The Folly of Realism: How the West Deceived Itself About Russia and Betrayed Ukraine

by Alexander S. Vindman

An Instant New York Times Bestseller 

A chilling analysis of how Western indecision and apathy made possible the return of brutal Russian expansionism with catastrophic consequences – “A must-read for anyone who wants to understand what went wrong and how it can be fixed” (Serhii Plokhy, Harvard University)

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, six US presidential administrations of both parties pursued policies for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia that emboldened Russia, playing into its imperialist, centuries-long mythos of regional hegemony. The military aggression and full-scale invasion. It was all too foreseeable.
 
In The Folly of Realism, leading national security expert and bestselling author Alexander Vindman argues that America’s mistakes in Eastern Europe result from policymakers’ fixation on immediate, short-term problem-solving and misplaced hopes and fears. He proposes a new long-term, values-based approach that insists on the fundamentals of liberal democracy and a rules-based world order.
 
Enlivened by firsthand accounts and behind-the-scenes interviews with leading Washington and international policymakers and culminating in the shocking brutality of Putin’s invasions of Ukraine, the book exposes the follies of western foreign policymaking, sources of the dangerous return of Russian imperialism, and proscribes how it can be contained.


 

Genres: Politics, Nonfiction, History, Russia, Ukraine, War, Audiobook

254 pages, Kindle Edition

Published February 25, 2025

Reviews

[Alan Chrisman · Rating 3 out of 5]

Author, once military attache to Moscow and Kyiv, shows how 6 administrations misread Putin, out of fear of nuclear war. Putin believes Ukraine part of his and Russia's destiny. I think now its a matter of who Trump at the time, Putin or Zelenskyy, feels keeps him most from making a "deal." Author( Ukrainian background) argues Putin only understands strength.

[Marks54 · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is Alexander Vindman’s new book on Ukraine’s battle with Russia and with Trump’s increasing alignment with Russia and its turn away from supporting Ukraine. This book was already near publication at the time of the ascent of the Trump administration but the story line fits in well with ongoing events and especially Trump’s While House betrayal of Ukraine at the end of February. The book provides a summary of the long history between Russia and Ukraine and incorporates the US into the story in terms of a failed policy of realism towards Russia, consistent with US policies for confronting the Soviet Union during the Cold War - a la Henry Kissinger. The argument is that this “realist” policy downplayed the Ukrainian nation and the identity of Ukrainians as secondary or even tertiary to the US-Soviet relationship. The effect of this de-emphasis was to provide incentives to Russia to predate on Ukraine and to handcuff the US in crafting responses to Russian agression in the 21st century. In place of realism, Vindman argues for a more idealist strategy/posture towards Ukraine that respects its historical aspirations and identity. The book is carefully argued and persuasive and is an ideal companion to the current Ukrainian crisis at the three year anniversary mark of Russia’s invasion.

[Julia · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book feels like Alexander Vindman looked at global politics, sighed deeply, and said, “I told you so.”

A sharp, no-nonsense breakdown of how the West completely misread Russia (again), this book pulls no punches. If you ever found yourself screaming at the news like “How did we NOT see this coming?!”—Vindman is here to tell you exactly how. And let’s just say…it’s infuriating.

Packed with history, strategic analysis, and a level of bluntness that’s honestly refreshing, The Folly of Realism is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the geopolitical mess we’re in (and maybe prevent future ones). Highly recommend if you like:
✔️ Political books that actually explain things
✔️ National security drama minus the fiction
✔️ Real-life examples of why “just be nice to dictators” is NOT a foreign policy

Read it. Get mad. Demand better.

[Dawn Michelle · Rating 5 out of 5]

As I try and write a review about this absolutely stunning book [I learned so much and I have bumped up the memoir by this author to higher on my TBR list], the farce that was the press conference between Ukrainian President Zelenskyy [a TRUE hero in my opinion] and the current administration aired and amidst my real embarrassment over how and what this country has become [I do not think I have EVER been so embarrassed by a U.S. president and his minions, even when he was in office previously], I just kept thinking how timely this book truly is and how now, even more than before, people need to be reading this book and learning lessons they may not have previously known they needed to learn. It will help you understand how we got there [no one is above blame here; both sides made serious mistakes along the way], more about Ukraine [with some of their history, both with the US and with Russia] and what needs to be done to both move forward and to make things right.

Jacques Roy is a fantastic narrator [he is one of my favorites] and he does this amazing book justice [I cannot imagine how difficult it must have been to read parts of this book that were very upsetting]; very well done. I highly recommend listening to his narration [with this and any other book for that matter].

Thank you to NetGalley, Alexander Vindman, Jacques Roy - Narrator, Public Affairs, and Hachette Audio for providing the eBook and audiobook ARC's in exchange for an honest review.

[Julia · Rating 4 out of 5]

A great overview of how Russia gained and still maintains its power, while Ukraine has struggled to get any recognition since gaining independence in 1991. All events are overlapped with the actions taken by different US administrations and this adds another layer of insight that helps us understand a bigger picture. In particular, the author describes the pitfalls of US decision-making regarding different Russian crimes and how the lack of action taken unlocked the monstrous scale of today’s aggression.
Here are a few quotes I liked, but the book definitely has more to offer for citation:

Grey zones are green light for dictators

Inaction by the west invited impunity producing deadly consequences

The fact that 6 US administrations have succombed to the same foreign policy shortfalls might suggest that we are destined to keep repeating the same mistakes, leading to a global catastrophe.

I was surprised how this book manages not only to dive deeply into the events of the last 30-40 years, but also covers highly important aspects of UA-RU relationships throughout their history (starting from the 10th century!). Many of these events were thoroughly analyzed and clearly explained with prerequisites and outcomes. With that, I must say, sometimes the same facts were mentioned 3-4 times from different angles, which I think was a bit redundant. 

Overall, I would definitely recommend this book to whoever is interested in world scale politics in general, and Ukraine / Russia / US foreign affairs in particular. Additionally, it explains different geopolitical methodologies and more in depth goes through the basics of neo-idealism, which presumably has become one of the best approaches for modern politics.

Thank you NetGalley for ARC copy!

[Ted · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was skeptical given the author's history, but this text is actually well worth a look. He goes into fairly intricate detail about the waffling of American policy during the 90s and 2000s, when both Democrats and Republicans were more focused on preserving Russia as an entity than helping Ukraine become independent. In key, the Bush neocons wanted cooperation with Russia post the Ossetia war, while Obama's Rangers attempted to undermine Kiyiv, even after the 2014 conflict. Really provides a gut punch to all the Putin apologists claiming America has been obsessed with destroying Moscow for the last 30 years.

[Rhonda · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fascinating and frightening! The more I learned about the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the more I realized how very little I myself, and I'm gonna say most Americans, know about the geopolitics of Eastern Europe .

[Cara · Rating 3 out of 5]

Aw, this reads like the poli sci texts I studied in college – how nostalgic; how quaint.
I read Morgenthau, Keohane, Waltz... and what the hell does it matter now.
Isn't it reassuring to know we've been screwing over Ukraine forever? I don't think Vindman manages to make the case for Neo-Idealism, not just because nothing matters anymore but because he makes it sound like common sense (think about the long term?? – groundbreaking!) and fails to flesh it out. Some invented situations, or some alternate realities would have been helpful. In my opinion this all comes out in the wash – Realism and Neo-Realism didn't fail because we should have employed Neo-Idealism, they failed because all of this &h!t is made up, our modern leaders bent the principles to their actions instead of the other way around, and my degree is f*#^!ng worthless.
The best parts of the book were him talking about his actual experiences. He can write about being tailed in Russia but doesn't have any special talent for presenting IR theory. I may read some Tallis in the hopes of compiling whatever the heck he's getting at. Meanwhile while IR Theory can be used for retrospective analysis I think, in the age of populist, personality-cult authoritarians, it has lost any use as a decision-making scaffold, if ever it even had that.

[Marren · Rating 1 out of 5]

This book seemed like it could have been an op-ed and then the author added a bunch of material to make it book-length. This extraneous information convoluted the argument, and I'm not sure there was an argument either. It was more a criticism without proposed solutions besides "US policy should be idealist and not realist and Ukraine is important."

[Josh · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very helpful. And actually interesting. I’m not the biggest fan of realism myself. The neo-idealism philosophy feels underbaked and has the benefit of hindsight. I would’ve liked to see more of how the author thinks this ought to be operationalized in policy setting.

Also, it is hilarious to me how the author clearly tacked on an epilogue to talk about Trump’s re-election before publication and that the authors idea was “well Trump is just going to make things worse so let’s just try this again when we have the next one.” We’re all feeling that way. Though I guess when you testify against Trump in an impeachment hearing and then your career falls apart your discomfort is amplified

[Dmitry · Rating 1 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

Трудно сказать, ради чего была написана эта книга, но определённо не с целью объективного анализа российско-украинских отношений. Книга так же не подходит в качестве объективного анализа украино-американских отношений. Главная проблема в том, что книга предлагает чёрно-белую картину мира. Хотя автор в своей книге и критикует политику США в отношении Украины, называя это чуть ли не предательством, тем не менее, по существу это абсолютно бессмысленные утверждения. С точки зрения автора, и демократы когда были у власти (в США) и республиканцы, предавали Украину, но возникает в таком случаи вопрос, на что рассчитывает автор, если абсолютно все президенты США проводили именно такую политику, которую автор характеризует как предательство Украины. Может быть, это не предательство в таком случаи, а объективный подход каждого президента США? К примеру, как я понял автора, он считает необходимым принять Украину в НАТО, чтобы в случаи военной агрессии со стороны России воевала бы не одна лишь Украина, а ещё и страны НАТО. С одной стороны, подобные заявления мы сегодня слышим очень и очень часто, но с другой, о принятии Украины в НАТО говорят лишь лидеры тех стран, от которых данное решение не зависит. Ключевые страны, такие как США, Германия, Франция, отрицают в��зможность принятия Украины в НАТО. Получается, автор говорит то, что хочет услышать определённая часть общества, тем самым книга понравится тем, кто продвигает такое решение, но с другой стороны, это абсолютно безопасные утверждения, ибо они высказываются человеком, от которого не зависит принятие Украины в НАТО. Автор это прекрасно знает и таким образом изображает себя «рыцарем в белых доспехах», прекрасно понимая при этом, что это просто сладки слова, за которыми нет реального решения. В этом смысле риторику автора можно назвать демагогией. Намного лучше было бы, если бы автор писал о том, что можно предпринять в реальности, а не о том, что предпринять нельзя (по крайне мере в данный момент). Вот именно поэтому мне пришла мысль, что эта книга была написана с целью заработать, а не сказать что-то новое или предложить объективный анализ ситуации.

Вторая проблема книги в том, что в качестве источников автор использует таких ангажированных спикеров как Сергей Плохий (Serhii Plokhy) и знаменитый украинский националист Taras Kuzio (этот человек не известен широкой публике, но специалистами он цитируется почти в каждой книге о современной Украине). В чём проблема с этими автора? Taras Kuzio ярый украинский националист, чья объективность уже давно ставится под вопрос, как и объективность его коллеги, но уже по другую сторону баррикад - Richard Sakwa. Что касается господина Плохий, то это тоже очень странный украинский историк, который пишет в своей книге, что во время голода начала 30-х годов XX века погибли украинцы, но при этом не упоминает гибель русских и казахов. Другими словами, Сергей Плохий является главным рычагом манипуляции, когда создаётся ложное мнение, что во время голода на территории СССР погибли ТОЛЬКО украинцы. Мне могут возразить, что Голодомор, это гибель ТОЛЬКО украинцев. Проблема тут в том, что люди, которые читают таких историков, в дальнейшем считают, что во время голода в СССР в целом погибли ТОЛЬКО украинцы. Откуда они могут знать, что там погибли и русские и казахи, если такие историки как Сергей Плохий, намеренно замалчивают факт гибели других народов СССР? И вот на таких историках основывается эта книга. Но, да, книга посвящена не далёкому прошлому, а совсем недавнему, что не отменяет того факта, что первую четверть книги можно спокойно пропустить.

Забавно, но в книге так же утверждается, что за взрывов Чернобыльской атомной станции так же стояла Москва. Автор пишет, что ЧАЭС управлялась из Москвы, что выглядит довольно странно, т.к. я всегда считал, что такие станции не имеют прямого управления из Москвы или любого другого города, а управляются непосредственно из самой станции. Не знаю, откуда автор это взял, но не удивлюсь, если и эту «новую версию» он нашёл у какого-то историка/политолога по типу Kuzio, который в каждой трагедии или неудачи Украины видит «руку Москвы».

Если говорить о книги в целом, то она вся сводится к двум составляющим – передача украинского ядерного оружия России, после распада СССР и описание таких событий как российско-грузинская война, российско-украинская война, т.е. когда западные союзники в лице США на словах поддерживали Украину или Грузию, а на деле продолжали поддерживать отношения с РФ. Получается, Грузия и Украина поверили странам Запада, что их примут в НАТО и ЕС, когда же Россия напала сначала на Грузию, а потом на Украину, страны Запада, включая США, почти ничего не предприняли что как-то наказать Россию или хотя бы защитить Грузию и Украину. Чисто внешне, может сложиться мнение, что именно так и обстояло дело, однако автор не упоминает, вернее не объясняет, почему Россия вообще напала на Украину? К примеру, почему Россия не напала на Казахстан или на Киргизию, в которой тоже произошла «цветная революция» или на ту же Армению, где тоже к власти пришёл лидер с помощью улицы, т.е. через революцию. Почему именно Грузия и Украина? Грузия и Украина заявили, что они хотят вступить в НАТО и именно поэтому Россия, действуя на опережение, и осуществила вторжение сначала в Грузию, а потом в Украину. Это выглядит как правда, но полной правдой всё же не является. Впрочем, об объективной стороне дела автор не пишет, ведь в таком случаи подразумевалось бы, что эти два события – вторжение России в Грузию и Украину – можно было избежать.

Если почитать объективные книги о современной истории Грузии и Украины, можно обнаружить, что и при Саакашвили и при Ющенко отношения между Россией и Грузией, а так же между Россией и Украиной находились в ужасном состоянии. Фактически и Саакашвили и Ющенко рассматривали Россию как главную угрозу и соответственно проводили политику, в которой Россия рассматривалась не как дружественный сосед, а как политический враг. К примеру, в 2006 году разгорелся российско-грузинский шпионский скандал а также торговая война того же года. Так же, примерно в эти же годы были закрыты российские базы в Грузии. Что касается российско-украинских отношений, то они начали ухудшаться начиная с распада СССР, а приход к власти Ющенко ещё более усугубил и без того плохие отношения между Россией и Украиной. Именно при Ющенко Голодомор стал проталкиваться как намеренное уничтожение украинцев русскими, а не отдельным её руководителем - Сталиным. Вот это и дало толчок к постепенному, но не прекращающемуся ухудшению отношений между Россией и Украиной, что потом вылилось в настоящее военное противостояние. И вот об этом автор не пишет.

Можно мне возразить, что я пишу о действиях грузинского и украинского правительства, но ничего не говорю про российское. Проблема тут в том, что об агрессивной внешней политике РФ, начиная с эпохи Ельцина и заканчивая Путиным, можно написать целые книги. Но в данном случаи можно лишь сказать, что изменить поведение диктатора – Путина – очень и очень сложно, особенно когда такие лидеры свободного мира как США, не особенно в этом заинтересованы. Если изменить поведение Путина невозможно, то можно было бы изменить поведение Саакашвили и Ющенко, сделав их более схожим с поведением казахстанского или киргизского лидера с целью недопущения военного столкновения между двумя странами. Другими словами, автор этой книги мог бы задаться вопросом не только о вине России (которая, разумеется, присутствует), но и о вине украинского правительства или шире, о вине украинской политической элиты, которая прекрасно понимала, что в военном противостоянии с Россией Запад не окажет помощь и, следовательно, Украина останется один на один с Россией.

Как я отметил выше, автор не пытается найти реальное решение урегулирования российско-украинского конфликта. Автор пишет о том, что никогда не случится, а не о том, что реально можно было сделать и что реально можно сделать сегодня исходя из реальной ситуации, а не из ситуации, когда Украину берут в НАТО. Да, мы все давно уже поняли, что Путин диктатор, который может вторгнуться в любую страну, но что дальше, т.е. что реально можно сегодня сделать, чтобы не только остановится кровопролитие, но и не дать ему повторится в будущем? Принять Украину в НАТО? А что сегодня мешает? А что два-три-четы-шесть-десять лет назад мешало? Если страны НАТО бояться передавать оружие Украине, бояться закрыть небо над Украиной, то, о каком вступлении Украины в НАТО может идти речь, если страны НАТО делают очень ограниченные действия в отношении помощи Украины? Да что там военная помощь, даже финансовую помощь страны Запада не желают оказывать в таком объеме, чтобы Украина могла применить точно такую же тактику, какую применил Владимир Путин в России, когда большинство солдат, это контрактники, которым платят огромные деньги. Страны Запада могут дать Украине столько денег, что она могла бы вдвое увеличить ту сумму, за которую в России идут на войну подписывающие контракт люди. Но страны Запада, этого не сделали. Так вот, автор как будто всего этого не замечает. Автор живёт в какой-то другой реальности. В итоге, автор не пишет, почему же Путин напал на Украину и не пишет, что же делать сегодня, чтобы прекратить это военное противостояние России и Украины.

It is hard to say what this book was written for, but certainly not for the purpose of objectively analyzing Russian-Ukrainian relations. The book is also not suitable as an objective analysis of Ukrainian-American relations. The main problem is that the book offers a black-and-white picture. Although the author in his book criticizes the US policy towards Ukraine, calling it almost treason, nevertheless, in essence, these are meaningless statements. From the author's point of view, both the Democrats when they were in power (in the USA) and the Republicans betrayed Ukraine, but the question arises in such a case, what does the author count on, if all presidents of the USA pursued exactly such a policy, which the author characterizes as betrayal of Ukraine. Maybe it is not a betrayal in such cases, but an objective approach of each US president. For example, as I understood the author, he considers it necessary to admit Ukraine to NATO, so that in case of military aggression by Russia, not only Ukraine alone, but also NATO countries would fight. On the one hand, we hear such statements very often today, but on the other hand, only the leaders of those countries, on whom this decision does not depend, speak about Ukraine's admission to NATO. Key countries such as the USA, Germany, and France deny the possibility of Ukraine's admission to NATO. It turns out that the author says what a certain part of society wants to hear, thus the book will appeal to those who promote such a decision, but on the other hand, these are absolutely safe statements, because they are made by a person on whom Ukraine's admission to NATO does not depend. The author knows this very well and thus portrays himself as a “knight in white armor”, realizing that these are just sweet words, behind which there is no real solution. In this sense, the author's rhetoric can be called demagogy. It would have been much better if the author had written about what can be done in reality, rather than what cannot be done (at least at the moment). That's why I thought that this book was written to make money, not to say something new or to offer an objective analysis of the situation.

The second problem with the book is that the author uses such biased speakers as Serhii Plokhy and the famous Ukrainian nationalist Taras Kuzio as sources (this person is not known to the general public, but he is quoted by experts in almost every book about modern Ukraine). What is the problem with these authors? Taras Kuzio is an ardent Ukrainian nationalist, whose objectivity has long been questioned, as well as the objectivity of his colleague on the other side of the barricades - Richard Sakwa. As for Mr. Plokhy, he is also a very strange Ukrainian historian who writes in his book that Ukrainians died during the famine of the early 1930s, but does not mention the deaths of Russians and Kazakhs. In other words, Serhii Plokhy is the main lever of manipulation, when a false opinion is created that ONLY Ukrainians died during the famine on the territory of the USSR. It may be argued that the Holodomor was the death of ONLY Ukrainians. The problem here is that people who read such historians later believe that ONLY Ukrainians died during the famine in the USSR as a whole. How can they know that Russians and Kazakhs also died there, if such historians as Serhii Plokhy deliberately silence the fact of the death of other peoples of the USSR? This book is based on such historians. But, yes, the book is devoted not to the distant past, but to the very recent past, which does not cancel the fact that the first quarter of the book can be safely skipped.

Funny, but the book also claims that Moscow was also behind the explosions of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The author writes that ChNPP was controlled from Moscow, which looks rather strange, as I always thought that such plants are not directly controlled from Moscow or any other city, but are controlled directly from the plant itself. I don't know where the author got this from, but I wouldn't be surprised if he found this “new version” from some historian/political scientist like Kuzio, who sees the “hand of Moscow” in every tragedy or failure of Ukraine.

If we talk about the book as a whole, it all boils down to two components - the transfer of Ukrainian nuclear weapons to Russia, after the collapse of the USSR and the description of such events as the Russian-Georgian war, the Russian-Ukrainian war, i.e. when the Western allies represented by the U.S. in words supported Ukraine and Georgia, but continued to maintain relations with Russia. It turns out that Georgia and Ukraine believed the Western countries that they would be accepted into NATO and the EU, and when Russia attacked first Georgia and then Ukraine, the Western countries, including the U.S., did almost nothing to punish Russia or at least protect Georgia and Ukraine. On the surface, one might think that this was the case, but the author does not mention or rather does not explain, why Russia attacked Ukraine in the first place. For example, why Russia did not attack Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan, which also had a “color revolution”, or Armenia, where a leader also came to power with the help of the street, i.e. through revolution? Why Georgia and Ukraine? Georgia and Ukraine declared that they wanted to join NATO and that is why Russia, acting ahead of the curve, invaded first Georgia and then Ukraine. This looks like the truth, but it is still not the whole truth. However, the author does not write about the objective side of the case, because in such a case it would imply that these two events - Russia's invasion of Georgia and Ukraine - could have been avoided.

If one reads objective books on the modern history of Georgia and Ukraine, one will find that under both Saakashvili and Yushchenko, relations between Russia and Georgia, as well as between Russia and Ukraine, were in a terrible condition. Both Saakashvili and Yushchenko saw Russia as a major threat and accordingly pursued a policy of treating Russia not as a friendly neighbor but as a political enemy. For example, in 2006, the Russian-Georgian spy scandal and the trade war of the same year broke out. Also, Russian bases in Georgia were closed around the same years. As for Russian-Ukrainian relations, they have been deteriorating since the collapse of the USSR, and Yushchenko's rise to power has further aggravated the already poor relations between Russia and Ukraine. It was under Yushchenko that the Holodomor began to be promoted as a deliberate extermination of Ukrainians by Russians, not by its leader, Stalin. This was the impetus for the gradual but never-ending deterioration of relations between Russia and Ukraine, which then resulted in a real military confrontation. And this is what the author does not write about.

One could argue that I am writing about the actions of the Georgian and Ukrainian governments, but not saying anything about the Russian government. The problem here is that whole books could be written about the aggressive foreign policy of the Russian Federation from the Yeltsin era to Putin. But in this case, we can only say that changing the behavior of a dictator - Putin - is very, very difficult, especially when the leaders of the free world like the United States are not particularly interested in it. If it is impossible to change Putin's behavior, it would be possible to change Saakashvili's and Yushchenko's behavior by making them more similar to that of a Kazakh or Kyrgyz leader in order to avoid a military clash between the two countries. In other words, the author of this book could ask not only about Russia's guilt (which is certainly present), but also about the guilt of the Ukrainian government or, more broadly, the guilt of the Ukrainian political elite, which understood perfectly well that in a military confrontation with Russia the West would not help and, consequently, Ukraine would be left alone with Russia.

As I noted above, the author is not trying to find a real solution to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The author is writing about what will never happen, not about what could realistically be done and what can realistically be done today based on the real situation, not the situation when Ukraine was taken into NATO. Yes, we have all realized long ago that Putin is a dictator who can invade any country, but what next, i.e. what can really be done today to not only stop the bloodshed but also to prevent it from happening again in the future? Admit Ukraine to NATO? What is preventing it today? And what prevented it two-three-four-six-ten years ago? If NATO countries are afraid to transfer weapons to Ukraine, to close the skies over Ukraine, then what kind of NATO membership can we talk about if NATO countries take very limited actions about assistance to Ukraine? Western countries are not even willing to provide so much financial aid that Ukraine can apply the same tactics that Vladimir Putin used in Russia when the majority of soldiers are contract workers who are paid huge sums of money. Western countries could give Ukraine so much money that it could double the amount for which people in Russia go to war. But the Western countries did not. So, it's as if the author doesn't notice all this. The author lives in some other reality. As a result, the author does not write why Putin attacked Ukraine and does not write what to do today to st

[Jessica · Rating 3 out of 5]

It’s not the book it’s me. Too US centric for my taste, at the moment not that keen on reading things like that

[Caleb Christopher · Rating 5 out of 5]

Following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, this volume goes into depth of the history of Russia and the connection to the West. Moving through history, explaining the makeup of the country and how it progressed into the USSR, and the Soviet Fall, into more modern times to basically the present. There is so much complexities that go into foreign relationships and how these relationships can threaten peace and stability in the world. There was an in depth analysis of US Foreign Policy, moving out of the Cold War into the current political age. This is a very informational read which really dives into how we’ve gotten to our current situation with Russia, and how the West and its allies have and continue to navigate this testy foreign connection.

[FellowBibliophile KvK · Rating 1 out of 5]

This book covers several decades worth of events (Bush I to Biden), yet is extremely thinly endnoted compared to Christian Ingrao's Les Chasseurs Noirs , which only covers events from October 1940 to May 1945, and compared to Mark Mazower's Inside Hitler's Greece which covers events from April 1941 to October 1944. Moreover, a large number of Vindman's endnotes refer to secondary source books, news reports, internet sources and interviews conducted years (and in some cases decades) after the fact à la Tacitus writing about Teutoberg. Not a single archival source is cited despite chapters of this book covering the Bush I, Clinton and Bush II eras, in stark contrast to Professors Mazower and Ingrao, whose book are heavily archival and document-based. Vindman does not even cite one letter, one diplomatic dispatch.

All of this leads one to conclude that Vindman's book is 99% opinion and supposition, in stark contrast to Professors Ingrao and Mazower's books, which constitute legitimate history.

This is not just a matter of the massive differential in references. Vindman uses long disproven tropes about Mongol "brutality", something long disproven by Isabel de Madariaga, and more recently by Mark Galeotti and Marie Favereau, all of who demonstrate that apart from the sack of cities that resisted like Vladimir, the Mongols actually promoted local governance in the form of the Kniaz and the Church.

Similarly, he uses Gibbon's entirely ahistorical "Byzantine Empire" to describe the Eastern Roman Empire, while he otherwise throws about the term "ahistorical" like it is his word of the day calendar word. Not to mention that he blames "the Vikings" (by which one can guess he actually means the Warange) for slavery while completely ignoring the fact that the Khazars were the principal slave traders of the area.

Likewise, he pretends as if what is today Ukraine was only ever "occupied" by the Mongols and the Russians, completely ignoring the Scythians, Sarmatians, Khazars, Rzeczpospolita and Swedes, none of who could be regarded as bleeding heart Bernie Bro Democrats.

On top of this, he says that " by the fifteenth century" [i.e., by 1400], the Rus "were free from the Mongol and Turkic yoke." In reality, both Mark Galeotti and Marie Favereau point out that the Rus had to fight the Mongols yet again at Ugra in 1480. Not to mention that the final successor state of the Orda, the Khaganate of Kazan, was only destroyed by Ivan Grozny in 1552 , at the end of the sixteenth century.

Not to mention that he gives an ill-informed, if not disingenuous, account of realism. He says that Kissinger was a "realist," something disproven by Patrick Seale and Avi Shlaim's biographies of Hafez al-Asad and King Hussein which show that Kissinger was a bumbling empire builder. Curiously and conspicuously absent from his demonology of "realism" are George Washington's Farewell Address and John Quincy Adam's 1821 4th of July Speech, which set the path for American foreign policy, the deviations from by Wilson and the Presidential Roosevelts being why America is in the hole it is in today.

As well, he is a completely tone-deaf elitist. If he wanted to drum up support for Ukraine, going in moralising like he did is exactly the wrong way to go. He cites Snyder about grain. If he had stuck with the fact that, as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, grain prices skyrocketed and contributed heavily to inflation, he would have won over a lot of the people his moralising alienated.

He hilariously asserts that taking a non-interventionist approach to Russia and Ukraine will "embolden" China with regards to Taiwan. In reality, as revealed in the joint RCMP-Canadian Security Intelligence Service report "Sidewinder," and by Jonathan Manthorpe's book Claws Of The Panda Beijing has been collaborating with the Triads for decades to undermine the West. The Triads have a massive presence in San Francisco, New York and Toronto, but where is their world headquarters? Taiwan. Why would Beijing move against Taiwan (as opposed to just acting like it wants to do something about Taiwan) when the Triads of Taiwan are working hand and glove with Beijing to funnel drugs to, and thereby undermine, America and the West? Vindman cannot understand this because, like Douglas Porch, Gian Gentile and Andrew Bacevich, he is a fanatical Clausewitzian--not to mention also being a Ticket-Punching Horse Holder who, like Gentile, deliberately sought a rear echelon position, unlike David Hackworth who could not wait to get his own battalion-- who cannot see that China is operating by Sun Tzu.

On that note, Vindman's little section on his allegedly going to the front lines of Ukraine to get photos in 2014 while he was a military attache is pure fantasy. For one thing, in his previous book, he specifically said that he refused a frontline battalion and deliberately chose to become what Davi Hackworth called a paper shuffler. For another thing, as Dick Marcinko pointed in Rogue Warrior military attaches are primarily concerned with establishing themselves poolside and at the Cercle Sportif.

Likewise, Vindman chose to write books about Ukraine. Other Colonels, like Robert K. Brown and Alex McColl, chose to go to the FRY and actually help train the locals to resist Milosevic, being in their 60s at the time while Vindman is still in his 40s in 2025. Vindman talks about having shrapnel. Robert Callen Mackenzie was declared 70% disabled after being wounded in Vietnam, but passed Rhodesian SAS selection to become a Major, all before he went training friendly forces in Central America, the FRY and Africa. Since Vindman was a Panzerjäger like Fritz Christen and Remy Schrijnen, one would have thought that his skill set would have been helpful in Ukraine starting in 2022. Yet, unlike Robert K. Brown, Alex McColl and Robert Callen Mackenzie, he did not feel the need to actually engage in Takka-Takka-Boom-Boom, and preferred to become a political "scientist," just like the infamous Al Haig wanted his ossifers to become.

All in all, Vindman would prefer that America spent 100% of its military on fighting Russia. Aside from the fact that America's military, at one million strong, is a mere fraction of what Halder had in 1941, this presumes that things like Iran, ISIS, China and the cartels are a mere afterthought.

Vindman would do well to learn from George Washington, "Nothing is more important than that permanent, inveterate antipathies and passionate attachments should be excluded .

[Robert Dowdle · Rating 4 out of 5]

Vindman’s book is better understood as one that follows Ukrainian post-independence politics with a focus on the trilateral relationship between the US, Ukraine, and Russia. Vindman focuses on not just realist administrations, which he defines as both Bush and Trump administrations, but also naive idealist administrations, which he defines as the Clinton, Obama, and Biden administrations. Realism is taken to primarily mean transactional diplomacy based on short term gains, while neo-idealism, the approach Vindman favors, is able to build relationships based on long term values.
Much of the book closely follows Ukrainian domestic politics with a focus on the era from 1991-2014. Foreign policy criticism is primarily directed towards US administrations that fail to encourage more reforms from Ukraine and instead work towards negotiating, or more pessimistically appeasing, Russia. If you’re very interested in understanding the pitfalls and the background for failed engagement with Ukraine and why Ukrainians feel the US has betrayed it, this book is for you. If you’re more interested in a theoretical, multi-faceted critic of realism, this book remains focused on just the US-Ukrainian relationship, with only a brief chapter on the US’s failure to respond adequately to the brief Russo-Georgian war in 2008.
At the time of writing this the 2nd Trump administration has recently presented its 28 point peace plan for the Russo-Ukraine war which has been received extremely negatively by many of the US’s allies, Ukraine, who was allegedly not consulted, and various domestic groups within the US. However, negotiations between the US and Ukraine have indicated that Ukrainian support for a resolution may be imminent, but Russia is still mute on whether or not it would accept a modified version of the original 28 point peace plan, making a resolution to the war uncertain. Towards the end Vindman touches on the recent 2nd Trump administration and its embrace of heavily realist, transactional, foreign policy in an increasingly unstable world could have long term consequences which revolve around authoritarian regimes replacing US influence in plays the US has withdrawn from. However, Vindman also points out how Trump’s, often seemingly erratic behavior, may deter adversaries who are intimidated.
This seemingly erratic behavior is likely the result of Trump’s own behavior and the 2nd Trump administration's deep divisions between isolationism and hawkishness. US aid to Ukraine, and sanctions on Russia, have both come with very short notice beforehand. USAID, Voice of America, and Radio Free Asia have all been dismantled or severely weakened. The US military has been active with military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, and alleged drug trafficking ships in the Caribbean sea. Yet private messages from a leaked Signal group indicate that Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of Defense (now Secretary of War) Pete Hegseth loath ‘European freeloading’ in response to US strikes against the Houthis off the coast of Yemen. The US’s foreign policy historically has followed a more realist than value based approach, although the rhetoric used tends to favor an idealist approach that, depending on the conflict, is mostly accurate or dangerously misplaced. Vindman’s description of Trump’s more explicit realism remains sound.
It is difficult to predict how the conflict between Russia and Ukraine will end and what changes US foreign policy will undergo under Trump’s administration or a future administration. It is unlikely isolationism will disappear. This isolationism did not appear in a vacuum. Idealist rhetoric when used to justify US interventions that very few in the world, and most importantly the US itself, believed was really for human rights and democracy has galvanized support for isolationism. Work needs to be done to convince large parts of the American population that US foreign aid, military aid, and sometimes military presence in other countries is in their best interest and the best interest of the other country in question. Isolationism is not new in America, and the 2nd Trump administration, like many of its policies, can often dramatically and rapidly change its foreign policy approach. On a final note about isolationism, regimes that pursue isolationism and autarky have always failed. The US’s embrace of isolationism has been interrupted two major times in history, with both interruptions involving the death of Americans, which galvanized domestic support for increased US involvement in foreign conflict and affairs. Accountability and communication both remain essential if the US is to embrace the neo-idealism that Vindman proposes. In regards to the current US administration, if history is any indicator, isolationism is a self-defeating long term strategy, and is likely to be repudiated by the administration itself, or the voters of the US. It is too early to say when and in which way this will occur, but I strongly believe it will happen.

[John · Rating 5 out of 5]

Splendid Overview on the Ongoing Mistakes in US & Russian Foreign Relations

Aleander Vindman’s “The Folly of Reason: How The West Deceived Itself About Russia and Betrayed Ukraine” may be one of the most important books about United States foreign policy published in recent years. An important book that warrants a wide readership, especially amongst those who are currently developing foreign policy not only for the United States government, but also among its allies, especially those in Europe. Vindman’s book is a compelling indictment on what the West has done wrong in cultivating a stable, peaceful relationship with Russia, while ignoring Ukraine’s right to exist as a democratic state independent of Russian manipulation in its internal affairs as well as its foreign policy. It demonstrates that what has gone wrong with this relationship has an important impact, not only within Europe, but in the West’s dealings with other dictatorships, especially the People’s Republic of China. If nothing else, Vindman’s book should serve as a clarion call to correct these mistakes, not only to prevent future problems with Russia, but especially to prevent problems with dictatorships like the People’s Republic of China now, and in the future.

Vindman offers readers a concise overview of what six United States Presidential administrations have done wrong with regards to the United States’ relationship with Russia, too often minimizing or ignoring potentially important ties with Ukraine, and allowing it to become part of the Western European economic union and a political and military alliance arrayed against Putin’s Russia. Consistently these mistakes have revolved around what can be regarded as a “realistic” view of United States – Russian relations, centered on Russia’s importance as a nuclear superpower, even if its post-Soviet Union history demonstrates just how impoverished it is both politically and economically in comparison with Western Europe, and especially, the United States. Vindman notes how the United States missed excellent opportunities to change for the better this relationship that could have prevented the brief Russian invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, and perhaps the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. Too often, United States presidential administrations – both Republican and Democrat – have had short-term objectives in seeking to appease and to accommodate Russia, especially with regards to rejecting Ukraine’s NATO membership, instead of adopting potentially more successful long-term strategies in dealing with Russia and its dictatorial leader Vladimir Putin.

Vindman makes a persuasive case as to why a “Neo-Idealism” approach to United States – Russian relations is preferable to the ad hoc, short term “realistic” approaches followed by these six administrations, and, as it seems, the current second Trump administration. A “Neo-Idealism” focused on staying true to American political principles that would foster greater democratic values and free market capitalism within Russia as well as to protect Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity. Where I might fault Vindman is that he doesn’t delve deeply into what “Neo-Idealism” is, though he does compare and contrast it with what he regards correctly, as the fundamentally flawed realism that the United States has pursed in its foreign relations with Russia. However, this is a minor criticism of what is both an excellent history as well as indictment of United States – Russia relations since the fall of the Soviet Union. Vindman has offered readers a compelling message as well as a credible warning of what may lie ahead not only with Russia, but with other dictatorships, especially the People’s Republic of China, if the United States does not pursue a foreign policy that stresses “Neo-Idealism”.

[Stephen Harrison · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was an interesting book that makes a good case for the failure of “Realism” in U.S. foreign, especially in regards to Russia and Ukraine. It is essentially a case study of US-Russian-Ukrainians relations, going all the way back to the formation of the USSR, but getting into the details after the end of the Cold War. Across six presidential administrations beginning with Georgie H.W. Bush, the United States prioritized relations with Russia and an emphasis on stability over principle and relations with Ukraine. Realism, in this case, led to short-term “crisis management,” allowing Russian aggression in 2008 and 2014 to go largely unchecked and encouraged the aggression of 2022. Vindman believes that promoting American values, especially democracy and diplomacy, would serve the country better in the long run. He calls the philosophy "Neo-Idealism" because it incorporates American ideals into calculations for America's overall benefit.

This book gave me a lot to think about, but it wasn't completely convincing. Specifically, he thinks the United States should have punished Russia for bad behavior decades ago, rather than looking the other way while focusing on other issues. I am sympathetic to this argument, but I can see someone attacking it by pointing out that Russia is basically a regional power with an economy around the size of Italy's or Texas. Why should the US get involved when we have bigger fish to fry in Asia? He doesn't really address that, so I would be interesting to see his response. In addition, I would like to see him discuss how any sort of idealist policy could be sold to the American people, who are notoriously short-term thinkers.

Vindman has a very interesting personal story that gives him a rare insight into what was going on. A career US Army officer, he transitioned mid-career into an area specialist on Russia and Ukraine, serving as military-attache in both embassies. He saw first hand how Obama explained away Russian actions in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria, which further emboldened Putin. He seems a little sympathetic to Obama, but doesn't pull any punches. He is more visceral in his analysis of Trump, which isn't surprising. First, Trump is the most transactional president in US history, which is Vindman's biggest criticism of US policy towards Russia. And then he was the whistleblower that reported Trump's attempted quid pro quo with Ukraine, where Trump withheld military aid to Ukraine while he asked them to dig up dirt on Biden.

One other part that I found particularly interesting part was that the United States needed assistance for Russian Cooperation in Afghanistan and Iraq, especially by helping get clearances for airspace from former Soviet republics. This meant that the US did nothing more than offer harsh words when Putin stepped up his rhetoric and then actions in Georgia and Ukraine.

I enjoyed the book and suggest it for anyone interested in US foreign relations overall or specifically with either Ukraine or Russia. It is concise and the author has the experience to give this some gravitas.

[Philip Girvan · Rating 2 out of 5]

Alexander Vindman skewers what he interprets as the last seven US presidential administrations’ realpolitik approach of to the various republics of the former USSR and advances neo-idealism as a supposedly new tack.

Quoting Benjamin Tallis, Vindman defines neo-idealism as “a morally-based approach to geopolitics, grounded in the power of values conceived as ideals to strive for: human rights and fundamental freedoms, social and cultural liberalism, democratic governance; self-determination for democratic societies; and perhaps most importantly, the right of citizens in those societies to a hopeful future”.

I agree with Vindman that the US approach to the region has been shortsighted and transactional, and that the US has not taken Ukraine seriously as a nation-state. My beef with his thesis is that the lovely words and admirable sentiments quoted above have, to a considerable degree, driven the rhetoric, policies, and actions of the US as concerns Ukraine and Russia since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Overall, the book is simple and dumb. On page 90, he writes

“the START agreement of the early 1990s already contained provisions for reducing nuclear weapons; the goal, therefore, should not have been to transfer to Russia existing nuclear weapons platforms sited in the former republics, with the bulk in Ukraine, making it easier for Russia to meet the treaty thresholds. The goal should have been to entirely dispose of the weapons and systems in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, while reducing launch platforms in Russia.”

Sure, would be lovely. But it was never going to happen. He removes all agency from the ex-Soviet republics. Certainly they were weakened, but they weren’t dead. It continues:

“Requiring Russia to cooperate in a true and durable threat-reduction effort by neutralizing the weapons— the road not taken in the 1990s—is an example of the tough-minded approach that would be repeatedly avoided, as we will see, in the ensuing series of turning points and climaxes that led to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.”

In other words, be a hardass. What’s the worst that could happen? The worst is beyond all imagination. It’s something of a miracle the denuclearization of Ukraine went as smoothly as it did.

A hindsight man if there ever was one, Vindman makes a significant historical errors on page 35. He writes that “[i]n the spring of 1989, Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates went to President Bush and advised him that, given the fall of the Berlin Wall and other events, the administration should start contingency planning for the USSR's collapse.

The Berlin Wall, of course, didn’t fall until November 1989. Irksome example of the laziness and wrongness that dominate this poorly thought out, poorly written waste of time.

[Mary · Rating 3 out of 5]

In this historical analysis spanning the last thousand years but focused mainly on the late 1980s to today, Vindman examined Ukraine-Russia relations from a perspective shaped by his academic, military, and foreign service background.

Vindman's premise was that the US should have adopted a neo-idealist philosophy to the region, which meant the long-term instilling of values such as democratic institutions, self-determination, and human rights. He criticized the past six US administrations for taking either a realist approach (short-term, transactional, fearful, crisis management-oriented) or a false idealism approach (hopeful empty rhetoric). Either way, Putin learned that Russia could act with impunity and nobody would stop him.

Vindman wrote an impressive analysis of government-level events in Ukraine and Russia during this period. To support his claims, he detailed the numerous missteps taken by Democrat and Republican presidents over the past 30 years that brought us to today.

The book's limitations became clear with his solutions for extricating ourselves from future disasters. Vindman failed to define the specifics of a neo-idealist approach or how much it would cost. He felt we don't have to worry about global nuclear war because Putin would never take that step. I wish I could be so confident. He didn't convince me that an aggressive Western strategy would have stopped Russian invasions in Ukraine and Georgia, given his own descriptions of the Russian imperial mentality and motivations. Vindman also failed to consider an American citizenry exhausted with being the policeman of the world and paying for that burden when our own debt level is astronomical and domestic needs are unmet.

The book is still worth reading for its chronological analysis of US-Russia-Ukraine relations over the past 30+ years and for an understanding of how neo-idealists view the world.

[Stuart Holland · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book charts the journey of Ukraine from the disolution of the Soviet Union through to Russia's war to conquer it of today. It's a remarkably frank look at how many well-meaning but misinformed actors, particularly in the US, (along with several not-well-meaning at all) had the opportunity to prevent such a tragedy, but instead ended up hastening it.

It's also an interesting contrast to what I read in The Situation Room, where I called out that book painting a surprisingly positive picture of George Bush Sr. This book does the opposite, painting him as the beginning of a Russia-centric foreign policy for the US that was at the core of their missteps in the following decades. (If I had to choose who I found more convincing, I'd say Vindman makes his case better.)

I'm obviously no diplomat, but a core moral tenet of this book also cuts deep into something that I think is missing from a lot of modern diplomacy. There's a lot of "we have to work with who we have" and "better the devil we know" which leads to terrible long term outcomes and encourages autocrats to act more autocratically, not less. It's easy to say that and sound like some kind of idealist who doesn't get anything done (though honestly to me, that line of thinking just seems like a framing that assumes the former's point of view to already be true), but that aside, Vindman also clearly doesn't endorse a direct idealism in foreign policy. He makes a great case for values-driven diplomacy, that foreign policy objectives only matter if they support your values, because otherwise why are you doing anything? Transactionalism is a trap - maybe you make more money now, but does that matter when there's no freedom to use that money 30 years later?

Well worth reading, it puts a lot into perspective.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

A bit wonky for my taste, but then again that's the whole point of the book, so not really a fair criticism, the entire field is like that. To me, it lays bare the lie that "political science" is a "science" in any sense of the word. At best, there are competing philosophies, in this case Neo-Idealism vs Neo-Realism, and as with any discussion involving "isms" and "Neo's", quickly becomes so abstract as to lose any relevance to the real world. The futility is exposed in the final chapter, with trump reassuming the throne and throwing any semblance of ideology or rationality out the window.

There are huge buildings in Washington DC and half the Pentagon devoted to serious analysis, and they seem to get almost everything wrong almost all of the time. From the "Domino Theory" to the Iranian Revolution, Islamist revolutions and global terrorism, the disastrous interventions in Central America, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and failures in Syria, Lebanon, Somalia, and dozens of other places and incidents, the track record for people like Vindman is awful.

So I approach anything that these bloodthirsty military types have to say with skepticism, especially when they resort to reliance on any sort of ideology of American exceptionalism or promoting interventionist meddling to secure our interests in places where we don't belong. He does make a strong case for providing more support to Ukraine in its war against Russia, arguing persuasively that fears of escalation into a broader conflict are unfounded, and that failing to act will further destabilize global power structures to the point that failing to act is actually the more dangerous choice. Plus, it's the right thing to do. And we should never become so cynical that doing the right thing is deemed irrelevant.

[Mr. Book · Rating 4 out of 5]

You can also see this review, along with others I have written, at my blog, Mr. Book's Book Reviews.

Thank you, PublicAffairs, for providing this book for review consideration via NetGalley in exchange for an honest review. All opinions are my own.

Mr. Book just finished The Folly Of Realism: How the West Deceived Itself About Russia and Betrayed Ukraine, by Alexander Vindman.

This book will be released on February 25, 2025.

Vindman was the first White House official to testify, at the impeachment hearing against Trump, on what was on the July 25, 2019 phone call between Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky, in which Trump asked Zelensky to investigate Hunter Biden.

This book gives a very good look at the history of the Ukraine/Russia relationship, along with how the United States has spent decades misjudging the situation and coming up with the wrong calculations and strategy options. The US actions have helped to embolden Russia over the years and have helped contribute to the mess we find ourselves in.

I give this book a B+. Goodreads and NetGalley require grades on a 1-5 star system. In my personal conversion system, a B+ equates to 4 stars. (A or A+: 5 stars, B+: 4 stars, B: 3 stars, C: 2 stars, D or F: 1 star).

This review has been posted at NetGalley, Goodreads and my blog, Mr. Book’s Book Reviews

Mr. Book finished reading this on October 1, 2024.

[Peter Podbielski · Rating 4 out of 5]

Vindman's analysis is solid. My only concern is his advocacy of a neo-idealist school of thought that may not gain the traction it needs among policy decisionmakers.

While crafting a chilling analysis of America’s ennui and uncertainty, which have facilitated the resurgence of brutal Russian expansionism with catastrophic consequences, Alexander Vindman presents a strategy for rectifying our misguided policies.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, six U.S. presidential administrations from both parties implemented policies toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia that emboldened Russia and reinforced its long-standing myth of regional dominance. The outcome was military aggression and a full-scale invasion, which were entirely foreseeable.

In "The Folly of Realism,” Vindman contends that America’s errors in Eastern Europe stem from policymakers’ obsession with immediate, short-term solutions and their misguided hopes and fears. He champions a new long-term, values-based strategy that highlights the principles of liberal democracy and a rules-based international order.

Filled with firsthand accounts and behind-the-scenes interviews with key policymakers from Washington and around the world, this book reveals the shortcomings in Western foreign policy, examines the roots of the alarming resurgence of Russian imperialism, and suggests strategies for containment, culminating in the shocking brutality of Putin’s invasions of Ukraine.

[Jennifer J. · Rating 3 out of 5]

I want to give this 3 and a half stars really. The book offers an illuminating and, to my knowledge, not-before compiled history of US foreign policy towards Ukraine and Russia. The book is valuable for this contribution alone. But this book falls short where many similar volumes do - in that it fails to clearly define the very idea it purports to be introducing (here, neo-idealism as Vindman conceives it). We don't get any sense about what neo-idealism would look like in any practical sense. Nor do we get a direct clarification on how neo-idealism differs from what Vindman cheekily calls "naive liberal idealism." I am fairly confident that Vindman holds a clear and distinct picture in his mind of each of these frameworks. But for readers coming across these terms for the first time, the text is rather murky with its concepts and quite non-instructive in any practical sense.

Still worth reading for the great accounting of the inside baseball of US foreign policy and for the most thorough undoing of the (false) argument that NATO expansion has anything to do with Putin's choices. I mean, it doesn't not have anything to do with it, but it's in no way the central driving force behind anything Russia does. It was really nice to read an account of current events from an author who clearly and plainly understands that.

I desperately want to know what Maria Popova and Oxana Shevel think of this book. Their review will wholly override mine in the end :)

[PyranopterinMo · Rating 4 out of 5]

Clearly written and argued but still this is an alternative rather than mainstream viewpoint.
It comes from someone not at the top of the geopolitics hierarchy. As a whisteblower you get what you expect- someone with strongly held views, someone who has grudges and is intolerant or impatient of alternative approaches. There is a lot of fingerpointing. He criticises all the admins since Clinton, France and Germany, quotes Gates ( Bush's replacement for Rumsfield as Sec Def) and Condoliza Rice (Rumsfield nemesis and an old school anti soviet) and Kissinger as well as the group of Waltz and Mearsheimer who blamed NATO and recommends a new approach - neo Idealism which sound a bit closer to Reagan than later presidents. Worth reading - he certainly mentions some people that I admire like former ambassador Herbst.
He is critical of the Biden admin and all the earlier ones back to Clinton but he has special venom for Trump. I wonder what he would have written about Biden if he was on the inside. He is a Ukraine partisan who isn't really Ukrainian perhaps more partisan than the Ukrainians who are better aware of their country's limitations. Also what would he have written about them if he had worked for the German or French governments.

[Marsha · Rating 5 out of 5]

An informative book on how various US administrations have misunderstood the essential natures of Russia vs Ukraine over the decades since the fall of the Soviet Union. The US has mistakenly bought in to Russia's concept of its own exceptionalism and has treated it with kid gloves, as if it's still an empire. Each time Putin, Medvedev et al crossed a red line, the US opted for solutions of "realism" -- to solve temporarily -- rather than idealism -- to take the principled stance and fight for democracy. The realism approach has basically encouraged Russia's bad behavior, all the while ignoring the great promise of not just Ukraine, but the other democratic countries newly free of the Soviet yoke.
Vindman says that the current US administration is as fearful of a Russian loss as it is of a Russian win, so has been giving Ukraine just enough to stay alive but not enough to win. He states that there is still time to turn this around, not just for the sake of Ukraine, but for our democratic ideals, because otherwise, all of the other dictatorships will be empowered and emboldened to cross borders and take what they want with impunity.

[Michael James · Rating 5 out of 5]

Among vulnerable borderline democracies and authoritarian regimes alike, the denuclearization of Ukraine, permitting Russian aggression and making the West a victim of nuclear extortion has only increased the desire to establish nuclear weapons programs, eroding Western nonproliferation efforts. page 200
Lt. Col. (Ret.) Vindman does not spare U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump for their indulgent attitude toward Russia and unwillingness to insist on preparing both the U.S. military and Ukraine's military for the inevitable Russian invasions of both 2014 and 2022. Realists feared loose nukes. Idealists dreamed of a Russian evolution to join a rules-based international order.
Vindman proposes a "return to neo-idealism...for piecing together a broken world" p.240. Recognizing that our national values are in fact also our national interests will align our national security with those who insist on fighting for their national language, history, and sovereignty and against an aging tyranny using sophisticated disinformation as well as state-of-the-art weapons technology to pursue its imperial ambitions.

[Dawn · Rating 5 out of 5]

Trying to make sense of current events without knowing the history can be a fool's errand. Fortunately, we've got Alexander Vindman who is sharing his insights and understanding -- so I can better understand (and, admittedly, sometimes weep at/for) recent tragedies.

Vindman goes deep into Ukrainian political history so, even though I'm a neophyte on Eastern European history, I can follow and appreciate his reasoning on realism in international affairs. I'm even reaching for my highlighter to keep track of his insights on various issues that crop up in public discourse. I need to remember this stuff!

All in all, The Folly of Realism is a good read that is absolutely essential during this pivotal moment.

[Jurij Fedorov · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's a good short summary of the conflict and how "the West" was fooled. Yet that's just it. If you followed the news you won't learn much new stuff here. He goes over the Ukraine conflict and how it started which is stuff any intellectual should know by now anyhow. Yet it's a strong refresher written by an expert who actually worked in the field collecting proof for USA and worked as an expert advicer on this issue.

Yet the author is American and "the West" here is only USA. When going over the history of Russia and Ukraine he mentions EU nations. But it's fast without much input while US presidents are mentioned by name and are even quoted. Hence the title of the book is false. I still enjoy the US focus, but it's absolutely not the West reacting. It's US presidents overlooking the danger. Baltikum and Scandinavia for example were observant. UK are also clear on their standpoint. While Germany basically created the riches in Russia. Yet none of this is explored. Pro Russia Belarus and Hungary are ignored too. This focused on basic history of Russia and Ukraine.

So there is not just 1 response. There are 10 different ones. Yet for the author only USA matters. Only the UA presidents matter. It makes for a shallow overview that leaves you with too many questions. It's worth a read if you want to catch up. Yet you wonder why he didn't try to look deeper into Russia's motivation.

[Brenda Kochis · Rating 5 out of 5]

Alexander Vindman is just the person to trace the historical events involving U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Russia for the past couple of decades. He recounts the missteps and assumptions from earlier administrations, talking about their view of Russia. Hindsight is always 20-20, but unfortunately this current administration is continuing to make policy errors. This was a very interesting historical view of the issues and policies that eventually lead to the Russian invasion. Recommended read for those who would like to understand this.