Curated analysis of the incentives arriving from business contracts. Relatively short and touches upon a limited aperture of topics but covers them well through examples followed by analysis.
Takeaways: - Ex-ante information asymmetries between buyer and seller have powerful impacts on the deal making process. A buyer must protect against the seller’s information advantage, and as a result sellers must behave with careful consideration for the way in which actions will be interpreted by the buyer - Ex-post uncertainty and the way it is handled, is the most important quality of a strong contract. While impossible in practice, a great contract covers actions in the vast array of future states of the world. - A ROFR, which gives a right to match any external bids in a sale process, can stymie the process as potential buyers must be convinced to do work. Additionally, at whatever price is chosen, the entity with the ROFR right has chosen not to invest. The buyer may not like having paid a price that an insider has decided was too high.
6,5/10 Zeer interessant boek voor mensen die geïnteresseerd zijn in zowel de juridische als de economische kant van overeenkomsten. Het is perfect om de basis van dealmaking te begrijpen en alle aspecten die ermee gepaard gaan maar als je al bepaalde kennis hebt over het onderwerp kan het soms te oppervlakkig voelen. Het is een goede syllabus die uitleg geeft over overeenkomsten, vanaf de eerste onderhandelingen tot het einde van een overeenkomst waarbij telkens veel echte voorbeelden worden gegeven om het nog duidelijker te maken.
Concise book designed as a textbook for the introductory part of the classic Columbia Law School "deals course," written by the people who adapted that course for classes at Stanford. Good discussion, laden with real-world examples, of how better designed contracts can increase value for both sides. Good for students or transactional lawyers. Not for litigators.