This book is Joseph Stiglitz’s diagnosis and prescription for the failures of neoliberal economics, primarily since its embrace during the Reagan presidency, as evidenced by slowed rates of economic growth and large increases in inequality within the US economy.
Economics for Stiglitz has not been a spectator sport. He has solid theoretical credentials. He’s won a Nobel Prize in Economics. But he has also served as chief of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisors and as chief economist for the World Bank.
The title of the book is indicative of its purpose. The Road to Freedom begins with a critique of neoliberal economics and free market theory, particularly as championed by Friedrich Hayek (author of The Road to Serfdom) and Milton Friedman. Stiglitz moves on from there to his own proposal for a new course of economic thinking and policy-making that he calls “progressive capitalism.”
Stiglitz criticizes Hayek and Friedman on two broad fronts. One is their conception of freedom, and the other is their treatment (or dismissal) of the assumptions behind free market economics, going back to Adam Smith’s admonitions about the conditions that must be met for the “invisible hand” of capitalism to do its work.
On “freedom” Stiglitz claims that Hayek and Friedman, I think Friedman in particular on this point, treat freedom in an arbitrarily exclusive manner as individual economic freedom — the freedom to do as you wish with your property, to enjoy it as you wish, to dispose or sell it as you wish, and to acquire more property as your means (other assets) allow. Friedman and Hayek of course do address political freedom as well, but treat, by Stiglitz’s account, political freedom as deriving from economic freedom. “Property” (or “private property” in this context) becomes almost a primitive, with rights, obligations, and political structures built on top of the notion of property.
By contrast, Stiglitz proposes a much broader conception of freedom, often called “opportunity sets” — the broad set of choices available to a person, including pursuing an education, choosing and pursuing a career, marrying, raising children, . . . as well as acquiring, enjoying, and disposing of property. Opportunity sets, by my understanding, are heterogeneous and potentially open-ended, depending on the social institutions and culture in which you live.
Several points fall out of Stiglitz’s differences with Hayek and Friedman on the notion of “freedom.” One is the potential relationship between political freedoms and economic freedoms. By Stiglitz’s account, Friedman especially emphasizes that political freedoms derive from economic freedoms. You cannot have a free society without economic freedoms.
Stiglitz sees the relationship as inherently going both ways. Economic freedoms, and the lack of economic freedoms, can derive from political freedoms, and their absence. In fact, a vicious cycle presents itself, and appears to be at work in our own politics and economy. When concentrated in the hands of some or a few, economic freedoms (and economic power), provide the ability to exercise political power, which in turn influences the distributions of economic freedoms, which then provide greater political power, and so on. We see that cycle at work in campaign funding and other forms of influence from economically advantaged corporations and persons on public policy, legislation, and broader political fronts.
Another, more philosophical point, is that other freedoms that have nothing to do with property or economic behavior can count just as much in the conception of a good life and a good society, and that that conception can fall under the proper reach of public policy and government designed to provide for and protect them — those freedoms I mentioned above, including the freedom to pursue an education, breathe clean air, raise children, etc. Those freedoms are likewise compromised by a scale that tips economic freedoms toward some and not all.
Stiglitz also emphasizes throughout the book potential trade-offs between freedoms, trade-offs that especially gain significance in social contexts, rather than the individualist contexts favored by the neoliberal tradition.
By Stiglitz’s argument, individual freedom is not sacred or absolute. Loss of freedom, or compromises of freedom, for one party may be overbalanced by increases of freedom for others. The compromise or loss can in some cases even be overbalanced with increased freedom for the one compromising or losing freedom in the first place. But the trade-off can be justified in any case. Obvious examples include taxes to fund public education (increasing the freedoms of the workforce) or public infrastructure (increasing the publicly available transportation or communications systems). Constraining polluters increases the freedom of the public to breathe clean air, drink clean water, etc.
A larger point, partly in response to those who do give absolute status to individual freedom, is his claim that one person’s freedom places limits, or diminishes, the freedoms of others. Freedom is inherently social — it is only with blinders on that we regard freedom entirely from one individual’s point of view. My property, my house, my car, etc., excludes others from enjoying those same freedoms. No one else can legally walk into my house, raid my refrigerator, etc. This may seem trivial until you experience scarcity.
Stiglitz clearly treats the “public good” more expansively than his neoliberal opponents do. But we shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that every individual has a stake in the public good, including those who may feel that they are paying too highly for it. Raising the educational levels and the health of the labor force and the population in general, building and maintaining physical infrastructure, . . . — these things provide broad benefits, ones that enable entrepreneurship, innovation, and growth.
That’s one front on which Stiglitz wants to argue against traditional neoliberalism. The other, as I mentioned, is the efficiency (and stability) of the free market economy. “Efficiency” here refers to an economy’s ability to generate growth, innovation, and improvements in the standard of living of those living within it.
We should say for the sake of definition that a “free market” here is an unregulated market, one as untouched by government constraints and other interventions as possible.
Free market economists argue that markets self-correct and by their very nature produce efficiencies — growth, just distributions of wealth, and inherent protections against exploitations and other injustices.
Stiglitz’s arguments against free market economists (again, primarily Friedman and Hayek) are, for the most part, not surprising or novel. Those arguments, primarily that the virtues of free market economics depend on unmet simplifying conditions (perfect information, narrow self-interestedness, competitive environments, perfect rationality, and other factors that would limit coercion and exploitation), have been consistently heard, empirically supported, and ignored at the political and policy level. Stiglitz himself, as chairman of Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisors, bore direct witness, to implementation of neoclassical, free market economics, against the wind of those arguments.
Those assumptions, as Stiglitz says, were known even to Adam Smith. He cites passages from Smith (both from The Wealth of Nations and Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments) warning about and discussing how to prevent monopolistic power, exploitation of labor, and other distortions to the workings of free markets. As I said, these points are not new.
What economists refer to as “externalities” distort the “perfect market” in ways that require some sort of action — “government intervention”. Externalities include monopoly power or other less obvious market power (e.g., a large employer’s advantage in setting wages in a small town), luck (natural disasters, etc.), lack of information to one party or another (e.g., deceptive advertising or suppression of information, such as health factors, that would influence buying or selling decisions), political power (e.g., through campaign funding or other means of supporting candidates whose policies will favor one or another party in market interactions), intergenerational wealth or other assets, the specifics of property laws (which can differ widely from place to place even within one country like the US).
.
Free market economists, especially Friedman, do have responses to those problems — arguments that “potential competition” prevents real monopolies from forming, or that prices (including for Friedman, taxes) can do the job of correcting cases of exploitation and free-riding. Stiglitz believes that Friedman’s arsenal is too weak to deal with those problems, relying on “prices” alone.
Looming above the theoretical problems are Stiglitz’s claims that the neoliberal economy, since the Reagan years, has just plain failed to produce the growth of previous decades and has produced a yawning gap in income and wealth distribution. The data does bear him out on this — US GDP growth in the decades prior to the Reagan administration ran between 11.3% and something over 4%. In 2023, it hit 2.5%, and it has rarely exceeded 4% over the last 40 years (World Bank numbers). Meanwhile the income growth of wealthier Americans has far outpaced that of the middle class, not to mention the lower class (see the Pew Research reports, or others, for corroboration). The trends span Democratic and Republican administrations.
But . . . the fact remains that, in American electoral politics, free market policies prevail, and candidates in elections benefit from messages associated with them.
There’s no mystery why the beneficiaries of free markets would favor ignoring their failures — the failures are their gains. And, as Stiglitz has claimed, their economic power builds their political power to perpetuate policies favoring them.
But why do free market arguments have such popular appeal that they sway elections, even getting the votes of those disadvantaged by free market economics? I’m not sure I know.
One factor, of course, is the ability of those with economic (and political) power to influence public thought. That is the topic of Part Two of Stiglitz’s book, focusing in part on the role of social media. That’s a topic of research and debate much larger than anything Stiglitz can take on as an economist, and much larger than I should even try to address here.
I will mention one other factor that may influence economic and policy thought, at both the expert level and the popular level -- the general appeal of arguments based on simplifying the relevant factors. Economists, historically and both on the “right” and “left”, seem notoriously guilty of arguments that simplify economic structures, making their cases on examples that reduce markets to a matter of negotiations and transactions between nondescript individuals without external influences or power relationships. As if the “markets’ of national economies were just aggregates of those simple, idealized cases of the kind of voluntary exchanges that take place at farmers’ markets. Stiglitz himself is not immune to using such examples.
Simplifications are persuasive, and for that matter, pretty much unavoidable in theorizing. Science, after all, begins with simplification. Just as economists don’t account for externalities and other distortions of economic behavior, physicists don't account for mountains, canyons, etc. in laws of planetary motion. But they don’t need to — mountains and canyons don’t relevantly affect the centers of mass they are analyzing. But the distortions of the free market — monopoly power, the power to set prices and costs, etc. — do relevantly affect the performance of economies, so much so that to ignore them is to promote fairy tales.
I’ve already gone very long in this review, so I’m going to bring it to a close. I’ve really only talked about the first part of Stiglitz’s book, his critique of neoliberalism. Part Two addresses the issue I briefly touched on — the influences, including especially social media, that shape public thought and attitudes, particularly when those who control those influences (the corporate media owners and CEOs) pursue their own economic and political self-interests.
Part Three is Stiglitz’s own positive program — the change of course he recommends. Stiglitz is no socialist. He proposes what he calls “progressive capitalism,” a capitalism that takes seriously the causes of unequal freedoms and the distortions that bend the economy to serve the interests of those already best off. In making his arguments, he relies repeatedly on insuring fairness through decisions and policies formulated behind something like John Rawls’ “veil of ignorance” or by Adam Smith’s “impartial spectator.”
I’ll add, because I can’t help it, that the recent US election makes Stiglitz’s proposals seem pretty much moot, at least for the time being. The new president will not be interested in Stiglitz’s thoughts. But they are here, and we can hope for a rebirth of serious concern for increased freedoms, justice, and fairness in the not-distant future.