable, long-term rentals.
Only local change, on a neighborhood or city-wide scale, can begin to restore balance to the housing market.
Escaping the Housing Trap is the must-read resource for everyone with a stake in the future of housing in America—and that means everyone. Readers will
Discussions of housing as an investment and how the country's neighborhoods are being transformed by the introduction of large amounts of investment Explorations of housing as shelter, including discussions of zoning policy and NIMBYism A comprehensive overview of the Strong Towns approach to solving the American housing crisis
225 pages, Kindle Edition
Published April 16, 2024
103 people are currently reading
1234 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 67 reviews
August 10, 2024
I've been a reader of Strong Towns writing for a while, but this was my first book of theirs I've picked up.
You could say the insane housing market of the last five years—colliding in time with my own family of five house-hunting on one non-affluent income—has radicalized me just a bit. The current housing situation is absolutely crushing for many people, in ways people might not understand if they haven't tried to purchase a home in the last five years with middle class or lower income. This has many downstream effects on human flourishing, financial precarity, single people, retired people stuck in place, young families forming and thriving, and the overall ability to find adequate housing where it's needed, to suit a variety of needs.
The housing crisis is multi-layered and complex, so the response will have to be equally multi-layered and complex. Strong Towns as an organization has continually pinpointed these glaring problems with certain restrictions, codes, policies, laws and even attitudes that—when compounded by their interactions with each other—are absolutely handicapping any common sense progress that would give people some relief.
What I appreciate about this book is that it is not full of "solutions" but rather "approaches" — approaches that align with a non-partisan approach to incremental, flexible, and local scale solutions to housing demand. (Yes, legalize the traditional development pattern that has existed for all of time for all of human history, up until several decades ago!)
This would pair well with Nolan Gray's book "Arbitrary Lines" and I'm sure Seth Kaplan's "Fragile Neighborhoods" (yet to read).
You could say the insane housing market of the last five years—colliding in time with my own family of five house-hunting on one non-affluent income—has radicalized me just a bit. The current housing situation is absolutely crushing for many people, in ways people might not understand if they haven't tried to purchase a home in the last five years with middle class or lower income. This has many downstream effects on human flourishing, financial precarity, single people, retired people stuck in place, young families forming and thriving, and the overall ability to find adequate housing where it's needed, to suit a variety of needs.
The housing crisis is multi-layered and complex, so the response will have to be equally multi-layered and complex. Strong Towns as an organization has continually pinpointed these glaring problems with certain restrictions, codes, policies, laws and even attitudes that—when compounded by their interactions with each other—are absolutely handicapping any common sense progress that would give people some relief.
What I appreciate about this book is that it is not full of "solutions" but rather "approaches" — approaches that align with a non-partisan approach to incremental, flexible, and local scale solutions to housing demand. (Yes, legalize the traditional development pattern that has existed for all of time for all of human history, up until several decades ago!)
This would pair well with Nolan Gray's book "Arbitrary Lines" and I'm sure Seth Kaplan's "Fragile Neighborhoods" (yet to read).
January 26, 2025
4/5.
Definitely recommend to anyone concerned about housing affordability. Loved the section on how housing is no longer primarily for shelter—it’s primarily for building equity.
Key point: Either housing costs outpace inflation (housing builds equity for homeowners) OR inflation outpaces housing costs (housing becomes more affordable). It cannot do both.
In order for housing to become affordable, we must accept that existing homeowners will *lose* equity (relative to inflation) in the process. Deflation is painful, but I think it’s necessary.
Definitely recommend to anyone concerned about housing affordability. Loved the section on how housing is no longer primarily for shelter—it’s primarily for building equity.
Key point: Either housing costs outpace inflation (housing builds equity for homeowners) OR inflation outpaces housing costs (housing becomes more affordable). It cannot do both.
In order for housing to become affordable, we must accept that existing homeowners will *lose* equity (relative to inflation) in the process. Deflation is painful, but I think it’s necessary.
April 30, 2024
Lacks a silver bullet answer to housing affordability, and that's a good thing. Rather than over simplifying by only saying "remove single family zoning" and "end parking minimums", this book details the complexity of housing as both a human need and now a financial instrument. At a high level, this book offers ideas for how we can reduce the friction for as many individuals that want to to incrementally improve and increase the housing available within their communities.
April 24, 2024
Chuck Marohn has once again written a wonderful book, though this time he has a co-author, Daniel Herriges. But whomever was ultimately responsible for each of the dozens of important, insightful arguments in the book, the result is a must-read. Politically speaking, I think there are some interesting ways to engage with, and even critique, some of the ways Marohn frames America's housing problems and how to respond to them; I lay out some of those engagements in my longer review here. But for a brief Goodreads review, the main thing to say is that Marohn is deeply convincing in his presentation of what he sees as our fundamental housing complication: the fact that housing isn't only, or even primarily, shelter in the U.S., but rather is a financial instrument, whose mortgages and construction costs are tied up with close to a century of economic, political, and social policies, all of which have their own legacies. Facing this complication will be mean building much, MUCH more housing in America, but doing it in incremental, in-fill ways, pushing wherever and however we can for the return of lightly regulated starter homes, and whatever experiments with social or shared or public housing might seem plausible, all while keeping our reform-minded eyes on parking minimums, excessive zoning requirements, and so much more that hampers the ability of builders and buyers to respond to the desperate need for new housing in a logical way. This is a tall order, to be sure, but Marohn shows how it can be done. So buy this book now, and get busy!
August 25, 2025
I really liked this! I liked that it was BUILD BUILD BUILD, but with nuance. Learned a ton about mortgages! Also learned that our economy is wrecked what a great system we have where houses are our main assets and so people want house prices to always be going up and also people need houses to live in hahaa so fun and so cool and def no problems there!!!
May 4, 2024
As a long-time StrongTowns member, a new StrongTowns book is always awaited with anticipation. Even if I don’t align with every aspect of the StrongTowns philosophy, the books written by StrongTowns leadership are always insightful, thought-provoking, and useful in creating community dialogue.
“Escaping the Housing Trap” is no exception.
The first third of the book addresses the century-long transition that made home mortgages and their derivatives a central support of the national economy, inhibiting national leaders from responding rationally to the role of the housing market as a provider of shelter. I lack the background in economics to adequately judge the argument. However, the reasoning presented by the authors seems credible. To validate my impressions, I had a copy of the book sent directly to a cousin who is a retired economics professor. I’m awaiting her thoughts.
The second third of the book, on the role of zoning, building codes, PUDs, and more in impacting the housing market, was more familiar terrain as I was already acquainted with the work of Gray, Parolek, Lauster, Rothstein, and others. The authors build on that work, with a particularly strong example of a 1952 position of the Urban Land Institute on building to a “finished state”, a flawed concept that further inhibits the ability of the housing market to provide shelter.
These first two segments constitute the argument that the nation is in a “housing trap”. The final third of the book lays out the StrongTowns proposal to address this housing trap. This segment was more problematic to me. While I agree with loosening zoning code and related restrictions on homeowners and small builders to ease the housing crisis, I don’t believe “unleashing the swarm” will make a substantial difference, at least where I live.
One reason for my reluctance is that my town is a counter-example to a key assertion made by the authors. They argue that capital flows easily to housing types, particularly finished state single-family homes and 5-over-1 multifamily, that don’t adequately address the housing crisis. But in my community, even those housing types are often not financially feasible, with construction costs out of alignment with local wages. This financial infeasibility seems to flow onward to the types of housing additions that the “swarm” might build. Thus, I fear unleashing the swarm would have negligible impact.
This isn’t to say that we shouldn’t undertake the zoning and related loosening called for by the authors, only that the loosening would provide little benefit.
To their credit, Marohn telling the story that he and his co-author pushed back on their publisher describing the book as the “StrongTowns solution” to housing, instead insisting on “StrongTowns response”, lessens their culpability for insufficiently useful ideas. Nonetheless, I could still wish for more actionable insights about the housing crisis.
This criticism aside, the book remains a valuable addition to the national conversation on housing and is easily worth five stars. It has already begun triggering renewed housing conversations in my community. And that is the best test of any book.
“Escaping the Housing Trap” is no exception.
The first third of the book addresses the century-long transition that made home mortgages and their derivatives a central support of the national economy, inhibiting national leaders from responding rationally to the role of the housing market as a provider of shelter. I lack the background in economics to adequately judge the argument. However, the reasoning presented by the authors seems credible. To validate my impressions, I had a copy of the book sent directly to a cousin who is a retired economics professor. I’m awaiting her thoughts.
The second third of the book, on the role of zoning, building codes, PUDs, and more in impacting the housing market, was more familiar terrain as I was already acquainted with the work of Gray, Parolek, Lauster, Rothstein, and others. The authors build on that work, with a particularly strong example of a 1952 position of the Urban Land Institute on building to a “finished state”, a flawed concept that further inhibits the ability of the housing market to provide shelter.
These first two segments constitute the argument that the nation is in a “housing trap”. The final third of the book lays out the StrongTowns proposal to address this housing trap. This segment was more problematic to me. While I agree with loosening zoning code and related restrictions on homeowners and small builders to ease the housing crisis, I don’t believe “unleashing the swarm” will make a substantial difference, at least where I live.
One reason for my reluctance is that my town is a counter-example to a key assertion made by the authors. They argue that capital flows easily to housing types, particularly finished state single-family homes and 5-over-1 multifamily, that don’t adequately address the housing crisis. But in my community, even those housing types are often not financially feasible, with construction costs out of alignment with local wages. This financial infeasibility seems to flow onward to the types of housing additions that the “swarm” might build. Thus, I fear unleashing the swarm would have negligible impact.
This isn’t to say that we shouldn’t undertake the zoning and related loosening called for by the authors, only that the loosening would provide little benefit.
To their credit, Marohn telling the story that he and his co-author pushed back on their publisher describing the book as the “StrongTowns solution” to housing, instead insisting on “StrongTowns response”, lessens their culpability for insufficiently useful ideas. Nonetheless, I could still wish for more actionable insights about the housing crisis.
This criticism aside, the book remains a valuable addition to the national conversation on housing and is easily worth five stars. It has already begun triggering renewed housing conversations in my community. And that is the best test of any book.
May 29, 2024
Chuck (and his new friend) have done it again. I loved every part of this book that wasn't in the boring (but important) beginning four chapters that explain the history of US housing finance. I like that the book isn't afraid to aim at popular movements/"solutions" in housing and calling them out where they deserve criticism and the do offer a new framework for what a effective, economically sustainable and responsive housing system would look like. I would strongly recommend this for anyone interested in housing, neighborhood development, or is just a concerned citizen looking to make change in their town. It is incredibly prescient and helpful in our dark housing times.
July 12, 2025
I loved this analysis up to the very end, when the tone became more strident. I would have appreciated more cause and effect analysis/ futurecasting about the proposed policies. The conclusions felt a little unearned and the second and third level consequences, underimagined.
July 9, 2024
Just like the two previous books in the Strong Towns series, this was so good and really resonated with me.
December 18, 2024
This book was well researched. I found the first third of the book that talked about the US financial system being built on housing prices quite fascinating. A collapse and housing prices could create a broader collapse in the entire financial system. The the second third of the book was a brief history on zoning and planning it was good not great. The final third provided some examples of things that might make an impact on the housing crisis. Some of the ideas were really good like providing resources and tools to allow for a small incremental development in every neighborhood and transitioning to a land value tax system rather than property tax in order to incentivize development.
A comprehensive historical overview of the US housing market. The book does an excellent job describing both the financial and planning history of how we have landed in the current affordable housing crisis.
The book explains how we went from a housing death spiral in the Great Depression to never ending appreciation in the housing market of today. To end the death spiral during the Depression, FHA was created to provide mortgage insurance and reduce down payment requirements from 50% to 20%, Fannie Mae was created to be a guaranteed purchaser of mortgages which allowed banks to lend on more and more homes, amortization was created rather than all being balloon payments. This set the housing trap for which homeowners, banks, and the rest of the financial system are reliant on steady growth of home prices. We have an affordability crisis, but reducing home prices is so destructive to the greater economy—policy makers and others often fight against it.
“As military and industry demobilized at the end of the second world war, all that war time spending banished. Economists and politicians worried America was going to slide back into another great depression. New home construction was the perfect economic stimulus to offset the declining military spending by purchasing a new home and assuming a mortgage, families unlocked decades of their future earnings and put them to work immediately growing the economy.” Page 35.
Between 1945 and 1970 mortgage debt exploded from 16% to 41% of GDP. The housing market was now the foundation of the economy. Keeping it going what’s the top priority. Page 38.
The secondary mortgage market enhancement act of 1984 expanded the market for private mortgage back securities by making those rated AA or above the financial equivalent of US treasuries. If a nationally recognized statistical ratings agency rated a mortgage back security as AA or AAA that security could be held by a savings and loan or private bank as their required reserves. This was in lieu of holding treasury bills. Since an MBS was almost guaranteed to pay a greater return than a treasury certificate. The market for mortgages was now set to become insatiable. Prior to 1984 homeownership in the housing market provided where the figurative foundation of the economy now,with mortgage back security set to guarantee the solvency of every financial institution homeownership and the housing market. we’re on their way to becoming the literal foundation of the economy. Page 47.
During the 1990s Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac reduced down payment requirements on mortgages 10% to 3%. In 2001 they eliminated the need for down payment altogether. This had a dramatic impact on the amount of equity. The homeowners had. In 1989, only 7% of home mortgages originated with less than 10% down payment . By 1999, half of all mortgages at down payments less than 10%. Page 52.
The irony of the 1990s was that, under the guise of making homeownership more accessible, purchasers were simply able to pay more for the same housing. Then, with housing price is going up, they were able to take the equity they gain from that appreciation and supplement their stretched income. Page 53.
Lowering interest rates is like reducing financial gravity. The weight of debt burdens declines and money begins to seep into places otherwise wouldn’t go. Page 55.
What led to the great financial crisis was a collection of the least scrupulous players becoming the market makers with everyone else needing to match their terms or lose market share. This was true of bankers, appraisers, insurers, and investors.
The subsequent rise, an interest rates brought into relief the absurdity of long-term mortgages as an investment vehicle would interest rates fall investment value of a 30 year fixed more mortgage goes up. Someone owning a bundle of mortgage is paying 6% annually is going to want to hang onto them when new mortgages are being made at 3%. Yet those are the exact conditions when the borrower refinances, terminating the 6% payment and exchange for a lower yielding loan, the investor has no recourse, but to give up their priced asset the opposite happens when interest rates rise someone owning a bundle of mortgage is paying 3% annually is going to want to trade them out when new mortgages are being bundled at 6%. That is exactly when homeowners hunker down few people commit to paying 30 year mortgage 3% rate seek to refinance When rates go to 6% again, the investor is stuck this time with lower yielding paper. Mortgages are the foundation of our financial system yet they are the worst kind of investment. The reason investors accept such bad payoff asymmetry is because the federal government is committed to keeping housing prices elevated. Investors by mortgages because mortgages are a safe bet. Page 69.
There will always be a coordinated effort to reinflate the housing market. There has to be if the housing market fails, the financial system fails. Prices can’t go down not in a meaningful way. This makes the next innovation and housing finance somewhat predictable: the 50 year mortgage. While demographic trans suggest there will be upward pressure on wages over the coming decade or so there remains a massive affordability gap for the next generation of homebuyers the 50 year mortgage fully backed by the federal government financed through Wall Street Investment banks will lower monthly payments enough to allow desperate Americans in their 20s and 30s to buy homes from desperate Americans in their 70s and 80s All while keeping prices elevated and the financial sector secure. Page 70.
Have a home without equity is like a rental with that we are poised to turn Americans into a nation of that laden renters. Page 70.
In Somerville, Massachusetts outside of Boston a city of 80,000 people took a look at the number of Foley zoning compliant lots in the city: there were only 22. Page 74.
Page 130 talks about the importance of having small, infill developers. Big developers and homebuilders can’t bridge this affordability and supply gap on their own, we need a coalition of smaller developers to mobilize and start to take bite sized chunks out of the supply gap.
Page 135 argues that the number one correlation for homelessness is regional housing costs.
The bigger problem with vouchers is that the program is a demand site subsidy as a rule. If you subsidize the supply of something you will get more of it, and that will then push the price down on the other hand if you subsidize the consumption of something supply constraint , such as price, such as rental housing you may market prices up. This is some of the out of town payment assistance program interest rates on all prices page 140.
Pathways to better affordability:
-mandate universal upzoning to the next incremental intensity in every neighborhood
The authors talk about the importance of creating an incremental developer network. Connections, open doors, especially in small scale development. We are knowing the right lender or the Wright affordable but also highly competent contractor is worth its weight in gold. Page 171.
We need a class of semi amateur citizen, developers many times larger than exist today. This will involve a range of levels of financial commitment and expertise. On one end of the Ranger house hackers modifying their own properties and ways to create new housing units. The other end of the range will be those who do make development their day job but who generally do so in or near their neighborhood in which they live at an incremental scale of individual lots with an existing belt fabric . Page 172.
One thing it would almost certainly mean if more ordinary, visionaries pursuit incremental development projects is that we would see a greater variety of housing types, sizes and price points. An illustrative example is that while 2/3 of American households have one or two members a full 88% of new homes built have three bedrooms or more. The business model of the incremental developer is based on financial economies of scale, but on hyper local knowledge. page 173
Page 178 talks about South Bend developer cohort empowerment program. They provide technical assistance as well as facilitating, networking peer support. This is something that Ivory Innovations could potentially consider as a way to impact housing affordability by deploying a host of in criminal developers across the country who can all make an impact.
On pages 190 and 191 it talks about the Oswego Renaissance Association, which provides modest matching grants to homeowners who are prepared to do something to improve their property. However, there are two catches first the chain must be visible from the street in order to signal to everyone else out there Making improvements to the neighborhood second, applications must come in groups of at least five homeowners. This has been a powerful tool which has awarded $560,000 of grants, but this modest amount leverage over $5.1 million in private investment through the neighborhood
A comprehensive historical overview of the US housing market. The book does an excellent job describing both the financial and planning history of how we have landed in the current affordable housing crisis.
The book explains how we went from a housing death spiral in the Great Depression to never ending appreciation in the housing market of today. To end the death spiral during the Depression, FHA was created to provide mortgage insurance and reduce down payment requirements from 50% to 20%, Fannie Mae was created to be a guaranteed purchaser of mortgages which allowed banks to lend on more and more homes, amortization was created rather than all being balloon payments. This set the housing trap for which homeowners, banks, and the rest of the financial system are reliant on steady growth of home prices. We have an affordability crisis, but reducing home prices is so destructive to the greater economy—policy makers and others often fight against it.
“As military and industry demobilized at the end of the second world war, all that war time spending banished. Economists and politicians worried America was going to slide back into another great depression. New home construction was the perfect economic stimulus to offset the declining military spending by purchasing a new home and assuming a mortgage, families unlocked decades of their future earnings and put them to work immediately growing the economy.” Page 35.
Between 1945 and 1970 mortgage debt exploded from 16% to 41% of GDP. The housing market was now the foundation of the economy. Keeping it going what’s the top priority. Page 38.
The secondary mortgage market enhancement act of 1984 expanded the market for private mortgage back securities by making those rated AA or above the financial equivalent of US treasuries. If a nationally recognized statistical ratings agency rated a mortgage back security as AA or AAA that security could be held by a savings and loan or private bank as their required reserves. This was in lieu of holding treasury bills. Since an MBS was almost guaranteed to pay a greater return than a treasury certificate. The market for mortgages was now set to become insatiable. Prior to 1984 homeownership in the housing market provided where the figurative foundation of the economy now,with mortgage back security set to guarantee the solvency of every financial institution homeownership and the housing market. we’re on their way to becoming the literal foundation of the economy. Page 47.
During the 1990s Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac reduced down payment requirements on mortgages 10% to 3%. In 2001 they eliminated the need for down payment altogether. This had a dramatic impact on the amount of equity. The homeowners had. In 1989, only 7% of home mortgages originated with less than 10% down payment . By 1999, half of all mortgages at down payments less than 10%. Page 52.
The irony of the 1990s was that, under the guise of making homeownership more accessible, purchasers were simply able to pay more for the same housing. Then, with housing price is going up, they were able to take the equity they gain from that appreciation and supplement their stretched income. Page 53.
Lowering interest rates is like reducing financial gravity. The weight of debt burdens declines and money begins to seep into places otherwise wouldn’t go. Page 55.
What led to the great financial crisis was a collection of the least scrupulous players becoming the market makers with everyone else needing to match their terms or lose market share. This was true of bankers, appraisers, insurers, and investors.
The subsequent rise, an interest rates brought into relief the absurdity of long-term mortgages as an investment vehicle would interest rates fall investment value of a 30 year fixed more mortgage goes up. Someone owning a bundle of mortgage is paying 6% annually is going to want to hang onto them when new mortgages are being made at 3%. Yet those are the exact conditions when the borrower refinances, terminating the 6% payment and exchange for a lower yielding loan, the investor has no recourse, but to give up their priced asset the opposite happens when interest rates rise someone owning a bundle of mortgage is paying 3% annually is going to want to trade them out when new mortgages are being bundled at 6%. That is exactly when homeowners hunker down few people commit to paying 30 year mortgage 3% rate seek to refinance When rates go to 6% again, the investor is stuck this time with lower yielding paper. Mortgages are the foundation of our financial system yet they are the worst kind of investment. The reason investors accept such bad payoff asymmetry is because the federal government is committed to keeping housing prices elevated. Investors by mortgages because mortgages are a safe bet. Page 69.
There will always be a coordinated effort to reinflate the housing market. There has to be if the housing market fails, the financial system fails. Prices can’t go down not in a meaningful way. This makes the next innovation and housing finance somewhat predictable: the 50 year mortgage. While demographic trans suggest there will be upward pressure on wages over the coming decade or so there remains a massive affordability gap for the next generation of homebuyers the 50 year mortgage fully backed by the federal government financed through Wall Street Investment banks will lower monthly payments enough to allow desperate Americans in their 20s and 30s to buy homes from desperate Americans in their 70s and 80s All while keeping prices elevated and the financial sector secure. Page 70.
Have a home without equity is like a rental with that we are poised to turn Americans into a nation of that laden renters. Page 70.
In Somerville, Massachusetts outside of Boston a city of 80,000 people took a look at the number of Foley zoning compliant lots in the city: there were only 22. Page 74.
Page 130 talks about the importance of having small, infill developers. Big developers and homebuilders can’t bridge this affordability and supply gap on their own, we need a coalition of smaller developers to mobilize and start to take bite sized chunks out of the supply gap.
Page 135 argues that the number one correlation for homelessness is regional housing costs.
The bigger problem with vouchers is that the program is a demand site subsidy as a rule. If you subsidize the supply of something you will get more of it, and that will then push the price down on the other hand if you subsidize the consumption of something supply constraint , such as price, such as rental housing you may market prices up. This is some of the out of town payment assistance program interest rates on all prices page 140.
Pathways to better affordability:
-mandate universal upzoning to the next incremental intensity in every neighborhood
The authors talk about the importance of creating an incremental developer network. Connections, open doors, especially in small scale development. We are knowing the right lender or the Wright affordable but also highly competent contractor is worth its weight in gold. Page 171.
We need a class of semi amateur citizen, developers many times larger than exist today. This will involve a range of levels of financial commitment and expertise. On one end of the Ranger house hackers modifying their own properties and ways to create new housing units. The other end of the range will be those who do make development their day job but who generally do so in or near their neighborhood in which they live at an incremental scale of individual lots with an existing belt fabric . Page 172.
One thing it would almost certainly mean if more ordinary, visionaries pursuit incremental development projects is that we would see a greater variety of housing types, sizes and price points. An illustrative example is that while 2/3 of American households have one or two members a full 88% of new homes built have three bedrooms or more. The business model of the incremental developer is based on financial economies of scale, but on hyper local knowledge. page 173
Page 178 talks about South Bend developer cohort empowerment program. They provide technical assistance as well as facilitating, networking peer support. This is something that Ivory Innovations could potentially consider as a way to impact housing affordability by deploying a host of in criminal developers across the country who can all make an impact.
On pages 190 and 191 it talks about the Oswego Renaissance Association, which provides modest matching grants to homeowners who are prepared to do something to improve their property. However, there are two catches first the chain must be visible from the street in order to signal to everyone else out there Making improvements to the neighborhood second, applications must come in groups of at least five homeowners. This has been a powerful tool which has awarded $560,000 of grants, but this modest amount leverage over $5.1 million in private investment through the neighborhood
July 7, 2024
Escaping the Housing Trap: The Strong Towns Response to the Housing Crisis by Charles L. Marohn Jr. and Daniel Herriges
Strong Towns Book 3
10h 3m narrated by Stephen R. Thorne, 240 pages
Genre: Nonfiction, Business, Economics, Politics
Featuring: Disclaimer, Parts, Introduction, Housing as Investment, Is Housing Shelter or an Investment?, Who Benefits from High Housing Prices?, Understanding the Housing Market, Can Housing Prices Go Down?, Building the Trap, Understanding the Traditional Development Pattern, The Progressive Movement's Housing Reforms, Housing Becomes a Financial Product, Stabilized and Ready to Grow, Setting the Trap, Mechanical Permanence as an Antidote to Organic Messiness, The First Generation of America's Suburban Experiment, The Second-Generation Implications of Permanence, The Trap Starts to Close, The Savings and Loan Bubble, Note, Trapped, The Subprime Crisis, The Road to Recovery?, What Comes Next?, Housing as Shelter, Zoning Lockdown: The Illegal City of Somerville, The Roots of American Zoning, The Birth and Death of the Triple-Decker, The “Lodger Evil”, Residential Hotels / SROs, Zoning as a Tool of Economic Exclusion, Zoning and the FHA, Locking Down the Core Cities, Downzoned and Pushed Out, Build and No-Build Zones, The Missing Middle, Did Zoning Cause the Housing Shortage?, Can We Escape from Zoning Lockdown?, Not in My Backyard, Who Are the NIMBYs?, How the Suburban Experiment Created the NIMBY, Incentives in the Driving City, The Outsized Power of No, Homevoters versus the Growth Machine (Spoiler: They Both Win), The New Battle over “Local Control”, Reclaiming the Banner of Community Empowerment, Yes! In My Backyard, The Start of a Movement, One Neat Trick, Does “Build Build Build” Offer an Escape from the Housing Crisis?, Big YIMBY Question #1: (How) Does Supply Matter?, Housing as Six Degrees of Separation, The Importance of Vacancy Rates, Try YIMBY™ Today! (*Your Local Experience May Vary), Big YIMBY Question #2: How Do We Get a Housing Revolution?, Successes That Scale, Affordable with a Capital “A”, How Los Angeles “Lost” 111,000 Affordable Housing Units, The “Affordable” System in the US, Public Housing, Housing Vouchers, Inclusionary Zoning, The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, Removing Housing from the Speculative Market, Social Housing: Public Housing 2.0?, A Parallel Option, Not a Panacea; Housing in a Strong Town, A System That Produces a Solution, A Paradigm Shift toward Complexity, The Principles of a New Approach to Housing, Maintaining a Sense of Urgency, Releasing the Swarm, Building an Incremental Development Culture: The South Bend Experiment, “Find Your Farm”, Growing an Intentionally, Inclusive Developer Community, Cities Built by Many Hands, The Incremental Developer's Business Model, Incremental Development as “Gentlefication”, It Takes a “Swarm”, How Cities Can Support the Growth of Incremental Development, Not “Does It Scale?” but “Does It Replicate?”, Financing a Housing Revolution, Buffer from the Distorting Boom, Repurposing Empty Bedrooms, Financing Backyard Cottages, Getting Capital off the Sidelines, Financing Small Developers, Transforming Entire Neighborhoods, Aligning Local Tax Policy, Building a Strong Town, References, Index, Websites - StrongTowns.org
Rating as a movie:
Quotes: The US Census Bureau reported in 2022 that nearly half of American renter households pay over 30% of their income in rent, an amount seen as likely to strain their personal finances and their ability to build up savings. Ownership is no easier. According to the Urban Institute, in December 2022 households earning the median US income could only afford to purchase 20 percent of US homes for sale. In some regions, homeownership is even more out of reach: in metropolitan Seattle, the figure was 7.6 percent. In Los Angeles, a mere 1.9 percent (Choi and Zinn 2022).
Those who make such assertions often focus on only one facet of the issue. In this, they call to mind the Indian parable of the blind men and the elephant. It describes a group of blind men who set out to determine the nature of an elephant but arrive at vastly different conclusions. One man, touching only the trunk, concludes that the elephant resembles a large snake. Another, reaching out and finding the elephant's ear, concludes that it is more like a fan; the man who touches the leg likens it to a tree, and so forth. None of them produces an accurate mental picture of the whole animal. The parable illustrates that people who have incomplete mental models of the world (which is to say, all of us) can arrive at vastly different and incompatible conclusions. Our national discourse about housing is incoherent in part because we are touching different parts of the elephant. Those who set housing policy often do not understand housing finance. Those who focus on finance are often oblivious to the effects of land-use policy. These conversations—housing finance and land-use policy—occur in separate circles and are often insufficiently informed by each other.
Culturally, the relationship between Americans and our neighborhoods has changed. The neighborhood was once the stage on which most of life took place. You were likely to live, work, and conduct commerce within a small radius, and as such you were a participant in the full range of the complex social life of your neighborhood. Today, new residential bedroom communities are more often marketed as places of privacy and exclusivity. They are less likely to be physically and socioeconomically integrated with the broader community, and their residents experience them largely as consumers, not cocreators.
Successive waves of financial innovation have been aimed not at stimulating the supply or variety of housing but at increasing Americans' ability to take on debt to gain access to it. That debt, in turn, would become the basis for an ever-more exotic collection of financial instruments that extracted profit for investors out of the basic homeownership transaction.
My rating: 🌟🌟🌟🌟🌟🏚🏡🏠🏘🏢
My thoughts: 📱38% 3:48:49 Chapter 5 Zoning Lockdown: The Illegal City of Somerville - Well my mind has been blown. There is some much we need to fix about this system and of course, the banks are the biggest problem.
I had no idea that duplexes are illegal in many areas, this might explain why many of the new apartment duplexes built in the last 2 years look like mini suburbs. I'm not surprised most zoning laws are fueled by racism and classism, I am surprised there haven't been more reforms. Especially since No-Build Zones are one of the major reasons for the housing shortage and cost surges in Los Angeles and other California metros.
Recommend to others: Yes! Yes! More people should be aware of what we're up against and the multiple factors that contribute to the housing problem.
Strong Towns
1. Strong Towns: A Bottom-Up Revolution to Rebuild American Prosperity
2. Confessions of a Recovering Engineer: Transportation for a Strong Town
3. Escaping the Housing Trap: The Strong Towns Response to the Housing Crisis
Strong Towns Book 3
10h 3m narrated by Stephen R. Thorne, 240 pages
Genre: Nonfiction, Business, Economics, Politics
Featuring: Disclaimer, Parts, Introduction, Housing as Investment, Is Housing Shelter or an Investment?, Who Benefits from High Housing Prices?, Understanding the Housing Market, Can Housing Prices Go Down?, Building the Trap, Understanding the Traditional Development Pattern, The Progressive Movement's Housing Reforms, Housing Becomes a Financial Product, Stabilized and Ready to Grow, Setting the Trap, Mechanical Permanence as an Antidote to Organic Messiness, The First Generation of America's Suburban Experiment, The Second-Generation Implications of Permanence, The Trap Starts to Close, The Savings and Loan Bubble, Note, Trapped, The Subprime Crisis, The Road to Recovery?, What Comes Next?, Housing as Shelter, Zoning Lockdown: The Illegal City of Somerville, The Roots of American Zoning, The Birth and Death of the Triple-Decker, The “Lodger Evil”, Residential Hotels / SROs, Zoning as a Tool of Economic Exclusion, Zoning and the FHA, Locking Down the Core Cities, Downzoned and Pushed Out, Build and No-Build Zones, The Missing Middle, Did Zoning Cause the Housing Shortage?, Can We Escape from Zoning Lockdown?, Not in My Backyard, Who Are the NIMBYs?, How the Suburban Experiment Created the NIMBY, Incentives in the Driving City, The Outsized Power of No, Homevoters versus the Growth Machine (Spoiler: They Both Win), The New Battle over “Local Control”, Reclaiming the Banner of Community Empowerment, Yes! In My Backyard, The Start of a Movement, One Neat Trick, Does “Build Build Build” Offer an Escape from the Housing Crisis?, Big YIMBY Question #1: (How) Does Supply Matter?, Housing as Six Degrees of Separation, The Importance of Vacancy Rates, Try YIMBY™ Today! (*Your Local Experience May Vary), Big YIMBY Question #2: How Do We Get a Housing Revolution?, Successes That Scale, Affordable with a Capital “A”, How Los Angeles “Lost” 111,000 Affordable Housing Units, The “Affordable” System in the US, Public Housing, Housing Vouchers, Inclusionary Zoning, The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, Removing Housing from the Speculative Market, Social Housing: Public Housing 2.0?, A Parallel Option, Not a Panacea; Housing in a Strong Town, A System That Produces a Solution, A Paradigm Shift toward Complexity, The Principles of a New Approach to Housing, Maintaining a Sense of Urgency, Releasing the Swarm, Building an Incremental Development Culture: The South Bend Experiment, “Find Your Farm”, Growing an Intentionally, Inclusive Developer Community, Cities Built by Many Hands, The Incremental Developer's Business Model, Incremental Development as “Gentlefication”, It Takes a “Swarm”, How Cities Can Support the Growth of Incremental Development, Not “Does It Scale?” but “Does It Replicate?”, Financing a Housing Revolution, Buffer from the Distorting Boom, Repurposing Empty Bedrooms, Financing Backyard Cottages, Getting Capital off the Sidelines, Financing Small Developers, Transforming Entire Neighborhoods, Aligning Local Tax Policy, Building a Strong Town, References, Index, Websites - StrongTowns.org
Rating as a movie:
Quotes: The US Census Bureau reported in 2022 that nearly half of American renter households pay over 30% of their income in rent, an amount seen as likely to strain their personal finances and their ability to build up savings. Ownership is no easier. According to the Urban Institute, in December 2022 households earning the median US income could only afford to purchase 20 percent of US homes for sale. In some regions, homeownership is even more out of reach: in metropolitan Seattle, the figure was 7.6 percent. In Los Angeles, a mere 1.9 percent (Choi and Zinn 2022).
Those who make such assertions often focus on only one facet of the issue. In this, they call to mind the Indian parable of the blind men and the elephant. It describes a group of blind men who set out to determine the nature of an elephant but arrive at vastly different conclusions. One man, touching only the trunk, concludes that the elephant resembles a large snake. Another, reaching out and finding the elephant's ear, concludes that it is more like a fan; the man who touches the leg likens it to a tree, and so forth. None of them produces an accurate mental picture of the whole animal. The parable illustrates that people who have incomplete mental models of the world (which is to say, all of us) can arrive at vastly different and incompatible conclusions. Our national discourse about housing is incoherent in part because we are touching different parts of the elephant. Those who set housing policy often do not understand housing finance. Those who focus on finance are often oblivious to the effects of land-use policy. These conversations—housing finance and land-use policy—occur in separate circles and are often insufficiently informed by each other.
Culturally, the relationship between Americans and our neighborhoods has changed. The neighborhood was once the stage on which most of life took place. You were likely to live, work, and conduct commerce within a small radius, and as such you were a participant in the full range of the complex social life of your neighborhood. Today, new residential bedroom communities are more often marketed as places of privacy and exclusivity. They are less likely to be physically and socioeconomically integrated with the broader community, and their residents experience them largely as consumers, not cocreators.
Successive waves of financial innovation have been aimed not at stimulating the supply or variety of housing but at increasing Americans' ability to take on debt to gain access to it. That debt, in turn, would become the basis for an ever-more exotic collection of financial instruments that extracted profit for investors out of the basic homeownership transaction.
My rating: 🌟🌟🌟🌟🌟🏚🏡🏠🏘🏢
My thoughts: 📱38% 3:48:49 Chapter 5 Zoning Lockdown: The Illegal City of Somerville - Well my mind has been blown. There is some much we need to fix about this system and of course, the banks are the biggest problem.
I had no idea that duplexes are illegal in many areas, this might explain why many of the new apartment duplexes built in the last 2 years look like mini suburbs. I'm not surprised most zoning laws are fueled by racism and classism, I am surprised there haven't been more reforms. Especially since No-Build Zones are one of the major reasons for the housing shortage and cost surges in Los Angeles and other California metros.
Recommend to others: Yes! Yes! More people should be aware of what we're up against and the multiple factors that contribute to the housing problem.
Strong Towns
1. Strong Towns: A Bottom-Up Revolution to Rebuild American Prosperity
2. Confessions of a Recovering Engineer: Transportation for a Strong Town
3. Escaping the Housing Trap: The Strong Towns Response to the Housing Crisis
November 12, 2024
I picked this book up at my local bookstore not having heard about the Strong Towns organization before, but having an interest in housing in America. I agree with Strong Towns' outlook that housing in America is broken; most new developments / housing is only by large-scale contractors and there is a missing "middle." Communities can be tied closer together by this missing middle.
However, I felt the book did not do enough to clearly inform me, the reader, of how to accomplish this middle or persuade me to take action in my own town. Many options were listed, but many times the carveout of one size does not fit all was given, almost as an escape to say if it doesn't work try something else or don't blame us.
I was intrigued by some of the tax policies suggested that could be implemented at a local level, but thought that some were hypocritical of the early to mid 20th century tax policies mentioned early in the book, such as suggesting that towns could basically co-sign loans to add studio apartments onto houses (good) but then suggesting a jumbo payment when the house was sold - hypocritical as earlier we learned jumbo payments were bad. Additionally, this solution does not address if the home looses value while the loan is unpaid. We learned earlier in the book much of the housing system relies that home values must never go down.
The book was densely written and often slow to read. It made good arguments throughout the book but was consistently nuanced with "this won't work everywhere" disclaimers. While these disclaimers were ok to an extent, I thought this severely weakened the author's argument. I appreciated the example of South Bend, Indiana, and wished the book offered more similar success stories.
However, I felt the book did not do enough to clearly inform me, the reader, of how to accomplish this middle or persuade me to take action in my own town. Many options were listed, but many times the carveout of one size does not fit all was given, almost as an escape to say if it doesn't work try something else or don't blame us.
I was intrigued by some of the tax policies suggested that could be implemented at a local level, but thought that some were hypocritical of the early to mid 20th century tax policies mentioned early in the book, such as suggesting that towns could basically co-sign loans to add studio apartments onto houses (good) but then suggesting a jumbo payment when the house was sold - hypocritical as earlier we learned jumbo payments were bad. Additionally, this solution does not address if the home looses value while the loan is unpaid. We learned earlier in the book much of the housing system relies that home values must never go down.
The book was densely written and often slow to read. It made good arguments throughout the book but was consistently nuanced with "this won't work everywhere" disclaimers. While these disclaimers were ok to an extent, I thought this severely weakened the author's argument. I appreciated the example of South Bend, Indiana, and wished the book offered more similar success stories.
February 2, 2025
This book is at best fine. The author brings up some good points (finance wants standard products for securitization) and the rest of the bit is just leading you into exactly what he thinks is important. Whether or not he is correct is never completely questioned. It is a good book to get you psyched for his movement, but if you’re looking for proven solutions they’re not listed in there. He spends a lot of time talking about the small developer driven revolution to create incremental progress, but never touches on the fact that incremental progress is usually totally and completely illegal. He also seems to simply ignore the existence of places like New York, San Francisco, or Los Angeles. LA has a lot of single family homes. They cost $2-4M. Is it a good use of our time to increment them into $2M duplexes? Some more drastic action needs to be taken. In New York, the next increment of density is often quite the undertaking. Will random neighbors take on all that risk?
January 12, 2025
Synopsis/Summary:
The book is about describing why this quote is true and figuring out an approach to tackling it: “We need housing prices to fall but we cannot afford them to fall, thus we are trapped.”
This book discusses some of the same historical events that were discussed in The Color of Law but with a bit less spin and agenda. And it grapples with the question of if housing can be shelter and an investment.
This book would’ve been more accurately titled:
“Understanding The Housing Trap”
Why I chose to read book:
Continuing on my unit to understand. housing in America as well as it’s useful to read for the Agrihood project I’m working on.
What I liked about book:
It was fairly comprehensive and shed light on aspects of the housing market that I didn’t know or fully appreciate.
What I disliked about book:
I didn’t feel like the author’s arguments for why non incremental developments were bad were convincing. In one example he talks about a 12 story condo at the edge of mid sized city downtown where only smaller buildings exist being distorative. But 4 smaller developments with the same number of units would have the same impact on the neighborhood. Maybe there’s just part of his argument I’m missing or don’t understand. His main thesis here is that “a large leap in the development intensity distorts financial gravity in the neighborhood.” And I agree with that mostly but don’t get how many of the examples he points to make much of an impact.
I think the author should’ve spent more time on solutions such as prefab options
I wish the author had spent more time on employment opportunities nearby and its impact on housing availability.
Concepts/Ideas Introduced:
Gave a hypothetical “micro TIF” example of an elderly woman who wants to stay in her home but convert one of her bedrooms to a studio and that the city makes her a loan bc they can borrow at favorable rates and then the old lady pays the loan back with higher property tax payments over time plus a lump sum payment for any remainder.
Regulatory Amber
army of semi pro developers and home hackers
The term cottage courts
Housing theory of everything concept
Vetocracy
Zoned capacity population concept
NOAH- naturally occurring affordable housing
The term gentlefication
Interesting Factual Claims:
Property tax assessment discrimination- impoverished areas consistently pay a higher tax burden based on homes market value than rich areas - this analysis has been undertaken by Urban3
In most US Cities between 70-90% of land is single family zoning
Case Schiller Index - home prices to income ratio - 2023 hit all time high
In 1940 Census half of homes lacked indoor plumbing
1924: first national size standards for lumber. Reduced shipping costs and housing costs.
HOLC - original group to make redlining map
Interesting Anecdotes
There’s a group called Oswego Renaissance Assn. who fights against the “bank run on confidence” they give matching grants to homeowners with 2 catches 1. Change must be visible from street and 2. No individual can apply on their own must come from a group of 5 homeowners. They have neighborhood pride grants
ULI cofounder delivered influential speech on planning for permanent communities that are 100% pre thought out and dont change - JC Nichols
Things this book made me understand better/deeper:
It’s wild how many market distortions are in the housing industry having to do with govt involvement in mortgages. It apparently stems from 30 year mortgages being of too much inherent risk and needing to come with some govt backing. This effectively amounts a subsidy. The author says the next trend will be 50 year mortgages to bring affordability to the masses.
Opinions updated/changed/Disconfirmation:
I didn’t appreciate before how redlining creates economic decline on its own by making loans on properties in redlined districts nearly impossible
Ideas I got while reading:
Neighborhood Stasis Tax: if some neighborhoods don’t want their neighborhood subject to change maybe they should have that right but there should be a recurring cost
Memorable quotes:
“Too often Preservation is just taxidermy “
“Favor Resiliency of result over efficiency of execution”
“Only when the tide goes out do you learn who has been swimming naked”
“What happens when a couple of decades of entropy takes its toll on a place designed for stasis on places built all at once?”
A big part of zoning is to limit the number of people in an area in order to limit the number of cars in an area - paraphrase
“We need housing prices to fall but we cannot afford them to fall, thus we are trapped”
“is housing shelter or investment?”
“Without permanence or renewal there’s only one option left on the menu: decline”
Taking Action:
Update some of the success metrics of the agrihood project to reflects ideas from this book such as what % of housing stock could be afforded by median income family
Chewing on/Food for thought:
The question of if housing can be shelter and investment
Readings referenced(ones that come to mind):
Enter text here
Did I make a good decision to choose to read this book?
Text here
How does this book stand on insights per page?1-10 scale
Text here
6 month + rating:
Enter text here
6 month + impact:
Enter text here
The book is about describing why this quote is true and figuring out an approach to tackling it: “We need housing prices to fall but we cannot afford them to fall, thus we are trapped.”
This book discusses some of the same historical events that were discussed in The Color of Law but with a bit less spin and agenda. And it grapples with the question of if housing can be shelter and an investment.
This book would’ve been more accurately titled:
“Understanding The Housing Trap”
Why I chose to read book:
Continuing on my unit to understand. housing in America as well as it’s useful to read for the Agrihood project I’m working on.
What I liked about book:
It was fairly comprehensive and shed light on aspects of the housing market that I didn’t know or fully appreciate.
What I disliked about book:
I didn’t feel like the author’s arguments for why non incremental developments were bad were convincing. In one example he talks about a 12 story condo at the edge of mid sized city downtown where only smaller buildings exist being distorative. But 4 smaller developments with the same number of units would have the same impact on the neighborhood. Maybe there’s just part of his argument I’m missing or don’t understand. His main thesis here is that “a large leap in the development intensity distorts financial gravity in the neighborhood.” And I agree with that mostly but don’t get how many of the examples he points to make much of an impact.
I think the author should’ve spent more time on solutions such as prefab options
I wish the author had spent more time on employment opportunities nearby and its impact on housing availability.
Concepts/Ideas Introduced:
Gave a hypothetical “micro TIF” example of an elderly woman who wants to stay in her home but convert one of her bedrooms to a studio and that the city makes her a loan bc they can borrow at favorable rates and then the old lady pays the loan back with higher property tax payments over time plus a lump sum payment for any remainder.
Regulatory Amber
army of semi pro developers and home hackers
The term cottage courts
Housing theory of everything concept
Vetocracy
Zoned capacity population concept
NOAH- naturally occurring affordable housing
The term gentlefication
Interesting Factual Claims:
Property tax assessment discrimination- impoverished areas consistently pay a higher tax burden based on homes market value than rich areas - this analysis has been undertaken by Urban3
In most US Cities between 70-90% of land is single family zoning
Case Schiller Index - home prices to income ratio - 2023 hit all time high
In 1940 Census half of homes lacked indoor plumbing
1924: first national size standards for lumber. Reduced shipping costs and housing costs.
HOLC - original group to make redlining map
Interesting Anecdotes
There’s a group called Oswego Renaissance Assn. who fights against the “bank run on confidence” they give matching grants to homeowners with 2 catches 1. Change must be visible from street and 2. No individual can apply on their own must come from a group of 5 homeowners. They have neighborhood pride grants
ULI cofounder delivered influential speech on planning for permanent communities that are 100% pre thought out and dont change - JC Nichols
Things this book made me understand better/deeper:
It’s wild how many market distortions are in the housing industry having to do with govt involvement in mortgages. It apparently stems from 30 year mortgages being of too much inherent risk and needing to come with some govt backing. This effectively amounts a subsidy. The author says the next trend will be 50 year mortgages to bring affordability to the masses.
Opinions updated/changed/Disconfirmation:
I didn’t appreciate before how redlining creates economic decline on its own by making loans on properties in redlined districts nearly impossible
Ideas I got while reading:
Neighborhood Stasis Tax: if some neighborhoods don’t want their neighborhood subject to change maybe they should have that right but there should be a recurring cost
Memorable quotes:
“Too often Preservation is just taxidermy “
“Favor Resiliency of result over efficiency of execution”
“Only when the tide goes out do you learn who has been swimming naked”
“What happens when a couple of decades of entropy takes its toll on a place designed for stasis on places built all at once?”
A big part of zoning is to limit the number of people in an area in order to limit the number of cars in an area - paraphrase
“We need housing prices to fall but we cannot afford them to fall, thus we are trapped”
“is housing shelter or investment?”
“Without permanence or renewal there’s only one option left on the menu: decline”
Taking Action:
Update some of the success metrics of the agrihood project to reflects ideas from this book such as what % of housing stock could be afforded by median income family
Chewing on/Food for thought:
The question of if housing can be shelter and investment
Readings referenced(ones that come to mind):
Enter text here
Did I make a good decision to choose to read this book?
Text here
How does this book stand on insights per page?1-10 scale
Text here
6 month + rating:
Enter text here
6 month + impact:
Enter text here
May 14, 2025
My central issue with this book is that the authors seem to have tunnel vision on what is a very large and complex problem that requires a broad set of solutions. My experience is on the rental housing side, so my criticisms come from that angle, but they are broadly applicable to the entire book. The authors see large scale, top-down development as a problem; even when evidence would say otherwise. For example, they state that the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program (the IRS program which drives most affordable rental development in the US) favors large projects that are over 100 units, which is simply not true. Most, if not all, state housing finance agencies, who allocate these tax credits, have caps on the maximum LIHTC allocation which generally restricts the size of the development. The actual average size of a LIHTC development is under 80 units and the most commonly built LIHTC developments are between 21-50 units which you would think would fit into the Strong Towns incremental development philosophy. Because there is a large federal program that a specialized group of professional for-profit & non-profit developers utilize to produce thousands of 45-unit affordable housing developments all over the country that doesn’t fit their ideology of bottom-up, neighborhood-level development, they just insist the facts are the opposite and move along. Short shrift is given to the Section 8 program which only merits a brief description before casting it aside as ineffective because the program has long waitlists. Again, Strong Towns couldn’t support an obvious change in federal policy to make Section 8 an entitlement thereby serving the 75% of households that currently qualify for Sec. 8 but who are not served by the program because that’s a top-down, Hamiltonian solution to housing affordability, and it doesn’t fit their narrative.
Instead, the authors focus on local policy changes which would enable individuals to convert basements into apartments, build ADUs, eliminate parking requirements, and loosen zoning so that upzoning to the next level of density is easy. These are all good policies since, as a nation, we have tightened the screws so much on development that hardly anything can get built. But, if we are going to rely on ADUs and boarding rooms to solve our housing shortage, the supply will never catch up with demand.
Incremental development is not a panacea and creates its own problems which the authors just ignore. There is a professionalism and adherence to certain standards in the management of properties that were built with debt, public subsidy, and/or private equity. These powerful stakeholders (banks, government entities, and investors) have a direct interest in ensuring that the property is well-managed, maintained, and in compliance with the law. This interest is expressed through annual financial audits, site visits and inspections, and the regular review of tenant files. This pressure does not exist for landlords that may own a handful of rental homes or someone who rents out their carriage house which can lead to unsafe living conditions and exploitative landlord/tenant relations.
I get what they are trying to say; I’m their audience. It is immensely problematic that our economy and our household savings are so reliant upon housing. Yet I don’t have a solution for that, and I don’t think the authors do either. I fall into the category of an incremental, infill housing developer myself, and I would love it if municipalities made my life easier, but this scope is too narrow. We need incremental developers, and we need large, investment driven, 200-unit 5-over-1s if that is what’s demanded, and there’s just no recognition of that in this book.
We need to support existing programs like Section 8 and LIHTC. We need to make it easier for developers, large and small, to build where there is demand. We need to reform our building codes so that I don’t need to build 2 emergency stairways in a 44-unit building, or have so many floor trusses in a 60-unit residential building that you could park a semi-truck on the roof and still be structurally sound, or a design requirement that an electrical outlet needs to be present literally everywhere a person would turn. Yes, we need municipalities to stop subsidizing greenfield development, but we do still need to incentivize workforce housing in our urban areas, even on big developments. We have to do it all, and while I truly believe in many of the prescriptions that the authors give, if we only follow those, we will miss half of the story.
Instead, the authors focus on local policy changes which would enable individuals to convert basements into apartments, build ADUs, eliminate parking requirements, and loosen zoning so that upzoning to the next level of density is easy. These are all good policies since, as a nation, we have tightened the screws so much on development that hardly anything can get built. But, if we are going to rely on ADUs and boarding rooms to solve our housing shortage, the supply will never catch up with demand.
Incremental development is not a panacea and creates its own problems which the authors just ignore. There is a professionalism and adherence to certain standards in the management of properties that were built with debt, public subsidy, and/or private equity. These powerful stakeholders (banks, government entities, and investors) have a direct interest in ensuring that the property is well-managed, maintained, and in compliance with the law. This interest is expressed through annual financial audits, site visits and inspections, and the regular review of tenant files. This pressure does not exist for landlords that may own a handful of rental homes or someone who rents out their carriage house which can lead to unsafe living conditions and exploitative landlord/tenant relations.
I get what they are trying to say; I’m their audience. It is immensely problematic that our economy and our household savings are so reliant upon housing. Yet I don’t have a solution for that, and I don’t think the authors do either. I fall into the category of an incremental, infill housing developer myself, and I would love it if municipalities made my life easier, but this scope is too narrow. We need incremental developers, and we need large, investment driven, 200-unit 5-over-1s if that is what’s demanded, and there’s just no recognition of that in this book.
We need to support existing programs like Section 8 and LIHTC. We need to make it easier for developers, large and small, to build where there is demand. We need to reform our building codes so that I don’t need to build 2 emergency stairways in a 44-unit building, or have so many floor trusses in a 60-unit residential building that you could park a semi-truck on the roof and still be structurally sound, or a design requirement that an electrical outlet needs to be present literally everywhere a person would turn. Yes, we need municipalities to stop subsidizing greenfield development, but we do still need to incentivize workforce housing in our urban areas, even on big developments. We have to do it all, and while I truly believe in many of the prescriptions that the authors give, if we only follow those, we will miss half of the story.
July 13, 2024
If you're wondering how we deal with our national housing crisis and you're unfamiliar with Strong Towns, this book is an absolute must read. However, as a long time reader and member of the Strong Towns movement, I was disappointed to find that the book did not break new ground on the responses to the crisis.
The first third of the book gives a tidy summary of the path to our thoroughly financialized housing market created by decades of well-meaning federal policy. It's eye-opening to see just how deeply we have chosen to embed housing within our economy and financial system. This is a particularly helpful perspective for urbanists, planners, and designers who tend to focus on the zoning side of the problem, sometimes to the exclusion of the financial side.
The middle third focuses on our approach to city building including zoning. The folly of moving away from a routine of incremental evolution of cities in pursuit of the false promise of permanent prosperity along with the transition from citizen as developer of the city to citizen as customer of the city are among the most piercing insights that Strong Towns has to offer. An empathetic yet firm rejection of NIMBYism, a cautionary note to YIMBYs, and a realistic explanation of the limits of public housing programs follows.
Finally, we arrive at the responses. Perhaps the greatest insight is the humble insistence that the housing market is complex and not micro manageable. As such the recommendation is to recapture the practice of allowing routine, rapid, yet incremental growth, built by the many hands of local amateur and semi professional developers--as was the norm throughout history prior to WW2. The focus is on the paradigm shift that is required to address the roots of the problem rather than on specific implementations. As compelling as this shift is, it feels a bit underdeveloped for a book-length piece. It also feels incomplete to have spent the first third of the book talking about the important role of federal financialization yet devote little attention to financing in the response section. I get that they are targeting local leaders and would-be leaders who have no control over the Federal Reserve but it still doesn't sit right. That said, the authors are to be commended for their refusal to indulge in silver bullet- and after-the-revolution thinking.
Overall, this is another good entry in the Strong Towns message. There is much room for people to take this book's message to heart to create revolutionary improvements to our towns one humble step at a time.
The first third of the book gives a tidy summary of the path to our thoroughly financialized housing market created by decades of well-meaning federal policy. It's eye-opening to see just how deeply we have chosen to embed housing within our economy and financial system. This is a particularly helpful perspective for urbanists, planners, and designers who tend to focus on the zoning side of the problem, sometimes to the exclusion of the financial side.
The middle third focuses on our approach to city building including zoning. The folly of moving away from a routine of incremental evolution of cities in pursuit of the false promise of permanent prosperity along with the transition from citizen as developer of the city to citizen as customer of the city are among the most piercing insights that Strong Towns has to offer. An empathetic yet firm rejection of NIMBYism, a cautionary note to YIMBYs, and a realistic explanation of the limits of public housing programs follows.
Finally, we arrive at the responses. Perhaps the greatest insight is the humble insistence that the housing market is complex and not micro manageable. As such the recommendation is to recapture the practice of allowing routine, rapid, yet incremental growth, built by the many hands of local amateur and semi professional developers--as was the norm throughout history prior to WW2. The focus is on the paradigm shift that is required to address the roots of the problem rather than on specific implementations. As compelling as this shift is, it feels a bit underdeveloped for a book-length piece. It also feels incomplete to have spent the first third of the book talking about the important role of federal financialization yet devote little attention to financing in the response section. I get that they are targeting local leaders and would-be leaders who have no control over the Federal Reserve but it still doesn't sit right. That said, the authors are to be commended for their refusal to indulge in silver bullet- and after-the-revolution thinking.
Overall, this is another good entry in the Strong Towns message. There is much room for people to take this book's message to heart to create revolutionary improvements to our towns one humble step at a time.
June 29, 2024
Excellent book that describes the issues with the housing crisis in a way that is understandable to someone who has no experience in the field.
Critical issues the book discusses are housing as an investment, how we created the housing trap (including the post war housing boom that turned into rising home prices), how zoning codes negatively impact the creation of housing, the Not in My Backyard movement against new housing, the Yes in My Backyard movement in search of creating more housing, and the difference between affordable with a lowercase A - in which housing is created that is 30% or less of someone’s income - and affordable with a uppercase A - in which housing is subsidized by the government to make it affordable for the lowest income.
One of the core issues is that there are some affordable housing available for the lowest income and plenty of housing for high income. However we’re missing the middle. The missing middle is a major part of the book argument in which housing with 3 to 5 units is built in a way that doesn’t tear apart the fabric of a neighborhood. This missing middle can provide reasonably affordable housing for those who are stuck in the middle. Obviously there are still problems with not enough low income housing, but it is important to learn and understand the difference between affordable for lowest income and affordable for low income.
Finally, the book provides a powerful outline towards a positive change. Incredible detail is given towards how we can slowly improve the situation that we’re dealing with. It’s not a drastic solution but a smart one to keep housing prices stable, the economy running, and banks successful.
Overall, this was an excellent look into this crisis. The amount of detail in a short read on such an important topic is amazing and after reading the first three books, I’m looking forward to the forthcoming books in the rest of this series.
Critical issues the book discusses are housing as an investment, how we created the housing trap (including the post war housing boom that turned into rising home prices), how zoning codes negatively impact the creation of housing, the Not in My Backyard movement against new housing, the Yes in My Backyard movement in search of creating more housing, and the difference between affordable with a lowercase A - in which housing is created that is 30% or less of someone’s income - and affordable with a uppercase A - in which housing is subsidized by the government to make it affordable for the lowest income.
One of the core issues is that there are some affordable housing available for the lowest income and plenty of housing for high income. However we’re missing the middle. The missing middle is a major part of the book argument in which housing with 3 to 5 units is built in a way that doesn’t tear apart the fabric of a neighborhood. This missing middle can provide reasonably affordable housing for those who are stuck in the middle. Obviously there are still problems with not enough low income housing, but it is important to learn and understand the difference between affordable for lowest income and affordable for low income.
Finally, the book provides a powerful outline towards a positive change. Incredible detail is given towards how we can slowly improve the situation that we’re dealing with. It’s not a drastic solution but a smart one to keep housing prices stable, the economy running, and banks successful.
Overall, this was an excellent look into this crisis. The amount of detail in a short read on such an important topic is amazing and after reading the first three books, I’m looking forward to the forthcoming books in the rest of this series.
June 24, 2024
As a non business or property manager, I appreciate this summation and history of the American housing market and the decisions and governmental interference that have led to this historic housing crisis. It is very interesting how the slow agenda of government and financial systems have created a system that is "too big to fail," despite America self identifying as a more libertarian country.
That being said, I do have some issues with how the authors approach ways that cities have tried to fund housing projects. Surely, some were absolute failures, but approaching every option with the fatalist mindset that they "do not work" or "do not scale" seems to be intentionally misleading. Maybe they don't scale, but do they work in some capacity? Certain situations? It seems to just be a strawman to force the reader into believing in the Strong Towns model (A model that I love in principle).
We have a housing debt and while we need the public to become involved again, it is unavoidable that 5 over 1s will need to be built in historic neighborhoods. Does it "radically change the area?" Maybe, but the libertarian bias needs to be looked at. What about areas that cannot add ADUs or build higher density housing? What if they are already maxed out, with the only option being quadplexes, which are somewhat shaky.
I do agree with the main thesis of this book and hope that this movement and book inspires people to take the risk to revitalize that home or commercial space. I just wish the authors were fairer to the situation on the ground.
That being said, I do have some issues with how the authors approach ways that cities have tried to fund housing projects. Surely, some were absolute failures, but approaching every option with the fatalist mindset that they "do not work" or "do not scale" seems to be intentionally misleading. Maybe they don't scale, but do they work in some capacity? Certain situations? It seems to just be a strawman to force the reader into believing in the Strong Towns model (A model that I love in principle).
We have a housing debt and while we need the public to become involved again, it is unavoidable that 5 over 1s will need to be built in historic neighborhoods. Does it "radically change the area?" Maybe, but the libertarian bias needs to be looked at. What about areas that cannot add ADUs or build higher density housing? What if they are already maxed out, with the only option being quadplexes, which are somewhat shaky.
I do agree with the main thesis of this book and hope that this movement and book inspires people to take the risk to revitalize that home or commercial space. I just wish the authors were fairer to the situation on the ground.
November 5, 2024
A very interesting read! The book was about how many regulations and financial practices disincentivize cities from building more housing, except giant eyesore apartment buildings and subsidized mini-mansions.
The first couple chapters were about housing financing and how the United States avoided a depression after WWII by inventing the 30-year mortgage. It then proceeded in great detail to explain how that debt is still being carried today and how the entire financial system is intertwined with the mortgage market.
Then the next couple of chapters are about the barriers to building more housing that is affordable. He is particularly sensitive here to consider the positions of both the NIMBY (Not-in-my-back-yard) and YIMBY (yes-in-my-back-yard) (essentially those who block new housing projects and those who support new housing projects). There are a ton of nuances to consider, that I didn't fully appreciate before.
The book finally goes on to explain what a future could look like with a different development pattern that prioritized community, local businesses and financial solvency. This part was chock full of details and examples and citations that were really interesting to consider.
It felt a bit rambly at times, but it was explaining a lot of complicated topics at a very high level. The author is clearly a master of this subject and it was intensely interesting to consider his ideas on how the housing crisis may start to be solved.
The first couple chapters were about housing financing and how the United States avoided a depression after WWII by inventing the 30-year mortgage. It then proceeded in great detail to explain how that debt is still being carried today and how the entire financial system is intertwined with the mortgage market.
Then the next couple of chapters are about the barriers to building more housing that is affordable. He is particularly sensitive here to consider the positions of both the NIMBY (Not-in-my-back-yard) and YIMBY (yes-in-my-back-yard) (essentially those who block new housing projects and those who support new housing projects). There are a ton of nuances to consider, that I didn't fully appreciate before.
The book finally goes on to explain what a future could look like with a different development pattern that prioritized community, local businesses and financial solvency. This part was chock full of details and examples and citations that were really interesting to consider.
It felt a bit rambly at times, but it was explaining a lot of complicated topics at a very high level. The author is clearly a master of this subject and it was intensely interesting to consider his ideas on how the housing crisis may start to be solved.
April 23, 2024
What a groundbreaking book by Strong Towns! This truly opens the conversation on how to more effectively solve our existing housing crisis. My favorite quote is this:
"There is no simple way out of our housing trap, no magical fix that does not entail some societal disruption and some economic pain. But we are not helpless. Within the financial and legal means of local leaders are avenues to reform regulations that stifle the production of housing, to curb the distorting influences of Wall Street capital on our towns and neighborhoods, and to cultivate a new groundswell of local, neighborhood-focused developers who can actually build the housing we need, where it is needed."
Policymakers throughout the 1900s, and especially since the 1950s, have created legally-imposed scarcity of walkable neighborhoods. We, as residents that WANT more walkable neighborhoods for many beneficial reasons, must push for municipalities of all sizes to ADAPT and lead the way in both USA and Canada.
Housing is an extremely complex issue yet the Strong Towns authors, Charles Marohn and Daniel Herriges, treat all efforts/approaches with respect and consideration. Excellent work of non-fiction!
"There is no simple way out of our housing trap, no magical fix that does not entail some societal disruption and some economic pain. But we are not helpless. Within the financial and legal means of local leaders are avenues to reform regulations that stifle the production of housing, to curb the distorting influences of Wall Street capital on our towns and neighborhoods, and to cultivate a new groundswell of local, neighborhood-focused developers who can actually build the housing we need, where it is needed."
Policymakers throughout the 1900s, and especially since the 1950s, have created legally-imposed scarcity of walkable neighborhoods. We, as residents that WANT more walkable neighborhoods for many beneficial reasons, must push for municipalities of all sizes to ADAPT and lead the way in both USA and Canada.
Housing is an extremely complex issue yet the Strong Towns authors, Charles Marohn and Daniel Herriges, treat all efforts/approaches with respect and consideration. Excellent work of non-fiction!
May 26, 2024
Like several other books I have recently read (most notably by Nolan Gray, Bryan Caplan and Robert Ellickson) this book points out that zoning needlessly restricts housing supply. But while other authors favor more radical deregulation, this book emphasizes the value of "incremental development"- that is, development that is just a little bit denser than the neighborhood status quo.
But I am not completely persuaded by the authors' argument. The authors suggest that there are simply not enough construction workers or cranes for large developers to build enough new housing to bring prices down. But construction workers are made, not born; if demand was adequate, we could have more of them.
I also don't quite understand why the authors think that incremental development will be more effective in producing new housing. If large developers don't have the capacity to build X number of housing units, why would smaller developers have the capacity to build that number of housing units?
I certainly agree with the authors more than not; like me, they believe Americans need less regulation and more housing. But I think I am more radical than they are.
But I am not completely persuaded by the authors' argument. The authors suggest that there are simply not enough construction workers or cranes for large developers to build enough new housing to bring prices down. But construction workers are made, not born; if demand was adequate, we could have more of them.
I also don't quite understand why the authors think that incremental development will be more effective in producing new housing. If large developers don't have the capacity to build X number of housing units, why would smaller developers have the capacity to build that number of housing units?
I certainly agree with the authors more than not; like me, they believe Americans need less regulation and more housing. But I think I am more radical than they are.
June 5, 2024
It’s probably because I’m all about this urbanism movement and wanting some action but I loved this book. I learned so much about why our housing and cities are the way they are. Learned the financing and mortgage backed securities that supply our single family housing and 5 over 1s. How it started as a good thing but has lead the US to cycle of boom and bust housing markets that are becoming more and more unaffordable. Without knowing the past, we can’t fix the future and I think this book did a great job of detailing our past. The second half was the ‘how do we turn the tide’ of the book. Very insightful and didn’t give a silver bullet because there isn’t one. There are just tons of small steps to take to give the power and ability back to the local people. I recommend anyone and everyone to learn more about our current housing issues. If anything it’s just to become more educated on the matter even if you’re not like me ready to change our society.
June 9, 2024
The most single important book you can read if you want to understand the North American housing crisis — and how we can potentially get out of it. Just an extraordinary & thorough examination of the numerous and interconnected factors that have resulted in such a toxic housing ecosystem.
While I was familiar with some of the elements — zoning, parking minimums, NIMBYism, etc. — the authors' analysis of US capital markets and federal housing & financing policies is particularly remarkable.
As always, I appreciate Marohn's deeply compassionate lens, and his (I think correct) assertion that the current crisis is the result of well-intentioned policies gone too far — and understandable (albeit misguided) human psychology that has taken us off the rails.
I hope that many, many city & local leaders read this book and take its lessons to heart.
While I was familiar with some of the elements — zoning, parking minimums, NIMBYism, etc. — the authors' analysis of US capital markets and federal housing & financing policies is particularly remarkable.
As always, I appreciate Marohn's deeply compassionate lens, and his (I think correct) assertion that the current crisis is the result of well-intentioned policies gone too far — and understandable (albeit misguided) human psychology that has taken us off the rails.
I hope that many, many city & local leaders read this book and take its lessons to heart.
January 26, 2025
This is a really good read that provides background as to how we ended up in the current situation and provides proposals to incrementally improve the situation. Escaping the Housing Trap easy to understand and accessible effectively to all audiences. My only nit which is a to some extent due to the subject matter discussed is that I would have hoped for more citations and, due to the lack of them, it felt more like an opinion piece pulled together by anecdote. This is a tricky subject matter because I know from experience getting a lot of hard municipal data is difficult. I also think that fairly young movements, as this one is, need to emerge first before studies may follow. That aside, this is a worthy topic that was well presented, and I hope this book is read by many people looking for ways to improve the place they live.
June 15, 2024
In the United States - because of socio-economically and legally manipulative decisions made by merely a few people over the past hundred years - we now all live in a system of housing that actively works against our universal human need to have a humble, reliable shelter. The universal human need for shelter and the presently top-down-orchestrated “need” for housing prices to increase forever (and always will be) at odds with one another. The current setup consequently moves the bar for entry into first-time home ownership ever-higher; turning the U.S. bit by bit into a nation of tenants who - increasingly - cannot even afford the rent.
June 21, 2024
Good Insights, Underestimates Rent Control
The book explains how the nation has painted itself into an economic dead end. Solutions focusing on small businesses and small property owners are doomed to fail because of the oppressive impact of Rent Control (legalized theft), onerous tenant rights, and an anti-owner mindset of government that gives squatters more rights than owners. The author underestimates the impact on anyone considering adding a rental property after learning owners are forced to go years without rent and pay repairs, utilities, and legal expenses while being treated as bad people.
The book explains how the nation has painted itself into an economic dead end. Solutions focusing on small businesses and small property owners are doomed to fail because of the oppressive impact of Rent Control (legalized theft), onerous tenant rights, and an anti-owner mindset of government that gives squatters more rights than owners. The author underestimates the impact on anyone considering adding a rental property after learning owners are forced to go years without rent and pay repairs, utilities, and legal expenses while being treated as bad people.
August 4, 2024
Really interesting and a solid introduction to the deeply interconnected nature of housing and the American economic system. Philosophically, I think (at this time) I agree with the majority of the authors' points, but I think the recommended approaches are idealistic the point of naive. It made me think of that book on open borders I read a few months ago. It seems unlikely that the insanely complex systems, which were built top-down over decades by state and federal legislatures, can be disentangled purely by bottom-up community organizing, at least not in time to prevent the disasters described. But I'm a pessimist. It's certainly worth a try.
May 31, 2025
One of the most important books I’ve ever read. This book (and the strong towns group) is one of the most important and inspiring pieces I’ve read to solve one of the most Wicked and Intractable problems of our time. The fact that struggling to build enough housing is a modern phenomenon with essentially NO historical precedent is shocking to modern readers, but makes sense when you even take a cursory glance historically. This book is a paradigm shift, viewing cities as complex organisms which require resilient and varied solutions combined with actionable and diverse strategies to do the next incremental step of growth and to clear blockers for evolution.
June 29, 2024
Overall it was a good book with an expansive scope. The reason it wasn't a five star read for me is because of two factors. I loved the first few chapters where it talked about housing being intrinsically linked to the entirety of the financial sector, but I wish it went a little more in-depth. Secondly, I would've enjoyed a chapter or two on exceptions to the solutions put forth. Community-led development is a beautiful concept but I don't believe it can work everywhere with the ease they suggested. Putting in a criticism section in any book makes solutions feel more realistic and researched to the greatest possible extent.
January 3, 2025
A clear and concise argument about the housing crisis and some possible solutions. In a field where there are so many different arguments, and deeply held personal positions, Marohn makes sound arguments that can be listed to from any side of the debate.
I do wish they would touch a bit more on design and the human desire of NIMBY's to push back on hideous architecture being built in modern developments (of which the 5 over 1 is the most common example). A good way to keep people on your side is to actually make places look nicer, after all.
I do wish they would touch a bit more on design and the human desire of NIMBY's to push back on hideous architecture being built in modern developments (of which the 5 over 1 is the most common example). A good way to keep people on your side is to actually make places look nicer, after all.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 67 reviews