Putin's Revenge: Why Russia Invaded Ukraine

by Lucian Kim

In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a bloody escalation of a conflict that had begun eight years earlier. What drove Vladimir Putin to launch Europe’s largest land war since World War II?

Lucian Kim—an on-the-ground reporter in the region for decades—offers a gripping, definitive account of Russia’s path to war, from Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2014 Maidan uprising right up to the full-scale invasion. He examines the Kremlin’s motives, tracing Putin’s transformation from a seemingly pragmatic leader into an embittered tyrant who saw it as his historical mission to reconquer Ukraine. Kim places the war in the broader context of the Soviet Union’s collapse, arguing that it represents a clash between those who reject the Soviet past—like Volodymyr Zelensky and Alexei Navalny—and those who still identify with it. He debunks the Kremlin narrative that the West instigated the conflict, and he instead identifies the root causes of the war in the legacy of Russian imperialism and Putin’s dictatorial rule. At the same time, Kim is critical of the West’s empty promises to Ukraine, which made the country vulnerable to a revanchist Russia.

Putin’s Revenge features insight from Kim’s first-hand reporting on key moments, such as Russia’s occupation of Crimea and the beginning of the Russian-backed insurgency in eastern Ukraine. This book tells the long history of the lead-up to the invasion with revelatory detail and fresh analysis, shedding new light on a conflict that has roiled the post–Cold War order.

Genres: History, Russia, War, Nonfiction, Politics, Ukraine, 21st Century

344 pages, Hardcover

First published November 26, 2024

Reviews

[Darya Silman · Rating 5 out of 5]

(Personal note: I lost several friends, some very dear to me, on social media in February 2022: I didn't believe reports about the deliberate, aggressive building up of Russian forces on the border. I couldn't comprehend the fact that Russia openly attacked Ukraine, and I wanted the 'military special operation' to be over, one way or another. I changed my mind after reading more and more about the war.)

(Personal note #2. Russian satirist Mikhail Zadornov said: When I am abroad, I miss my Motherland, when I return - I am terrified by the country.')

I saw one reviewer on GR say that an above-average book on Ukraine does not include the words 'fascists,' 'nazis' and other emotionally charged insults. The bar is pretty low, in my opinion, yet it demonstrates how hard it is to remain neutral when social media and news reports, in English and Russian, boil with hatred. I guess, I got spoiled by history books on WW2: the dead are dead, causes and consequences are organized in the correct order, and the righteous and wrongdoers are determined.

If you want the type of objectivity I seek, PUTIN'S REVENGE: WHY RUSSIA INVADED UKRAINE would be your perfect guide. Following the familiar path of other Western authors (I cringe at such generalization - Western - yet let it be), Lucian Kim opens an abscess of Putin's duality; the representative of the generation that saw the Soviet Union's collapse firsthand. Being simultaneously envious of the West vs. proud to be Russian. Desperately wanting to be accepted as an equal in the superpower league vs. seeing Russia's path as unique. Wanting to charm vs. wanting to rule by force. Etc., etc., etc.

What makes PUTIN'S REVENGE stand out is the author's attention to detail. Does it matter who ordered the shooting of protesters during the Euromaidan? Does it matter how Yanukovych wandered around Eastern Ukraine and Crimea before he escaped to Russia? Does it matter what mistakes Mikheil Saakashvili made to create a pretext for the Russian invasion of Georgia? Small details matter as they pile up to reveal something hidden. As Lucian Kim postulates, one of the reasons Ukraine wasn't prepared for a full-scale Russian invasion - apart from corruption, Zelensky's narrow choices, and his inexperience in politics - is the reliance on American promises of assistance, dating back to the belligerent foreign policy of George W. Bush. On television these promises looked magnanimous; on paper, they were as much vague as politicians could master. Even while briefing Ukrainians on the imminence of the Russian attack, even while evacuating the embassy's staff from Kyiv, Americans offered Zelensky only words about friendship, not arms or an increase in funding. Small details, remember?

I predict such an author's position would anger adherents of both the Russian and Western sides. If the author's thoroughness isn't enough, this point alone is enough for reading PUTIN'S REVENGE.

I received an advance review copy from Netgalley, and I am leaving this review voluntarily.

[Dmitry · Rating 2 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

По сути, эта книга является пересказом нескольких ключевых событий – Майдан, события в Крыму и военные действия на Донбассе 2014 года, антиправительственные митинги и демонстрации в России, а также взлёт политика Алексея Навального и его противостояние с Путиным. Заканчивается всё это темой нынешнего военного конфликта начавшегося в 2022 году. Что же мы в итоге имеем? НАТО, цветные революции, свергающие диктаторов и подбирающиеся всё ближе к России, появления харизматичного политика Алексея Навального, который бросает вызов верховной российской власти впервые за всё ельцинско-путинское правление. Очевидно, что из книги получается, что вся эта карусель, которая началась в 2014 году была не ради того чтобы не пустить Украину в НАТО (которую ни тогда ни сейчас не планировали принимать и скорее всего никогда и не примут, именно из-за опасения войны с Россией). Всё это было организовано Путиным с одной целью - торпедировать цветную революцию в самой России, не дать ей состояться. Добавим к этому тот факт, что рейтинг Путина до 2014 года неуклонно снижался, а появление Медведева давало надежду на то, что страна начнёт наконец-то развиваться. Не зря возвращение Путина было воспринято даже людьми из элиты как негативный сценарий для России и чуть ли не предательство того что обещал Дмитрий Медведев, когда заявлял: "Мы должны сконцентрироваться на своеобразных четырех "и" - институтах, инфраструктуре, инновациях, инвестициях".

Да, есть мнение, что противостояние с Украиной вызвано в первую очередь именно боязнью цветных революций, а не приближением НАТО. Я с такой точкой зрения согласен больше, чем с версией "расширение НАТО на восток" как главной причиной начала военных действий. Тем не менее, моя точка зрения остаётся неизменной, хотя и включает и эту версию. Я считаю, что и Украина и Грузия и Крым есть результат большой и кровавой PR акции по созданию внешнего врага (политика, которую начал Ельцин, кстати) с целью сплочения, как народа, так и элит вокруг нынешнего режима. В дополнении к этому авторитаризм стал набирать силы, стала навязываться политика милитаризации и поиска "пятой колонны" и самое главное, это был ответ на вопрос, почему Путин и дальше должен править Россией. Да, моя версия никак не противоречит версии, что всё это было реализовано из-за страха перед "цветными революциями". Ведь возникает такой вопрос: зачем портить отношения с грузинским и украинским народом, если можно сделать всё как в Таджикистане и как это по факту произошло сегодня в России, т.е. ликвидировать любую оппозицию как явление? Определенно, что такие санкции, какие сегодня введены не стали бы вводить, если бы Путин ограничился только ликвидацией какой-либо оппозиции или вообще провозгласил бы себя пожизненным диктатором. Это ведь проще, нежели вторгнуться в чужую страну, положить огромное количество своих же солдат и фактически уничтожить всю современную технику и всё вооружение (а потом просить оружие у Северной Кореи). Так что нет, всё это идёт от времён Бориса Ельцина, который ради того чтобы спасти свой рейтинг вернулся к старому советскому нарративу про «враждебный Запад», который испокон веков вредит России (только сейчас понял, что это точь в точь о чём говорят украинские националисты, только уже в отношении Украины, которую якобы Россия испокон веков желала уничтожить). Однако вернёмся к книге.

Да, книга написана довольно объективно, хотя назвать книгу полностью объективной я не могу по двум причинам. Автор ничего не говорит о начале напряжённости в российско-украинской политике, которую начал претворять в жизнь Ющенко, которой активно накачивали украинский народ украинские же политические элиты, обвиняя Россию в геноциде украинцев (Голодомор), ставя памятники неоднозначным лидерам УПА и всячески приветствуя героизацию этого неоднозначного движения, сокращали русские школы в Украине и старались всячески выдавить русский язык из культурного пространства Украины. Я сразу отмечу, что всё это вовсе не оправдывает действия Путина ни в 2014 году, ни тем более в 2022. Однако если мы хотим дать объективную оценку, нужно показать что элиты всех стран виноваты в том, что либо напрямую вели свои страны к нынешнему военному противостоянию России и Украины, либо не мешали этому движению, как это делали Западные страны, которые видели, куда всё идёт, но продолжали убеждать украинское правительство что "мы все вместе". Касаемо автора. Вот автор начинает описывать события на востоке Украины, которые начались сразу после свержения Януковича.

(1) Rallies and counterrallies continued. In Donetsk, a pro-Ukrainian activist was stabbed to death after a demonstration for the country’s unity.

Вы спросите меня, а что тут неправильно? Неправильно тут то, что автор не упоминает, что убивали и про-российских активистов, т.е. создаётся иллюзия, что про-украинские активисты были мирными активистами, которым было чуждо насилие. Не защищая про-российских активистов, ибо там определённо были не адекватные люди, стоит всё же подойти объективно и написать то, что имело место.

(2) On the night of 14 March, violence reached its peak, when two Anti-Maidan activists were killed in a shootout between the Right Sector and the Anti-Maidan on Rymarska Street.

Автор описывает ситуацию в мятежных регионах Украины - Донецке и Луганске - правильно отмечая наличие разных групп граждан поддерживающих разные стороны, но почему-то я не обнаружил качественного анализа по вопросу АТО, которое начало украинское правительство в ответ на захват сепаратистами административных зданий на востоке Украины. Проблема с АТО в том, что это копия того что делала Российская Федерация во время правления Ельцина в Чечне, т.е. контртеррористическая операция. На самом деле вопрос этической составляющей тут очень важен, ибо сегодня, когда целей АТО не достигла, стоит задаться вопросом правильности данного решения. Да, автор отмечает недовольство гражданских проживающих на этой территории, когда их собственное правительство начало их бомбить, но автор не акцентирует на этом, переводя всю ответственность на Россию. Если бы АТО победило, тогда можно было бы сегодня утверждать что это был правильный шаг, но история пошла по другому пути, а именно, ситуация с тех пор в разы ухудшилась, поэтому сегодня можно задавать вопрос актуальности решения начать АТО, вместо переговоров.

(3) “At first we wanted autonomy,” a miner named Anatoly Gutnik told me. “But after they started killing us in Slovyansk, Odesa, and Mariupol, we don’t want to live in this country anymore.”

Конечно, это вовсе не означает, что жители Донбасса хотели войти в состав РФ, вовсе нет. Даже сегодня многие жители регионов находящиеся под контролем России считают себя украинцами, а не россиянами (или русскими). Более того, сами россияне их не принимают за россиян. Думаю, причиной является тот факт, что и в царской России и в Советском Союзе украинцы хотя и рассматривались в качестве народа во многом схожим с русским, но всегда подчёркивалось, что русские и украинцы, это два совершенно разных народа, а не один. И в царской России и в СССР, украинцы жили отдельно, а русские - отдельно, т.е. у каждого народа была своя собственная территория, поэтому УССР не входило в состав РСФСР.

Что касается всего остального, что пишет автор насчёт событий 2014 года, то в принципе картина дана довольно объективная. Впрочем, обо всём этом уже раз сто говорили и писали в англоязычных СМИ и литературе. Однако что книгу роднит с другими книгами написанными гражданами Западных стран, так это взвешенная точка зрения на действия своего собственного правительства. Автор правильно отмечает довольно странную позицию США, которые поступили с Украиной примерно так же как с Грузией в 2008 году (о чём великолепно рассказал Ronald D. Asmus в книге A Little War That Shook the World).

(4) The United States, together with the EU, sought to rein in Russia’s behavior with largely symbolic sanctions. But the Obama administration’s caution, as maddening as it was for Ukrainians, also had its logic. Ukraine was not a treaty ally and had never been considered an area of vital American interest. Moreover, Putin was effectively wielding the threat of a nuclear escalation to force Washington to weigh its meager options very, very carefully.
<…>
Washington would continue sending mixed signals to Kyiv, pledging “unwavering support” for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while betraying an almost fatalistic resignation that Russia would prevail.

Наверно страны Запада думали также как и политическая элита Украины, т.е. что Путин отделается лишь риторикой, но ведь была же война в Грузии в 2008 году, не так ли? Почему страны Запада, зная, что они не смогут помочь Украине, продолжали публично заверять украинцев, что их примут в НАТО, если даже в 2022 году они побоялись дать Украине достаточно оружия чтобы отбросить российские войска хотя бы за пределы границ 2022 года? У меня нет ответа на этот вопрос. Впрочем, украинские политики оказались не намного умнее, ибо вместо того чтобы как минимум не злить Кремль, после 2008 года, они начали наоборот делать всё возможное чтобы эскалировать конфликт. Опять же, зачем, если все знали что Путин - диктатор, а в России авторитарное правление?

The seizure of Crimea, in contrast, came without warning or provocation.

Автор ошибается. Провокации и предупреждения были ещё при правлении Ельцина, когда впервые произошёл открытый и ожесточённый спор за Крым, в котором активную роль принял тогдашний мэр Москвы Юрий Лужков. В дальнейшем о Крыме постоянно говорили как о части российской территории. Так что предсказать можно было. Ну и добавим враждебную к России политику украинских властей.

This book is a retelling of several key events - the Maidan, the events in Crimea and the hostilities in Donbass in 2014, the anti-government rallies and demonstrations in Russia, and the rise of politician Alexei Navalny and his confrontation with Putin. It all ends with the theme of the current military conflict starting in 2022. What do we have in the end? NATO, color revolutions toppling dictators and getting closer and closer to Russia, and the emergence of a charismatic politician, Alexei Navalny, who challenges the supreme Russian power for the first time in the entire Yeltsin-Putin reign. Obviously, the book shows that this whole merry-go-round that started in 2014 was not to keep Ukraine out of NATO (which neither then nor now was planned to be accepted and most likely never will be, precisely because of the fear of war with Russia). All this was organized by Putin for one purpose - to torpedo the color revolution in Russia itself, to prevent it from taking place. Add to this the fact that Putin's rating had been steadily declining until 2014, while Medvedev's arrival gave hope that the country would finally start to develop. It is not for nothing that Putin's return was perceived even by people in the elite as a negative scenario for Russia and almost a betrayal of what Medvedev promised when he said: “We must focus on the four ‘i's’ - institutions, infrastructure, innovation, investment.

Yes, there is an opinion that the confrontation with Ukraine is caused primarily by the fear of color revolutions and not by the approach of NATO. I agree with this point of view more than with the version of “NATO expansion to the east” as the main reason for the start of hostilities. Nevertheless, my point of view remains unchanged, although it includes this version as well. I believe that Ukraine, Georgia, and Crimea are the result of a big and bloody PR campaign to create an external enemy (a policy started by Yeltsin, by the way) in order to rally both the people and the elites around the current regime. In addition, authoritarianism began to gain strength, a policy of militarization and the search for a “fifth column” began to be imposed, and most importantly, it was the answer to the question of why Putin should continue to rule Russia. Yes, my version in no way contradicts the version that all this was implemented because of the fear of “color revolutions”. After all, the question arises: why spoil relations with the Georgian and Ukrainian people, if it is possible to do everything as in Tajikistan and as it actually happened in Russia today, i.e., to eliminate any opposition as a phenomenon? It is certain that such sanctions as those imposed today would not have been imposed if Putin had limited himself to eliminating any opposition or proclaimed himself dictator for life. It's easier than invading a foreign country, killing a huge number of your own soldiers, and actually destroying all modern equipment and weapons (and then asking North Korea for weapons). So no, it all comes from the time of Boris Yeltsin, who, in order to save his rating, returned to the old Soviet narrative about the “hostile West”, which has been harming Russia for centuries (only now I realized that this is exactly what the Ukrainian nationalists are talking about, only in relation to Ukraine, which allegedly Russia has wanted to destroy for centuries). However, let's return to the book.

Yes, the book is written fairly objectively, although I can't call the book completely objective for two reasons. The author says nothing about the beginning of tension in the Russian-Ukrainian policy, which Yushchenko began to implement, which was actively pumped into the Ukrainian people by the Ukrainian political elites, accusing Russia of genocide of Ukrainians (Holodomor), erecting monuments to ambiguous leaders of the UPA and in every way welcoming the glorification of this ambiguous movement, reducing Russian schools in Ukraine and trying to squeeze the Russian language out of the cultural space of Ukraine. I'll note right away that none of this justifies Putin's actions in 2014, much less in 2022. However, if we want to give an objective assessment, we need to show that the elites of all countries are to blame for either directly leading their countries to the current military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, or for not preventing this movement, as the Western countries did, who saw where things were going, but kept convincing the Ukrainian government that “we are all in this together”. Regarding the author. Here, the author begins to describe the events in eastern Ukraine, which began immediately after the overthrow of Yanukovych.

(1)

You ask me: "What is wrong with this?" What is wrong here is that the author does not mention that pro-Russian activists were also killed, i.e., it creates an illusion that pro-Ukrainian activists were peaceful activists who were alien to violence. Without defending the pro-Russian activists, because there were definitely some inadequate people there, it is worthwhile to take an objective approach and write what happened.

(2)

The author describes the situation in the rebellious regions of Ukraine - Donetsk and Luhansk - correctly noting the presence of different groups of citizens supporting different sides, but for some reason, I did not find any qualitative analysis of the ATO, which was launched by the Ukrainian government in response to the separatists' seizure of administrative buildings in eastern Ukraine. The problem with the ATO is that it is a copy of what the Russian Federation did during Yeltsin's reign in Chechnya, i.e., a counter-terrorist operation. The question of the ethical component is very important here because today when the ATO has not achieved its goals, it is worth questioning the correctness of this decision. Yes, the author notes the discontent of civilians living on this territory when their own government started bombing them, but the author does not emphasize this, transferring all responsibility to Russia. If the ATO had won, then it would be possible to say today that it was the right step, but history has gone the other way, namely, the situation has worsened many times since then, so today we can ask the question of the relevance of the decision to start the ATO, instead of negotiations.

(3)

Of course, this does not mean that the residents of Donbass wanted to become part of the Russian Federation, not at all. Even today, many residents of the regions under Russian control consider themselves Ukrainians, not Russians. Moreover, Russians themselves do not take them for Russians. I think the reason is the fact that both in Tsarist Russia and in the Soviet Union, Ukrainians were considered a people in many ways similar to Russians, but it was always emphasized that Russians and Ukrainians are two completely different people, not one. Both in Tsarist Russia and the USSR, Ukrainians lived separately, and Russians lived separately, i.e., each nation had its own territory (so the Ukrainian SSR was not part of the RSFSR).

As for the rest of what the author writes about the events of 2014, in principle, the picture is quite objective. However, all of this has already been said and written about a hundred times in the English-language media and literature. However, what the book has in common with other books written by citizens of Western countries is a balanced point of view on the actions of their own government. The author correctly points out the rather strange position of the US, which treated Ukraine in much the same way as it did Georgia in 2008 (as Ronald D. Asmus beautifully described in his book A Little War That Shook the World).

(4)

Probably the Western countries thought the same as the political elite of Ukraine, i.e., that Putin would get away with just rhetoric, but there was a war in Georgia in 2008, wasn't there? Why did Western countries, knowing that they could not help Ukraine, continue to publicly assure Ukrainians that they would be accepted into NATO if, even in 2022, they were afraid to give Ukraine enough weapons to push back Russian troops at least beyond the 2022 borders? I don't have an answer to that question. However, Ukrainian politicians were not much smarter, for instead of at least not angering the Kremlin, after 2008, they started on the contrary to do everything possible to escalate the conflict. Again, why, if everyone knew that Putin is a dictator and Russia has authoritarian rule?

The seizure of Crimea, in contrast, came without warning or provocation.

The author is mistaken. There were provocations and warnings even during Yeltsin's reign, when, for the first time, there was an open and fierce dispute over Crimea, in which the then mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov played an active role. Thereafter, Crimea was constantly spoken of as part of Russian territory. So it was possible to predict. And let's add the hostile policy of the Ukrainian authorities towards Russia.

[Meghan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting, but really dry.

[Lachlan Finlayson · Rating 4 out of 5]

I am grateful to NetGalley for providing an advance copy of this book in exchange for my honest review. 

This book, subtitled “Why Russia Invaded Ukraine” is by a journalist who has lived in Russia and Ukraine for much of the last two decades. He has reported for multiple respected US and International news outlets, including print media, online and American Public Radio.

There have been multiple books about Putin over recent years. Some are weighty academic or historical efforts based on the abundant archive material that is available since the downfall of the Soviet Union. Others are based upon interviews with the active participants in these events; those great and powerful figures who tend to dominate the historical narrative. The author spent many years living in Moscow, travelling in Europe, Russia and Ukraine, so he brings a personal, broad and ultimately more nuanced perspective to his book. It is a most compelling account , especially when he is on the ground at important times, close to important events. This allows him access to the usual sources, the politicians, diplomats and military staff, but also to bystanders, ordinary Ukrainians and Russians, caught up in events. At these times the author provides important insights that may be missing from other accounts.

For example, a quote from his time in Crimea:
“It was hard to know what most in Crimea were thinking beyond not wanting to go back to the past…”

Or another example from Russia:
“I lived in Russia for eight years … not once did I hear anyone saying … they wanted Crimea back …”

Nevertheless he observes:
“… the loss of Crimea loomed large in Russian pop culture”.

The format of the book is largely chronological. Russia’s historical grievances are touched upon in the book, but for the most part, the author tells the Ukraine story in the context of the relatively recent past since the downfall of the Soviet Union.

Initial chapters describe the years in Ukraine following independence. A general turning by the population towards the West, in search of a better life. Many, if not most Ukrainians maintained a favourable view of Russia due to its proximity, power, energy supply, trade issues and most importantly familial and cultural links, not least, sharing among many people, a common language. Until the Russian invasions of Ukraine, NATO membership was never a high-priority for the general population. EU membership and domestic stability was a far greater desire.

As well as the views of people from various parts of Ukraine, the author documents the decades of duplicity, dishonesty and corruption from an endless array of dodgy authoritarian politicians and businessmen. Many with close links to Russia, crime and other nefarious activities. None of this excuses the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 or the full-scale invasion in 2022. But it does paint a picture of a broken political system in Ukraine and provides some context as to why Russia, or at least Putin thought their military actions would be successful.

The author extends the picture beyond Ukraine and provides further context in several areas. These include the rise of Putin in the post-Soviet era and the consolidation of authoritarian power in Russia and beyond, including military actions in Georgia. While provoking consternation and hand-wring in the West, such actions went largely unchallenged or at least under-challenged. As did later Russian military actions in the Middle East and Africa.

The US, while encouraging Democracy and building institutions in Ukraine to support elected Governments, was often distracted by other issues. Domestic politics of course but also wars in the Middle East and Africa not to mention the growing economic and military power of China. The author brings all these global issues into view, as context to what has happened in Ukraine over the years. He offers a balanced viewpoint and largely rubbishes the Russian narrative of the US meddling in the internal affairs of Ukraine. The US is presented as generally an influence of support. Providing Ukraine with aid and assistance, while not actively meddling in domestic politics or in anyway becoming actively involved in another conflict area which has little to do with US National Interests.

As for the Europeans, their emphasis is generally on maintaining the lucrative trade relationship with Russia, particularly Oil and Gas. In parallel, European Governments and Institutions urge and aid the growth of Ukrainian democracy, as well as support a focus on Human Rights and Economic growth, that could eventually lead to EU membership. Various institutions, such as the EU, NATO, IMF and others take part in various initiatives to help Ukraine find a way to a better life. A careful yet pragmatic approach given the political shenanigans in Ukraine and understandable given the West’s overall desire to avoid any costly new conflict.

Russia’s or at least Putin’s views are well described. The inferiority complex, the desire to regain historical influence, revenge for post-Soviets humiliations and so on. The rise of several Russian opposition figures, in particular the rise of Navalny, is covered in a nuanced and balanced style. The charade of Russian ‘Democracy’ as Putin entrenches power is unsettling.

The comings and goings of numerous Ukrainian politicians is a little difficult to follow at times. But the constant presence of Russian interference and influence is clearly captured and described. Ukrainian Oligarchs, politicians and military figures are often tainted with their relationships with Russia and their blatant self-interest. The feeling is captured that the Ukrainian people want something better than the status quo. Anything, as long as it is not a return to the Soviet model or the Putin model.

The rise of Zelensky is particular well presented. He is depicted as not just as an ‘accidental’ President, but as a thoughtful individual, more a businessman than a comedian, who wants the best for his country. Something better than the crime, corruption and dishonesty that was prevalent in the ruling circles after Ukrainian independence.

The author sets the scene well with an accounting of various complex and sometimes related events leading to the 2014 Crimea invasion. These include the Orange Revolution, the ‘Maidan’, NATO, the EU, the Middle East, China, Oil & Gas, Kosovo, Georgia, the Arab Spring, US and Russian domestic politics and so on.

These events build a sense of almost inevitability for Ukraine, firstly resulting in the Crimea invasion and later the full-scale invasion in 2022. In some regards this book reads like a slow-motion car crash, with the West, for a multitude of reasons, seemingly unwilling or at least unable to stop the outcomes.

I thoroughly enjoyed this book. I found the authors views compelling and even-handed. A recent book I read on this same topic was decidedly anti-American, viewing events and people from the lofty towers of academia. This book provided a more satisfying and balanced account. Not pushing any particular political or cultural point of view, while capturing the events, the people, the reasons and feelings behind what has happened and the war that continues. I wish the author and his publishers and the vest best with this important book.

[Eloise H. · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book was good and interesting. The author was very well informed as he spent a good amount of his career in that region and specifically Moscow. It gave a great background as to the origin of the dispute and invasion, as well as the main auxiliary political figures. It really helped me to understand Russia’s mercenary rational for the invasions. There was a buildup with tension to the latest invasion, only to stop abruptly on the verge of that invasion! I was left with my mouth hanging open and saying ‘WHAT!’. It was frustrating as I invested in really ingesting the book, keeping all the Russian and Ukrainian names straight to be wholly let down with the end. I’d like to give a great thanks to NetGalley and Columbia University Press for giving me the opportunity to read this advanced copy.

[Dusan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Zasto je Rusija napala Ukrajinu? Analiza knjige Why Russia Invaded Ukraine: Putin's Revenge, autor: Lucian Kim, Columbia University Press (2025)

U knjizi Why Russia Invaded Ukraine: Putin's War of Revenge, Lucian Kim iznosi tezu da je rat protiv Ukrajine proizvod Vladimira Putina, njegove autokratske moci i nasljedja ruskog imperijalizma. Prema knjizi rijec je o zakasnjelom i krvavom pokusaju da se zaustavi demokratski talas koji je zahvatio prostor postsovjetske Evrope.

Kim kaze da Putin nikada nije prihvatio Ukrajinu kao istinski nezavisnu drzavu i kao legitimnu politicku zajednicu sa pravom da bira evropski put, vec prostor koji pripada ruskoj istorijskoj bastini. Zbog toga prozapadna Ukrajina za Putina je direktna prijetnja njegovom rezimu.

Invazija se posmatra i kao cin osvete na vise nivoa - protiv Zapada zbog navodnog ponizenja Rusije nakon Hladnog rata, protiv Ukrajine zbog njenog odbijanja da ostane pod ruskom kontrolom, ali i kao licnu osvetu za revolucije iz 2004. i 2014. godine.

Kim tvrdi da rat zapravo nije poceo 2022. godine, vec mnogo ranije. Narandzasta revolucija, Majdan, Krim i Donbas su faze istog procesa Putinove radikalizacije. Prema tome, Kremlj je ukrajinski demokratski razvoj dozivio kao opasan primjer koji ugrozava stabilnost autoritarnog poretka u Rusiji.

Knjiga ostro osudjuje i odbacuje ruske narative o denacifikaciji i zastiti ruskog stanovnistva kao propagandne konstrukcije. NATO priznaje denacifikaciju kao faktor koji je Kremlj koristio u svojoj retorici, ali ne i kao stvarni, glavni uzrok rata. Stoga, presudni notiv nije bio bezbjedonosne prirode, vec ideoloska opsesija Ukrajinom Vladimira Putina.

Naravno, knjiga ovakva kakva jeste, koliko je jaka, toliko je i slaba. Cini se da, koliko je Vladimir Putin ideoloski opsjednut Ukrajinom, toliko je i Lucian Kim opsjednut Vladimirom Putinom. To je generalno gledano glavna slabost ovog narativa, jer previse personalizuje rat sa Ukrajinom. Ovo potcjenjuje glavne strukture ruske politike, bezbjednosnu kulturu i imperijalnu tradiciju Rusije koja nije pocela Putinom i koja se nece zavrsiti Putinom.

Iako je realno reci da NATO nije bio stvarni glavni uzrok invazije na Ukrajinu, previse reduktivno je reci da je NATO nebitan. Putin je moralno i politicki odgovoran za invaziju, ali smijesno je reci da sirenje NATO-a, samit u Bukurestu 2008. i nejasna zapadna strategija nisu imali nikakvu ulogu u formiranju onoga sto Rusi zovu prijetnjom. Tu je glavni problem knjige, sto autor olako prelazi sa cinjenice da nesto nije presudni uzrok na "to je samo izgovor".

Jos jedan problem koji postoji u knjizi je sto Kim uvodi analizu Putinovog psiholoskog profila u cijelu pricu, ali je to nesto sto je otprilike nemoguce dokazati, i sto je epistemoloski dosta slabije od konkretne istorijske i politicke analize.

Osim navedenih problema, problem knjige je i sto dihotomicno predstavlja demokratsku Ukrajinu i autoritarnu Rusiju, kao da ce takva dihotomija objasniti sama po sebi rat. Nije tajna da je dihotomija bitna sama po sebi, ali nije presudan faktor i predstavlja prepodjednostavljivanje situacije. Koliko je Ukrajina razvijala demokratski identitet, toliko je i bila prostor borbe oligarha, regionalnih podjela, slabih i korumpiranih institucija i teskih unutarpolitickih kriza.

Jos nesto sto bih naveo, tice se samog linearnog karaktera razumijevanja rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba. Ispada da, kada pratimo istorijsku stiuaciju i analiziramo dogadjaje iz 2004. 2014. i 2022. godine, imamo jedan jasan linearni tok koji je doveo do rata, ali to je iluzija koja se stice retrospektivnim gledanjem na ove specificne dogadjaje, a ignorisu se razlicite "situacije" koje su se odvijale izmedju pomenutih godina. Kim kao da posmatra rusko-ukrajinski sukob kroz naocare jedne arkadne igre gdje neizbjezno poslije jednog nivoa, slijedi drugi, a zapravo su postojale razne alternative. Kim bi vjerovatno rekao da bi demokratska Rusija, ona koja nema na celu Putina ili nekog slicnog, olako prihvatila da Ukrajina izadje iz ruske sfere uticaja, ali to ne zvuci bas uvjerljivo.

Tako da u sustini, rekao bih da Kim ne grijesi kada kaze da rat nije bio istorijska nuznost, ali grijesi kada previse ide u smijeru gdje je jedini i glavni odgovorni Vladimir Putin, kao da ne postoji cjelokupna drzavna struktura, ruska elita, ideoloska tradicija i bezbjednosna kultura u Rusiji.

[K.S. Blom · Rating 4 out of 5]

Lucian Kim's Putin's Revenge dives deep into the intricate web of history, geopolitics, and personal ambition that led to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Though dense at times, the book effectively unravels Vladimir Putin's long-term strategy to undermine American influence in Europe and restore Russia to its perceived former glory.

Kim highlights the progression from the Soviet Union's collapse, through failed democratic reforms, to the rise of a centralized autocracy under Putin. State-controlled media emerges as a vital tool in consolidating power, with Kim illustrating how dissent has been systematically silenced. While the author’s American background may explain the occasional lack of clarification on terms like "Kremlin" or events such as the "Orange Revolution," his journalistic experience and time spent in the region lend credibility to his account.

The book excels when tracing Putin's narrative: portraying Ukraine as an inseparable part of Russia's heritage while dismissing its burgeoning nationalism. This tension is central to understanding the invasion. Kim contrasts Russia’s authoritarian governance with Ukraine's pro-European aspirations, highlighting the cultural and linguistic ties between the two nations—comparable, as the author notes, to Italian and Spanish.

However, the book’s scope feels limited, focusing almost exclusively on the U.S.-Europe-Russia dynamic. Geopolitical players like China or North Korea are barely mentioned, leaving a gap in the broader context of Russia’s global strategy. Yet, Kim’s insights into how Putin leverages perceptions of strength and weakness—qualities that resonate deeply in Russian culture—offer a chilling portrayal of the Russian president as cold and calculating, a sentiment echoed by former U.S. President George W. Bush.

For readers familiar with Putin's rise to power, Kim's analysis clarifies the rationale behind the war in Ukraine, presenting it as an inevitable confrontation between Russian autocracy and Western ideals of freedom. That said, the book’s conclusion feels abrupt, with extensive footnotes serving as a reminder of its densely packed content. Once you adjust to Kim's style, the narrative ends, leaving you wanting a more comprehensive exploration.

Overall, Putin's Revenge is an insightful, albeit demanding, read that sheds light on Putin's ambitions and the complexities of modern geopolitics. It’s a must-read for those seeking to understand the historical and ideological forces driving the current conflict.

[Jax · Rating 4 out of 5]

Reporter Lucian Kim says he has spent most of his life studying Russia. As a journalist, he covered Russia for many years, including a stint in Moscow as the business editor and columnist for The Moscow Times. His commentary on Putin includes a 2011 article titled “Inside the Brain of Vladimir Putin.” In it, Kim says that it’s possible to piece together Putin’s world view by listening to his annual call-in shows, though in this book he describes them as highly curated.

Kim argues that mass demonstrations are a source of fear for Putin after he saw them bring down the Berlin Wall when he was with the KGB in Dresden. The Orange Revolution and later Maidan uprising in Ukraine were evidence to Putin that the West, particularly the United States, was undermining the relationship between Russia and Ukraine. Kim says that George W. Bush sowed the seeds that led to current events when he dangled a NATO membership carrot to Ukraine. That being said, he also describes the rapport and friendship between Bush and Putin. The best chance the West had to gain an ally in Russia was during that timeframe.

Putin is described as deeply jealous of U.S. dominance and is seeking geopolitical dominance for himself. He has not been shy in comparing himself to Peter the Great and once told a visiting group that Peter did not seize land in the Northern Wars, he “reclaimed it.” This, alone, most clearly demonstrates his views on the war with Ukraine.

Thank you to Columbia University Press and NetGalley for providing this eARC.

[nickiknackinoo · Rating 5 out of 5]

Putin’s Revenge is written by Lucian Kim, who was a reporter out there for decades. He has written about Putin and his obvious views on how Russia should be, causing conflict and progressing to war in 2022.
I found he wrote about this really well and all the facts and insider knowledge made this a very very interesting but sad read. As we get all the reports on how this war is now, nearly three years on, we hope for peace.
Many thanks to Columbia University press for the opportunity to read this arc copy via Netgalley. My opinions are my own.
#LucianKim, #Netgalley,#ColumbiaUniversityPress.

[Marsha · Rating 5 out of 5]

Lucian Kim's perspective on Putin's career is a unique one in that he's a western reporter who has been on the ground reporting in Moscow since Putin came to office. His insider tidbits are most illuminating. We get insight into how off the radar Ukraine was for most in the west, particularly for American presidents, for most of the decades following the fall of the Soviet Union. So much attention and fawning to the failed state of Russia. So much blindness to the promise of Ukraine. Kim shows us how Putin's predatory goals toward Ukraine and other post-Soviet states was obvious pretty much from the get-go. A bit of a dry read but quite illuminating.
#Netgalley #LucianKim

[Samuel Steffen · Rating 5 out of 5]

Lucian Kim provides valuable insights into Vladimir Putin's mindset and the rationale behind his decision to invade Ukraine. The narrative delves into Ukraine's historical context, tracing its journey from centuries of incorporation into the Soviet Union to its emergence as an independent nation. Additionally, the book examines Putin's ascent to power. This work is ideal for enthusiasts of Russian history, Ukrainian studies, Cold War history, military history, political analysis, and those keen on understanding the current conflict.

[Anne Ulrich · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is good journalism but poor history. I learned several new facts about the state of the Donbas before 2022 which was helpful. but Kim doesn't really establish an argument about why 2022 made sense as a time to invade Ukraine (apart from one paragraph discussing the state of Russian currency reserves). There were also a couple of facts that were presented in a misleading way (eg Kim doesn't correctly interpret Putin's decision to delay congratulations after Biden won the 2020 election). I'm glad I read it because I did feel I learned something, but I wouldn't do it again.

[Ellen Brown · Rating 3 out of 5]

A well-written book that thoroughly documents the history and lead-up to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. I found it a bit dry but interesting. It was difficult to stay engaged once I arrived at the recent history to which we have been exposed. The implication that how the US President acts toward and with the Russian President can make so much difference certainly gives one pause when selecting a leader.

[Alex Helm · Rating 1 out of 5]

stop NATO proxy wars

[Thomas Escritt · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very lucid, compelling account that does a good job of exposing the confusion, paranoia and ignorance in the protagonist’s head

[Beth · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thank you NetGalley, Lucian Kim and Columbia University Press for this copy of Putin’s Revenge: Why Russia Invaded Ukraine. Kim’s research and personal experience give this book credibility. His writing is clear and accessible for everyone looking to understand what the provocation may have been behind not just Russia’s invasion into Ukraine in February 2022 but also the 2014 annexation of Crimea. It was very interesting to read how the relationships between Putin and the presidents of the United States played a role in Russia’s actions towards Ukraine. Wonderfully researched and presented.

[JenSen Yermi · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book you need to read to debunk all that NATO enlargement myth and other Kremlin propaganda that blame the West for Russo-Ukraine War.