!! This does not contain ‘spoilers’ as such, but I will be discussing many of the things Evans talks about in his book!!
“Altered Pasts” by Richard Evans is an excellent review of the subject of counterfactual history - it’s pros and cons and overall uses.
The book is separated into four sections.
Part One is entitled “Wishful Thinking” and covers the history of counterfactuals and why they had a revival in Britain and the US in the 1990s and 2000s, Part Two is called “Virtual History” and discusses the arguments for and against the genre, Part Three is “Future Fictions” which looks at the different ways counterfactuals have been used/the forms they can take, whilst Part Four attempts to conclude the arguments and reach a decision about the usefulness of counterfactuals. (The lack of chapters is admittedly quite tedious, especially seeing as the same theme continues throughout each section without breaks, and the sections do also share topics and are slightly confused, but this is being hyper-critical).
I found the concepts of “wishful thinking”, as described by Evans, fascinating and also incredibly logical. For instance, the conquest of the entire world by Napoleon, as set out by a French admirer of Napoleon Louis Geoffrey, is more an alternative history than a true counterfactual due to it being driven by political motives. In this wishful thinking has clearly played a major part, Evans proves, due to its inclusion of “pseudohistorical inevitability” - one change in the course of history led inexorably to a whole long chain of subsequent events, and becomes a “uchronie” (a utopia of a past time) caused by nostalgia and a regret for a history that had taken the wrong turn. Evans’ discussion of the complete implausibility of such chains is intellectual and helps guide the reader by showing the challenges facing the counterfactual historian: such large historical chains cannot be seen as “true” counterfactuals as the further the historian gets from the “point de scission” the less evidence there is to support the argument and the more alternatives there become (and therefore the more implausible it becomes). These long chains, Evans argues, become inevitabilist, as they completely ignore chance and contingency later on in the altered reality. Extrapolating alternate history beyond the borders of what can be ‘proved’ with evidence is dangerous and seriously undermines the counterfactual argument, but is naturally very difficult to judge: at what point do historians say “we cannot go any further with this counterfactual without chance becoming too great a factor”? As Megill suggests: “contingency cuts two ways” - if we have a chance occurrence at the start then we must naturally have it in the early, middle and late stages as well. But in order to make a counterfactual meaningful we must assume that there were no other random events that shook up the course of history due to someone being in a different place/frame of mind I.e. we must, to a certain extent, ignore the later contingencies.
Wishful thinking is the bane of counterfactual history, especially due to historians trying to rewrite the past ‘in the way they would have done it’: i.e. the historian is naturally going to suggest that “if this individual had done THIS instead of THAT he would have been much better off”. But in this way the historians are placing a personality change on their subjects - “if this person had done this” seemingly ignores the fact that that person DIDN’T do that because their personality made them do one thing rather than another.
Evans ties the study of counterfactuals into a chronological account of historiography in the 20th century, which is incredibly useful in determining the motives behind particular counterfactuals. For instance in the 1920s and 30s there was a rise in the number of counterfactuals being published due to, according to Evans, the uncertainties and anxieties of British politics at this time. Or in 1961 the essay “If Hitler Had Won WWII” by American journalist William L Shirer was intended to reawaken American memories of the Holocaust at a time when Adolf Eichmann was being tried in Jerusalem, and “If I Had Been ... Ten Historical Fantasies” published in 1979 by historian Daniel Snowman fell into a period of uncertainty and ‘self-examination’ that prevailed in the 1970s. Similarly the emergence of post-modernism blurs the boundaries of factual, fiction and counter-factual (although Evans’ notions that people are now learning about medieval Europe from Lord of the Rings seems a bit far-fetched). The Anglo-American dominance of counterfactuals based on had the Nazis won the war was due to them being on the winning side of the war (therefore showing why the war was worth fighting) and because neither country had been under direct Nazi occupation, and therefore could only imagine what occupation by a hostile power would be like, Evans also argues. Evans’ examinations of the many different counterfactuals and alternative realities centred on WWII are well-researched and help show a diverse range of the uses of counterfactuals for various political agendas, and how counterfactuals can have many different guises depending on their uses e.g. conspiracy theories.
One of the biggest issues faced by those attempting to envisage an ‘altered past’ is the focus on “great men”, suggests Evans, as by placing precedence on these individuals’ actions the role of impersonal factors and wider context is downplayed. Therefore these counterfactuals threaten to reduce everything to a matter of chance, as opposed to greater political/social/cultural movements. Evans therefore suggests that counterfactuals have been mainly the realm of the conservative historian who emphasises the role of the contingent as opposed to those on the left who emphasise inevitability and determinism in historical causation. Yet, interestingly, Evans argues that most practising Marxist historians perfectly understand the need for chance and contingency: Marx’s arguments about free will suggest that “People make their own history ... but under circumstances directly found to be already there, given and transmitted from the past” (I.e. the individual may make choices, but these choices are relatively limited due to wider contextual factors, and therefore his views are not polarised at all, as some conservative historians would suggest). Personally I believe there is no reason why counterfactuals should be reduced to only one side of the political spectrum, as surely the whole point of a “What if” question is not to create a wildly imaginative and ‘fun’ alternative reality but to weigh up the different factors that caused something to come to pass and to therefore come to a conclusion about the importance of wider context compared to the choices available to an individual - but this should naturally differ with each particular case. Evans suggests that in order to create a counterfactual we have to say that the condition or cause that we are altering was the decisive one, but this does not necessarily have to be the case. Indeed, surely the POINT of a counterfactual is to to determine whether or not that cause was decisive or not, or where it stands in the hierarchy of causation. Similarly, when Evans suggests that counterfactuals preach a history where politics and warfare are of greatest importance, I must challenge this suggestion: there is NO reason why this must be the case, it simply is the case in the counterfactuals that have already been written.
I would have liked to see Evans discuss some of the positives of counterfactuals (how they have been used effectively to understand more about a particular period for instance), as the majority of what Evans includes are negatives of counterfactuals and how they can be easily undermined.
Be warned that Evans focusses primarily on WWII (in which he is a specialist). This is not a major issue as there is a wealth of counterfactuals about this period, as well as altered histories and fictions. Using this period actually aids the book significantly as it allows Evans to show all the issues surrounding counterfactuals in the discussion of one particular historical period, rather than dotting about all over the place. Be aware, though, that if you’re looking for a wide variety of counterfactuals this isn’t the book for you (apart from a few references to the Armada, the Gunpowder plot and Napoleon the book is sparse in terms of actual examples).
Indeed the book is designed not to explore examples of counterfactuals, but to use such examples to explain why there are inextricable problems with the discipline.
I was, however, rather disappointed with Evans’ conclusion: that counterfactuals are in fact of little use to historians, and should instead be used to discuss the counterfactual side of history as a whole phenomenon. This, in my opinion, is a shame as though, as Evans so eruditely discussed in this book, counterfactual historians are faced with a myriad of problems when constructing their arguments, this does not mean that asking “What if” questions are not important (or indeed vital) to certain historical studies.
Personally I believe that counterfactuals are a fascinating way of viewing history that can provide crucial answers to questions historians pose about their periods of time, enabling them to understand an era/topic more. For instance, asking the question “What if Henry VIII had not fallen in love with Anne Boleyn?” is a vital question historians of the Reformation must ask in order to comprehend whether the Reformation was caused by top-down or bottom-up historical change (or a combination of both). Obviously this question poses challenges that Evans has discussed: what is to say that Henry falling in love with Anne Boleyn was a “random” event and not a sincerely natural occurrence, why is Henry’s divorce being separated from wider contextual factors when a major factor in the need for the divorce was Henry’s deep piety and aggravation over the political power of the church (both factors in the Reformation), and how far can we extrapolate before we fall into wishful-thinking - surely Henry would have simply fallen in love with someone else as he consistently did throughout his reign?
Evans’ scepticism is naturally appropriate when dealing with this area of history (it is, after all, prone to be corrupted by the individual political motives of the historian involved), however I feel that his ending is notably very conclusive, leaving little room for any other conclusion: he ends with a quote by Walther Rathenau that states that “History ... speaks of what is and what was, not what would be and what would have been”. But (as Evans himself noted earlier in his book) to the contemporaries the future was uncertain: to ignore this would be to suggest that the factor of indecision is irrelevant. In fact it is incredibly important to remember that those in positions of power who had to make crucial decisions, or who (may) have had the power to change the course of global history, may not have taken the paths they did, and this is vital to understanding those periods of time.
This being said I would recommend this book to anyone considering the study of counterfactuals, or merely an interest in the subject.