Putere și progres: Lupta noastră de o mie de ani pentru tehnologie și progres

by Daron Acemoğlu, Simon Johnson, Dan Crăciun (Translator)

Daron Acemoglu și Simon Johnson oferă o reinterpretare curajoasă a economiei și a istoriei, care va schimba fundamental felul în care vedeți lumea.

Un mileniu de istorie și de dovezi contemporane face să fie clar un lucru: progresul depinde de alegerile pe care le facem în privința tehnologiei. Metodele noi de organizare a producției și mijloacele noi de comunicare pot fie să servească interesele înguste ale unei elite, fie să devină fundamentul unei prosperități larg răspândite.

Avuția generată de progresele tehnologice ale agriculturii europene din timpul Evului Mediu a fost însușită de nobilime și folosită pentru construirea marilor catedrale, în vreme ce țăranii au rămas să-și ducă traiul la limita înfometării. Primul secol de industrializare din Anglia a oferit clasei muncitoare venituri stagnante. Și în toată lumea de astăzi tehnologiile digitale și inteligența artificială subminează joburile și democrația prin automatizare excesivă, culegere masivă de date și supraveghere inoportună. Nu trebuie să se întâmple astfel. Putere și progres demonstrează că avansul tehnologic a fost cândva – și poate fi din nou – ținut sub control. Progresele tehnologice de ultimă oră pot să devină instrumente de emancipare și democratizare, nu însă dacă deciziile majore rămân în mâinile câtorva lideri din domeniul high-tech mânați de hybris.

Prin cutezătoarea lor reinterpretare a economiei și a istoriei, Daron Acemoglu și Simon Johnson schimbă fundamental modul în care vedem lumea, oferindu-ne viziunea de care avem nevoie ca să reorientăm inovația în așa fel încât să fie încă o dată benefică pentru majoritatea oamenilor.

Genres: Economics, History, Nonfiction, Politics, Technology, Business, Science

704 pages, Paperback

First published May 16, 2023

About the author

Daron Acemoglu is the Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 2005 he won the prestigious John Bates Clark medal, awarded to the best economist under 40.

Reviews

[Lisa O · Rating 3 out of 5]

Two American economists reinterpret a thousand years of history and technological progress. The evidence shows that technology (as with most other things) has all too often benefited the elites and made others worse off. Progress is not automatic, and it is dependent on choices made as a society. Using the lessons from the past, society must reshape the path of innovation to create shared prosperity for all.

It feels impossible to escape the current hype about artificial intelligence. And while I am no expert on AI technology, I do have a strong curiosity about the uses for AI and find myself wondering often what it will look like in the future…hence my interest in this book. The authors' reinterpretation of the last 1,000 years of human development supports the somewhat unsettling conclusion that technology does not always equal progress. The book pulls examples from the agricultural technologies of the neolithic and medieval ages, the building of the Panama Canal, the rise of middle class entrepreneurs during the Industrial Revolution, and how banks got to be thought of as too big to fail during the financial crisis. A lot of these examples offered a new layer of understanding to what I already knew about these time periods or events. I also found the authors' analysis of automation to be particularly compelling with the exploration of so-so automation ("all the displacement and little of the promised productivity gains"). Finally, I walked away with a lot to consider about future AI developments based on the authors' roadmap of how the benefits of the next technological wave can be shared with everyone.

The two authors are economics professors, so you can expect that the writing is heavy on the research and light on the narrative storytelling. The book is still very readable, but it is definitely not concise. The authors reinforce their points over and over, so the content starts to feel quite repetitive a few chapters in. I found the ideas and messages of the book to be really interesting, but I wish there had been a little more editing. I think the book could have been about 200 pages shorter just by removing all of the repetition without sacrificing any of the critical messaging and ideas.

I gained some new perspectives on technological progress, and I learned quite a bit from the historical case studies included in the book. However, due to the unnecessary length, this probably isn't one I would actively recommend to others, but it's still an interesting read for anyone with a strong interest in technology, AI, and/or automation.

[Graeme Newell · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ever wondered how tech revolutions, from the humble plow to today's smartphones, impacted the average person? Well, 'Power and Progress' is like this time-traveling tour, stopping at all the big game-changing moments: farming breakthroughs, steam power, the huge buzz of the Industrial Revolution, and of course, our modern smartphone craze. But here's the kicker – the book doesn't just geek out over the gadgets and innovations; it dives deep into who really got the better end of the deal. Did the big shots and aristocrats cash in all the chips? Or did the everyday people see some of the action? Acemoğlu's takes us on a ride through history's tech rollercoaster.

Acemoğlu's writing style, for starters, is captivating. There's this refreshing balance between depth and approachability. Some authors delve so deep into academic jargon that you feel like you need a PhD to understand them. Not here. Daron manages to serve up a scholarly feast that's easy on the palate, ensuring you grasp the key points without feeling overwhelmed.

One of my favorite sections dives into the Industrial Revolution. We've all learned about it in school, but Acemoğlu provides fresh insights, explaining not just the “what” but the “why.” Why did some societies flourish during this period while others seemed to stagnate? His answers, deeply rooted in the interplay of power dynamics, technological change, and institutional structures, give a fresh perspective on this critical epoch.

Another highlight is his analysis of modern technological advancements, especially when it comes to AI and automation. We're living in an era where the pace of technological progress is, frankly, mind-boggling. Acemoğlu raises smart questions about how these shifts will influence labor markets, income distribution, and social structures. He doesn't pretend to have all the answers, but his explorations are thought-provoking and timely.

Now, don’t get me wrong, this isn’t a light read you’d pick up for a beach day. But if you're up for something a bit more cerebral, something that challenges you to think about the world around you and the future that awaits, “Power and Progress” is a worthy choice.

There are just so many insights in this book that are brand new. It offers a rich, insightful look into the complicated relationship between technology, societal structures, and prosperity. It's a blend of history, economics, and foresight, all wrapped up in an engaging narrative. Whether you're a student, an academic, or just a curious soul looking for a meaningful read, this one's really compelling. I learned a lot.

[Kevin Postlewaite · Rating 2 out of 5]

I had high hopes for this book, given the intelligence and expertise of the authors, but was sorely disappointed.

I was hoping for a model of how to think about the distribution of productivity gains from technological change. Instead, there's a parade of extreme of anecdotes of productivity gains not being widely shared through society. The case of communist China and the Soviet Union should be directly applicable to the situation our economy might face, right? Well, no.

There is much discussion about the history of economic growth. The book does not go into detail but blithely dismisses the explanations that (I think) are widely accepted in the academic profession without much support. Probably the authors should go read _How the World Became Rich_, a book with well-argued and well-referenced modern research. The authors need not agree but without better support of their positions (without SOME support of their positions) there's really no justification for accepting their positions.

The authors repeatedly make the same advice: think about the people when taking actions that affect technological progress. Just that, nothing more specific. Why might people/companies NOT already have those thoughts? If there are such reasons, why do they make the choices that they do and what would be required to change those choices? The book is mostly silent on this and thus no particular help: if you're someone who's already thought a tiny bit about the issues faced you won't find anything here to help you think about the potential problems any more clearly.

The book does point to how the German economy has handled such problems, the authors should go back and read their colleague Autor's book _The Work of the Future_ to understand the complications and limitations of introducing such a system to the US. In fact, if you're reading this review, you should probably Autor's book over this one: it doesn't promise to cover the ground of _Power and Progress_ but at least it covers its related material well and, even though imperfect, it may increase your understanding of the coming changes and how to think about them.

[Gus Hebblewhite · Rating 2 out of 5]

Part of the 2 star rating is that I think it could have been a lot better, so while I'm really on the fence between 2 and 3, I'm rounding down as a "missed opportunity" penalty. I wouldn't have bothered to write such a long review if I didn't have a lot of respect for Acemoglu and think a lot of what they're arguing about is important

TLDR I wouldn't reccomend this book to anyone. You'd only be persuaded of the thesis if you already agreed.

Basically the book has a plausible thesis; technology doesn't necessarily benefit humanity. There are obvious contexts in which this is true (e.g. inside authoritarian regimes). There are also more controvercial cases where it's very complicated (e.g. automation, social media).

There are at least four serious problems with how the authors argue in this book. In all cases I'm not even saying they are wrong, just that they aren't persuasive.

First, they don't actually state who or what matters. This is really important, say in the case of labour unions, since (if all goes well) labour unions being powerful likely helps wages for [employed, unionised] workers, at the expense of something. That something might be less business profits for the rich (presumably what society wants), or it might be
- Higher prices for consumers
- Less total jobs
- Less prefits for shareholders (some of whom are rich others might be pension funds)
- If union power leads to say less offshoring it might mean jobs go to Americans that would have gone to people in the developing world.
(Probably all of these things happen to varying extents). The implicit assumption of the authors based on what they paint as 'good' and 'bad' outcomes is that American workers are all that matter. I don't think the authors actually believe thisl; my point is just that whether say labor unions slowing automation is good depends on heaps of complicated dynamics, and how we allocate moral value, and the authors at least for the sake of the book seem uninterested in delving down into the complicated dynamics. For someone like me who's philosophical intuition is that "all people matter basically equally" reading chapters like this offers almost nothing.

Secondly, the authors seem to ignore other plausible approaches to fix the (sometimes very real) problems they point out. For example, if automation hurts jobs we have at least two possible approaches. One is we can encourage/force companies to use labor they don't need. Another is we could have a robust social safetly net such that people out of jobs are supported (e.g. UBI, negative income tax, job training programs). There are some reasons to favour the former; less distruption, jobs are good for mental health etc. There might also be good reasons to consider that latter:
- If we're wrong and the labour market will adapt, then we aren't locking ourselves in an inefficient way of doing things. Few poeple lament that there aren't many weavers, or that relatively few of us need to be farmers, even though when these sectors were distrupted we worries about the same things we are now.
- The overall efficiency is likely to be higher without distorting incentives, so there is in theory more actual stuff to redistribute.
- A policy of redistribution is less complicated than trying to regulate automation, so it's less likely policy will make a mistake and cause harm
For the most part the authors don't even entertain these kinds of market based or welfaree based alternatives, so if they have good reason to prefer direct regulation on automation they don't tell me what it is. In the very final chapter they very superficially touch on some of these alternatives, but unhelpfully. E.g. they they dismiss UBI in about two sentences on the gounds that it's not targeted and might lead to less people working. Now I'm not some pro UBI zeolot but I can see that this is a bad argument. UBI advocates would respond that a UBI can 'become' functionally targeted because you increase marginal tax rates, and you can get around incentives by combining it with e.g. a negative income tax, or having the level be quire low (enough to live on but not very comfortably). My point isn't that a UBI is good and the authors are wrong, it's that the authors aren't interested in exploring plausible alternatives in good faith and don't explain why.

Thirdly, the authors have a common habit of pointing out problems and not positing clear alternatives or counterfactuals. For example in probably the worst chapter of the book they posit that current software development is (not necessarily on nett) harmful and antithetical to the original hacker ethos. This is because (they argue) big companies try to control software, and design software so that experts can use it and automate things. Aside from being completely contrary to my own experience as a software person (open source culturs is alive and well, hackers by and large I would say less interested than normal in like making stuff that can be used by non-technical people) it doesn't explain what actual "hacker approved" measures could have made things different. It seems to me that as companies like microsoft and apple create their own ecosystems and walled gardens hackers said "ok fine I'll do my own thing". Would hackers (or anyone) prefer it if... instead the government came along and said "no Microsoft you have to make software for noobs"? Surely not, so what are the authors even advocating? They don't say.

Finally, there's a lot of what feel like morte and bailey arguments. One of the problems the authors face is that some claims about technology are kind of obvious and not that interesting (e.g. tech + authoritarianism = bad), and the latter claims are really unclear and depend a lot on your values and/or how the future turns out (e.g. social media is bad). The authors seem to try to have their cake and eat it too by muddling things up, so that some type of technology is BAD FOR US in an INTERESTING/UNEXPECTED way, but where this is only true given their muddling. As an example, take the chapter on the Panama Canal. The point of the chapter is to demonstrate that big technological grand visions can be bad. But the failure of the Panama Canal is one of a grand vision coupled with abuses of state power (e.g. forced labor) and what would be at least today literal crimes (invester fraud). If you imagine a market context, something like what exists in Western Democracies, then it's not really clear grand visions are bad. Sure they will sometimes/often fail, but then they go out of business, investors lose money, people learn and we all move on.

[Suman Srivastava · Rating 5 out of 5]

The basic thesis of this book is: throughout history, technological progress is made to benefit the elite. Left to itself, there is no trickle down effect and the masses end up worse off than before the new technology appeared. However there have been times when societal forces (what we would call Samaj in India) have managed to force benefits to become more widespread.

Today we’re at such a juncture with two technologies - Green Energy and Artificial Intelligence. The book argues that we seem to be taking a more elitist path with AI compared to Green Energy. We could still change direction in both. Which path will we take?

Great book, that could change your mental model. The only drawback is that it is excessively focused on the USA (and, to a lesser extent, the UK) and makes only token references to the rest of the world. Still, the thesis is interesting and hence worth reading.

[Anna Mangnus · Rating 3 out of 5]

2.5, thesis point interesting and uses some cool case studies but over-all not my cup of tea, primarily because I think it could have been much shorter

[Mad Hab · Rating 5 out of 5]

I really, really love Acemoglu and think his Nobel Prize is well deserved. I admire his style, his writing, and especially his ideas. What he says about technology and its failure to improve people’s lives over the past few decades really resonates with me. However, his proposed solutions and explanations aren’t entirely convincing to me. More government isn’t a cure-all for every problem.

In my view, the book has a clear progressive bias, and the authors aren’t trying to hide it. It feels nostalgic for a past era of progressive ideals. Meanwhile, the question of why the Industrial Revolution happened when and where it did—and why there hasn’t been another like it in recent times—remains up in the air.

You may like him or not, agree with him or not, but this book is a must-read.

[Dorota · Rating 2 out of 5]

Made some interesting points but essentially a long procession of anecdotal evidence. Could have been a quarter of its length.

[Saleh Rostami · Rating 4 out of 5]

مسئلهِ مسیر بهره‌وری



یادداشتی به مناسبت خوانش آخرین اثر دارون عجم اغلو:

Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity


کتاب قدرت و پیشرفت اثر مفصل عجم اغلو و سایمون جانسون، شاید یکی از مهم‌ترین کُتب‌های اقتصادِ عمومی دهه اخیر باشد. کتابی حاصلِ دغدغه‌های اخیر عجم اغلو یعنی، تکنولوژی و خصوصا هوش مصنوعی که به پشتوانه منابع مفصلش برای افراد علاقه‌مند به تکنولوژی بسیار اهمیت دارد. در اینفوگرافیک بالا، مهم‌ترین نکات کتاب قدرت و پیشرفت را خلاصه کردم. و در ادامه مهم‌ترین نکات کتاب را به زبان ساده آورده‌ام، هرچند باید کتاب به دقت خوانده شود تا این نکات به ذهن و جان خوانندگان بنشیند.

نسخه بهتر اینفوگرافیک را اینجاببینید:


ممسئله اصلی کتاب


شاید بتوان مسئله اصلی کتاب را این پرسش مطرح کرد: آیا عواید فناوری به شکل مساوی به آحاد جامعه می‌رسد؟ کتاب سعی می‌کند با ادله فراوان به یک پاسخ روشن برای این سوال برسد. پاسخ کتاب این است: نه لزوما و شوربختانه در بیشتر تاریخ بشر عواید نشئت گرفته از فناوری تنها به گروه محدودی از جامعه رسیده است. کتاب به خوش‌بینی غول‌های فناوری و مدیران و سهام‌داران شرکت‌های دیجیتال مانند ماکروسافت، گوگل و متا (فیسبوک) می‌پردازد که معتقد اند مسیر فناوری امروز که در راستای توسعه هوش‌مصنوعی است، باعث می‌شود تا جامعه بهره‌مندتر گردند. کتاب این فرضیه و خوش‌بینی را زیر سوال می‌برد و نویسندگان کتاب معتقد اند که مسیرفعلی نوآوری‌های دیجیتال باعث بیش‌ترشدن شکاف طبقاتی در جامعه می‌شود و باید مسیر توسعه فناوری تغییر کند.

ارابه ناقص بهره‌وری

یکی از کلیدی‌ترین موضوعات کتاب زیر سوال بردن تئوری یا اثر Bandwagon productivity effect یا اثر ارابه بهره‌وری است. بر اساس این تئوری با افزایش بهره‌وری (که عمدتا به خاطر اتوماسیون صورت می‌پذیرد)، هزینه‌ها کاهش می‌یابد، درآمد افراد افزایش می‌یابد و بر اساس آن عواید حاصل از بهره‌وری به آحاد جامعه می‌رسد. عجم اغلو و سایمون جانسون نشان می‌دهند که به طور تاریخی این موضوع نمی‌تواند اثبات شود. و فناوری‌هایی که موجب بهره‌وری می‌شوند خود به خود باعث این نخواهند شد که عواید حاصل از بهره‌وری و کاهش هزینه‌ها به آحاد جامعه برسد. اتفاقا، اتوماسیون حاصل از بهروری می‌تواند باعث دو قطبی شدن جامعه به لحاظ رفاه و بهره‌مندی شود.

چشم‌انداز فناوری

کتاب بدون این که به شکل مستقیم به این پرسش مهم‌ فلسفی پاسخ دهد که آیا فناوری Value-free است، در فصل دوم به طور کامل به این پرسش می‌پردازد. کتاب با مقایسه دو موردِ کانال سوئز و کانال پاناما نشان می‌دهد که چگونه یک فناوری بدون توجه به مسئله چشم انداز و اثرات جانبی آن می‌تواند باعث فاجعه شود. کتاب تاکید می‌کند که فناوری مسیر لاجرمی ندارد و توسط انسان‌ها، هدایت می‌شود و این بدین معناست که انتخاب‌های ما انسان‌هاست که به فناوری جهت می‌دهد.

بهره‌وری حاشیه‌ای: توانمندسازی آحاد جامعه یا اتوماسیون نصف و نیمه (So-So Automation)

شاید یکی از مضامین اصلی کتاب پاسخ به این سوال باشد که در چه صورت ارابه بهره‌وری رخ می‌دهد و آحادجامعه از فواید فناوری بهره‌مند می‌شوند؟ پاسخ کتاب این است: زمانی که فناوری باعث شود تا به جای کنار گذاشتن آدم‌ها، آن‌ها توانمند شوند و برایشان فعالیت‌های جدید و متنوع تعریف شود، آن وقت می‌توان گفت که فناوری می‌تواند منجر به اثر ارابه‌ای شود. کتاب در این جا به مفهوم مهمی به نام Marginal productivity اشاره می‌کند که به زبان ساده و ریاضی به این معنی است که اگر یک انسان به یک کسب و کار اضافه شود چقد به بهره‌وری و خروجی آن کسب و کار اضافه می‌شود. کتاب به این حقیقت اشاره می‌کند که در صورتی که Marginal Productivity افراد یا بهره‌وری حاشیه‌ای کارکنانِ یک شرکت یا یک کارخانه افزایش پیدا کند، آن وقت کسب و کارها افراد بیشتری را استخدام می‌کنند و کسب و کارشان را گسترش می‌بخشند و مشاغل بیشتری ناشی از فناوری ایجاد می‌شود. اما در صورتی که فناوری باعث شود تا کارهای افراد دچار فرآیند اتوماسیون شود و فقط ماشین‌ها جایگزین انسان‌ها شوند و فعالیت‌های جدید پدید نیایند، آن وقت بهره‌وری حاشیه‌ای افراد کاهش می‌یابد و افراد بیکار می‌شوند و عواید ناشی از بهره‌وری فقط به صاحبان کسب و کارها و سهام دارها می‌شوند. این که به کارگیری فناوری‌ها باعث شود تا توانمندسازی افراد و یا جایگزین شدنشان رخ دهد، تنها انتخاب ماست. کتاب همچنین به اثر اتوماسیون بر بهره‌وری کلان سازمان‌ها می‌پردازد. برای مثال، اگر به جای صندوق‌دار مغازه‌ها از دستگاه‌های خودکار استفاده کنیم، تنها شغل‌ها را از بین برده‌ایم و باعث بهره‌وری کلان مغازه‌ها نشده‌ایم، کتاب به این نوع اتوماسیون، اتوماسیون نصف و نیمه می‌گویند که تنها باعث بیکاری و پر پول شدن جیب مدیران و سهام‌داران شرکت‌ها می‌شود.

یادگیری ماشینی یا کاربرد ماشینی

کتاب به سه دوره عصرکشاورزی و فناوری‌های کشاورزی، عصر انقلاب صنعتی و عصر دیجیتال می‌پردازد. به طور خلاصه، کتاب نشان می‌دهد که در نیمه دوم عصر انقلاب صنعتی و نیمه نخست عصر دیجیتال به دلیل نهادهای مدنی، قدرتمند بودن نیروی کار و توضیح نسبتا متناسب قدرت میان کارگر و کارفرما مسیر فناوری به سمت توانمندسازی افراد و توزیع متوازن بهره‌وری پیش‌رفته است. اتفاقی که در عصر دیجیتال امروز، رخ نمی‌دهد. در عصر دیجیتال امروز، ابزارهای دیجیتال به جای توانمندسازی کارکنان تبدیل به ابزارهایی برای کنترل آن‌ها و کمتر کردن قدرتشان شده اند. همچنین فناوری‌هایی نظیر یادگیری ماشینی (هوش مصنوعی) باعث شده می‌شود تا افراد شغل خود را از دست بدهند بدون آن که بهره‌وری به شکل کلان رخ دهد و این یعنی اتوماسیون نصف و نیمه. کتاب توصیه می‌کند تا به جای توجه به Machine Learning یا یادگیری ماشینی باید به Machine Usefulness یا کاربرد ماشینی توجه کرد. به این که چگونه باید فناوری‌های گسترش یابند تا مکمل آدمی باشند به جای آن که باعث شوند افراد شغل‌شان را از دست دهند. همچنین کتاب می‌گوید فناوری یادگیری ماشینی یا هوش مصنوعی قادر نیست تا بسیاری از فعالیت‌های مهم و تصمیم‌گیری‌های اساسی را انجام دهند چرا که هوش آدمی یا مکانیزم تصمیم‌گیری آدمی بسیار مبتنی بر شرایط محیطی و شرایط اجتماعی است و دائما در حال تغییر است. بنابراین یادگیری ماشینی نمی‌تواند نویدبخش یک اتوماسیون گسترده با افزایش بهره‌نوری خیره‌کننده باشد و خوش‌بینی غول‌های فناوری در این باره بسیار گمراه کننده است.

راه حل چیست؟

کتاب به مانند بسیاری از کُتُب مشابه دیگر، مثل کتابِ رقابت نوآوری دیجیتال که نگارنده ترجمه نموده، هدفش تشخیص و نه تجویز است. اما راهکارهای کتاب بعضا می‌تواند سرنخی باشد برای رسیدن به راهکارهای جامع‌تر. راهکارهایی مانند تقویت جامعه‌مدنی و توانمندسازی طبقه کارگر، مالیات بستن بر اتوماسیون، اعطای گرنت به پژوهش‌ها و پروژه‌های تحقیقاتی در حوزه کاربردماشینی به جای یادگیری ماشینی، انحصارزدایی و شکستن شرکت‌های بزرگ فناوری مانند گوگل، ماکروسافت و فیسبوک و توجه به مسئله آموزش از راهکارهای کتاب است. به طور کلی، کتاب با غنای عمیقی به مسئله فناوری و بهره‌وری آن در طول تاریخ یک هزارساله اخیربشری می‌پردازد و درس آموزه‌های بسیاری برای آینده کوتاه مدت و میان مدت بشریت دارد.

[Nihan Çumralıgil · Rating 4 out of 5]

Trump’ın 2. dönemi gelişmelerini de göz önünde bulundurunca iyice içinizi karartacak bir kitap ama çok anlaşılır ve neden sonuç ilişkileri kurabilme yeteneği olan herkes anlar. Yani ekonomi üatadı olmanıza gerek yok.

Özellikle Daniel Susskind’in “Çalışılmayan Bir Dünya” kitabında anlatıldığı gibi hiçbir şeyin günlük güneşlik devam etmeyeceğini iddia ediyor. önlem almazsak çalışanlar için dezavantajlı, tekno-zenginler ve güç sahibi politikacılar için bulunmaz bir silah haline gelen otomasyon sistemleri, yapay zeka, sosyal medya gibi araçları anlatıyor. Ama yüzeysel değil. Tarihsel gidişatı, özellikle otomasyonun etkileri üzerinden çok iyi anlatmış. Bu gelişmelerin şu ana kadarki olumsuz etkilerini “kader” olarak görmek yerine müdahale etmek gerekliliğinden bahsetmiş ama maalesef şu an ne liderler eski liderler ne işçi hareketi eskisi kadar güçlü, ne genel halk örgütlü.

[Here_Lies_the_Bookdragon · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a book club read I never would have picked up otherwise. And I'm so glad I did! I didn't have time to write a review immediately when I finished (as I normally do), which is a win in this case. A week after reading it, I can honestly say this book is actively influencing the way I think at the world around me (especially current events).

Anyway, this book provides an in-depth look at how technological progress affects societies and who has power in them - ranging from the canal digging machines used for the Suez and Panama canals to more recent developments in AI. At its core, it criticises the view that technological progress automatically means a better world, while maintaining that it can almost always result in a better world if the right choices are made about its use.

To absolutely nobody's surprise, a non-fiction book by 2 nobelprize winning economists makes for fairly dense reading, so I won't go into a more detailed description. The writing is more accessible than I'd expect, but it is simply a lot of information - they are nothing if not thorough in making their case. I'm convinced, and if you have any interest at all in the subject, you'll find it well worth the effort.

[Kartik]

Joint winners of the 2024 Nobel Prize in Economics.

[Rajesh Kandaswamy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Rarely do you come across a book that forces you to pause and rethink assumptions you have held for years. "Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity" by Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson did that for me. For a long time, my stance has been that while technological disruptions frequently harm workers in the short term, the long arc of innovation ultimately bends toward prosperity. Much of that belief stems from reading economic history, which shows how successive industrial revolutions have ultimately expanded opportunities and living standards.

But AI has made me increasingly uneasy about assuming this trajectory will simply repeat itself. Acemoglu and Johnson sharpen that discomfort by presenting a convincing case: economic progress through technology is possible, but it is far from guaranteed. History, they argue, shows that shared prosperity emerges only when specific conditions align. And many of those conditions, at least so far, do not clearly exist for AI.

The book outlines several essential ingredients as conditions for broad-based prosperity from new technologies:

1. Technology must raise the marginal productivity of workers: This is the "productivity bandwagon" effect, where upstream tools such as water wheels or steam engines create downstream tasks, industries, and output. In many historical cases, productivity gains did not result from replacing workers, but rather from enabling them to do more.

2. Workers must have enough bargaining power to claim part of the gains. This typically requires a combination of labor organization, supportive policies, and an active political voice. Without it, productivity increases can coexist with worker impoverishment, as seen in early industrial England.

3. New technologies must create space for new entrepreneurs rather than simply entrench incumbents. When technologies open new markets instead of merely automating old ones, new entrants emerge, competition increases, and more of society benefits.

4. Societies must intentionally steer innovation toward complementing human capabilities rather than replacing them. Technologies that broadened prosperity did so because institutions and norms directed innovation toward enhancing human work rather than sidelining it.

Throughout the book, Acemoglu and Johnson draw on a wide range of historical examples to illustrate these dynamics, sometimes selectively, but often with useful depth. They describe how medieval Egypt's reliance on skilled labor created different wage structures compared to England, which was dominated by unskilled labor; how lessons from failed canal attempts informed the eventual success of the Suez Canal; and how innovations like the steam engine catalyzed the emergence of new classes of entrepreneurs. Their treatment of Britain's institutional evolution - privateering, shifting land ownership, and the rise of practical innovators such as Wedgwood and Stephenson - is particularly insightful. These examples illustrate how technological breakthroughs and social conditions combined to create new industries, opportunities, and forms of mobility.

For all its strengths, the book leans heavily on certain narratives and sometimes stretches thin historical episodes to fit its broader thesis. It focuses disproportionately on supply-side explanations for progress while offering only a cursory treatment of how demand expands. Its critique of digital technologies feels dated and occasionally overbroad, relying on examples that no longer carry much explanatory power. And its assessment of AI is anchored too firmly in what the technology could do at the time of writing, underestimating both the pace and variety of ongoing progress. These do not undermine the book's core argument, but they do leave important questions underexplored.

Despite these shortcomings, I found Power and Progress enormously valuable. It provides a clear, historically grounded explanation for why technological progress is not automatic and why societies sometimes fail to distribute its gains. The book helped me articulate my own unease more precisely: the concern is not that AI will harm the economy, but that assuming it will naturally become a positive long-term force is historically unwarranted. The conditions that enabled earlier technologies to lift broad segments of society - wide-ranging productivity gains, empowered workers, dynamic entrepreneurship, and intentional direction of innovation - do not appear by default. They must be created.

Even where I disagree with the authors, the process of wrestling with their arguments has been clarifying. The book serves as a useful lens, one that sharpens assumptions, broadens perspective, and prompts us to ask better questions about how AI should evolve if we want it to lead not just to faster automation, but to shared prosperity.

[Jarrett Bell · Rating 4 out of 5]

In “Power and Progress,” Acemoglu and Johnson convincingly make the case that technological progress has never been automatically associated with societal benefits (e.g., agricultural improvements in the Middle Ages were captured by nobles to build cathedrals, early factories in England made factory owners rich while workers became poorer and less healthy). Instead, whether new technologies benefit society at large depends on institutions and how power is shared in society.

Take Germany’s approach to automation in the car industry, for example. Unlike the US, Germany uses sectoral collective bargaining to set wages, which incentivizes companies to find ways to raise productivity compared to their peers and still pay workers the same amount as their peers, meaning that productivity increases translate to profit gains. Germany has actually embraced automation more than the US, but thanks to its sectoral unions, it has made efforts to retrain workers and reallocate them to new tasks, finding ways for technology to complement, not replace, workers. Technology-as-human-replacement can be inefficient and fails to take advantage of human workers’ flexibility and adaptability. As Elon Musk put it after unsuccessfully trying to fully automate the production of Teslas: “Humans are underrated.”

And yet, many companies are embracing automation regardless of the costs, widening inequality, worsening or hardly improving consumer experiences (e.g., automated help lines), surveilling workers, and hollowing out the skilled workforce.

Acemoglu and Johnson call for policy change to incentivize human-complementing technology developments and stop subsidizing AI, not halt technological progress altogether. Some ideas struck me as particularly effective (e.g., decreasing payroll taxes below taxes on capital to stop incentivizing automation, subsidizing technologies that increase the labor share of income, regulating digital privacy, investing in retraining programs).

The challenge will be how to continue to incentivize the very real societal benefits technological progress enables (e.g., better and more rapidly developed life-saving vaccines and drugs) with ensuring new technologies produce shared prosperity and do not worsen societal challenges (e.g., anti democratic forces, mass unemployment, growing inequality). Burdensome regulation and industrial policy are likely to be less effective than adjusting incentives away from automation toward productivity-increasing technologies (e.g., by taxing capital more heavily than labor, investing in research).

Regardless of whether you agree with Acemoglu and Johnson’s conclusions and recommendations, “Power and Progress” will challenge you and possibly inspire some optimism that we can still shape the effects of AI and other new technologies on our societies.

[Can Yildirmaz · Rating 5 out of 5]

Uluslarin dususu ve dar koridor gibi etkileyici bir kitap degil, ama yine de teknolojinin topluma etkisi uzerine mukemmel bir kitap. Ozellikle gunumuzde dijital teknolojilerin topluma etkileri, nasil toplum icin daha faydali hale gelebilecegi hakkinda pratik bilgiler de veriyor. Ayrica cok iyi bir arastirma var arkasinda. Kitabin sonu cok iyi, teknoloji devlerini elestiriyor. Ozellikle ilk bolumleri oldukca isci/toplum bakis acisini iceriyor. Bunu ekonomiye ve ulkelere etkilerini inceliyor, bunu da karsilastirmalar yaparak veriyor. Ilk bolumleri cok uzun buldum, bunlar kisalabilir. Ayrica tercume de cok iyi degil, cokca yazim hatasi da var.

[David Wagner · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was...surprising. Authors describe the problems of concentration and technology pointing out well the risks and problems. What is less convincing are the proposed solutions, what is a bit tiring is the too long historical intro.
Also, small thjngs here and there - the echo chambers are ať least according to Bail not so much of a problem and I would expect the authors to confront this somehow.

[Chirsty · Rating 1 out of 5]

DNF at 35%. There was absolutely no need for this book to be so long. Read another review that said it reads like 'economists discover social power' and literally, that. Chapter 1 summarises a really basic thesis and the rest of the book is just repeating the same point with different historical examples.

[Ali · Rating 1 out of 5]

DNFed

[Harshan Ramadass · Rating 5 out of 5]

Didn’t disappoint, every bit as good as I expected. Going into collection

[Stephen King · Rating 5 out of 5]

Another thoughtful and well written book by Daron Acemoglu, this time co-authored with Simon Johnson. Power and Progress challenges the idea that the pace of technological change is inevitable and that it will lead to greater automation and job losses. Tracing the concepts from medieval times through the Industrial Revolution it shows how ‘countervailing forces’ such as protective legislation, organised labour and government intervention have balanced technological progress with societal well being. Bringing the notion up to date with the experience of big tech and the prospect of Generative AI, it argues for urgent measures to tackle this new threat to democracy, employment and humanity.

[Mary C. Saavedra · Rating 5 out of 5]

Este libro es una sacudida elegante y necesaria para todos los que creemos que la tecnología es sinónimo de bienestar. Poder y Progreso combina historia, economía y política para mostrarnos que el desarrollo tecnológico ha sido —y sigue siendo— una lucha de poder: no entre humanos y máquinas, sino entre quienes controlan la tecnología y quienes viven con sus consecuencias.

Los autores recorren mil años de innovaciones, desde los molinos medievales hasta la inteligencia artificial, y revelan un patrón inquietante: las grandes transformaciones solo benefician a la mayoría cuando el poder se distribuye y las instituciones lo permiten. Su mensaje es tan claro como urgente: la tecnología puede mejorar la vida de todos, pero eso no ocurre por accidente, sino por diseño y decisión colectiva.

Me encantó cómo el libro evita el catastrofismo fácil del “los robots nos reemplazarán” y también el optimismo ingenuo del “todo progreso es bueno”. En cambio, invita a pensar, debatir y —sobre todo— actuar. Es un llamado a redirigir la innovación hacia el bien común.

⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ Para un libro lúcido, provocador y esperanzador. Si te interesa la tecnología, la historia o simplemente entender hacia dónde va el mundo, este es un must-read

[Dilek Sayedahmed, PhD · Rating 3 out of 5]

Disclaimer: this review is written by a fellow economist, who is a micro theorist.

- Generic model, common sense policy. Easily it could have been around 300 pages but long is the authors’ style.

- Great anecdotal and historical data, as always. First 1/3 is great, last 1/3 is great. The middle 1/3 is redundant but again that is their style.

- I’d highly recommend Why Nations Fail instead. Feel free to skip this one.

[Sharath Reddy · Rating 2 out of 5]

The authors’ arguments work when they discuss need for improved regulation and policy so that economies work smoother and prevent excess rent taking. But since they want their book to be about how technology is bad, they don’t focus there. In their own book there is plenty of evidence that humanity’s technology improvements - from axes and fire until today - is the reason we have the potential for longer and richer lives.

[Peggy Donnelly · Rating 1 out of 5]

This book is awful. It has some interesting history then ruins it by superimposing communist anti-capitalist anti-industrial interpretation. The last chapter is a hate Trump manifesto that calls for government control of the internet, speech and AI. Don't waste your time.

[Pablo Ballesteros · Rating 5 out of 5]

Estos libros me recuerdan las razones por las que elegí ser economista. Aprendí mucho.

[Jack Lewis · Rating 4 out of 5]

The central thesis of this book is that we should not allow crazed billionaires who had a good idea once when they were in university to determine the course of human history. Or, technological advancement does not always automatically result in increased shared prosperity; in order for it to do so, governments must regulate and, well, govern it.

Regarding crazed billionaires, the opening story of the book is about Ferdinand de Lesseps as he planned and built first the Suez canal, and then planned and attempted to build the Panama canal. He himself was not an engineer: his exceptional ability seemed to be to be able to get extremely contagiously excited about something, and convince others to trust him and invest in him. The Suez canal, built across flat, sea-level, dry terrain in Egypt, was a great success, and led to fame and riches for Lesseps ("The Great Frenchman"). Despite the best advice of experts, Lesseps then got given the go ahead to build the Panama canal using the exact same model as the Suez, despite Panama being almost opposite in terrain: mountainous, wet jungle, teeming with tropical diseases. Obviously it goes horribly wrong, thousands lose their money and tens of thousands of workers die and the Panama canal is not completed. I personally think the key message of this is not to trust the French, but the authors’ suggestion is that we should not mistake confidence, status and persuasive vision for genuine technical judgment, or assume that because something is innovative, that it will work, or be for the betterment of humanity.

I actually really enjoyed Lesseps as a character, even if he led to the deaths of thousands of people and ultimately did very little good. He was so determined and had such faith in his own vision that he was willing to constantly risk everything on it. He was clearly a fascinating character of his time, and it is his story that was the highlight and most memorable part of the book for me. Long after I forget this book, I will remember Lesseps. I have a vision of him standing in the Panamanian mud surrounded by men dying of yellow fever, months behind schedule and millions above budget, engineers telling him flat to his face that his plan wouldn't work, and him still urging everyone on, telling them it will work out the way he had imagined it in the end. It makes me think of Elon Musk's sad future Mars colony of slowly suffocating, regret-filled, homesick people alone on a cold, red, dusty world, eating vitamin goop and drinking recycled piss while he dementedly urges more people to go there, that it is for the better of humanity, that we just need to crack a few more eggs to make the interplanetary omelette he saw in his dreams after reading a summary of an Iain M Banks novel.

The conclusion of this book was predictable - governments must regulate, legislate and tax their way into a position of control of the reckless way that corporations are being allowed to determine the direction that technological advancement is going. They are not anti-tech, they just want to shift from asking not simply whether a technology works, increases output, or makes money, to asking whether a technology creates socially useful productivity gains and whether those gains are broadly shared. If it does not create useful productivity gains and those gains are not broadly shared, it should be taxed, regulated, blocked etc.

The reason for 4 and not 5 stars is that it wasn’t all fun stories of Victorian era eccentrics, and that it proposes broad solutions - wealth taxes, for example - that seem common sensical and reasonable, but does not address the elephant in the room: these common sensical, reasonable solutions, for some reason, seem far far beyond our imagination. The USA, the only player that really matters in AI, is run by Trump, who is not going to introduce higher taxes on these corporations or their billionaire owners or regulate their products unless it benefits him in some way. And even if America did regulate, China could storm ahead, and they will almost certainly not be concerned with the interests of people living outside of China, and maybe not even those living inside China, when deciding how to use advanced technologies. For now, I can't see any of the proposed solutions in this book happening, but we'll see - it took a while for government to catch up to technology after the Industrial Revolution, but they did eventually, and it led to a rise in living standards and life expectancy...so there is hope.

[Ronald Diehl]

Paired with Why Nations Fail, one wonders if Acemoglu’s strategy for getting readers to accept his theses is to grind them into submission—the chapters are needlessly long, meandering slogs that at times venture into territory that isn’t obviously connected to the book’s central arguments.

Those arguments—that technological advancements often don’t translate to widely shared prosperity and that the direction of technology is determined by the vision of elites—I found objectionable.

I reject the notion that the long-run direction of technology is determined by the choices and whims of elites—capital owners, executives, policymakers, etc. Rather, I think the evidence points to technology evolving convergently and semi-deterministically—i.e., similar technologies develop in response to similar conditions, needs, and pressures, independent of time, place, or the visions of specific individuals. Diamond (1997) touches on this in noting the independent development of technologies related to agriculture, metallurgy, and writing in isolated temporal and geographic contexts. Mokyr (1990) notes the independent invention of spinning wheels, looms, windmills, waterwheels, plows, and irrigation. Theorists like George Basalla (1988), Brian Arthur (2009), and Kevin Kelly (2010) paint portraits of new technologies emerging nigh-inevitably when requisite conditions and precursor technologies exist. Sure, historical, cultural, and institutional variation exists, and this leaves room for substantial divergence, but I think that convergence dominates the long-run, and doubly so in a globalized world of heightened competition.

I also think the authors’ contention that technological progress is only loosely associated with social progress suffers from a glaring oversight. The authors focus their attention pretty much exclusively on how new technologies shift the distribution of national wealth and income, noting that technical advances tend to displace workers and exacerbate inequality. They don’t, however, pay much attention to how technologies improve human welfare via new products. They claim that new technologies aren’t neatly associated with inclusive prosperity because they disproportionately benefit owners of capital over labor, but they overlook how new products benefit everyone as consumers. That is, the authors focus almost exclusively on how technology impacts production, but they largely neglect how it impacts consumption, resulting in a skewed and incomplete account of how technology contributes to progress. Capital income shares and real wages are important dimensions of a complete picture, for sure, but it’s hard to deny that technology has been an overwhelming net boon when life expectancy has doubled and vaccination, electricity, running water, refrigeration, automobiles, radio, television, personal computing, mobile telecommunication, etc., etc.—all products—have gone from non-existent to ubiquity.

Ultimately, I perceived the work as techno-pessimist. My issue with this pessimism is that I don’t think technology per se should be indicted in discussions of the perennial tension between capital owners and labor or the tradeoffs between innovation and displacement. In my view, such discussions and the concerns raised by the book are more appropriately framed as matters of economic culture and institutional milieu than as a matter of the rightness or wrongness of the “direction” of technology.

[Lordoftaipo · Rating 4 out of 5]

Progress is never automatic. Throughout the book, from the prologue to the concluding chapter, Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson reiterate this central message. Our intuition thinking otherwise reflects a misguided vision–a utopia promised and powered by new technologies.

This is not a technosceptic’s testimony. Unlike some proponents of AI regulations, such as Max Tegmark and Sam Altman, the economists are concerned with the labour setting disrupted by an unsupervised trend of innovation.

The authors cite the malnourishment of the mediaeval English farmers, defying our expectation on their long list of innovations. Similarly, they explore how the Industrial Revolution was initially a continuation of deplorable labour arrangement. The ‘technology bandwagon’ only rings true up to the first word, because no one beside some entitled cliques can jump on it.

This illusion is just as prevalent today as ever. It is unlikely that artificial intelligence is taking away troubles, but first and foremost, jobs. In other words, ‘Hillbilly Elegy’ is just as plausible as the ones in ‘I, Robot’ and ‘Brave New World’, the former and the residents thereof aptly foreshadowing a bleak future.

Think of ‘so-so automations’, such as digital check-ins. You’ll run into your boss on a Friday evening just before you go, not coincidentally because the app has tracked and predicted your business hour patterns. The power of the powerless is being chipped away.

As you progress through chapters four to eight, the authors gradually convince the reader that misdirected advancement is fundamentally dystopian. However, while their analysis has posed a veritable challenge to the prevailing vision, they did not chart a course against it in the coming chapters.

They propose the use of automation to assist manpower, but whether such a coalescence wastes human resources would have rightly bugged the late David Graebar. In that case, policymakers may turn to digital and automation taxes and dismantle tech giants. All this brashness underscores a key message: any interventions serve not to hamper the economy, better still, they steer it away from unintended consequences.

In spite of that, these solutions are not a proper response to their keen emphasis on ‘visions’ early on. While both policies and visions can undo or avert the wrongdoings, the bottom-up vision clearly has far-reaching impacts and is harder to spur into existence without guidance.

What they prize as the ultra determinant in Industrial Britain is an aspirant middle class following the Glorious Revolution. So within the bounds of the law, how to spark off a society-wide discourse above the pecking order remains unanswered. They briefly mentioned investigative journalism, a public sphere and some crowdfunded unions, all feasible until you meet the countries where the right to assemble is abridged, all bets are off.

Institutions that promote diverse opinions are well within the research field of the veteran economists. If not a roadmap, maybe a list of actionable steps for individuals would suffice? Robert J. Shiller developed a similar thesis in his 2019 book ‘Narrative Economics’, but apparently, his ‘narrative’ didn’t take off. It is hoped that this visionary book will not suffer the same irony.

Overall, they have studied widely and dispelled the digital utopian vision that riddles contemporary discourse. Even though the proposed solutions may not be a full answer to the challenge, the book nonetheless puts some policies in perspective as an attempt.

[Juan Lovera · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book would have been a significant contribution in 2017 but right now its seems outdated on some aspects. You can also skip most of it, reading the introduction and the last two chapters is enough the rest is superfluous to the argument. Acemoglu seems to have moved left politically since writing Why Nations Fail, which is a welcome development. I had hoped that developments in the real world would wean him of his (neo)liberal institutionalist idealism and this seems to somewhat have happened. The central thesis of the book is that technology is socially biased because some visions are more relevant in society because of the power and wealth of the people propagating this vision. When this is combined with no strong counter movements this leads to an application of technology which tends to strengthen the power of those who already have power.
In spite of power being in the title, the book doesn’t often touch on the specifics of political-economy (in spite of the central thesis of the book being that whether the productivity bandwagon functions depends on the specific political economy that technological advances encounter). This is a consequence of two factors: the usual cherry-picking done by economists trying their hand at historical writing means that every chapter requires long introductions. On the other hand, the liberal framework with which the authors work requires the exact workings of powers to remain somewhat diffuse as analyzing the in depth working of power and political economy would result in an explanation that woud undermine their liberalism. The labour movement starting in the 80s is impaired, not crushed as a result of a 50 year project by US capital, in the narrative of Acemoglu and Johnson. The authors do not present this as coming out of thing air but they do present it as just one factor in why technology has a social bias that is against the majority of society. However the crushing of the labour movement by Reagan and his successors is fundamental in understanding why the use of technology is biased towards capital. But again, elaborating on this would make the liberal framework falter as it would reveal class-struggle and the domination of capital over labour as the main reason that technology serves the needs of capital. This is important to highlight because the authors themselves present the social bias of technology as the main reason for the growing inequality of our age.
A class based analysis would undermine a large part of their thesis: looking at the history of technology in the industrial age through this lens reveals that the turning point of 1980/neoliberalism is not necessarily exceptional but more similar to the pre New Deal era. Responding to imperatives of the fundamentals of production (relatively restrained labour supply) was of course one reason that US companies invested heavily in capital during the 1870-1930 period but another reason was disciplining the labour movement. This was successfully kept down until the terminal crisis of the Great Depression forced a reevaluation, just as the crisis of the 1970s forced a reevaluation of the Keynesian concensus and reignited class warfare. The corporatist New Deal compromise benefitted workers more than the preceding era. Neoliberalism has swung the class balance in the other direction. When analyzed through this lens, New Deal Keynesianism becomes the exception rather than a glorified normal that we should look to return to. Still things were better back then for working people than now and that also points us in the right direction of where our energies should be spent: strengthening the collective power of workers which is most likely done best by strengthening unions which are the institutions representing this collective power. The authors do recommend stronger unions in the conclusion however their approach to unions is corporative instead of confrontational. They idealize unions who work together with management and the state instead of unions who look for confrontation by prioritising the interests of working people. In the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden this stance has led unions to be defanged which has enabled the slow and steady rollback since the 1980s of the welfare state. The authors recommendation to try to entice companies to take more social responsibility in the way they apply technology seems similarly misguided. This seems to ignore that the profit motive is an imperative in capitalism and that the way companies behave in a socially responsible way is that there is money to be made in that way. Having them move away from labour cost cutting voluntarily seems far fetched, although the suggestions they make in the conclusion to push companies towards this through subsidies and taxes are interesting. But in the end for a substantial transformation the economic system would have to change.
To bring it back to AI, the reason why AI is not benefitting workers is because worker power has been so curtailed since the 1980s that capital reigns supreme. That is why all new developments in this field from Western companies seems to favour donig away with workers instead of making workers jobs easier. Lets hope Deepseek and other Chinese companies take a different angle.
I will spare you a rant on how ridiculous it is to highlight digital surveillance by China, Russia and Iran whilenot even mentioning Israel. The authors highlight that “The US is not China” in relation to the revelations of the NSA spying on basically the whole world. It is true that there was a public reaction to the revelations but the result was not any accountability, unless you consider that whistleblowers being prosecuted and going into exile is a form of accountability. Acemoglu has not shed all his Western chauvinist ideological feathers. Nonetheless it’s an improvement over Why Nations Fail.

[Juan David Diez Cortés · Rating 5 out of 5]

Creo que es importante comenzar mencionando que lo que muchas personas dicen en otros comentarios es cierto, este libro pudo haber sido un poco más corto. Habiendo dicho eso, yo disfruté de la totalidad del libro tanto en el aspecto de aprendizaje como en la sencilla curiosidad por los ejemplos y casos de estudio presentados por los autores. Es un libre interesante, sí, toca temas políticos, económicos, sociales, entre otros, pero lo hace de una manera coherente, fácil de seguir y ejemplificando sus puntos de una muy buena manera. En cuanto al aprendizaje en es te libro, debo decir que soporta una tesis que yo ya tenía conmigo con anterioridad y un poco como una cámara de eco, cada capítulo me llevaba a confirmar más esa tesis. Debo mencionar que los autores terminan con una aproximación mucho más optimista que yo, y esto podría ser una decepción pero entiendo de donde vienen y por qué piensan que sí hay una salida a un futuro lleno de "progreso tecnológico" que represente solo sufrimiento para lo que llamamos "el ciudadano de a pie". Esa es un poco la reflexión cínica que me llevo del libro, cada capítulo ayudó a cimentar más la idea y me da más bagaje para discutir al respecto y para conversar con otros. También me deja una reflexión sobre la productividad, la organización social colectiva y la participación en política. Creo que es un libro que más personas deberían leer, o por lo menos aproximarse a sus ideas.