The Good War: Why We Couldn't Win the War or the Peace in Afghanistan

by Jack Fairweather

In its earliest days, the American-led war in Afghanistan appeared to be a triumph—a “good war”—in comparison to the debacle in Iraq. It has since turned into one of the longest and most costly wars in U.S. history. The story of how
this good war went so bad may well turn out to be a defining tragedy of the 21st century—yet as acclaimed war correspondent Jack Fairweather explains, it should also give us reason to hope for an outcome grounded in Afghan reality, rather than our own.

In The Good War, Fairweather provides the first full narrative history of the war in Afghanistan, from its inception after 9/11 to the drawdown in 2014. Drawing on hundreds of interviews, previously unpublished archives, and months of reporting in Afghanistan, Fairweather explores the righteous intentions and astounding hubris that caused the American strategy in Afghanistan to flounder, refuting the long-held notion that the war could have been won with more troops and cash. Fairweather argues that only by accepting the limitations in Afghanistan—from the presence of the Taliban to the ubiquity of the opium trade to the country’s unsuitability for rapid, Western-style development—can America help to restore peace in this shattered land.

A timely lesson in the perils of nation-building and a sobering reminder of the limits of American power, The Good War leads readers from the White House situation room to American military outposts, from warlords’ palaces to insurgents’ dens, to explain how the U.S. and its allies might have salvaged the Afghan campaign—and how we must rethink other “good” wars in the future.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, Middle East, Politics, Military History

416 pages, Hardcover

First published August 7, 2014

About the author

Jack Fairweather, is a British journalist and author.

He has been a correspondent for the Washington Post and the Daily Telegraph, where he served as the Baghdad and Persian Gulf bureau chief of British troops. His reporting during the Iraq War earned him Britain’s top press award.

Reviews

[Jodee · Rating 4 out of 5]

War will always be examined and critiqued for the causalities, failures and lost missions. Lessons learned will end up in scholarly analysis to identify the decisions made and how they ultimately affected the outcome of initial missions. The overall hope of such analysis is to go forward and not create the same mistakes of those in the past. Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region surrounding those areas of strife create much talk about failed decision points. The book “The Good War: Why We Couldn’t Win the War or the Peace in Afghanistan” by Jack Fairweather delves into what went wrong on the various mission attempts by a vast variety of players in Afghanistan. As a prominent war reporter, specifically on Afghanistan, Fairweather utilized his in depth compilation of knowledge, interviews and interactions from the inside to create a visual understanding of how all the pieces of Afghanistan fell together or in reality fell apart. His inside look allows a somewhat neutral view on the overall details of how and why Afghanistan has not been a successful mission for the Western nations. The title of Fairweather’s book helps portray his general interpretation of what manifested in the context of Afghanistan during the past decades. Rather the mission was war or peace; the end result still remained the same. It was a loss for more than just the Afghanistans; all those involved have lost something in the struggle to gain success.

The greatest argument that Fairweather presents in this particular book is the multinational collaboration that misunderstood what was needed to bring success to Afghanistan. His argument presented several layers of failures. The failures were not any one specific Nation, effort, individual or response. Overall, from the viewpoint of Fairweather, the failure was systemic mishaps and lack of knowledge within the region. This insight and perspective view of the region and Afghanistan War brings many “aha” moments to the open minded reader. Regardless of what lane the reader is coming from in the text of Fairweather, one can honestly see a fair review of several failures on all parties involved. Even with the frustrating realities as a reader, one can see a broader examination into the events which shaped the here and now of Afghanistan. Fairweather offers a front row seat to the intricate details in a manner that seems reasonable and impartial to all Nations. He doesn’t pick on any particular Nation more than others but merely points out how ill knowledge decisions became bad choices.

[Vikas Datta · Rating 5 out of 5]

Another absorbing account of the West's self-created morass in Afghanistan

[Jeff Swystun · Rating 5 out of 5]

So, here we are in 2021. Western powers have formally withdrawn from Afghanistan and the Taliban have basically retaken the country. Comparisons and photos liken it to South Vietnam in 1973. Trillions of dollars were spent and a death toll achieved that we are strangely comfortable to accept. We are getting really good at moving onto the next loss of life either due to war, disease, or natural disaster.

What is amazing about this book is it was written in 2014. Author Fairweather brilliantly documents, details and dissects all that went wrong over the first 12 years of the war. It is extremely well written and reasoned. What makes the book most relevant is how he rightfully weaves in the overlapping conflict in Iraq. The Brits and Yanks were actually fighting a two-front war for years and how they prosecuted each influenced the other resulting in poor and dangerous strategies. Not to mention the fact, that their militaries were stretched in two theatres that allowed more dangerous global threats (Russia and China) to make serious inroads.

There was both a bloodlust and an impatient reaction to 9/11. America was definitely wounded and Western nations felt under threat from all things Muslim, all things not properly understood. The villains were everywhere it seemed. The arguments and decisions for both wars now appear dubious if not downright stupid. I was a supporter of my country, Canada, entering Afghanistan and proud that we saw through the Iraqi invasion for what it was. Now I question both in larger measures.

Why did coalition forces take on the whole of Afghanistan? We stupidly believed the Taliban and Al Qaeda were one in the same. It would have made more sense to hunt down the latter with the assistance of certain Afghan warlords and Pakistan (more on that country in a bit). Instead, the argument was we need to attack all extremists and the game plan was pacification and nation-building. We now know those efforts are unsustainable unless you are invited into the conflict zone.

Comparisons to Vietnam have their place. The length of both wars is the clearest indicator that it was not working. Many NATO officials believed it would take 30 years to have lasting impact. The hearts and minds doctrine was a joke in application in Afghanistan. It basically equated to billions of aid dollars that were siphoned off in prodigious amounts. By his own account, the author shares that by 2009 of the 100 billion spend on reconstruction, only 15% made it to the intended projects.

Also like Vietnam, coalition forces were rotated out after six months thus eroding any experience and institutional knowledge to fight the war. Meanwhile, American personnel were seeing their tours extended by a year or 15 months resulting in many soldiers turning to a diet of antidepressants. And all the training of local Afghans to fight went way worse than that of the ARVN.

The biggest and mostly costly error was, once committed, the Western nations were unable or unwilling to decode the tribal factions and their motivations. Afghanistan is one country on maps only. It breaks down to hundreds of different communities to such an extent that it makes the complexity of Yugoslavia’s disintegration look simple.

The Taliban had and has a potent brand and “maintains a powerful ideological cohesion”. They materialize and drift away. Constitute, dissolve and reconstitute. They are not a monolithic enemy that the West prepares for and prefers to fight.

The author certainly criticizes American strategy but acknowledges their commitment of men and materiel. In the same breath, he does a great job of showing that the American military is challenged to learn and adapt. Think back to the terrible period of deterioration in the war. Every day the news covered a new IED incident. These maimed as much as they killed. Upwards of 80% of coalition forces casualties resulted from IEDs.

Fairweather documents the inertia within the British and American militaries to invest quickly in mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles or MRAPs. Both armies were in long drawn out procurement processes for futuristic networked vehicles and equipment. Neither shut those down to pivot to the current threat. I have a family relation, a US marine, who was deployed to Afghanistan. His job largely was to weld metal panels on humvees as a stop gap.

When Robert Gates took over from Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense in 2006, he fast tracked the purchase and shipping of 11,500 MRAPs over two years. A further 8,000 would be added over the next sixteen months representing “the largest defense procurement program since World War II.” Deaths from IEDs fell by 90% in 2007.

And do you remember the surges? Escalation is not a change in strategy, it is doubling down on the same approach in a grander way. It worked for a time in Iraq but was massively costly. It did not work in Afghanistan.

The Brits get hammered in the book for trying to punch above their weight to demonstrate power on the world stage. Their command structure’s arrogance and incompetence is laid bare. And a surprising desire to cut and run in both wars that got tangled up in politics, public opinion and military leadership shows a terrible miscalculation. Their Colonel Blimp image was rekindled through silly efforts like having Eton donate rowing skiffs to Afghanistan. Meanwhile in 2009, they had just 30 choppers to support 8,000 distributed troops.

Canada too, is criticized for poor planning and equipping of their forces. I remember our men arriving in 2002 in their bright green relish camouflage that stood out nicely on the local topography. In the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa while the war still waged, one exhibit showcased one the military’s thinly armoured Iltis jeeps that was now twisted and ruined by an IED. I stared at this for a long time then watched my fellow citizens walk by appreciating the destruction but not parsing the lesson.

The war and the book raise so many questions. Why not drop a couple of big bombs within Pakistan as they were basically puppet masters? American was doing a few drone strikes but Pakistan and its intelligence agency were horribly guilty for complicating and extending the hostilities. Where were the Taliban getting munitions? Sure, every home had an AK leftover the from the Soviets and RPGs were prevalent but that does not explain it. Follow the munitions would have been a worthwhile strategy.

I was amazed to learn that American General McChrystal (he became a sideshow and was disgraced in the press) discovered during his time that “swathes of the country were relatively peaceful.” 60 out of 398 districts were hot. These 60 “also happened to be those with the heaviest concentrations of western troops.” That should tell the most green intelligence officer a whole lot.

In profiling one battle (that of Wanat), Fairweather calls it, “poorly conceived and terribly executed.” That line describes the entire conflict.

[Ben Manifold · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fairweather provides a comprehensive, insightful overview of the Afghanistan War. Highlighting the complexities of the country, the contradictions in policy and politics, and the devastation which ensued - it's a must read for those seeking to gain a deeper appreciation of what the US, UK, and allied presence in Afghanistan was and is.

[Elgin · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very eye-opening book about the motivations, personalities, successes, and failures of the people, countries, and private enterprises involved in the Afghanistan war. Overall this is a very informative history of the war from the perspective of the West. When the war started I thought "how can we hope to impose a western government on an Islamic nation?" (I had the same thoughts about Iraq.) Fairweather reveals how very little the war architects (Rumsfeld, Bush, etc.) knew or wanted to know about Afghan society, and the degree to which the war was seen not as a chance to help an improvised nation, but rather as a chance to build personal resumes. US military leaders seemed more interested in playing soldier than trying to work out strategies that would work in Afghan society, the British were interested only in showing that they had a "military to be reckoned with", and political figures in Western countries were interested on only doing the bare minimum to be seen as "contributing" to the war effort. All in all a pretty damning assessment of the minds and decision makers behind the war effort.

While I felt that Fairweather did a nice job of addressing the Western people, effort, and motivations, I did not feel that I learned much about the Afghan point of view. There was s good deal about Karzai, but very little about the thoughts and motivations of the Taliban, Afghan war lords, and the Afghan people. Fairweather wrote about the anti-American and anti-British feelings of the people but very little about what they wanted or needed (at least initially) from the west?

After finishing the book I was still asking the question: Could this war have been a success with a different approach from the West, or does the Afghan tribal society and the role of Islam make this a problem that cannot be effectively addressed by the West?

[Jonathan Green · Rating 5 out of 5]

With searing narrative drive and the pace of a novelist, Jack Fairweather, fast becoming one of the great modern military historians, writes of the folly that has led to Afghanistan becoming a graveyard for US and UK military intervention. Fairweather has both a cutting intelligence and a remarkable grasp of context but also a lucid style that essays one of the most stunning accounts of the Afghan war and the mistakes that led to the impasse we are now at. Fairweather stands as a unique voice: both understanding war (he is a war correspondent) but also making clear his stance that war itself in this instance is folly. This joins other legendary war chronicles on my shelf like Michael Herr's Dispatches and Black Hawk Down.

[Hj Reichen · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Good War is easily read, like a tragic novel. A brilliant description of the different factors, that led to the failure in Afghanistan. The appalling lack of sensitivity and knowledge of most Western actors coupled with a lack of leadership and U.S. aggressiveness are showcased as the ingredients for disaster. Not very promising for future challenges

[Steve Kohn · Rating 3 out of 5]

I've just finished reading "The Good War" and still don't think we know where the war went wrong. With as many sources as the author had, I wonder if he still didn't have enough, or if the story we're given is not the whole story, just one version of it (the Rashomon effect). Maybe that's inevitable in as complicated a country as Afghanistan.

My problems with the book:
-- Bagram Air Base is hardly mentioned (just two entries in the index). Anyone who's been to Afghanistan knows its importance, logistically, tactically, but also for its prison and special ops center.
-- The book has little discussion of the fighting in the east, near the Pakistan border.
-- Too much credence is given to objections to the use of drones and special forces night raids that targeted known enemies.
-- Vignettes about individuals help to give us some appreciation for the difficulties and dangers, but I question how relevant some of them were. Some seemed to be included simply because the author knew or were friends with them, not because of their ability to symbolize events. (Tom Gregg of the UN, for example.)
-- There's not enough (for me) discussion of the civil war before we invaded, and the chaos and destruction it created, arguably worse than in the American effort to rebuild the country.
-- The author describes corruption, but does not give this critical subject enough attention. No mention at all, for example, of the nine hundred million dollars that disappeared from the Kabul Bank in 2010, the bank then saved only by an almost equal amount of American taxpayer dollars.
-- Not nearly enough discussion of the terrorism of the Taliban...in fact, far too much support, I thought, for including the Taliban in any future government. That would be rewarding terrorism, not punishing it.
-- And not nearly enough about the progress in Afghanistan, most visibly shown by a photo of Kabul at night in 2001 and again in 2014. The difference in the amount of electric lights is astonishing. (I wish I could find the photos again. When I do I'll come back here and include the link.)

Made clear to me that I didn't know:
1. The British suffered more than their share of combat casualties.
2. The British were in Afghanistan more for national pride than anything else. (And due to their 19th century involvement, probably should have never come back.)
3. Karzai was unfortunately not the George Washington his country needed, while Ghani makes one optimistic.
4. Biden is smarter, tougher than I gave him credit for.

I served in AFG in 2005 while in the Army, and then again in 2009-2010 as a contractor. Neither time was I in a position to influence or observe much if anything. My memories of the country cause me to wish it well.

My own thoughts, for what they're worth, are to:
1) Leave Afghanistan to the Afghans. They'll probably always continue killing each other. Which is tragic, but not as tragic as them killing us. If Al Qaeda or a similar group returns, take them out again, and again make the Afghan leaders who harbor them pay a price.
2) Never get involved in nation-state building, not unless the country has first been completely destroyed. As were Germany, Japan and South Korea. (Of course I know we didn't fight against South Korea.) And not unless the country has a strong central government in its history.
3) Never believe democracy is an appropriate form of government for all nations. (Sometimes I wonder if it's even appropriate here in America, but that's another issue.) Indisputable is that a democracy requires an informed, educated electorate, and that's not at all the case in Afghanistan.

The book had good maps but its photographs were insufficient in number and inexplicably small, making them of almost no use.

"The Good War" was an easy read and I'm glad I read it, but I kept having the feeling we still haven't been given the answer to the book's subtitle, "Why We Couldn't Win the War or the Peace in Afghanistan."

[Dave Beeman · Rating 4 out of 5]

As the author points out in the content of his book there was a whole series of reasons for not winning the war or the peace in Afghanistan.
Starting with poor leadership from the White House (POTUS never gave firm strategic guidance or direction for the prosecution of the war) which left the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and the in-country commanders in a fix; to the introduction of a NATO Headquarters and forces for the first time in history all leading to a goat rope of command relationships.
To top it all off the British were trying to prove their military relevance in the 21st century. Not a good time and place. All of the above happening without the proper troop strengths at NATO or the U.S..
Corrupt Afghan government, corrupt police force, inexperienced and untrained Afghan army, senseless rules of engagement and to top it off inexperienced civilians trying to figure out do we conduct nation building or not. Examples of fixing a problem with a hammer instead using a screwdriver (see U.S. Marines in Helmand). Numerous politicians both western and Afghani working their own agendas. Not understanding Afghan societal structure and finally and most importantly NOT LISTENING to the people who had the answers and solutions to the military and political problems.

All this and more within the cover of this excellent book.

[Jane · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thought this was good - but depressing (unsurprisingly). Politicians and the military really ought to read a few history books before embarking on wars of choice in countries about which they know next to nothing.

[Nathan Williams · Rating 5 out of 5]

A concise yet comprehensive history of America's war in Afghanistan.

[Alexandra · Rating 3 out of 5]

3.5 ⭐️ A seemingly straightforward narrative critiquing the shortcomings of the Western World in their establishment of a democratic government in Afghanistan. A good description of the complexities of Afghani culture and religious tribal relations and the involvement of the West in the “War on Terror”. The book was a little slow at times considering the nature of the style of read, but overall I felt I learned a lot and enjoyed the narrative Fairweather conveyed.

[Grady · Rating 5 out of 5]

'The irresistible Illusion'

Author Jack Fairweather is a former foreign correspondent for the Daily Telegraph and the Washington Post. He won the British Press Award for his reporting on the Iraq invasion and is the author of A WAR OF CHOICE. Fairweather is currently a Middle East editor and correspondent for Bloomberg News, and he lives in Istanbul with his wife and two daughters.

Given the quality of the writing in this penetrating and wholly absorbing book one would think that the days of the gifted writer of journalism is resurrecting. Rather than the usual slapdash reportage of hyperirritable catastrophes that new take favor over true journalism, Fairweather writes in the style of the greats, careful with language, with footnotes, with index and resources, while at the same time creating a driving force in the reader to continue his train of thought and line of reasoning.

Does anyone understand Afghanistan? Russia failed and now we are failing to bring about a peace that likely is not possible as long as outside forces are present to impose modes of governance that simply are not part of the essence of this poor country.

To quote Fairweather in his introduction: `This is the story of how the world's most powerful leaders plotted to build a new kind of nation in Afghanistan that was pure fantasy. It is the story of how those leaders pinned their hopes on a marginal tribal leader and failed to heed his prescient advice, and how he in turn outplayed them. It is the story of why the long-suffering Afghan people rejected salvation from a global army of would-be rescuers. And finally it is the story of how the promise of a new military doctrine was ended by the Good War in Afghanistan and what it means for the future of western military action in the developing world.'

Fairweather covers form 2001 to the present - the end of 2014, when we were supposed to be completely out of Afghanistan. The details are devastating: the reporting is first class.

[Erika · Rating 4 out of 5]

All in all, I recommend to read the book. Well written, good research, covers so much from war to economics, to tribal settlements, culture clashes, modern international relations, superiority or lack of and so much more. Good work!

I consider Jack Fairweather a very good writer: this piece is utterly enjoyable (language and build-up wise) because how enjoyable a war itself can be? Yes, you guessed it- not at all.
I LOVED the thorough research on facts, subject etc - I honestly believe what he says which is something I completely disregard with other parties with (obvious or hidden) interest/connections to war.

To me, honestly, it wasn't the Afghan or Iraqi war - it was any war. Was/is it different in any country? No, it's despisable all the way through filled with personal motives and... wait for it... money. So if you're looking to have a good overview of said wars, it's definitely a good book. But it's also a refreshing, honest and fascinating reading on types of action, egos, modern world being stuck in romanticizing the war and we-do-it-because-we've-always-done-so.
The "puppetry" in military is laughable and Fairweather shows it in a slightly ridiculing way. I am a fan.

[T. Fowler · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is easily one of the best books on the Western countries' incursion into Afghanistan. The main focus is the British experience in Helmand province, but this is made more meaningul as it is placed within a thorough, concise explanation of the context of decisions by American and British politicians and military leaders. This is strengthened by Fairweather's writing style which leads the reader smoothly through the explanations as to how Western countries found themselves immersed in an unconventional war which they did not properly understand. Fairweather condemns the assumptions that Western leaders made in trying to rebuild Afghanistan in the image of a Western democracy (the "Good War"), which became the underlying source of the West's failure. But he ends on a positive note that success in future efforts at a Good War is possible if we "seek out those voices that reveal the internal order [of the country] and then listen to their wishes." There are lessons to be learned from the Afghan experience.

[W · Rating 4 out of 5]

Brings out how incoherent the nation-building mission was: support brutal provincial warlords and drive the populace to the Taliban, or take on the warlords and see them join the Taliban; condone the opium trade and fill the coffers of warlords, or see them and ordinary farmers join the Taliban; condone the patriarchal power structure or offend and alienate those in charge. A welter of agencies variously negotiating, fighting, subsidising, raiding, turning a blind eye, all at the same time, invariably without any strategy. Above all, I'm impressed by the minimal research, understanding and planning that went into the whole project.

[Sherrie · Rating 3 out of 5]

The was obviously a well written and well researched book, but I couldn't finish it. It wasn't the right book to start out with to understand Afghanistan's history and politics. I would certainly consider coming back to it after I learned some more basic information about the subject matter, which would hopefully help me to understand this book better.

[Aaron Shields · Rating 4 out of 5]

Afghanistan: "A continual state of feud and strife prevails through the land...Every man's hand is against the other, and all against the stranger."

Churchill. 1897.

"We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our own image or as we choose."

McNamara: After the Vietnam War

[N · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very good, rich, but not not oppressively detailed history of the US war in Afghanistan, and how any chance of 'winning' was lost by about 2006. Interesting (albeit short) perspective on the Canadian mission as well, a little more objective than the coverage we saw in the media here.

[Liza Boyd · Rating 5 out of 5]

If you only read one book about the U.S. war in Afghanistan, make it this one. Explains the whole thing, soup to nuts, in engaging, compelling narrative.

[Roger Taylor · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent analysis of an extremely complex war that failed to achieve all of the goals that were anticipated in 2001 and have led many to question the validity of the concept of the "Good War".

[Bhavin Prajapati · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting and I may have to read it again to get more info

[Deborah · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great book, even for someone that has never read a book about war.

[Slatteryjm · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very interesting to read the story and suffering behind the Afghanistan war