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Colonialism Devours Itself: The Waning of Françafrique
France is the only country that never decolonised its colonies, emotionally, financially or strategically. In the aftermath of losing the Second World War, notwithstanding de Gaulle's attempts to convince his people otherwise, the French knew the game was up. (The Resistance fighters were heroes; but heroes are lonely.) For France, after 1945, the Second World War blended into the early Cold War, which Paris jumped into the day before it began. It fought in Indochina, and lost again. The independence war dragged on in Algeria. Then France lost there, too--painfully, with millions of its ordinary citizens expelled to a homeland that many of them hardly knew.
But Sub-Saharan Africa was still there. France produced a postcolonial Françafrique, France's sphere of influence (or 'backyard') over its former West and Central African colonies. France loved Africa. Some Frenchmen died for Françafrique; others made millions from it.
The entire toxic edifice is now crumbling away. Young Africans are happy about this--but not so many of their parents, who often live in France. In his inimitable style, Gérard Prunier recounts a tragic transcultural saga, with one leg in the past and one in the the end of Françafrique.
But Sub-Saharan Africa was still there. France produced a postcolonial Françafrique, France's sphere of influence (or 'backyard') over its former West and Central African colonies. France loved Africa. Some Frenchmen died for Françafrique; others made millions from it.
The entire toxic edifice is now crumbling away. Young Africans are happy about this--but not so many of their parents, who often live in France. In his inimitable style, Gérard Prunier recounts a tragic transcultural saga, with one leg in the past and one in the the end of Françafrique.
365 pages, Hardcover
First published May 15, 2025
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October 22, 2025
For those familiar with Prunier, as any student of Francophone and Central Africa must surely be, they will know him above all for his two brilliant academic books on Rwanda and, above all, the Congo Wars. The latter in particular is a great tour de force and, despite being 17 years old, remains the best book on the matter by a long shot. The former, notwithstanding the incorrect position on Kagame (which he soon admitted), was written just after the genocide but remains among the best works on the historical background to the genocide-a very dense and high-quality field. There are more methodologically sophisticated works from Genocide Studies Scholars (see Straus’s 2005 book and, best of all, McDoom’s 2021 work), but they all have a level of deference to the context given in Prunier’s book.
Those hoping for a fourth (he also wrote about Somaliland) book along these lines will be disappointed. This is not a particularly academic work. Yes, it has a bibliography, but it’s not a piece of academic history, it’s not coherently structured as such, and it has no methodology or social-scientific approach.
It’s not really even a proper narrative history, either, though it has elements of that.
Rather, it’s almost a polemic. Reading it is like being in a conversation, and he writes in a colloquial and informal way. Written with a great deal of wit and scorn, it’s an emotive and frustrated conversation, almost a decades-long vent. It’s strange, and certainly not what I expected (nor, in truth, what I hoped for), but it’s not without charm. Prunier is a good writer, understands the topic well, and writes with a rightly sardonic humour and very much ‘French’ in spirit to my Angliche eyes.
There are some arguments beneath the un-academic style, though not all are convincing.
(A) Françafrique is not an institution or a system of governance, nor even a model of neo-colonialism. Rather, it is a social network that is partially nested in the state but reaches out into the economy and into both French and African elite society. It is more so a sort of geopolitical mafia gang, with all the personal drama, feuding, and sometimes even romance therein.
There is clearly some truth to this, and Françafrique wasn’t an actual department, sub-ministerial body, or proper organisation/institution. It was, indeed, a shadowy network beneath and within the states of France and French Africa, a two-way street of corruption, murder, profiteering, and power. I say ‘two-way’ for, while France was obviously the dominant power here, there were Africa-to-France interactions, such as when the Gabonese dictator Ali Bongo murdered dissidents in Paris using White French assassins, when he murdered his wife’s French lover, and, perhaps more importantly, when Bongo spent huge swathes of money influencing French domestic politics for his own geopolitical ends, something former French President Sarkozy has was sentenced for literally the day before I write this.
Also, the whole ‘anti Anglo Saxon’ angle is very interesting. I don’t know enough to comment on it (Prunier doesn’t really go into detail but does cite another book which I will read at some point). It’s rather one-sided, if true, for there is no feeling of rivalry with France here in the UK outside of sports.
I am unconvinced you can call it “not neo-colonial”, and I don’t think Prunier really explains his reasoning well here. Perhaps it was not a formal state endeavour, but it was close enough to one-every political leader knew of it, played a key and decisive role in it, and was the most important organising force within it. The intelligence services, though never fully under the thumb of elected politicians, are integrated into the state that its many contributions cannot be separated from formal state influence operations. Finally, as Prunier recognises, Françafrique was very much a military endeavour, and French hard power was constantly responsible for upholding friendly leaders.
So, what’s not neo-colonialist about this? Perhaps the question is why Françafrique actually exists, and, on this, I think Prunier is, again, partly wrong.
(B) Françafrique does not exist for the purpose of wealth extraction, nor purely for realpolitikal power, but out of something much more distinctly French. Sure, money mattered, but above all it was what Prunier calls “grandeur”. France has a particular identity, one which was shattered by a long list of defeats from 1870 through 1940, and then, more recently, in both Vietnam and Algeria. Here was the last part of the world a waning France could be glorious. Where it could matter again. The French colonies were not a peripheral addendum but were core to what France was and how it saw itself. “The very soul of the nation was at stake.” There is some temporal variance outlined by Prunier, but I won’t get into that here. Above all, however, it was the French way of recovering its wounded soul, recovering its historical place (“had the French not brought civilisation to Africa?”
There is clearly an evident of truth here, even if I disagree with it quite fundamentally. I am not going to dispute this or that about French identity, and I’m sure he is right that it’s important to them. Indeed, there are times when grandeur appeared to triumph over money. One example given was that the French giant Elf, having ‘dishonoured’ itself through a massive embezzling scandal, was forbidden from taking over Total and thus consolidating national oil capital into a monopoly. Indeed, state intervention made it so Total took over Elf! Total then had the duty of cleansing the image of French oil capital in Africa, even though it was the junior firm. So, too, did grandeur appear to triumph over monied interests in Rwanda-even more clearly. There was no real money to be made in Rwanda at that time, so why did France support (though not create) the genocidaire regime, and why then did it launch a very expensive, ineffectual, and fairly pointless “humanitarian” response, Operation Turquoise, towards the end of the genocide?
Some, including UNAMIR Commander Romeo Dallaire, have claimed the French did so to allow the genocidaire leaders to escape, but Prunier disagrees with this, noting that most of them had escaped anyway, and it made no sense to do such a large deployment for a discrete task like that anyway. This is fair enough. Rather, it was “to wash Mitterand’s bloody hands under a humanitarian tap.” To restore France’s grandeur and image in Africa.
These things being true don’t exclude a more traditional neo-colonial and extractive economic motivation, though, and it’s clear there was one throughout, as remains today in the loyalist parts of Françafrique clinging on. Prunier never denies this, and even demonstrates it clearly, so it’s very confusing to me why he then turns around and says money was not a primary motivating factor and that it wasn’t neo-colonial. You don’t think a British version of glory mattered in their imperial decisions? Go look at the first Anglo-Afghan War, when a fairly arbitrary and pointless-but massively expensive-punitive expedition was launched after the embarrassment of the first invasion for the sole purpose of destroying and avenging their fallen comrades. This was very expensive and won very little for the vast expense of the operation.
(C) Françafrique is dying a slow death that matches its inherent informality and lack of real formal existence. It will continue to do so, though there’ll be no Russafrique, for it lacks the capacity, and the lack of real new security partner will lead to greater instability and poor outcomes with regards to the Jihadists.
This is true, despite what Russophiles argue online. The Wagner operations, with the exception of the Central African Republic (where the armed opposition is meagre compared to the Sahelian Jihadists), have behaved worse than the French and have failed miserably in their job. The insurgencies in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali have gotten worse for, while France failed to defeat them, they at least kept a lid on the whole thing that has now thoroughly burst beyond its seams. The future is troubling.
While some pro-French African governments remain (e.g., Togo, Benin, Ivory Coast, Chad, Gabon (I feel Prunier may be overstating the rupture with the coup here), Guinea, etc), French power has declined to the point where their allies can freely shop around and pressure France into concessions, and France simply lacks the hard power to enforce its will alone anymore. Above all, the networks that defined Françafrique have withered away through mismanagement, scandal, and incompetence, something that continues through the arrogant but naïve, indecisive, and patronising President Macron.
PS: I don't like the equation of tribe and ethnic group. It feels Afro-orientalist.
Those hoping for a fourth (he also wrote about Somaliland) book along these lines will be disappointed. This is not a particularly academic work. Yes, it has a bibliography, but it’s not a piece of academic history, it’s not coherently structured as such, and it has no methodology or social-scientific approach.
It’s not really even a proper narrative history, either, though it has elements of that.
Rather, it’s almost a polemic. Reading it is like being in a conversation, and he writes in a colloquial and informal way. Written with a great deal of wit and scorn, it’s an emotive and frustrated conversation, almost a decades-long vent. It’s strange, and certainly not what I expected (nor, in truth, what I hoped for), but it’s not without charm. Prunier is a good writer, understands the topic well, and writes with a rightly sardonic humour and very much ‘French’ in spirit to my Angliche eyes.
There are some arguments beneath the un-academic style, though not all are convincing.
(A) Françafrique is not an institution or a system of governance, nor even a model of neo-colonialism. Rather, it is a social network that is partially nested in the state but reaches out into the economy and into both French and African elite society. It is more so a sort of geopolitical mafia gang, with all the personal drama, feuding, and sometimes even romance therein.
There is clearly some truth to this, and Françafrique wasn’t an actual department, sub-ministerial body, or proper organisation/institution. It was, indeed, a shadowy network beneath and within the states of France and French Africa, a two-way street of corruption, murder, profiteering, and power. I say ‘two-way’ for, while France was obviously the dominant power here, there were Africa-to-France interactions, such as when the Gabonese dictator Ali Bongo murdered dissidents in Paris using White French assassins, when he murdered his wife’s French lover, and, perhaps more importantly, when Bongo spent huge swathes of money influencing French domestic politics for his own geopolitical ends, something former French President Sarkozy has was sentenced for literally the day before I write this.
Also, the whole ‘anti Anglo Saxon’ angle is very interesting. I don’t know enough to comment on it (Prunier doesn’t really go into detail but does cite another book which I will read at some point). It’s rather one-sided, if true, for there is no feeling of rivalry with France here in the UK outside of sports.
I am unconvinced you can call it “not neo-colonial”, and I don’t think Prunier really explains his reasoning well here. Perhaps it was not a formal state endeavour, but it was close enough to one-every political leader knew of it, played a key and decisive role in it, and was the most important organising force within it. The intelligence services, though never fully under the thumb of elected politicians, are integrated into the state that its many contributions cannot be separated from formal state influence operations. Finally, as Prunier recognises, Françafrique was very much a military endeavour, and French hard power was constantly responsible for upholding friendly leaders.
So, what’s not neo-colonialist about this? Perhaps the question is why Françafrique actually exists, and, on this, I think Prunier is, again, partly wrong.
(B) Françafrique does not exist for the purpose of wealth extraction, nor purely for realpolitikal power, but out of something much more distinctly French. Sure, money mattered, but above all it was what Prunier calls “grandeur”. France has a particular identity, one which was shattered by a long list of defeats from 1870 through 1940, and then, more recently, in both Vietnam and Algeria. Here was the last part of the world a waning France could be glorious. Where it could matter again. The French colonies were not a peripheral addendum but were core to what France was and how it saw itself. “The very soul of the nation was at stake.” There is some temporal variance outlined by Prunier, but I won’t get into that here. Above all, however, it was the French way of recovering its wounded soul, recovering its historical place (“had the French not brought civilisation to Africa?”
There is clearly an evident of truth here, even if I disagree with it quite fundamentally. I am not going to dispute this or that about French identity, and I’m sure he is right that it’s important to them. Indeed, there are times when grandeur appeared to triumph over money. One example given was that the French giant Elf, having ‘dishonoured’ itself through a massive embezzling scandal, was forbidden from taking over Total and thus consolidating national oil capital into a monopoly. Indeed, state intervention made it so Total took over Elf! Total then had the duty of cleansing the image of French oil capital in Africa, even though it was the junior firm. So, too, did grandeur appear to triumph over monied interests in Rwanda-even more clearly. There was no real money to be made in Rwanda at that time, so why did France support (though not create) the genocidaire regime, and why then did it launch a very expensive, ineffectual, and fairly pointless “humanitarian” response, Operation Turquoise, towards the end of the genocide?
Some, including UNAMIR Commander Romeo Dallaire, have claimed the French did so to allow the genocidaire leaders to escape, but Prunier disagrees with this, noting that most of them had escaped anyway, and it made no sense to do such a large deployment for a discrete task like that anyway. This is fair enough. Rather, it was “to wash Mitterand’s bloody hands under a humanitarian tap.” To restore France’s grandeur and image in Africa.
These things being true don’t exclude a more traditional neo-colonial and extractive economic motivation, though, and it’s clear there was one throughout, as remains today in the loyalist parts of Françafrique clinging on. Prunier never denies this, and even demonstrates it clearly, so it’s very confusing to me why he then turns around and says money was not a primary motivating factor and that it wasn’t neo-colonial. You don’t think a British version of glory mattered in their imperial decisions? Go look at the first Anglo-Afghan War, when a fairly arbitrary and pointless-but massively expensive-punitive expedition was launched after the embarrassment of the first invasion for the sole purpose of destroying and avenging their fallen comrades. This was very expensive and won very little for the vast expense of the operation.
(C) Françafrique is dying a slow death that matches its inherent informality and lack of real formal existence. It will continue to do so, though there’ll be no Russafrique, for it lacks the capacity, and the lack of real new security partner will lead to greater instability and poor outcomes with regards to the Jihadists.
This is true, despite what Russophiles argue online. The Wagner operations, with the exception of the Central African Republic (where the armed opposition is meagre compared to the Sahelian Jihadists), have behaved worse than the French and have failed miserably in their job. The insurgencies in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali have gotten worse for, while France failed to defeat them, they at least kept a lid on the whole thing that has now thoroughly burst beyond its seams. The future is troubling.
While some pro-French African governments remain (e.g., Togo, Benin, Ivory Coast, Chad, Gabon (I feel Prunier may be overstating the rupture with the coup here), Guinea, etc), French power has declined to the point where their allies can freely shop around and pressure France into concessions, and France simply lacks the hard power to enforce its will alone anymore. Above all, the networks that defined Françafrique have withered away through mismanagement, scandal, and incompetence, something that continues through the arrogant but naïve, indecisive, and patronising President Macron.
PS: I don't like the equation of tribe and ethnic group. It feels Afro-orientalist.
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