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Bombing to Provoke: Rockets, Missiles, and Drones as Instruments of Fear and Coercion
224 pages, Paperback
Published October 24, 2024
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
January 2, 2025
This book is incredibly niche, so I would not recommend it to anyone. However, if you're interested in the effect of ballistic missiles on Air Power Theory, give it a read.
This book is incredibly well-written and researched, and I found it enjoyable as well as informative.
(I'm posting this as read last year because I want to start fresh for my reading challenge!)
This book is incredibly well-written and researched, and I found it enjoyable as well as informative.
(I'm posting this as read last year because I want to start fresh for my reading challenge!)
February 9, 2026
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Хотя тема книги очень многообещающая – бомбардировка городов как инструмент принуждения противника к капитуляции – книга получилась очень узконаправленной, скучной и вообще данный вопрос освещается довольно слабо. К тому же большая часть книги посвящена ближневосточным военным конфликтам. Исключением является лишь первая глава посвященная описанию тому, как политика бомбардировок гражданских объектов в качестве инструмента принуждения противника к капитуляции использовалась во время Второй мировой войны. Как мы помним по истории Второй мировой войны, этот метод не повлиял на сроки окончания этой войны.
Again, on 28 March 1942, following a British raid on the historic German city of Lübeck, Hitler furiously demanded that the German armed forces immediately retaliate. Beginning in March 1943, under Sir Arthur Harris, the British air force launched a series of bombing attacks on industrial cities in the German Ruhr. On 24 July 1943, the British air force began bombing Hamburg, Germany’s second largest city, forcing the evacuation of more than 1,000,000 citizens and causing 40,000 deaths within the next nine days.
On the morning of 25 July 1943, Hitler, disappointed with the retaliatory options provided to him by his air force experts, angrily declared, “You can only smash terror with counter-terror!” He announced to his military advisors that coercing the British to stop the bombing of German cities required systematic targeting of Britain’s cities.
К сожалению даже в этой главе автор не приводит никакого анализа, как данная политика террора гражданского населения повлияла на ход войны. Впрочем, возможно отсутствие какого-либо эффекта и объясняется тем, что автор особо не рассматривает этот вопрос, ограничившись констатацией факта этой самой взаимной бомбардировки. Однако я ожидал более глубокого исследования именно этого вопроса, т.е. вопроса эффективности террора против гражданских лиц в контексте войны. Далее автор рассматривает ирако-иранскую войну, где так же использовалась такая тактика устрашения гражданского населения, но опять же, никаких особо интересных подробностей в книге не приводится.
Saddam Hussein repeatedly struck Iranian cities with missiles aiming to coerce its leaders into capitulation. The Iranians reciprocated with limited missile strikes and aerial bombardment of Iraqi cities. However, a combination of very low launch rates and poor targeting accuracies ensured that the effect of Iraqi missile strikes was limited. Soon civilians in targeted Iranian cities found ways to survive the Iraqi missile attacks.
<…>
Saddam Hussein and his military leaders constantly threatened Iran with chemical warfare, hoping to coerce the Iranian decisionmakers to end the war on preferential terms. The Iraqi military high command issued a statement in September 1983 warning that chemical weapons “will be used for the first time in war . . . were not used in previous attacks for humanitarian and ethical reasons. . . . If you execute the orders of Khomeini’s warmongering regime and go to the fronts, your death will be certain because this time we will use a weapon that will destroy any moving creature on the fronts.”
<…>
Similarly, in a 6 March 1987 conversation with his advisors, Saddam Hussein seemed to support striking Iranian cities with chemical weapons. The conversation unfolds as follows:
Abdul-Ghani Abdul-Ghafur: Sir, I support the opinion to strike cities because cities have residents and economic facilities. Striking cities has a psychological effect that frustrates the Persian enemy and reveal’s Khomeini’s deception . . . and leads the Iranians themselves to hate him. It is true that [striking the] economic facilities slows down the Persian economy, but at the same time, striking the cities has economic and psychological effects that we need. The type of cities to strike must be, certainly, important cities with a deeper impact, if possible, but at the same time this is an issue to be left to the General Command and to Your Excellency. . . . On March 21, the situation escalates inside Iran on a large scale and I believe if there is a possibility to strike them at that time inside the cities, any city, it could have a psychological effect as far as defeating the Persian enemy, and a higher positive psychological effect for the Iraqis . . .
Sa’doun Hammadi: Is the chemical weapon as effective as we think? I mean the way we think of it as civilians?
Saddam Hussein: Yes, it’s effective against those who do not use masks momentarily, just like the way we as civilians think of it.
Sa’doun Hammadi: You mean it exterminates by the thousands?
Saddam Hussein: Yes, it exterminates by the thousands. It exterminates by the thousands and make them restrain from drinking or eating the available food and makes them leave the city for a period of time until it is fully decontaminated [inaudible background comments]. They can do nothing, they cannot sleep on a mattress, eat, drink or anything; they will leave [inaudible] naked.
Несмотря на кажущуюся интересность книги, автор сухо описывает военные конфликты как таковые, а не проводит анализ непосредственно террора или угрозы террора гражданского населения. Я бы оценил, что непосредственно этой теме посвящается не более 15% всей книги ибо всё остальное является простым описанием того как протекал тот или иной военный конфликт.
Although the book's topic is very promising—the bombing of cities as a means of forcing the enemy to surrender—the book turned out to be very narrow in focus, boring, and, in general, the issue is covered rather poorly. In addition, most of the book is devoted to military conflicts in the Middle East. The only exception is the first chapter, which describes how the policy of bombing civilian targets as a means of forcing the enemy to surrender was used during World War II. As we remember from the history of World War II, this method did not affect the timing of the end of the war.
Again, on 28 March 1942, following a British raid on the historic German city of Lübeck, Hitler furiously demanded that the German armed forces immediately retaliate. Beginning in March 1943, under Sir Arthur Harris, the British air force launched a series of bombing attacks on industrial cities in the German Ruhr. On 24 July 1943, the British air force began bombing Hamburg, Germany’s second largest city, forcing the evacuation of more than 1,000,000 citizens and causing 40,000 deaths within the next nine days.
On the morning of 25 July 1943, Hitler, disappointed with the retaliatory options provided to him by his air force experts, angrily declared, “You can only smash terror with counter-terror!” He announced to his military advisors that coercing the British to stop the bombing of German cities required systematic targeting of Britain’s cities.
Unfortunately, even in this chapter, the author does not provide any analysis of how this policy of terror against the civilian population affected the course of the war. However, the lack of any effect may be explained by the fact that the author does not specifically address this issue, limiting himself to stating the fact of this mutual bombing. However, I expected a more in-depth study of this very issue, i.e., the effectiveness of terror against civilians in the context of war. The author then examines the Iran-Iraq War, where similar tactics of intimidation of the civilian population were used, but again, no particularly interesting details are provided in the book.
Saddam Hussein repeatedly struck Iranian cities with missiles aiming to coerce its leaders into capitulation. The Iranians reciprocated with limited missile strikes and aerial bombardment of Iraqi cities. However, a combination of very low launch rates and poor targeting accuracies ensured that the effect of Iraqi missile strikes was limited. Soon civilians in targeted Iranian cities found ways to survive the Iraqi missile attacks.
<…>
Saddam Hussein and his military leaders constantly threatened Iran with chemical warfare, hoping to coerce the Iranian decisionmakers to end the war on preferential terms. The Iraqi military high command issued a statement in September 1983 warning that chemical weapons “will be used for the first time in war . . . were not used in previous attacks for humanitarian and ethical reasons. . . . If you execute the orders of Khomeini’s warmongering regime and go to the fronts, your death will be certain because this time we will use a weapon that will destroy any moving creature on the fronts.”
<…>
Similarly, in a 6 March 1987 conversation with his advisors, Saddam Hussein seemed to support striking Iranian cities with chemical weapons. The conversation unfolds as follows:
Abdul-Ghani Abdul-Ghafur: Sir, I support the opinion to strike cities because cities have residents and economic facilities. Striking cities has a psychological effect that frustrates the Persian enemy and reveal’s Khomeini’s deception . . . and leads the Iranians themselves to hate him. It is true that [striking the] economic facilities slows down the Persian economy, but at the same time, striking the cities has economic and psychological effects that we need. The type of cities to strike must be, certainly, important cities with a deeper impact, if possible, but at the same time this is an issue to be left to the General Command and to Your Excellency. . . . On March 21, the situation escalates inside Iran on a large scale and I believe if there is a possibility to strike them at that time inside the cities, any city, it could have a psychological effect as far as defeating the Persian enemy, and a higher positive psychological effect for the Iraqis . . .
Sa’doun Hammadi: Is the chemical weapon as effective as we think? I mean the way we think of it as civilians?
Saddam Hussein: Yes, it’s effective against those who do not use masks momentarily, just like the way we as civilians think of it.
Sa’doun Hammadi: You mean it exterminates by the thousands?
Saddam Hussein: Yes, it exterminates by the thousands. It exterminates by the thousands and make them restrain from drinking or eating the available food and makes them leave the city for a period of time until it is fully decontaminated [inaudible background comments]. They can do nothing, they cannot sleep on a mattress, eat, drink or anything; they will leave [inaudible] naked.
Despite the apparent interest of the book, the author dryly describes military conflicts as such, rather than analyzing the terror or threat of terror against the civilian population. I would estimate that no more than 15% of the entire book is devoted to this topic, as the rest is a simple description of how a particular military conflict unfolded.
Хотя тема книги очень многообещающая – бомбардировка городов как инструмент принуждения противника к капитуляции – книга получилась очень узконаправленной, скучной и вообще данный вопрос освещается довольно слабо. К тому же большая часть книги посвящена ближневосточным военным конфликтам. Исключением является лишь первая глава посвященная описанию тому, как политика бомбардировок гражданских объектов в качестве инструмента принуждения противника к капитуляции использовалась во время Второй мировой войны. Как мы помним по истории Второй мировой войны, этот метод не повлиял на сроки окончания этой войны.
Again, on 28 March 1942, following a British raid on the historic German city of Lübeck, Hitler furiously demanded that the German armed forces immediately retaliate. Beginning in March 1943, under Sir Arthur Harris, the British air force launched a series of bombing attacks on industrial cities in the German Ruhr. On 24 July 1943, the British air force began bombing Hamburg, Germany’s second largest city, forcing the evacuation of more than 1,000,000 citizens and causing 40,000 deaths within the next nine days.
On the morning of 25 July 1943, Hitler, disappointed with the retaliatory options provided to him by his air force experts, angrily declared, “You can only smash terror with counter-terror!” He announced to his military advisors that coercing the British to stop the bombing of German cities required systematic targeting of Britain’s cities.
К сожалению даже в этой главе автор не приводит никакого анализа, как данная политика террора гражданского населения повлияла на ход войны. Впрочем, возможно отсутствие какого-либо эффекта и объясняется тем, что автор особо не рассматривает этот вопрос, ограничившись констатацией факта этой самой взаимной бомбардировки. Однако я ожидал более глубокого исследования именно этого вопроса, т.е. вопроса эффективности террора против гражданских лиц в контексте войны. Далее автор рассматривает ирако-иранскую войну, где так же использовалась такая тактика устрашения гражданского населения, но опять же, никаких особо интересных подробностей в книге не приводится.
Saddam Hussein repeatedly struck Iranian cities with missiles aiming to coerce its leaders into capitulation. The Iranians reciprocated with limited missile strikes and aerial bombardment of Iraqi cities. However, a combination of very low launch rates and poor targeting accuracies ensured that the effect of Iraqi missile strikes was limited. Soon civilians in targeted Iranian cities found ways to survive the Iraqi missile attacks.
<…>
Saddam Hussein and his military leaders constantly threatened Iran with chemical warfare, hoping to coerce the Iranian decisionmakers to end the war on preferential terms. The Iraqi military high command issued a statement in September 1983 warning that chemical weapons “will be used for the first time in war . . . were not used in previous attacks for humanitarian and ethical reasons. . . . If you execute the orders of Khomeini’s warmongering regime and go to the fronts, your death will be certain because this time we will use a weapon that will destroy any moving creature on the fronts.”
<…>
Similarly, in a 6 March 1987 conversation with his advisors, Saddam Hussein seemed to support striking Iranian cities with chemical weapons. The conversation unfolds as follows:
Abdul-Ghani Abdul-Ghafur: Sir, I support the opinion to strike cities because cities have residents and economic facilities. Striking cities has a psychological effect that frustrates the Persian enemy and reveal’s Khomeini’s deception . . . and leads the Iranians themselves to hate him. It is true that [striking the] economic facilities slows down the Persian economy, but at the same time, striking the cities has economic and psychological effects that we need. The type of cities to strike must be, certainly, important cities with a deeper impact, if possible, but at the same time this is an issue to be left to the General Command and to Your Excellency. . . . On March 21, the situation escalates inside Iran on a large scale and I believe if there is a possibility to strike them at that time inside the cities, any city, it could have a psychological effect as far as defeating the Persian enemy, and a higher positive psychological effect for the Iraqis . . .
Sa’doun Hammadi: Is the chemical weapon as effective as we think? I mean the way we think of it as civilians?
Saddam Hussein: Yes, it’s effective against those who do not use masks momentarily, just like the way we as civilians think of it.
Sa’doun Hammadi: You mean it exterminates by the thousands?
Saddam Hussein: Yes, it exterminates by the thousands. It exterminates by the thousands and make them restrain from drinking or eating the available food and makes them leave the city for a period of time until it is fully decontaminated [inaudible background comments]. They can do nothing, they cannot sleep on a mattress, eat, drink or anything; they will leave [inaudible] naked.
Несмотря на кажущуюся интересность книги, автор сухо описывает военные конфликты как таковые, а не проводит анализ непосредственно террора или угрозы террора гражданского населения. Я бы оценил, что непосредственно этой теме посвящается не более 15% всей книги ибо всё остальное является простым описанием того как протекал тот или иной военный конфликт.
Although the book's topic is very promising—the bombing of cities as a means of forcing the enemy to surrender—the book turned out to be very narrow in focus, boring, and, in general, the issue is covered rather poorly. In addition, most of the book is devoted to military conflicts in the Middle East. The only exception is the first chapter, which describes how the policy of bombing civilian targets as a means of forcing the enemy to surrender was used during World War II. As we remember from the history of World War II, this method did not affect the timing of the end of the war.
Again, on 28 March 1942, following a British raid on the historic German city of Lübeck, Hitler furiously demanded that the German armed forces immediately retaliate. Beginning in March 1943, under Sir Arthur Harris, the British air force launched a series of bombing attacks on industrial cities in the German Ruhr. On 24 July 1943, the British air force began bombing Hamburg, Germany’s second largest city, forcing the evacuation of more than 1,000,000 citizens and causing 40,000 deaths within the next nine days.
On the morning of 25 July 1943, Hitler, disappointed with the retaliatory options provided to him by his air force experts, angrily declared, “You can only smash terror with counter-terror!” He announced to his military advisors that coercing the British to stop the bombing of German cities required systematic targeting of Britain’s cities.
Unfortunately, even in this chapter, the author does not provide any analysis of how this policy of terror against the civilian population affected the course of the war. However, the lack of any effect may be explained by the fact that the author does not specifically address this issue, limiting himself to stating the fact of this mutual bombing. However, I expected a more in-depth study of this very issue, i.e., the effectiveness of terror against civilians in the context of war. The author then examines the Iran-Iraq War, where similar tactics of intimidation of the civilian population were used, but again, no particularly interesting details are provided in the book.
Saddam Hussein repeatedly struck Iranian cities with missiles aiming to coerce its leaders into capitulation. The Iranians reciprocated with limited missile strikes and aerial bombardment of Iraqi cities. However, a combination of very low launch rates and poor targeting accuracies ensured that the effect of Iraqi missile strikes was limited. Soon civilians in targeted Iranian cities found ways to survive the Iraqi missile attacks.
<…>
Saddam Hussein and his military leaders constantly threatened Iran with chemical warfare, hoping to coerce the Iranian decisionmakers to end the war on preferential terms. The Iraqi military high command issued a statement in September 1983 warning that chemical weapons “will be used for the first time in war . . . were not used in previous attacks for humanitarian and ethical reasons. . . . If you execute the orders of Khomeini’s warmongering regime and go to the fronts, your death will be certain because this time we will use a weapon that will destroy any moving creature on the fronts.”
<…>
Similarly, in a 6 March 1987 conversation with his advisors, Saddam Hussein seemed to support striking Iranian cities with chemical weapons. The conversation unfolds as follows:
Abdul-Ghani Abdul-Ghafur: Sir, I support the opinion to strike cities because cities have residents and economic facilities. Striking cities has a psychological effect that frustrates the Persian enemy and reveal’s Khomeini’s deception . . . and leads the Iranians themselves to hate him. It is true that [striking the] economic facilities slows down the Persian economy, but at the same time, striking the cities has economic and psychological effects that we need. The type of cities to strike must be, certainly, important cities with a deeper impact, if possible, but at the same time this is an issue to be left to the General Command and to Your Excellency. . . . On March 21, the situation escalates inside Iran on a large scale and I believe if there is a possibility to strike them at that time inside the cities, any city, it could have a psychological effect as far as defeating the Persian enemy, and a higher positive psychological effect for the Iraqis . . .
Sa’doun Hammadi: Is the chemical weapon as effective as we think? I mean the way we think of it as civilians?
Saddam Hussein: Yes, it’s effective against those who do not use masks momentarily, just like the way we as civilians think of it.
Sa’doun Hammadi: You mean it exterminates by the thousands?
Saddam Hussein: Yes, it exterminates by the thousands. It exterminates by the thousands and make them restrain from drinking or eating the available food and makes them leave the city for a period of time until it is fully decontaminated [inaudible background comments]. They can do nothing, they cannot sleep on a mattress, eat, drink or anything; they will leave [inaudible] naked.
Despite the apparent interest of the book, the author dryly describes military conflicts as such, rather than analyzing the terror or threat of terror against the civilian population. I would estimate that no more than 15% of the entire book is devoted to this topic, as the rest is a simple description of how a particular military conflict unfolded.
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