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Outmaneuvered: America's Tragic Encounter with Warfare from Vietnam to Afghanistan
From a celebrated military historian, a “searing…persuasive” (Kirkus Reviews) exploration of why the mighty United States military has repeatedly failed in irregular wars and military campaigns from Vietnam to Afghanistan.
Since the early 1960s, the United States has fought in four major wars and a cluster of complicated and bloody irregular warfare campaigns. The majority have ended in failure, or something close to it. Why has the US been so ineffective, despite the American armed forces being universally recognized as the best in the world?
Most scholars and analysts believe that the primary cause of our abysmal war record since Vietnam has been the US military’s overwhelmingly conventional approach to conflict, which favors highly mobile precision firepower and sophisticated systems of command and control. Here, James Warren argues that a much more formidable obstacle to success has been pervasive strategic ineptitude at the highest levels of decision-making, including the presidency, the National Security Council, and the foreign policy community in DC.
Time and time again, American presidents have committed military forces to operations in foreign countries whose politics and cultures they did not fully understand. Presidents of both political parties, including Johnson, Carter, Reagan, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama have overestimated the capacity of US forces to alter the social and political landscape of foreign nations, and underestimated the ability of insurgents and terrorists to develop effective protracted war strategies that eventually, inevitably sap Washington’s will to carry on the fight.
Warren asserts that in the War on Terror that followed September 11, 2001, senior military officers have been complicit in extending bankrupt strategies by refusing to speak truthfully about them to their civilian bosses. So have the American people, who lost interest in the “forever wars” in Afghanistan and Iraq and failed to press their presidents and Congress to bring an end to two futile conflicts. Warren advocates for a less hubristic foreign policy and a broader conception of warfare as a political and military enterprise.
“An admirable must-read for military…foreign policy history buffs” (Booklist), and anyone interested in geopolitical strategy, this book offers unparalleled insights into America’s prior—and potentially future—military conflicts.
Since the early 1960s, the United States has fought in four major wars and a cluster of complicated and bloody irregular warfare campaigns. The majority have ended in failure, or something close to it. Why has the US been so ineffective, despite the American armed forces being universally recognized as the best in the world?
Most scholars and analysts believe that the primary cause of our abysmal war record since Vietnam has been the US military’s overwhelmingly conventional approach to conflict, which favors highly mobile precision firepower and sophisticated systems of command and control. Here, James Warren argues that a much more formidable obstacle to success has been pervasive strategic ineptitude at the highest levels of decision-making, including the presidency, the National Security Council, and the foreign policy community in DC.
Time and time again, American presidents have committed military forces to operations in foreign countries whose politics and cultures they did not fully understand. Presidents of both political parties, including Johnson, Carter, Reagan, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama have overestimated the capacity of US forces to alter the social and political landscape of foreign nations, and underestimated the ability of insurgents and terrorists to develop effective protracted war strategies that eventually, inevitably sap Washington’s will to carry on the fight.
Warren asserts that in the War on Terror that followed September 11, 2001, senior military officers have been complicit in extending bankrupt strategies by refusing to speak truthfully about them to their civilian bosses. So have the American people, who lost interest in the “forever wars” in Afghanistan and Iraq and failed to press their presidents and Congress to bring an end to two futile conflicts. Warren advocates for a less hubristic foreign policy and a broader conception of warfare as a political and military enterprise.
“An admirable must-read for military…foreign policy history buffs” (Booklist), and anyone interested in geopolitical strategy, this book offers unparalleled insights into America’s prior—and potentially future—military conflicts.
326 pages, Kindle Edition
First published March 4, 2025
About the author
James A. Warren
10 books14 followersJames Warren is a freelance writer specializing in modern American military history. He has written books on the Vietnam War and the cold war, and contributed the chapter on the Vietnam War to The Atlas of American Military History (1993). His reviews and articles have appeared in MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, as well as in Society and The Providence (RI) Journal.
He is the author of a highly acclaimed History of the U.S. Marines from Iwo Jima to Iraq, American Spartans, and Portrait of a Tragedy: America and the Vietnam War. He lives in Narragansett, Rhode Island.
He is the author of a highly acclaimed History of the U.S. Marines from Iwo Jima to Iraq, American Spartans, and Portrait of a Tragedy: America and the Vietnam War. He lives in Narragansett, Rhode Island.
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
March 5, 2025
Mr. Warren does an admirable job of connecting the lack of strategic planning in any form of fashion from Vietnam to the War on Terror. I used to believe that our leaders were adults, who actually spent time thinking and had a basic foundational understanding of how people and the world worked. The only critique I have of this work is that more time could have been spent particularly on the lack of coverage for the inept and ill-advised invasion and overthrow of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. I look forward to reading the finished copy and look over the photographs and the works cited pages.
May 22, 2025
Warren offers a measured yet urgent reflection on the United States’ repeated failures in irregular warfare from Vietnam through the post-9/11 conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather than solely blaming the military’s continued reliance on conventional tactics, Warren expands his critique to include strategic ineptitude at the highest civilian and military leadership levels. Drawing from decades of U.S. foreign interventions, he offers a postmortem of American empire-building and a moral and political reckoning with the enduring consequences of these misadventures.
One of the book’s most prominent claims is that the U.S. has persistently misunderstood the nature of the conflicts it enters. Irregular warfare, Warren argues, must be seen as “primarily political struggles with a military component, not vice versa” (p.256). Yet American strategy has privileged force and high-tech superiority over the messy work of diplomacy, political development, and cultural literacy, which nonmilitary personnel are better prepared to navigate. He writes, “In all three major wars discussed in this book, the nonmilitary elements of American power (the State Department, the US Agency for International Development, the intelligence services, and a host of other US government agencies) have been underpowered and poorly integrated with the military effort. The civilian agencies, in truth, lack the personnel and the proper expeditionary training to deploy to war zones” (p.256).
This misalignment has produced more than just poor outcomes on the battlefield. It has also undermined global peace efforts and reinforced colonial dynamics under the guise of democracy promotion. As Warren notes, “Washington policymakers have a long tradition of going to war in countries where they lack a detailed understanding of local politics and culture. As a result, they end up allying themselves with corrupt sycophants rather than reliable and committed local partners” (p.256). This pattern is painfully familiar today, as we continue to see foreign interventions in the Middle East and North Africa justified through narratives of stability and security while dismantling local sovereignty and long-term peacebuilding efforts.
Warren is also clear-eyed about the role of domestic complicity. The failures of the War on Terror were not limited to elite decision-makers. “Policy makers, politicians, and senior military leaders were all complicit in developing and executing inept and unrealistic politico-military strategies… The American people were complicit in perpetuating the two major GWOT wars simply through their neglect and indifference” (p.260). He notes with devastating precision that “more than thirty thousand veterans have returned from their wars only to commit suicide. That is roughly four times the number of service members killed in the two conflicts” (p.260). This is not presented for rhetorical effect, but as part of a larger moral calculus: what does it mean when a nation conducts wars without public scrutiny, without adequate care for those it sends to fight, and without a clear vision of peace?
In an era marked by the erosion of postcolonial solidarity, the rise of disinformation, and the decline of public information literacy, Warren’s insistence that war is inseparable from politics (and that politics is inherently moral and personal) feels profoundly relevant. His final chapters call not just for strategic reform but for ethical introspection. “American strategists and decision makers need to take a broader view of war as a political process, not just a military one,” he writes. “Since World War II, the shapers of American foreign policy have made the chauvinistic assumption that the United States has a special dispensation from Providence and history to shape world affairs because of its immense military power and superior form of government. This arrogance has led to a long series of disastrous decisions” (p.261-262). He argues instead for “more restraint and humility in international affairs, especially when it comes to determining when and where to use [America’s] unrivaled military power” (p.262).
Outmaneuvered does not offer an easy way forward, which is precisely its strength; it forces readers to confront the ideological and institutional patterns that have enabled decades of failed interventions, and to reflect on what responsible power could look like in a world where peace, justice, and truth are increasingly contested. Warren’s book is a timely and necessary contribution to the broader conversation about the future of American foreign policy and its ethical obligations in an increasingly unstable world.
One of the book’s most prominent claims is that the U.S. has persistently misunderstood the nature of the conflicts it enters. Irregular warfare, Warren argues, must be seen as “primarily political struggles with a military component, not vice versa” (p.256). Yet American strategy has privileged force and high-tech superiority over the messy work of diplomacy, political development, and cultural literacy, which nonmilitary personnel are better prepared to navigate. He writes, “In all three major wars discussed in this book, the nonmilitary elements of American power (the State Department, the US Agency for International Development, the intelligence services, and a host of other US government agencies) have been underpowered and poorly integrated with the military effort. The civilian agencies, in truth, lack the personnel and the proper expeditionary training to deploy to war zones” (p.256).
This misalignment has produced more than just poor outcomes on the battlefield. It has also undermined global peace efforts and reinforced colonial dynamics under the guise of democracy promotion. As Warren notes, “Washington policymakers have a long tradition of going to war in countries where they lack a detailed understanding of local politics and culture. As a result, they end up allying themselves with corrupt sycophants rather than reliable and committed local partners” (p.256). This pattern is painfully familiar today, as we continue to see foreign interventions in the Middle East and North Africa justified through narratives of stability and security while dismantling local sovereignty and long-term peacebuilding efforts.
Warren is also clear-eyed about the role of domestic complicity. The failures of the War on Terror were not limited to elite decision-makers. “Policy makers, politicians, and senior military leaders were all complicit in developing and executing inept and unrealistic politico-military strategies… The American people were complicit in perpetuating the two major GWOT wars simply through their neglect and indifference” (p.260). He notes with devastating precision that “more than thirty thousand veterans have returned from their wars only to commit suicide. That is roughly four times the number of service members killed in the two conflicts” (p.260). This is not presented for rhetorical effect, but as part of a larger moral calculus: what does it mean when a nation conducts wars without public scrutiny, without adequate care for those it sends to fight, and without a clear vision of peace?
In an era marked by the erosion of postcolonial solidarity, the rise of disinformation, and the decline of public information literacy, Warren’s insistence that war is inseparable from politics (and that politics is inherently moral and personal) feels profoundly relevant. His final chapters call not just for strategic reform but for ethical introspection. “American strategists and decision makers need to take a broader view of war as a political process, not just a military one,” he writes. “Since World War II, the shapers of American foreign policy have made the chauvinistic assumption that the United States has a special dispensation from Providence and history to shape world affairs because of its immense military power and superior form of government. This arrogance has led to a long series of disastrous decisions” (p.261-262). He argues instead for “more restraint and humility in international affairs, especially when it comes to determining when and where to use [America’s] unrivaled military power” (p.262).
Outmaneuvered does not offer an easy way forward, which is precisely its strength; it forces readers to confront the ideological and institutional patterns that have enabled decades of failed interventions, and to reflect on what responsible power could look like in a world where peace, justice, and truth are increasingly contested. Warren’s book is a timely and necessary contribution to the broader conversation about the future of American foreign policy and its ethical obligations in an increasingly unstable world.
July 16, 2025
James A. Warren’s “Outmaneuvered” is a compelling and sobering analysis of America’s recurrent failures in irregular warfare from the 1960s through the 21st century. Drawing on decades of military conflicts—most notably Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, as well as U.S. interventions in Somalia, Lebanon, and Iran—Warren critiques not only battlefield tactics but also the strategic thinking of American leaders.
- Strategic Ineptitude Over Tactical Failings: Warren’s most damning argument is that the United States’ poor military record since Vietnam cannot be solely attributed to a “conventional” military culture obsessed with technology and overwhelming force. Instead, he pins responsibility on the highest levels of political and military leadership—presidents, national security councils, and top advisors—whose lack of cultural understanding and political awareness often led to grievous miscalculations.
- Misunderstanding Irregular Warfare: The book explains how U.S. leaders persistently overestimated military power’s capacity to reshape foreign societies and underestimated the resilience and adaptability of insurgents and terrorists. American presidents from both parties failed to appreciate the fundamentally political nature of these conflicts, engaging in wishful thinking and strategic denial even as setbacks mounted.
- Shared Responsibility: Warren charges not just policy-makers and generals, but also the American public, with complicity: citizens failed to hold leaders accountable or question the goals and costs of endless, fruitless wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Warren’s narrative combines scholarly depth with a persuasive, almost urgent tone. He marshals evidence from six decades of U.S. military engagement, rendering complex events accessible without oversimplification. The analysis is scathing yet fair, offering case studies that highlight missed opportunities for honest assessment and course correction. “Outmaneuvered” stands out both as history and as a policy critique. It serves as a timely warning: unless the U.S. accepts the politically dynamic nature of modern war and curbs its arrogance, future military interventions will likely repeat the tragic patterns of the past. Warren calls passionately for humility, accountability, and a wiser, more nuanced conception of war and foreign policy—a message that should resonate with both policymakers and engaged citizens.
- Strategic Ineptitude Over Tactical Failings: Warren’s most damning argument is that the United States’ poor military record since Vietnam cannot be solely attributed to a “conventional” military culture obsessed with technology and overwhelming force. Instead, he pins responsibility on the highest levels of political and military leadership—presidents, national security councils, and top advisors—whose lack of cultural understanding and political awareness often led to grievous miscalculations.
- Misunderstanding Irregular Warfare: The book explains how U.S. leaders persistently overestimated military power’s capacity to reshape foreign societies and underestimated the resilience and adaptability of insurgents and terrorists. American presidents from both parties failed to appreciate the fundamentally political nature of these conflicts, engaging in wishful thinking and strategic denial even as setbacks mounted.
- Shared Responsibility: Warren charges not just policy-makers and generals, but also the American public, with complicity: citizens failed to hold leaders accountable or question the goals and costs of endless, fruitless wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Warren’s narrative combines scholarly depth with a persuasive, almost urgent tone. He marshals evidence from six decades of U.S. military engagement, rendering complex events accessible without oversimplification. The analysis is scathing yet fair, offering case studies that highlight missed opportunities for honest assessment and course correction. “Outmaneuvered” stands out both as history and as a policy critique. It serves as a timely warning: unless the U.S. accepts the politically dynamic nature of modern war and curbs its arrogance, future military interventions will likely repeat the tragic patterns of the past. Warren calls passionately for humility, accountability, and a wiser, more nuanced conception of war and foreign policy—a message that should resonate with both policymakers and engaged citizens.
May 15, 2025
Well worth reading, but be prepared, it is a depressing read. One is left with the question, “Will we ever learn?” The United States continues to participate in “irregular wars” where our leadership’s arrogance insists in employing conventional warfare tactics. The author traces this ineptitude from Vietnam though Afghanistan. Administrations of both major political parties come under close scrutiny and all fail. Will we ever learn?
September 29, 2024
You can also see this review, along with others I have written, at my blog, Mr. Book's Book Reviews.
Thank you, St. Martin’s Press, for providing this book for review consideration via NetGalley in exchange for an honest review. All opinions are my own.
Mr. Book just finished Outmaneuvered: America’s Tragic Encounter with Warfare from Vietnam to Afghanistan, by James A. Warren.
This book will be released on March 4, 2025.
This is an excellent book about the failures of the US military from Vietnam to the present. The book makes the powerful case that the reasons for the failures was a result of our presidents, and their top civilian advisers not understanding the situations they were in and not understanding that the strategies didn’t have a chance of succeeding. The military advisers who understood and advised against them were ignored in favor of the policy makers just listening to what they already wanted to hear and just doing what their pre-conceived policy objectives were.
The largest portions of the book were about Vietnam and the second Iraq War, while it also covered the events in Iran, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Somalia and the CIA’s role in the Soviet war in Afghanistan.
I give this book an A. Goodreads and NetGalley require grades on a 1-5 star system. In my personal conversion system, an A equates to 5 stars. (A or A+: 5 stars, B+: 4 stars, B: 3 stars, C: 2 stars, D or F: 1 star).
This review has been posted at NetGalley, Goodreads and my blog, Mr. Book’s Book Reviews
Mr. Book finished reading this on September 29, 2024.
Thank you, St. Martin’s Press, for providing this book for review consideration via NetGalley in exchange for an honest review. All opinions are my own.
Mr. Book just finished Outmaneuvered: America’s Tragic Encounter with Warfare from Vietnam to Afghanistan, by James A. Warren.
This book will be released on March 4, 2025.
This is an excellent book about the failures of the US military from Vietnam to the present. The book makes the powerful case that the reasons for the failures was a result of our presidents, and their top civilian advisers not understanding the situations they were in and not understanding that the strategies didn’t have a chance of succeeding. The military advisers who understood and advised against them were ignored in favor of the policy makers just listening to what they already wanted to hear and just doing what their pre-conceived policy objectives were.
The largest portions of the book were about Vietnam and the second Iraq War, while it also covered the events in Iran, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Somalia and the CIA’s role in the Soviet war in Afghanistan.
I give this book an A. Goodreads and NetGalley require grades on a 1-5 star system. In my personal conversion system, an A equates to 5 stars. (A or A+: 5 stars, B+: 4 stars, B: 3 stars, C: 2 stars, D or F: 1 star).
This review has been posted at NetGalley, Goodreads and my blog, Mr. Book’s Book Reviews
Mr. Book finished reading this on September 29, 2024.
December 27, 2025
I had a very pleasant time reading this book. I learned a lot and I felt the author brings facts from many sources to light! Take this review with a grain of salt, as it is mainly my personal notes for later reference.
The book was structured well and centers the book around 2 main criticisms of American policy when it comes to irregular warfare.
1) America needs to view irregular warfare as an intersection of politics and military- it focuses far too heavily on the military
2) The US has an arrogance that yields itself to believing it has a particular purpose that requires it to engage in shaping world events, often for the worse
Some favorite highlights from this book:
-via Qutl: American spirituality is anchored in a “primitivism that reminds us of the ages of jungles and caves”
-America couldn’t come to grips with the “Islamic fundamentalist threat” because they attempted to launch a regional strategy- but they had no understanding of the politics of the region (see criticism 1)
-the author noted that the decision to invade Iraq made about as much sense “as invading Mexico after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor”, although it is also noted Washington had their reasons, poorly considered as they may have been
-Bush’s “chronic lack of curiosity”
-some blame on the American public- the rxn to the Afghanistan Papers being so weak and poorly felt among the general public is a major reason why the government is able to stretch out these conflicts for so long
The book was structured well and centers the book around 2 main criticisms of American policy when it comes to irregular warfare.
1) America needs to view irregular warfare as an intersection of politics and military- it focuses far too heavily on the military
2) The US has an arrogance that yields itself to believing it has a particular purpose that requires it to engage in shaping world events, often for the worse
Some favorite highlights from this book:
-via Qutl: American spirituality is anchored in a “primitivism that reminds us of the ages of jungles and caves”
-America couldn’t come to grips with the “Islamic fundamentalist threat” because they attempted to launch a regional strategy- but they had no understanding of the politics of the region (see criticism 1)
-the author noted that the decision to invade Iraq made about as much sense “as invading Mexico after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor”, although it is also noted Washington had their reasons, poorly considered as they may have been
-Bush’s “chronic lack of curiosity”
-some blame on the American public- the rxn to the Afghanistan Papers being so weak and poorly felt among the general public is a major reason why the government is able to stretch out these conflicts for so long
November 7, 2025
Not bad, but it felt a little surface-level to me. It's an account of problems the US has had fighting wars from Vietnam-onward. The book's central argument is that the military keeps focusing on the wars it wants to fight (conventional, this army vs. that army wars) instead of the wars it's usually been called on to fight: irregular wars where the military component is just a sub-section of a political cause. These movements are less about winning battles and more about outlasting the opponent. The US just focuses on short-term military gains and thinks that's it. The main lesson is that the nation needs to think of military and political goals as intertwined in wars instead of just being separate things. Warren does seem to like the rise of special operations forces.
Some random nuggets: from 2001-21, about 30,000 veterans and active duty military personal committed suicide. (HOLY SHIT! Book says a major study said so. Looking it up, it's the Costs of War Project). The US had just 150 fatalities in Iraq when Bush gave his Mission Accomplished speech. The Surge was a political failure as it just created some breathing room, but the Iraqi government had little interest in doing much beyond looking out for the narrow interests of those in charge.
Some random nuggets: from 2001-21, about 30,000 veterans and active duty military personal committed suicide. (HOLY SHIT! Book says a major study said so. Looking it up, it's the Costs of War Project). The US had just 150 fatalities in Iraq when Bush gave his Mission Accomplished speech. The Surge was a political failure as it just created some breathing room, but the Iraqi government had little interest in doing much beyond looking out for the narrow interests of those in charge.
November 10, 2025
Interesting and detailed history of American military failures through the lens of political infighting. Maybe a bit heavy on the historical recounting and light on the analytical argument. Convincing, but often felt like there was not enough counterargument.
June 2, 2025
Garbage
July 27, 2025
A good snap shot of the challenges the military has face over the past couple of decades with counter-insurgency, terrorism, and irregular warfare in general.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews