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Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare
The epic story of how America turned the world economy into a weapon, upending decades of globalization to take on a new authoritarian axis—Russia, China, and Iran.
It used to be that ravaging another country’s economy required blockading its ports and laying siege to its cities. Now all it takes is a statement posted online by the U.S. government.
In Chokepoints, Edward Fishman, a former top State Department sanctions official, takes us deep into the back rooms of power to reveal the untold history of the last two decades of U.S. foreign policy, in which America renounced the gospel of globalization and waged a new kind of economic war. As Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Ayatollah Khamenei wreaked havoc on the world stage, mavericks within the U.S. government built a fearsome new arsenal of economic weapons, exploiting America’s dominance in global finance and technology. Successive U.S. presidents have relied on these unconventional weapons to address the most pressing national-security threats, for good and for ill.
Chokepoints provides a thrilling account of one of the most critical geopolitical developments of our time, demystifying the complex strategies the U.S. government uses to harness the power of Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and Big Oil against America’s enemies. At the center of the narrative is an eclectic group of policy innovators: the diplomats, lawyers, and financial whizzes who’ve masterminded America’s escalating economic wars against Russia, China, and Iran.
Control over economic chokepoints—such as the U.S. dollar, advanced microchip technology, and critical energy supply chains—has become the key to geopolitical power in the twenty-first century. The result is a new world order: an economic arms race among great powers and a fracturing global economy. Chokepoints is the definitive account of how America pioneered a new, hard-hitting style of economic warfare—and how it’s changing the world.
It used to be that ravaging another country’s economy required blockading its ports and laying siege to its cities. Now all it takes is a statement posted online by the U.S. government.
In Chokepoints, Edward Fishman, a former top State Department sanctions official, takes us deep into the back rooms of power to reveal the untold history of the last two decades of U.S. foreign policy, in which America renounced the gospel of globalization and waged a new kind of economic war. As Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Ayatollah Khamenei wreaked havoc on the world stage, mavericks within the U.S. government built a fearsome new arsenal of economic weapons, exploiting America’s dominance in global finance and technology. Successive U.S. presidents have relied on these unconventional weapons to address the most pressing national-security threats, for good and for ill.
Chokepoints provides a thrilling account of one of the most critical geopolitical developments of our time, demystifying the complex strategies the U.S. government uses to harness the power of Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and Big Oil against America’s enemies. At the center of the narrative is an eclectic group of policy innovators: the diplomats, lawyers, and financial whizzes who’ve masterminded America’s escalating economic wars against Russia, China, and Iran.
Control over economic chokepoints—such as the U.S. dollar, advanced microchip technology, and critical energy supply chains—has become the key to geopolitical power in the twenty-first century. The result is a new world order: an economic arms race among great powers and a fracturing global economy. Chokepoints is the definitive account of how America pioneered a new, hard-hitting style of economic warfare—and how it’s changing the world.
560 pages, Hardcover
First published February 25, 2025
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About the author
Edward Fishman
1 book63 followersEdward Fishman teaches at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and is a senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy. He previously served at the U.S. State Department, the Pentagon, and the Treasury Department, earning multiple awards for his contributions to U.S. foreign policy. His writing has appeared in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Politico Magazine, and Boston Review, among other publications. A native of Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, he lives in New York City with his wife and two children.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 203 reviews
May 16, 2025
Sanctions should be used like antibiotics.
This is a phenomenal book about the economic weapons the US has used specifically against Iran, China and Russia dating back to the early 2000s up until today and the impact of those weapons. When George W. Bush was in office, the prevailing wisdom was that economic sanctions were an impotent tool to be used in geopolitical economic warfare but that convection has since been turned on its head with sometimes dramatic and other times unpredictable consequences. This book outlines the use of sanctions and multilateral and international banking pressure that has been used to some sort of geopolitical ends.
The financial sanctions prior against Hussein weren’t that useful and made sanctions seem like a weak tool to use at the time. The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence or TFI was organized in 2004. It was created to target and sanctions money laundering of other countries. TFI discovered money laundering schemes with North Korea and China amongst other operations. The TFI, headed by a man named Stuart Levey, recognized a specific bank was doing the laundering and they shut that bank off from the American financial system. This action alone had an enormous ripple effect on North Korea which froze $25M from the country and it was an effective proof of concept test that found financial warfare could be a tool of the US.
After North Korea, Levey went after Iran. He and his team personally went out and threatened banks all over the world of penalties and threats of being shut off from the American financial system if they did any business with the Iranian government. Iran balked at this tactic until they really started to work. The weaponization of multinational banks against Iran was so effective that it brought Iran to the negotiating table and put their uranium enrichment on hold. The amazing thing about this was that the effect was really only on Iran without a backlash on American or European markets.
This book then goes into detail about TFI and the American effort to stop the Chinese global take over of 5G through the company Huawei which is clearly part of China’s multi-pronged effort to take America’s place as the world’ hegemony. From Obama, to Trump to Biden, many financial tools were used to try to prevent Hauwei’s routers from spreading through the US and Europe to varying success. The US restricted Huawei's access to semiconductors, even if produced abroad. These restrictions were included in Taiwan’s famous TSMCS chip making planet.
Enter Russia and its annexation of Crimea. This prompted TFI to act again. The challenge this time was much larger than Iran because Europe heavily relied on oil from Russia. Sanctions couldn’t be so broad on Russia or they would risk financial impact on Europe and contagion to the US. At first sanctions were simply targeted at Russian oligarchs but this mostly only affected their yacht-fairing lifestyles. Some Russian banks were banned from using SWIFT for international payments as well as caps on their oil. What impacted the economy most, and what Putin likely didn’t expect, was that the Russian central bank was sanctioned. Did this stop Putin from a full invasion of Ukraine? Nope. So, like the author says: sanctions are like antibiotics. They need to be used at the right time and at the right dose or they can have negative or neutral impacts.
This is a really, really, excellent non-partisan book about an unrecognized weapon that the US has employed to varying degrees across the world. This is a book firmly about geopolitics and will help you understand lots about what’s going on between world powers right now.
This is a phenomenal book about the economic weapons the US has used specifically against Iran, China and Russia dating back to the early 2000s up until today and the impact of those weapons. When George W. Bush was in office, the prevailing wisdom was that economic sanctions were an impotent tool to be used in geopolitical economic warfare but that convection has since been turned on its head with sometimes dramatic and other times unpredictable consequences. This book outlines the use of sanctions and multilateral and international banking pressure that has been used to some sort of geopolitical ends.
The financial sanctions prior against Hussein weren’t that useful and made sanctions seem like a weak tool to use at the time. The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence or TFI was organized in 2004. It was created to target and sanctions money laundering of other countries. TFI discovered money laundering schemes with North Korea and China amongst other operations. The TFI, headed by a man named Stuart Levey, recognized a specific bank was doing the laundering and they shut that bank off from the American financial system. This action alone had an enormous ripple effect on North Korea which froze $25M from the country and it was an effective proof of concept test that found financial warfare could be a tool of the US.
After North Korea, Levey went after Iran. He and his team personally went out and threatened banks all over the world of penalties and threats of being shut off from the American financial system if they did any business with the Iranian government. Iran balked at this tactic until they really started to work. The weaponization of multinational banks against Iran was so effective that it brought Iran to the negotiating table and put their uranium enrichment on hold. The amazing thing about this was that the effect was really only on Iran without a backlash on American or European markets.
This book then goes into detail about TFI and the American effort to stop the Chinese global take over of 5G through the company Huawei which is clearly part of China’s multi-pronged effort to take America’s place as the world’ hegemony. From Obama, to Trump to Biden, many financial tools were used to try to prevent Hauwei’s routers from spreading through the US and Europe to varying success. The US restricted Huawei's access to semiconductors, even if produced abroad. These restrictions were included in Taiwan’s famous TSMCS chip making planet.
Enter Russia and its annexation of Crimea. This prompted TFI to act again. The challenge this time was much larger than Iran because Europe heavily relied on oil from Russia. Sanctions couldn’t be so broad on Russia or they would risk financial impact on Europe and contagion to the US. At first sanctions were simply targeted at Russian oligarchs but this mostly only affected their yacht-fairing lifestyles. Some Russian banks were banned from using SWIFT for international payments as well as caps on their oil. What impacted the economy most, and what Putin likely didn’t expect, was that the Russian central bank was sanctioned. Did this stop Putin from a full invasion of Ukraine? Nope. So, like the author says: sanctions are like antibiotics. They need to be used at the right time and at the right dose or they can have negative or neutral impacts.
This is a really, really, excellent non-partisan book about an unrecognized weapon that the US has employed to varying degrees across the world. This is a book firmly about geopolitics and will help you understand lots about what’s going on between world powers right now.
March 9, 2025
With all the discussions about tariffs and sanctions this book is a must read. Very informative and easy to take in. The author does an outstanding job producing a book that is consumable by the average person.
March 19, 2025
Excellent take on one of the most important subjects of our times. It’s a necessary read for anyone who is even vaguely interested in the world we live in.
The authors has had incredible access to all the major players and we always feel like the proverbial fly on the wall. Without neglecting how the sausage is made, Fishman is particularly good at pointing out the intellectual exercise necessary to develop the doctrine and the tools of this new weapon. He’s particularly good the junctures between one campaign and the next, he shows how the tools developed by Washington against Iran were then reused and gradually changed for the effort against Moscow and how these same tools were then used and changed against Beijing.
He’s a little lighter on the sort of world these tools are creating but, then again, that world has only just started to take shape.
The warnings he raises at the end unfortunately have not been heeded and now… well…
From a European pov the book is also a wake up call it shows quite how secondary the EU has been for years in that great game. More generally, it’s also a fantastic reminder that through timidity and lack of resolve, the West has brought the current situation upon itself.
The authors has had incredible access to all the major players and we always feel like the proverbial fly on the wall. Without neglecting how the sausage is made, Fishman is particularly good at pointing out the intellectual exercise necessary to develop the doctrine and the tools of this new weapon. He’s particularly good the junctures between one campaign and the next, he shows how the tools developed by Washington against Iran were then reused and gradually changed for the effort against Moscow and how these same tools were then used and changed against Beijing.
He’s a little lighter on the sort of world these tools are creating but, then again, that world has only just started to take shape.
The warnings he raises at the end unfortunately have not been heeded and now… well…
From a European pov the book is also a wake up call it shows quite how secondary the EU has been for years in that great game. More generally, it’s also a fantastic reminder that through timidity and lack of resolve, the West has brought the current situation upon itself.
June 14, 2025
The best book on global economics sanctions I've ever read which is ... not really what I expected :)
I was interested in the general mechanisms of economic influence US uses on the daily basis in contacts with various countries - those they consider allies, and the ones they don't. How they leverage their advantages, how they build them up globally, etc. I was looking for to find out how Americans keep their strong position in the Middle East. And when it comes to sanctions (which are a very interesting topic indeed, I was mostly interested in how they are maintained "operationally" - because one way is to announce something, but it's something completely different to enforce it ...). But that's NOT what this book is about.
This is a detailed history of US economical conflicts against - Iraq, Iran, Russia (~2014), China, and Russia again (~2022). How they started, developed, what options were considered, how the support was gained, etc. To be very honest, in the initial ~2 chapters the level of detail was ... disappointing, but the further the better - China and Russia chapters are top-notch, one can learn a lot of details that were not 100% visible from the neutral observer perspective.
Recommended (if you're into modern geopolitics).
I was interested in the general mechanisms of economic influence US uses on the daily basis in contacts with various countries - those they consider allies, and the ones they don't. How they leverage their advantages, how they build them up globally, etc. I was looking for to find out how Americans keep their strong position in the Middle East. And when it comes to sanctions (which are a very interesting topic indeed, I was mostly interested in how they are maintained "operationally" - because one way is to announce something, but it's something completely different to enforce it ...). But that's NOT what this book is about.
This is a detailed history of US economical conflicts against - Iraq, Iran, Russia (~2014), China, and Russia again (~2022). How they started, developed, what options were considered, how the support was gained, etc. To be very honest, in the initial ~2 chapters the level of detail was ... disappointing, but the further the better - China and Russia chapters are top-notch, one can learn a lot of details that were not 100% visible from the neutral observer perspective.
Recommended (if you're into modern geopolitics).
April 1, 2025
Edward Fishman’s “Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare” is a riveting exploration of how the United States has transformed the global economy into a potent weapon for confronting geopolitical adversaries. Fishman, a former top sanctions official at the U.S. State Department, combines insider knowledge with scholarly analysis to deliver a dramatic narrative about America’s use of economic tools against nations like Russia, China, and Iran. The book traces the evolution of economic warfare, revealing how successive U.S. administrations have exploited chokepoints—such as dominance in global finance, advanced technology, and energy supply chains—to exert influence on the world stage. Fishman takes readers behind closed doors, introducing the diplomats, lawyers, and financial experts who pioneered these strategies. His account is both thrilling and accessible, offering insights into the successes and failures of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. What sets “Chokepoints” apart is its ability to synthesize complex geopolitical shifts into a compelling story. Fishman demystifies the mechanisms behind America’s economic power, from leveraging the U.S. dollar to controlling microchip technology. He argues that these tools have reshaped international relations, creating an era of economic arms races and fractured global systems. The narrative is enriched by vivid anecdotes and strategic lessons that are crucial for policymakers and business leaders alike. While other books on economic warfare delve into specific aspects—like oligarchs or financial networks—Fishman’s work stands out for its holistic approach. It not only explains how America gained its outsized economic power but also examines the risks of overusing it. His recommendations for navigating this new era make “Chokepoints” indispensable reading for anyone seeking to understand the future of global power dynamics. In sum, “Chokepoints” is a masterful blend of history, strategy, and storytelling that illuminates one of the most critical developments in modern geopolitics. It is both urgent and engrossing—a must-read for scholars, policymakers, and curious minds alike.
June 8, 2025
Chokepoints is a must-read exploration of the growing economic wars and their influence on global security, economics, and geopolitics. The book is both timely and timeless, and the writing is both engaging and deeply informative—making complex geopolitical issues accessible to any reader.
The author masterfully blends history, economics, and first-hand experience to show how vital economic chokepoints (waterways, the USD, telecom hardware, et al) are becoming growing leverage points in international relations—especially with the new authoritarian axis of Russia, China, and Iran.
What makes this book stand out is the author’s ability to take complex geopolitical issues and present them in a clear, engaging, and thought-provoking way. His expertise in foreign policy is evident, and he writes in a way that is accessible to both experts and casual readers alike by showing us an insider’s view of the black box of policymaking through compelling stories and the people behind them.
While geopolitical and economics books can be dense, this book is far from it. Chokepoints reads as a novel more akin to a beach read than a textbook. The writing reminds me of Michael Lewis or Malcolm Gladwell.
Required reading for everyone – whether you’re a diplomat, farmer, entrepreneur, or investor. Highly recommended!
The author masterfully blends history, economics, and first-hand experience to show how vital economic chokepoints (waterways, the USD, telecom hardware, et al) are becoming growing leverage points in international relations—especially with the new authoritarian axis of Russia, China, and Iran.
What makes this book stand out is the author’s ability to take complex geopolitical issues and present them in a clear, engaging, and thought-provoking way. His expertise in foreign policy is evident, and he writes in a way that is accessible to both experts and casual readers alike by showing us an insider’s view of the black box of policymaking through compelling stories and the people behind them.
While geopolitical and economics books can be dense, this book is far from it. Chokepoints reads as a novel more akin to a beach read than a textbook. The writing reminds me of Michael Lewis or Malcolm Gladwell.
Required reading for everyone – whether you’re a diplomat, farmer, entrepreneur, or investor. Highly recommended!
July 1, 2025
[rough quote] “instead of learning Arabic and studying counterterrorism, young IR professionals are learning Chinese and studying finance and trade regulations (economic warfare).”
one of the first historical/policy books i’ve read where i didn’t pick up on left or right ideologies - felt like information was presented clearly without personal judgement and i was allowed to form my own opinions on decision making. understand more of the backstory behind Tr*mps decisions with the PRC
one of the first historical/policy books i’ve read where i didn’t pick up on left or right ideologies - felt like information was presented clearly without personal judgement and i was allowed to form my own opinions on decision making. understand more of the backstory behind Tr*mps decisions with the PRC
April 6, 2025
Arguably the most dense book a person can read in regards to foreign economic policy that is also easily accessible at the same time. The language is easy to digest, but it's hard to keep track and remember everything due to so much information. This book was also an eye opener on how bad the current administration is at handling its macroeconomic policies.
June 12, 2025
a comprehensive, minute by minute account of how the united states has leveraged her dominance of finance and trade to bludgeon adversaries over the past two decades. i found it very educational since i knew little about the intricate details of sanctions and the like. very helpful for understanding the current unraveling of globalization and trade wars being waged by 47
April 30, 2025
I learned a bit about the behind-the-scenes debates and discussions that occurred around these policies over the last decade or so. However, if you're someone who pays close attention to the news, you probably won't learn a ton of new information from this book.
June 6, 2025
Chokepoints takes the international economic history of the past 20 years and repackages it into a high stakes espionage thriller. It gives you the technical know-how in such a clever way that it has you gasping and cheering for mundane things like the Department of Commerces Press Statements. It takes faceless government bureaucrats and administrations and make them rockstars and James Bond-esq espionage masters.
Particularly, Stuart Levey, Adam Szubin, David Cohen, Matt Pottinger, Daleep Singh, Elvira Nabiullina and Jack Lew are some of the "Characters" that will inspire me and stay with me for a while.
Highly recommend this book if you have even a slight interest in learning about Economic Warfare in the eras of growing and fractioning globalization and the knowledge depth and writing style of Fishman will get you hooked for the rest!
Particularly, Stuart Levey, Adam Szubin, David Cohen, Matt Pottinger, Daleep Singh, Elvira Nabiullina and Jack Lew are some of the "Characters" that will inspire me and stay with me for a while.
Highly recommend this book if you have even a slight interest in learning about Economic Warfare in the eras of growing and fractioning globalization and the knowledge depth and writing style of Fishman will get you hooked for the rest!
March 16, 2025
This is the exact book I needed to better understand the last 15 years of geopolitics when it felt like both a lot, and not that much, was happening. Really, really fun read and I learned a ton.
May 15, 2025
this is quite interesting, particularly if read as a complement to Nicholas Mulder's 'The Economic Weapon'. although it inevitably at times exudes a bit of an American saviour complex, I thought it was nonetheless a pretty interesting account of the rise of economic sanctions as a tool of international statecraft over the past few decades, with a clear awareness of their limits too.
unfortunately, it tends towards the descriptive and sometimes veers vaguely towards hysteria; it is better in handling the sanctions enacted on Iran and North Korea than Russia, where there is too much of a moment-by-moment reporting feel to the writing.
I also think that it is a touch dated in its focus on financial tools; Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman's 'Underground Empire' is a bit more technical and interesting in exploring how the actual infrastructure that enables the US to undertake such actions works.
2.5?
unfortunately, it tends towards the descriptive and sometimes veers vaguely towards hysteria; it is better in handling the sanctions enacted on Iran and North Korea than Russia, where there is too much of a moment-by-moment reporting feel to the writing.
I also think that it is a touch dated in its focus on financial tools; Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman's 'Underground Empire' is a bit more technical and interesting in exploring how the actual infrastructure that enables the US to undertake such actions works.
2.5?
September 3, 2025
This book was a disappointment. The basic premise, that economic warfare is a little understood but valuable instrument, could easily have been proven in 80-100 pages. The remaining 400 pages are therefore extraneous fluff. The book leaves the reader asking many first order questions which the author alluded to, but did not address . . . If Sanctions are such an asymmetric advantage, why didn’t the United States use them before the 2000s? What does classic economic theory say about sanctions? What might be the second and third order effects of Americas use of sanctions? These are the most interesting questions, but ones which the author seems to stop short of addressing.
March 18, 2025
What a great book.So easy to follow, it grabs your attention from the first st page. it's chronologically told which brings clarity to the unfolding of history. I highly recommend it as an audiobook or the hard cover.
I can not wait for Mr. Fishman next book.
I can not wait for Mr. Fishman next book.
December 19, 2025
Let’s just say that you are a Cold War kid, and us who know, know when that time period is. When the Cold War “ended”, there would be a ‘peace dividend’ we were told. Instead, the CW era evolved into today’s Economic Warfare, not the Triad and the Bretton Woods system, but sanctions and export controls. For those of us who have wondered what exactly that is and how did it come to be, this book is for you. The author is absolutely masterful in tying together the origins and consequences of this new Economic Cold (?) War we have been in for the last 30 years. Three major sections are used to cover Iran, Russia, and China, the modern adversaries of the American financial system. Very readable, very worth your time if the above topics interest you.
May 25, 2025
Read read read this book. So incredibly digestible, so much good info about how the US executive branch has masterfully learned to counter foreign enemies by engineering new economic weapons rather than deploying any military force.
December 29, 2025
Apie "sankcijas" daug kas išgirdom tik karo prieš Ukrainą kontekste, bet gera ir skaitoma knyga apie didžiausius panašių priemonių naudojimo atvejus per pastaruosius keliasdešimt metų. Padeda suprasti kontekstą ir nepaskęsti kasdienių naujienų detalėse, kurios dažnai nieko nereiškia.
August 2, 2025
Absolutely fascinating. I'd have to re-read this to fully digest everything though. Coming in with no knowledge on anything tied to economic warfare, this is a really insightful first look into the mechanics of it and the many, many different stakeholders necessary to keep American economic power effective.
January 17, 2026
Hell yeah we're all going to die (or devalue the dollar! or both!)
May 27, 2025
This is an outstanding book that is well-researched and tells a great story. I have rarely enjoyed a history/political science book so much, especially because it is about economics. I was actually embarrassed to tell friends what I was reading and how much I was enjoying it. It was written before Trump returned to power, so it doesn't include his capricious use of tariffs. I would love to see what Fishman thinks about that. I highly recommend this book for anyone who wants to understand the role of the United States in the world and the power it can wield.
The book looks at how the United States has used economic tools—particularly sanctions and financial dominance- as weapons to achieve its ends. The main theme is that chokepoints are essential but vulnerable places for transportation. Cutting them off means cutting off your enemies' vital supply lines. These have normally been thought of as physical, like the Bosphorus Straits, but in the last few decades have included chokepoints in the global economic system, most of which the United States now controls. The United States started small in both the aggressiveness of sanctions and the targets of them but eventually looked at bigger targets and more complex and damaging sanctions. It did this with or without consensus from the international community, but the power of its controls over the chokepoints forced most other countries to go along with it. However, weaponizing this control has and will cause other countries, even allies of the United States, to look for ways around those choke points to end American dominance. In essence, using the weapon will make it less effective in the future and also threaten the overall global economy. In addition, it has shown the way for other countries to use their own chokepoints to their own advantage, specifically China and rare earth minerals.
He finishes by arguing that because economic warfare is now so common, the USG should have a permanent apparatus to plan for it, as it does for military warfare. The US has always been afraid of ripple effects on the world economy, which would affect the US economy, so it has generally been conservative in how it used its economic weapons. Consistent study and preparation would allow these tools to be use more effectively.
He also suggests that economic warfare will ultimately undermine and perhaps destroy the globally interdependent economy. Economic chokepoints will probably be weakened as countries and companies look for alternatives that keep power out of a single entities hand. Alternatively, it is possible that economic rivalry/warfare will eventually move into military warfare.
Here are my takes on the the book:
It is divided into four major events that caused the US to enact increasingly complicated sanctions, along with an introduction and conclusion. The events are: Iran and nukes, Russia subverting Donbas, China and 5G technology, Russia invading Ukraine. It offers a lot of detail on the development of each, including the decision-making processes in the White House and the diplomacy associated with it.
Part One: Building the Chokepoints
This is largely the development of economic warfare, beginning after World War I, and the establishment of American economics dominance after WWII. The global trading system was designed and developed by the United States and, as a result, put the United States at the center of it, with control of the economic chokepoints. This included the dominance of the U.S. dollar, the establishment of financial institutions, originally around Bretton Woods, but later around access to SWIFT and access to the dollar as an exchange currency.
Economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War were effective in that it degraded his ability to produce WMDs, but it didn't significantly change his behavior. And it was expensive because it required US warships to actively search ships coming and going from Iraq. The Clinton Administration recognized that it had some powerful economic tools to use, but was hesitant to use them because it would make people wary of the US-centered global economic system. After 9-11, the Bush Administration started trying to stop Al-Queda's money transfers and was successful to some extent. Post-9-11 policy changes also transferred a lot of the Treasury Department's law enforcement duties to DHS, so Treasury had relatively little to do, until Bush wanted to put pressure on North Korea. They cut off a Chinese bank that was laundering money for the Kim regime from SWIFT, which cut of North Korea from the global economic system and, more importantly, showed the power the United States had on economic chokepoints. Future sanctions wouldn't need ships or the military, just US say-so.
Part Two: Iran and the Bomb
US Sanctions on Iran go back to the 1979 Hostage Crisis and basically cut off trade between the United States and Iran. As Iran started moving towards making nuclear weapons in the Bush Administration, it was clear that the US should to do something more, but didn't have the international cooperation it needed. Bush said that "we have sanctioned ourselves out of influence with Iran", suggesting that the United States had no more cards to play. But one of his officials, Stuart Levy, sought to find other ways to pressure Iran with new types of sanctions, beginning a new period of economic warfare.
These new weapons were really put to use in the Obama administration, helped by Obama's success in rallying Europeans and others around the world to further isolate Iran economically, aiming to bring it to the negotiating table. That was possible because of several Iranian provocations. This included a planned assassination of the Saudi ambassador in Washington and a very worrying speech by Iranian president Mahmoud Amadinejad at the UN. Pushed by Congress to get tougher, including amendments to appropriations bills that required increase sanctions, the Obama Administration, made possible by a Bush-holdover in Treasury, got creative in imposing secondary sanctions, which penalized companies that did business with Iran. Because access to the US market and financial system was much more valuable than anything Iran could offer, this worked well, but caused a lot of ill-will among European allies because it hearkened back to the Bush-era "you're with us or against us" diplomacy. To make that worse, Europeans disregarded American intelligence on Iran's nuclear program because of the huge miss on WMDs in Iraq. Ultimately, by 2013, Obama's sanctions team came to the consensus that it couldn't do much else and should try to use existing pressure to make a deal. The deal that had a few problems. It was hated by Iran-hawks in the Senate and by Israel's PM Benjamin Netanyahu. It didn't permanently end Iran's nuclear weapons program. It was actually quite difficult to get banks to work with Tehran again after working so hard to scare them into giving up that business. Nevertheless, sanctions worked where military force did not, even if imperfectly. This marked a significant moment because sanctions were the force behind getting a foreign government to change its behavior.
Part Three: Russia’s Imperial Land Grab
Following the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine, Russia used thinly veiled operatives, pretending to be independent of the Kremlin, to foment rebellion in several Ukrainian provinces with a majority of Russian speakers. Obama wanted to give Russia a reason to not expand the war, which meant hitting him where it hurt. The problem was that Russia's economy was much bigger than Iran's and Russia supplied Europe with a lot of oil and gas. There was fear that widespread sanctions, like those used on Iran, would send the global economy into a tailspin. Obama was naturally cautious and wanted to work in lockstep with European allies who were more vulnerable to effects of Russian sanctions. Obama's team came up with sanctioning individuals close to put and also cutting of key Russian economic institutions from western capital markets, hoping that it would be a slow burn that would put Putin under pressure without creating volatility in world markets. It prevented recapitalization in Russia and, coupled with falling oil prices, created a crisis for Putin, but not a decisive one. And it didn't change the situation in Donbas. However, Fishman argues that Obama didn't go for the kill, which allowed Russia to rebuild its economy to make it "sanction proof".
Part Four: China’s Bid for Technological Mastery
The story that China was stealing American technology is not new, nor is the story that it has many non-tariff barriers to trade that make it very difficult for foreign companies to get into the Chinese market. Presidents from Clinton to Obama tried to get China to open up as it integrated into the global trading system, but they never put significant pressure on China to force its hand. Obama feared that China was already integrated into the world economy so much that sanctions on it would have massive ripples across the world. Trump changed that for two reasons. First, although Trump spoke most often about the trade deficit with China, the US use of economic warfare against China was more about technology. The start came when a Chinese company, ZTE, was caught selling US technology to Iran, in spite of US sanctions. The Commerce Department put ZTE on "Entities List" of companies and individuals that are known to be acting against US national interests. This meant that ZTE couldn't get access to US technology, which of a technology company was essentially a death sentence. For some reason, Trump withdrew this sentence as a favor to Xi Jinping so ZTE survived.
The stakes jumped up with another Chinese company, Huawei, which produced "5G" technology and sold it around the world. The USG found that Huawei had built a backdoor into the system that could potentially give China a huge weapon in any conflict. It banned Huawei technology from being used in the US, but US allies, particularly Britain, were using Huawei to build their own infrastructure. The Trump administration couldn't convince those countries to drop Huawei because it had the best equipment at the best price, partially because of subsidies from the Chinese govt. The US felt the need to raise the stakes and found a chokepoint in US technology. While Huawei was an industry leader, a lot of its products relied on US technology, so cutting off any US technology from being sold to Huawei was a major blow to the company and suggested that it was not a reliable partner. As a result, most US friendly governments and companies stopped using Huawei.
There are a few differences in using economic weapons against China. First, the size of China's economy gave it a lot more leverage than other targets. It also made it difficult to attack China directly because of the codependence between the two countries. Second, the United States didn't use its powers of dominating economic commerce and banking. Instead, it used its dominance in technology as a weapon to freeze China, and specifically Huawei, out. Third, earlier sanctions against Russia and Iran were meant to force those countries to change their behavior. Trump envisioned these new sanctions as permanent, which meant he wasn't looking for a deal with China. This was restructuring the world trade system and decoupling United States from China. It is possible that Trump thought the world would break into two blocs, but there was a danger that the EU would not join the US and would form a third bloc.
Part Five: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
Fishman provides an in-depth look at the escalation of economic warfare following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Unlike previous economic warfare, the US had months to prep for this one because strong intelligence gave early notice of Putin's invasion of Ukraine. The Biden Administration had time to craft sanctions that would hurt Russia without severely damaging the world economy. The problem was that heavy sanctions were meant to deter Russia from invading, but saying what those sanctions were going to be would severely limit their effectiveness. Sanctioning the Russian Central Bank was unheard of, so Russia didn't prep for it, leaving hundreds of billions of dollars in reserves outside the country. This was devastating to Russia's economy but had the US threatened it in advance to scare Russia, Russia would have moved its reserves back under its own control. The US also cut Russia off from SWIFT, which basically cut Russia off from international banking.
Another problem was oil and gas. They made up about half of Russia's exports, so sanctioning that would severely hurt the Russian economy, but would also hurt the world economy by driving up gas prices. As long as Russia could continue to sell these, sanctions would be limited in their effect. There was also the problem of getting other countries to comply with US and EU sanctions, especially China. An attempt at the solution was to allow Russia to sell oil to the world economy, but to sanction any company that insured Russian oil shipments where the price was over $60 a barrel. This would allow oil to stay on the world markets without driving the price up and still limiting Russia's oil income. Surprisingly, this worked in so far as it hurt the Russian economy. But it didn't change Russian behavior. So, again, the west settled for degrading Russia's war-making ability by hurting its economy long term.
Part Six: The World Economic Rupture
The final part assesses the long-term implications of economic warfare on global trade, finance, and diplomacy. Fishman argues that economic sanctions have limited effectiveness because they take a long time for the effects to show. That makes it a poor deterrent. He also argues that using these chokepoints undermines their effectiveness and the global economy in general. No one wants to be at the mercy of the whims of the White House. On the other hand, China already uses access to its markets as a weapon (Australia for asking for an inquiry into the origins of Covid-19, Lithuania for allowing Taiwan to open an interest section in Vilnius), so many countries see that at least the United States don't use them for minor disagreements. (The book was written before Trump returned to the White House and got tariff happy, so Fishman didn't include America at its most capricious.) He suggests that for sanctions to work, they would need to be used in advance of a conflict, as the US has begun doing to China, to limit the effectiveness of a potential hostile act, such as invading Taiwan.
The book looks at how the United States has used economic tools—particularly sanctions and financial dominance- as weapons to achieve its ends. The main theme is that chokepoints are essential but vulnerable places for transportation. Cutting them off means cutting off your enemies' vital supply lines. These have normally been thought of as physical, like the Bosphorus Straits, but in the last few decades have included chokepoints in the global economic system, most of which the United States now controls. The United States started small in both the aggressiveness of sanctions and the targets of them but eventually looked at bigger targets and more complex and damaging sanctions. It did this with or without consensus from the international community, but the power of its controls over the chokepoints forced most other countries to go along with it. However, weaponizing this control has and will cause other countries, even allies of the United States, to look for ways around those choke points to end American dominance. In essence, using the weapon will make it less effective in the future and also threaten the overall global economy. In addition, it has shown the way for other countries to use their own chokepoints to their own advantage, specifically China and rare earth minerals.
He finishes by arguing that because economic warfare is now so common, the USG should have a permanent apparatus to plan for it, as it does for military warfare. The US has always been afraid of ripple effects on the world economy, which would affect the US economy, so it has generally been conservative in how it used its economic weapons. Consistent study and preparation would allow these tools to be use more effectively.
He also suggests that economic warfare will ultimately undermine and perhaps destroy the globally interdependent economy. Economic chokepoints will probably be weakened as countries and companies look for alternatives that keep power out of a single entities hand. Alternatively, it is possible that economic rivalry/warfare will eventually move into military warfare.
Here are my takes on the the book:
It is divided into four major events that caused the US to enact increasingly complicated sanctions, along with an introduction and conclusion. The events are: Iran and nukes, Russia subverting Donbas, China and 5G technology, Russia invading Ukraine. It offers a lot of detail on the development of each, including the decision-making processes in the White House and the diplomacy associated with it.
Part One: Building the Chokepoints
This is largely the development of economic warfare, beginning after World War I, and the establishment of American economics dominance after WWII. The global trading system was designed and developed by the United States and, as a result, put the United States at the center of it, with control of the economic chokepoints. This included the dominance of the U.S. dollar, the establishment of financial institutions, originally around Bretton Woods, but later around access to SWIFT and access to the dollar as an exchange currency.
Economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War were effective in that it degraded his ability to produce WMDs, but it didn't significantly change his behavior. And it was expensive because it required US warships to actively search ships coming and going from Iraq. The Clinton Administration recognized that it had some powerful economic tools to use, but was hesitant to use them because it would make people wary of the US-centered global economic system. After 9-11, the Bush Administration started trying to stop Al-Queda's money transfers and was successful to some extent. Post-9-11 policy changes also transferred a lot of the Treasury Department's law enforcement duties to DHS, so Treasury had relatively little to do, until Bush wanted to put pressure on North Korea. They cut off a Chinese bank that was laundering money for the Kim regime from SWIFT, which cut of North Korea from the global economic system and, more importantly, showed the power the United States had on economic chokepoints. Future sanctions wouldn't need ships or the military, just US say-so.
Part Two: Iran and the Bomb
US Sanctions on Iran go back to the 1979 Hostage Crisis and basically cut off trade between the United States and Iran. As Iran started moving towards making nuclear weapons in the Bush Administration, it was clear that the US should to do something more, but didn't have the international cooperation it needed. Bush said that "we have sanctioned ourselves out of influence with Iran", suggesting that the United States had no more cards to play. But one of his officials, Stuart Levy, sought to find other ways to pressure Iran with new types of sanctions, beginning a new period of economic warfare.
These new weapons were really put to use in the Obama administration, helped by Obama's success in rallying Europeans and others around the world to further isolate Iran economically, aiming to bring it to the negotiating table. That was possible because of several Iranian provocations. This included a planned assassination of the Saudi ambassador in Washington and a very worrying speech by Iranian president Mahmoud Amadinejad at the UN. Pushed by Congress to get tougher, including amendments to appropriations bills that required increase sanctions, the Obama Administration, made possible by a Bush-holdover in Treasury, got creative in imposing secondary sanctions, which penalized companies that did business with Iran. Because access to the US market and financial system was much more valuable than anything Iran could offer, this worked well, but caused a lot of ill-will among European allies because it hearkened back to the Bush-era "you're with us or against us" diplomacy. To make that worse, Europeans disregarded American intelligence on Iran's nuclear program because of the huge miss on WMDs in Iraq. Ultimately, by 2013, Obama's sanctions team came to the consensus that it couldn't do much else and should try to use existing pressure to make a deal. The deal that had a few problems. It was hated by Iran-hawks in the Senate and by Israel's PM Benjamin Netanyahu. It didn't permanently end Iran's nuclear weapons program. It was actually quite difficult to get banks to work with Tehran again after working so hard to scare them into giving up that business. Nevertheless, sanctions worked where military force did not, even if imperfectly. This marked a significant moment because sanctions were the force behind getting a foreign government to change its behavior.
Part Three: Russia’s Imperial Land Grab
Following the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine, Russia used thinly veiled operatives, pretending to be independent of the Kremlin, to foment rebellion in several Ukrainian provinces with a majority of Russian speakers. Obama wanted to give Russia a reason to not expand the war, which meant hitting him where it hurt. The problem was that Russia's economy was much bigger than Iran's and Russia supplied Europe with a lot of oil and gas. There was fear that widespread sanctions, like those used on Iran, would send the global economy into a tailspin. Obama was naturally cautious and wanted to work in lockstep with European allies who were more vulnerable to effects of Russian sanctions. Obama's team came up with sanctioning individuals close to put and also cutting of key Russian economic institutions from western capital markets, hoping that it would be a slow burn that would put Putin under pressure without creating volatility in world markets. It prevented recapitalization in Russia and, coupled with falling oil prices, created a crisis for Putin, but not a decisive one. And it didn't change the situation in Donbas. However, Fishman argues that Obama didn't go for the kill, which allowed Russia to rebuild its economy to make it "sanction proof".
Part Four: China’s Bid for Technological Mastery
The story that China was stealing American technology is not new, nor is the story that it has many non-tariff barriers to trade that make it very difficult for foreign companies to get into the Chinese market. Presidents from Clinton to Obama tried to get China to open up as it integrated into the global trading system, but they never put significant pressure on China to force its hand. Obama feared that China was already integrated into the world economy so much that sanctions on it would have massive ripples across the world. Trump changed that for two reasons. First, although Trump spoke most often about the trade deficit with China, the US use of economic warfare against China was more about technology. The start came when a Chinese company, ZTE, was caught selling US technology to Iran, in spite of US sanctions. The Commerce Department put ZTE on "Entities List" of companies and individuals that are known to be acting against US national interests. This meant that ZTE couldn't get access to US technology, which of a technology company was essentially a death sentence. For some reason, Trump withdrew this sentence as a favor to Xi Jinping so ZTE survived.
The stakes jumped up with another Chinese company, Huawei, which produced "5G" technology and sold it around the world. The USG found that Huawei had built a backdoor into the system that could potentially give China a huge weapon in any conflict. It banned Huawei technology from being used in the US, but US allies, particularly Britain, were using Huawei to build their own infrastructure. The Trump administration couldn't convince those countries to drop Huawei because it had the best equipment at the best price, partially because of subsidies from the Chinese govt. The US felt the need to raise the stakes and found a chokepoint in US technology. While Huawei was an industry leader, a lot of its products relied on US technology, so cutting off any US technology from being sold to Huawei was a major blow to the company and suggested that it was not a reliable partner. As a result, most US friendly governments and companies stopped using Huawei.
There are a few differences in using economic weapons against China. First, the size of China's economy gave it a lot more leverage than other targets. It also made it difficult to attack China directly because of the codependence between the two countries. Second, the United States didn't use its powers of dominating economic commerce and banking. Instead, it used its dominance in technology as a weapon to freeze China, and specifically Huawei, out. Third, earlier sanctions against Russia and Iran were meant to force those countries to change their behavior. Trump envisioned these new sanctions as permanent, which meant he wasn't looking for a deal with China. This was restructuring the world trade system and decoupling United States from China. It is possible that Trump thought the world would break into two blocs, but there was a danger that the EU would not join the US and would form a third bloc.
Part Five: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
Fishman provides an in-depth look at the escalation of economic warfare following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Unlike previous economic warfare, the US had months to prep for this one because strong intelligence gave early notice of Putin's invasion of Ukraine. The Biden Administration had time to craft sanctions that would hurt Russia without severely damaging the world economy. The problem was that heavy sanctions were meant to deter Russia from invading, but saying what those sanctions were going to be would severely limit their effectiveness. Sanctioning the Russian Central Bank was unheard of, so Russia didn't prep for it, leaving hundreds of billions of dollars in reserves outside the country. This was devastating to Russia's economy but had the US threatened it in advance to scare Russia, Russia would have moved its reserves back under its own control. The US also cut Russia off from SWIFT, which basically cut Russia off from international banking.
Another problem was oil and gas. They made up about half of Russia's exports, so sanctioning that would severely hurt the Russian economy, but would also hurt the world economy by driving up gas prices. As long as Russia could continue to sell these, sanctions would be limited in their effect. There was also the problem of getting other countries to comply with US and EU sanctions, especially China. An attempt at the solution was to allow Russia to sell oil to the world economy, but to sanction any company that insured Russian oil shipments where the price was over $60 a barrel. This would allow oil to stay on the world markets without driving the price up and still limiting Russia's oil income. Surprisingly, this worked in so far as it hurt the Russian economy. But it didn't change Russian behavior. So, again, the west settled for degrading Russia's war-making ability by hurting its economy long term.
Part Six: The World Economic Rupture
The final part assesses the long-term implications of economic warfare on global trade, finance, and diplomacy. Fishman argues that economic sanctions have limited effectiveness because they take a long time for the effects to show. That makes it a poor deterrent. He also argues that using these chokepoints undermines their effectiveness and the global economy in general. No one wants to be at the mercy of the whims of the White House. On the other hand, China already uses access to its markets as a weapon (Australia for asking for an inquiry into the origins of Covid-19, Lithuania for allowing Taiwan to open an interest section in Vilnius), so many countries see that at least the United States don't use them for minor disagreements. (The book was written before Trump returned to the White House and got tariff happy, so Fishman didn't include America at its most capricious.) He suggests that for sanctions to work, they would need to be used in advance of a conflict, as the US has begun doing to China, to limit the effectiveness of a potential hostile act, such as invading Taiwan.
August 4, 2025
This is the best nonfiction book I’ve read in years. The author has a compelling narrative, like Hamilton’s “The Room Where It Happens,” showing us how the sausage of economic sanctions gets made. A really timely subject in today’s geopolitical landscape that will remain relevant for years to come.
December 28, 2025
one of the best books in the field of PPE I've read. descriptions of events were detailed, yet rather readable. extremely insightful given the author's background and career experiences. i also loved how the author brought in the perspectives of many different diplomats, bankers and lawyers and how their backgrounds contributed to the innovations they made in the field of economic warfare. this is definitely a book that i'll read again sometime down the line.
September 16, 2025
This book is amazing.
April 3, 2025
Great job of making a complex issue understandable while telling as a story. Thoroughly researched and thoughtfully analyzed, Fishman is a talent and a breath of fresh air if you like the politics of economic power. Surprisingly easy read that I thought would be boring but is anything but. Really couldn’t put it down.
March 27, 2025
This is my wheelhouse and I’m still so happy this book was written
March 25, 2025
An interesting, deeply informed look into how the U.S. wields economic power in the 21st century. Fishman expertly weaves together history, policy, and strategy to explain the rise of financial warfare and the critical role of the dollar in global affairs. Highly recommended for anyone interested in international relations, economics, or national security.
Read
December 7, 2025"Chokepoints: How the Global Economy Became a Weapon of War" explores how the United States learned to use the hidden pressure points of global commerce - financial networks, shipping lanes, and technological supply chains - as tools of modern conflict. The book argues that today's great-power struggles often unfold not through armies and bombs, but through regulations, sanctions, and the ability to block access to the world’s most essential economic systems. By following the evolution of American financial dominance and the way it has been leveraged against adversaries, the narrative shows how seemingly mundane systems - banking rails, semiconductor factories, and maritime insurance - have become some of the most potent instruments in geopolitics.
The story begins with the rise of the dollar. When President Nixon severed the dollar’s convertibility into gold in the 1970s, many feared the currency would weaken. Instead, the shift opened the door to a new global order. Deals with major oil exporters, especially Saudi Arabia, tied energy markets tightly to the dollar, ensuring that every country importing oil needed access to American financial institutions. As a result, the dollar became the backbone of world trade, and the banking networks running through the United States became unavoidable. These financial channels would later prove to be chokepoints - areas where the US could exert enormous leverage with relatively small actions.
For decades, however, American leaders avoided weaponizing the dollar. That restraint evaporated after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Under broad counterterrorism powers, the US Treasury began cutting off banks, individuals, and entire organizations from access to American financial systems. The case of Banco Delta Asia in 2005 demonstrated the power of this new strategy. By hinting that foreign institutions dealing with the small Macau bank might lose their access to the US network, Treasury spurred a chain reaction: Macau froze North Korean funds, banks across Asia severed ties with Pyongyang, and even North Korean officials admitted how deeply the pressure hurt. It was a preview of what economic chokepoints could achieve.
This tactic evolved dramatically in the effort to halt Iran’s nuclear program. With military options off the table, US officials crafted a series of increasingly sophisticated sanctions. They didn’t just target Iranian assets - they made Iran toxic to global finance. By linking Iranian banks to nuclear activity and terrorism, the US made foreign institutions view business with Iran as legally risky and financially dangerous. Massive fines reinforced the message. Soon, major banks around the world began avoiding Iran altogether. To further restrict Tehran, Congress pushed SWIFT - the global messaging system behind international payments - to disconnect Iranian financial institutions. Then, through legislation requiring that Iran’s oil revenues be held in overseas escrow accounts, the US prevented the regime from accessing the money it earned from selling oil. Iran could export energy, but the profits were locked abroad, untouchable. The resulting economic shock was severe enough to force the Iranian government back to the negotiating table, culminating in the 2015 nuclear agreement.
A different set of challenges emerged when Russia seized Crimea in 2014. Unlike Iran, Russia was deeply intertwined with the global economy. Conventional sanctions risked harming Europe as much as Moscow. Instead, US officials adopted a targeted strategy aimed at Russia’s reliance on Western credit. By preventing Russian state banks and energy giants from raising new debt in the US, the sanctions choked Russia’s ability to refinance its enormous obligations. The ruble collapsed, interest rates soared, and the Russian central bank scrambled to prop up the system. At the same time, a surge in US shale oil production drove global prices down, multiplying the economic strain on the Kremlin. Russia halted its broader ambitions in Ukraine, though it kept control of Crimea, revealing both the power and the limits of economic pressure.
Chokepoints also took shape in the realm of technology, most dramatically in the campaign against Huawei. When America’s closest allies began considering Huawei’s equipment for their 5G networks, US officials panicked. They viewed Huawei not as an ordinary company but as an extension of Chinese state power - a potential backdoor into global communications. The US responded by adding Huawei to the Entity List, which blocked American firms from selling it advanced chips and essential software. But the most devastating blow came from resurrecting and redefining the Foreign Direct Product Rule. By declaring that foreign-made semiconductors using US technology could not be sold to Huawei without a license, the rule triggered an industry-wide cutoff. TSMC, the world’s most advanced chipmaker, abandoned Huawei as a customer. Without access to cutting-edge chips, Huawei’s 5G ambitions began to unravel, and countries like the UK reversed earlier decisions and banned its equipment.
This approach set the stage for the West’s response during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Anticipating the attack, US and European officials designed sanctions ready to activate immediately. When Russian missiles struck Ukrainian cities, these measures cut major Russian banks off from the dollar system, froze assets, and halted Russia’s ability to obtain high-end semiconductors. In a historic move, Western governments even froze a huge share of Russia’s central bank reserves. The ruble crashed and panic spread through the Russian market. Yet oil profits continued to sustain the war machine, so the US and its allies introduced a novel mechanism: a price cap. Instead of banning Russian oil outright, they allowed it to be sold - but only below a set price, enforced by restricting access to Western shipping insurance. After initial delays in the Bosphorus as Turkish authorities verified compliance, the system settled into place. Oil kept flowing, preventing a global energy crisis, but Russia earned far less. Its revenues dropped dramatically, reshaping global oil markets in the process.
The book concludes by examining the uncertain future of economic warfare. The Biden administration’s sweeping export controls on China - designed to block Beijing’s access to the world’s most advanced chips - reflect a new philosophy in Washington. Rather than waiting for crises to erupt, the US is increasingly trying to prevent rivals from ever gaining certain strategic capabilities. This has sparked a global reassessment, with many nations seeking to diversify supply chains, reduce exposure to US financial pressure, or build alternative systems. At the same time, US leaders are debating how to pair punitive measures with positive incentives, such as friendshoring and targeted investment, to shape global behavior without relying solely on threats.
In the end, "Chokepoints: How the Global Economy Became a Weapon of War" suggests that as long as nations compete for influence, they will look for ways to turn economic interdependence into leverage. Economic coercion may be imperfect, but compared with military conflict, it remains vastly less destructive. Whether this era continues or collapses under intensifying geopolitical rivalry will shape not only future wars, but the structure of the global economy itself.
The story begins with the rise of the dollar. When President Nixon severed the dollar’s convertibility into gold in the 1970s, many feared the currency would weaken. Instead, the shift opened the door to a new global order. Deals with major oil exporters, especially Saudi Arabia, tied energy markets tightly to the dollar, ensuring that every country importing oil needed access to American financial institutions. As a result, the dollar became the backbone of world trade, and the banking networks running through the United States became unavoidable. These financial channels would later prove to be chokepoints - areas where the US could exert enormous leverage with relatively small actions.
For decades, however, American leaders avoided weaponizing the dollar. That restraint evaporated after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Under broad counterterrorism powers, the US Treasury began cutting off banks, individuals, and entire organizations from access to American financial systems. The case of Banco Delta Asia in 2005 demonstrated the power of this new strategy. By hinting that foreign institutions dealing with the small Macau bank might lose their access to the US network, Treasury spurred a chain reaction: Macau froze North Korean funds, banks across Asia severed ties with Pyongyang, and even North Korean officials admitted how deeply the pressure hurt. It was a preview of what economic chokepoints could achieve.
This tactic evolved dramatically in the effort to halt Iran’s nuclear program. With military options off the table, US officials crafted a series of increasingly sophisticated sanctions. They didn’t just target Iranian assets - they made Iran toxic to global finance. By linking Iranian banks to nuclear activity and terrorism, the US made foreign institutions view business with Iran as legally risky and financially dangerous. Massive fines reinforced the message. Soon, major banks around the world began avoiding Iran altogether. To further restrict Tehran, Congress pushed SWIFT - the global messaging system behind international payments - to disconnect Iranian financial institutions. Then, through legislation requiring that Iran’s oil revenues be held in overseas escrow accounts, the US prevented the regime from accessing the money it earned from selling oil. Iran could export energy, but the profits were locked abroad, untouchable. The resulting economic shock was severe enough to force the Iranian government back to the negotiating table, culminating in the 2015 nuclear agreement.
A different set of challenges emerged when Russia seized Crimea in 2014. Unlike Iran, Russia was deeply intertwined with the global economy. Conventional sanctions risked harming Europe as much as Moscow. Instead, US officials adopted a targeted strategy aimed at Russia’s reliance on Western credit. By preventing Russian state banks and energy giants from raising new debt in the US, the sanctions choked Russia’s ability to refinance its enormous obligations. The ruble collapsed, interest rates soared, and the Russian central bank scrambled to prop up the system. At the same time, a surge in US shale oil production drove global prices down, multiplying the economic strain on the Kremlin. Russia halted its broader ambitions in Ukraine, though it kept control of Crimea, revealing both the power and the limits of economic pressure.
Chokepoints also took shape in the realm of technology, most dramatically in the campaign against Huawei. When America’s closest allies began considering Huawei’s equipment for their 5G networks, US officials panicked. They viewed Huawei not as an ordinary company but as an extension of Chinese state power - a potential backdoor into global communications. The US responded by adding Huawei to the Entity List, which blocked American firms from selling it advanced chips and essential software. But the most devastating blow came from resurrecting and redefining the Foreign Direct Product Rule. By declaring that foreign-made semiconductors using US technology could not be sold to Huawei without a license, the rule triggered an industry-wide cutoff. TSMC, the world’s most advanced chipmaker, abandoned Huawei as a customer. Without access to cutting-edge chips, Huawei’s 5G ambitions began to unravel, and countries like the UK reversed earlier decisions and banned its equipment.
This approach set the stage for the West’s response during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Anticipating the attack, US and European officials designed sanctions ready to activate immediately. When Russian missiles struck Ukrainian cities, these measures cut major Russian banks off from the dollar system, froze assets, and halted Russia’s ability to obtain high-end semiconductors. In a historic move, Western governments even froze a huge share of Russia’s central bank reserves. The ruble crashed and panic spread through the Russian market. Yet oil profits continued to sustain the war machine, so the US and its allies introduced a novel mechanism: a price cap. Instead of banning Russian oil outright, they allowed it to be sold - but only below a set price, enforced by restricting access to Western shipping insurance. After initial delays in the Bosphorus as Turkish authorities verified compliance, the system settled into place. Oil kept flowing, preventing a global energy crisis, but Russia earned far less. Its revenues dropped dramatically, reshaping global oil markets in the process.
The book concludes by examining the uncertain future of economic warfare. The Biden administration’s sweeping export controls on China - designed to block Beijing’s access to the world’s most advanced chips - reflect a new philosophy in Washington. Rather than waiting for crises to erupt, the US is increasingly trying to prevent rivals from ever gaining certain strategic capabilities. This has sparked a global reassessment, with many nations seeking to diversify supply chains, reduce exposure to US financial pressure, or build alternative systems. At the same time, US leaders are debating how to pair punitive measures with positive incentives, such as friendshoring and targeted investment, to shape global behavior without relying solely on threats.
In the end, "Chokepoints: How the Global Economy Became a Weapon of War" suggests that as long as nations compete for influence, they will look for ways to turn economic interdependence into leverage. Economic coercion may be imperfect, but compared with military conflict, it remains vastly less destructive. Whether this era continues or collapses under intensifying geopolitical rivalry will shape not only future wars, but the structure of the global economy itself.
August 24, 2025
Feels like a competent extension of the last parts of Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology, to financial and oil sanctions. Consequently, with Iran and Russia in focus.
Some takeaways:
1. "Foreign direct product rule" is an extremely powerful weapon, e.g. destroyed Huawei's 5G dominance (though Huawei remains the global leader).
2. Public communication and actual reasons for policies can differ a lot e.g. hesitancy with sanctions on Iran communicated as need to align with allies, while actual reason was - avoiding economic fallout from rocketing oil prices (and the rocketing prices could paradoxically increase Iran's revenues). Similar, but more open considerations today with sanctions on Russia, e.g. when thinking about restricting its shadow fleet that circumvents price caps (price caps themselves an innovative form of sanctions).
3. Sanctions against industries, via chokepoints are much more impactful than sanctions against individuals, which are largely symbolic.
4. Russia's economic crisis management team has thus far been successful in preventing economy's collapse both after occupation of Crimea and since 2022. An island of competence in otherwise often mismanaged economy.
5. As one reviewer here says, from US perspective, "sanctions should be used like antibiotics". US constantly has tried to sanction and to not lose out economically: for oil - avoiding economic fallout through oil price shocks, for financial sanctions - the dollar's dominance, for chip sanctions - reliance of the world on US stack. Sanctions are usually considered against these competing objectives. Recent tariff wars by US are not nearly as considered, and my impression that they harm US ability to impose future sanctions a lot.
6. A little error on a topic close to me: Baltic countries' exports to Russia before annexation of Crimea were not 40% but 10-15% of their total exports. Haven't been 40% since the 90s.
Some takeaways:
1. "Foreign direct product rule" is an extremely powerful weapon, e.g. destroyed Huawei's 5G dominance (though Huawei remains the global leader).
2. Public communication and actual reasons for policies can differ a lot e.g. hesitancy with sanctions on Iran communicated as need to align with allies, while actual reason was - avoiding economic fallout from rocketing oil prices (and the rocketing prices could paradoxically increase Iran's revenues). Similar, but more open considerations today with sanctions on Russia, e.g. when thinking about restricting its shadow fleet that circumvents price caps (price caps themselves an innovative form of sanctions).
3. Sanctions against industries, via chokepoints are much more impactful than sanctions against individuals, which are largely symbolic.
4. Russia's economic crisis management team has thus far been successful in preventing economy's collapse both after occupation of Crimea and since 2022. An island of competence in otherwise often mismanaged economy.
5. As one reviewer here says, from US perspective, "sanctions should be used like antibiotics". US constantly has tried to sanction and to not lose out economically: for oil - avoiding economic fallout through oil price shocks, for financial sanctions - the dollar's dominance, for chip sanctions - reliance of the world on US stack. Sanctions are usually considered against these competing objectives. Recent tariff wars by US are not nearly as considered, and my impression that they harm US ability to impose future sanctions a lot.
6. A little error on a topic close to me: Baltic countries' exports to Russia before annexation of Crimea were not 40% but 10-15% of their total exports. Haven't been 40% since the 90s.
March 12, 2025
This book is a skeleton key to understanding what’s happening in the world today, from the tech war with China to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Best book on geopolitics I’ve ever read… and it reads like a novel!
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