'Napoleon's legend is so persistent that it confounds the historical reality in the popular imagination. He himself contributed much towards the construction of his own myth, from his youth even until after he fell from power, when, while in exile, he dictated his memoirs to a group of disciples who took down his every word in the hope that his version of history would prevail. Such were Napoleon's skills as a chronicler that much of the legend is still unquestioningly accepted...'
This second volume of Philip Dwyer's outstanding biography sheds further fresh light on one of the great figures of modern history. After a meteoric rise, a military-political coup in 1799 established Napoleon Bonaparte in government, aged just thirty. This meticulously researched study examines the man in power, from his brooding obsessions and capacity for violence, to his ability to inspire others and realise his visionary ideas. One of the first truly modern politicians, Napoleon skilfully fashioned the image of himself that laid the foundation of the legend that endures to this day; Philip Dwyer's ambitious, definitive work separates myth from history to offer us anew one of history's most charismatic and able leaders.
Philip Dwyer studied in Perth, Paris and Berlin before receiving his doctorate from the University of Western Australia. His first posting was as a Leverhulme Fellow at the University of Dundee. He has taught European History at the University of Newcastle since 1994. His primary research interest is eighteenth-century Europe with a particular emphasis on the Napoleonic Empire. Volume one of his study on Napoleon won the National Biography Award in 2008. The second volume published in 2013 was short-listed for a number of prizes. The third and final volume of Napoleon is due out in 2017. He is currently working on a global history of violence. Philip is founding Director of the Centre for the History of Violence.
Firstly a little history of my own, to put what follows in context. Originally this was intended as a three-volume work. Having read the first I was disappointed when the publication date for the second volume, Autumn 2010, passed without it. Many years ago I worked in Bloomsbury London and, I don't recall why, several times went to the offices of Bloomsbury publishing - then mainly known for Tarot and New Age books. Then they got Pottered and moved into the big time, losing on the way the small firm empathy.
In reply to my question about publication in 2010 I was told, without explanation, that it was now due in September 2012. Finally it arrived in November 2013 and the third volume was now part of the second (or had just disappeared). In my frustration I had contacted Dr. Dwyer who was most kind in responding to me.
Although competent and a work of scholarship this final volume lacked, for me, the inspirational quality of the first. I had the impression that the author had grown to thoroughly dislike his subject, and in truth there is not much to like about someone who was responsible for the death of over six million people. However, the dislike seemed to me to get in the way of the narrative. I don't suggest that a biographer has to like their subject, but neutrality is important. Apart from that the closing chapters were rushed, as if an editor had done a really bad abridgement job. I will never know, but suspect that was the case. Dr, Dwyer deserved better and so do his readers
As per my review of the first volume, disappointingly flat. My hopes of a bit of spark due to the increase in his power proved groundless. Not bad, just not as good as it could have been.
I didn’t expect to find an Australian writing about Napoleon but,, why not? Dwyer has already published volume one, Napoleon: the Path to Power, of this monumental work and also written previously on Talleyrand, the great survivor who served throughout the revolutionary period as well as serving Napoleon, if ‘serving’ is the appropriate word for such a self-serving survivor such as he was. There are 565 pages of text with cartoon and map illustrations from the period, followed by 235 pages of notes, bibliography, acknowledgements and index. It required a pillow and a reading rack to read without arm and wrist pain but I thoroughly enjoyed it.
As a sometime teacher of modern history, many years ago, I am still cognisant of the characters and issues of those times that Wordsworth and Dickens labelled when ‘the best of times’ and ‘the worst of times’ were ‘bliss to be young’. Dwyer shows all the nuances of Napoleon’s character and public persona in all those periods from the royal but youthful, equestrian figure portrayed by David, crossing the Alps with a soon to be victorious army, to the depressed, corpulent man after the final defeat at Waterloo. My conclusion from Dwyer’s interpretation is that Napoleon was a much better administrator than a general; this is probably a radical view for army historians. There are considerable changes to the orthodox view of this period. Napoleon’s first great victory at Marengo was much more hype than fact and the victory was more significantly won by his rival general who soundly defeated the Austrians in the subsequent days and forced them into peace negotiations. Bonaparte, as he was known before becoming Emperor Napoleon, almost lost the Battle at Austerlitz which was celebrated as his most famous victory and we all know how he lost his judgement in the Russian campaign which began as a grossly political error in not settling the peace with Tsar Alexander. Borodino was not the worst battle of those times as Tolstoy convinced us: it looked the worst as the Russian retreat was chaotic and left all the wounded to die slowly on the battlefield. This was corroborated by the horrors of the return journey six weeks later when the French found the wounded still there, left to die amid the stench of the unburied corpses. Note that six weeks, the French stayed in Moscow for that time as only half of it was burnt and the officers enjoyed the life in the palaces, a critical error of judgement following no peace approach from Alexander. And we all know that the Kremlin was not burnt. Napoleon retrieved some of his military genius in the final campaigns against the huge numbers of the combined armies of Europe, when the tactic of the allies was to avoid him at all cost: hence Blucher’s notorious late arrival at Waterloo which was a battle largely lost because the French had so few horses left after the carnage on the winter retreat from Moscow. Another interesting fact about Waterloo, the majority of the forces led by Wellington were not British, they were Dutch.
As I have seen travelling frequently throughout France, the legacy of Napoleon is his organization of the French nation state and French law. Every village has its mayor and its Marie building, ecole maternelle (baby centre) and school and every one of the 95 Departmentes has its Prefect as begun by the Revolution and codified by Napoleon. Dwyer also has the opinion that the establishment of the Empire was more popular than I had assumed as many of the royalists and the middle class saw it as the equivalent of the monarchy as amended by the proposals led by Mirabeau in the early days of the revolution; hence Dwyer’s choice of title, Citizen Emperor.
Napoleon is one of the great figures of history. His is the story of one man’s burning drive and ambition to reach for the heights and claim his glory. He is a figure that polarises opinion from virtually the day that he came onto the political scene to even today, with their being thousands of books written about him and the many aspects of his career, it’s rise and it’s fall.
This is the second volume of the life of Napoleon by Philip Dwyer and focuses on the 16 year period where Napoleon ruled France and a large part of Europe, from the Coup that brought him into power to the final, fateful battle of Waterloo. While covering only a span of 16 years, it was a frantic time, with numerous wars across Europe and a period of great internal change within France itself, as the revolution was done away with, and a monarchy was put in its place. New laws were brought into place (The famous Napoleonic Code) which actually form the basis for the law in many countries today, the settlement and reestablishment of the catholic church in France and the following struggles with the pope and numerous building works.
Philip Dwyer looks at this time with a deeply critical eye. There is a definite sense that the author is not a fan of Napoleon and argues that he was lucky (something which Napoleon has admitted to, luck does play a part in any great general, though to Napoleon it was more destiny then luck) in some of his battles and that his tactical skill was not as great as made out. Philip Dwyer argues that Napoleon’s direct impact was very little on some events, for example he had very little influence over the writing of the Napoleonic Code, but what he did enjoy was a great propaganda machine which was able to put forth the message that the regime wanted. The book is meticulously researched, almost a third of the book is devoted to notes and further reading, yet there are points where some things could have been explained better (for example, the treaty of Amiens which ended the war between Britain and France in 1802 is not covered other then in passing, the author assumes you know was in it, nor are the reasons for war breaking out again in 1804 really covered)
This was an enjoyable book and does cast Napoleon in a new light, but for me, it is only one side of the man and should not be considered the only book one has to read about the man.
This didn’t hit as well as its predecessor. Dwyer’s biography of Napoleon’s path to power was full of interesting interpretations of Napoleon’s self-fashioning and how, with the participation of his audience, he created a persona that could end the revolution.
I don’t know whether Napoleon’s passage from consular to emperor to outcast wasn’t as open to interpretation to his earlier years, or Dwyer just wasn’t as invested, but this was largely the same sort of narrative of Napoleonic campaigns you can really get anywhere.
It’s well written, but the only spin I can see that is specific to this book is that Dwyer takes pains to describe how every action Napoleon took was deeply unpopular with the French public who were in a constant state of outrage, or at best, deep confusion with every action he took. There is a lot of citations in this book, but I’m not sure how Dwyer’s research allowed him to peer into the mind of the early nineteenth century French public. Dwyer’s interpretation of a public either opposed, or at best completely indifferent to Napoleon feels very contrived in the last stretch when the return of Napoleon from Elba produces a lot of support and sends the returning regime fleeing. After recounting this, Dwyer somehow reminds us that Napoleon was just largely hated or at best, ignored by the French public. Perhaps I am being unfair, but I am always wary of historians who constantly present how ‘the public’ felt about something. It is too often an excuse for historians to shake out the examples that they find most agreeable from the chaff which contradicts them.
I was pleased that he accurately assessed the participation of the British in the Waterloo campaign as an aspect of the allied army and not the sole winners of the day.
Because I am, unfortunately, a completist, I will also read Dwyer’s follow up about the legacy of Napoleon. I expect it to be entirely made up of the aspects I disliked in this book.
This second volume of Philip Dwyer's biography of Napoleon begins with the coup of Brumaire in November 1799. The book provides plenty of evidence to support the view of Napoleon as tyrant, as someone who was actually worse than a "great bad man", the phrase adopted by the historian of the Napoleonic wars, David Chandler, from Lord Clarendon's famous description of Oliver Cromwell.
A number of themes emerge that serve to erode the Napoleonic legend. Napoleon had a propensity to propagandise victories, particularly Marengo in 1800. This battle was also significant in that it convinced Napoleon of the connection between victory in battle and public opinion (p. 47). It could be said to be the origin of the megalomania that was to culminate in defeat in Russia. Moreover, the lip service paid to the demos through the cynical use of the plebiscite allowed Napoleon to legitimise his rule as First Consul, and then as Emperor, as a manifestation of the people's will.
The Civil Code (later the Code Napoleon), which is seen as his lasting legacy, was "neither inspired" (p. 88) nor written by Napoleon. The brutal abduction and execution of the Bourbon prince, the Duc d'Enghien, in 1804 by a "kangaroo court" (p. 121) compares unfavourably with the death of Louis XVI. As Dwyer points out, even "the revolutionaries observed legal procedure" (p. 121).
The emergence of a cult of personality and Napoleon's promiscuous nepotism are documented. Dwyer rightly does not see him as a precursor of totalitarianism but rather as a throwback to the absolutism of Louis XIV.
Napoleon's vanity was shameless. For example, he downplayed the more significant French victory at Auerstaedt in 1806 in favour of his triumph at Jena on the same day. There is an interesting portrayal of Napoleon's reaction to the bloody battle of Eylau in February 1807: a mixture of some human feeling for the suffering of the soldiery and a cynical disregard for the truth that the Russians had fought his forces to a standstill. Dwyer brilliantly documents the use of art as a propaganda tool and the way in which it was used, in some instances, to portray Napoleon as a Christ-like figure of compassion and, in others, to show him as a worthy successor to the heroes of Antiquity.
1807 was the zenith of Napoleon's career. The Peace of Tilsit marked the height of his popularity, but was also the beginning of the descent to ultimate defeat. It did not solve the Russian or British problems; it was also around this time that Napoleon's physical and mental powers began to wane. Moreover, he acquired the intractable problem of Spain, a decision that Dwyer ascribes to a combination of arrogance and feelings of invincibility. Dwyer argues that the withdrawal of British forces in early 1809 coupled with punitive measures against the Spanish resistance convinced Napoleon that the revolt had been crushed. However, he failed to realise the nature of the war that he had provoked in the Peninsula.
Like other revisionists, Dwyer strips away at the notion of Napoleon as military genius interpreting many of his successes as having been built upon the efforts of others, such as Desaix at Marengo and especially Davout at Jena-Auerstaedt. The energy and derring-do of his first Italian campaign would not be repeated as he assumed more and more the responsibilities and burdens of command given the size of the forces at his disposal. In the end, in Russia especially, the command of such forces proved too much for even someone of his talent. It is perhaps no coincidence that Napoleon's most effective performance in the latter part of his career was to be in 1814 when he was commanding much smaller forces. Unfortunately for him, it was a futile effort as the Allies closed in on Paris.
Dwyer acknowledges the Napoleonic quest for decisive battle from Austerlitz on (p. 208). However, he also alludes to the changes in warfare that were heralded during these years, in particular, the extended frontages caused by sheer weight of numbers that led to attritional battles, notably at Wagram in 1809 and Borodino in 1812 where the casualty count from one day of battle would not be surpassed until the battle of the Somme (p. 385). Moreover, Napoleon's fixation on battle proved costly as, despite some hesitation, he ploughed on with the Russian campaign in the face of his enemy's strategy of avoiding a clash of arms.
Those who believe that Napoleon wished to acquire "universal empire" would have understood the logic of his decision to invade Russia. In reality, it marked the point at which his star truly descended. In Dwyer's words, the occupation of a two-thirds destroyed Moscow saw him go "from being an active agent of his own destiny to a passive agent" (p. 395). French losses in Russia were staggering: 85 per cent of the army in dead, wounded, deserters, and prisoners (p. 426). Yet Napoleon still had the self-confidence to believe that he could raise a new army and maintain his empire in Central Europe.
Napoleon would later confess that the armistice of Plaeswitz, which divided the spring and autumn campaigns of 1813, was the "dumbest decision" of his life (p. 448). The latter of these campaigns culminated in the battle of Leipzig, the biggest battle in world history at that time, where Allied numerical superiority told.
When the possibility of a negotiated settlement to the conflict arose in late 1813, Napoleon refused it. Dwyer believes that Napoleon's determination to fight on against increasing odds owed much to an inability to compromise that had been apparent as far back as his days in Corsica. His relatively humble origins were also a factor: "He was convinced that he had to keep on producing victories in order to justify his existence because he could not overcome his own inner doubts that he was no more than an upstart." (p. 468.) Moreover, Dwyer demonstrates that the myth that Napoleon was betrayed, and not defeated, in 1814 was just that: a French variant of the German "stab in the back" of 1918. Dwyer describes the exile in Elba in more detail than many accounts before concluding with an analysis of the Hundred Days and Napoleon's subsequent abdication.
With 139 pages of notes and a bibliography covering a further 70 pages, Dwyer's work is a testament to his scholarly rigour. This book is a necessary corrective to those who continue to extol the Napoleonic legend, and should be read by anyone with an interest in the period and/or an interest in the lives of significant historical figures.
Not realizing this was the middle volume of a three-volume bio of Napoleon when I ordered from HBC, Ii was content to let it sit on my shelf for a while as I read through some of the more pressing agenda item books on the shelf, of which there are many and more...the list never gets shorter! A friend and I agreed that this was one person and time period we needed to and wanted to know more about, so we embarked on a two-person book club of sorts. I have yet to get his feelings about the book, but mine are luke-warm at best. One of THE most influential historical figures of modern history gets a treatment in this book that is lackluster. It left me wanting more, always more. I will most likely find a bio of Napoleon's early life and career, and it may even be Mr. Dwyer's volume. But it won't be my first choice.
An interesting book. A particular focus of the author is on the propaganda and iconography surrounding Napoleon (hence long discussins on various paintings of Napoleon). Having now read all three books of Dwyer's trilogy, my conclusion is that - while I like other works, such as Broers' trilogy, better for their detailed treatment of politics, diplomacy and military affairs - Dwyer's approach is an interesting perspective as well.
How much do you know about Napoleon? Probably not as much as you think and no where near as much as you should! That's certainly the impression I got when starting this book. When people describe Philip Dwyer's biography as meticulously researched, they are not exaggerating.
From the historical, cultural and political context behind key decisions to the little details that bring the events to life like the weather of during key dates, to even the hour of the day when things happened (such as when Louis XVIII fled as Napoleon returned from Elba and rushes to Paris) -this book has it all.
The biography covers the creation of the Empire and how the French Napoleonic Government ran, to horrors of war which seem so large in scale as to stretch the mind. But it always follows Napoleon closely. I feel I got an excellent sense of what drove him -both the ambition, fear and loathing of the revolutionary chaos and blood lust of the populace during la Terreur, and desire to establish himself on equal footing with the old style Monarch's of Europe while also trying to remove them. Lastly, you also get a sense of how much luck plays into major events and how this is often written up as 'talent'. It happens to both Napoleon and his enemies but perhaps Napoleon was better as capitalising on it (until he started to believe his own truth).
Dwyer's coverage takes into account newspaper articles, census figures, police/military records, personal journals and letters at the time as well as auto biographies and more. This provides two valuable benefits: (i) it gives different perspectives to derive as much of an objective biography as possible, and (ii) allows you to enjoy the facts without worrying too much on author interpretation. In fact where Dwyer is sceptical due to few records on matters he notes this.
I admit to knowing some of the history of the end of the First French Empire and having read Henry Kissinger's Diplomacy I found the resulting Congress of Vienna decisions fascinating (can someone please write a decent biography of Klemens von Metternich?) But strangely Philip Dwyer's book does not dwell too long on this aspect. The coverage of the battle of Waterloo is also short but this makes sense as you read the book -the end really is the cumulation of the decisions and approach Napoleon took in the years prior.
A final point, but vital none the less, is that Dwyer's style of writing is engaging. It isn't the typical dry academic approach. Sure, there aren't really any jokes but the writing is light to digest. It is a very large account (covering 16 years), and so I read it over several months but I didn't feel my mind wearying. In fact I often wanted to talk in depth about what I was learning.
If I was to improve this book I would suggest the maps be drawn more clearly (rivers and country borders were hard to tell apart) and perhaps split the maps to cover segments of campaigns and wars across chapter pages as and when they are written about. But this is a minor issue as there aren't many maps to begin with.
4.5/5 and I now hope to read sometime later this year.
Bonus addition:
There are numerous little facts you'd never think of to keep you entertained in this book. Did you know that a form of an IED was used to try to assassinate Napoleon long before the most famous wars? Or that he attempted to commit suicide before his first abdication but failed due to the age of the poison mixture? Or even that enterprising businessmen would flock to scenes of Napoleonic battles to gather the bones, return to Britain and make fertiliser. I didn't before, but feel richer now for the knowledge (regardless of its practicality).
Having enjoyed the first instalment in this biography very much I was a little disappointed with this volume by comparison. This being said many things contained within were very informative, particularly the discussion of the disastrous Russian and Spanish campaigns which severely tarnished Napoleons image. I also enjoy the discussion of the abandonment of the republic and the adoption of the empire. certainly worth a read if only to get the full story but definitely not as concise as the first volume.
An excellent overview of Napoleon's empire period. As big as this is it still has to skimp on certain areas. surprising it spends merely moments on Waterloo - he is content that anyone studying Nappy will look further into the more specific volumes and events. Still it covers lot's of the political elements and if looking for battle strategies you will be better to look at other authors. I will be seeking out his first volume - the Rise of Napoleon and I do hope he will write a volume on his last days as this book ends with him sailing away to St Helena