Politicians are opportunists, cynics clamouring after power for power's sake. The people are disillusioned, many pathologically distrustful. Some seem browbeaten by the hopelessness of it all, others manifest a learned indifference to a domain that seems to have long since eschewed any representative function. For many, the object of blame seems clear. The culprit is late-90s Third Way politics, its rhetorical strategies of triangulation, bringing power to the people by granting to markets what was once the role of government.
Yet Mair is not content laying the blame at the feet of a particular political dead-end. The question he poses is wider. How did we reach the state of affairs where such a political culture has become not only viable but for many the sole imaginable form of political organization? On the one hand, Third Way rhetoric was backed up by an array of specialist literature, in particular the growing field of democracy studies which flourished after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Nonetheless, Mair's text resists the urge to read all this as some kind of nefarious plot emanating from the academy. In democracy studies, he instead finds an attempt by political scientists to redefine democracy in such a way that it can more easily account for, cope with, and adapt to a climate wherein popular interest and engagement with politics are in apparently terminal decline.
One particular success of this emerging field was its firm establishment of a distinction between constitutional democracy for the people, and popular democracy by the people. Broadly speaking, the texts Mair summarises tend to privilege the former over the latter, de-emphasising electoral accountability in favour of formally de-politicized decision-making bodies – so-called 'non-majoritarian institutions' such as the EU, WTO, and the IMF. This intellectual tendency certainly granted legitimacy to the ongoing process of 'depoliticization' associated with the Third Way. Nevertheless, it did not create the climate in which such a distinction was deemed necessary. What, then, is the origin of the increasing alienation of the electorate?
Mair argues that it is the consequence of the decline of the political party as a mode of organization. He follows American political scientist Elmer Eric Schattschneider, for whom democracy was unthinkable without parties. Schattschneider posited that the survival of democracy guarantees the survival of parties, and vice versa. But surely this just defers the question, leading us to now ask why political parties are failing. Nonetheless, the political party is a concrete form of social organization, while democracy in the abstract is, as we have seen, imprecise and malleable. Focussing our attention on the party indicates the possibility of a stance from which we can gain a more empirically grounded insight into the sociological trends that inform the weakening of democratic accountability.
To begin with, Mair explores the relationship between a political party and its social constituency. The mass party emerged as enfranchisement became more widespread, and was set the task of representing electoral constituencies which were strongly homogeneous, organized, and partisan. However, it was the party form itself which facilitated their stabilization into collective political identities. Particular social institutions led to the formation of social collectivities which gradually developed into the closed social communities out of which the political community emerged. The impetus for this latter shift was impelled by the party institution, which, uniquely, stands 'at once representative and governor' (71), guaranteeing through its formal structure both representation –government by the people – and procedural legitimacy – government for the people.
In contemporary times, we find that the social base of these constituencies has contracted as a result of socio-economic and socio-cultural developments over the last thirty years. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, followed by the oil-price crisis, led to widespread deregulation and privatization. Thus began the tendency of delegating 'decision-making authority' regarding economic matters to 'ostensibly non-partisan bodies', adopting 'binding rules [...] which deny discretion to the government of the day' (50). No longer wielding meaningful control over a domestic economic environment enmeshed in a world economic system, governments quietly slipped into a new role as gatekeepers of the party-neutral management of the economy for production and distribution.
Yet political parties were not passive in this. To the contrary, this trend was accelerated by a loss of will on their part to resist the erosion of governmental control over domestic policy. With economic distribution no longer constituting the focus of policy, the left-right axis became increasingly bereft of the interpretive power it once had. Faced with a traditional constituency losing the foundation of its political identity, parties responded by attempting to broaden their appeal, thereby shedding the wider network of social groupings upon which they used to depend: trade unions, churches, business associations, and so on. Parties increasingly understood themselves to be self-sufficient, unrestricted by duties towards their membership or affiliates. The aforementioned economic shifts were further reinforced by the zeal of political parties to abandon the traditional space they occupied within wider society, through which the political articulation of a community would become manifest, and where political education would take place. Without such support, managerial politics and the global economic system were ascribed a mystifying complexity in the popular imaginary, allowing them to break free from the realm of popular understanding and hence scrutiny. Over the last thirty years, the representative functions of political parties have tended to fade into insignificance, while their procedural functions – the exigencies of governing – have been pushed to the forefront. Parties today are no longer the primarily social actors they used to be, having instead relocated to the heart of state power.
Mair defines effective party government as follows. A party or parties win control of the executive through competitive elections. It is by and through parties that political leaders are recruited. Parties offer voters clear alternatives in policy. Such policy is determined by the party or parties in the executive. Parties hold the executive accountable (60). What has changed? Parties still, generally speaking, win control of the executive through competitive elections. However, the leader is linked to the electorate in a more direct way, rather than mediated by the organisational structures of political parties. Accordingly, he or she is more likely to draw resources from external public institutions than from those of the party. Constrained by multinational institutions and uncertain over the constitution of its social base, the party itself proves increasingly unwilling to offer partisan policy alternatives. Differences between parties are levelled, resulting in 'an opposition of form rather than of content' (62). For Mair, this eventually culminates in the emergence of a new party organisation – the cartel party, an interpenetration of party and state. Technocratic fixes become the goal of politics, while inter-party competition focuses on the effective management of the polity and the provision of spectacle.
All of this provides context for Mair's closing discussion of the European Union, among the most eminent of the emerging political structures formed around a constitutional, procedural form of democracy. Despite providing various channels for electoral input, the EU is structured in such a way as to privilege institutional pluralism and reasoned decision-making over elections. The rationale states that its organs must be shielded from an excess of electorally-mandated input, which may threaten their working efficiency. In practice, the EU functions as 'a protected sphere in which policy making can evade the constraints imposed by representative democracy' (85). Yet the predominance of such a powerful institution has a further corrosive effect on domestic politics. Mair describes how the labyrinthine structures of the EU provide a medium through which domestic politicians can defer decision-making, avoiding contention in order to secure the broadest possible support amongst the electorate, gradually hollowing out the sphere of domestic party politics through which policy was once shaped with the goal of future implementation. In the meantime, acting in the name of an indeterminate demos yet secured against popular accountability, the EU is structurally alienated from conditions on the ground, turgidly bureaucratic and resistant to reform.
Could the EU be democratised? For Mair, the democratic deficit is an absolutely fundamental feature of the union. It has developed as it has in response to a crisis of democracy that preceded it, and therefore if the EU could be democratised, it would surely be unnecessary. Mair's unexpected death in 2011 means that it is impossible to know what he would have made of developments since this time. He notes in passing that resistance to 'Europeanization' in the United Kingdom has some sway over domestic politics, while on the continent such pockets of resistance are more typically confined to the fringes of European institutions themselves, where they have the least possibility of resulting in any fundamental change. However, the rise of various forms of anti-European populism across the continent seems to indicate that this is no longer the case. Some have written of the chilling nature of Mair's text for the ostensible reason that the increasing voiding of our politics seems to a large extent an unstoppable, self-perpetuating process. Yet the growth of these populisms may signal an unexpected new development. Ideologically heterogeneous, they may indicate the gradual re-emergence of an agonistic political space, but nonetheless find themselves pitted against deeply entrenched discursive orthodoxies, with the economic orthodoxy of the EU constituting one emblematic example. Whether this will result in a more favourable state of affairs remains to be seen, but Mair's text provides an invaluable tool to account for the historical trajectory that has led to the present moment.