This is a wonderful book – I think what I like most about, when compared to other books by Fairclough I have read, is that it really does go out of its way to be clear and useable. This is a less of a book and more of a weapon. It presents a series of worked examples to show the reader how to critically engage with language so as to see how language is being used to position them within political and ideological frames. Although this book was written quite some time ago – many of the examples, for instance, relate to Margaret Thatcher’s Prime Ministership – it is still highly relevant. In some ways it may be that the distance we have from the events and stories discussed here might make them easier for us to learn from.
Fairclough is very much on the left of politics – but I think that even people on the right could learn from this book. Not that I think it would ‘convert’ you – but the linguistic tools he uses here don’t really belong to left or right, but to reason and rationality. If language is essentially a socially conditioned means for us to communicate and if it can be shown that language helps to structure the world into ‘common sense’ so as to make certain ideas seem natural and others unthinkable, then surely seeing how language facilitates that framing is something of interest to everyone.
One of Fairclough’s main concerns is that society is essentially coercive. There are two major (although certainly not mutually exclusive) ways in which a society can enforce the power relations it needs to sustain itself. The most obvious, even if the least frequently used, is through literal coercion. That is, the use of force. Every society reserves the ultimate right to use force to maintain itself, in fact, societies reserve for themselves the sole legitimate use of force – any other use of force in society not performed by the state is, by definition, illegitimate. But no society would last long if it required the constant use of force against its own population just to remain in power. Consent, then, must be manufactured and it must be manufactured in a way that makes such consent seem obvious, necessary and common sense. How this is done is based largely on how language is used to naturalise the inequality of power relations within a society.
Fairclough’s point, then, and how the book ends, is to call for critical language analysis to be taught in schools so that students can see how language is used as an instrument of power in the interests of those in power so as to naturalise certain ways of understanding the world.
A lot of this book, then, presents texts and then shows how the grammatical features of those texts work to construct the reader in particular ways. This isn’t just about an analysis of texts, though. The point is that language is a form of social communication. As such to understand any particular text demands a three level analysis. This analysis begins by viewing the features extant in the text itself – questions such as whether or not agency is being attributed. This is a key idea and so I won’t just pass over it. In English the standard form of a sentence is subject-verb-object – someone does something to someone else. Such a sentence has agency – you can see who did what. But there are other sentences in English which only have verb-object. These sentences, by definition, cannot show agency, since there is no one shown as doing anything. These sentences describe ‘events’ – they tell you stuff happened, but not what caused the event. If you see sentences without subjects – sentences without agency – you should always wonder why you are not being told who brought those events about.
There are, obviously enough, many more grammatical features to texts than just agency, and many of these are discussed throughout the worked examples. However, texts do not stand in isolation. They are meant to communicate, and communication always takes place within particular contexts. To understand a text it is essential to also understand these contexts and what transactions are being made within those contexts and therefore what power relations those contexts are manifesting.
The three levels of interpretation, then, should focus on the content of what is said or done; the relations that the people engaged in the communication have with each other; and the ‘subject positions’ these relations enable or enforce via this exchange. (see page 46)
Okay, so what does all that mean? There is an interesting part of this where a teaching doctor is asking questions of a trainee doctor. Naturally, we need to look at the literal structure of the questions and dialogue to gain an understanding of how this communication is taking place. But the point here is that you really also need to understand the power relationships that are implied, or a lot of this simply will not make sense. In ‘normal’ conversations one person doesn’t get to ask all of the questions or to structure the answers the other person will give in a way outside of the will of that other person. The subject positions of teacher and taught are power relations and their maintenance and coercive force are brought into being in communication – particularly via the use of language. Analysing how those relations become apparent in language is the point of critical discourse analysis and what this book is seeking to explain.
The rest of this review will be a series of quotes from the book. They will give the wrong impression of this book, as I have tended to focus on bits I want to use elsewhere – and, as I’ve said, this book is mostly a series of worked examples, something the quotes which follow do not make clear.
…the exercise of power in modern society, is increasingly achieved through ideology, and more particularly through the ideological workings of language. Page 2
Language is therefore important enough to merit the attention of all citizens. In particular, so far as this book is concerned, nobody who has an interest in modern society, and certainly nobody who has an interest in relationships of power in modern society, can afford to ignore language. Page 3
It is perhaps helpful to make a broad distinction between the exercise of power through coercion of various sorts including physical violence, and the exercise of power through the manufacture of consent to or at least acquiescence towards it. Power relations depend on both, though in varying proportions. Ideology is the prime means of manufacturing consent. Page 3-4
This does not, I hope, mean that I am writing political propaganda. The scientific investigation of social matters is perfectly compatible with committed and ‘opinionated’ investigators (there are no others!), and being committed does not excuse you from arguing rationally or producing evidence for your statements. Page 5
Mainstream linguistics is an asocial way of studying language, which has nothing to say about relationships between language and power and ideology. Page 7
Sociolinguistics is heavily influenced by ‘positivist’ conceptions of social science Page 7
The main weakness of pragmatism from a critical point of view is its individualism: ‘action’ is thought of atomistically as emanating wholly from the individual, and is often conceptualised in terms of the ‘strategies adopted by the individual speaker to achieve her ‘goals’ or ‘intentions’. Page 9
Language is part of society; linguistic phenomena are social phenomena of a special sort, and social phenomena are (in part) linguistic phenomena. Page 23
Politics partly consists in the disputes and struggles which occur in language and over language. Page 23
So, in seeing language as discourse and as social practice, one is committing oneself not just to analysing texts, but to analysing the relationship between texts, processes, and their social conditions, both the immediate conditions of the situational context and the more remote conditions of institutional and social structures. Page 26
But the increasing reliance on control through consent is also perhaps at the root of another, qualitative feature of contemporary discourse: the tendency of the discourse of social control towards simulated egalitarianism, and the removal of surface markers of authority and power. Page 37
Notice that the latter type of constraint is also a form of self-constraint: once a discourse type has been settled upon, its conventions apply to all participants, including the powerful ones. However, this is something of a simplification, because more powerful participants may be able to disallow varying degrees of latitude to less powerful participants. Page 47
Not all photographs are equal: any photograph gives one image of a scene or a person from among the many possible images. The choice is very important, because different images convey different meanings. Page 52
The myth of free speech, that anyone is ‘free’ to say what they like, is an amazingly powerful one, given the actuality of a plethora of constraints on access to various sorts of speech, and writing. Page 63
‘Formality’ is one pervasive and familiar aspect of constraints on access to discourse. Formality is a common property in many societies of practices and discourses of high social prestige and restricted access. It is a contributory factor in keeping access restricted, for it makes demands on participants above and beyond those of most discourse, and the ability to meet those demands is itself unevenly distributed. It can also serve to generate awe among those who are excluded by it and daunted by it. Page 65
A formidable axis is set up between social position and knowledge; since whose in prestigious social positions do learn to operate formally, an easy conclusion for those who don’t is ‘I can’t because I’m not clever enough’ rather than ‘I can’t because I’m working class’. Page 68
Broadly speaking, inculcation is the mechanism of power-holders who wish to preserve their power, while communication is the mechanism of emancipation and the struggle against domination. Page 75
Recall that I suggested in Chapter 2 that ideology be regarded as essentially tied to power relations. Let us correspondingly understand ideological common sense as common sense in the service of sustaining unequal relations of power. Page 84
Texts do not typically spout ideology. They so position the interpreter through their cues that she brings ideologies to the interpretation of texts – and reproduces them in the process! Page 85
‘News’ generally disguises the complex and messy processes of information gathering and interpretation which go into its production, and the role therein of ideologies embedded in the established practices and assumptions which interpreters bring to the process of interpretation. Page 129
Informal conversation between equals has great significance and mobilizing power as an ideal for of social interaction, but its actual occurrence in our class-divided and power-riven society is extremely limited. Where it does occur, its occurrence is itself in need of explanation; it certainly ought not to be taken, as it often is, as a ‘norm’ for interaction in general. Page 134
Any political party or political tendency needs to have a social base, some section or sections of a population whom it can claim to represent and can look to for support; it is commonplace for parties to project this social base onto the whole population, claiming that ‘the people’ have the properties of their own supporters. Page 185
Synthetic personalization simulates solidarity: it seems that the more ‘mass’ the media become, and therefore the less in touch with individuals or particular groupings in their audiences, the more media workers and ‘personalities’ (including politicians) purport to relate to members of their audiences as individuals who share large areas of common ground. Page 195
There seems to be a widespread delusion (or in some cases, an attempt to delude) that if more people were trained in getting jobs, there would be more jobs – or to put it differently, that people’s failure to get jobs is due to their own inadequacies, including for instance their inability to ‘interview well’, rather than to those of the social system. Page 217
I think that in general, synthetic personalization may strengthen the position of the bureaucracy and the state by disguising its instrumental and manipulative relationship – but only so long as people do not see through it! Page 222
Yet as we have seen in this book, language use – discourse – is not just a matter of performing tasks, it is also a matter of expressing and constituting and reproducing social identities and social relations, including crucially relations of power. Page 237