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The Army of Alexander the Great
Alexander the Great is one of the most famous men in history, and many believe he was the greatest military genius of all time (Julius Caesar wept at the feet of his statue in envy of his achievements). Most of his thirteen year reign as king of Macedon was spent in hard campaigning which conquered half the known world, during which he was never defeated in open battle and never besieged a city he did not take. Yet, while biographies of Alexander abound, there are relatively few full-length books dedicated to the Macedonian army which made his dazzling conquests possible and which proved itself the most formidable machine of the age.
Stephen English investigates every aspect of the Macedonian forces, analysing the recruitment, equipment, organisation, tactics, command and control of the fighting arms (including the famous pike phalanxes, elite Hypaspists and incomparable Companion cavalry),Some of Alexander's most famous battles and sieges are described in detail to show the army in action. With forensic thoroughness he draws on recent archaeological evidence and scholarship to present a detailed portrait of the army which demonstrated a superiority over its opponents equal to (but much longer-lasting than) that enjoyed by the German forces in the blitzkrieg campaigns of 1939/40. Alexnader's navy is also covered.
- GenresGreece
270 pages, Kindle Edition
First published March 19, 2009
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
August 5, 2016
3 1/2 stars.
I couldn't wait to start reading this as Alexander happens to be one of my favorite historical figures and I couldn't understand how these books escaped my attention for so long.I have enjoyed reading,watching documentaries and learning about Alexander for some time and wondered why I had never seen anything like this series of books before.Fortunately,it was recommended to me.Just how fortunate I am though with regards to this book is debatable.
This covers probably almost every aspect of his army from heavy infantry to command structure.Highlights for me included siege engines,Thessalian calvary,equipment,companion cavalry,command structure and royal bodyguard.It does get technical with all the troop numbers and also with the construction of the siege engines.I just loved how the book was laid out with each section of the army receiving it's own chapter or heading.The photos in the middle of the book were amazing with the fourth-century sword reconstruction being a particular favorite of mine.
Now,for the not so amazing points.The author tends to come to his own conclusions at times instead of using All the sources available.The sources that best suit him(when he uses them) seem mostly to be in the Vulgate tradition of which I am not a fan. He also contradicts himself on a few occasions.One statement at the beginning mentions that Alexander frequently changed command officers to allow more flexibility in his men.Then he states later that Alexander only did this so that the focus of the men would be on himself only and not on a commanding officer.
I did like the book however, and this seems to be one of the few I have come across that's mainly focused on the army.
I couldn't wait to start reading this as Alexander happens to be one of my favorite historical figures and I couldn't understand how these books escaped my attention for so long.I have enjoyed reading,watching documentaries and learning about Alexander for some time and wondered why I had never seen anything like this series of books before.Fortunately,it was recommended to me.Just how fortunate I am though with regards to this book is debatable.
This covers probably almost every aspect of his army from heavy infantry to command structure.Highlights for me included siege engines,Thessalian calvary,equipment,companion cavalry,command structure and royal bodyguard.It does get technical with all the troop numbers and also with the construction of the siege engines.I just loved how the book was laid out with each section of the army receiving it's own chapter or heading.The photos in the middle of the book were amazing with the fourth-century sword reconstruction being a particular favorite of mine.
Now,for the not so amazing points.The author tends to come to his own conclusions at times instead of using All the sources available.The sources that best suit him(when he uses them) seem mostly to be in the Vulgate tradition of which I am not a fan. He also contradicts himself on a few occasions.One statement at the beginning mentions that Alexander frequently changed command officers to allow more flexibility in his men.Then he states later that Alexander only did this so that the focus of the men would be on himself only and not on a commanding officer.
I did like the book however, and this seems to be one of the few I have come across that's mainly focused on the army.
July 22, 2021
Book: The Army Of Alexander The Great
Author: Stephen English
Publisher: Pen & Sword History (19 March 2009)
Language: English
File size: 3042 KB
Print length: 207 pages
Price: 275/--
The calling of Alexander the Great is fundamentally one extensive and just about uninterrupted campaign lasting some eleven years. With this in mind, it is to some extent startling that his army has received comparatively diminutive consideration from modern scholars. Even his campaigns are underrepresented in the literature, with most choosing to write sparsely-veiled biographies of Alexander himself.
This book intends to redress the equilibrium supportive of the study of military history; despondently no longer trendy.
In conventional Hellenistic combat, until the Peloponnesian War, a phalanx was a heavily-armed mass of infantrymen who fought as a well-knit body. They wielded spears in their right hands and carried a large shield in their left. This led to the propensity described by Thucydides for men, to move not only forward, but to the right too, so as to gain greater fortification from the shield of the hoplite stationed in that position.
The hoplites that fought in these phalanxes were comparatively untrained, being citizens of the various city-states who were pressed into service as situations demanded.
The hoplite phalanx was consequently a rather inflexible body, more often than not incompetent of complex manoeuvres, although the actions of the Athenian hoplites at Marathon would tend to suggest that this was not always the case.
Alexander's army, like the Macedonian state, was run from the court, that always travelled with the king. This comprised a hundred or so courtiers, known as 'Personal Companions', or now and then just 'Companions'.
These Companions are distinctive from the Companion cavalry. The sources also refer to the king's 'Friends', which may be either the highest ranking of Personal Companion at court, or just another name for Personal Companions. In battle the Personal Companions fought alongside the king in the Royal Squadron of the Companion cavalry.
In Hellenistic times, the king would give his courtiers purple cloaks as a sign of their rank, and there is evidence that the practice was already established in Alexander's reign. Alexander often wore elaborate dress in battle, but he on the whole dressed in the uniform of an officer of the Companion cavalry.
The king ran the army from the royal tent, an impressive pavilion with a large chamber where the council of war met (perhaps separate from the main tent).
The royal tent also included a vestibule beyond which none could enter without passing Chares, the royal usher; the armoury (perhaps also separate from the main tent); and beyond the vestibule, the king's apartments where he slept and bathed. The tent was erected by its own work--party, commanded by a Macedonian called Proxenus.
The king was attended by his chamberlains, while the royal tent itself was guarded by a watch from the Bodyguards, and the area of the royal quarters was defended by a detachment of hypaspists (elite infantry).
Also accompanying the king would be an augur, to provide omens before battle.
Stephen English has divided his book into nine chapters: -
Chapter 1 - Macedonian Heavy Infantry
Chapter 2 - Hypaspists
Chapter 3 - Macedonian Cavalry
Chapter 4 - Thessalian Cavalry
Chapter 5 - Mercenaries and Allies
Chapter 6 - Mediterranean Fleets
Chapter 7 - Siege Engines
Chapter 8 - Command Structure
Chapter 9 - The Army in Action
The author of this book, at the very onset admits the fact that historians of any period are faced with the difficulties of historiography. And these difficulties are chiefly heightened for the ancient historian given the sequential fissure between us and our subject. This difficulty is magnified yet further with any study of Alexander, as the initial surviving source was written some 400 years after his death.
The surviving source material on Alexander is typically divided into two general groups, the first of which is commonly referred to as the ‘Vulgate Tradition’ (or derivatives thereof). The term does far more harm to these sources than is probably justified: they present a popular tradition and are represented by 1) Diodorus, 2) Curtius, 3) Pompeius Trogus (in the epitome of Justin) and 4) Plutarch. It is not proper to say that these sources are anti-Alexander, but they undoubtedly are not as sympathetic to Alexander as the other tradition, that represented by someline of the likes of Arrian.
The army that Alexander took to Asia in spring 334 was far from harmonized. The core was the army of Macedon, but added to this were groups supplied to the expeditionary force by the vassal princedoms on Macedon's borders - Paeonians, Agrianians, Triballians, Odrysians and Illyrians.
Alexander was also head of the Thessalian army and head of the League of Corinth, so the states of Greece supplied Alexander with contingents of infantry, cavalry and ships from their own armed forces.
Finally, the numbers of the force were swelled by a large number of mercenaries. Most of these were Greek, though some of Alexander's units of Balkan troops may also have been mercenaries. Given the historical animosity between the different peoples in the army, and the fact that the different groups could not for the main part communicate due to language differences, it is a tribute to the leadership of the army that racial tensions were kept low enough for it to function.
At the highest level the army was commanded by its staff officers, the Royal Bodyguards, and by other generals. The army often divided into a number of divisions (moirai) , particularly during the later campaigns, and a general would be appointed to command each division. It was usual for these generals to retain direct command of an individual taxis too, so many of the infantry taxeis were commanded by generals rather than taxiarcbs. Below the generals were the rest of the officers selected from Macedonian aristocratic families.
Command of individual units was very much a family affair: many of the units seem to have been commanded by members of families prominent in the area where they had been recruited. Command was centralized. The king himself would give the army its orders. These were given by trumpet signals, first by Alexander's trumpeter, and then taken up by the trumpeters attached to each unit.
The ile (squadron) of 200 men in four tetrarchies continued to be the building block of the cavalry. A number of ilai, usually two, three or four, might be formed into a cavalry brigade, hipparchy, commanded by a hipparch. At first the number of squadrons per brigade was variable, but later on the system became more standardized.
Each cavalryman was allowed a groom, who might have been mounted, to look after his horse and equipment. The grooms were stationed behind the squadron in battle.
The cavalrymen owned their own horses, though it was customary for a man drafted into the cavalry to be granted an initial sum to enable him to buy a mount of suitable quality. Horses lost in action were replaced from the pool of remounts, a system run by the Secretary for Cavalry. He had a difficult job as huge numbers of horses died in battle, and in an age before horseshoes, a horse could easily be ruined by a long march. At Gaugamela, the cavalry, 7,000 strong, lost 1,000 horses; nearly one in three of the Companion cavalry lost theirs.
Commandeering was used to obtain remounts locally, but more usually it was the duty of provincial governors to procure horses and send them to the remount pool. Many cities or provinces paid tribute on the hoof. In the last resort, recourse had to be made to sequestration of surplus mounts within the army itself.
Alexander’s conquests remain some of the most extraordinary in the whole of the annals of military history. By his actions, and those of his army, he has gained a measure of immortality that few ever achieve.
Alexander replaced the Phrygian helmet with the Boeotian helmet. Cavalry helmets on the Alexander sarcophagus and mosaic seem to show insignia of rank. Horsehair 'tails', gold or silver wreaths and the silvering of the helmet could all have indicated different ranks, although Alexander was known to give gold crowns to his troops for bravery, which could be an alternative, though less likely, explanation for the wreaths. Bracelets were also worn as badges of rank, as they were by the Persians.
The long cavalry spear (xyston), though made of strong cornel wood, often shattered in action, so was fitted with a second spear--head at the butt to allow the trooper to continue fighting. The xyston was used to stab at the faces of enemy riders and horses. The sword, a secondary weapon, was slung under the left arm.
The aristocratic cavalrymen may have chosen to use their own highly decorated swords. Greek cavalry did not carry shields at this time, although it was normal for generals to be accompanied by their personal shield--bearers to enable them to fight on foot if necessary.
Some cavalrymen wore only a short--sleeved tunic, but most wore a long-sleeved outer tunic over the first. The heavy cavalry - Companion, Thessalian and allied - were issued with cuirasses. The cuirass was made of small metal plates, linked together, lined or covered with leather or linen, which made the cuirass resilient but flexible.
In the early campaigns, Alexander himself hardly ever wore a cuirass, and this may have been extensively copied by the young nobles in the cavalry, especially in the Companion cavalry. Cavalry boots seem to have been standard throughout the cavalry. It is possible that saddle cloths, made of a shaggy felt--like material, were dyed in the regimental colour and faced in the squadron colour, but this is speculative. Over the saddle cloth a pantherskin saddle cloth was sometimes seen, perhaps restricted just to officers. Persian saddle cloths were sometimes used.
These probably do not represent booty, as highly decorated Persian saddle cloths were much favoured by the aristocracy and had long been a luxury import into the Greek world.
This book, all the way through the first eight chapters scrutinizes Alexander’s army, its composition and configuration.
The very last chapter, points at a discussion of Alexander’s campaigns. While the initial sections of the book shows the reader the tools that enabled Alexander to achieve empire, the last section is an analysis of how the Macedonian was able to conquer the largest, richest and most powerful empire the western world had yet seen; and do it in a matter of only three or four years.
This dating assumes that the Persian Empire was defeated with the Battle of Gaugamela in 331, some resistance did still remained after this point, conspicuously in the northeast of the former empire.
Alexander’s campaigns were many and diverse, encompassing mountain warfare, minor skirmishes, massive set-piece battles, great sieges and guerrilla actions. In a very short career, Alexander experienced every form of warfare that the ancient world had to offer (although his naval experience was limited to the siege of Tyre), and adapted his schemes radiantly every time he was presented with a new challenge.
Given the extent of Alexander’s battles, the author analyzes only three of his seminal campaigns: the Balkans, Issus and Tyre. Within these three campaigns he shows Alexander at his most sparkling. The reader also comes home to the depths of the preparation, restraint and flair possessed by the army and some of its key components.
Philip of Macedon inherited a shambles of a kingdom; beset on all sides by enemies and with its army having suffered a massive recent defeat. Within the space of thirty-five years the Macedonian state rose to rule the majority of the known world, having conquered the largest and most powerful empire the world had yet seen: Persia.
What do we then take away from this tome? We carry off the following points:
1) Alexander’s real genius was two-fold: firstly, the capacity to modify a relatively small parcel of strategies and tactics to meet the needs of every situation, every enemy and every type of terrain that he encountered; secondly, it was his ability to truly inspire men to ever greater achievements: his men showed repeatedly that they would do almost anything for their king and only finally said ‘no more’ when they had reached the very ends of the earth in India.
2) The life of Alexander is an incredible nexus of events that is nigh on unequaled in history. Alexander was, possibly, the finest military mind the world had yet seen: coupled with this was his bequest from his father of one of the greatest armies of the ancient world.
3) Had Alexander been born in less promising circumstances, we can only imagine how very unusual history would have been. The two factors – intellect and situation – combined to enable the Macedonians to create, in less than a decade, an empire that spanned the known world. Hence, Alexander’s triumphs are legendary and worthy of study: rightly so.
4) Philip and Alexander showed themselves capable of adapting to any new conditions and of overcoming any hindrance placed in their path, be it natural or artificial. Once they crossed the Hellespont, most of the army did not see Greece again for 11 years; the fact that the army showed very few signs of displeasure or revolt until the ‘Opis mutiny’, displays their own discipline and belief in the campaign, as well as Alexander’s implausible personal magnetism and leadership aptitude.
This book very effectively puts forth to the reader the story of a significant turn around which was achieved by use of military ploys and application.
Philip and Alexander forged an army that was unparalleled in the ancient world, an army that was capable of campaigning at any time of year and in any terrain that Greece or Persia had to offer.
If you are into military history, this book is intended for you. Volume is of little import, you see!! This 200 odd page book, packs a real punch.
Grab a copy if you choose.
Author: Stephen English
Publisher: Pen & Sword History (19 March 2009)
Language: English
File size: 3042 KB
Print length: 207 pages
Price: 275/--
The calling of Alexander the Great is fundamentally one extensive and just about uninterrupted campaign lasting some eleven years. With this in mind, it is to some extent startling that his army has received comparatively diminutive consideration from modern scholars. Even his campaigns are underrepresented in the literature, with most choosing to write sparsely-veiled biographies of Alexander himself.
This book intends to redress the equilibrium supportive of the study of military history; despondently no longer trendy.
In conventional Hellenistic combat, until the Peloponnesian War, a phalanx was a heavily-armed mass of infantrymen who fought as a well-knit body. They wielded spears in their right hands and carried a large shield in their left. This led to the propensity described by Thucydides for men, to move not only forward, but to the right too, so as to gain greater fortification from the shield of the hoplite stationed in that position.
The hoplites that fought in these phalanxes were comparatively untrained, being citizens of the various city-states who were pressed into service as situations demanded.
The hoplite phalanx was consequently a rather inflexible body, more often than not incompetent of complex manoeuvres, although the actions of the Athenian hoplites at Marathon would tend to suggest that this was not always the case.
Alexander's army, like the Macedonian state, was run from the court, that always travelled with the king. This comprised a hundred or so courtiers, known as 'Personal Companions', or now and then just 'Companions'.
These Companions are distinctive from the Companion cavalry. The sources also refer to the king's 'Friends', which may be either the highest ranking of Personal Companion at court, or just another name for Personal Companions. In battle the Personal Companions fought alongside the king in the Royal Squadron of the Companion cavalry.
In Hellenistic times, the king would give his courtiers purple cloaks as a sign of their rank, and there is evidence that the practice was already established in Alexander's reign. Alexander often wore elaborate dress in battle, but he on the whole dressed in the uniform of an officer of the Companion cavalry.
The king ran the army from the royal tent, an impressive pavilion with a large chamber where the council of war met (perhaps separate from the main tent).
The royal tent also included a vestibule beyond which none could enter without passing Chares, the royal usher; the armoury (perhaps also separate from the main tent); and beyond the vestibule, the king's apartments where he slept and bathed. The tent was erected by its own work--party, commanded by a Macedonian called Proxenus.
The king was attended by his chamberlains, while the royal tent itself was guarded by a watch from the Bodyguards, and the area of the royal quarters was defended by a detachment of hypaspists (elite infantry).
Also accompanying the king would be an augur, to provide omens before battle.
Stephen English has divided his book into nine chapters: -
Chapter 1 - Macedonian Heavy Infantry
Chapter 2 - Hypaspists
Chapter 3 - Macedonian Cavalry
Chapter 4 - Thessalian Cavalry
Chapter 5 - Mercenaries and Allies
Chapter 6 - Mediterranean Fleets
Chapter 7 - Siege Engines
Chapter 8 - Command Structure
Chapter 9 - The Army in Action
The author of this book, at the very onset admits the fact that historians of any period are faced with the difficulties of historiography. And these difficulties are chiefly heightened for the ancient historian given the sequential fissure between us and our subject. This difficulty is magnified yet further with any study of Alexander, as the initial surviving source was written some 400 years after his death.
The surviving source material on Alexander is typically divided into two general groups, the first of which is commonly referred to as the ‘Vulgate Tradition’ (or derivatives thereof). The term does far more harm to these sources than is probably justified: they present a popular tradition and are represented by 1) Diodorus, 2) Curtius, 3) Pompeius Trogus (in the epitome of Justin) and 4) Plutarch. It is not proper to say that these sources are anti-Alexander, but they undoubtedly are not as sympathetic to Alexander as the other tradition, that represented by someline of the likes of Arrian.
The army that Alexander took to Asia in spring 334 was far from harmonized. The core was the army of Macedon, but added to this were groups supplied to the expeditionary force by the vassal princedoms on Macedon's borders - Paeonians, Agrianians, Triballians, Odrysians and Illyrians.
Alexander was also head of the Thessalian army and head of the League of Corinth, so the states of Greece supplied Alexander with contingents of infantry, cavalry and ships from their own armed forces.
Finally, the numbers of the force were swelled by a large number of mercenaries. Most of these were Greek, though some of Alexander's units of Balkan troops may also have been mercenaries. Given the historical animosity between the different peoples in the army, and the fact that the different groups could not for the main part communicate due to language differences, it is a tribute to the leadership of the army that racial tensions were kept low enough for it to function.
At the highest level the army was commanded by its staff officers, the Royal Bodyguards, and by other generals. The army often divided into a number of divisions (moirai) , particularly during the later campaigns, and a general would be appointed to command each division. It was usual for these generals to retain direct command of an individual taxis too, so many of the infantry taxeis were commanded by generals rather than taxiarcbs. Below the generals were the rest of the officers selected from Macedonian aristocratic families.
Command of individual units was very much a family affair: many of the units seem to have been commanded by members of families prominent in the area where they had been recruited. Command was centralized. The king himself would give the army its orders. These were given by trumpet signals, first by Alexander's trumpeter, and then taken up by the trumpeters attached to each unit.
The ile (squadron) of 200 men in four tetrarchies continued to be the building block of the cavalry. A number of ilai, usually two, three or four, might be formed into a cavalry brigade, hipparchy, commanded by a hipparch. At first the number of squadrons per brigade was variable, but later on the system became more standardized.
Each cavalryman was allowed a groom, who might have been mounted, to look after his horse and equipment. The grooms were stationed behind the squadron in battle.
The cavalrymen owned their own horses, though it was customary for a man drafted into the cavalry to be granted an initial sum to enable him to buy a mount of suitable quality. Horses lost in action were replaced from the pool of remounts, a system run by the Secretary for Cavalry. He had a difficult job as huge numbers of horses died in battle, and in an age before horseshoes, a horse could easily be ruined by a long march. At Gaugamela, the cavalry, 7,000 strong, lost 1,000 horses; nearly one in three of the Companion cavalry lost theirs.
Commandeering was used to obtain remounts locally, but more usually it was the duty of provincial governors to procure horses and send them to the remount pool. Many cities or provinces paid tribute on the hoof. In the last resort, recourse had to be made to sequestration of surplus mounts within the army itself.
Alexander’s conquests remain some of the most extraordinary in the whole of the annals of military history. By his actions, and those of his army, he has gained a measure of immortality that few ever achieve.
Alexander replaced the Phrygian helmet with the Boeotian helmet. Cavalry helmets on the Alexander sarcophagus and mosaic seem to show insignia of rank. Horsehair 'tails', gold or silver wreaths and the silvering of the helmet could all have indicated different ranks, although Alexander was known to give gold crowns to his troops for bravery, which could be an alternative, though less likely, explanation for the wreaths. Bracelets were also worn as badges of rank, as they were by the Persians.
The long cavalry spear (xyston), though made of strong cornel wood, often shattered in action, so was fitted with a second spear--head at the butt to allow the trooper to continue fighting. The xyston was used to stab at the faces of enemy riders and horses. The sword, a secondary weapon, was slung under the left arm.
The aristocratic cavalrymen may have chosen to use their own highly decorated swords. Greek cavalry did not carry shields at this time, although it was normal for generals to be accompanied by their personal shield--bearers to enable them to fight on foot if necessary.
Some cavalrymen wore only a short--sleeved tunic, but most wore a long-sleeved outer tunic over the first. The heavy cavalry - Companion, Thessalian and allied - were issued with cuirasses. The cuirass was made of small metal plates, linked together, lined or covered with leather or linen, which made the cuirass resilient but flexible.
In the early campaigns, Alexander himself hardly ever wore a cuirass, and this may have been extensively copied by the young nobles in the cavalry, especially in the Companion cavalry. Cavalry boots seem to have been standard throughout the cavalry. It is possible that saddle cloths, made of a shaggy felt--like material, were dyed in the regimental colour and faced in the squadron colour, but this is speculative. Over the saddle cloth a pantherskin saddle cloth was sometimes seen, perhaps restricted just to officers. Persian saddle cloths were sometimes used.
These probably do not represent booty, as highly decorated Persian saddle cloths were much favoured by the aristocracy and had long been a luxury import into the Greek world.
This book, all the way through the first eight chapters scrutinizes Alexander’s army, its composition and configuration.
The very last chapter, points at a discussion of Alexander’s campaigns. While the initial sections of the book shows the reader the tools that enabled Alexander to achieve empire, the last section is an analysis of how the Macedonian was able to conquer the largest, richest and most powerful empire the western world had yet seen; and do it in a matter of only three or four years.
This dating assumes that the Persian Empire was defeated with the Battle of Gaugamela in 331, some resistance did still remained after this point, conspicuously in the northeast of the former empire.
Alexander’s campaigns were many and diverse, encompassing mountain warfare, minor skirmishes, massive set-piece battles, great sieges and guerrilla actions. In a very short career, Alexander experienced every form of warfare that the ancient world had to offer (although his naval experience was limited to the siege of Tyre), and adapted his schemes radiantly every time he was presented with a new challenge.
Given the extent of Alexander’s battles, the author analyzes only three of his seminal campaigns: the Balkans, Issus and Tyre. Within these three campaigns he shows Alexander at his most sparkling. The reader also comes home to the depths of the preparation, restraint and flair possessed by the army and some of its key components.
Philip of Macedon inherited a shambles of a kingdom; beset on all sides by enemies and with its army having suffered a massive recent defeat. Within the space of thirty-five years the Macedonian state rose to rule the majority of the known world, having conquered the largest and most powerful empire the world had yet seen: Persia.
What do we then take away from this tome? We carry off the following points:
1) Alexander’s real genius was two-fold: firstly, the capacity to modify a relatively small parcel of strategies and tactics to meet the needs of every situation, every enemy and every type of terrain that he encountered; secondly, it was his ability to truly inspire men to ever greater achievements: his men showed repeatedly that they would do almost anything for their king and only finally said ‘no more’ when they had reached the very ends of the earth in India.
2) The life of Alexander is an incredible nexus of events that is nigh on unequaled in history. Alexander was, possibly, the finest military mind the world had yet seen: coupled with this was his bequest from his father of one of the greatest armies of the ancient world.
3) Had Alexander been born in less promising circumstances, we can only imagine how very unusual history would have been. The two factors – intellect and situation – combined to enable the Macedonians to create, in less than a decade, an empire that spanned the known world. Hence, Alexander’s triumphs are legendary and worthy of study: rightly so.
4) Philip and Alexander showed themselves capable of adapting to any new conditions and of overcoming any hindrance placed in their path, be it natural or artificial. Once they crossed the Hellespont, most of the army did not see Greece again for 11 years; the fact that the army showed very few signs of displeasure or revolt until the ‘Opis mutiny’, displays their own discipline and belief in the campaign, as well as Alexander’s implausible personal magnetism and leadership aptitude.
This book very effectively puts forth to the reader the story of a significant turn around which was achieved by use of military ploys and application.
Philip and Alexander forged an army that was unparalleled in the ancient world, an army that was capable of campaigning at any time of year and in any terrain that Greece or Persia had to offer.
If you are into military history, this book is intended for you. Volume is of little import, you see!! This 200 odd page book, packs a real punch.
Grab a copy if you choose.
January 16, 2018
A great book if you want to know the composition of Alexander The Great's army, the training, the weapons, and the general strategy of combat. The author closes in the last chapter with a brief look at the army in action during three different battles. All in all, a very interesting book, however there's so many names that are hard to pounce that it can get a big confusing. Not really the author's fault, though.
May 22, 2021
Despite the generic name, English is unlike those other leeches from the Academia. He is the one person who has evaluated the original diagrams used by Alexander's generals and he has watched countless of video footage so he knows what he is writing about. His caste of paper pushers usually sells fairy tales with speculations based on fragments of texts that might as well been the product of ”The Onion” or some antique ”Saturday Night Live”.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews