The Struggle for Taiwan

by Sulmaan Wasif Khan

A gripping account of the past and future of Taiwan

'Deeply researched and fascinating' - The Guardian

In the overwhelming chaos across Asia at the end of the Second World War, one relatively minor issue was the future of the Japanese colony of Taiwan, a large island some one hundred miles off the coast of Fujian. Handed to the Kuomintang-ruled Republic of China, in 1949 it suddenly became the focus of global attention as a random cross-section of defeated Nationalists, including President Chiang Kai-shek, fled there from Mao's triumphant Communist forces.

The Struggle for Taiwan is a balanced and convincing account of the sequence of events that has left Taiwan for generations as a political anomaly, with issues around its status and future continuing to threaten war. With deepening democratization, Taiwan further goads Beijing, remaining functionally independent from China even as Xi Jinping clamours for unification.

This invaluable book allows readers to understand the complex story of this unique place and its role in international relations. With its striking economic dynamism and commitment to democracy, can Taiwan continue - as Hong Kong once did - to thrive, or will China conquer it? And will the world be able to maintain peace across the Taiwan Strait or will it stumble into war?

Genres: History, China, Politics, Asia, Nonfiction, Audiobook, War

336 pages, Hardcover

First published May 14, 2024

About the author

Sulmaan Wasif Khan is Assistant Professor of International History and Chinese Foreign Relations at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. He also directs the Water and Oceans program at the Center for International Environment and Resource Policy (CIERP). He received a Ph.D. in History from Yale University in 2012. He has written for The Economist, The American Interest, Prospect, e360, and YaleGlobal on topics ranging from Burmese Muslims in China to dolphin migration through the Bosphorus.

Reviews

[William Cooper · Rating 4 out of 5]

While Americans obsess over political trivially--like the latest spat between Marjorie Taylor Green and AOC on the House floor--huge challenges that impact all of humanity go ignored by millions. Near the top of the list: the struggle for Taiwan.

This shouldn't be followed closely only by professionals in national security and a few pundits. It should be watched intently by everyone. A great place to start: by reading this well-informed and thoroughly researched book. It's rooted in the history of the struggle and the current dynamics--and also looks to the future. An important addition to the subject.

[CatReader · Rating 4 out of 5]

Sulmaan Wasif Khan is an associate professor of International History and Chinese Foreign Relations at Tufts University. In The Struggle for Taiwan, he narrates the history of Taiwan dating back to World War II, and how it's been a chronic sticking point in US-China relations, intensifying in recent years as US-China relations have soured and tensions have escalated. I found this to be a quick and informative read, and generally well-researched (the caveat being that I listened to the audiobook and thus didn't see footnotes, which I presume are in the physical text).

As I've stated in prior reviews as a Westerner reading about China in this current political climate, it's important to read books from all sources to stay informed and derive opinions.

Further reading: China and US-China relations
The Impossible City: A Hong Kong Memoir by Karen Cheung
Waiting to Be Arrested at Night: A Uyghur Poet's Memoir of China's Genocide by Tahir Hamut Izgil
China's World View: Demystifying China to Prevent Global Conflict by David Daokui Li

My statistics:
Book 180 for 2024
Book 1783 cumulatively

[Audrey · Rating 4 out of 5]

For a quick down and dirty explanation of the shifting loyalties and tensions between China, Taiwan, and the United States, this can't be beat. It is written in such a way as to be completely accessible to the novice in foreign affairs while still maintaining a respect for the people standing on the knife blade of empire and politics. Thanks to Edelweiss and the publisher for the ARC.

[Graham · Rating 5 out of 5]

Just finished:

New York: Basic Books, 2024.

An eye-opening book as well that should be required reading for anyone interested in where World War 3 could happen (not that I want that). Khan argues that the United States has not had a clear policy in regards to China partially due to not clearly spelling it out as well as changes in administrations and the split between the executive and legislative branch. However, the PRC at one point was willing to give Taiwan up or even have two China's (a North and South China would be an interesting intellectual question). It was only with Chiang Kai-Shek's efforts to attack Communist China from the mainland. Finally Taiwan, the most dynamic player in this conflict. It started a dictatorship under Chiang, who did all he could to manipulate the United States and keep money flowing to the ROC. However, Taiwan ultimately became a democracy and has leaned towards the United States in order to keep that democracy.

Ultimately the author argues that it was not inevitable that we would be where we are and a war with China is not inevitable if cooler heads prevail.

[Cav · Rating 1 out of 5]

"In another time, Washington and Beijing would have been able to dial the tension down. But June 2023 belongs to a different age..."

The Struggle for Taiwan is a timely and important book, but the writing here bored me to tears...

Author Sulmaan Wasif Khan is Assistant Professor of International History and Chinese Foreign Relations at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. He also directs the Water and Oceans program at the Center for International Environment and Resource Policy (CIERP).

Sulmaan Wasif Khan:


As mentioned above; the geopolitical struggle for Taiwan is a pressing matter. Tensions between the United States and China over the small island have gradually been escalating since the Communists won the Chinese Civil War in 1949..

Unfortunately, the telling of this interesting history fell far short for me here. Broadly speaking - history books break into two distinct categories. Some find the most exciting and memorable episodes and characters, and unfold the story around a cohesive plot, ensuring the reader stays engaged. Others rattle off a virtual non-stop torrent of names, dates, and places. Over and over again. Rinse and repeat - until the reader becomes frustrated.

Sadly, this book was an example of the former, and not the latter. My reviews are always very heavily weighted towards how readable I find the book, and sadly that will see this one penalized fairly harshly...

The author drops this quote, outlining the aim of the book:

"This book, therefore, seeks to provide a comprehensive account of that relationship over the last eight decades. The story begins in 1943, when the Cairo Declaration first held forth the idea that Taiwan would be part of a Chinese state; it ends with the elections in a democratic, practically independent Taiwan in 2024. I could not have attempted such a survey without the excellent work that others have done on various aspects of those relations, though I have also benefited from primary sources from all three sides.7 There are, to be sure, inevitable gaps in the record. But there is enough material around to guide us along the paths that brought the three countries to their present moment—and thereby, perhaps, to show where they might go in the future..."

******************

Although the book presents a factual telling of this important topic, the writing here was way too long-winded and tedious for my picky tastes. I put the book down midway, which is something I rarely do.
I would not recommend it.
1 star.

[Murtaza · Rating 4 out of 5]

As good a history for Taiwan as you’ll get.

[Jay Perrone · Rating 5 out of 5]

I don't read a lot of nonfiction, but I'm glad I picked this one up. The history between the three nations is long, (and while Taiwan hasn't officially declared itself independent from the People's Republic of China, it functionally is) and things have most definitely reached the "edge of chaos" the author mentions in the book. I can only hope that the people in power make the right choices to keep from all out war because the consequences would be dire. The book was really informative and I'm really glad I have this understanding now.

[Thomas H. · Rating 3 out of 5]

Sulmaan Wasif Khan writes that a key purpose of this book is to stimulate curiosity - and in this he is successful. As a stand alone book, however, it suffers from a number of weaknesses.

One main argument of the book is that events have not unfolded inevitably but rather were contingent on factors that could have gone either way at the time - the choices made by political actors 'were the result of confusion, panic, stubbornness, and a stunning inability to think through long-term consequences'. 'If FDR had insisted on self-determination for Taiwan after the war, if the ROC police had been gentler on February 27, if the Korean War had not happened, if Beijing had made "one country, two systems" work the way it was meant to, if Taiwan had developed a nuclear weapon, if Nancy Pelosi's plane had indeed been shot at' - if any of these events had happened differently, and they could have, the author argues, then history could have worked out differently. Taiwan could have become part of China on many occasions that were missed, he argues, and he is certainly correct about this. Nothing was inevitable. A few examples notwithstanding, he argues this convincingly and I really like this aspect of the book - it serves as a useful reminder of how no political leaders act within the frameworks of rationality commentators often expect them too, and for PRC-Taiwan relations especially, that 'when deterrence, toughness, and pride drive policy, the room for error diminishes to virtually nil'.

The other main argument of the book is that for one reason or another genuine opportunities for a unification have been missed and Taiwan has now developed its own separate identity. Being Taiwanese has become something different than being Chinese, and this has been made possible by Taiwan's history on the periphery of empires (and never an integral part of them). This argument is fine on a political level, and also on the level of how people think about their identity - but it struggles with some of the history. What I mean by this is that because the author argues that Taiwanese identity is distinct, he sees the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-Shek and his son Chiang Ching-Kuo as effectively the same or worse than that of the PRC. Indeed, while they are alive, the author seems to argue, Taiwan's unification with China wouldn't have been something particularly worth defending - because it wasn't a democracy. Now, however, it is a democracy, it has values, and it is worth defending. This again is a fine conclusion.

The problem is that, narratively speaking, the author can't wait for the Chiang dynasty (which he really dislikes) to die, so that he can make his argument about how Taiwan has fundamentally changed since then, that it has become different and now more deserving of support. But the history itself is clearly more complicated - the son, Chiang Ching-Kuo, is constantly referenced as a Machiavellian, cruel defender of autocracy throughout the book, until a confusing few pages in which he begins to open up the political system and allow more freedom of expression - why? Was that just because of Taiwanese civil society? I would have liked more on this. What were the economics of this opening? What were the similarities between Deng and Chiang Ching-Kuo in their economic approach? Because it clearly matters that Taiwan had an economic boom in these years. The enigma of his leadership remains unresolved.

Similarly, as the author argues that Taiwan has discovered its own democratic identity in comparison to its repressive past under the Chiang's, so China under Xi Jinping is particularly malevolent in comparison to its past - one of the strangest consequences of the narrative is that Mao, Deng, Hu Jintao, and Jiang Zemin, all come across relatively well, the author grants them all opportunities for moderation in their relations and tries to understand their actions, but Xi Jinping, it seems, is particularly aggressive in his nationalism in a way that previous Chinese leaders were not. Is this really the case? Is this not just a consequence of writing in the present - would not everything said about Xi now have also been said about previous Chinese leaders during their time in power? Is this not just because we have more documents that explain the motives for previous leaders? And yet the author wants us to see a fundamental change in Xi's leadership that contrasts with Taiwanese society's own fundamental change. I'm convinced by Taiwan's changes but I'm not convinced that Xi's leadership marks a total break with the previous history of CCP leadership.

But the biggest problem is how surprisingly few pages there are covering the political leaders that follow - Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian especially -and the developments in Taiwan's society since the 1970s. I'd like to know more information so that I can understand why the author seems to like Tsai Ing-wen so much, but not particularly much the other Presidents. What about the backgrounds of political figures and more about their biographies? What about Taiwan's cultural outreach and its incredible film industry, for example? What about the importance of the capital, the development of other cities, the introduction of a shinkansen railway network, the effect of the loss of recognition, how the media report on yet another country unrecognising Taiwan etc.? Why did the Taiwan's People Party emerge? Isn't the emergence of a three-party political system good news, so why didn't the author make this part of his argument that Taiwan's an effective democracy (arguably more so than the US!)? Although the book is an introduction to the subject, this part was quite weak. It barely scratches the surface. I do understand why the author doesn't answer these questions however - a reviewer below nonsensically gave the book one star and calls it 'long-winded and tedious'. When your audience has the attention span of a fruit fly, it is difficult to inject details that may distract from your narrative. But, still, the fruit flies aren't happy anyway, so better to write for elephants!

In his acknowledgments Sulmaan Wasif Khan writes how 'at several points, I had to consult those better informed than I. Chen Jian, Sergey Radchenko, and Mary Sarotte continued to provide invaluable information on sources'. It's a shame he did not attempt to inject some of these author's detailed approaches into his last few chapters, but I do respect his modesty and humbleness towards his subject. Considering his narrative that the Chiang's prevented everything beautiful in Taiwan from emerging, it's interesting that in suggestions for further reading, he mentions both the Jay Taylor and Alexander Pantsov biographies of Chiang, which are far more nuanced on the dictator! I generally agree with many of the author's points and his approach and perspective, but sometimes he leans towards platitudes, generalisations, and wish fulfilment. I'm fine with all of that, but I would like more details too, and they are sorely lacking after a certain point. I think readers of this book would have liked to leave with more knowledge of Taiwan.

I'm excited to read 'The Taiwan Story' by Kerry Brown next and see if it can answer some of these questions. Perhaps they will have different strengths and therefore be a good reading pair for each other.

[William The Avid Reader · Rating 3 out of 5]

An enlightening international relations history of Taiwan on the years 1943-2024. The book starts with the Cairo conference in 1943 when it was decided that Taiwan would be handed to the leader of China, Chiang Kai-Shek, up to today with the Biden administration's hardening stance on Taiwan. The book also includes Deng's "One China, Two Systems" idea and the democratization that Taiwan experienced in the 1990s. My main criticisms with this book is that Khan is hypercritical of Chiang and not critical enough of Mao, underappreciating the impact of Chiang's modernization policy from the 1960s onwards that was happening while Mainland China was experiencing one of its darkest chapters in history. Khan is also hypercritical of the US policy to Taiwan, which at times is fair and at times underappreciates the kind of stability it has brought to the region, often attributing the de-escalation of potential wars between the US and China to "luck". It is a worthwhile read that should be taken with a grain of salt.

[Connor Cashman · Rating 3 out of 5]

A very interesting topic but I found the author condescending and lacking insight outside of the facts.

[John Reid · Rating 3 out of 5]

Didn't grab me the way I hoped for. It's mostly just dry politics. I think I wanted the lens of the Taiwanese experience most often told. Fair enough, I know about Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT but tell me more about Taiwanese dreams, lives, hopes and fears. A good scholarly book but lacking feeling to me.

[Brian Thorson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Useful read to understand the seemingly ever shifting yet never clear (sometimes by intention) “official” relationship between the U.S., the PRC, and the ROC.

[Jennifer · Rating 4 out of 5]

Idaho Talkington Family Book Club Summer 25.

[Karen · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very nuanced perspective the complex relationship between US, China and Taiwan.

[Rafeeq O. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Sulmaan Wasif Khan's 2024 The Struggle for Taiwan: A History of America, China, and the Island Caught Between examines the relationship of Taiwan with competing great powers, not just in the present era or even during the Cold War, but beginning mainly in 1943, along with some deeper backstory as well.

After a 2-page map of the Pacific Ocean, the book gives a 10-page Introduction that includes a full-page map of Taiwan and another that extends to coastal China and also the northern part of the Philippines. Here we are told that the text "seeks to provide a comprehensive account of" the United States, the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of China "over the last eight decades":

"The story begins in 1943, when the Cairo Declaration first held forth the idea that Taiwan would be part of the Chinese state; it ends with the elections in a democratic, practically independent Taiwan in 2024." (2024 Basic Books hardcover, page 8)

As we will see, however, Khan here and there actually gives us the useful contours of even older history as well. In any event, as he suggests, "A full understanding of the triangular relationship" indeed is required "if we are to avoid catastrophe" (page 8).

The actual chapters themselves are "1. The Making of the Taiwan Problem: 1943 to 1953," "2. Choosing Between two Tyrannies: 1953 to 1971," "3. Toward Another Crisis: 1971 to 1996," "4. The Hardening Line: 1996 to 2020," and "5. After Covid." The Epilogue wraps everything up not only with summary but also with different scenarios for moving forward, along with the reminder that just as "[c]ataclysm was not inevitable" on the eve of the First World War in 1914, "it is not inevitable now" (page 261). The Suggestions for Further Reading are useful, too.

Sometimes, early on as we read, it almost might appear that the author seems to be privileging the viewpoint of Communist China, which of course for quite some time has been adamant that Taiwan is part of the PRC...despite never having controlled it. Such a perception of potential slant, though, will be shown to be mistaken as we progress through the book. The discussion proves itself to be wide-ranging, and it examines each perspective with objectivity.

On the one hand, the 1943 Cairo Conference with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Josef Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek determined that "[t]he three great Allies...fighting this war" would require "that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores,...be restored to the Republic of China" (page 12). On the other hand, Khan tells us that Mao Zedong "[a]t least in the 1930s (like many Chinese) seems to have thought of Taiwan as something apart from China proper," such that "[e]xcluding Taiwan from the state the [Chinese Communist Party] ruled...was not a stretch--particularly when one considered that the CCP was, when all was said and done, a land-based gang of peasants" (page 49).

In addition, Khan explains that Taiwan--despite the postwar plans of the Cairo Conference--actually had not even belonged to China for more than 40 years before the Second World War. The Qing Empire had not conquered Taiwan until 1683, when it was "populated mostly by aboriginals of Austronesian descent," with the ruling Qing, who were "Manchus who had come pouring down from Manchuria"--"which also had not been part of China" until then (page 13)--being "wary of letting Han Chinese migrate to Taiwan" and perhaps "have a chance at plotting a rebellion" (page 15). Taiwan thus belonged to China and yet wasn't heavily populated by Chinese, and after the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, China was "forced...to cede Taiwan to Japan in perpetuity" (page 16). This has zero effect on how Communist China sees Taiwan today, of course, but it is an interesting piece of context that could have affected the early split between the two.

Yet although perhaps right after the Second World War "Mao might have been content with two Chinas" if Chiang had agreed to the truce with the Communists in the civil war that U.S. General George Marshall "was pleading...for" (pages 49-50), the Generalissimo "remained unprepared to countenance anything other than the complete destruction of the CCP" (page 50). Thus when Chiang, still with a sizeable military, along with American recognition and backing--since he was, after all, leader of the Chinese government the United States had supported throughout the Second World War--retreated across the Taiwan Strait, Mao for political reasons "refus[ed] to let a reviled foe hold territory so close" and for strategic reasons needed "to deny an enemy a base from which the PRC could be attacked" (page 50).

The book takes us from this early separation, through the Quemoy and Matsu Crisis of 1955 that could have gone nuclear (page 88), to the death of Chiang Kai-shek's son and the rise of a vigorous democracy in the former dictatorship, U.S. uncertainty about how to improve relations with the formerly ignored PRC after President Nixon's opening of relations, the push and pull of the American One China policy formalized then by the Shanghai Communique of 1972 (pages 106-107), the "kneejerk assertiveness to China's policy" under Xi Jinping that "undermined his hopes for reaching a peaceful understanding with Taiwan" (page 167), and right up to the time of writing in 2024.

The text discusses the 1972 U.S. Shanghai "acknowledge[ment] that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China," with America "not challeng[ing] that position" (page 107), with some care. While both U.S. and Chinese negotiators "evinced an understanding that Taiwan would, after a face-saving pause, return to China" (page 108), allowing this so-called return--since Taiwan actually had never belonged to the Communists--by "terminat[ing]the defense agreement with the ROC and switch[ing] recognition" would have been very difficult to to "political backlash." Khan tells us that "Nixon's visit to China was Washington's best chance to return [sic] the island to PRC control"...though he admits that "[i]n fairness, it was not a great chance, but it was as good as it was going to get" (page 113).

"[N]ot a great chance" seems rather an understatement to me, by the way. That is, it was hard enough to recognize a Communist dictatorship that the U.S. government had been calling illegitimate for over 20 years--as Nixon described to Henry Kissinger, "It's not going to be hunky-dory; it's going to be tough titties" (page 117)--but how could a President sell the American public on abandoning our dictator, whom we had been supporting for 30 years, and whom we of course never publicly termed a dictator?

Moreover, although, as Nixon said, "we've gone to China, we've shaken hands" (page 117), to me it seems difficult actually to have embraced the PRC. Aside from the virulent anti-Americanism mouthed during the Cultural Revolution, let's face it--this is a very, very different place than the West, even now, with the PRC being an unctuously smiling police state while Taiwan has become a true democracy. Freedom of speech, such that you can criticize leaders' actions and call for a different course? Freedom of religion, such that the government will not insist that your sermons also teach x,y,z or require that your mosques be redone so that the architecture looks Chinese rather than Arab? Sorry--you're in the wrong country.

Would Taiwan, especially after becoming a true democracy from the 1970s onward, truly want to be unified into this communist state? There was a time, after the British handover of Hong Kong in 1997, that "the 'one country, two systems,' model" seemed like it might be able to work for Taiwan, too...until "Xi Jinping...show[ed] that the promise of two systems was easily reneged on" (page 119). The author rather takes his own sweet time getting to these fundamentals of the PRC, but eventually he characterizes the "bristling, insecure assertiveness" of Xi's rule from 2012 onward in unflinching terms:

"In China proper, those whose views differed from Xi's--and not just dissidents but party members, businesspeople, and academics--found themselves bullied into silence or incarcerated. Tibet and Xinjiang were transformed into gulags. And Hong Kong, that erstwhile poster child for 'one country, two systems,' found its autonomy dismantled completely. Far from the universal suffrage it had once aimed for, Hong Kong found Beijing seeking to pick candidates for the position of chief executive on its behalf. Pro-democracy protests broke out... The protestors were jailed." (page 187)

As Khan puts it, "Xi's China was becoming an advertisement for everything Taiwan did not want to become" (page 187).

Now, there are a few things here that struck an off note for me. The mischaracterization of General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War going farther than Truman's desire "simply...to beat the North Korean forces back across the thirty-eighth parallel" (page 61), is a surprising whopper that suggests the author has not read William Manchester's American Caesar, which quoted the orders specifically giving MacArthur the authority to push northward for full unification of Korea. There were one or two gratuitous, too-cute digs at Trump, too, along with an obvious glitch about the "old Vulcan proverb" that "Only Nixon could go to China" being from "Spock on Star Trek" (page 105), meaning the television show of the 1960s, rather than being from one of the later films. Somewhere, though I have lost the page, there also occurred a misspelling of the homophone variety that was very noticeable.

Still, despite a few fairly minor annoyances, Sulmaan Wasif Khan's The Struggle for Taiwan: A History of America, China, and the Island Caught Between is a very eye-opening and useful exploration of tangled, sometimes-contradictory issues that--although the author concludes, perhaps over-hopefully, that "[c]ataclysm" "is not inevitable now"--evoke "real parallels to 1914" and its lurch toward the First World War (page 261).

[James Rooney · Rating 5 out of 5]

As a self-declared islomane and an enthusiast of seapower, I thought I ought to know more about Taiwan and about the geopolitical realities underpinning the relationships between Taiwan, China, and the United States.

I had hoped that this book would involve a lot more technical aspects about how Taiwan would defend herself or how the US would help defend her, in terms of ships and aircraft, but there is almost nothing about this in the book.

This book focuses almost exclusively on the diplomatic aspects of the question with considerable focus also on the domestic politics of Taiwan.

There have been multiple crises centered on Taiwan and on China's incessant claims to the island, which have resulted in some tension between China and the United States.

One aspect of this book that I did not like was that the author would present new policies of, say, successive American presidents, as if they were any kind of deviation from prior policy.

For example he criticizes Eisenhower for having a confused and contradictory policy on Taiwan. Then says 'from here on out' that was the case, when he had made it clear that this was the exact same situation under Truman.

Neither of them knew what their policy on Taiwan and China should be, and so it was to remain with their successors. The famous policy of 'strategic ambiguity.'

We are subjected to repetitive information like this, but also like how China refuses to accept Taiwan's independence, that China does not like Taiwan displaying any kind of initiative ('China made it clear that there was a price for this' is a line I read about fifteen times).

Nonetheless, this book was solid and informative concerning the triangle of politics between the three countries.

First off, the KMT was a brutal dictatorship and it was insightful to learn that Taiwan was certainly not destined to become a democracy. This was willfully and impressively brought about by the decisions of Taiwan's leadership to sacrifice their own power. Khan is right that there are lessons American politicians can learn from this.

Other insights include the mass immigration to Taiwan from China following Mao's victory in the civil war. This was exacerbated by the repatriation of nearly three-hundred thousand Japanese from the island after WWII.

Khan is critical of Roosevelt in engaging in horse-trading like a European diplomat of the eighteenth century, arbitrarily assigning Taiwan to Chiang without consulting the island's people or considering any other alternatives.

An interesting fact in this regard is that the Republic of China, as Taiwan officially calls herself, is something of a foreign imposition and not a genuine expression of Taiwanese self-determination. It is fascinating to learn that Kennan at one point suggested that the US expel the KMT from Taiwan and allow the island to become a true Taiwanese nation-state, as opposed to just pretending to represent all China.

That is, instead of calling herself China and regarding herself as 'the good China' or 'the free China' in the same vein as how the Austrians declared themselves to be 'the good Germans' in the interwar period, Taiwan could create her own national identity distinct from China. Austria could again show the way here.

I was interested to learn that Taiwan waged a guerrilla against the Japanese in the 1890s, and again revolted against the KMT in the postwar era. I had known, of course, that Taiwan was historically not Han Chinese at all, despite the proximity to China, until very recently.

The Portuguese, Dutch, and Spanish vied for control of the island, which was inhabited by Austronesian people and has even been proposed as the original homeland of the Austronesian and Polynesian cultures, until the seventeenth century when the Qing took over the island.

Even then the island was slow in becoming Sinicized because the Qing were reluctant to allow Chinese immigration, similar to how they discouraged it in Manchuria and elsewhere in the non-Han imperial periphery.

Having read a decent amount about the Korean War and the MacArthur-Truman controversy, it was still a revelation to learn that if not for Korea, Taiwan might have fallen to Mao.

The decision to challenge China in Korea led logically to the decision to defend Taiwan, and it is informative to learn that Chiang had learned how to exploit the US to his own ends by drumming up anti-communist fervor.

Truman, of course, was not prepared to go as far as MacArthur had wanted. But it's incredible that after MacArthur's dismissal Eisenhower circled back to his proposals. Ike in 1955 considered using nukes on China.

MacArthur's ideas seem less insane in this light. Though it still would probably have been a very poor idea.

Khan seems to have a certain respect for Nixon and Kissinger, and regards Nixon as the decisive moment in Taiwan's history. He says Nixon alone might have abandoned Taiwan and weathered the political storm in Washington, but his resignation ended any hopes of this coming about.

Taiwan had some strategic utility for the United States during the Vietnam War, as a staging area for troops en route to Southeast Asia, and I would like to delve into this a little more. It is only mentioned in passing here.

Khan does us a service to shed light on domestic politics in China too, explaining that Mao was a pragmatist who might have let Taiwan go her own way it not for his obsession with destroying Chiang. At some point Mao lost focus of his original plans and replaced his obsession with hunting Chiang to the ends of the earth to just insisting on having Taiwan.

More rational PRC leaders might have achieved union with Taiwan had they been genuine in their policy of allowing for autonomy to Hong Kong, Tibet, Macau, etc. But Xi enforced conformity on these regions and reduced them to the same rule as in the rest of China.

I did not know that the Chinese had rose in revolt against the shutdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic, or that the Chinese Government caved to their demands. What a development!

The pandemic was also crucial in rehabilitating Taiwan in the eyes of the international community, for it demonstrated that Taiwan was a more trustworthy and effective player than the PRC.

You can tell Khan has a great deal of respect for Tsai Ing-Wen, who indeed comes off as a great statesman, or stateswoman rather. The leaders of comparatively weak states are always very impressive because they're working with a bad hand, but when they play it well it redounds to their credit all the more.

The Far East is mostly out of my wheelhouse. The vastness of the Pacific is the navalist's paradise and the American Lake established after WWII is of great relevance to the history of seapower and of the United States Navy.

But the politics and history of China and Taiwan are mostly unknown to me, so I learned a great deal about both. It is a shame there isn't enough time to study everything one would like, but this was a nice change of pace from my normal reading.

[Pei-jean Lu · Rating 5 out of 5]

As a Taiwanese, I’m well versed in Taiwan’s history and so I have a certain level of expectation when I do read a book on Taiwan. Thus far all books I’ve read fall very short of truly explaining in depth the challenges that Taiwan faces as a country without any formal recognition on the world stage. This is the book I have been waiting for and one that doesn’t over simplify the events that lead to Taiwan’s current standing in the world.

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was so good. And terrifying at the end. I had no idea how dangerous things have gotten.

Khan winds the clock back all the way to the Manchus and the Qing dynasty, and this is necessary for a nuanced understanding of how the island of Formosa was lately part of that empire, like Tibet and Mongolia. This empire fell apart with the Xinhai Revolution in 1912, and then blah blah, a lot of Chinese goings-on that Khan capsulizes but I didn’t retain, and now Chiang Kai-shek is leader of the Republic of China (ROC).

Taiwan was part of China in the same way that, say, Gibraltar is part of Britain. Or Algeria was part of France.

Then Japan invades Manchuria. Chiang was lukewarm about mounting resistance, and this posture contributed to the rise of the CCP. The factionalism and conflict with China make for a situation defying brief synthesis. With the entry of the US into WWII, FDR and everyone assumed it would be very important to eventually launch offensive operations against Japan from China. So Chiang was an ally. Japan had taken Manchuria and Formosa as well as Korea et al. There was a conference in Cairo to establish agreement between the allies, and there was an understanding that Chinese territories, including Formosa, would be returned to the ROC after the war.

After WWII, now we have Chiang sitting on Formosa figuring he will soon take back mainland China, and we have Mao and the CCP figuring on a final conquest of Formosa. Of course we have US troops on Formosa and we had that Cairo conference, and we also don’t like Communists.
The one summing-up idea that Khan emphasizes is how none of what happened then and since was inevitable. If FDR hadn’t died. If some US administration had found the political courage to talk nicely to Mao, we could have had a two-state solution. Mao was very pragmatic about that; the main thing was not to be threatened by a US-armed entity.

Truman didn’t have that kind of political courage, and anyway, at that time it was far from clear that the CCP could or would hold on to the mainland. Let’s wait and see.

Now Eisenhower is in charge, and the great strategist finds himself talking seriously about using atomic bombs to help Chiang defend two islands that no one has ever heard of, but which are just off the Chinese mainland and which Chiang had had fortified, and so now… what’s the US interest here, again? Why can’t we just cut Chiang loose? He’s a brutal dictator towards his own people anyway, not like we can’t make up some stuff about internal Chinese affairs and self-determinism. Oh. Communism.

And then Dean Acheson give a speech where he defines America’s defensive perimeter as starting at the Aleutians and running down Japan, Taiwan, … he doesn’t say “we won’t do anything if the Communists take over Korea,” but that’s what they heard, and now we have the Korean War, and we REALLY don’t have the option of making nice with the DPRC.

Chiang was still alive and scheming to take back the mainland when Nixon went to China. It was a perfect situation for Nixon, who delighted in being duplicitous. Chiang had gotten so good at manipulating the US government that he really didn’t see this coming. Now Nixon had a real opportunity to settle the Taiwan thing. Remember, at this time, Taiwan was still a dictatorship under Chiang. Some arrangement of amnesty for Chiang and his Nationalist government, or even then some kind of protectorate would have still been possible… but none of that happened.

Chiang dies, and in an amazing series of events, Taiwan actually becomes democratic. Now we are really stuck. Someone in every US administration seems to commit some gaffe where it sounds like we’re calling for regime change… damn it, we’re just trying to be nice to both sides without pissing either of you off. But since you mention it, fuck you too.

Deng Xiaoping, fortunately, was always pragmatic and valued the American relationship too much to go to war over this.

Now we have Xi, and he has adopted a posture of aggrieved nationalism and has made a side project about whipping up in his citizens a patriotic fervor about Taiwan.

Then Nancy Pelosi goes to Taipei. I don’t remember that, but apparently, it could literally have started WWIII. Literally one little thing could have gone wrong… Thanks for that, Nancy.

I just loved the book – it gives you historic perspective with just the right level of detail, mainly dealing with post-WWII Taiwan history from a U.S. perspective (this time, there really isn’t much else that matters, since the US posture towards Taiwan defines whether it exists or not). Written with great clarity.

[Zulu Fox · Rating 4 out of 5]

“From the very first, then, ‘Free China’ was founded on a base of authoritarianism and terror.”

“Mao’s mental map of China had, until around this point, been shifting at the edges. He came of age in a China broken; he was by no means adamant on how far the territorial extent of his China should go. Had Taiwan been denied to the KMT and moved from trusteeship to eventual independence, it is perfectly possible that the CCP would have abandoned all thoughts of taking it. Mao did not start out thinking that the vast peripheral regions the Qing had conquered had to be part of his China.”

“Chiang was using Taiwan as a base from which to wage naval war against the CCP. For the Communists, as for the Qing Empire before them, the problem was not Taiwan itself but the hostile enemy that held it.”

3.5 stars, rounded up.

This is a pretty great introduction to the modern history of Taiwan. It’s extremely accessible, well-written, and thoughtfully argued.

The earlier sections on the end of WW2, the Cairo Conference and the Chinese Civil War are definitely the strongest, both because thats where the current status quo was born and because that period is obviously Khan’s wheelhouse.

Another aspect of Khan’s approach that I really liked was his focus on counterfactuals: i.e. how things could have been different. One obvious one which I was pleased to see Khan include was US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s famous 1950 speech on US security guarantees in East Asia (the defensive perimeter which omitted Taiwan and Korea) That speech seems to have been the thing that convinced Stalin to give Kim Il-Sung the green light to invade the South, which drew PRC troops north and away from their intended 1951 invasion of Taiwan.

One point I had been unaware of which I found fascinating was George Kennan’s (author of the famous “Long Telegram” which essentially set us policy towards the USSR post WW2) 1949 proposal to evict the KMT from Taiwan and make it a US trusteeship as a means of denying it to the Communists. I don’t know how I was unaware of this but it’s pretty mind-boggling in its implications.

Further to this point, while the whole were-the-Qing-really-Chinese arguments are, in my view, cute (which is to say: disingenuous and made in bad faith; could the last Emperor even speak Manchu? What did Sun Yat-sen have to say about the Manchus after the Qing Dynasty fell? Hint: he no longer suggested they were foreigners), I did appreciate very much the point that the CCP might have reached some kind of understanding with an indigenous, US-back government on Taiwan so long as the KMT wasn’t there. Khan’s point that the CCP could have accepted a divided China in 1945 or 1946 is also well-taken.

While a few of Khan’s other counterfactuals struck me as unserious (and his quibbling over FDR promising Taiwan to Chiang Kai-shek struck me as weird, why WOULDNT he? It was WW2 and Chiang was an ally), in general I quite appreciated his point on how not-inevitable certain outcomes were, and how contingent they were on the choices of particular human beings.

One other strength of the book was to situate Mao’s apparent belligerence towards Taiwan during the first and second Strait crises within PRC domestic politics and the Sino-Soviet split. These bits were more thoughtful and informative than the accounts I often come across in books aimed at a general readership.

Finally, the shout-out to Jimmy Carter for his role in normalizing relations with the PRC was well-taken, it’s a major achievement not widely credited to the man outside of specialist circles.

Regarding some more vexing points: it felt like the later portions of the book were phoned-in. No serious treatment of Chiang Ching-kuo is provided, nor Lee Teng-hui how democratization really happened for that matter. Some of the bits on missed opportunities for unification or independence are pretty unserious as well.

In general though, despite a few flaws, for a general readership - especially for uninformed government officials and policy-makers who brief on China/Taiwan but have never read an entire book on either - this book is probably better, more nuanced and more thoughtful than anything else they’re likely to come across.

[Mehrdad Alemzadeh · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ming dynasty was dethroned by Qing in 1600s. This was a group of people in Manturia who took over China and later Taiwan and central Asia.
Qing went after Taiwan to mainly manage the European presence as well as Ming devoted pirates.
During the mid 1800s, with the British success of the Opium War and the Treaty of Nanjing (freedom over Chinese law for the foreigners), other countries including the US, Russia, Germany and French followed suit.
With Japan’s attack in 1894, Qing lost Taiwan.
The early 20th century was all about domestic challengers to the Qing such as the Boxers, Sun Yat-sen and Yuan Shikai. Therefore, China started to loose territories such as Mongolia to Russia, Tibet as an independent entity.
During the WWI Rosevelt was trying to annex/exploit China for a war against Japan. Chian Kaishek expected the US to help restore a lot of territories under China/Qing. While the generals on the ground (born and raised in China) counsoled FDR about lack of stamina in Kaishek to fight against Japan, the US agreed to Taiwan becoming a part of China in Cairo (there are records to prove that the US has deliberately kept these discussions unavoidable).
American support of Chiang (who had fled to Taiwan) and Mao leaning towards the Soviets, had put FDR in a situation of losing territories to the communists (therefore the cold wars). The US was divided in terms of taking Taiwan or let it fall in the hands of CCP. They finally decided that because they don’t have the public support for a takeover and that they can rely on the UN in case of future hostilities, therefore, they should strengthen their positions in the Philippines and Japan and focus on trade continuum with China.
In 1950 North Korea got the Soviet green light to invade the south, now that they all had Mao’s blessing. Washington poured in through a UN lead coalition (US kept China out of the UN till 71) to prevent further losses to the Communist.
McArthur’s fight against communism came at the cost of getting China involved in the Korean war (AKA Sino-American War) because he tried to further militarize Taiwan. And China, not only got him sacked but won the war for North Korea to show immense power and a retaliation for hosting Chiang. The war dragged for so long since the US and China couldn’t agree for the US to de-base from Taiwan. This is in spite of Japan de-claiming it through San Francisco conference.
Post Covid pandemic, Sino-American relationships took another twist in regard to Taiwan. Taiwan had correctly warned against the virus spread in 2019, and due to China’s influence over WHO, this information was suppressed. Also during the pandemic, Taiwan had successfully managed to control it by implementing the correct social and international isolations, but that information was also blocked from the rest if the world by China. Trump’s tariff politics wouldn’t work and therefore Biden came in. In a different situation he would had wanted a smoother relationship with China but ended up toughening up even more than all his predecessors but clearly claiming that Taiwan is not part of China and sending Pompeo and Pelosi there for strengthening his political ambitions.
One issue for Taiwan to lean towards the US was the expectation for buying more ractopamine-pork which is forbidden almost everywhere due to its health concerns.
We shall see soon if the US can eventually block China from the Pacific Ocean and its corridors of Taiwan or not.

[Henry · Rating 4 out of 5]

There are many ways to write about Taiwan. One can speculate loudly about the future, deliver dramatic predictions about war, or simply declare the island strategically indispensable and call it a day. Thankfully, The Struggle for Taiwan by Sulmaan Wasif Khan takes the far more useful approach of explaining how the world gradually arrived at that conclusion.

Khan’s book succeeds because it treats the story of Taiwan as a historical process rather than a modern slogan. Before Taiwan became the focal point of Indo Pacific strategic anxiety, it was an island known historically as Formosa whose ownership and significance were not always treated with today’s level of urgency. Khan wisely begins by examining the island’s status and competing claims prior to the Second World War. This early context is essential because the later political arguments surrounding Taiwan did not emerge from thin air. They grew out of earlier imperial arrangements and shifting political realities.

One of the book’s greatest strengths is its examination of how perspectives evolved among both American officials and the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The United States did not initially view Taiwan as the central pillar of regional stability that it is often described as today. In fact, Washington’s early thinking about Taiwan contained a surprising amount of uncertainty and occasional indifference. Khan carefully traces how that outlook changed as Cold War pressures intensified and policymakers gradually concluded that the island mattered rather a lot.

The book is equally effective in describing the evolving position of the Chinese Communist Party. Rather than presenting Beijing’s position as a timeless doctrine, Khan shows how Communist leadership views regarding Taiwan developed over time, shaped by ideology, strategic opportunity, and the realities of governing a newly established state. The result is a more nuanced portrait of policy formation than the simplified narratives often heard in modern political debates.

Khan also demonstrates how much uncertainty surrounded these decisions. Policymakers in Washington and Beijing were often working with incomplete information while attempting to balance ideology, strategy, and political pressure. The Taiwan issue, as the book makes clear, was never the tidy geopolitical equation that hindsight might suggest.

Despite the depth of research, The Struggle for Taiwan remains accessible to a broad audience. Khan manages to present complex diplomatic history without burying readers under academic jargon. Instead, he offers a clear narrative showing how competing claims, evolving political priorities, and great power rivalry gradually transformed Taiwan into one of the most strategically discussed islands on Earth.

In short, the book reminds us that today’s geopolitical certainties were once debated, uncertain, and occasionally improvised by officials who were still figuring things out. For readers seeking historical clarity rather than contemporary shouting, that alone makes the book well worth reading.

[Randall Harrison · Rating 3 out of 5]

A good history lesson, or refresh for those with knowledge of the subject. Well-researched, but concisely reported analyses of R.O.C./US relations from 49 to present - economically, politically, and militarily, and changes in those issues over time.

Funny (tragic?) how much the Wolf Warriors in the PRC's foreign ministry seem to have turned the heat up on the issue and hardened US resistance to perceived Chinese bullying over Taiwan in response, exactly opposite of what the warriors expected strategically from their efforts.

As an American, I have an issue with laws that restrict the democratically-elected leader of Taiwan from simply traveling in and out of our country freely, wholly at the PRC's insistence. We sell the country billions in military hardware, but kowtow to the PRC with respect to how we interact with them otherwise, e.g., interest sections instead of embassies, etc.

I get it, I know about the Shanghai Communique and all that. Times have changed, time for a reboot of our policies wrt this unique nation. The concern for ROC's sovereignty has only heightened after we see how the PRC reneged on treaty commitments toward Hong Kong after the turnover. With Xi in charge, what's past is prologue. Taiwan and the US have strong vested interest in remaining friendly. What say you Professor Khan about the nature and direction of that relationship?

Khan is a historian by trade, providing much more description than prescription, or even some prediction. He cops to this in the Epilogue yet I wanted a bit more historical analysis from a guy at Fletcher. Why is the author hedging his bets and not telling us what his education, knowledge and research is telling him where this is most likely to go? Put differently, I found the Epilogue some disappointingly thin gruel.

Good book, but think it better as a Foreign Affairs, New Yorker, or Atlantic-type long read. Regardless, it would be worthwhile for a lot of Americans to read this book, but it's not likely many will.

Taiwan is a certain incubator for an unanticipated spark to a military conflict between PRC and USA. More people in the US should be reading this book, if only to get a better understanding of the issue. Informed citizens can do a better job communicating to our elected officials how we feel about the issue. There could come a time in the very near future when it will be a determinative campaign issue in Senate and Presidential elections.

Read it, liked it. Just left me wanting more definitive response to basic questions I had before reading. Where does he think this is most likely to go? Maybe he'll answer those in his next volume.

[Vinod Peris · Rating 4 out of 5]

I work with a lot of engineers from Taiwan and have always been curious about what the fuss about Taiwan and Mainland China is all about. This book seemed like it would be a good place to get some answers. The first thing that caught my attention was the name of the author. Sulmaan Wasif Khan was born and raised in Karachi, Pakistan. He is a Professor of History at Tufts University and to the best of my knowledge did not grow up or live in Taiwan. However, from reading the book, it is clear that he has an extensive and deep knowledge of both the history and culture that has shaped present day Taiwan. In this book, he explores the intricate relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan, highlighting how historical events have shaped this dynamic. It discusses America’s fluctuating commitment to Taiwan's defense, China’s resentment over Taiwan's separation, and Taiwan's evolution into a thriving democracy.

Khan traces Taiwan's history from its time as a Japanese colony to its post-World War II status under the Kuomintang (KMT) after their retreat from mainland China in 1949. This period set the stage for Taiwan's contentious political status. The book details how the U.S. initially supported Taiwan as a bulwark against communism, backing the authoritarian regime of Chiang Kai-shek. However, shifts in U.S. foreign policy, particularly during the Nixon administration, complicated Taiwan's international standing.

In 1987, Chiang lifted martial law, which had been in place since 1949. This pivotal decision allowed for greater political freedoms and set the stage for opposition parties like the Deomcratic Progressive Party (DPP) to emerge. The DPP mobilized public support for democratic reforms and played a critical role in advocating for elections and civil rights.

Chiang Kai Shek was succeeded by his son Chiang Ching-kuo, who did in 1988. Following that, Lee Teng-hui became Taiwan’s first native-born president. Under Lee's leadership, Taiwan held its first direct presidential election in 1996, marking a significant milestone in its democratic journey.

Since then, Taiwan has become increasingly democratic and consistently held free and fair elections, allowing for peaceful transition of power. Taiwan has faced increasing pressure from China, which seeks to undermine its democratic processes through intimidation and influence operations. Despite these challenges, Taiwan's commitment to democracy has remained steadfast, as evidenced by public backlash against perceived threats from Beijing.

[Beejai Richardson · Rating 4 out of 5]

At the time of my writing this, two days ago, five Chinese spies were caught and arrested in the Philippines. Three days ago Philippines President Marcos promised he would return the Typhoon (an American SMRF missile system) to the US if China backed off its aggression in the Western Philippine islands. The day before that, Chinese warships prevented the Philippine coast guard from rescuing some Philippine fishermen. Not long before that, they prevented a Philippine scientific research team from landing and conducting on a different Philippine island.

I am certain that if you, the reader, were to do a quick Google research of just two words: "Philippines" and "China" an abundance of new similar articles would appear. China is not a fair player on the global stage. Its actions with regard to its neighbors are not all that different from Japan a century ago or Austria in the Balkans around the dawn of the twentieth century. To put it in a more modern perspective, I demonstrated to my students how China's current actions against the PH is eerily similar to the scenario of Russia towards Ukraine from about 2010 to 2015... and we all know how that has played out. China is simply a banana republic style dictatorship with the economic, political, and military clout to pretend at legitimacy. As true as this is for places like the Philippines, Japan, or even Australia, it is ten times more true for the Republic of China, more commonly known as Taiwan.

The PRC (mainland China) has never given up pretensions of owning this island and to this day will refuse to negotiate with any country that recognizes Taiwan's independence. See again the economic, political, and military clout comment above and you can imagine how well that bodes for the island nation. What is more, any time anyone does anything that might offend the PRC, they retaliate by invading Taiwanese waters, launching missiles over or near the island, and calling it "military drills." As you can imagine, of late this is a nearly daily occurrence.

Despite this handicap, this little democratic island nation has thrived. It has earned much goodwill recently for being a model for the rest of the world on how to effectively combat COVID (or, as Trump calls it, "the China virus"). The Struggle for Taiwan by Sulmaan Wasif Khan charts the historical course of how this has come to be. He demonstrates how this was by no means a foregone conclusion and its much likelier fate should have parallelled that of Hong Kong. He doesn't take sides in equally criticizing or praising China, the US, or the Chiangs (Kai-shek and his son Ching-kuo). Khan demonstrates how, as with most history, we have arrived where we are at by a rambling combination of missteps and blind luck. For Taiwan to remain free of the PRC's despotic grip, we need even more blind luck in the days to come.

[Joey · Rating 4 out of 5]

In "The Struggle for Taiwan" Wasif Khan seems primarily interested in establishing that decisionmakers in the United States, China, and Taiwan are free to choose the way forward through the tangle of this geopolitical love/hate triangle. This seems like a slightly sophomoric conclusion, but Wasif Khan explains well why it's actually a critical distinction. Viewed in hindsight, the way that key moments in this three-way relationship (the Cairo conference, the Korean War, the Nixon/Kissinger detente with China in the 1970s, the 1996 cross-strait crisis, etc) played out seems inevitable, like the flow of history is really quite outside decisionmakers' control. This, of course, is not so. Had leaders made different choices at these junctures, or had any numbers of factors broke differently, Taiwan could today be an independent nation, a province under the PRC, an illiberal police state, a player within the international community, etc. Taiwan's existence today as a democratic success story on the knife's edge of serious conflict with mainland China was never preordained. This seems to be one of Wasif Khan's central theses.

"The Struggle for Taiwan" is well-written and well-paced. A healthy share of the book seems to be devoted to the period spanning the end of WWII through the US detente with China in the 1970s. But I didn't feel that Wasif Khan gave short shrift to more contemporary developments either. I think that my only beef with this volume is that Wasif Khan seems to repeatedly contradict himself in one key way. He correctly notes that the conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan has been characterized through the decades by reliance on deterrence, chest-beating, posturing, toxic nationalism, and reluctance to try to understand the restrictions, mindset, history, and vital interests of the other side(s, as we should include Taiwan here too). Yet when he lays out the possibilities for the future of the three-way relationship, Wasif Khan seems to assume that it's possible for any of these three powers to turn on a dime and stop behaving like they have for 80 years. Sure, it's possible, strictly speaking. But reality seems much more likely to be more of the same. Changes to the landscape of the conflict must come slowly, gradually, and within the framework of the reality that the past has gifted to the present. It didn't seem like Wasif Khan grasped that.

[Chad Manske · Rating 4 out of 5]

Sulmaan Wasif Khan’s “The Struggle for Taiwan: A History of America, China, and the Island Caught Between” offers a nuanced exploration of Taiwan’s complex historical and geopolitical trajectory. Khan adeptly traces Taiwan’s evolution from a Japanese colony to a Cold War flashpoint and its current status as a de facto independent democracy under constant pressure from Beijing. The book excels in unpacking the policy missteps, ideological clashes, and strategic indecision by both the U.S. and China that have perpetuated Taiwan’s precarious position. Khan’s narrative is most compelling in its analysis of missed opportunities, such as the potential for a U.N. trusteeship or Formosan separatism during the mid-20th century. These alternatives, though feasible, were sidelined by Washington’s commitment to Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, leading to “strategic drift” that constrained U.S. options. His detailed recounting of Cold War dynamics highlights how anti-communism shaped U.S.-Taiwan relations while avoiding oversimplification of either side’s motives. However, the book is not without flaws. Some claims, such as linking Taiwan’s independence movement directly to the 1947 228 Incident, are critiqued as oversimplified or misleading. Despite these missteps, Khan’s balanced approach and rigorous research provide valuable insights into Taiwan’s unique role in global politics. The book’s strength lies in its ability to connect historical decisions with contemporary challenges, offering a sobering reminder of how past choices shape present dilemmas. Khan concludes with a poignant call for future decisions on Taiwan to be informed by history’s lessons and unrealized possibilities—a timely message as tensions in the Taiwan Strait escalate. This work is essential reading for those seeking a deeper understanding of Taiwan’s past and its implications for the future.

[Thomas Ray · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Struggle for Taiwan, Sulmaan Wasif Khan (M.A. 2005, Ph.D. 2012), 2024, 321 pages, Dewey 951.249, ISBN 9781541605046

History of U.S.-People's Republic of China-Taiwan relations, 1943-2024 (with backstory back to the 1600s). p. 8.

The author's writings have appeared in /The Economist/, /Foreign Affairs/, and /Foreign Policy/. So we know he's coming from the all-for-the-billionaires camp. But both Taiwan and Xi Jinping's People's Republic of China are in the same camp (as is every U.S. administration). This book gives a relatively evenhanded account, duly criticizing all three governments.

For an establishment pundit, Khan is quite alive to the fact that war with China would be Bad.

ERRATA

Accepts the 1943 Cairo Declaration at face value, "The U.S., UK and Republic of China are fighting to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves." p. 12. No admission that FDR /forced/ Japan to war, by blockading fuel, so that U.S. corporations, not Japan, could take the natural wealth of Indonesia. Pearl Harbor gave FDR the excuse he was waiting for to go to war. But to this author, FDR was not imperialist. pp. 24, 27.

Uses "Democrat" to mean "Democratic," as in "Democrat officials." pp. 1, 128.

AT THE EDGE OF THE ABYSS

U.S., PRC, and ROC choices have come from confusion, panic, stubbornness, and a stunning inability to think through long-term consequences. p. 247.

The normalization of force to answer complex problems may lead to catastrophe. p. 260.

Nuclear holocaust is only one of several futures we might bring into being. p. 251, 256.

Taking Taiwan could infect Chinese people with Taiwanese ideas of democracy. p. 254

An empire is overstretched when its commitments outstrip its resources, and its economy is cannibalized by military spending. p. 255. Taiwan can't be defended cheaply. p. 258.

Security is in neighbors' goodwill. p. 255.

HISTORY

1943 FDR agrees that Taiwan will be part of China. p. 27.

1945 Chiang's troops and officials looted Taiwan. p. 34.

1946.02.22 George Kennan's "long telegram" presages knee-jerk anticommunism as U.S. policy. p. 34. Being soft on Communism would be the death blow to a political career. p. 53.

1946 Chiang resumes civil war against Mao. p. 36.

1947 It was surprising how often American officials would recognize irremediable incompetence in a leader and still recommend military support. As General Wedemeyer did, supporting the brutal, kleptocratic Nationalist rule in Taiwan. pp. 36-42.

1948 Chiang gave himself temporary powers, suspending the Republic of China's constitution. These powers would stay until 1991. p. 48.

1949 Communism thrived where there was oppression. The only way to keep Formosa out of Communist hands would have been to eject the brutal Kuomintang government. --George Kennan. This would've meant evicting the 300,000 KMT soldiers on the island. pp. 42-45, 48, 55, 66.

1949.10.01 Mao's Communists declared the foundation of the People's Republic of China. p. 48.

1950.01.12 Secretary of State Dean Acheson tells the National Press Club that the U.S. is not committed to defending Korea or Taiwan. pp. 57-58.

1950.02 Senator Joseph McCarthy gains political power by slandering officials as Communist. Anticommunism is now the predominant force in U.S. politics. No U.S. politician can henceforth afford to be soft on Communism or soft on China. pp. 53, 71, 105.

1950.06.25 North Korean dictator Kim Il-Sung attacked South Korea. Suddenly the U.S. decided that Korea was a vital interest. p. 59. General MacArthur disobeyed Truman and pursued the North Korean army not just to 38°N, but beyond, leading China into the Korean War. p. 61.

1950.07 Truman sent the U.S. Navy to the Taiwan Strait, to prevent the PRC and ROC from attacking each other. pp. 60, 71. Truman wrongly believed that doing so did not constitute interference in the Chinese civil war, which he had said he would not do. Mao learned not to trust the U.S. p. 63.

1964 China develops an atomic bomb. p. 97.

1971.10 The People's Republic of China finally gains its seat in the United Nations. p. 60, 113.

1975. Chiang Kai-shek died. Senator Barry Goldwater made sure the Senate kept backing the ROC. p. 126-127.

1976.09 Mao died. China will turn capitalist in all but name, under Deng Xiaoping p. 118.

1979.01.01 U.S. & People's Republic of China normalize relations. BUT Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, saying the U.S. won't tolerate PRC invasion of Taiwan: the U.S. /would/ interfere in Chinese internal affairs. pp. 92, 118, 131-134.

1988 Chiang Ching-kuo died. The Chiang-dynasty police state will end. p. 149.

1989 Tiananmen square massacre. pp. 136,

1995 Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui donated generously to U.S. congresspeople's campaign funds. He was then given a visa to give a speech in the U.S. p. 157.

2002 Taiwan joins World Trade Organization. p. 137.

2007 Costa Rica terminated diplomatic relations with the ROC, after Taiwan's rapacious fishing in Costa Rican waters. Costa Rica sold fishing rights instead to the PRC. p. 182

2008.07 Tourists may now fly across the strait. p. 179.

2012 Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. p. 167. He rules as an authoritarian, brooking no criticism. p. 187.

2017.01 Donald Trump became president of the United States. p. 167. Trump normalized the idea of a China threat that required getting tough. p. 196. With broad bipartisan support. p. 207.

2019.12.30 Wuhan doctors warn of the Covid danger. Hospital management tells them to shut up. p. 209. The People's Republic of China and the World Health Organization withhold facts about the danger. Millions died. The world shut down. p. 211. The resulting downturn would hamper Trump's bid for reelection. p. 213.

2022.02 President Biden says the U.S. will protect Taiwan. p. 216. The U.S. supports Taiwan in order to antagonize China. p. 220. American pundits lead cheers for war, including nuclear war, with China. p. 240. Jingoism and confusion guide the foreign policies of both the U.S. and PRC. 2024 presidential candidates vied to be "toughest-on-China." p. 241.

2022 U.S. officials, including speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, visited Taiwan, angering China and spurring it to new levels of aggression, including 1,600 PRC incursions per year into ROC airspace. p. 260.

2023 Taiwan builds and launches its first submarine. p. 199.

2024.05 This book published.


SEE ALSO
https://www.goodreads.com/review/list...

[Daniel Gusev · Rating 5 out of 5]

Greatly enjoyable, well-paced, academic enough to be highly regarded, well written to be generally accessible.

Evokes stories by James Barr on the origins of the Arab-Israeli grievances: rooted in history, entrenched in moral convictions and nationalistic fervour, turned around by accidental manoeuvring in a maze of internal politicking.

Sulmaan Khan is a masterful author and an extremely well qualified expert on the matters of China.

A short digest follows:

A territory that once belonged to a long gone empire of Qing - that modern autocratic regimes love to resurrect as they stretch the newfound or accumulated resources - one witness Communist China fighting together with indigenous population against usurpers of Japan during WW2 and then Chiang Kai Shek government.

It is the suppression of nationalist tendencies that in the 1980 provide a relative period of detente as China opens up under Deng and the bygone era of Taiwan being seen as an aircraft carrier during Korean War is relegated to history - to re-emerge as a porcupine to demonstrate resolve to “punish China” during the current era of “strong powers”.

Numerous misinterpretations and sidestepping of realism - that Kissinger and then Brzezinski professed - narrate the current dangerous time: where common sense is abjectly missing. Absurdity evokes numerous juxtapositions - where proclaimed goals contradict themselves (one China policy yet proceed with actions that dismantle the policy), are full of holes (claim territory as something eternal where other territories were in the past amicably negotiated).

Politics never changes.

[Christine LaBatt · Rating 3 out of 5]

3.5/5 ⭐️
A look into Chinese and American relations as the issue of who controlled Taiwan was being decided.

What I liked:
- Well-researched
- Covered a wide span of time to really try to get at the issue

What I didn't like:
- The chapter organization! It was way too long of a time period in one chapter. The first chapter was almost 60 pages long. In NF books, I think more medium sized chapters (not too short, not too long) are important because they allow the reader to have a good stopping point and to digest the information just presented. Just so much happened in each chapter and I kept thinking why didn't this break here.
- I would say this is more about Chinese-American diplomacy issues that uses Taiwan as the mechanism for this. I wish there had been more analysis of how the people in Taiwan today feel.

I received my copy from Netgalley in exchange for an honest review.

[Fer Tostado · Rating 4 out of 5]

Taiwan stands as a compelling case study in Cold War geopolitics—a strategic proxy in the broader struggle to contain communist expansion in East Asia. This island nation has been profoundly shaped by American influence and support, transforming from a relatively modest economy into the technological and economic powerhouse we see today. Without sustained U.S. backing, Taiwan's remarkable development trajectory would likely have been impossible.
The question that looms large is whether we are approaching a pivotal moment when China will move beyond rhetoric to action in pursuing its "One Country, Two Systems" vision. Will Beijing finally commit to forcibly reunifying Taiwan with the mainland? The answer may ultimately depend less on Chinese resolve than on American willingness to permit such an outcome.