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Johnson at 10: The Inside Story
***THE INSTANT SUNDAY TIMES BESTSELLER*** *A FINANCIAL TIMES, TELEGRAPH, NEW STATESMAN AND TIMES BOOK OF THE YEAR* ***A WATERSTONES BEST POLITICS BOOK OF 2023*** After his dramatic rise to power in the summer of 2019 amid the Brexit deadlock, Boris Johnson presided over the most turbulent period of British history in living memory. Beginning with the controversial prorogation of Parliament in August and the historic landslide election victory later that year, Johnson was barely through the door of No. 10 when Britain was engulfed by a series of crises that will define its place in the world for decades to come. From the agonising upheaval of Brexit and the devastating Covid-19 pandemic to the nerve-shredding crisis in Afghanistan, the outbreak of war in Ukraine and the Partygate scandal, Johnson's government ultimately unravelled after just three years. This gripping behind-the-scenes work of contemporary history maps Johnson's time in power from start to finish and sheds new light on the most divisive premiership, the shockwaves of which are still felt today.
650 pages, Kindle Edition
First published May 4, 2023
334 people are currently reading
899 people want to read
About the author
Anthony Seldon
83 books70 followersSir Anthony Francis Seldon, FRSA, FRHistS, FKC, is a British educator and contemporary historian. He was the 13th Master (headmaster) of Wellington College, one of Britain's co-educational independent boarding schools. In 2009, he set up The Wellington Academy, the first state school to carry the name of its founding independent school. He was Vice-Chancellor of the University of Buckingham from 2015 to 2020. Seldon was knighted in the 2014 Birthday Honours for services to education and modern political history.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 143 reviews
May 12, 2023
Excellent- extensive, balanced and compelling, can't wait to read the 2 page pamphlet covering Liz Trusse's tenure.
August 9, 2023
A brilliant book about a man who had the potential to be one of the great Prime Ministers of the UK and had the opportunities to be, but ultimately let himself down due to his self-centredness and his inability to tell the truth at any time.
It's wonderful to read a book by a gifted historian about events that are fresh in my memory.
Johnson was a gifted orator and writer but he was hopeless at converting his woolly ideas in substance. With Johnson trust was temporary, what he believed in really was mistrust. He wanted to run No 10 with responsibilities fuzzed, everyone distrusting each other, currying favour and owing their loyalty to Johnson alone - very similar to another politician of recent times.
He had nicknames for almost everyone including referring to a secretary as his 'golden retriever' and he referred to his cabinet as 'hungry sheep'. Cabinet meetings were an annoyance to him and he wanted them over with as quickly as possible. He wasn't interested in building consensus in his cabinet and he was rude about them all to officials behind their backs.
Rarely in 300 years and never since 1916 has a Prime Minister been so poor at appointments, so incompetent at running Cabinet government or so incapable of finding a stable team to run 10 Downing Street.
In the end it was his personal weaknesses which proved fatal. He wasn't interested enough in the people a Prime Minister needs to be interested in, unless it was very clear that they could quickly give him something back. He wasn't interested in his MPS, in his ministers, or in a host of others from public servants to business people.
He never listened, never learned, never changed: he never believed he had done anything wrong.
It's wonderful to read a book by a gifted historian about events that are fresh in my memory.
Johnson was a gifted orator and writer but he was hopeless at converting his woolly ideas in substance. With Johnson trust was temporary, what he believed in really was mistrust. He wanted to run No 10 with responsibilities fuzzed, everyone distrusting each other, currying favour and owing their loyalty to Johnson alone - very similar to another politician of recent times.
He had nicknames for almost everyone including referring to a secretary as his 'golden retriever' and he referred to his cabinet as 'hungry sheep'. Cabinet meetings were an annoyance to him and he wanted them over with as quickly as possible. He wasn't interested in building consensus in his cabinet and he was rude about them all to officials behind their backs.
Rarely in 300 years and never since 1916 has a Prime Minister been so poor at appointments, so incompetent at running Cabinet government or so incapable of finding a stable team to run 10 Downing Street.
In the end it was his personal weaknesses which proved fatal. He wasn't interested enough in the people a Prime Minister needs to be interested in, unless it was very clear that they could quickly give him something back. He wasn't interested in his MPS, in his ministers, or in a host of others from public servants to business people.
He never listened, never learned, never changed: he never believed he had done anything wrong.
May 11, 2023
The only minor flaw in Seldon and Newell’s detailed unpicking of Johnson’s time in office is a commendable one: a tendency to kindness or mercy that strikes a very minor bum note in the conclusion: while the evidence that Johnson had the aspirations and opportunity to become one of the great Prime Ministers is compelling, the case that he had the potential too is not. As repeatedly demonstrated, his personal insecurity, egotism, need to be loved, frequent intellectual laziness and inability to make hard choices were deep flaws which were always in evidence. Perhaps the addition of ‘potential’ was meant to render the conclusion more damning, but it feels out of place. But then this is judging him by standards he asked to be judged by, talking of a decade in office and changing the country.
Otherwise it’s unsparing but often generous in ascribing motivations: the highlight comes very early with the authors providing damning, appropriate comparisons from Johnson’s own supposed areas of expertise (or at least the ones he was commissioned to write about). You may require blood pressure tablets while reading, but it’s a thorough account of the chaos of the Johnson years and why neither his party nor the electorate could rely on him to deal with the issues that brought him to office. It’s also acute on the legacy Johnson left that enabled the rise of Truss and the issues Sunak is being forced to reckon with. As a first draft of history, exceptional and thoughtful.
Otherwise it’s unsparing but often generous in ascribing motivations: the highlight comes very early with the authors providing damning, appropriate comparisons from Johnson’s own supposed areas of expertise (or at least the ones he was commissioned to write about). You may require blood pressure tablets while reading, but it’s a thorough account of the chaos of the Johnson years and why neither his party nor the electorate could rely on him to deal with the issues that brought him to office. It’s also acute on the legacy Johnson left that enabled the rise of Truss and the issues Sunak is being forced to reckon with. As a first draft of history, exceptional and thoughtful.
June 22, 2023
In depth blow-by-blow account of Boris Johnson’s premiership and events leading up to the partial fulfilment of his childhood dream (to be King of the World – he had to settle for being merely Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). A balanced account of this man-child’s life and adventures in Downing Street was a shockingly exhausting read. The authors were fair in their assessments and managed to elicit sympathy from me from time to time towards BJ for the pickles he found himself in. But the 3 of us knew – the authors and moir – that he was the creator of the bulk of his problems. His strengths were underlined and his weaknesses were there unvarnished.
It is scary to think that all this could happen: no less shocking than if a random man or woman had been catapulted from the street into No 10. They could scarcely be less ignorant of how government works or is supposed to, or, frankly, less interested in the nitty gritty of running a successful business – GB/UK.
Survival by divide and rule and the blame game - even “her upstairs” got to carry the can from time to time! Weak and needy, hence the plethora of advisers, some more dysfunctional than others. Comparisons with other PMs, especially Lloyd George, though the authors see Johnson as a very poor second to the Welsh wizzard.
His relationship with truth would cause Machiavelli to blush!
This is a tale about the court of a would-be-king, Boris, who just happened to be Prime Minister and therefore should have been working from a different job description.
Democracy at work!? God help us that it never happens again.
Where is Shakespeare when we need him!?
It is scary to think that all this could happen: no less shocking than if a random man or woman had been catapulted from the street into No 10. They could scarcely be less ignorant of how government works or is supposed to, or, frankly, less interested in the nitty gritty of running a successful business – GB/UK.
Survival by divide and rule and the blame game - even “her upstairs” got to carry the can from time to time! Weak and needy, hence the plethora of advisers, some more dysfunctional than others. Comparisons with other PMs, especially Lloyd George, though the authors see Johnson as a very poor second to the Welsh wizzard.
His relationship with truth would cause Machiavelli to blush!
This is a tale about the court of a would-be-king, Boris, who just happened to be Prime Minister and therefore should have been working from a different job description.
Democracy at work!? God help us that it never happens again.
Where is Shakespeare when we need him!?
May 16, 2023
I was amused by the idea of ticking ‘spoilers’ here but there are none!! Of course we know what happened at the surface level. This was fascinating to get to the ‘why’ it happened.
At times reading & re-living some of this was unsettling. It reignited the fury, contempt, disgust & disbelief I felt at the time that a prime minister could behave so badly, lie so enthusiastically and lead so abysmally. I couldn’t understand how someone so clearly incapable (to me!) of effective leadership could become prime minister and this book helped me to understand how this seeming mystery came about.
It is a very balanced read and I will now go and read the others in the series. I confess I didn’t want balance on Johnson. I didn’t want to hear of any redeeming qualities and credit to the authors that I felt obliged to accept them. That balance though gives the conclusion more weight. Too many mistakes, too many character flaws; a lack of seriousness, commitment and work ethic, a wish for celebrity without actual purpose or focus and moral failings particularly with regard to the truth and to buying support with patronage and positions. Glad I read it. Whatever Johnson would like - for the sake of the country he needs to never be allowed near government again.
At times reading & re-living some of this was unsettling. It reignited the fury, contempt, disgust & disbelief I felt at the time that a prime minister could behave so badly, lie so enthusiastically and lead so abysmally. I couldn’t understand how someone so clearly incapable (to me!) of effective leadership could become prime minister and this book helped me to understand how this seeming mystery came about.
It is a very balanced read and I will now go and read the others in the series. I confess I didn’t want balance on Johnson. I didn’t want to hear of any redeeming qualities and credit to the authors that I felt obliged to accept them. That balance though gives the conclusion more weight. Too many mistakes, too many character flaws; a lack of seriousness, commitment and work ethic, a wish for celebrity without actual purpose or focus and moral failings particularly with regard to the truth and to buying support with patronage and positions. Glad I read it. Whatever Johnson would like - for the sake of the country he needs to never be allowed near government again.
December 4, 2023
For anyone wondering why I’ve read this, review of the Johnson years incoming on socialist.net hahah
July 2, 2023
I guess political biographies are my guilty pleasure read lol. This isn't great and should probably rank a star lower than I've given it - Seldon is an irritating and blustery writer, who often sounds more like a sloganeering speechwriter or soundbite-focused journalist than a serious historian. The historian side does come out though, and again usually less illuminating than it is pedantic and show-offy (finding historical rhymes in Johnson's premiership that are often just rhetorical and surface level, for example). Also, he way overestimates Johnson's gifts, though he does get to the heart of how ideologically strange and vacant the man is, and how void and useless his political style. Johnson could never be as strong as Trump or Bolsonaro because he doesn't have their venom; he just wants to be the entertaining centre of attention.
May 31, 2023
An absolutely outstanding piece of contemporary history which eviscerated Johnson, emphasising the chaotic nature of his premiership and challenging many of the myths perpetrated about his unique abilities.
The authors of this book highlight Johnson’s plethora of flaws, and show he was driven by nothing except his own lust for power and attention, such that even when he had outstanding opportunities to remake the country, his deep personal failures prevented him from doing so.
Throughout, the authors keep returning to the phrase: “In his beginning, was his end” which sums up Johnson’s premiership – he was brought down by sleaze and scandal after proving himself entirely incapable of the role of Prime Minister, something that should surprise nobody.
An outstanding read, which will stand the test of time.
The authors of this book highlight Johnson’s plethora of flaws, and show he was driven by nothing except his own lust for power and attention, such that even when he had outstanding opportunities to remake the country, his deep personal failures prevented him from doing so.
Throughout, the authors keep returning to the phrase: “In his beginning, was his end” which sums up Johnson’s premiership – he was brought down by sleaze and scandal after proving himself entirely incapable of the role of Prime Minister, something that should surprise nobody.
An outstanding read, which will stand the test of time.
October 6, 2024
Detailed analysis of Johnson's downfall and his character flaws. Reads rather unstructured. Nothing you don't already know about Johnson, but a good impression of the chaos and disorder inside No. 10.
November 12, 2024
In some ways not surprising, in other ways deeply insightful. The conclusion that Johnson’s failure was down to himself and himself alone is hardly new. However the way he killed his PMship is even more surprising and alarming than I expected. Seldon writes well. His narrative style is fast and flowing without losing attention to detail. I also like that he has codified what makes a truly great PM so he can test all against that ‘repeatable model’. Onto Truss (the Lord help me).
June 21, 2023
It was interesting to read such an immediate review of Johnson's time at No 10, the conclusion written just over a month ago. There was a lot here that was familiar and anticipated, but also a lot of fascinating detail that fleshes out the picture.
I thought the first third was excellent, with a chronological review of Johnson's path to the top. The book vividly captures that frenzied collapse of May's government and the Get Brexit Done campaign that carried all before it. And then straight into covid and lockdown.
I felt the book lost its way in the middle as it moved from a chronological review to a thematic one. Firstly there was a detailed look at Cummings, and then at the various traits that sowed the seeds of Johnson's destruction - confusion, infighting, lies, distrust of Whitehall and the Civil Service, an inability to lead, to work hard, to grasp detail or accept responsibility. There's a great deal of interesting information in these chapters, but they become repetitive and confusing. There are so many names to juggle, and because they are thematic, the book moves between different Johnson administrations, making it even harder to keep track.
The final chapter was gripping as the administration fell and all Johnson's personal failings caught up with him.
The book was also relentlessly London centric and constantly referred to 'the country' when it really meant England. Covid led to some real flexing of devolved government muscles, with both Scotland and Wales making different choices on lockdown and asserting their authority. As someone living in Wales, I looked to our own First Minister for guidance far more than Johnson and really felt like a separate nation at times. This book barely mentions either country and rarely anything outside the home counties, making it weak on the impact of Johnson outside the Westminster bubble.
I think it also overestimates Johnson's role in the Ukrain war, giving him far too much credit. Many of us saw it as a way for him to escape from the reality of the mess he had made domestically and allow him to emulate Churchill. I can understand why his forthright stance made him popular in Ukraine, but how do we balance his actions against his close association with oligarchs and Russian money?
All in all, it is an interesting read that gives a clear picture of Johnson's failures as both a man and a leader, but is less good on his lasting impact on the country as a whole.
I thought the first third was excellent, with a chronological review of Johnson's path to the top. The book vividly captures that frenzied collapse of May's government and the Get Brexit Done campaign that carried all before it. And then straight into covid and lockdown.
I felt the book lost its way in the middle as it moved from a chronological review to a thematic one. Firstly there was a detailed look at Cummings, and then at the various traits that sowed the seeds of Johnson's destruction - confusion, infighting, lies, distrust of Whitehall and the Civil Service, an inability to lead, to work hard, to grasp detail or accept responsibility. There's a great deal of interesting information in these chapters, but they become repetitive and confusing. There are so many names to juggle, and because they are thematic, the book moves between different Johnson administrations, making it even harder to keep track.
The final chapter was gripping as the administration fell and all Johnson's personal failings caught up with him.
The book was also relentlessly London centric and constantly referred to 'the country' when it really meant England. Covid led to some real flexing of devolved government muscles, with both Scotland and Wales making different choices on lockdown and asserting their authority. As someone living in Wales, I looked to our own First Minister for guidance far more than Johnson and really felt like a separate nation at times. This book barely mentions either country and rarely anything outside the home counties, making it weak on the impact of Johnson outside the Westminster bubble.
I think it also overestimates Johnson's role in the Ukrain war, giving him far too much credit. Many of us saw it as a way for him to escape from the reality of the mess he had made domestically and allow him to emulate Churchill. I can understand why his forthright stance made him popular in Ukraine, but how do we balance his actions against his close association with oligarchs and Russian money?
All in all, it is an interesting read that gives a clear picture of Johnson's failures as both a man and a leader, but is less good on his lasting impact on the country as a whole.
July 20, 2023
The Inside Story is undoubtedly one of the books of 2023. The period 2019-2022 was especially chaotic and will long be remembered and discussed. Brexit and Covid alone were both noteworthy events that meant interest in politics was above normal. That these events happened to occur when Johnson and Trump were at their respective helms made them even more the remarkable. The authors have done a good job of unpicking the chaos and presenting a coherent narrative of the Johnson years in No. 10. There is lots to look back on and ponder as you work your way through this work.
I recently read the excellent Chums: How A Tiny Caste of Oxford Tories Took Over The UK which covers (amongst other things) Boris Johnson's formative years at Eton and Oxford, which set the scene for his later life. It was therefore an excellent, if unintentional, personal sequel.
The Inside Story starts by looking at the thorny issue of what Boris Johnson actually believes in, which is difficult to pin down. The short answer it seems is whoever he spoke to last. He certainly has never been a great political thinker, was probably never an ideological Brexiteer, and (as the book frequently cites) is naturally attracted to grand projects that will provide a legacy and be forever associated with his name (London 2012, Crossrail, Brexit, HS2, Net zero, numerous bridges and airports). There never was a Johnsonism, he lacked conviction and could often be easily (momentarily) persuaded by those who did, it would seem.
Johnson's finest hour was undoubtedly the 2019 election and his 80-seat majority. Corbyn was a complete gift, and his reach extended to socially conservative voters sick of the "dithering" (to use his words) over Brexit from the previous parliament and Labour's recipe for basically more of the same. As the authors point out, he claimed this victory as a personal mandate but never had a plan of what to do after Brexit, other than vague aspirations (little more than slogans) like Levelling Up. The 2019 manifesto was a lightweight work, knocked up quickly, and with few specific pledges.
Johnson's standard method was to lie about his plans and let others work out the details later. We read that again and again in this volume. A good example is his (oven-ready) Brexit deal on Northern Ireland where he lied about not having a border in the Irish Sea just to get a deal - which May was unwilling to do, even though it could potentially break up the UK. That deal has only been revised once since he left office. He got away with that one, but the pattern was set of reckless gambles with the truth.
Covid and Cummings are the central two chapters of the book and they complement one another perfectly. Covid would have been difficult for any PM but did not suit Johnson as it commanded too much detail. Cummings ended up running the show, and it was obvious from the daily briefings at the time that officials were having an enormous say in the decision-making during the pandemic.
The first 18 months of the new government sounded like an absolute nightmare and Cummings was effectively in charge of the country, a modern-day Thomas Cromwell. Johnson didn't understand government or cabinet, and Cummings disliked both. Lockdown made them even more irrelevant. Johnson at times sounded frustrated about being bypassed but was incapable of acting and tried to please everyone all the time.
The most ridiculous part of the whole book is how everyone in government has to work around Johnson, a bit like a difficult Special Needs pupil who is disruptive in class. He rarely read papers before meetings, and everything had to be shortened to suit his attention span. Ironically the people around him did get better at working around his "issues" and things did improve for a while during his time in office.
It must have been an enormous challenge keeping track of all the factions and in-fighting when writing this book, and the authors do a great job. They point out the lack of job descriptions for many of his officials, which (probably intentionally) created an atmosphere rife with overlapping fiefdoms and office politics. It's exhausting reading it all, and it sounds more like Game of Thrones than running the country, everyone has their own agendas - including his wife. There was a complete absence of discipline. The nation was rudderless and no wonder Partygate happened, in retrospect. Above all else, this sounds like the area he most failed in, and where the authors reserve their strongest criticisms. Just a couple of examples: Cummings was responsible for engineering the resignation of the chancellor and cabinet secretary. Then Matt Hancock was only kept on so he could be blamed in the subsequent enquiry.
Levelling Up was Johnson's great vision but fizzled out with no plan and Sunak denied it any money after the covid costs. Decisions were made in smaller meetings or Johnson bypassed department heads and spoke directly to their staff. Cabinet went almost 2 years without debating anything substantial, almost unbelievable.
Johnson got away with the big things where others bailed him out but it was the smaller decisions which were just down to him which really let him down, and ultimately lost him his dream job. Barnard Castle was the perfect opportunity to get rid of Cummings but he dithered. It was the same with Patterson, Partygate and Pincher - all things which could have been dealt with far better but blew up into much larger issues than they actually were.
The authors do apportion some praise as well as criticism. His greatest accomplishments were on global issues where broad brush strokes were needed and not the fine detail he struggles with. Getting a deal on Brexit, Net Zero and Ukraine is what he'll be remembered for. With the right team and without Covid (which saw off Trump too) he could have been a better PM, but his decision-making around appointments sounds consistently poor.
Johnson's legacy is higher taxes and higher spending, more Labour territory than Conservative. Sunak did manage to keep the brakes on many of his plans, but governing the country is going to be difficult for many years, future leaders will soon become unpopular, and I wouldn't be surprised if he comes back into the political landscape at some point. Really though, his future should lie outside politics, the after-dinner speaking circuit will be better with him on it.
Ultimately though his colleagues should have known better than to put him in the final two in the 2019 leadership election and they will pay the price, with many of them losing their jobs and a lengthy period in opposition for the MPs that remain. The people who knew him best are the ones who work with him, and they must have known how poor a PM he would make, but they overlooked his failings as his ability to connect with people and win elections is so extraordinary. Just a shame he can't do the day job.
I recently read the excellent Chums: How A Tiny Caste of Oxford Tories Took Over The UK which covers (amongst other things) Boris Johnson's formative years at Eton and Oxford, which set the scene for his later life. It was therefore an excellent, if unintentional, personal sequel.
The Inside Story starts by looking at the thorny issue of what Boris Johnson actually believes in, which is difficult to pin down. The short answer it seems is whoever he spoke to last. He certainly has never been a great political thinker, was probably never an ideological Brexiteer, and (as the book frequently cites) is naturally attracted to grand projects that will provide a legacy and be forever associated with his name (London 2012, Crossrail, Brexit, HS2, Net zero, numerous bridges and airports). There never was a Johnsonism, he lacked conviction and could often be easily (momentarily) persuaded by those who did, it would seem.
Johnson's finest hour was undoubtedly the 2019 election and his 80-seat majority. Corbyn was a complete gift, and his reach extended to socially conservative voters sick of the "dithering" (to use his words) over Brexit from the previous parliament and Labour's recipe for basically more of the same. As the authors point out, he claimed this victory as a personal mandate but never had a plan of what to do after Brexit, other than vague aspirations (little more than slogans) like Levelling Up. The 2019 manifesto was a lightweight work, knocked up quickly, and with few specific pledges.
Johnson's standard method was to lie about his plans and let others work out the details later. We read that again and again in this volume. A good example is his (oven-ready) Brexit deal on Northern Ireland where he lied about not having a border in the Irish Sea just to get a deal - which May was unwilling to do, even though it could potentially break up the UK. That deal has only been revised once since he left office. He got away with that one, but the pattern was set of reckless gambles with the truth.
Covid and Cummings are the central two chapters of the book and they complement one another perfectly. Covid would have been difficult for any PM but did not suit Johnson as it commanded too much detail. Cummings ended up running the show, and it was obvious from the daily briefings at the time that officials were having an enormous say in the decision-making during the pandemic.
The first 18 months of the new government sounded like an absolute nightmare and Cummings was effectively in charge of the country, a modern-day Thomas Cromwell. Johnson didn't understand government or cabinet, and Cummings disliked both. Lockdown made them even more irrelevant. Johnson at times sounded frustrated about being bypassed but was incapable of acting and tried to please everyone all the time.
The most ridiculous part of the whole book is how everyone in government has to work around Johnson, a bit like a difficult Special Needs pupil who is disruptive in class. He rarely read papers before meetings, and everything had to be shortened to suit his attention span. Ironically the people around him did get better at working around his "issues" and things did improve for a while during his time in office.
It must have been an enormous challenge keeping track of all the factions and in-fighting when writing this book, and the authors do a great job. They point out the lack of job descriptions for many of his officials, which (probably intentionally) created an atmosphere rife with overlapping fiefdoms and office politics. It's exhausting reading it all, and it sounds more like Game of Thrones than running the country, everyone has their own agendas - including his wife. There was a complete absence of discipline. The nation was rudderless and no wonder Partygate happened, in retrospect. Above all else, this sounds like the area he most failed in, and where the authors reserve their strongest criticisms. Just a couple of examples: Cummings was responsible for engineering the resignation of the chancellor and cabinet secretary. Then Matt Hancock was only kept on so he could be blamed in the subsequent enquiry.
Levelling Up was Johnson's great vision but fizzled out with no plan and Sunak denied it any money after the covid costs. Decisions were made in smaller meetings or Johnson bypassed department heads and spoke directly to their staff. Cabinet went almost 2 years without debating anything substantial, almost unbelievable.
Johnson got away with the big things where others bailed him out but it was the smaller decisions which were just down to him which really let him down, and ultimately lost him his dream job. Barnard Castle was the perfect opportunity to get rid of Cummings but he dithered. It was the same with Patterson, Partygate and Pincher - all things which could have been dealt with far better but blew up into much larger issues than they actually were.
The authors do apportion some praise as well as criticism. His greatest accomplishments were on global issues where broad brush strokes were needed and not the fine detail he struggles with. Getting a deal on Brexit, Net Zero and Ukraine is what he'll be remembered for. With the right team and without Covid (which saw off Trump too) he could have been a better PM, but his decision-making around appointments sounds consistently poor.
Johnson's legacy is higher taxes and higher spending, more Labour territory than Conservative. Sunak did manage to keep the brakes on many of his plans, but governing the country is going to be difficult for many years, future leaders will soon become unpopular, and I wouldn't be surprised if he comes back into the political landscape at some point. Really though, his future should lie outside politics, the after-dinner speaking circuit will be better with him on it.
Ultimately though his colleagues should have known better than to put him in the final two in the 2019 leadership election and they will pay the price, with many of them losing their jobs and a lengthy period in opposition for the MPs that remain. The people who knew him best are the ones who work with him, and they must have known how poor a PM he would make, but they overlooked his failings as his ability to connect with people and win elections is so extraordinary. Just a shame he can't do the day job.
July 6, 2023
Seldon and Newell's character study on former Prime Minister Boris Johnson was surprisingly more balanced and detailed than I had expected. Johnson was a deeply flawed individual, whose conduct on various issues such as Covid and Brexit, were reckless at best, and disasterous at worst. At the same time, however, he had taken decisive action with Ukraine, and was at the behest of colleagues who undermined him. I particularly thought the chapter of Dominic Cummings was especially crucial. As a foreigner, I had no idea how much impact a chief of staff had on a British Prime Minister. What this book illustrates is that Johnson, for all his vanity, desired to be liked, yet was conflicted on who to trust, which, in the end, contributed to his downfall.
It would have been interesting to see more information about Johnson's upbringing and background (I felt it was only skimmed through). While I understand the book's main focus was on Johnson's time in Downing Street, more context on what shaped the leader he was, would have nicely complemented this deep psychological analysis.
Nonetheless, I couldn't fault it. I think this deserves a reread.
It would have been interesting to see more information about Johnson's upbringing and background (I felt it was only skimmed through). While I understand the book's main focus was on Johnson's time in Downing Street, more context on what shaped the leader he was, would have nicely complemented this deep psychological analysis.
Nonetheless, I couldn't fault it. I think this deserves a reread.
August 6, 2023
Anthony Seldon has written accounts of the time at 10 Downing Street of all UK Prime Ministers since John Major. The only other I read before this was May at 10, whose fascinating account of those woebegone 3 years was spoilt by poor writing and sloppy editing.
No such problems here. The writing is taut and businesslike and there are almost no stylistic blemishes to make me wince.
The tone is much more judgmental too, but really, how could it not be? Like Margaret Thatcher, Boris Johnson was a political figure whom people either adore or hate. Those in the first group are prepared to overlook his outrageous mendacity, immoral behaviour, and hyprocrisy because he got them what they wanted - most obviously, a massive election victory and Brexit. Those in the latter group could not overlook those flaws whether or not they liked Brexit. And, in the end, those flaws were enough to undo him.
Gripping stuff - recommended.
No such problems here. The writing is taut and businesslike and there are almost no stylistic blemishes to make me wince.
The tone is much more judgmental too, but really, how could it not be? Like Margaret Thatcher, Boris Johnson was a political figure whom people either adore or hate. Those in the first group are prepared to overlook his outrageous mendacity, immoral behaviour, and hyprocrisy because he got them what they wanted - most obviously, a massive election victory and Brexit. Those in the latter group could not overlook those flaws whether or not they liked Brexit. And, in the end, those flaws were enough to undo him.
Gripping stuff - recommended.
September 27, 2025
Your mileage for ‘great man’ biographies may vary, but this is, rather, a biography about a man whom the authors cannot consider ‘great’, but rather ‘ungreat’.
Reading Johnson at 10, you have the sense of Anthony Seldon and Raymond Newell as disappointed schoolmasters scalding an errant pupil. What’s more, they are fairly even-handed, admitting that in Johnson’s agenda there was “a genuinely innovative and heterodox set of aims, with some lofty ambitions - reducing regional inequalities, resolving the unrelenting issue of social care, ending the housing crisis”, not to mention Brexit (p. 374). They identify a mixture of three impulses, namely a passion for infrastructure, for ‘levelling up’, and for patriotism (p. 154). What follows is a jaw-dropping defenestration, chronicling not only the personal flaws of its subject but the effect on cabinet government and the operation of No. 10. Insider interviews provide meat on the bones, chronicling a tale of indecision and court politics.
At times this registers as the touch of a diarist dipping into their excavation of the soul of their protagonist, occasionally with a wry movement of the eyebrows (“Johnson got the idea: there's a lot in those words” - p. 76). It reads almost like a chronicle of a Shakespearean tragedy, only reinforced by cold empirical evidence. One such example is their discussion of the 2019 election, whereby the Conservatives gained just 300,000 more votes than under May in 2017 (“Corbyn and Brexit were thus central to understanding the result” - p. 137). They also discuss a 2019 coalition invariably built on sand, whereby a disregard for cabinet and parliamentary government and a misinterpretation of the 2019 result led to an inchoate and overly presidential government (yet its president was at sea - “Often unserious, unable to focus for long and lacking any kind of grip on the machine, his mentality was ill-equipped for the task of governing for an extended period” - p. 373).
The book swims in historical comparisons, drawing on specific comparisons with David Lloyd George, contextualising Johnson against the records of his predecessors. The authors wear their learning on their sleeves, ensuring this is connected to the history of the office, rather than to the 2019-22 period alone. Perhaps this is like using a sledgehammer to crack a nut - minds are unlikely to be changed - and, as some commentators have noted, the ecosystem around Johnson is left at one remove (not least one of the author’s initial support for Johnson, until his flaws paralysed his premiership).
There is far too much to summarise in one review, but it is definitely worth a read as a definitive first draft of history that is likely to stand the test of time. It is packed with sharp observations, reaching labyrinthian proportions in its coverage of the court politics and the fate of Johnson’s cakeist domestic policy. On a more superficial note, it is also a withering piece of writing — you will not be disappointed if you like your sass, but, more importantly, it is also even-handed and, like a barrister setting out his case, feels well worth the paper it is written on (with some small caveats!).
Reading Johnson at 10, you have the sense of Anthony Seldon and Raymond Newell as disappointed schoolmasters scalding an errant pupil. What’s more, they are fairly even-handed, admitting that in Johnson’s agenda there was “a genuinely innovative and heterodox set of aims, with some lofty ambitions - reducing regional inequalities, resolving the unrelenting issue of social care, ending the housing crisis”, not to mention Brexit (p. 374). They identify a mixture of three impulses, namely a passion for infrastructure, for ‘levelling up’, and for patriotism (p. 154). What follows is a jaw-dropping defenestration, chronicling not only the personal flaws of its subject but the effect on cabinet government and the operation of No. 10. Insider interviews provide meat on the bones, chronicling a tale of indecision and court politics.
At times this registers as the touch of a diarist dipping into their excavation of the soul of their protagonist, occasionally with a wry movement of the eyebrows (“Johnson got the idea: there's a lot in those words” - p. 76). It reads almost like a chronicle of a Shakespearean tragedy, only reinforced by cold empirical evidence. One such example is their discussion of the 2019 election, whereby the Conservatives gained just 300,000 more votes than under May in 2017 (“Corbyn and Brexit were thus central to understanding the result” - p. 137). They also discuss a 2019 coalition invariably built on sand, whereby a disregard for cabinet and parliamentary government and a misinterpretation of the 2019 result led to an inchoate and overly presidential government (yet its president was at sea - “Often unserious, unable to focus for long and lacking any kind of grip on the machine, his mentality was ill-equipped for the task of governing for an extended period” - p. 373).
The book swims in historical comparisons, drawing on specific comparisons with David Lloyd George, contextualising Johnson against the records of his predecessors. The authors wear their learning on their sleeves, ensuring this is connected to the history of the office, rather than to the 2019-22 period alone. Perhaps this is like using a sledgehammer to crack a nut - minds are unlikely to be changed - and, as some commentators have noted, the ecosystem around Johnson is left at one remove (not least one of the author’s initial support for Johnson, until his flaws paralysed his premiership).
There is far too much to summarise in one review, but it is definitely worth a read as a definitive first draft of history that is likely to stand the test of time. It is packed with sharp observations, reaching labyrinthian proportions in its coverage of the court politics and the fate of Johnson’s cakeist domestic policy. On a more superficial note, it is also a withering piece of writing — you will not be disappointed if you like your sass, but, more importantly, it is also even-handed and, like a barrister setting out his case, feels well worth the paper it is written on (with some small caveats!).
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
May 18, 2023
A damning and blistering page-turner of one of the worst PMs in modern British political history. . ..
Having been fired from every job he has ever done, apart from serving as Mayor of London, did we really expect Boris Johnson to act any differently as PM?
He was exceptional. . .. he was ‘exceptionally bad’ as commented by Jenny Jones on BBC Radio 4’s ‘Any Questions’ in July, 2022:
These are only some of the questions and topics that Seldon and Newell cover in the first of an avalanche of books and research on the Johnson administration:
• What was left to desire from Johnson’s side-lining of his own Cabinet and Parliament?
• Why was the prorogation of Parliament in 2019 illegal?
• Could he have been a better leader, if he had paid more attention to his briefs, liaised closer with his own cabinet ministers, MPs and cabinet staff, despite Covid and the war in Ukraine?
• What proves that Johnson was never a Brexiteer with no clear or ambitious plan for a post-Brexit Britain?
• What completely unrealistic levelling-up projects did Johnson envisage?
• How did Johnson despise the Conservative Parliamentary Party with a number of his own MPs doubting he was a Conservative with his high-spending and interventionist views?
• Despite the fact that Liz Truss said, ‘Boris, you are admired from Kyiv to Carlisle’, to what extent was Truss loyal to him?
• What motivated Javid and Sunak’s resignations as former and current Chancellors? Did the Chris Pincher scandal prove a step too far or were there other motives to topple Johnson?
• Why did Britain get the Covid pandemic wrong in the early stages and did the government learn from its mistakes?
• Why would a previously serving Foreign Secretary ask civil servants to write him a 3,000-word essay on what his foreign policy should be as PM, when he had previously served in the role under Theresa May?
• How did Johnson play upstairs-downstairs between his Cabinet and his new wife, Carrie? To what extent did Johnson prefer infighting rather than coherent government?
• To what extent, was Boris Johnson the ‘British Trump’ throughout his government and in his downfall?
This is a book that will be read, re-read and serve as a massive foundation for why trust in British politics disintegrated in a wave of unprecedented resignations, where the future of British Conservatism lies in an era of dangerous and backwards right-wing populism, and why we need a new type of politics.
Having been fired from every job he has ever done, apart from serving as Mayor of London, did we really expect Boris Johnson to act any differently as PM?
He was exceptional. . .. he was ‘exceptionally bad’ as commented by Jenny Jones on BBC Radio 4’s ‘Any Questions’ in July, 2022:
These are only some of the questions and topics that Seldon and Newell cover in the first of an avalanche of books and research on the Johnson administration:
• What was left to desire from Johnson’s side-lining of his own Cabinet and Parliament?
• Why was the prorogation of Parliament in 2019 illegal?
• Could he have been a better leader, if he had paid more attention to his briefs, liaised closer with his own cabinet ministers, MPs and cabinet staff, despite Covid and the war in Ukraine?
• What proves that Johnson was never a Brexiteer with no clear or ambitious plan for a post-Brexit Britain?
• What completely unrealistic levelling-up projects did Johnson envisage?
• How did Johnson despise the Conservative Parliamentary Party with a number of his own MPs doubting he was a Conservative with his high-spending and interventionist views?
• Despite the fact that Liz Truss said, ‘Boris, you are admired from Kyiv to Carlisle’, to what extent was Truss loyal to him?
• What motivated Javid and Sunak’s resignations as former and current Chancellors? Did the Chris Pincher scandal prove a step too far or were there other motives to topple Johnson?
• Why did Britain get the Covid pandemic wrong in the early stages and did the government learn from its mistakes?
• Why would a previously serving Foreign Secretary ask civil servants to write him a 3,000-word essay on what his foreign policy should be as PM, when he had previously served in the role under Theresa May?
• How did Johnson play upstairs-downstairs between his Cabinet and his new wife, Carrie? To what extent did Johnson prefer infighting rather than coherent government?
• To what extent, was Boris Johnson the ‘British Trump’ throughout his government and in his downfall?
This is a book that will be read, re-read and serve as a massive foundation for why trust in British politics disintegrated in a wave of unprecedented resignations, where the future of British Conservatism lies in an era of dangerous and backwards right-wing populism, and why we need a new type of politics.
February 8, 2024
Oh wow, this is an excellent book that is presented with forensic detail thus rendering it impossible to disbelieve. Anthony Seldon and Raymond Newell have written about all our recent Prime Ministers and try to offer an analysis of their strengths and weaknesses and where they might stand against all previous holders of this important role.
And guess what? Boris does not come out well. Having lived through the Johnson premiership this should not come across as a big surprise to anyone. Boris always boasted that his thumping majority was all down to him. It wasn't. He was certainly a factor and the fact he was such a showman with a great ability to reach out beyond the party was a great contributor. But he was up against Corbyn! A stuffed Otter would have probably won under these circumstances. The problem with Boris was he was just a showman.
Sheldon makes this point at the end "...critically he did not possess other top tier traits: moral seriousness, an ability to work relentlessly hard when the pressure eased, decisiveness and resolution, mature and stable core relationships, the courage to appoint strong Cabinet and No 10 teams and a gift for managing Cabinet and the media proactively.
This is an excellent read and will appeal to those particularly who feel we have been poorly served since 2019.
And guess what? Boris does not come out well. Having lived through the Johnson premiership this should not come across as a big surprise to anyone. Boris always boasted that his thumping majority was all down to him. It wasn't. He was certainly a factor and the fact he was such a showman with a great ability to reach out beyond the party was a great contributor. But he was up against Corbyn! A stuffed Otter would have probably won under these circumstances. The problem with Boris was he was just a showman.
Sheldon makes this point at the end "...critically he did not possess other top tier traits: moral seriousness, an ability to work relentlessly hard when the pressure eased, decisiveness and resolution, mature and stable core relationships, the courage to appoint strong Cabinet and No 10 teams and a gift for managing Cabinet and the media proactively.
This is an excellent read and will appeal to those particularly who feel we have been poorly served since 2019.
November 30, 2023
Although I followed all of the events in this book through the media as they happened, there is a lot of extra detail in here. This book was VERY interesting in parts, and a bit tedious in others. The authors had access to a lot of people and source material, and it's not easy to put together what happened during a very turbulent time into a logical narrative.
That being said, I didn't like the way later chapters were based on theme instead of chronology- it made it confusing and towards the end I felt buried in names. Only someone with a decent understanding of more recent British politics would get something out of this. As well I didn't really like the author's tone- it felt too much like a school report, and I wasn't really convinced by some of the (surface) analogies to other PMs.
That being said, I didn't like the way later chapters were based on theme instead of chronology- it made it confusing and towards the end I felt buried in names. Only someone with a decent understanding of more recent British politics would get something out of this. As well I didn't really like the author's tone- it felt too much like a school report, and I wasn't really convinced by some of the (surface) analogies to other PMs.
Read
May 22, 2023This is a scholarly work which carefully dissects Johnson's premiership, and his unique unsuitability for high office. It assumes quite a strong background knowledge of the events of his premiership, and takes a thematic, rather than chronological, route, which meant I did need to do a bit of Googling to remind myself of the recent past.
I found it impressive, rather than engaging. If you want to know how Oliver Dowden felt about paragraph 3 of some piece of legislation, here is your chance. Rumours about Boris impregnating his nanny, not so much. It's no doubt my own failing, but when I read that one of Johnson's top civil servants was spending an inordinate amount of his time dealing with his boss's personal problems, I really want to know what they were, rather than read more pages on who distrusted whom in the corridors.(Spoiler: everyone hates everyone else.)
The authors really rack up the evidence though, to support their thesis that Johnson was responsible for his own downfall, and really did have as little clue about what he was doing as it appeared to the casual observer. This is a frightening discovery and makes the reader wonder what might have happened had the covid vaccine not worked, or had Putin launched a nuclear strike.
As a final takeaway,I have become weirdly fascinated with Dougie Smith, of whom I had never heard, but who developed an overwhelming hatred of Johnson and vowed to bring him down with a thousand cuts, and as far as I can see, succeeded. If anyone has written a book about him, especially a scurrilous, gossipy one, please let me know! I am your target audience.
I found it impressive, rather than engaging. If you want to know how Oliver Dowden felt about paragraph 3 of some piece of legislation, here is your chance. Rumours about Boris impregnating his nanny, not so much. It's no doubt my own failing, but when I read that one of Johnson's top civil servants was spending an inordinate amount of his time dealing with his boss's personal problems, I really want to know what they were, rather than read more pages on who distrusted whom in the corridors.(Spoiler: everyone hates everyone else.)
The authors really rack up the evidence though, to support their thesis that Johnson was responsible for his own downfall, and really did have as little clue about what he was doing as it appeared to the casual observer. This is a frightening discovery and makes the reader wonder what might have happened had the covid vaccine not worked, or had Putin launched a nuclear strike.
As a final takeaway,I have become weirdly fascinated with Dougie Smith, of whom I had never heard, but who developed an overwhelming hatred of Johnson and vowed to bring him down with a thousand cuts, and as far as I can see, succeeded. If anyone has written a book about him, especially a scurrilous, gossipy one, please let me know! I am your target audience.
June 24, 2023
A forensic and detailed account of the decisions, character flaws and personnel that dictated the course of Johnson’s premiership. It’s a fair analysis which talks of missed opportunities to be a good or great PM because he simply wasn’t aware of what was needed or too obsessed with himself. It beggars belief that someone who schemed and manipulated and took advantage of situations to get the top job just didn’t know what he wanted to do or how to do it once he got there. But most of all the book shows that he lied “morning noon and night” which made him impossible to work with or help. Shocking that someone like that could get so far and do so much damage. Politics eh?
April 1, 2025
A fascinating, well researched account of a fascinating and decisive character.
May 22, 2023
Great book! A detailed account of Johnson’s turbulent period in No.10. The book is a great narrative and assessment of Johnson’s Downing Street, it explores how the hart of government, under such a chaotic figure handled the most pressing issues since the Second World War and concludes how unfit Johnson was to lead the nation. A fast paced and adrenaline filled book, truly a great read!
May 19, 2023
Thoroughly researched and detailed, the authors make a comprehensive argument for Johnson’s shortcomings, of which there are many (no spoilers there!) and of which the authors are clear!
They make cogent arguments and provide strong evidence. This is an interesting and insightful reflection on contemporary history. It lacks the flair of other political diarists such as Tim Shipman and Andrew Rawnsley, the difference between academics and journalists perhaps explaining why this book is less readable than similar recent missives.
Worth the read but not the easiest or most enjoyable.
They make cogent arguments and provide strong evidence. This is an interesting and insightful reflection on contemporary history. It lacks the flair of other political diarists such as Tim Shipman and Andrew Rawnsley, the difference between academics and journalists perhaps explaining why this book is less readable than similar recent missives.
Worth the read but not the easiest or most enjoyable.
February 7, 2025
It’s a thoroughly researched and well written read. I only didn’t give it five stars because reading it made me angry
May 21, 2023
This is the latest in the long and distinguished series of "immediate" accounts of recent British prime ministers. Anthony Seldon is a fine historian of British politics and the constitution. His judgments of political figures are invariably sound and reasonable. So it is with this account of the turbulent premiership of Boris Johnson.
Reading this is a sad experience. This is not to make a political point but to reflect how far Boris Johnson's tenure in 10 Downing Street fell short of the demands of office, which is why he fell so spectacularly from power after only three years.
The book is really two things. First, a distillation of the views of many (not all) of those who were part of the Boris Johnson administration. Secondly, the authors draw conclusions from what they found. The outcome is entertaining, alarming and plausible. But it is incomplete. Although Seldon refutes in his conclusion the notion that it is too soon to judge Boris Johnson's career and that argues instead his judgments will stand the test of time, I don't think that necessarily stands. Without access to the full official records and any direct or indirect information from Boris Johnson himself or his closest associates, this can only be an interim assessment. But it is very well worth reading with what proviso.
Reading this is a sad experience. This is not to make a political point but to reflect how far Boris Johnson's tenure in 10 Downing Street fell short of the demands of office, which is why he fell so spectacularly from power after only three years.
The book is really two things. First, a distillation of the views of many (not all) of those who were part of the Boris Johnson administration. Secondly, the authors draw conclusions from what they found. The outcome is entertaining, alarming and plausible. But it is incomplete. Although Seldon refutes in his conclusion the notion that it is too soon to judge Boris Johnson's career and that argues instead his judgments will stand the test of time, I don't think that necessarily stands. Without access to the full official records and any direct or indirect information from Boris Johnson himself or his closest associates, this can only be an interim assessment. But it is very well worth reading with what proviso.
July 13, 2023
https://fromtheheartofeurope.eu/johnson-at-10-the-inside-story-by-anthony-seldon-and-raymond-newell/
Tantalised by the reviews and published snippets, and searching for something very different to read after finishing the Clarke submissions, I gave in and coughed up $11 (on American Amazon) for this much discussed book about the dreadful mess of Boris Johnson’s term as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. It’s not just, or not even a matter of policy; he was quite simply a very bad prime minister.
I think readers will be aware that I was never Johnson’s biggest fan. He cynically supported Brexit because he thought (correctly) that it would make him Prime Minister (though he screwed up on the first attempt in 2016), building on a career of lies about Europe and about his personal life. In office as Foreign Secretary, he displayed casual incompetence to the point where he endangered the life of a British citizen held captive in Iran. He endorsed Theresa May’s Brexit deal with the EU, before deciding that it would be more convenient to resign in protest, disrupting and upstaging a Balkans conference in London that the UK had laboured on for months. From then on, it was only a matter of time before he got to Number 10.
Seldon and Newell have interviewed hundreds of people who worked in the Johnson government, mostly but not all off the record, to build a comprehensive picture of how and why it was such a disaster. And the answer is pretty clear. Like Lloyd George a hundred years before, Johnson came into the office distrusted by large parts of the political system and with a chaotic personal life distracting him. But Lloyd George was good at surrounding himself with other strong figures and listening to them, and also had a vision for what he wanted to achieve, which enabled him to achieve it.
Johnson filled his cabinet with mediocrities and created a team in Number 10, including his partner/wife, whose main job was sniping at each other. (His mayorship of London had been supported by a strong team of advisers, most of whom refused to work with him again in Number 10.) His vision did not exist, beyond winning the 2019 election and “getting Brexit done”. But most of all, his personality is so flawed that he is unable to exercise leadership. He says one thing before a meeting, another in the meeting and something else entirely after it is over. He hates making decisions. He doesn’t really like or understand people in general. He has no idea how government works, and is therefore incapable of governing.
Seldon and Newell have arranged their book thematically rather than chronologically. This is sometimes a little confusing as events come out of order, but probably for the best overall. They look at Johnson’s rise, Brexit, the 2019 election, the (lack of) agenda, COVID, Cummings, domestic policy, foreign policy, the shifting cast of characters in Number 10 and the eventual collapse. The Cummings chapter is the longest, at 69 pages, and his gaunt shadow looms over most of the rest. At the end the authors ask which of the many possible culprits was most responsible for Johnson losing office, and the answer is clear: it was Johnson himself.
There are a couple of points to be said in Johnson’s favour. He did win an election with a clear majority, which is a notable achievement even in the supposedly decisive British system (helped of course by the incompetence at the time of Labour and the Lib Dems). He was seriously committed to Net Zero, and was ready to argue the toss on climate with sceptics in his own party, though less good at doing the preparatory legwork for the Glasgow COP meeting. He came in early and strong on Ukraine’s side in the war, and helped consolidate the G7 and NATO in support. (Though there too, the UK is a smaller player compared to the US and the EU.)
But otherwise there is nothing much to be said for him as a prime minister. His Brexit deal was deeply deficient; I wish the authors had gone a bit more into the Northern Ireland Protocol, though I must admit they may be right to leave that to the specialists. His flagship “levelling-up” agenda got nowhere because he was unable and unwilling to give it leadership. His reluctance to lock down earlier in the COVID waves cost thousands of lives. He allowed Cummings to erode the structures of the constitution, and tolerated unethical behaviour by his allies to beyond the breaking point of government standards. He learned nothing, and forgot nothing. (Also, he seriously thought you could build a bridge/tunnel between Northern Ireland and Scotland.)
None of this can come as any surprise. Johnson’s character flaws were obvious, and widely reported by those who had previously attempted to work with him, going back to his days as a schoolboy at Eton. I have some sympathy for those who joined his team after the event, hoping to make the best of a bad job. But nobody who supported Johnson’s rise to power deserves to have their political judgement trusted on anything else. (And that includes Rishi Sunak, whose late endorsement during the leadership campaign was an important moment.)
This is already long enough, but I was interested in personal glimpses of two people who I know a little and a third who I am fascinated by. I knew Martin Reynolds, the Principal Private Secretary to Johnson, when he was a mid-level diplomat in Brussels fifteen years ago. He is more capable than most officials, but was nonetheless out of his depth in the sheer awfulness of trying to manage the Johnson system. On the other hand, John Bew, Johnson’s main foreign policy advisor, is one of the few people to come out of the book looking good; he gave sound advice and wrote a substantive paper on UK global strategy post-Brexit. His father was a colleague of my father’s; I last saw John when he was about ten years old, and I’m glad he is doing well.
The third person of interest is the late Queen Elizabeth II. Although manipulated by Johnson into proroguing Parliament, she did him a massive favour during the pandemic by giving him permission to jog in the grounds of Buckingham Palace – a nice human gesture, at palatial scale. Much more importantly, it’s strongly hinted that the crucial breakthrough in the Brexit negotiations, when Johnson and Leo Varadkar spoke on the afternoon of 8 October 2019 (after a disastrous conversation between Johnson and Merkel), was directly suggested to Johnson by the Queen. It’s certainly difficult to identify anyone else who could have made the suggestion and that he would have listened to, and impossible to imagine him thinking of it on his own. If so, it’s one of the most consequential personal political interventions of her reign.
The acknowledgements include this peculiar back-hander:
"We would like to thank Isaac Farnworth and John Paton, but cannot for the life of us remember what you did to help.
This is not a great book. The writing style is breathless and occasionally out of breath, sometimes repetitive, sometimes clunky. The trees get a lot of attention, the forest as a whole not so much and the outside world very little. I can really recommend it only to fascinated spectators of slow-motion political train crashes (though I admit that I am one, and there are a lot of us around).
Tantalised by the reviews and published snippets, and searching for something very different to read after finishing the Clarke submissions, I gave in and coughed up $11 (on American Amazon) for this much discussed book about the dreadful mess of Boris Johnson’s term as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. It’s not just, or not even a matter of policy; he was quite simply a very bad prime minister.
I think readers will be aware that I was never Johnson’s biggest fan. He cynically supported Brexit because he thought (correctly) that it would make him Prime Minister (though he screwed up on the first attempt in 2016), building on a career of lies about Europe and about his personal life. In office as Foreign Secretary, he displayed casual incompetence to the point where he endangered the life of a British citizen held captive in Iran. He endorsed Theresa May’s Brexit deal with the EU, before deciding that it would be more convenient to resign in protest, disrupting and upstaging a Balkans conference in London that the UK had laboured on for months. From then on, it was only a matter of time before he got to Number 10.
Seldon and Newell have interviewed hundreds of people who worked in the Johnson government, mostly but not all off the record, to build a comprehensive picture of how and why it was such a disaster. And the answer is pretty clear. Like Lloyd George a hundred years before, Johnson came into the office distrusted by large parts of the political system and with a chaotic personal life distracting him. But Lloyd George was good at surrounding himself with other strong figures and listening to them, and also had a vision for what he wanted to achieve, which enabled him to achieve it.
Johnson filled his cabinet with mediocrities and created a team in Number 10, including his partner/wife, whose main job was sniping at each other. (His mayorship of London had been supported by a strong team of advisers, most of whom refused to work with him again in Number 10.) His vision did not exist, beyond winning the 2019 election and “getting Brexit done”. But most of all, his personality is so flawed that he is unable to exercise leadership. He says one thing before a meeting, another in the meeting and something else entirely after it is over. He hates making decisions. He doesn’t really like or understand people in general. He has no idea how government works, and is therefore incapable of governing.
Seldon and Newell have arranged their book thematically rather than chronologically. This is sometimes a little confusing as events come out of order, but probably for the best overall. They look at Johnson’s rise, Brexit, the 2019 election, the (lack of) agenda, COVID, Cummings, domestic policy, foreign policy, the shifting cast of characters in Number 10 and the eventual collapse. The Cummings chapter is the longest, at 69 pages, and his gaunt shadow looms over most of the rest. At the end the authors ask which of the many possible culprits was most responsible for Johnson losing office, and the answer is clear: it was Johnson himself.
There are a couple of points to be said in Johnson’s favour. He did win an election with a clear majority, which is a notable achievement even in the supposedly decisive British system (helped of course by the incompetence at the time of Labour and the Lib Dems). He was seriously committed to Net Zero, and was ready to argue the toss on climate with sceptics in his own party, though less good at doing the preparatory legwork for the Glasgow COP meeting. He came in early and strong on Ukraine’s side in the war, and helped consolidate the G7 and NATO in support. (Though there too, the UK is a smaller player compared to the US and the EU.)
But otherwise there is nothing much to be said for him as a prime minister. His Brexit deal was deeply deficient; I wish the authors had gone a bit more into the Northern Ireland Protocol, though I must admit they may be right to leave that to the specialists. His flagship “levelling-up” agenda got nowhere because he was unable and unwilling to give it leadership. His reluctance to lock down earlier in the COVID waves cost thousands of lives. He allowed Cummings to erode the structures of the constitution, and tolerated unethical behaviour by his allies to beyond the breaking point of government standards. He learned nothing, and forgot nothing. (Also, he seriously thought you could build a bridge/tunnel between Northern Ireland and Scotland.)
None of this can come as any surprise. Johnson’s character flaws were obvious, and widely reported by those who had previously attempted to work with him, going back to his days as a schoolboy at Eton. I have some sympathy for those who joined his team after the event, hoping to make the best of a bad job. But nobody who supported Johnson’s rise to power deserves to have their political judgement trusted on anything else. (And that includes Rishi Sunak, whose late endorsement during the leadership campaign was an important moment.)
This is already long enough, but I was interested in personal glimpses of two people who I know a little and a third who I am fascinated by. I knew Martin Reynolds, the Principal Private Secretary to Johnson, when he was a mid-level diplomat in Brussels fifteen years ago. He is more capable than most officials, but was nonetheless out of his depth in the sheer awfulness of trying to manage the Johnson system. On the other hand, John Bew, Johnson’s main foreign policy advisor, is one of the few people to come out of the book looking good; he gave sound advice and wrote a substantive paper on UK global strategy post-Brexit. His father was a colleague of my father’s; I last saw John when he was about ten years old, and I’m glad he is doing well.
The third person of interest is the late Queen Elizabeth II. Although manipulated by Johnson into proroguing Parliament, she did him a massive favour during the pandemic by giving him permission to jog in the grounds of Buckingham Palace – a nice human gesture, at palatial scale. Much more importantly, it’s strongly hinted that the crucial breakthrough in the Brexit negotiations, when Johnson and Leo Varadkar spoke on the afternoon of 8 October 2019 (after a disastrous conversation between Johnson and Merkel), was directly suggested to Johnson by the Queen. It’s certainly difficult to identify anyone else who could have made the suggestion and that he would have listened to, and impossible to imagine him thinking of it on his own. If so, it’s one of the most consequential personal political interventions of her reign.
The acknowledgements include this peculiar back-hander:
"We would like to thank Isaac Farnworth and John Paton, but cannot for the life of us remember what you did to help.
This is not a great book. The writing style is breathless and occasionally out of breath, sometimes repetitive, sometimes clunky. The trees get a lot of attention, the forest as a whole not so much and the outside world very little. I can really recommend it only to fascinated spectators of slow-motion political train crashes (though I admit that I am one, and there are a lot of us around).
July 21, 2023
This series about recent prime ministers is one I’ve been meaning to catch up with . This one is a fair and balanced account of an era I don’t love . It’s nuanced about what Johnson is to blame for and what he isn’t , especially with Covid .
It’s conclusion is that Johnson could have been a great leader but this was lost in his constant vacillating, lack of integrity and other facets that made him hard to take seriously . Much here disturbs , such as an outdated culture of toxic masculinity at Downing Street. His culture war grandstanding where defacing statues of Churchill was faced with bigger sentences than rape . I’m no fan of cancel culture but that doesn’t make its right wing opposites better .
Johnson’s Brexit deal is also charged with being inferior to May’s . Time will tell, but the logic is sound. I didn’t vote for Brexit and nothing since has changed my mind but having done it we needed to get it done .
I had little respect for Johnson’s cabinet as it mainly consisted of sycophants such as Nadine Dorries who was about as suited to government as my late goldfish and ministers seemed to be judged on hard Brexit sympathy rather than competence. The culture war grandstanding was profoundly immature as was a bombastic Brexit that took little account of things like Northern Ireland protocols and our ongoing role in horizon and Erasmus programs etc , and little regard for the views of other UK countries such as Scotland . But he was right about a few things and this book does give him credit for environmental sympathies ( defying Trump ) and some other things . Some of our lack of preparedness for Covid is down to him but much more is down to the austerity of the Cameron era .
I wish we’d had more of May but it’s not surprising after the brief Truss disaster than we got Sunak , who bar idiocies like eat out to help out actually helped massively with furlough . I think he’s money oriented to the point of not seeing anything else but a steadier hand . Leaders like Johnson and Trump represented a populist phase and a culture war mentality which have both thankfully passed to an extent , and we will see what comes next .
It’s conclusion is that Johnson could have been a great leader but this was lost in his constant vacillating, lack of integrity and other facets that made him hard to take seriously . Much here disturbs , such as an outdated culture of toxic masculinity at Downing Street. His culture war grandstanding where defacing statues of Churchill was faced with bigger sentences than rape . I’m no fan of cancel culture but that doesn’t make its right wing opposites better .
Johnson’s Brexit deal is also charged with being inferior to May’s . Time will tell, but the logic is sound. I didn’t vote for Brexit and nothing since has changed my mind but having done it we needed to get it done .
I had little respect for Johnson’s cabinet as it mainly consisted of sycophants such as Nadine Dorries who was about as suited to government as my late goldfish and ministers seemed to be judged on hard Brexit sympathy rather than competence. The culture war grandstanding was profoundly immature as was a bombastic Brexit that took little account of things like Northern Ireland protocols and our ongoing role in horizon and Erasmus programs etc , and little regard for the views of other UK countries such as Scotland . But he was right about a few things and this book does give him credit for environmental sympathies ( defying Trump ) and some other things . Some of our lack of preparedness for Covid is down to him but much more is down to the austerity of the Cameron era .
I wish we’d had more of May but it’s not surprising after the brief Truss disaster than we got Sunak , who bar idiocies like eat out to help out actually helped massively with furlough . I think he’s money oriented to the point of not seeing anything else but a steadier hand . Leaders like Johnson and Trump represented a populist phase and a culture war mentality which have both thankfully passed to an extent , and we will see what comes next .
June 17, 2023
If you have been paying any attention to the British political landscape over the last seven years nothing in this detailed book will come as any surprise at all.
This is not a book that I enjoyed, not a book to be enjoyed from the viewpoint of my politics certainly because of all of the depressing confirmation that it provided of the failings that Johnson brought into No.10 and the damage it did to our nation.
It is a book to be appreciated for all of the diligent hard work that the authors have put into it though.
Diligent hard work is not something that you could ever claim that Boris Johnson has exhibited and this book goes into minute detail about chaotic operation that Johnson ran in No.10 , his lack of focus and seriousness proving to be catastrophic and his lack of willingness to learn or change his approach in any way suggesting that he truly believes the world should revolve around him and that truth is whatever he may choose it to be at any given moment.
The approach of the authors to source information from those out of the public view but actually in the heart of the action , the civil servants , those close to the inner circle but in many ways part of it, as well as, clearly , some more senior figures speaking under the promise of anonymity make this a damning indictment of a narcissistic man who has charmed and let down many many people
This is not a book that I enjoyed, not a book to be enjoyed from the viewpoint of my politics certainly because of all of the depressing confirmation that it provided of the failings that Johnson brought into No.10 and the damage it did to our nation.
It is a book to be appreciated for all of the diligent hard work that the authors have put into it though.
Diligent hard work is not something that you could ever claim that Boris Johnson has exhibited and this book goes into minute detail about chaotic operation that Johnson ran in No.10 , his lack of focus and seriousness proving to be catastrophic and his lack of willingness to learn or change his approach in any way suggesting that he truly believes the world should revolve around him and that truth is whatever he may choose it to be at any given moment.
The approach of the authors to source information from those out of the public view but actually in the heart of the action , the civil servants , those close to the inner circle but in many ways part of it, as well as, clearly , some more senior figures speaking under the promise of anonymity make this a damning indictment of a narcissistic man who has charmed and let down many many people
January 3, 2024
Introduction (pre-PM)
In the end was his beginning as Anthony Seldon puts very succinctly. The PM BJ most resembled was Lloyd George in both his character (serial womanisers) and governing approach (candidate approach to Britain’s institutions). However, where Lloyd George triumphed in WW1, BJ failed miserably in his war moment - Covid. BJ was an insider desperate to be seen as an outside, while LG was an outsider desperate to be seen as an insider. A PM (or any leader really) is only as good as the team they have around them. LG understood this, BJ did not. BJ thought that governing was like his time at City Hall, a lot of PR, ceremonies and popularity, with no need to have the desire to do the hard work to solve policy issues. BJ was definitively supportive of staying within the EU. In a 2001 book about his Henley constituency, his said that to exit Europe was to lose influence over a continent that it was in Britain’s interest to keep onside. He secretly despised the ERG, but knew his future depended on them.
To think of BJ as an intellect is wrong. He would name drop his admiration for Roman emperors like Pericles and Augustus, but would never engage with their leadership and achievements at a deeper level, and try to transfer their traits into his own leadership. He liked classic films like Buch Cassidy (a film choice of Jeremy Clarkson) but again was unable to think more deeply about what these films meant or represented. In short, his intellect/attempts to come across like a WC historian were shallow and vein. If he had engaged with history at a deeper level, he would have known that one of the key lessons to being a great PM was that you had to work through your team and the cabinet (a point Churchill knew) to achieve favourable policy outcomes.
2019
BJ was haunted by Gove stabbing him in the back in 2016 and had his card marked as a serious rival along with Rabb. Robert Jenrick hosted many get to know Boris events at his Vincent Square house during his 2ndleadership bid, with BJ given briefing notes of what to say to each guest as he disliked/did not respect/did not know many Tory backbenchers. BJ was reluctant to talk propagation, but when Rabb pledged on the leadership campaign that he would be willing to prorogue Parliament, BJ had no choice. A little-known fact is that Theresa May also considered proroguing Parliament but backed down. Persuading DC to work in N10 was harder than many thought. Repeating Nicholas Sarkozy “only you can do this job DC” when asking him to work in N10 in June 2019.
Once in power, BJ was terrified about the steps he would have to take to win an election. However, after a showdown with Cummings, BJ felt he had been boxed in and had no choice but to prorogue Parliament and put his entire faith in DC’s strategy. Ironically, the period up to the election was when he worked most effectively with his team, as he put his trust in them and listened to what they said. It was also the time when his team was most unified (from a very low bar). Mark Sedwill deserved credit along with the Queen for helping set BJ up with Leo Varadaka in which they struck a new NI deal in the Autumn. In that deal BJ decided that getting a clean-cut Brexit would be paid for by keeping NI in the customs union. As BJ pushed for an election, the Lib Dems knew that no deal was off the table but feared BJ’s Brexit deal going through so pledged to support any vote on an election. Labour did not want an election but knew that the game was up with the Lib Dems backing an election. DC knew this would happen and that Labour could not block an election. Once again, DC’s Brexit strategy was correct.
Upon seeing the manifesto BJ was furious that none of his ambition/ideas was inserted – which is another reason why his premiership failed so badly. The manifesto did not actually contain any policies on levelling up/BJ hated it. He did not realise that it was designed to purely secure victory and be as risk free as possible – undermining his claim that he had a mandate from the British people. Carrie Simmons became increasingly involved in the campaign, and was worries about the impact that skipping an Andrew Neil interview would have. BJ to her face agreed to do the interview, only to turn around to Cain and DC and say to their face, you are correct we must not do the interview. This demonstrated a key trait of BJ and why he never could build a successful team around him because he could never trust anyone (which DC loved as it gave him more power. DC would regularly talk about the need to have a good team, but knew this would expose his own weaknesses).
When the election result was confirmed, DC and other knew that the game was up in Downing Street. Isaac Levido knew that BJ would be a failure as his manifesto had given him no policy mandate. During BJ’s Xmas holiday, he got a deluge of messages from former City Hall aids saying that this was now the time to sack DC and govern from the middle not the right. BJ, lacking any idea of his governmental strategy ignored them. BJ only won 300,000 more votes than Theresa May, and 130,000 less than John Major, who had a smaller electorate in 1992. His victory was no mandate – only a reflection of Labour’s weakness.
COVID
Johnson actually deserves less blame for a late shutdown in March than most believe. The advice from the scientists was ambiguous, and only very recently had the Global Health Security Index shown that the UK was the second-best country prepared for an epidemic behind the US. The failure to not attend SAGE and COBRA was not the neglect of duty the media portrayed it to be. These forums were technical and detailed and used to for cabinet office members to then brief the PM. The behavioural insights teams warned that Britain’s may not tolerate lockdown (a classic case of British exceptionalism being embedded in society). The Cabinet office struggled to construct a swift decision-making matrix – with Mark Sidwell’s plan falling apart at contact – however some sympathy is due as it had to account for the N10 politics as there was no formal team structure around BJ. A third of N10 reported to DC, a third to Lee Cain, and a third to Mirza, head of political strategy. Least of all he had to account for DC – who had huge power of the PM, but had completely lost it by March, swearing, and shouting at his computer. There was a private rota drawn up that simply said “EVERYONE ALL OF THE TIME”, which meant everyone became fatigued. When it was put to them by an official that “calm and order” were the key words of the WW2 operation centre in N10, and aid said, “I did not think of that”. It links in with toxic masculine culture BJ & others brought to N10 – that really was a lot of insecure males who were trying to act tough, a classic defence mechanism for insecure incompetence. It is no coincidence that the last four PMs (Cameron, May, BJ and Truss) all brought in masculine, dodgy male advisors at some points in their careers (Cameron’s was Steve Hilton, May’s Nick Timothy, BJ was DC and Truss Mark Fullbrook). All four have records to regret. Chris Witty remained calm and collected.
When BJ was incapacitated with Covid, RABB really stepped up and calmed everything down. He was at his best, and at no point did he ever lose his temper or swear at any official. He also ran meetings very well. When BJ got back to work in May, there was an awkward exchange with Sedwill where both said each other was in charge of reopening. Sedwill, with the hostile briefings knew the game was up. Case came in and very quickly changed some of the organisational structures for the better, as he was leading the cabinet office and working as N10 permanent secretary.
BJ once recovered from Covid was pretty much the same. He became more frustrated with Hancock, referred to him as the C*** in behind his back. In a pre-recorded interview, he accidently referred to Hancock as a C***. He had to apologise to Matt in person. Important lesson – how you behave/refer to people in private is easily reflected to how you behave in public. BJ concluded that keeping Hancock at Health was beneficial as it gave him someone to blame. Hancock was hopeless, and when he felt (never confirmed but suspected) along with BJ that Kate Bingham was getting too much credit for the vaccine, negative briefings were put out against her. Very quickly after coming back, BJ grew bored of discussing Covid protocol, which was a key reason why he was late locking down at the end of 2020.
Rest of premiership
This weakness of the manifesto impacted policy decisions at the most basis level. When asked what levelling up meant, Simon Clarke, Chief Secretary to the Treasury replied “devolving powers”. Rees Mogg said, “I believe the opposite”. This division did enable Sunak to play the politics well. Whenever money was controlled by the Treasury, levelling up initiatives got money. When they were controlled by N10, they were blocked. BJ was fascinated by Trump, despite not liking the “Trumpies”. He quickly got on with Steve Bannon and they continued to exchange messages throughout his premiership (as I suspected back in 2020). He learnt how to manage Trump’s ego saying shamelessly once “ignore the media here, you are loved in the UK”.
BJ was brilliant at feigning ignorance, sometimes to hide when he actually was ignorant. In Sept 2020, when discussing the trade deal, it was starting to dawn on BJ what leaving the customs union meant. “No no Frosty, what happens with a deal?”. Frost replies “PM this is what happens with a deal, that’s what leaving the customs union means”. (A side point, only in 1820 did the US realise that leaving the British empire was beneficial (they left in 1776)). Who knows, Brexit could be beneficial in 50 years? BJ, as written earlier was a very good chair of meetings when he wanted to. At the G7, he had not read his briefing papers, but still managed to survive and almost thrive.
BJ could never say no to people and always wanted to please. When wanting to find someone to be the COP President, he was told at no costs to ask Theresa May, who came to N10 for tea to unveil her N10 Portrait. He promptly offered it to her but then to reinforce the fact of what a liar he was he said to an aid “I would never give it to her”. What BJ could never understand was that by trying so hard to please people, it actually over the long term had the opposite effect. He was completely unaware/deliberately ignorant of the fact that the PM sets the culture of the country and his office. By lying morning, noon and night (as one aid put it) he set the wrong example.
BJ’s sometimes direct approach sometimes did pay off. When trying to persuade the Germans/EU to abandon Nord Steam 2, he unexpectedly brought it up in a speech at the Guildhall despite being told not to do so by officials (it will piss off the German). The Germans were annoyed, but three months later cancelled Nord 2. He could also when he wanted, to be constructive. Finland and Sweden were very impressed with him after he gave them security guarantees which pleased the Germans hugely. He was, when on top of his brief very good at playing devil’s advocate to interrogate ideas, and get minister to speak clearly (this was rare however, and often he hated Minister challenging him).
Ultimately the lessons I take from this book are so many populist traits emerge.
1. An appearance of caring for the worse off but doing the opposite of what will actually help them. “Boris you care about people unlike Osborne” a suck up Ben Wallace said to BJ while at City Hall and supported getting him into N10. BW eventually realised however the BJ was a slight waste of time and their relationship cooled.
2. At their best when against something (getting Brexit done, against Russia, pushing COVID vaccines) but never for anything. That extended to his team around him, most of all DC who did not have a clue what levelling up meant.
3. A myth peddled that he was the best leader given the toughest brief and any failures are to do with others (Trump often blames is failures on his predecessors). Evidence proves his personal floors were such even if he had become PM at the 1st time of asking, it would likely still have been a disaster.
4. Easily swayed by popularity. At May’s Chequers summit, he toasted her proposal at an evening supper (keen to see Brexit done) – but was shocked when he turned on his phone and saw his potential supports criticise the deal. He subsequently knew that he had to resign to maintain his credibility.
5. A desperate desire to hold court/power over his court. In some way BJ revelled in the chaos of having three different factions within his team, as shown by the story of Carrie and DC. It actually gave him protection and an ability to blame others. Similar to Hitler, who was well aware of the egos/dislike many German generals had for one another.
6. An obvious lazy approach/clear avoidance of doing the tough boring work. Implementation, and strategy he avoided at all costs.
7. An obsession with brand. Trump has his own MAGA brand, while DC revelled in his brand as a weirdo. But when it came to actual substance beyond Cumming’s brand of Brexit, he had no ideas about how to implement Brexit, and little personal substance, hence why he deliberately delayed a BJ idea to refresh his team after the election. This is proven by how much DC hated the fact BJ did respect Sedwill’s advice about National Security, and tried to get Lord Frost to become the National Security Advisor. Not known at the time, when DC walked out from N10 after being sacked with the box, that box was empty. It was just used to scare BJ and reinforce his brand. BJ also was obsessed by his brand and during meetings with John Kerry was always trying to joke, starting down one track, and then moving to another. John Kerry hated BJ and knew that he was a lazy intellectual who want to pop and pick at lazy ideas in briefs.
Lessons.
1. Do not do a Dan Rosenfeld and give a speech to N10 saying what good friends you were with a colleague everyone knew that you hated. Just keep quiet.
2. Being a leader gives you so little time to think. Trusting people, and the people who are there to support is what in some ways defines a leader.
In the end was his beginning as Anthony Seldon puts very succinctly. The PM BJ most resembled was Lloyd George in both his character (serial womanisers) and governing approach (candidate approach to Britain’s institutions). However, where Lloyd George triumphed in WW1, BJ failed miserably in his war moment - Covid. BJ was an insider desperate to be seen as an outside, while LG was an outsider desperate to be seen as an insider. A PM (or any leader really) is only as good as the team they have around them. LG understood this, BJ did not. BJ thought that governing was like his time at City Hall, a lot of PR, ceremonies and popularity, with no need to have the desire to do the hard work to solve policy issues. BJ was definitively supportive of staying within the EU. In a 2001 book about his Henley constituency, his said that to exit Europe was to lose influence over a continent that it was in Britain’s interest to keep onside. He secretly despised the ERG, but knew his future depended on them.
To think of BJ as an intellect is wrong. He would name drop his admiration for Roman emperors like Pericles and Augustus, but would never engage with their leadership and achievements at a deeper level, and try to transfer their traits into his own leadership. He liked classic films like Buch Cassidy (a film choice of Jeremy Clarkson) but again was unable to think more deeply about what these films meant or represented. In short, his intellect/attempts to come across like a WC historian were shallow and vein. If he had engaged with history at a deeper level, he would have known that one of the key lessons to being a great PM was that you had to work through your team and the cabinet (a point Churchill knew) to achieve favourable policy outcomes.
2019
BJ was haunted by Gove stabbing him in the back in 2016 and had his card marked as a serious rival along with Rabb. Robert Jenrick hosted many get to know Boris events at his Vincent Square house during his 2ndleadership bid, with BJ given briefing notes of what to say to each guest as he disliked/did not respect/did not know many Tory backbenchers. BJ was reluctant to talk propagation, but when Rabb pledged on the leadership campaign that he would be willing to prorogue Parliament, BJ had no choice. A little-known fact is that Theresa May also considered proroguing Parliament but backed down. Persuading DC to work in N10 was harder than many thought. Repeating Nicholas Sarkozy “only you can do this job DC” when asking him to work in N10 in June 2019.
Once in power, BJ was terrified about the steps he would have to take to win an election. However, after a showdown with Cummings, BJ felt he had been boxed in and had no choice but to prorogue Parliament and put his entire faith in DC’s strategy. Ironically, the period up to the election was when he worked most effectively with his team, as he put his trust in them and listened to what they said. It was also the time when his team was most unified (from a very low bar). Mark Sedwill deserved credit along with the Queen for helping set BJ up with Leo Varadaka in which they struck a new NI deal in the Autumn. In that deal BJ decided that getting a clean-cut Brexit would be paid for by keeping NI in the customs union. As BJ pushed for an election, the Lib Dems knew that no deal was off the table but feared BJ’s Brexit deal going through so pledged to support any vote on an election. Labour did not want an election but knew that the game was up with the Lib Dems backing an election. DC knew this would happen and that Labour could not block an election. Once again, DC’s Brexit strategy was correct.
Upon seeing the manifesto BJ was furious that none of his ambition/ideas was inserted – which is another reason why his premiership failed so badly. The manifesto did not actually contain any policies on levelling up/BJ hated it. He did not realise that it was designed to purely secure victory and be as risk free as possible – undermining his claim that he had a mandate from the British people. Carrie Simmons became increasingly involved in the campaign, and was worries about the impact that skipping an Andrew Neil interview would have. BJ to her face agreed to do the interview, only to turn around to Cain and DC and say to their face, you are correct we must not do the interview. This demonstrated a key trait of BJ and why he never could build a successful team around him because he could never trust anyone (which DC loved as it gave him more power. DC would regularly talk about the need to have a good team, but knew this would expose his own weaknesses).
When the election result was confirmed, DC and other knew that the game was up in Downing Street. Isaac Levido knew that BJ would be a failure as his manifesto had given him no policy mandate. During BJ’s Xmas holiday, he got a deluge of messages from former City Hall aids saying that this was now the time to sack DC and govern from the middle not the right. BJ, lacking any idea of his governmental strategy ignored them. BJ only won 300,000 more votes than Theresa May, and 130,000 less than John Major, who had a smaller electorate in 1992. His victory was no mandate – only a reflection of Labour’s weakness.
COVID
Johnson actually deserves less blame for a late shutdown in March than most believe. The advice from the scientists was ambiguous, and only very recently had the Global Health Security Index shown that the UK was the second-best country prepared for an epidemic behind the US. The failure to not attend SAGE and COBRA was not the neglect of duty the media portrayed it to be. These forums were technical and detailed and used to for cabinet office members to then brief the PM. The behavioural insights teams warned that Britain’s may not tolerate lockdown (a classic case of British exceptionalism being embedded in society). The Cabinet office struggled to construct a swift decision-making matrix – with Mark Sidwell’s plan falling apart at contact – however some sympathy is due as it had to account for the N10 politics as there was no formal team structure around BJ. A third of N10 reported to DC, a third to Lee Cain, and a third to Mirza, head of political strategy. Least of all he had to account for DC – who had huge power of the PM, but had completely lost it by March, swearing, and shouting at his computer. There was a private rota drawn up that simply said “EVERYONE ALL OF THE TIME”, which meant everyone became fatigued. When it was put to them by an official that “calm and order” were the key words of the WW2 operation centre in N10, and aid said, “I did not think of that”. It links in with toxic masculine culture BJ & others brought to N10 – that really was a lot of insecure males who were trying to act tough, a classic defence mechanism for insecure incompetence. It is no coincidence that the last four PMs (Cameron, May, BJ and Truss) all brought in masculine, dodgy male advisors at some points in their careers (Cameron’s was Steve Hilton, May’s Nick Timothy, BJ was DC and Truss Mark Fullbrook). All four have records to regret. Chris Witty remained calm and collected.
When BJ was incapacitated with Covid, RABB really stepped up and calmed everything down. He was at his best, and at no point did he ever lose his temper or swear at any official. He also ran meetings very well. When BJ got back to work in May, there was an awkward exchange with Sedwill where both said each other was in charge of reopening. Sedwill, with the hostile briefings knew the game was up. Case came in and very quickly changed some of the organisational structures for the better, as he was leading the cabinet office and working as N10 permanent secretary.
BJ once recovered from Covid was pretty much the same. He became more frustrated with Hancock, referred to him as the C*** in behind his back. In a pre-recorded interview, he accidently referred to Hancock as a C***. He had to apologise to Matt in person. Important lesson – how you behave/refer to people in private is easily reflected to how you behave in public. BJ concluded that keeping Hancock at Health was beneficial as it gave him someone to blame. Hancock was hopeless, and when he felt (never confirmed but suspected) along with BJ that Kate Bingham was getting too much credit for the vaccine, negative briefings were put out against her. Very quickly after coming back, BJ grew bored of discussing Covid protocol, which was a key reason why he was late locking down at the end of 2020.
Rest of premiership
This weakness of the manifesto impacted policy decisions at the most basis level. When asked what levelling up meant, Simon Clarke, Chief Secretary to the Treasury replied “devolving powers”. Rees Mogg said, “I believe the opposite”. This division did enable Sunak to play the politics well. Whenever money was controlled by the Treasury, levelling up initiatives got money. When they were controlled by N10, they were blocked. BJ was fascinated by Trump, despite not liking the “Trumpies”. He quickly got on with Steve Bannon and they continued to exchange messages throughout his premiership (as I suspected back in 2020). He learnt how to manage Trump’s ego saying shamelessly once “ignore the media here, you are loved in the UK”.
BJ was brilliant at feigning ignorance, sometimes to hide when he actually was ignorant. In Sept 2020, when discussing the trade deal, it was starting to dawn on BJ what leaving the customs union meant. “No no Frosty, what happens with a deal?”. Frost replies “PM this is what happens with a deal, that’s what leaving the customs union means”. (A side point, only in 1820 did the US realise that leaving the British empire was beneficial (they left in 1776)). Who knows, Brexit could be beneficial in 50 years? BJ, as written earlier was a very good chair of meetings when he wanted to. At the G7, he had not read his briefing papers, but still managed to survive and almost thrive.
BJ could never say no to people and always wanted to please. When wanting to find someone to be the COP President, he was told at no costs to ask Theresa May, who came to N10 for tea to unveil her N10 Portrait. He promptly offered it to her but then to reinforce the fact of what a liar he was he said to an aid “I would never give it to her”. What BJ could never understand was that by trying so hard to please people, it actually over the long term had the opposite effect. He was completely unaware/deliberately ignorant of the fact that the PM sets the culture of the country and his office. By lying morning, noon and night (as one aid put it) he set the wrong example.
BJ’s sometimes direct approach sometimes did pay off. When trying to persuade the Germans/EU to abandon Nord Steam 2, he unexpectedly brought it up in a speech at the Guildhall despite being told not to do so by officials (it will piss off the German). The Germans were annoyed, but three months later cancelled Nord 2. He could also when he wanted, to be constructive. Finland and Sweden were very impressed with him after he gave them security guarantees which pleased the Germans hugely. He was, when on top of his brief very good at playing devil’s advocate to interrogate ideas, and get minister to speak clearly (this was rare however, and often he hated Minister challenging him).
Ultimately the lessons I take from this book are so many populist traits emerge.
1. An appearance of caring for the worse off but doing the opposite of what will actually help them. “Boris you care about people unlike Osborne” a suck up Ben Wallace said to BJ while at City Hall and supported getting him into N10. BW eventually realised however the BJ was a slight waste of time and their relationship cooled.
2. At their best when against something (getting Brexit done, against Russia, pushing COVID vaccines) but never for anything. That extended to his team around him, most of all DC who did not have a clue what levelling up meant.
3. A myth peddled that he was the best leader given the toughest brief and any failures are to do with others (Trump often blames is failures on his predecessors). Evidence proves his personal floors were such even if he had become PM at the 1st time of asking, it would likely still have been a disaster.
4. Easily swayed by popularity. At May’s Chequers summit, he toasted her proposal at an evening supper (keen to see Brexit done) – but was shocked when he turned on his phone and saw his potential supports criticise the deal. He subsequently knew that he had to resign to maintain his credibility.
5. A desperate desire to hold court/power over his court. In some way BJ revelled in the chaos of having three different factions within his team, as shown by the story of Carrie and DC. It actually gave him protection and an ability to blame others. Similar to Hitler, who was well aware of the egos/dislike many German generals had for one another.
6. An obvious lazy approach/clear avoidance of doing the tough boring work. Implementation, and strategy he avoided at all costs.
7. An obsession with brand. Trump has his own MAGA brand, while DC revelled in his brand as a weirdo. But when it came to actual substance beyond Cumming’s brand of Brexit, he had no ideas about how to implement Brexit, and little personal substance, hence why he deliberately delayed a BJ idea to refresh his team after the election. This is proven by how much DC hated the fact BJ did respect Sedwill’s advice about National Security, and tried to get Lord Frost to become the National Security Advisor. Not known at the time, when DC walked out from N10 after being sacked with the box, that box was empty. It was just used to scare BJ and reinforce his brand. BJ also was obsessed by his brand and during meetings with John Kerry was always trying to joke, starting down one track, and then moving to another. John Kerry hated BJ and knew that he was a lazy intellectual who want to pop and pick at lazy ideas in briefs.
Lessons.
1. Do not do a Dan Rosenfeld and give a speech to N10 saying what good friends you were with a colleague everyone knew that you hated. Just keep quiet.
2. Being a leader gives you so little time to think. Trusting people, and the people who are there to support is what in some ways defines a leader.
September 20, 2023
This is not an inspiriting book. Seldon and Newell bend over backwards to commend what is commendable about Johnson’s performance – and indeed it was usually a performance, or, rather, an improvisation – and highlight his success in banging the drum for Brexit, pushing the Covid vaccine rollout and championing support for Ukraine. But his list of personal and political shortcomings earns their severe chastisement, for want of a better word, which utterly undermine any successes Johnson may have enjoyed.
Johnson was clearly a man unfit to govern. He was lazy; his attention was spasmodic; he chose to be surrounded by people who would not challenge him; he was unable to make decisions effectively; he was often torn between what Carrie, his wife, would say, what his advisers were advising and what he felt ought to be done; he did not cultivate his MPs; his inclinations were at odds with the influential (and obstinate) Conservative right-wingers; he was a liar, arrogantly self-confident, inconsistent to the exasperation of his aides and advisers, often unbriefable, utterly casual over detail… And so on and so forth. He was a vortex of chaos, and No 10 became one as well without the kind of clear and consistent leadership that makes for an effective administration. The heart of government was, in fact, under Johnson, dysfunctional.
Three moments in the story stood out for me – there were probably more, but these struck me particularly. First, when the 2016 referendum count was announced, Johnson is reliably reported to have said “Holy sh*t, f**k, what have we done?”, and, though Seldon does not offer specific authority for this, followed it up with “Oh sh*t, we’ve got no plan. We haven’t thought about it. I didn’t think it would happen. Holy crap, what will we do?”
The second moment was when Johnson ‘told his startled officials “Put down in 3,000 words what you think my foreign policy should be.”’
The third is a moment in which Seldon and Newell analyse one of the elements in Johnson’s downfall. This is what they say:
‘Not since Macmillan was Prime Minister (1957-1963) was there so much confusion over what the party stood for. It was both Johnson’s luck and misfortune to be the leader at a time when the Conservatives were in transition – though to where, they knew not. Did it favour low tax and pared-back spending, as Truss and Kwarteng wanted, or larger spending and state, as Johnson himself favoured? Being libertarian and sceptical about the state’s role in Covid, as Sunak, Shapps and Rees-Mogg were, or interventionist as Gove and Hancock were? Socially conservative, as Patel, Braverman and Badenoch among Cabinet, and Mirza and Smith in No 10 favoured, or progressive as Carrie and her set wanted? A hard Brexit as Raab and Frost demanded, or more alignment with the EU, as Javid and departed ministers Morgan, Rudd and Smith advocated? The absence of Conservative scripture had helped Johnson with his own contradictory and messy ideas, ascend to the top. It was somewhat less helpful when attempting to govern.’
On occasions he could show substance, a sense of the necessity of forensic attention to detail, and exhibit firm and purposeful chairmanship and focused hard work, but rarely and only when the subject matter had absorbed his interest. But, as the authors point out, occasional, unpredictable manifestations of these qualities are, in a Prime Minister, inadequate to ensure good government. Johnson remains, in the authors’ concluding words, a man ‘with the potential, the aspirations and the opportunity to be one of Britain’s great Prime Ministers. His unequivocal exclusion from that club can be laid at the feet of no one else, but himself.’
For those who like a detailed laying-down of facts and their subsequent analysis, I’d have thought this book offers everything they will like. So, not an inspiriting read, but a fine example of authors doing a thorough job.
Johnson was clearly a man unfit to govern. He was lazy; his attention was spasmodic; he chose to be surrounded by people who would not challenge him; he was unable to make decisions effectively; he was often torn between what Carrie, his wife, would say, what his advisers were advising and what he felt ought to be done; he did not cultivate his MPs; his inclinations were at odds with the influential (and obstinate) Conservative right-wingers; he was a liar, arrogantly self-confident, inconsistent to the exasperation of his aides and advisers, often unbriefable, utterly casual over detail… And so on and so forth. He was a vortex of chaos, and No 10 became one as well without the kind of clear and consistent leadership that makes for an effective administration. The heart of government was, in fact, under Johnson, dysfunctional.
Three moments in the story stood out for me – there were probably more, but these struck me particularly. First, when the 2016 referendum count was announced, Johnson is reliably reported to have said “Holy sh*t, f**k, what have we done?”, and, though Seldon does not offer specific authority for this, followed it up with “Oh sh*t, we’ve got no plan. We haven’t thought about it. I didn’t think it would happen. Holy crap, what will we do?”
The second moment was when Johnson ‘told his startled officials “Put down in 3,000 words what you think my foreign policy should be.”’
The third is a moment in which Seldon and Newell analyse one of the elements in Johnson’s downfall. This is what they say:
‘Not since Macmillan was Prime Minister (1957-1963) was there so much confusion over what the party stood for. It was both Johnson’s luck and misfortune to be the leader at a time when the Conservatives were in transition – though to where, they knew not. Did it favour low tax and pared-back spending, as Truss and Kwarteng wanted, or larger spending and state, as Johnson himself favoured? Being libertarian and sceptical about the state’s role in Covid, as Sunak, Shapps and Rees-Mogg were, or interventionist as Gove and Hancock were? Socially conservative, as Patel, Braverman and Badenoch among Cabinet, and Mirza and Smith in No 10 favoured, or progressive as Carrie and her set wanted? A hard Brexit as Raab and Frost demanded, or more alignment with the EU, as Javid and departed ministers Morgan, Rudd and Smith advocated? The absence of Conservative scripture had helped Johnson with his own contradictory and messy ideas, ascend to the top. It was somewhat less helpful when attempting to govern.’
On occasions he could show substance, a sense of the necessity of forensic attention to detail, and exhibit firm and purposeful chairmanship and focused hard work, but rarely and only when the subject matter had absorbed his interest. But, as the authors point out, occasional, unpredictable manifestations of these qualities are, in a Prime Minister, inadequate to ensure good government. Johnson remains, in the authors’ concluding words, a man ‘with the potential, the aspirations and the opportunity to be one of Britain’s great Prime Ministers. His unequivocal exclusion from that club can be laid at the feet of no one else, but himself.’
For those who like a detailed laying-down of facts and their subsequent analysis, I’d have thought this book offers everything they will like. So, not an inspiriting read, but a fine example of authors doing a thorough job.
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