What do you think?
Rate this book
How to Survive a Crisis: Lessons in Resilience and Avoiding Disaster
'Sir David Omand is undoubtedly one of the most able people to have served in British government since the Second World War' TLSWe never really know when a crisis might arise. Some 'black swan' events, like terrorist attacks or natural disasters, blow up suddenly out of a clear sky. But some crises build slowly, often with warning signs along the way underestimated or ignored, until as if from nowhere, a tipping point is reached and a wildfire breaks out that suddenly spreads at a ferocious rate. Coincidental bad luck can easily cause a situation to spiral out of control. By then, it might be next to impossible to pull things back together, and there's a real crisis to manage rather than just a local emergency. Slow burning crises, and bad luck, happen more often than they should in the world of business and politics.In How to Survive a Crisis, Professor Sir David Omand, formerly both a director of GCHQ and the UK's Security and Intelligence Coordinator, shows how to manage crises in myriad forms, using methodologies employed by the British intelligence agencies. Through gripping examples from Professor Omand's storied career, including from the COBRA room in government, to lessons from historic crises such as Chernobyl or the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, this book will equip you with military intelligence techniques such as situational awareness and adaptive resilience that can be used in any crisis, from the professional to the personal.
- GenresNonfictionSelf Help
336 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 2023
52 people are currently reading
331 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
January 3, 2024
A good book – but more suited to political leaders than business leaders.
The “Rubber Lever Test” which is when all the levers and button to deal with an issue do not effect, or even connected to the outside world. That is when you are in a real crisis.
A saying in the Cabinet Office is that you have got to understand the rules inside out to know when to break them. Individuals needs the confidence on the day to deviate from the manual/drills. When the Manchester Bombing occurred, lives were lost by too many people sticking to the rules such as fire and rescue people being held back until the areas was deemed safe for them to enter by the Police. The way to counter this situation is to rehearse the rules, but across countless scenarios and settings. You get to that level of planning by leaders asking genuinely and intently, when was the last time we really tested our system? But another way, Field Marshal Von Helmuth said in WW1 that it was a waste of time to prepare plans, but that it was better to prepare a series of options that could be exercised according to the scenario. Churchill said something similar – that the best generals were those that arrive at the results of planning without being tied to plans, a view echoed by Eisenhower. “It is the act of planning and preparation and the interactions that it forces between stakeholders that matters on the day, and not the thoroughness of the completed plan”. I agree. When trying to predict the future, it is best to provide scenarios, and percentages, not a definitive “this will happen”.
Level of risk = likelihood X vulnerability X initial impact X duration of disruption.
“Relational-system approach. This involves making the mental leap from of no longer thinking of the foundation of reality as things like photons of light, or atoms, but instead nodes, where each individual entity interacts with other entities. The properties they exhibit then depend on the nature of those interactions with other nodes. In other words, “everything is what is only in respect to something else”. If we learn to move from thinking of the world as an ensemble of distinct things to a network of interconnected processes, we will make better decisions. This is excellent advice and highlights where at times you have made your investment mistakes. Think about your past bullishness of Chinese markets which on its own was correct – GDP was strong. However, what you failed to realise was every stock market competes for capital with others, and in the end the US performed better, so therefore although Chinese GDP was stronger, the US stock market outperformed. The same goes for your prediction of high inflation post COVID but failing to translate that into an impact on the stock market.
Creating an environmental where crises can be managed is vital. A continuous rolling meeting is an inefficient use of valuable time. Tony Blair’s sofa government encouraged a “court” atmosphere, whereby one meeting merged with another an ultimately there is no clear process of decision making.
Creating your own personal mentality for a crisis is also important. Have a personal notebook and imagine the various crisis that could occur, how you will respond and who you will trust. The same can be applied to how you think an overall crisis will occur, how it will be handled, and where some of the issues will arise.
Too often warnings of risk from junior employees is ignored by senior management to bad consequences. To make a warning to senior management effective:
1. Strong knowledge claim about worrying development.
2. Assessment of why really matters.
3. Sufficient illustration of how current policies or deployment may be affected.
4. Highlight any near misses that mimic the risk/crisis that is now unfolding and lessons from those near misses.
The paradox of prevention. It is harder to mount a major effort while a problem still seems minor. Once the danger has materialised, evidence to mobilise becomes much easier. US intelligence knew far in advance of Al-Qaida’s plot to attack America, but when tacking that problem against the many others, action was not taken. It is the inverse to your saying about the paradox of certainty. COVID became such an obvious risk to the UK that the required actions were so clear based on what other countries had been through, that the action was not taken. People almost dismiss the action because they think someone else (the government) will handle the risk, or because the actions are so obvious a lack of research of the actions required to deal with the risks takes place.
In your crisis planning, identify which pieces of data are key to establish situational awareness. Better still identify the sources of that information that will need to be protected. For example, if you are running an airline, and there is a volcanic eruption in European, the situational data you will need is all the plans in European airspace.
In crisis, leave the management of problems (whether in crisis or just everyday) to the lowest level capable of solve them with the resources available. In crises decentralise operational responses while also centralising strategic decisions. This will enable you to make the tough decision which is when a risk turns into a crisis. As Willie Whitelaw told Margret Thatcher during the Falklands war, “you must trust the man on the spot. He may be right, he may be wrong but by interfering you bring on yourself a responsibility which you cannot sensibly exercise from Downing Street. As a rule of thumb, longer term sources of trouble can be identified by looking at trends (obtaining strategic notice of possible futures). Near term developments of concern can often be spotted working forwards from evidence of the recent past. Always pay attention to the difference in meaning of probabilistic words such as unlikely, very likely, almost certain. As the book Superforcaster suggests, you should predict things in percentages, or better still do not try and predict one outcome, but a series of scenarios.
The leader says “come on” the commander says “go on”. Be a leader.
Never discount how leaders often lie to themselves in the hope that something will/will not happen either through blind faith, shallow reasoning. Logic often trumps emotion in correctness, while blind faith/shallow reasoning often decide the choices/leaders make. The difference between results and consequences is that results are what we expect, and consequences are what we get. Do not exaggerate the former and minimise the latter. In a crisis having options can be a luxury, so try and avoid making decisions that narrow your options.
Always communicate with your customers and clients in a crisis. The sooner the better, even if it is a holding message.
In a crisis – where you have your meetings is important. Choosing a grand room like the Cabinet room can lead to people becoming Churchillian and speaking for effect, with too many pens and papers. A COBRA meeting room with lots of screens, bland setting encourages people to factual, unemotional. Resilience at a national level is the ability to mobilise civil society in response. A more divided society makes it harder to muster than response.
Never instil a culture of trying to spin the facts, particularly in a crisis. It may appear to work for a short time, but a combination of whistle-blowers and investigative journalists often find the truth. Think of Matt Hancock. Having an existing reputation for trustworthiness is priceless.
Treat the media like the weather. Be respectful of its power, carry an umbrella where necessary, plan, but never fall into the trap of thinking that it can be controlled.
PG 260 – 262 provides an excellent explanation of what a journalist is like and how to avoid their tricks.
As crisis drag on, people become exhausted with the constant stream of negativity. Try and avoid sounding as if you are the victim, something BP managed after crisis dragged on for months.
The “Rubber Lever Test” which is when all the levers and button to deal with an issue do not effect, or even connected to the outside world. That is when you are in a real crisis.
A saying in the Cabinet Office is that you have got to understand the rules inside out to know when to break them. Individuals needs the confidence on the day to deviate from the manual/drills. When the Manchester Bombing occurred, lives were lost by too many people sticking to the rules such as fire and rescue people being held back until the areas was deemed safe for them to enter by the Police. The way to counter this situation is to rehearse the rules, but across countless scenarios and settings. You get to that level of planning by leaders asking genuinely and intently, when was the last time we really tested our system? But another way, Field Marshal Von Helmuth said in WW1 that it was a waste of time to prepare plans, but that it was better to prepare a series of options that could be exercised according to the scenario. Churchill said something similar – that the best generals were those that arrive at the results of planning without being tied to plans, a view echoed by Eisenhower. “It is the act of planning and preparation and the interactions that it forces between stakeholders that matters on the day, and not the thoroughness of the completed plan”. I agree. When trying to predict the future, it is best to provide scenarios, and percentages, not a definitive “this will happen”.
Level of risk = likelihood X vulnerability X initial impact X duration of disruption.
“Relational-system approach. This involves making the mental leap from of no longer thinking of the foundation of reality as things like photons of light, or atoms, but instead nodes, where each individual entity interacts with other entities. The properties they exhibit then depend on the nature of those interactions with other nodes. In other words, “everything is what is only in respect to something else”. If we learn to move from thinking of the world as an ensemble of distinct things to a network of interconnected processes, we will make better decisions. This is excellent advice and highlights where at times you have made your investment mistakes. Think about your past bullishness of Chinese markets which on its own was correct – GDP was strong. However, what you failed to realise was every stock market competes for capital with others, and in the end the US performed better, so therefore although Chinese GDP was stronger, the US stock market outperformed. The same goes for your prediction of high inflation post COVID but failing to translate that into an impact on the stock market.
Creating an environmental where crises can be managed is vital. A continuous rolling meeting is an inefficient use of valuable time. Tony Blair’s sofa government encouraged a “court” atmosphere, whereby one meeting merged with another an ultimately there is no clear process of decision making.
Creating your own personal mentality for a crisis is also important. Have a personal notebook and imagine the various crisis that could occur, how you will respond and who you will trust. The same can be applied to how you think an overall crisis will occur, how it will be handled, and where some of the issues will arise.
Too often warnings of risk from junior employees is ignored by senior management to bad consequences. To make a warning to senior management effective:
1. Strong knowledge claim about worrying development.
2. Assessment of why really matters.
3. Sufficient illustration of how current policies or deployment may be affected.
4. Highlight any near misses that mimic the risk/crisis that is now unfolding and lessons from those near misses.
The paradox of prevention. It is harder to mount a major effort while a problem still seems minor. Once the danger has materialised, evidence to mobilise becomes much easier. US intelligence knew far in advance of Al-Qaida’s plot to attack America, but when tacking that problem against the many others, action was not taken. It is the inverse to your saying about the paradox of certainty. COVID became such an obvious risk to the UK that the required actions were so clear based on what other countries had been through, that the action was not taken. People almost dismiss the action because they think someone else (the government) will handle the risk, or because the actions are so obvious a lack of research of the actions required to deal with the risks takes place.
In your crisis planning, identify which pieces of data are key to establish situational awareness. Better still identify the sources of that information that will need to be protected. For example, if you are running an airline, and there is a volcanic eruption in European, the situational data you will need is all the plans in European airspace.
In crisis, leave the management of problems (whether in crisis or just everyday) to the lowest level capable of solve them with the resources available. In crises decentralise operational responses while also centralising strategic decisions. This will enable you to make the tough decision which is when a risk turns into a crisis. As Willie Whitelaw told Margret Thatcher during the Falklands war, “you must trust the man on the spot. He may be right, he may be wrong but by interfering you bring on yourself a responsibility which you cannot sensibly exercise from Downing Street. As a rule of thumb, longer term sources of trouble can be identified by looking at trends (obtaining strategic notice of possible futures). Near term developments of concern can often be spotted working forwards from evidence of the recent past. Always pay attention to the difference in meaning of probabilistic words such as unlikely, very likely, almost certain. As the book Superforcaster suggests, you should predict things in percentages, or better still do not try and predict one outcome, but a series of scenarios.
The leader says “come on” the commander says “go on”. Be a leader.
Never discount how leaders often lie to themselves in the hope that something will/will not happen either through blind faith, shallow reasoning. Logic often trumps emotion in correctness, while blind faith/shallow reasoning often decide the choices/leaders make. The difference between results and consequences is that results are what we expect, and consequences are what we get. Do not exaggerate the former and minimise the latter. In a crisis having options can be a luxury, so try and avoid making decisions that narrow your options.
Always communicate with your customers and clients in a crisis. The sooner the better, even if it is a holding message.
In a crisis – where you have your meetings is important. Choosing a grand room like the Cabinet room can lead to people becoming Churchillian and speaking for effect, with too many pens and papers. A COBRA meeting room with lots of screens, bland setting encourages people to factual, unemotional. Resilience at a national level is the ability to mobilise civil society in response. A more divided society makes it harder to muster than response.
Never instil a culture of trying to spin the facts, particularly in a crisis. It may appear to work for a short time, but a combination of whistle-blowers and investigative journalists often find the truth. Think of Matt Hancock. Having an existing reputation for trustworthiness is priceless.
Treat the media like the weather. Be respectful of its power, carry an umbrella where necessary, plan, but never fall into the trap of thinking that it can be controlled.
PG 260 – 262 provides an excellent explanation of what a journalist is like and how to avoid their tricks.
As crisis drag on, people become exhausted with the constant stream of negativity. Try and avoid sounding as if you are the victim, something BP managed after crisis dragged on for months.
December 9, 2024
Heel wat interessante anekdotes en tips, naast een groot gedeelte dat als autobiografie van David omands carrière kan gezien worden. De bullet point samenvatting van de sleutelgedachtes na elk hoofdstuk zijn ook een meerwaarde om nadien zaken terug snel op te kunnen zoeken.
Een 7/10.
Een 7/10.
June 18, 2025
This was ok - useful summaries at end of chapters but examples were too many and too high level to be engaging. Better to have focused on a few for depth.
January 22, 2024
In een mengeling van handboek en autobiografie deelt David Omand in dit boek zijn persoonlijke inzichten over en ervaringen met de omgang met crises. COVID-19, 9/11, not-Petya, de val van Kaboel in 2021, Dien Bien Phu, de Londense flatbrand, de Falkland-oorlog, het begin van de Oekraïne-oorlog, enzovoort — ze passeren allemaal de revue. Omand is voormalig Brits topambtenaar met een decennialange palmares (hij was onder andere medewerker en directeur van Global Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), lid van het Joint Intelligence Committee en adviseur van de Britse minister-president na 9/11). Tegenwoordig is Omand als hoogleraar verbonden aan King’s College in Londen. Eerder schreef hij het boek How Spies Think (2020), dat we in het MT eveneens hebben gelezen. Het is zonder meer te prijzen dat hij als voormalig topambtenaar de tijd neemt zijn inzichten te delen, ook al leidt de mengeling van handboek en autobiografie tot een betoog dat niet alleen getuigt van intelligentie maar hier en daar ook van de hak op de tak overkomt.
Omand gaat in How to Survive a Crisis uit van de definitie van ‘crisis’ die de Britse overheid hanteert: “an abnormal and unstable situation that threatens an organization’s strategic objectives, reputation or viability.” (11) Kenmerkend aan een crisis is volgens hem het verlies van controle (hij noemt dit de ‘rubber levers test’, naar een humoristische scène in een film van Oliver Hardy en Stan Laurel die de controle over hun auto verliezen omdat de remmen en het stuur niet meer functioneren). “At first, the uncertainties will far outnumber the certainties. Get used to the reality that you will never know enough yet you still have to act.” (38)
Omand spreekt dan ook liever niet van “crisis management” maar van “crisis survival” (12) en “[averting] crises turning into disasters” (2). Omand: “In crisis, leaders have to accept considerable loss of control over events, and resign themselves to the reality that it will be efforts of others that determine how it will all work out.” (308). Alleen door in een crisis een strak ‘battle rhythm’ af te spreken en de informatievoorziening snel op orde te brengen, komt er iets van controle terug (54 e.v.). De meest effectieve vorm van leiderschap in een crisis is volgens Omand verder vooral “sense-giving leadership [providing] the citizen with a reason to retain hope.” (309) En: “The best outcomes in crisis come from strong strategic direction from the top coupled with giving the greatest scope possible for local decisions in light of local circumstances.” (308) Volgens Omand blonk de Oekraïense president Volodymir Zelenskyy juist hierin uit nadat zijn land op 23 februari 2022 door Rusland militair werd aangevallen.
Omand maakt in zijn boek een scherp onderscheid tussen crises die als een volledige verrassing komen en “slow-burn crises” die zich al lang — al dan niet latent — aandienen en zich vroeg of laat manifesteren. Citerend uit een dialoog uit The Sun also Rises van Ernest Hemingway op blz 310:
“How did you go bankrupt?”
“Two ways. Gradually and then suddenly.”
Volgens Omand zijn het “the slow-burn crises that test the government, companies and individuals the most. Slow-burn crises are often created by impending failures that have not been recognized early enough and have been allowed to fester, making them harder to tackle.” (313) Deze crises kunnen doorgaans worden vermeden door tijdig te handelen; en als vermijden niet tot de mogelijkheden blijkt te behoren, kunnen overheden zich ten minste nog zo goed mogelijk op “slow-burn crises” voorbereiden. Daartoe moeten zij natuurlijk wel eerst worden onderkend en geïnternaliseerd – en dat, zo leert de ervaring, is nog behoorlijk lastig. Omand kent daarom een belangrijke rol toe aan het vak van “strategic notice” (147-151), een vak waar ook inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten aan de lat staan. Even later gaat hij in op het ons bekende voorbeeld van de val van Kaboel in 2021: “a shortage of evidence for a real warning does not seem to have been the main problem. There was plenty of anecdotal evidence from those who knew the country well that loyalty to the Afghan state on the part of the newly formed Afghan forces was fragile. The Taliban were known to be totally committed to regaining control of Afghanistan and ruthless in their methods.” (152) Er was alleen nog een ‘tipping point’ nodig, zoals het plotselinge vertrek van hoogwaardigheidsbekleders of het intrekken van de Amerikaanse luchtsteun, om een ontwikkeling die al gaande was in een stroomversnelling te brengen en te laten uitmonden in “an unambiguous defeat for the West”. (153). Net als het bankroet in de roman van Hemingway kwam deze nederlaag ‘gradually and then suddenly’. Het is daarom een gemis dat Omand in zijn beschouwing voorbij gaat aan het begrip ‘tipping point’ uit de complexiteitswetenschap.
Met welke ‘slow-burn crises’ moeten Nederland en Europa de komende jaren rekening houden? Duidelijk is dat Europa zich in ieder geval moet voorbereiden op de mogelijkheid van een grootschalig militair conflict, voortkomend uit geopolitieke spanningen in hetzij Europa (Rusland) dan wel Oost-Azië (China). ‘Strategic notice’ is er in overvloed. Is een geopolitieke crisis nog te voorkomen, en zo ja hoe? En hoe bereiden we ons optimaal voor op een dergelijke crisis mocht deze zich onverhoopt voordoen? De hoofdboodschap van Omand is dat de kansen om een crisis te overleven in ieder geval aanzienlijk kunnen worden vergroot door doelgericht te investeren in de versterking van de nationale weerbaarheid (resilience), met inbegrip van het versterken van ‘early warning’-mechanismen en het houden van oefeningen. Dat is ook waar de recente toespraak van admiraal Rob Bauer, voorzitter van het Militaire Comité van de Navo, over ging. Voor Nederland en de MIVD zijn dit de komende jaren belangrijk thema’s. Dit boek van een Brits topambtenaar met een schat aan ervaring is alleen daarom al de moeite van het lezen waard.
Omand gaat in How to Survive a Crisis uit van de definitie van ‘crisis’ die de Britse overheid hanteert: “an abnormal and unstable situation that threatens an organization’s strategic objectives, reputation or viability.” (11) Kenmerkend aan een crisis is volgens hem het verlies van controle (hij noemt dit de ‘rubber levers test’, naar een humoristische scène in een film van Oliver Hardy en Stan Laurel die de controle over hun auto verliezen omdat de remmen en het stuur niet meer functioneren). “At first, the uncertainties will far outnumber the certainties. Get used to the reality that you will never know enough yet you still have to act.” (38)
Omand spreekt dan ook liever niet van “crisis management” maar van “crisis survival” (12) en “[averting] crises turning into disasters” (2). Omand: “In crisis, leaders have to accept considerable loss of control over events, and resign themselves to the reality that it will be efforts of others that determine how it will all work out.” (308). Alleen door in een crisis een strak ‘battle rhythm’ af te spreken en de informatievoorziening snel op orde te brengen, komt er iets van controle terug (54 e.v.). De meest effectieve vorm van leiderschap in een crisis is volgens Omand verder vooral “sense-giving leadership [providing] the citizen with a reason to retain hope.” (309) En: “The best outcomes in crisis come from strong strategic direction from the top coupled with giving the greatest scope possible for local decisions in light of local circumstances.” (308) Volgens Omand blonk de Oekraïense president Volodymir Zelenskyy juist hierin uit nadat zijn land op 23 februari 2022 door Rusland militair werd aangevallen.
Omand maakt in zijn boek een scherp onderscheid tussen crises die als een volledige verrassing komen en “slow-burn crises” die zich al lang — al dan niet latent — aandienen en zich vroeg of laat manifesteren. Citerend uit een dialoog uit The Sun also Rises van Ernest Hemingway op blz 310:
“How did you go bankrupt?”
“Two ways. Gradually and then suddenly.”
Volgens Omand zijn het “the slow-burn crises that test the government, companies and individuals the most. Slow-burn crises are often created by impending failures that have not been recognized early enough and have been allowed to fester, making them harder to tackle.” (313) Deze crises kunnen doorgaans worden vermeden door tijdig te handelen; en als vermijden niet tot de mogelijkheden blijkt te behoren, kunnen overheden zich ten minste nog zo goed mogelijk op “slow-burn crises” voorbereiden. Daartoe moeten zij natuurlijk wel eerst worden onderkend en geïnternaliseerd – en dat, zo leert de ervaring, is nog behoorlijk lastig. Omand kent daarom een belangrijke rol toe aan het vak van “strategic notice” (147-151), een vak waar ook inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten aan de lat staan. Even later gaat hij in op het ons bekende voorbeeld van de val van Kaboel in 2021: “a shortage of evidence for a real warning does not seem to have been the main problem. There was plenty of anecdotal evidence from those who knew the country well that loyalty to the Afghan state on the part of the newly formed Afghan forces was fragile. The Taliban were known to be totally committed to regaining control of Afghanistan and ruthless in their methods.” (152) Er was alleen nog een ‘tipping point’ nodig, zoals het plotselinge vertrek van hoogwaardigheidsbekleders of het intrekken van de Amerikaanse luchtsteun, om een ontwikkeling die al gaande was in een stroomversnelling te brengen en te laten uitmonden in “an unambiguous defeat for the West”. (153). Net als het bankroet in de roman van Hemingway kwam deze nederlaag ‘gradually and then suddenly’. Het is daarom een gemis dat Omand in zijn beschouwing voorbij gaat aan het begrip ‘tipping point’ uit de complexiteitswetenschap.
Met welke ‘slow-burn crises’ moeten Nederland en Europa de komende jaren rekening houden? Duidelijk is dat Europa zich in ieder geval moet voorbereiden op de mogelijkheid van een grootschalig militair conflict, voortkomend uit geopolitieke spanningen in hetzij Europa (Rusland) dan wel Oost-Azië (China). ‘Strategic notice’ is er in overvloed. Is een geopolitieke crisis nog te voorkomen, en zo ja hoe? En hoe bereiden we ons optimaal voor op een dergelijke crisis mocht deze zich onverhoopt voordoen? De hoofdboodschap van Omand is dat de kansen om een crisis te overleven in ieder geval aanzienlijk kunnen worden vergroot door doelgericht te investeren in de versterking van de nationale weerbaarheid (resilience), met inbegrip van het versterken van ‘early warning’-mechanismen en het houden van oefeningen. Dat is ook waar de recente toespraak van admiraal Rob Bauer, voorzitter van het Militaire Comité van de Navo, over ging. Voor Nederland en de MIVD zijn dit de komende jaren belangrijk thema’s. Dit boek van een Brits topambtenaar met een schat aan ervaring is alleen daarom al de moeite van het lezen waard.
May 22, 2025
I have finished reading “How to Survive A Crisis: Lessons in Resilience and Avoiding Disaster” by David Omand.
Professor Sir David Omand was Director of the UK intelligence agency Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and was the UK Intelligence and Security Coordinator. He has also held other senior public sector posts relating to security and national crisis management.
What is a crisis? A crisis is an emergency that cannot be contained by normal services. At that point it is up to government to direct the response to manage or resolve the crisis sufficiently to limit the harm it can cause. Sometimes they are due to human borne threats. Other times they can be acts of nature. But sometimes the most destructive are slow-burning crisis that explode after years of bad policy and the continued ignoring of warnings. If a crisis is not contained they can turn into disasters where the power of governments to influence events becomes worryingly limited, or more frighteningly, non-existent.
The author is very clear. Our country (by which I mean the UK) will definitely see more crisis in the future. Many may be more deadly than experienced and some may even overlap with each other. To prepare for them sufficiently many ingredients are needed. There needs to be sufficient trust and levels of communication between the state and the individuals so the latter trusts the former to act in a way that is rational and proportionate to adequately resolve crisis that may arise. Public investment in human capital and public money also needs to be made to build up national resilience infrastructure, which is perhaps not an easy sell during times of hardship. The author makes it clear that when it comes to crisis three aspects should be considered: Intensity of impact, extent of penetration of the crisis effects and it’s duration.
The human factor can be a double-edged sword in a crisis. Skills and expertise is crucial, but human flaws can all too often either contribute to the creation of a crisis or get in the way of it being resolved. Hubris can make people take risks against their better judgement. People wedded to preserving certain policies can be blind to their failures. Groupthink also has it’s hazards.
Overall, I found this book to be fascinating, scarily relevant and, at least for the majority, very accessible. I liked the feature of summary takeaway points at the end of each chapter. There were some fascinating historical examples of crisis and near-crisis too. The author made a convincing call for us as a nation to take more inspiration from our Nordic neighbours who have well publicised national contingency plans. This area needs to be woven into our culture to be successful and not treated cynically or as an afterthought. There are some fascinating insights for leadership too.
However, there were times where I felt that the old Civil Servant held back. Political populism is a direct threat to recognising real upcoming crisis due to it’s distortion of reality, fed by their social media driven ecosystems. Surely, a rallying call is due to get informed and assault the threat of disinformation on many fronts?
Still, I found this book informative, entertaining and at times suitable alarming.
Professor Sir David Omand was Director of the UK intelligence agency Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and was the UK Intelligence and Security Coordinator. He has also held other senior public sector posts relating to security and national crisis management.
What is a crisis? A crisis is an emergency that cannot be contained by normal services. At that point it is up to government to direct the response to manage or resolve the crisis sufficiently to limit the harm it can cause. Sometimes they are due to human borne threats. Other times they can be acts of nature. But sometimes the most destructive are slow-burning crisis that explode after years of bad policy and the continued ignoring of warnings. If a crisis is not contained they can turn into disasters where the power of governments to influence events becomes worryingly limited, or more frighteningly, non-existent.
The author is very clear. Our country (by which I mean the UK) will definitely see more crisis in the future. Many may be more deadly than experienced and some may even overlap with each other. To prepare for them sufficiently many ingredients are needed. There needs to be sufficient trust and levels of communication between the state and the individuals so the latter trusts the former to act in a way that is rational and proportionate to adequately resolve crisis that may arise. Public investment in human capital and public money also needs to be made to build up national resilience infrastructure, which is perhaps not an easy sell during times of hardship. The author makes it clear that when it comes to crisis three aspects should be considered: Intensity of impact, extent of penetration of the crisis effects and it’s duration.
The human factor can be a double-edged sword in a crisis. Skills and expertise is crucial, but human flaws can all too often either contribute to the creation of a crisis or get in the way of it being resolved. Hubris can make people take risks against their better judgement. People wedded to preserving certain policies can be blind to their failures. Groupthink also has it’s hazards.
Overall, I found this book to be fascinating, scarily relevant and, at least for the majority, very accessible. I liked the feature of summary takeaway points at the end of each chapter. There were some fascinating historical examples of crisis and near-crisis too. The author made a convincing call for us as a nation to take more inspiration from our Nordic neighbours who have well publicised national contingency plans. This area needs to be woven into our culture to be successful and not treated cynically or as an afterthought. There are some fascinating insights for leadership too.
However, there were times where I felt that the old Civil Servant held back. Political populism is a direct threat to recognising real upcoming crisis due to it’s distortion of reality, fed by their social media driven ecosystems. Surely, a rallying call is due to get informed and assault the threat of disinformation on many fronts?
Still, I found this book informative, entertaining and at times suitable alarming.
September 26, 2024
I enjoyed this book. It’s a familiar subject for me but I picked up stuff and had existing knowledge confirmed.
It’s difficult to say at what point in one’s professional development you should think about how you might manage in a crisis but if you think the time is right, this is good narrative introduction. However, I would encourage people to consider the principles of business continuity management first.
The book covers in outline lots of crises that have happened to nations and companies, which are just interesting to learn about. My favourite lift from those stories is William Whitelaw, the deputy prime minister to Margaret Thatcher explaining how she should sit tight during the Falkland Islands war after British Forces had landed at San Carlos. She was agitated from the distance of London as to why there seemed to be a delay in moving forces out of the beachhead. William Whitelaw was incredibly loyal to Thatcher right up until his gentle speech in Parliament against her just before her downfall. He said “Margaret, you have to trust the man on the spot. He may be right, he may be wrong. in this case, he may well be wrong. But by interfering you bring on yourself a responsibility you cannot sensibly manage from Downing Street.”
This event speaks to the principle of subsidiary, which posits that you should leave the management of problems, whether in crisis or every day to the lowest level capable to resolve them with the resources at hand. Decentralize operational responses while also centralizing strategic decisions. If only more managers were taught this sooner.
It’s difficult to say at what point in one’s professional development you should think about how you might manage in a crisis but if you think the time is right, this is good narrative introduction. However, I would encourage people to consider the principles of business continuity management first.
The book covers in outline lots of crises that have happened to nations and companies, which are just interesting to learn about. My favourite lift from those stories is William Whitelaw, the deputy prime minister to Margaret Thatcher explaining how she should sit tight during the Falkland Islands war after British Forces had landed at San Carlos. She was agitated from the distance of London as to why there seemed to be a delay in moving forces out of the beachhead. William Whitelaw was incredibly loyal to Thatcher right up until his gentle speech in Parliament against her just before her downfall. He said “Margaret, you have to trust the man on the spot. He may be right, he may be wrong. in this case, he may well be wrong. But by interfering you bring on yourself a responsibility you cannot sensibly manage from Downing Street.”
This event speaks to the principle of subsidiary, which posits that you should leave the management of problems, whether in crisis or every day to the lowest level capable to resolve them with the resources at hand. Decentralize operational responses while also centralizing strategic decisions. If only more managers were taught this sooner.
October 23, 2023
I found some of the case studies useful and interesting particularly in relation to cyber security. I think this book would be particularly relevant to someone managing risks such as a project manager. It is well written though I found some of his lists of things you would need to do to manage risks very dry to read.
March 6, 2025
Brilliant book. Interesting stories, useful takeaways and lessons, will be sure to re-read this in the future.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews