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Waste Land: A World in Permanent Crisis
An urgent exploration of a world in constant crisis, where every regional disaster threatens to become a global conflict, with lessons from history that can stop the spiral—from the New York Times bestselling author of The Revenge of Geography
We are entering a new era of global cataclysm in which the world faces a deadly mix of war, climate change, great power rivalry, rapid technological advancement, the end of both monarchy and empire, and countless other dangers. In Waste Land, Robert D. Kaplan, geopolitical expert and author of more than twenty books on world affairs, incisively explains how we got here and where we are going. Kaplan makes a novel argument that the current geopolitical landscape must be considered alongside contemporary social phenomena such as urbanization and digital news media, grounding his ideas in foundational modern works of philosophy, politics, and literature, including the poem from which the title is borrowed, and celebrating a canon of tradistionally conservative thinkers, including Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and many others.
As in many of his books, Kaplan looks to history and literature to inform the present, drawing particular comparisons between today's challenges and the Weimar Republic, the post-World War I democratic German government that fell to Nazism in the 1930s. Just as in Weimar, which faced myriad crises inextricably bound up with global systems, the singular dilemmas of the twenty-first century—pandemic disease, recession, mass migration, the destabilizing effects of large-scale democracy and great power conflicts, and the intimate bonds created by technology—mean that every disaster in one country has the potential to become a global crisis, too. According to Kaplan, the solutions lie in prioritizing order in governing systems, arguing that stability and historic liberalism rather than mass democracy per se will save global populations from an anarchic future.
Waste Land is a bracing glimpse into a future defined by the connections afforded by technology but with remarkable parallels to the past. Just as it did in Weimar, Kaplan fears the situation may be spiraling out of our control—unless our leaders act first.
We are entering a new era of global cataclysm in which the world faces a deadly mix of war, climate change, great power rivalry, rapid technological advancement, the end of both monarchy and empire, and countless other dangers. In Waste Land, Robert D. Kaplan, geopolitical expert and author of more than twenty books on world affairs, incisively explains how we got here and where we are going. Kaplan makes a novel argument that the current geopolitical landscape must be considered alongside contemporary social phenomena such as urbanization and digital news media, grounding his ideas in foundational modern works of philosophy, politics, and literature, including the poem from which the title is borrowed, and celebrating a canon of tradistionally conservative thinkers, including Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and many others.
As in many of his books, Kaplan looks to history and literature to inform the present, drawing particular comparisons between today's challenges and the Weimar Republic, the post-World War I democratic German government that fell to Nazism in the 1930s. Just as in Weimar, which faced myriad crises inextricably bound up with global systems, the singular dilemmas of the twenty-first century—pandemic disease, recession, mass migration, the destabilizing effects of large-scale democracy and great power conflicts, and the intimate bonds created by technology—mean that every disaster in one country has the potential to become a global crisis, too. According to Kaplan, the solutions lie in prioritizing order in governing systems, arguing that stability and historic liberalism rather than mass democracy per se will save global populations from an anarchic future.
Waste Land is a bracing glimpse into a future defined by the connections afforded by technology but with remarkable parallels to the past. Just as it did in Weimar, Kaplan fears the situation may be spiraling out of our control—unless our leaders act first.
212 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 28, 2025
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About the author
Robert D. Kaplan
52 books1,265 followersRobert David Kaplan is an American journalist, currently a National Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly. His writings have also been featured in The Washington Post, The New York Times, The New Republic, The National Interest, Foreign Affairs and The Wall Street Journal, among other newspapers and publications, and his more controversial essays about the nature of U.S. power have spurred debate in academia, the media, and the highest levels of government. A frequent theme in his work is the reemergence of cultural and historical tensions temporarily suspended during the Cold War.
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February 6, 2025
Robert D. Kaplan began his career as a journalist in 1982 working as a “super-stringer” stationed out of Athens. He published his first book, Surrender or Starve: Travels in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea, in 1988. Since that book, and counting this one, he’s now published a total of 23 books by my count, not to mention innumerable magazine articles, book introductions, and talks. I haven’t read all of his books or articles, but I’ve read a fair number of them, and he’s become my favorite active author. Kaplan, who’s now into his eighth decade (b. 1952), has probably gone through more passport books than one can count. He’s not an armchair thinker—or I should say—not solely an armchair thinker; he’s a deeply and widely read in history and literature. And he’s been to about every region to see first-hand what’s happening (although I don’t know of him writing about Latin America).
This work is an assessment of the current state of our world. I see it as a culmination of what he’s been writing about the last 40-plus years, a summa of his observations and assessment of the state of the world. And our world is in a sorry state. The guiding metaphor of this book is that the world is now collectively in a state of political and social dysfunction like that of Weimar Germany between the end of World War I and the rise of Hitler. That’s not a pleasant thought.
The world now lacks a leader, as the three “great powers” are all in decline and are not able—or willing—to take up the mantle of leadership that the US held during the post-World War II up through the fall of the Berlin Wall and early post-Cold War days. In military strength and economic output, the US is still by far ahead, but the quality of our leadership has been in decline. (N.B. Kaplan’s book went on sale about a week after Trump’s inauguration, so his manuscript was submitted well before the election of Trump in 2024, so readers should compound any pessimism that one takes from this book.) Ian Bremmer describes the current state of international politics as a “G-zero” world, as Kaplan notes. There is no dominant Great Power or concert of powers. The world is without a stronger leader, organizer, and enforcer. The US, after unforced errors from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan and the 2008 crash—and much else—is prepared to walk away from world affairs. As if we could.
Kaplan is a self-described realist, but don’t let this self-description fool you into thinking that Kaplan is simple-minded as some realists certainly are. Kaplan takes a long view, and he incorporates his deep and wide reading of history and literature to bring perspective to contemporary affairs. He perceives the course of history as not only guided by the great forces: wars, geography, demographics, plagues, and revolutions, he also perceives history as guided by actors, by those who make decisions. He calls this perspective the “Shakespearean” perspective on history, as, for instance, in Richard III’s “My Country for a Horse.” This perspective takes into account the fortune, fate, and choice that Shakespeare highlights in his plays. This combination of “forces” and “contingencies” allows Kaplan to appreciate history—and thus our world—from a variety of perspectives: the inexorable, impersonal, and random and that of individual actors and their choices and luck. As an example of his ability to draw on history and literature, Kaplan references the later works of Solzhenitsyn about Russia and World War I, which serves to buttress and enliven his arguments.
Kaplan posits several tenets that mark his perspective, and he highlights them again in this book. One is that order precedes freedom and justice; if no order, then no justice, and no freedom. Disorder leads to repression. For instance, citing Churchill, he posits that Europe might have been better off if the great dynasties—Romanov, Hapsburg, and Hohenzollern—had survived the war, thereby abating the rise of Nazism and Leninist Communism. Kaplan also argues, following Samuel Huntington, that the longer a nation is subject to tyranny, the harder and longer the transition to democracy takes. And, following former U.N. ambassador Jean Kilpatrick, he agrees that right-wing tyrannies (of the traditional, militaristic, kleptocratic sort) are easier and more quickly toppled than Communist regimes. This argument makes sense, given that communism is a secular religion to which some in a regime religiously adhere. Kaplan also argues that we must “think tragically to avoid tragedy,” and we should use pessimism to avoid catastrophe. Nostrums, sayings, and generalities don’t always apply to current events, but some apply most of the time. I contend that Kaplan’s reference library of insights will stand up well against the test of time and experience.
Kaplan argues that while technology has brought us closer and allowed us to become more knowledgeable and informed about the wider world, it also has radicalized and isolated us. And, I’d add, it certainly hasn’t improved our judgment. The follies of Vietnam and Iraq played out about as poorly as the Athenian adventure in Sicily recorded by Thucydides. Sicily was about the equivalent in practical distance from Athens as Iraq and Vietnam are from the U.S. in contemporary travel times, but the results for the U.S. were no less a failure because of our newfound virtual and actual proximity. Add the potential of ballistic missiles to launch an attack across continents and the potential of a nuclear spasm that could wipe out most of the world within little more than 30 minutes, and you better appreciate how our world has grown smaller but no less dangerous. Also, Kaplan explores our virtual proximities and finds that we are a crowd (now often virtual) as described in the work of Elias Canetti in his Crowds and Power (1960). Add to this the isolation amid extreme urbanization found in the contemporary world, and we get the loneliness and anxiety that Hannah Arendt identifies as crucial to the development of populations susceptible to radical, even totalitarian, regimes.
In the wider world, outside of the strong nation-states, the greatest threat isn’t tyranny, but anarchy. (Kaplan published a 1994 book on this, The Coming Anarchy.)
Kaplan discusses current conditions in Russia and China (and the U.S., of course). Russia has always been the key to peace in Europe, and it’s in a precarious state at present (a quagmire of a war, declining population, isolated leader, oligarchy as kleptocracy, etc.) And in China, the pragmatism of Deng has given way to the nationalist doctrines of one man: Xi. China is certainly in better shape than Russia, but it, too, is facing a dramatic demographic decline within the context of a sclerotic political system.
One point that did puzzle me in the book was the brief but significant emphasis that Kaplan put upon anti-Semitism in the world as a whole, and its effects on different governments. His treatment is brief and not well supported. Anti-semitism is vile, stupid, and (in some measure) widespread, without question. But how consequential is it outside of Europe and (to a lesser extent), the U.S.? In the Middle East, of course, Muslim populations are anti-Israeli, but are they deeply anti-Semitic? Maybe the disease of anti-Semitism has infected a wider population than I once thought, but Kaplan doesn’t develop the point, and I wish he would have.
In the final section on “Crowds and Chaos,” Kaplan references Canetti, as I noted above, and he discusses the work of Oswald Spengler, the German schoolmaster whose work, The Decline of the West, was published near the end of World War I. This fascinated me, as I’d come to believe (without reading him) that Spengler was a bit of a crank who spun out speculations via a misapplied biological metaphor. Reading Kaplan’s reflections on Spengler, I’m not so much disabused of my perceptions as I am chastened by the suspicion that I may have prematurely thrown the baby out with the bathwater. Perhaps, despite my doubts about his guiding metaphor (growth and decay), Spengler has some insights worth culling. As an American, I can no longer doubt the reality of decline, not with Donald Trump and his Yahoos tearing down our institutions and abusing our Constitution and the rule of law. Is the whole world now Weimar? Perhaps, but the U.S. looks like it at the moment. (I’ve thought for some time now that the most relevant historical era frame for our current state is the 1930s.)
So how does T.S. Eliot’s enigmatic 1922 poem, “The Waste Land,” connect with Kaplan’s argument? In that poem, and other literary and historical works that Kaplan notes (Nietzsche, Ortega y Gasset, Sartre, Camus, and others), he sees a world out of joint, one that’s becoming more technologically sophisticated, more urbanized, and wealthier (at least in material terms), yet more threatening, violent, and dysfunctional. Citing the historian of early 20th-century Vienna, Carl Schorske, Kaplan sees a growing tide of “feeling and instinct” overtaking rational deliberation. Individuals who have an education without breadth and insight and who suffer tunnel vision via our increasing communications technologies. Against this growing tide of alienation and ennui, we get “bullies” of the fascist sort who promote “vitality” and a romanticism of violence. It’s not a good place to be.
The only significant criticism I have of this work is one that I find in almost all of the commentators I follow about international relations, global affairs, and geopolitical strategy: Thomas P.M. Barnett, Peter Zeihan, Ian Bremmer, and Fareed Zakaria. All, I contend, underestimate the significance of climate change in the near term. None of the commentators that I read are climate change deniers; indeed, all of them note the significance of climate change. But I fear that because of its potential impact, they can’t grasp the full implications of climate change. So with Kaplan. (The best visionaries about climate change are writing fiction (sort of), such as Stephen Markley, Kim Stanley Robinson, Octavia Butler, and Neal Stephenson, to name just a quartet that I’ve read. Among those with academic credentials to have faced the implications of climate change head-on, two stand out for me: William Ophuls and Thomas Homer-Dixon.)
I haven’t done justice to Kaplan’s book. There are so many insights and discussions that I’ve not touched upon here. It’s a terrific book, sobering, thought-provoking, full of hard-won insights. Do read it.
This work is an assessment of the current state of our world. I see it as a culmination of what he’s been writing about the last 40-plus years, a summa of his observations and assessment of the state of the world. And our world is in a sorry state. The guiding metaphor of this book is that the world is now collectively in a state of political and social dysfunction like that of Weimar Germany between the end of World War I and the rise of Hitler. That’s not a pleasant thought.
The world now lacks a leader, as the three “great powers” are all in decline and are not able—or willing—to take up the mantle of leadership that the US held during the post-World War II up through the fall of the Berlin Wall and early post-Cold War days. In military strength and economic output, the US is still by far ahead, but the quality of our leadership has been in decline. (N.B. Kaplan’s book went on sale about a week after Trump’s inauguration, so his manuscript was submitted well before the election of Trump in 2024, so readers should compound any pessimism that one takes from this book.) Ian Bremmer describes the current state of international politics as a “G-zero” world, as Kaplan notes. There is no dominant Great Power or concert of powers. The world is without a stronger leader, organizer, and enforcer. The US, after unforced errors from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan and the 2008 crash—and much else—is prepared to walk away from world affairs. As if we could.
Kaplan is a self-described realist, but don’t let this self-description fool you into thinking that Kaplan is simple-minded as some realists certainly are. Kaplan takes a long view, and he incorporates his deep and wide reading of history and literature to bring perspective to contemporary affairs. He perceives the course of history as not only guided by the great forces: wars, geography, demographics, plagues, and revolutions, he also perceives history as guided by actors, by those who make decisions. He calls this perspective the “Shakespearean” perspective on history, as, for instance, in Richard III’s “My Country for a Horse.” This perspective takes into account the fortune, fate, and choice that Shakespeare highlights in his plays. This combination of “forces” and “contingencies” allows Kaplan to appreciate history—and thus our world—from a variety of perspectives: the inexorable, impersonal, and random and that of individual actors and their choices and luck. As an example of his ability to draw on history and literature, Kaplan references the later works of Solzhenitsyn about Russia and World War I, which serves to buttress and enliven his arguments.
Kaplan posits several tenets that mark his perspective, and he highlights them again in this book. One is that order precedes freedom and justice; if no order, then no justice, and no freedom. Disorder leads to repression. For instance, citing Churchill, he posits that Europe might have been better off if the great dynasties—Romanov, Hapsburg, and Hohenzollern—had survived the war, thereby abating the rise of Nazism and Leninist Communism. Kaplan also argues, following Samuel Huntington, that the longer a nation is subject to tyranny, the harder and longer the transition to democracy takes. And, following former U.N. ambassador Jean Kilpatrick, he agrees that right-wing tyrannies (of the traditional, militaristic, kleptocratic sort) are easier and more quickly toppled than Communist regimes. This argument makes sense, given that communism is a secular religion to which some in a regime religiously adhere. Kaplan also argues that we must “think tragically to avoid tragedy,” and we should use pessimism to avoid catastrophe. Nostrums, sayings, and generalities don’t always apply to current events, but some apply most of the time. I contend that Kaplan’s reference library of insights will stand up well against the test of time and experience.
Kaplan argues that while technology has brought us closer and allowed us to become more knowledgeable and informed about the wider world, it also has radicalized and isolated us. And, I’d add, it certainly hasn’t improved our judgment. The follies of Vietnam and Iraq played out about as poorly as the Athenian adventure in Sicily recorded by Thucydides. Sicily was about the equivalent in practical distance from Athens as Iraq and Vietnam are from the U.S. in contemporary travel times, but the results for the U.S. were no less a failure because of our newfound virtual and actual proximity. Add the potential of ballistic missiles to launch an attack across continents and the potential of a nuclear spasm that could wipe out most of the world within little more than 30 minutes, and you better appreciate how our world has grown smaller but no less dangerous. Also, Kaplan explores our virtual proximities and finds that we are a crowd (now often virtual) as described in the work of Elias Canetti in his Crowds and Power (1960). Add to this the isolation amid extreme urbanization found in the contemporary world, and we get the loneliness and anxiety that Hannah Arendt identifies as crucial to the development of populations susceptible to radical, even totalitarian, regimes.
In the wider world, outside of the strong nation-states, the greatest threat isn’t tyranny, but anarchy. (Kaplan published a 1994 book on this, The Coming Anarchy.)
Kaplan discusses current conditions in Russia and China (and the U.S., of course). Russia has always been the key to peace in Europe, and it’s in a precarious state at present (a quagmire of a war, declining population, isolated leader, oligarchy as kleptocracy, etc.) And in China, the pragmatism of Deng has given way to the nationalist doctrines of one man: Xi. China is certainly in better shape than Russia, but it, too, is facing a dramatic demographic decline within the context of a sclerotic political system.
One point that did puzzle me in the book was the brief but significant emphasis that Kaplan put upon anti-Semitism in the world as a whole, and its effects on different governments. His treatment is brief and not well supported. Anti-semitism is vile, stupid, and (in some measure) widespread, without question. But how consequential is it outside of Europe and (to a lesser extent), the U.S.? In the Middle East, of course, Muslim populations are anti-Israeli, but are they deeply anti-Semitic? Maybe the disease of anti-Semitism has infected a wider population than I once thought, but Kaplan doesn’t develop the point, and I wish he would have.
In the final section on “Crowds and Chaos,” Kaplan references Canetti, as I noted above, and he discusses the work of Oswald Spengler, the German schoolmaster whose work, The Decline of the West, was published near the end of World War I. This fascinated me, as I’d come to believe (without reading him) that Spengler was a bit of a crank who spun out speculations via a misapplied biological metaphor. Reading Kaplan’s reflections on Spengler, I’m not so much disabused of my perceptions as I am chastened by the suspicion that I may have prematurely thrown the baby out with the bathwater. Perhaps, despite my doubts about his guiding metaphor (growth and decay), Spengler has some insights worth culling. As an American, I can no longer doubt the reality of decline, not with Donald Trump and his Yahoos tearing down our institutions and abusing our Constitution and the rule of law. Is the whole world now Weimar? Perhaps, but the U.S. looks like it at the moment. (I’ve thought for some time now that the most relevant historical era frame for our current state is the 1930s.)
So how does T.S. Eliot’s enigmatic 1922 poem, “The Waste Land,” connect with Kaplan’s argument? In that poem, and other literary and historical works that Kaplan notes (Nietzsche, Ortega y Gasset, Sartre, Camus, and others), he sees a world out of joint, one that’s becoming more technologically sophisticated, more urbanized, and wealthier (at least in material terms), yet more threatening, violent, and dysfunctional. Citing the historian of early 20th-century Vienna, Carl Schorske, Kaplan sees a growing tide of “feeling and instinct” overtaking rational deliberation. Individuals who have an education without breadth and insight and who suffer tunnel vision via our increasing communications technologies. Against this growing tide of alienation and ennui, we get “bullies” of the fascist sort who promote “vitality” and a romanticism of violence. It’s not a good place to be.
The only significant criticism I have of this work is one that I find in almost all of the commentators I follow about international relations, global affairs, and geopolitical strategy: Thomas P.M. Barnett, Peter Zeihan, Ian Bremmer, and Fareed Zakaria. All, I contend, underestimate the significance of climate change in the near term. None of the commentators that I read are climate change deniers; indeed, all of them note the significance of climate change. But I fear that because of its potential impact, they can’t grasp the full implications of climate change. So with Kaplan. (The best visionaries about climate change are writing fiction (sort of), such as Stephen Markley, Kim Stanley Robinson, Octavia Butler, and Neal Stephenson, to name just a quartet that I’ve read. Among those with academic credentials to have faced the implications of climate change head-on, two stand out for me: William Ophuls and Thomas Homer-Dixon.)
I haven’t done justice to Kaplan’s book. There are so many insights and discussions that I’ve not touched upon here. It’s a terrific book, sobering, thought-provoking, full of hard-won insights. Do read it.
March 13, 2025
Some will recoil at the extreme pessimism of this book, but if anything Robert D. Kaplan is consistent. His first book, based on a 1994 Atlantic Monthly article with the same title, was The Coming Anarchy.
His main thesis, largely influenced by Oswald Spengler, whom he discusses at length, is that political systems are doomed to fail as early idealism yields to decadence and self-interest; that the major powers -- the U.S., Russia, and China -- are all in decline; and that the final unravellings are underway. Sounds like a best-selling, nonfiction potboiler; but simply to dismiss it is to sell Kaplan short. For one things he's a very good writer. For another, he has worlds of experience; as a recognized geography expert he has traveled and written up the world multiple times. He knows a lot about Africa, which by 2100 is expected to contain 40% of humanity. He also knows a lot about technology, climate, AI, and any other drivers you can think of.
Verdict: time reading this book is well spent. Now, if only it weren't quite so pessimistic.
His main thesis, largely influenced by Oswald Spengler, whom he discusses at length, is that political systems are doomed to fail as early idealism yields to decadence and self-interest; that the major powers -- the U.S., Russia, and China -- are all in decline; and that the final unravellings are underway. Sounds like a best-selling, nonfiction potboiler; but simply to dismiss it is to sell Kaplan short. For one things he's a very good writer. For another, he has worlds of experience; as a recognized geography expert he has traveled and written up the world multiple times. He knows a lot about Africa, which by 2100 is expected to contain 40% of humanity. He also knows a lot about technology, climate, AI, and any other drivers you can think of.
Verdict: time reading this book is well spent. Now, if only it weren't quite so pessimistic.
September 16, 2025
Justo ayer Mariana Enríquez decía en una entrevista para el diario El Mundo que el catastrofismo de nuestro tiempo es falta de perspectiva histórica y que debemos pensar cuánto tiene de narcisismo occidental. Nada puede resumir mejor mis impresiones sobre este ensayo del afamado periodista norteamericano y viajero profesional Robert D. Kaplan, al que siempre pondré en un altar por haberme descubierto el grandioso Cordero negro y halcón gris de Rebecca West. Aún no me atrevo a tildarlo totalmente de “narcisista occidental”, pero lo que sí es cierto es que aborda la situación geopolítica actual desde el pesimismo, la duda tecnológica y el bioconservadurismo. En todo momento me lo imaginé escribiendo desesperanzado en su buró con ojos lacrimosos sobre las divisiones de las grandes potencias actuales, la decadencia de los imperios, la reducción de la geografía a través de la tecnología, el legado del comunismo y el declive shakesperiano de la geopolítica actual, siempre regodeándose en sus fuentes sumamente conservadoras: Malthus, Scruton, Spengler... Después de haber expuesto su visión de la "Weimar global" en la que hoy vivimos, me sorprendió para bien el tercer bloque del texto, sobre la urbanización, las masas y el poder de la turba en el devenir de la política, pero ni aun así. Coincido con sus críticos en que su visión es sumamente deprimente y desmoralizadora.
April 12, 2025
1.5 As I read this book I grew uneasy and distressed with the author's arguments and perspective. He's often inaccurate and perhaps worse, he has a smug tone when he relates info or viewpoints that are basically common knowledge. His writing style felt forced as if he wanted to make me feel I was in the presence of a Scholar.
Regarding sources, for an 'academic' book the author draws from a remarkably narrow, one sided, outcome driven pool of historians. Their analysis and this author's limited selection of sources should be no surprise given that one of his key sources for information and wisdom is Oswald Spengler. Mr Spengler has been criticized by my many academics who argued that his methods are not scientific, relying on broad generalizations and anecdotal evidence rather than rigorous historical analysis. Apparently Mr Kaplan learned from the best.
Let's dig into some of his views and conclusions. He writes "The tyranny of perfect virtue on regard to race and foreign policy that has swarmed over our elite universities in recent years..." had me cringing and anti DEI came to mind. Let me get this straight Mr Kaplan, you think that an oppressive moral certainty around social issues has taken hold in academia, stifling nuance and enforcing conformity, right? Wow.
Meanwhile, apparently I should trust his opinions and the authors he cites. He reference "the liberal mainstream media" and, claims that "the mob on the political left is obsessed with conformity: if you don't agree with us on every point we will destroy you." Uhm, OK. Where exactly do I find this mob? My experience with the 'left' is that the tent is so huge because of its desire to respect and attempt to honor all voices and opinions that diversity vs conformity is the principal, healthy challenge vs what he describes.
His selective highlights from history are revealing given what he chooses to not include. He criticizes Nasser's military murdering the Iraqi royal family and the forced abdication of Shah Pahlavi, while conveniently leaving out the US governments involvement in undermining and attempting to assassinate Nasser, and the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mosaddegh, etc. He conveniently omits the Shah's human rights record as well. I was surprised to get to the end without him praising Pinochet. When he began to reference Kissinger I thought, here it comes. What a disappointment.
He made up for this omission with zingers like "If the Pahlavi dynasty had remained on the throne, Iran might have evolved in the late 20th century into a pro-Western constitutional monarchy and, in economic terms, become a Middle Eastern version of South Korea." Sure, just pay no attention to the horrific, inequality, corruption and human rights violations of the good old Shah! Oh and monkeys might fly out my butt. Clearly this author likes the ruler of a country so long as they are our guy and, he has no issue overlooking their crimes. Ugh, about a quarter of the way in and I'm not certain I can complete this biased, offensive book. I'm absolutely not saying that Mr Kaplan is wrong about everything (duh), nor an I inferring that there are valid observations. It's simply that taken as a whole, it's severely lacking in objectivity.
I did finish it so I can now, safely say, do not bother with this less than 'academic' book - it's classic FPRI & Atlantic magazine journalism. Even if you agree with the author, there are far superior books that cover similar ground in a more balanced and historically inclusive manner. Oops, there's that 'I' in DEI.
Meanwhile, if I haven't convinced you to abandon your desire to read, here's some more concerns and observations:
The author references the Biden Administration "...and it's dogged attempts to get a ceasefire in Gaza". DOGGED!? How about if he had stopped sending weapons and aid?! Oh be quiet with, 'but he did'. What infinitesimal reduction he did was insignificant. Kaplan writes critically about the violent "mob of rioters" incensed by the murder of George Floyd but fails to mention the agent provocateurs captured on film starting fires and smashing windows. In fact, on pg 141 he equates simply attending the thousands of peaceful protests that took place during that time with approving of any and all of the limited rioting that took place. Ridiculous assertion given the # of protests that were peaceful vs violent and of course no mention of police provocation. He just doesn't approve of dissent. He has serious issues with "the phenomena of genuinely liberal people socially intimidated into supporting movements to their far left, which also happen to be violent." You read that correctly, through his lens, by attending any priest associated with BLM, all participants and the whole movement is violent and they have been"intimidated" into bring complicit in this violence merely by association. Calling Dr King...
The author is a big fan of Jeanne Kirkpatrick and sympathetically agrees with her support of Somoza and the Shah. Ugh, now he's equating 'cancel culture' with Stalinism, just without the violence or imprisonment! I'm starting to think you've got some skeletons in your closet Bob...
Now he's on to attaching the"Hollywood mindset", the liberal media and "digital-video technology" but no mention of corporate control and capitals influence on information. He actually referred to the "press" as "the tip of the spear in terms of civilizational decline".
He also appears to intensely dislike and fear youth: "The triumph of youth over age, rather than leading to hope, as conventional wisdom has it, leads instead to disintegration." Someone needs to have an intervention with Bob, I think he's off his meds. We better make sure he doesn't have access to any weapons, including the printing press.
Regarding sources, for an 'academic' book the author draws from a remarkably narrow, one sided, outcome driven pool of historians. Their analysis and this author's limited selection of sources should be no surprise given that one of his key sources for information and wisdom is Oswald Spengler. Mr Spengler has been criticized by my many academics who argued that his methods are not scientific, relying on broad generalizations and anecdotal evidence rather than rigorous historical analysis. Apparently Mr Kaplan learned from the best.
Let's dig into some of his views and conclusions. He writes "The tyranny of perfect virtue on regard to race and foreign policy that has swarmed over our elite universities in recent years..." had me cringing and anti DEI came to mind. Let me get this straight Mr Kaplan, you think that an oppressive moral certainty around social issues has taken hold in academia, stifling nuance and enforcing conformity, right? Wow.
Meanwhile, apparently I should trust his opinions and the authors he cites. He reference "the liberal mainstream media" and, claims that "the mob on the political left is obsessed with conformity: if you don't agree with us on every point we will destroy you." Uhm, OK. Where exactly do I find this mob? My experience with the 'left' is that the tent is so huge because of its desire to respect and attempt to honor all voices and opinions that diversity vs conformity is the principal, healthy challenge vs what he describes.
His selective highlights from history are revealing given what he chooses to not include. He criticizes Nasser's military murdering the Iraqi royal family and the forced abdication of Shah Pahlavi, while conveniently leaving out the US governments involvement in undermining and attempting to assassinate Nasser, and the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mosaddegh, etc. He conveniently omits the Shah's human rights record as well. I was surprised to get to the end without him praising Pinochet. When he began to reference Kissinger I thought, here it comes. What a disappointment.
He made up for this omission with zingers like "If the Pahlavi dynasty had remained on the throne, Iran might have evolved in the late 20th century into a pro-Western constitutional monarchy and, in economic terms, become a Middle Eastern version of South Korea." Sure, just pay no attention to the horrific, inequality, corruption and human rights violations of the good old Shah! Oh and monkeys might fly out my butt. Clearly this author likes the ruler of a country so long as they are our guy and, he has no issue overlooking their crimes. Ugh, about a quarter of the way in and I'm not certain I can complete this biased, offensive book. I'm absolutely not saying that Mr Kaplan is wrong about everything (duh), nor an I inferring that there are valid observations. It's simply that taken as a whole, it's severely lacking in objectivity.
I did finish it so I can now, safely say, do not bother with this less than 'academic' book - it's classic FPRI & Atlantic magazine journalism. Even if you agree with the author, there are far superior books that cover similar ground in a more balanced and historically inclusive manner. Oops, there's that 'I' in DEI.
Meanwhile, if I haven't convinced you to abandon your desire to read, here's some more concerns and observations:
The author references the Biden Administration "...and it's dogged attempts to get a ceasefire in Gaza". DOGGED!? How about if he had stopped sending weapons and aid?! Oh be quiet with, 'but he did'. What infinitesimal reduction he did was insignificant. Kaplan writes critically about the violent "mob of rioters" incensed by the murder of George Floyd but fails to mention the agent provocateurs captured on film starting fires and smashing windows. In fact, on pg 141 he equates simply attending the thousands of peaceful protests that took place during that time with approving of any and all of the limited rioting that took place. Ridiculous assertion given the # of protests that were peaceful vs violent and of course no mention of police provocation. He just doesn't approve of dissent. He has serious issues with "the phenomena of genuinely liberal people socially intimidated into supporting movements to their far left, which also happen to be violent." You read that correctly, through his lens, by attending any priest associated with BLM, all participants and the whole movement is violent and they have been"intimidated" into bring complicit in this violence merely by association. Calling Dr King...
The author is a big fan of Jeanne Kirkpatrick and sympathetically agrees with her support of Somoza and the Shah. Ugh, now he's equating 'cancel culture' with Stalinism, just without the violence or imprisonment! I'm starting to think you've got some skeletons in your closet Bob...
Now he's on to attaching the"Hollywood mindset", the liberal media and "digital-video technology" but no mention of corporate control and capitals influence on information. He actually referred to the "press" as "the tip of the spear in terms of civilizational decline".
He also appears to intensely dislike and fear youth: "The triumph of youth over age, rather than leading to hope, as conventional wisdom has it, leads instead to disintegration." Someone needs to have an intervention with Bob, I think he's off his meds. We better make sure he doesn't have access to any weapons, including the printing press.
February 13, 2025
While this book sounded fascinating in terms of using history to analyze our current global turmoil, it came across as disorganized, meandering, and, frankly, pointless.
The book is divided into three large chapters. The first focuses on the Weimar Republic and reads like a love letter to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Kaplan makes the argument that monarchies like the Romanovs, Hohenzollerns, Wittelsbachs, and Habsburgs would have been better than what came after. Essentially, the Romanovs killed fewer people in the preceding century than died in the Russian Revolution, so the stability of that monarchy would have been better (regardless of the people who had to suffer under it). He waffles on about how the Weimar Republic was really good, except for Hitler. The writing includes a substantial amount of referencing authors and political figures to the point where Kaplan's arguments got lost.
The second chapter was the most interesting to me as it focused on present-day global governments and the history that preceded them, especially China and Russia. Kaplan's questioning of what happens when Putin is no longer capable of ruling was a fascinating question to ponder. In addition, he compared Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping, and I found that comparison enlightening.
Unfortunately, the third chapter, which Kaplan claimed would focus on the U.S., was the most disorganized. He makes the argument that Western civilization is dying in a roundabout way, using urbanization, cities, loneliness, the mob, liberals vs. conservatives, AI, technology, the media, classical music, theater, etc. There were just too many ideas being thrown about. Also, I felt like Kaplan came across as elitist in this chapter: an author can't insult the "uneducated masses" for not wanting to read their book when they talk down to those people and insult them in that book. Granted, he is pretty good about keeping his bias in check, but there are a few comments that show his disdain for Trump and all rural conservatives who watch Fox News.
Overall, the constant referencing of old books, articles, and poems was just overwhelming, and it felt like there really wasn't much to the author's thesis if you pushed all of the other stuff aside. I got very little out of this.
The book is divided into three large chapters. The first focuses on the Weimar Republic and reads like a love letter to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Kaplan makes the argument that monarchies like the Romanovs, Hohenzollerns, Wittelsbachs, and Habsburgs would have been better than what came after. Essentially, the Romanovs killed fewer people in the preceding century than died in the Russian Revolution, so the stability of that monarchy would have been better (regardless of the people who had to suffer under it). He waffles on about how the Weimar Republic was really good, except for Hitler. The writing includes a substantial amount of referencing authors and political figures to the point where Kaplan's arguments got lost.
The second chapter was the most interesting to me as it focused on present-day global governments and the history that preceded them, especially China and Russia. Kaplan's questioning of what happens when Putin is no longer capable of ruling was a fascinating question to ponder. In addition, he compared Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping, and I found that comparison enlightening.
Unfortunately, the third chapter, which Kaplan claimed would focus on the U.S., was the most disorganized. He makes the argument that Western civilization is dying in a roundabout way, using urbanization, cities, loneliness, the mob, liberals vs. conservatives, AI, technology, the media, classical music, theater, etc. There were just too many ideas being thrown about. Also, I felt like Kaplan came across as elitist in this chapter: an author can't insult the "uneducated masses" for not wanting to read their book when they talk down to those people and insult them in that book. Granted, he is pretty good about keeping his bias in check, but there are a few comments that show his disdain for Trump and all rural conservatives who watch Fox News.
Overall, the constant referencing of old books, articles, and poems was just overwhelming, and it felt like there really wasn't much to the author's thesis if you pushed all of the other stuff aside. I got very little out of this.
January 28, 2025
We are living in interesting global times, probably not more or less than some other generations before us, it’s just that we are all living and experiencing the present. However, probably in no generation so far has global conditions and situations reverberated around the world with such immediacy than it does today given technology. So where are we headed in the future? To figure out the present and to imagine the future, the author takes us back to the past. He draws parallels to Germany’s Weimar Republic following World War I and the crises it experienced that had international implications, resulting in global consequences. He illustrates with this example how occurrences in our current world have global spread even more so than before because of digital and social media technology. He also posits that total democracy for a country may not always be the immediate answer - it may depend on several factors including factional turmoil, leadership, and readiness of the population - but that the goal should ultimately be democracy. The author’s insights are based on his deep knowledge of history coupled with his extensive experience and keen perspective as a journalist and traveler. I love that the title of the book is a salute to T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land - so apt. This was an interesting and absorbing read of yet another of Robert D. Kaplan’s books. Many thanks to the author, publisher, and NetGalley for the opportunity to read and review this book.
May 11, 2025
És de llarg, un dels pitjors llibres que he llegit en molt de temps. Una merda descomunal.
Per resumir, l’autor es passa tot el llibre dient “El fascismo está mal, Hitler malo PERO uau los comunistas, los comunistas supermal y peor todo”. Afirma que totes les revolucions (TOTES!), inclosa la Francesa de 1789, han sigut perjudicials per a l’home (no diu ni humanitat) i que si Hitler va governar va ser culpa dels demés i sobretot… sabeu de qui? Tatxan! Sí, dels comunistes alemanys!
Si este tipo és un referent de la geopolítica, apaga y vámonos amb el cagalló de sistema que tenim. Més classisme no li cap al llibre. No ho diu, però si pogués, llevaria drets a la classe treballadora.
He perdut 7 dies amb açò i estic cabrejat.
Per resumir, l’autor es passa tot el llibre dient “El fascismo está mal, Hitler malo PERO uau los comunistas, los comunistas supermal y peor todo”. Afirma que totes les revolucions (TOTES!), inclosa la Francesa de 1789, han sigut perjudicials per a l’home (no diu ni humanitat) i que si Hitler va governar va ser culpa dels demés i sobretot… sabeu de qui? Tatxan! Sí, dels comunistes alemanys!
Si este tipo és un referent de la geopolítica, apaga y vámonos amb el cagalló de sistema que tenim. Més classisme no li cap al llibre. No ho diu, però si pogués, llevaria drets a la classe treballadora.
He perdut 7 dies amb açò i estic cabrejat.
August 8, 2025
Het is een erg erudiet boek, met veel referenties naar allerlei oudere literatuur. Het belangrijkste punt dat Kaplan maakt is een parallel tussen de huidige wereld en de Weimar-republiek; de hele wereld is met elkaar verbonden (dichtbij), maar er is geen politieke coherentie, geen internationale instituties die daadwerkelijk iets te zeggen hebben. En hij is heel erg pessimistisch over de toekomst.
Verder gelooft hij vooral in machtspolitiek en ziet hij niet zoveel in de internationale rechtsorde. En hij dweept wel heel erg met de negentiende-eeuwse imperia als bakens van stabiliteit. Aan het feit dat het daarin voor de meeste mensen niet heel erg prettig leven was, gaat hij min of meer voorbij.
Al met al zeker de moeite waard, maar als je het huidige tijdsgewricht wat beter wilt duiden zou ik (ook) Autocracy Inc. van Anne Applebaum lezen.
Verder gelooft hij vooral in machtspolitiek en ziet hij niet zoveel in de internationale rechtsorde. En hij dweept wel heel erg met de negentiende-eeuwse imperia als bakens van stabiliteit. Aan het feit dat het daarin voor de meeste mensen niet heel erg prettig leven was, gaat hij min of meer voorbij.
Al met al zeker de moeite waard, maar als je het huidige tijdsgewricht wat beter wilt duiden zou ik (ook) Autocracy Inc. van Anne Applebaum lezen.
February 16, 2025
I imagine Robert D. Kaplan looks around at our modern world with a little bit of satisfaction, but it is certainly not enjoyable. “I warned you,” he seems to say in parts of Waste Land, his newest book. “But you were not listening.” Tragedy, scarcity, the friction of ancient animosities that combust after the chassis that held them rigidly tight has come apart.
“The Anarchy That Came” Buy it here: https://www.artpal.com/joeldhirst?i=3...
We are living in Kaplan’s world now. The coming anarchy has arrived, as Kaplan warned us that it would. Our colossal, Herculean efforts at order have come to naught. We failed, and we were fired. Sent home. “We can’t afford it anymore,” we have been told. “But it doesn’t really matter, it wasn’t working anyways.”
How do we account for pessimism in a world where the problems are coming at us faster and faster, and we still have to make decisions. Despite what some may say, we can’t just turn our backs and walk away. We must continue to fight, because our enemies still hate us and they are still coming for us even if we no longer feel we need to go to them. “But none of it worked,” we are told, and that is not wrong. Decades, sixty years of efforts: judicial trainings, elections, peace processes, decentralization efforts, local government strengthening, civil society building, the creation of independent media. Nation building from the ground up, starting with the schools and then the teachers to staff them and then the students to fill them. All of it.
And yet the war raged.
How to balance pessimism with wonder? A sense of curiosity, which is the central philosophical tenet of the West, but without the hubris that resulted in the smugness of the Fukuyama Consensus? Where Francis in a debate with Aleksandr Dugin said, “Seems all you object to is gay marriage. Don’t worry that will come too,” and Russia responded with a land invasion. Talk about misreading a situation. These are America’s Weimar days. Crazy times where anything seems possible and the smartest thing is to keep your head down and see what survives the inferno.
I am mourning my world order these days. And it was very much mine. Starting in 1999, young and ignorant I went out into the world. It was well-meaning and well-intentioned. Armies of us went out into the hinterlands of the world to bring our Anglo-Saxon sense of order to the dark disordered corners of the globe. What we didn’t know was that as our little candles were lighting up the darkness, places that had been mired in poverty and darkness, the darkness itself was creeping across our unguarded borders, infecting places close to home with the anarchy.
Kaplan warned us of all of this, that it was tenuous. “There once was a dream that was Rome,” like an essay of mine that has gone perpetually viral. “…you could only whisper it. Anything more than a whisper and it would vanish.” But we were not whispering. We were screaming as it vanished behind us while we were not looking.
In the fullness of the floodlights our Weimar days are looking sickly indeed. But an anarchy that has arrived is nothing to revel in either.
“The Anarchy That Came” Buy it here: https://www.artpal.com/joeldhirst?i=3...
We are living in Kaplan’s world now. The coming anarchy has arrived, as Kaplan warned us that it would. Our colossal, Herculean efforts at order have come to naught. We failed, and we were fired. Sent home. “We can’t afford it anymore,” we have been told. “But it doesn’t really matter, it wasn’t working anyways.”
How do we account for pessimism in a world where the problems are coming at us faster and faster, and we still have to make decisions. Despite what some may say, we can’t just turn our backs and walk away. We must continue to fight, because our enemies still hate us and they are still coming for us even if we no longer feel we need to go to them. “But none of it worked,” we are told, and that is not wrong. Decades, sixty years of efforts: judicial trainings, elections, peace processes, decentralization efforts, local government strengthening, civil society building, the creation of independent media. Nation building from the ground up, starting with the schools and then the teachers to staff them and then the students to fill them. All of it.
And yet the war raged.
How to balance pessimism with wonder? A sense of curiosity, which is the central philosophical tenet of the West, but without the hubris that resulted in the smugness of the Fukuyama Consensus? Where Francis in a debate with Aleksandr Dugin said, “Seems all you object to is gay marriage. Don’t worry that will come too,” and Russia responded with a land invasion. Talk about misreading a situation. These are America’s Weimar days. Crazy times where anything seems possible and the smartest thing is to keep your head down and see what survives the inferno.
I am mourning my world order these days. And it was very much mine. Starting in 1999, young and ignorant I went out into the world. It was well-meaning and well-intentioned. Armies of us went out into the hinterlands of the world to bring our Anglo-Saxon sense of order to the dark disordered corners of the globe. What we didn’t know was that as our little candles were lighting up the darkness, places that had been mired in poverty and darkness, the darkness itself was creeping across our unguarded borders, infecting places close to home with the anarchy.
Kaplan warned us of all of this, that it was tenuous. “There once was a dream that was Rome,” like an essay of mine that has gone perpetually viral. “…you could only whisper it. Anything more than a whisper and it would vanish.” But we were not whispering. We were screaming as it vanished behind us while we were not looking.
In the fullness of the floodlights our Weimar days are looking sickly indeed. But an anarchy that has arrived is nothing to revel in either.
April 3, 2025
In Waste Land: A World in Permanent Crisis, Robert D. Kaplan presents a sobering analysis of contemporary global instability, drawing parallels between the current geopolitical climate and the tumultuous era of the Weimar Republic. Published in January 2025, this work reflects Kaplan’s extensive experience as a geopolitical analyst and his commitment to understanding the cyclical nature of history. 
Kaplan argues that the world is experiencing a confluence of crises—pandemics, economic instability, mass migration, and great power rivalries—that mirror the fragility and volatility of early 20th-century Europe. He emphasizes that the erosion of traditional hierarchies and the decline of established political orders have created power vacuums, leading to increased anarchy and conflict. Kaplan posits that the collapse of imperial and hegemonic structures in the 20th century has left a void that modern institutions have struggled to fill, resulting in a fragmented and unstable international landscape.  
Central to Kaplan’s thesis is the notion that technological advancements and globalization, while fostering interconnectivity, have also amplified the speed and scale at which crises unfold. He warns that without decisive and strategic leadership, the world risks descending into a state of perpetual disorder. 
Kaplan’s historical analogies are compelling, offering readers a lens through which to interpret current events. His comparison to the Weimar Republic serves as a cautionary tale, highlighting the dangers of political fragmentation and economic hardship. However, some critics argue that such comparisons may oversimplify complex contemporary issues and overlook the unique factors that distinguish the present era from the past.
While Kaplan’s analysis is thorough, his prognosis is decidedly pessimistic. He underscores the potential for decline but offers limited solutions beyond advocating for strong leadership and a return to order. This has led some reviewers to question the practicality of his recommendations in addressing the nuanced challenges of today’s global landscape.
Waste Land: A World in Permanent Crisis is a thought-provoking examination of the parallels between historical and contemporary global instability. Kaplan’s insights into the recurring patterns of disorder serve as a reminder of the importance of learning from history. While his outlook may be bleak, the book contributes significantly to the discourse on international relations and the challenges of maintaining global order in an increasingly complex world.
GPT
Kaplan argues that the world is experiencing a confluence of crises—pandemics, economic instability, mass migration, and great power rivalries—that mirror the fragility and volatility of early 20th-century Europe. He emphasizes that the erosion of traditional hierarchies and the decline of established political orders have created power vacuums, leading to increased anarchy and conflict. Kaplan posits that the collapse of imperial and hegemonic structures in the 20th century has left a void that modern institutions have struggled to fill, resulting in a fragmented and unstable international landscape.  
Central to Kaplan’s thesis is the notion that technological advancements and globalization, while fostering interconnectivity, have also amplified the speed and scale at which crises unfold. He warns that without decisive and strategic leadership, the world risks descending into a state of perpetual disorder. 
Kaplan’s historical analogies are compelling, offering readers a lens through which to interpret current events. His comparison to the Weimar Republic serves as a cautionary tale, highlighting the dangers of political fragmentation and economic hardship. However, some critics argue that such comparisons may oversimplify complex contemporary issues and overlook the unique factors that distinguish the present era from the past.
While Kaplan’s analysis is thorough, his prognosis is decidedly pessimistic. He underscores the potential for decline but offers limited solutions beyond advocating for strong leadership and a return to order. This has led some reviewers to question the practicality of his recommendations in addressing the nuanced challenges of today’s global landscape.
Waste Land: A World in Permanent Crisis is a thought-provoking examination of the parallels between historical and contemporary global instability. Kaplan’s insights into the recurring patterns of disorder serve as a reminder of the importance of learning from history. While his outlook may be bleak, the book contributes significantly to the discourse on international relations and the challenges of maintaining global order in an increasingly complex world.
GPT
July 3, 2025
The latest book from known geopolitical analyst Robert Kaplan deals with the world situation as of 2024. The book was written prior to Trump's election but still envisages a world in chaos. The author uses the comparison with Weimar Germany, a democracy that was under pressure and eventually fell after a financial crisis. He sees the whole world as a Weimar Republic today. Russia is in terminal decline and is on its way to become a Chinese vassal, China has a population and political decline and the US is in chaos.
June 25, 2025
Het laatste hoofdstuk is eigenlijk het belangrijkste.
February 10, 2025
Robert D. Kaplan’s “Waste Land: A World in Permanent Crisis” is a compelling exploration of the interconnected crises defining our modern era, drawing insightful parallels to historical events like the Weimar Republic's collapse. Published in January 2025, this book offers a sobering analysis of how global challenges—pandemics, mass migration, economic instability, and technological upheaval—mirror the systemic vulnerabilities of interwar Germany, where localized crises spiraled into global catastrophe. Kaplan’s argument centers on the need for prioritizing order and stability over unchecked mass democracy, advocating for governance rooted in historic liberalism to prevent societal collapse. His critique of modernity is enriched by references to literature, philosophy, and political theory, including T.S. Eliot’s “The Waste Land,” from which the book borrows its title. This literary touchstone reinforces Kaplan’s theme of disillusionment with a world on the brink of chaos. The book’s strength lies in its ability to weave past and present into a cohesive narrative. Kaplan warns that advancements in technology and globalization have created an unprecedented level of interdependence, where even isolated disasters can trigger worldwide repercussions. His analysis is both provocative and urgent, urging leaders to act decisively before the current trajectory leads to irreversible consequences. Critics have praised “Waste Land” for its depth and clarity. Kaplan’s ability to blend historical analysis with contemporary geopolitical insights makes this work a must-read for anyone seeking to understand the fragility of our global systems. However, some may find his emphasis on stability over democratic expansion controversial, sparking debates about the balance between governance and freedom. In just 224 pages, Kaplan delivers a bracing vision of a world teetering on the edge, offering not only a diagnosis but also potential solutions grounded in historical wisdom. “Waste Land” is a thought-provoking call to action for policymakers and readers alike.
February 22, 2025
Kaplan is as good as always.
March 9, 2025
This book has three chapters, with each chapter approximately 60 some pages, - give or take few pages on either side; there are a total of 186 reading pages plus notes and index. The central thesis of this book is that the economic hardship, inflation, political instability from the left, right, and center, resentments and political power vacuums is no longer the challenges for one country/state but rather is now a global connected phenomenon. The author's thesis is not new. It was elaborated on in Samuel Huntington's infamous "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" The global tensions - economic, political, diplomatic, cultural/social were all addressed over 30 years ago with the publication of Huntington's work in Foreign Affairs magazine and subsequent book. Additionally, a superior look and read on globalization can be found in the late Barbara Tuchman's, The Proud Tower which explores the connectedness and globalization from circa 1870s thru the eve of WW I - 1914.
Kaplan presents his thesis by cherry picking personalities and events across history and here are few selected examples; Canetti, Crowds and Power; Orwell, 1984; Huxley, Brave New World; Ibn Kaldun of 14th Century fame; the NYT and Fox News. In the NYT and Fox News references, - page 145 Kindle edition - he states that NYT is a more professional source - yet does not provide either the data or sources to substantiate that-other than his own feelings. Kaplan also references Oswald Spengler as also a source of proof of the decline of the West, Russia, China, et. al. Another example of the authors bias can be found on page 136 - kindle edition - that Trumps election success was the result of a masses -the public - that was "willing to believe just about anything." The author fails to elaborate that Trumps success was a rebuke of the in-your-face liberalism that assaulted the sensibilities of conservatives on the left, right and center, and a level of institutional corruption and weaponization of agencies that may have rivaled the FDR era and the McCarthy era.
I digress for a moment - FDR created all these alphabet agencies in the 1930s because he hated the constitution and did not want those agencies to undergo political scrutiny.
working thru the book, back to front, on page 134, the author attributes the incubation of Hitler, Marx, and Lenin's ideology as a result of Urbanization. by inference he indicates that it is a liberal education that also produced Kant and Sarte, et.al.
On page 95, Kaplan tells his reader that the decline of Russia can be squarely place with Vladimir Putin. The author fails to tell his reader that there is a primary axiom of geopolitics - culture, religion, economics and poltics aside - there are no friends in geopolitics and only strategic interests and when state security and sovereignty are at risk then morals and morality may be sacrificed. Yet, if the author would have used the "Case Method" of analysis he would have attempted to understand "protagonist" which would have resulted in understanding what the level of conflict and character of that conflict that one could expect.
All in all the book is rather biased to the left. There are better sources to explain the current global tensions and Kaplan does not do a good job at conveying that. His premise is that politics has rarely played out on such an intense, globe-spanning and consequential level. Au contraire, one can look to the sources I mentioned above, or the global conflict of the Napoleonic Wars beginning with the French Revolution, the interregnum 1918-1939, and even the low-level proxies' conflicts of the Cold War.
Kaplan presents his thesis by cherry picking personalities and events across history and here are few selected examples; Canetti, Crowds and Power; Orwell, 1984; Huxley, Brave New World; Ibn Kaldun of 14th Century fame; the NYT and Fox News. In the NYT and Fox News references, - page 145 Kindle edition - he states that NYT is a more professional source - yet does not provide either the data or sources to substantiate that-other than his own feelings. Kaplan also references Oswald Spengler as also a source of proof of the decline of the West, Russia, China, et. al. Another example of the authors bias can be found on page 136 - kindle edition - that Trumps election success was the result of a masses -the public - that was "willing to believe just about anything." The author fails to elaborate that Trumps success was a rebuke of the in-your-face liberalism that assaulted the sensibilities of conservatives on the left, right and center, and a level of institutional corruption and weaponization of agencies that may have rivaled the FDR era and the McCarthy era.
I digress for a moment - FDR created all these alphabet agencies in the 1930s because he hated the constitution and did not want those agencies to undergo political scrutiny.
working thru the book, back to front, on page 134, the author attributes the incubation of Hitler, Marx, and Lenin's ideology as a result of Urbanization. by inference he indicates that it is a liberal education that also produced Kant and Sarte, et.al.
On page 95, Kaplan tells his reader that the decline of Russia can be squarely place with Vladimir Putin. The author fails to tell his reader that there is a primary axiom of geopolitics - culture, religion, economics and poltics aside - there are no friends in geopolitics and only strategic interests and when state security and sovereignty are at risk then morals and morality may be sacrificed. Yet, if the author would have used the "Case Method" of analysis he would have attempted to understand "protagonist" which would have resulted in understanding what the level of conflict and character of that conflict that one could expect.
All in all the book is rather biased to the left. There are better sources to explain the current global tensions and Kaplan does not do a good job at conveying that. His premise is that politics has rarely played out on such an intense, globe-spanning and consequential level. Au contraire, one can look to the sources I mentioned above, or the global conflict of the Napoleonic Wars beginning with the French Revolution, the interregnum 1918-1939, and even the low-level proxies' conflicts of the Cold War.
September 30, 2025
Robert Kaplan’s “relentlessly pessimistic” and realist thesis posits that we’re living in a global Weimar Republic with a rupture to come. Sadly, that part doesn’t sound far fetched. But I found myself chafing at a world view I otherwise don’t share. Kaplan lost me at assertions like: so-called “cancel culture” is akin to tyranny and left-wing totalitarianism is inherently more brutal than its other incarnations. Ultimately, Kaplan’s conservative ideology gets in the way of what could have been a more consequential analysis of our perilous times.
September 11, 2025
Per mi, el llibre més fluixet que he llegit de Kaplan. Parteix d'una idea suggerent —la "república de Weimar" com a metàfora d’un món altament fragmentat i caòtic—, després dibuixa escenaris on les grans potències es van desfent i el lideratge global es dilueix, obrint pas a una època de desordre i incertesa. El to general és força negatiu i pessimista, i crec que en alguns moments fins i tot posa la pota. No m'ha acabat de convèncer.
July 23, 2025
Pesimista por convicción, ya que cree que los optimistas tienden a meternos en problemas, el autor traslada un mensaje oscuro, pero muy bien contado.
August 17, 2025
El mejor libro posible para entender la época en la que ya estamos inmersos y la inestabilidad global que hoy impera. Cargado de referencias culturales, filosofía e historia del siglo XX y XXI. Muy recomendable su lectura.
November 9, 2025
Video Review to follow
June 17, 2025
Vienas geriausių pasaulio geopolitikų, todėl norisi giliau. Paviršutiniškai apie pasaulyje vykstančius procesus, kuriuos regi kiekvienas, įdėmiai stebintis vykstančius procesus. Nebent jeigu norisi lengvesnio skaitinio turint daug laiko.
August 5, 2025
Short and profound, though evidently not a page-turner for me as it took me many months to finish. It’s dark in a way I’m not used to with Kaplan. Though I can’t really take issue with his informed, articulate, and well-read and researched speculative pessimism. (31/2025)
May 8, 2025
I really like when Kaplan goes some place and then ties it into the bigger picture, but in this book he is writing about the big picture by referring to other authors and his own works.
February 14, 2025
A lamentation of sorts for the world that is passing. The classic liberal order of the western group of nations is being replaced by a new order that is, at yet, to be fully defined and coming into full focus.
Kaplan begins with a meditation on Germany’s Weimar Republic from after WWI to the rise of the Nazis. Asserting that Hitler was not inevitable Kaplan does a fantastic job of listing the structural weaknesses of the Weimar project. In doing so the reader is left with the impression that the old monarchies of Germany, and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire may have been able to provide sufficient continuity and guidance to thwart the rise of Hitler. Russia was a stickier problem with an autocratic ruler system that replaced a czar with a maniac (Stalin [my description not Kaplan’s]).
Part II is chapter two and describes the great powers of today in decline. In order of severity and steepness of decline are Russia, China, and the US. He cites reasons for their diminishment and forecasts their possible future actions by exploring their motivations for current ones.
Chapter three is both a meditation, and explanation of the social media driven world we find ourselves in. A world that lends itself to the rise of demagogues that promise to fix and repair the shortcomings of liberal democratic order. Kaplan gets into the weeds of Oswald Spengler and his defining work” The Decline of the West” that seems highly tangential to his project here but Kaplan effectively provides direct linkage to the decline of the US as representative of the west.
The audible version is perfect for long road trips, and for long haul truckers, or for anyone longing for intellectual growth while performing rote-work. The print version perfect for politically oriented book clubs, or for political meetings. Students in between semesters may find this very satisfying.
Overall a good book for anyone concerned about the future of the United States to tuck into.
Kaplan begins with a meditation on Germany’s Weimar Republic from after WWI to the rise of the Nazis. Asserting that Hitler was not inevitable Kaplan does a fantastic job of listing the structural weaknesses of the Weimar project. In doing so the reader is left with the impression that the old monarchies of Germany, and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire may have been able to provide sufficient continuity and guidance to thwart the rise of Hitler. Russia was a stickier problem with an autocratic ruler system that replaced a czar with a maniac (Stalin [my description not Kaplan’s]).
Part II is chapter two and describes the great powers of today in decline. In order of severity and steepness of decline are Russia, China, and the US. He cites reasons for their diminishment and forecasts their possible future actions by exploring their motivations for current ones.
Chapter three is both a meditation, and explanation of the social media driven world we find ourselves in. A world that lends itself to the rise of demagogues that promise to fix and repair the shortcomings of liberal democratic order. Kaplan gets into the weeds of Oswald Spengler and his defining work” The Decline of the West” that seems highly tangential to his project here but Kaplan effectively provides direct linkage to the decline of the US as representative of the west.
The audible version is perfect for long road trips, and for long haul truckers, or for anyone longing for intellectual growth while performing rote-work. The print version perfect for politically oriented book clubs, or for political meetings. Students in between semesters may find this very satisfying.
Overall a good book for anyone concerned about the future of the United States to tuck into.
March 26, 2025
In dit non-fictie werk waarvan de titel ontleend werd aan een gedicht van T.S. Eliot, stelt Kaplan dat de wereld te kampen heeft met een catastrofale combinatie van oorlogen, klimaatverandering, rivaliserende grootmachten, razendsnelle technologische ontwikkelingen en ontelbare andere uitdagingen. Hierdoor is onze samenleving na een korte periode van rust (na de val van de Muur) in een aanhoudende crisis terechtgekomen. Ook Eliot beschreef na WOI in zijn gedicht het verval zoals Kaplan dit nu doet. Ook nu lijken de huidige problemen zoals recessie, aanhoudende inflatie, massamigratie en machtsconflicten ervoor te zorgen dat elke regionale ramp een wereldwijde crisis teweeg kan brengen. Net als in Weimar dreigt de situatie uit de hand te lopen, tenzij onze leiders opstaan en de neerwaartse spiraal een halt toebrengen.
Het thema is op zich heel interessant. Je kijkt dan ook uit naar de mogelijke remedie om uit de crisis te komen en bv. een WOIII te voorkomen. Alleen blijf je als lezer op je honger zitten. Het blijft bij een opsomming van de gevaren die hij permanent vergelijkt met de tijd van de Weimarrepubliek. Bovendien wordt het derde deel wel heel anekdotisch waardoor je je stilaan afvraagt wat de boodschap van de auteur is. Met de zeer vele citaten uit diverse werken etaleert hij zijn erudiete kennis maar vaak is de meerwaarde nihil voor de lezer. Kortom, van een auteur als Kaplan had ik toch een andere dimensie in dit werk verwacht. Of je het nu gelezen hebt of niet, veel wijzer word je niet over de richting waarin onze wereld naartoe gaat.
Het thema is op zich heel interessant. Je kijkt dan ook uit naar de mogelijke remedie om uit de crisis te komen en bv. een WOIII te voorkomen. Alleen blijf je als lezer op je honger zitten. Het blijft bij een opsomming van de gevaren die hij permanent vergelijkt met de tijd van de Weimarrepubliek. Bovendien wordt het derde deel wel heel anekdotisch waardoor je je stilaan afvraagt wat de boodschap van de auteur is. Met de zeer vele citaten uit diverse werken etaleert hij zijn erudiete kennis maar vaak is de meerwaarde nihil voor de lezer. Kortom, van een auteur als Kaplan had ik toch een andere dimensie in dit werk verwacht. Of je het nu gelezen hebt of niet, veel wijzer word je niet over de richting waarin onze wereld naartoe gaat.
February 14, 2025
For the journalist and geo-strategist Robert A. Kaplan it’s always about order. Upholding it, or at least staving off its perennial adversary chaos, is the work of statesmen blessed with wisdom and tempered by a Shakespearian sense of tragedy. If you can find them.
In Kaplan’s telling, 21st century statesmen are fewer and their task ever more Herculean: events from the decline of the great powers to the development of precision weaponry, global urbanization, and spread of social media all tip the balance toward disorder.
Kaplan’s previous two books, both reviewed here, explore how one cultivates the requisite sense of tragedy at the core of sound judgment (“think tragically to avoid tragedy”), and how policies not so grounded added to disorder and hence misery in the contemporary Middle East.
Here, Kaplan takes a global view of a shrinking world. Technology means integration, but also that nations (figuratively) and people (literally) live cheek-by-jowl. Distant actions impact everyone else. Social media-enflamed urbanites behave as conformist mobs. Governing effectively becomes ever harder and managing great power politics harder still.
There is Spengler here, and Canetti, and Solzhenitsyn and much more. Possibly in future I will try my hand at a fuller account. But for now 5 stars…
In Kaplan’s telling, 21st century statesmen are fewer and their task ever more Herculean: events from the decline of the great powers to the development of precision weaponry, global urbanization, and spread of social media all tip the balance toward disorder.
Kaplan’s previous two books, both reviewed here, explore how one cultivates the requisite sense of tragedy at the core of sound judgment (“think tragically to avoid tragedy”), and how policies not so grounded added to disorder and hence misery in the contemporary Middle East.
Here, Kaplan takes a global view of a shrinking world. Technology means integration, but also that nations (figuratively) and people (literally) live cheek-by-jowl. Distant actions impact everyone else. Social media-enflamed urbanites behave as conformist mobs. Governing effectively becomes ever harder and managing great power politics harder still.
There is Spengler here, and Canetti, and Solzhenitsyn and much more. Possibly in future I will try my hand at a fuller account. But for now 5 stars…
July 23, 2025
For scenario planners and strategic thinkers, "Waste Land" by Robert D. Kaplan offers a rich source of insight. Rather than attempting predictions, Kaplan adopts a methodical approach in which he maps global trends — and the uncertainties they entail — with geopolitical precision. His strength lies in uncovering the interplay between structural megatrends and human impulses shaping the current world order.
Kaplan presents himself as a sober, realist thinker. Although the future is fundamentally unpredictable, he acknowledges that certain long-term trajectories impose themselves with growing inevitability. As he states:
“The best futurology is the description of reality ignored by the media.” (p. 87, Dutch translation)
Among these realities:
- the rapid population growth in Africa, where 40% of the world’s population is expected to live by 2100,
- the critical depletion of underground water in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa,
- and the rise of megacities, which, Kaplan argues, generate a psychological climate he calls “the curse of boredom” (drawing on Jane Jacobs): a setting that fosters mass psychology and ideological collectivism.
He also highlights the widespread absence of bureaucratic stability in many Sub-Saharan regions, leading to chronic disorder.
Another striking element in Kaplan’s analysis is the role of individual personalities in history. He refers to this as the Shakespearean dimension of geopolitics, emphasizing how character, ego, and personal passions influence international outcomes. He argues that in the age of the printing press, political decisions were made with more restraint and moderation, while today’s crises are driven in part by instantaneous communication and emotional contagion.
Kaplan links personality and power directly to shifts in the international order — noting, for example, how conflicts such as the war in Ukraine are interconnected with other flashpoints, like Gaza.
(!) On page 135 (Dutch translation), he speculates about a possible U.S.-Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear sites — a scenario that has since moved from speculation to real possibility.
---
Megacities and Mass Psychology
In the final part of the book, Kaplan develops a sharp cultural critique. He examines how mass behavior, the erosion of ritual, and moral disorientation are tied to the emergence of megacities. Mass behavior, he writes, arises from atomization and social loneliness. In a world where communal ties and traditions dissolve, people yearn for belonging — but without reciprocity. This renders them vulnerable to ideologies and groupthink.
He draws on thinkers such as Hannah Arendt and Elias Canetti, the latter of whom warned:
“The true executioner is the crowd around the scaffold.”
Kaplan sees this logic playing out today in political correctness and cancel culture. He builds on Arendt’s work on totalitarianism and isolation, as well as on Spengler, Ibn Khaldun, and Ortega y Gasset. Especially Ortega’s The Revolt of the Masses, written in the 1920s, feels remarkably relevant again.
Modern cities — and today’s social media networks — amplify this massification. They create (both physical and digital) megacities where individual judgment is weakened and ideological conformity thrives.
Kaplan remains critical of technological advancement without moral vigilance (see pp. 176–185). He argues that algorithms — such as those used by Google — do not elevate truth, but reinforce the lowest common denominator.
“Artificial intelligence does not enhance our objectivity; it amplifies our prejudices and traps us in self-reinforcing echo chambers.”
As he writes:
As Nietzsche and Ortega y Gasset warned, science conspires with mass psychology […] to produce mass-men in the cities.” (p. 185)
A Plea for Classical Liberalism
Against this backdrop, Kaplan ends his book with a defense of classical liberalism, rooted in the tradition of Edmund Burke, John Stuart Mill, and Isaiah Berlin. He underscores the importance of reasonable disagreement as the basis of democracy, and advocates moderation and restraint as moral anchors for public debate.
Today’s boundless cosmopolitanism — which rejects all geographic or cultural rootedness — is, in Kaplan’s view, potentially anti-democratic. He quotes Michael Walzer:
“Ultimately, pure cosmopolitanism […] can become anti-democratic.” (p. 191, Dutch translation)
Not a Pessimistic Book, but a Cautionary One
Waste Land is not a pessimistic book. It is a sharp warning. Kaplan reminds us of the fragility of order and the tragic currents of history. He refers to the Weimar Republic:
“Weimar had an abundance of liberal thinkers and intellectual flowering (…) but lacked order.”
Progress is not linear. History is not a straight path, and optimism without vigilance is reckless. As he concludes:
“We have no choice but to keep struggling, because no one knows the outcome in advance.” (p. 192, Dutch Translation)
Final Thoughts
Kaplan’s depiction of how ideologies function is compelling and concrete — not only theoretical, but grounded in decades of international reporting and war correspondence. He captures the psychological void around which ideologies orbit. Like Camus in The Rebel, Kaplan writes:
“It is in the nature of man to rebel. Human solidarity is rooted in rebellion. There will always be resistance…” (p. 187, Dutch Translation)
While thinkers like Slavoj Žižek may offer deeper psychoanalytic frameworks, Kaplan’s strength lies in his geopolitical clarity — shaped by a conservative- liberal viewpoint. He does not reject capitalism or globalization, but acknowledges their self-destructive tendencies and the need to continually reform and restrain them.
This, ultimately, is the conservative premise: not opposition to capitalism, but recognition of its dangers — and the need for a robust value system to contain its excesses. Kaplan offers no revolutionary alternative, and in that sense, he writes from within the establishment, through a conservative lens.
Five stars — not for ideological reasons, but for the depth and relevance of his observations and connections. Kaplan is no hardline ideologue, but a pragmatic realist in the tradition of classical conservatives like Edmund Burke.
Kaplan presents himself as a sober, realist thinker. Although the future is fundamentally unpredictable, he acknowledges that certain long-term trajectories impose themselves with growing inevitability. As he states:
“The best futurology is the description of reality ignored by the media.” (p. 87, Dutch translation)
Among these realities:
- the rapid population growth in Africa, where 40% of the world’s population is expected to live by 2100,
- the critical depletion of underground water in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa,
- and the rise of megacities, which, Kaplan argues, generate a psychological climate he calls “the curse of boredom” (drawing on Jane Jacobs): a setting that fosters mass psychology and ideological collectivism.
He also highlights the widespread absence of bureaucratic stability in many Sub-Saharan regions, leading to chronic disorder.
Another striking element in Kaplan’s analysis is the role of individual personalities in history. He refers to this as the Shakespearean dimension of geopolitics, emphasizing how character, ego, and personal passions influence international outcomes. He argues that in the age of the printing press, political decisions were made with more restraint and moderation, while today’s crises are driven in part by instantaneous communication and emotional contagion.
Kaplan links personality and power directly to shifts in the international order — noting, for example, how conflicts such as the war in Ukraine are interconnected with other flashpoints, like Gaza.
(!) On page 135 (Dutch translation), he speculates about a possible U.S.-Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear sites — a scenario that has since moved from speculation to real possibility.
---
Megacities and Mass Psychology
In the final part of the book, Kaplan develops a sharp cultural critique. He examines how mass behavior, the erosion of ritual, and moral disorientation are tied to the emergence of megacities. Mass behavior, he writes, arises from atomization and social loneliness. In a world where communal ties and traditions dissolve, people yearn for belonging — but without reciprocity. This renders them vulnerable to ideologies and groupthink.
He draws on thinkers such as Hannah Arendt and Elias Canetti, the latter of whom warned:
“The true executioner is the crowd around the scaffold.”
Kaplan sees this logic playing out today in political correctness and cancel culture. He builds on Arendt’s work on totalitarianism and isolation, as well as on Spengler, Ibn Khaldun, and Ortega y Gasset. Especially Ortega’s The Revolt of the Masses, written in the 1920s, feels remarkably relevant again.
Modern cities — and today’s social media networks — amplify this massification. They create (both physical and digital) megacities where individual judgment is weakened and ideological conformity thrives.
Kaplan remains critical of technological advancement without moral vigilance (see pp. 176–185). He argues that algorithms — such as those used by Google — do not elevate truth, but reinforce the lowest common denominator.
“Artificial intelligence does not enhance our objectivity; it amplifies our prejudices and traps us in self-reinforcing echo chambers.”
As he writes:
As Nietzsche and Ortega y Gasset warned, science conspires with mass psychology […] to produce mass-men in the cities.” (p. 185)
A Plea for Classical Liberalism
Against this backdrop, Kaplan ends his book with a defense of classical liberalism, rooted in the tradition of Edmund Burke, John Stuart Mill, and Isaiah Berlin. He underscores the importance of reasonable disagreement as the basis of democracy, and advocates moderation and restraint as moral anchors for public debate.
Today’s boundless cosmopolitanism — which rejects all geographic or cultural rootedness — is, in Kaplan’s view, potentially anti-democratic. He quotes Michael Walzer:
“Ultimately, pure cosmopolitanism […] can become anti-democratic.” (p. 191, Dutch translation)
Not a Pessimistic Book, but a Cautionary One
Waste Land is not a pessimistic book. It is a sharp warning. Kaplan reminds us of the fragility of order and the tragic currents of history. He refers to the Weimar Republic:
“Weimar had an abundance of liberal thinkers and intellectual flowering (…) but lacked order.”
Progress is not linear. History is not a straight path, and optimism without vigilance is reckless. As he concludes:
“We have no choice but to keep struggling, because no one knows the outcome in advance.” (p. 192, Dutch Translation)
Final Thoughts
Kaplan’s depiction of how ideologies function is compelling and concrete — not only theoretical, but grounded in decades of international reporting and war correspondence. He captures the psychological void around which ideologies orbit. Like Camus in The Rebel, Kaplan writes:
“It is in the nature of man to rebel. Human solidarity is rooted in rebellion. There will always be resistance…” (p. 187, Dutch Translation)
While thinkers like Slavoj Žižek may offer deeper psychoanalytic frameworks, Kaplan’s strength lies in his geopolitical clarity — shaped by a conservative- liberal viewpoint. He does not reject capitalism or globalization, but acknowledges their self-destructive tendencies and the need to continually reform and restrain them.
This, ultimately, is the conservative premise: not opposition to capitalism, but recognition of its dangers — and the need for a robust value system to contain its excesses. Kaplan offers no revolutionary alternative, and in that sense, he writes from within the establishment, through a conservative lens.
Five stars — not for ideological reasons, but for the depth and relevance of his observations and connections. Kaplan is no hardline ideologue, but a pragmatic realist in the tradition of classical conservatives like Edmund Burke.
March 22, 2025
Van dik hout zaagt men planken. Wat is Kaplan toch een grote sombermans. Doemdenken, zin na zin. En nog altijd met het motto: conservatief is goed, progressief niet. Oswald Spengler ‘misschien de belangrijkste filosoof-historicus aller tijden’ noemen, geeft al wat weg.
Scruton, Canetti en Huntington komen ook voorbij.
Grotendeels oneens met Kaplans betoog. Bijvoorbeeld: ‘Het Westen gaat ten onder (en dat zie je bijvoorbeeld aan de verslonzing van de kledij van mensen).’
Toch heb ik het boek met veel plezier (nou ja, plezier!) gelezen. Want leerzaam. En ik lees Kaplan graag.
Scruton, Canetti en Huntington komen ook voorbij.
Grotendeels oneens met Kaplans betoog. Bijvoorbeeld: ‘Het Westen gaat ten onder (en dat zie je bijvoorbeeld aan de verslonzing van de kledij van mensen).’
Toch heb ik het boek met veel plezier (nou ja, plezier!) gelezen. Want leerzaam. En ik lees Kaplan graag.
April 22, 2025
I should not have bothered with this one. Grumpiness, pessimism on blast. Not enough of an argument carried all the way through, seems to wander around a lot. Well written and, sure, the guy is smart, but not enough to make up for the basic weakness of the book.
April 22, 2025
”Waste Land. A World in Permanent Crisis” de Robert D. Kaplan (2025)
Cartea aceasta a fost publicată pe 28 ianuarie 2025, și tot timpul cât am citit-o am vrut să văd cât de premonitorie se va dovedi experiența geopolitică și de călătorii prin întreaga lume a acest gânditor erudit. Așa cum scrie chiar în ultimul paragraf al cărții, Kaplan nu-mi răspunde acestei curiozități copilărești: ” Direcția istoriei nu poate fi cunoscută. Nu există nimic de genul progresului linear automat. Prin urmare, nu ne rămâne decât să ne luptăm continuu, pentru că niciunuia nu ne este garantat vreun rezultat anterior stabilit. … Marea încercare pentru întreaga umanitate în prezent rămâne evitarea repetării destinului Republicii de la Weimar.”
Una dintre ideile demonstrate în carte este cea a” procesului istoric natural care subminează și diluează Vestul și toate valorile acestuia”. Kaplan ne poartă prin istorie și ne arată succesiunea perioadelor umanității: de la valorile romane, la creștinism, apoi la umanism și a la liberalismul din prezent, care celebrează libertățile individuale.
Kaplan își structurează cartea în trei capitole care ajută la creionarea unei dinamici globale ce nu pare a avea multe șanse către un scenariu optimist: în prima parte, el explică de ce situația politică actuală este un Weimar de dimensiuni mondiale. Datorită multiplelor conexiuni și interdependențe între diversele zone geografice ale lumii, întreaga planetă este astăzi un Weimar. ”Geografia nu dispare. Dar devine mult mai mică”, scrie Kaplan. El arată că dacă impactul unor războaie recente, inclusiv cel din Ucraina, pare a fi oarecum redus asupra piețelor de aprovizionare, combustibililor sau piețelor financiare ( în primul rând pentru că Rusia și Ucraina sunt fracțiuni mici din economia mondială), o confruntare armată care ar implica SUA, China, Japonia ar avea consecințe uriașe, chiar și dacă ar fi de durată scurtă (ceea ce el numește ”doom-loop”). Prin urmare, un război care este departe geografic (spre exemplu, în Taiwan) va fi resimțit ca fiind aproape prin consecințele sale. Apoi, Kaplan analizează situația politică de pe continentul african, unde multe grupări sunt înarmate până în dinți, cu instituții statale anemice sau absente, în contextul sărăciei, al resurselor puține și al schimbărilor climatice. El atrage atenția asupra rolului pe care îl va juca acest continent, a cărui populație va reprezenta 40% din populația lumii până în 2100. Pe scurt, lumea este în prezent un sistem închis, divizat și înarmat până în dinți, amenințat de o multipolaritate de factori, semănând mult cu Weimarul de acum 100 de ani.
Capitolul al doilea ne prezintă declinul actual al marilor puteri ( SUA, Rusia și China) și analizează noul război rece dintre SUA și China. Kaplan formulează un concept interesant: ” declinul Shakespearean – adică, demonii ce îi împing pe marii lideri ai lumii spre un anumit grad de nebunie, așa cum întâlnim în piesele lui Shakespeare”. Dincolo de dinamica dintre marile puteri, liderii posedați de declinul shakesperean sunt caracterizați de Kaplan ca fiind conduși de forțe interioare întunecate și trăind într-un sistem care nu îi contrazice și nu îi obligă să accepte opinii contrare. Toate acestea creează cadrul perfect pentru greșeli și decizii cu implicații uriașe. Pesimismul cititorului crește când citește analiza distopică a utilizării tehnologiei în scopuri politice și de control, și când Kaplan scrie cât de puțin surprinde media ce se întâmplă în anumite zone uitate ale lumii, cum ar fi periferiile sărace și suprapopulate ale mega orașelor sau în alte locuri de la marginea civilizației.
Toate aceste ingrediente de instabilitate prezentate mai sus capătă noi note de complexitate în capitolul final despre mulțimi și haos. Acesta a fost un capitol fascinant, despre urbanizare (până în 2050, 2/3 din populația lumii va locui în orașe) și despre felul în care orașele schimbă oamenii, nu neapărat în sens bun. Aserțiunea principală pe care autorul o demonstrează este că satul a produs ”poporul”, iar orașele produc ”gloata”. Iar de aici, analiza este captivantă, căci se prezentă mecanismele gândirii de grup, ale izolării în bule, a ceea ce se numește cancel culture și ale tiraniei mulțimii. Astfel este cimentată calea către decăderea Vestului, subminarea individualismului, ideologizarea presei, totul fiind amplificat de tehnologia din orașe, fie ele reale sau chiar virtuale. Kaplan îl citează pe Strausz-Hupe care spune că ideologiile ” sunt produse de masă în cel mai direct sens și reprezintă forma finală și profundă de degradare a rațiunii”.
Am scris deja, cred, de mai multe ori că nu citești cartea asta și te inundă starea de bine și chiar autorul recunoaște că scrie aceste gânduri pentru că este anxios. Dar, ținând cont că dintre optimism și pesimism ”optimismul este cel care poate ucide cu mai mare siguranță”, rămân cu convingerea că această carte are rolul de a ne scutura de iluzii.
Cartea aceasta a fost publicată pe 28 ianuarie 2025, și tot timpul cât am citit-o am vrut să văd cât de premonitorie se va dovedi experiența geopolitică și de călătorii prin întreaga lume a acest gânditor erudit. Așa cum scrie chiar în ultimul paragraf al cărții, Kaplan nu-mi răspunde acestei curiozități copilărești: ” Direcția istoriei nu poate fi cunoscută. Nu există nimic de genul progresului linear automat. Prin urmare, nu ne rămâne decât să ne luptăm continuu, pentru că niciunuia nu ne este garantat vreun rezultat anterior stabilit. … Marea încercare pentru întreaga umanitate în prezent rămâne evitarea repetării destinului Republicii de la Weimar.”
Una dintre ideile demonstrate în carte este cea a” procesului istoric natural care subminează și diluează Vestul și toate valorile acestuia”. Kaplan ne poartă prin istorie și ne arată succesiunea perioadelor umanității: de la valorile romane, la creștinism, apoi la umanism și a la liberalismul din prezent, care celebrează libertățile individuale.
Kaplan își structurează cartea în trei capitole care ajută la creionarea unei dinamici globale ce nu pare a avea multe șanse către un scenariu optimist: în prima parte, el explică de ce situația politică actuală este un Weimar de dimensiuni mondiale. Datorită multiplelor conexiuni și interdependențe între diversele zone geografice ale lumii, întreaga planetă este astăzi un Weimar. ”Geografia nu dispare. Dar devine mult mai mică”, scrie Kaplan. El arată că dacă impactul unor războaie recente, inclusiv cel din Ucraina, pare a fi oarecum redus asupra piețelor de aprovizionare, combustibililor sau piețelor financiare ( în primul rând pentru că Rusia și Ucraina sunt fracțiuni mici din economia mondială), o confruntare armată care ar implica SUA, China, Japonia ar avea consecințe uriașe, chiar și dacă ar fi de durată scurtă (ceea ce el numește ”doom-loop”). Prin urmare, un război care este departe geografic (spre exemplu, în Taiwan) va fi resimțit ca fiind aproape prin consecințele sale. Apoi, Kaplan analizează situația politică de pe continentul african, unde multe grupări sunt înarmate până în dinți, cu instituții statale anemice sau absente, în contextul sărăciei, al resurselor puține și al schimbărilor climatice. El atrage atenția asupra rolului pe care îl va juca acest continent, a cărui populație va reprezenta 40% din populația lumii până în 2100. Pe scurt, lumea este în prezent un sistem închis, divizat și înarmat până în dinți, amenințat de o multipolaritate de factori, semănând mult cu Weimarul de acum 100 de ani.
Capitolul al doilea ne prezintă declinul actual al marilor puteri ( SUA, Rusia și China) și analizează noul război rece dintre SUA și China. Kaplan formulează un concept interesant: ” declinul Shakespearean – adică, demonii ce îi împing pe marii lideri ai lumii spre un anumit grad de nebunie, așa cum întâlnim în piesele lui Shakespeare”. Dincolo de dinamica dintre marile puteri, liderii posedați de declinul shakesperean sunt caracterizați de Kaplan ca fiind conduși de forțe interioare întunecate și trăind într-un sistem care nu îi contrazice și nu îi obligă să accepte opinii contrare. Toate acestea creează cadrul perfect pentru greșeli și decizii cu implicații uriașe. Pesimismul cititorului crește când citește analiza distopică a utilizării tehnologiei în scopuri politice și de control, și când Kaplan scrie cât de puțin surprinde media ce se întâmplă în anumite zone uitate ale lumii, cum ar fi periferiile sărace și suprapopulate ale mega orașelor sau în alte locuri de la marginea civilizației.
Toate aceste ingrediente de instabilitate prezentate mai sus capătă noi note de complexitate în capitolul final despre mulțimi și haos. Acesta a fost un capitol fascinant, despre urbanizare (până în 2050, 2/3 din populația lumii va locui în orașe) și despre felul în care orașele schimbă oamenii, nu neapărat în sens bun. Aserțiunea principală pe care autorul o demonstrează este că satul a produs ”poporul”, iar orașele produc ”gloata”. Iar de aici, analiza este captivantă, căci se prezentă mecanismele gândirii de grup, ale izolării în bule, a ceea ce se numește cancel culture și ale tiraniei mulțimii. Astfel este cimentată calea către decăderea Vestului, subminarea individualismului, ideologizarea presei, totul fiind amplificat de tehnologia din orașe, fie ele reale sau chiar virtuale. Kaplan îl citează pe Strausz-Hupe care spune că ideologiile ” sunt produse de masă în cel mai direct sens și reprezintă forma finală și profundă de degradare a rațiunii”.
Am scris deja, cred, de mai multe ori că nu citești cartea asta și te inundă starea de bine și chiar autorul recunoaște că scrie aceste gânduri pentru că este anxios. Dar, ținând cont că dintre optimism și pesimism ”optimismul este cel care poate ucide cu mai mare siguranță”, rămân cu convingerea că această carte are rolul de a ne scutura de iluzii.
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