Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism

by Marcel H. Van Herpen

This book offers the first systematic analysis of Putin's two wars, placing the Second Chechen War and the War with Georgia of 2008 in their broader historical contexts. Drawing on extensive original Russian sources, Marcel H. Van Herpen analyzes in detail how Putin's wars were prepared and conducted and why they led to allegations of war crimes and genocide. He shows how the conflicts functioned to consolidate and legitimate Putin's regime and explores how they were connected to a third, hidden, "internal war" waged by the Kremlin against the opposition. The author convincingly argues that the Kremlin--relying on the secret services, the Orthodox Church, the Kremlin youth "Nashi," and the rehabilitated Cossacks--is preparing for an imperial revival, most recently in the form of a "Eurasian Union."An essential book for understanding the dynamics of Putin's regime, this study digs deep into the Kremlin's secret long-term strategies. Readable and clearly argued, it makes a compelling case that Putin's regime emulates an established Russian paradigm in which empire building and despotic rule are mutually reinforcing. As the first comprehensive exploration of the historical antecedents and political continuity of the Kremlin's contemporary policies, Van Herpen's work will make a valuable contribution to the literature on post-Soviet Russia, and his arguments will stimulate vigorous debate.

Genres: Russia, Politics, History, Nonfiction, War, Historical, Military History

296 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 2014

Reviews

[Suzannah Rowntree · Rating 5 out of 5]

Published on the eve of Ukraine's definitive step away from Russia towards Europe in the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, this short, concise, academic study contains a shockingly prescient warning.

If Ukraine were to opt for deeper integration into the European Union, a Georgian scenario could not be excluded, in which the Kremlin could provoke riots in Eastern Ukraine or the Crimea, where many Russian passport holders live. This would offer Russia a pretext for intervening in Ukraine in order “to protect its nationals” and dismember the country. Unfortunately, such a scenario cannot be excluded.

But this book isn't about Ukraine - at least, not until the conclusion, which is when van Herpen predicts that "Everything suggests that Ukraine will be next to bear the brunt of the Russian pressure". Part 1 of the book is a study of Russian imperialism as a historical phenomenon from the times of the tsars up till Vladimir Putin, arguing that for many Russians including the present ruling elite, the country is still by definition an empire. Part 2 tracks the many ways in which Putin has consolidated power in Russia - via the United Russia party and its fake opposition parties, via the Nashi, a tidy new Russian variant of the Hitler Youth, and also via Putin's own Cossack praetorian guard, together with more plays stolen from fascist rulebooks of the past - all under the banner of a resurgent and expansionist Russian nationalism. Finally, Part 3 discusses the Second Chechen War and the 2008 invasion of Georgia in the context of Putin's imperialist ambitions, before going on in the conclusion to predict precisely how and why Putin would next be going after Ukraine. This in fact happened within weeks of the book's publication.

In 1992 Brzezinski warned: “The crucial issue here...is the future stability and independence of Ukraine.” In 2012—twenty years later—in his book Strategic Vision, Brzezinski repeated this warning, writing: “It cannot be stressed enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.”

I read this because I wanted to get up to date on Putin's foreign policy especially as regarded the Chechen and Georgian wars. I wasn't expecting the clear and concise evidence that modern Russia is an aggressive expansionist imperialist state driven by ultranationalist ideology, but the book makes a watertight case. It was the fate of Chechnya, however, that was most heartbreaking. All the terrible things Russia is doing right now in Ukraine to massive international outcry were done first in Chechnya, killing hundreds of thousands of people, wiping out 15-20% of the Chechen population, or approximately 10 civilians to every Chechen figher killed; and the world stayed silent because Putin was able to spin the war as a crusade against Islamist terrorism. Ironically, the acts of terror that enabled Putin to declare war on Chechnya in 1999 may very well have been provocations carried out by the FSB to ensure their man got elected as president.

This books makes an excellent chaser to Catherine Belton's PUTIN'S PEOPLE which adds more to the picture by tracing Putin's early life and rise to power and his use of soft power, as opposed to the wars this book focuses on.

[Kw Estes · Rating 4 out of 5]

While van Herpen did not necessarily convince me that the Kremlin under Putin has a clear and direct goal of reproducing an empire, he does point out clear warning signs of Russia's being an "outlaw" state both domestically and in foreign policy. The case is well made for Putin as a Machivellian, statist, great-power-status seeking leader. Less helpful are the allusions to Putin as a fascist ideologue (though it is never stated quite so clearly, it is oft hinted at by comparisons between Russia's leader and the likes of Hitler, Mussolini, and Pol Pot.) The organization of groups such as "Nashi" are, to my mind, better conceived of as a means of keeping a potentially threatening domestic force in Russia--that is, Russian nationalism--under the control of the "power vertical," and not letting it go rogue in the form of, say, Aleksandr Navalny. If there is one key lesson from this book, it is that we should not necessarily pay all that much attention to what Putin or other leaders say, as much as we should try to anticipate patterns of actions.

[Rapp · Rating 4 out of 5]

On February 27, Marcel H. Van Herpen published Putin's Wars, in which he warned that "the Kremlin could provoke riots in Eastern Ukraine or the Crimea ... to offer a pretext voor intervening in Ukraine in order 'to protect its nationals' and dismember the country." This warning proved extraordinarily prescient for that very day armed units seized control of the parliamentary building in Simferopol. Shortly thereafter, Russia succeeded in annexing the entire peninsula. Later in the spring and summer of 2014, Russian soldiers and Russian-supported rebels engaged in wide-scale fighting in eastern Ukraine.

In Putin's Wars, Van Herpen contrasts Russia with other post-imperial nations and argues that Russia is a case apart. Whereas other powers let their empires dissolve, during the course of the 20th century, the Soviet Union did not. Though the Soviets eschewed the capitalist imperialism, they actually rebuilt the tsarist empire, albeit under Marxist-Leninist terminology.

After the dissolution of the USSR, Russia faced the choice whether to pursue closer relation with the European Union/the West or to build an opposing alliances. Van Herpen points to the year 1997 as the year of change. In this year, Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations with NATO, but also the Union Treaty with Belarus. The Russian Eagle was looking both East and West, but the Putin has led Russia away from the West. First under Yeltsin in his position within the KGB and as Prime Minister, and even further after he assumed the Presidency. Van Herpen compares Putin to Soviet premier Yuri Andropov, who ascended to become General Secretary through the KGB apparat. According to Van Herpen, Andropov planned the Soviet War in Afghanistan from the KGB office before he became General Secretary, and Putin did the same with the Chechen wars.

This book is a good introduction to post-Soviet Russian politics and foreign policy. An entire section of the book is devoted to Kremlin attempts to coopt the political system through fake parties and youth groups such as Nashi. Two sections of the book are devoted respectively to an analysis of the Wars in Chechnya and Georgia. Van Herpen proves that the Kremlin planned these wars long in advance to restore the disintegrated Russian empire. Van Herpen emphasizes that Russia seems more intent on building a Slavic nation than necessarily rebuilding the empire in Central Asia. The recent events in Ukraine are perhaps confirmation.

One lesson the West should certainly learn from this book is not to underestimate Putin's Russia. Considering the crimes against humanity committed in Chechnya and Georgia (and crimes against the Russian people themselves, such as the apartment bombings in Moscow, leading up to Chechnya), there is little this regime wouldn't do to preserve and expand power.

[Anna · Rating 5 out of 5]

"If Ukraine were to opt for deeper integration into the European Union, a Georgian scenario could not be excluded, in which the Kremlin could provoke riots in Eastern Ukraine or the Crimea, where many Russian passport holders live. This would offer Russia a pretext for intervening in Ukraine in order to "protect its nationals" and dismember the country."

Tyjo! Nezbytná knížka pro sledování dění na Ukrajině a ve světě obecně. Mrazivý. Jak se asi usíná Estoncům?

[Dmitry · Rating 2 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

Жаль, подмога не пришла, подкрепленье не прислали.
Нас осталось только два, нас с тобою на***ли.
Все братушки полегли и с патронами напряжно,
Но мы держим рубежи, мы сражаемся отважно!

Пушка сдохла - все, п****ц, больше нечем отбиваться!
Что ж, закурим, брат-боец, нам от смерти не съ***т*ся!
Жаль, подмога не пришла, подкрепленье не прислали.
Что ж, обычные дела - нас с тобою на***ли

С моей точки зрения, автор не понял ни Путина, ни России.
Название книги очень громкое и многообещающее. Казалось, книга обещает вскрыть что-то невообразимо важное и интересное по вопросу постсоветской России. Возможно, какой-то анализ ситуации и интересный прогноз на будущее. Сама фраза - «войны Путина» - звучит пугающе, угрожающе, а возможно даже для кого-то, оскорбительно (ведь «Россия не начинает войн – она их заканчивает», как гласит пропагандистский лозунг). В любом случаи, книга найдёт своего читателя, не привыкшего думать вне рамок предлагаемой автором парадигмы. Однако, не смотря на очень доходчивое объяснение, многие факты, которые не вписываются в созданную автором картину мира, просто не упоминает. Таким образом, у нас получилась Россия, какой её видит автор этой книги, но не какой она является в действительности.

Нет, я не хочу сказать, что автор не прав, упоминая все три войны, которая вела путинская Россия (Чечня, Грузия, Украина). Всё это имело место и все они несправедливы и ошибочны. Но сначала пару слов о стиле написания книги. Если давать наиболее точное описание этому произведению, то это дайджест по всем военным конфликтам (войнам), что вела Россия за последние 20+ лет. Плюс, все антизападные заявления/действия, что имели место в России, как например речь Путина в Мюнхене (Мюнхенская речь). Другими словами, перед нами хорошо задокументированный сборник агрессивных действий и деклараций России за последние 20+ лет. Для тех, кто не следил за новостями по данному вопросу и ничего не знает о событиях, происходивших в Чечне, Грузии и в Украине, эта книга даст общее представление. К сожалению, так как книга написана в стиле газетной статьи, тут трудно понять, насколько источники автора заслуживают доверия. В принципе, я не увидел каких-то особо ярких перегибов. Кроме одного.

Итак, как я понял, суть книги: показать читателю, что Россия, с началом правления Путина, вернулась к практике проведения агрессивной имперской политики. Ну, звучит это красиво, да. Проблема только в том, что это мало имеет отношение к реальности, даже с учётом происходящих событий в 2022 году на Украине. Я бы даже сказал, что именно по событиям в Украине, начиная с конца февраля 2022 года, мы можем сделать заключение, что вывод автора, касательно имперской или захватнической политики России, неверен. Сегодня Россию часто представляют как аналог Германии 30-х годов, однако данная аналогия не находит подтверждения в главном – военном потенциале. Как мы помним из истории, Гитлер к началу войны построил не только абсолютно тоталитарный режим (включая милитаризированное общество), но и чуть ли не с нуля ВПК. Оснащение армии было на очень высоком уровне, ибо Германия готовилась к полномасштабной захватнической войне. Видим ли мы то же самое в нынешней России? Нет, не видим. Общество в России не является ни милитаризированным (за все три месяца я увидел лишь одну Z), ни живущим под жёстким тоталитаризмом (хотя диктатура присутствует). Что касается военного потенциала России, то уже сейчас видно что «вторая армия мира» вся сверху донизу была разворована. Могла ли в Германии 30-х существовать такая коррупция? Разумеется, нет, ибо Германия готовилась к войне, Россия же готовилась к спецоперации. Кстати именно поэтому корректней было бы говорить не о войне, а о спецоперации методом войны. Тут нужно понимать (именно поэтому я и написал, что автор не понял Путина), что вся деятельность Путина на посту президента РФ, это сплошная спецоперация, начиная с выборов в 1999 (2000) и заканчивая нынешней ситуаций между Россией и Украиной. Так что да, правы те люди, что говорят, что Путин ведёт спецоперацию, а не войну. И добавляют, что для самой Украины важно, чтобы спецоперация не превратилась в настоящую войну (уж не знаю, на что они намекают: на ядерное оружие или на всеобщую мобилизацию, которая может дать Путину 10 миллионов солдат). В любом случаи, мы видим попытки Путина провернуть ещё одну спецоперацию, чтобы в итоге сказать народу России и всему миру: «Как я вас всех обвёл вокруг пальца!». Наиболее ярко мы наблюдали это на примере Крыма в 2014, т.е. когда Путин сначала говорил, что никаких российских солдат там нет, а после того, как стало понятно, что спецоперация прошла успешно, он, не моргнув глазом, объявил, что с самого начала именно он контролировал эту спецоперацию, т.е. что он единственный кто отвечал и за планирование и за реализацию и за успех (т.е. награду). И вот так, по всем вопросам, которыми занимался Путин. Путин никогда не участвует в чём-то, что имеет отрицательные коннотации, т.е. неуспех. Он всегда должен купаться в лучах успеха, будь то спортивные победы Российской сборной, открытие нового предприятия/производства или встреча на высшем уровне глав мировых государств. Северный поток 2, это тоже спецоперация.

Так, а что же пишет автор? А автор ничего про это не пишет. Автор просто переписывает те статьи, которые появлялись в то время. Другими словами, автор пишет не то, что реально происходило, а то, что было на поверхности и о чём писали СМИ. Это не анализ, а пересказ. К примеру, если политика России уже изначально была имперская/захватническая, то почему Россия не оккупировала Украину, когда был наиболее благоприятный для этого момент, т.е. в 2014 году? Так как книга была издана в 2014, но до начала конфликта, автор об этом не пишет. Но мы-то можем сейчас этот вопрос задать, правда? Во-вторых, если Россия все эти двадцать лет готовилась к реваншу, то почему её армия находится в таком состоянии? Почему всё разворовано? Нет ответа? Единственно правильный ответ дал Алексей Навальный в своей очень точной характеристике В. В. Путину – потому что (он) вор. И вот с этой позиции всё становится ясно.

Путинский режим не пытается быть ни имперским, ни советским. Путину чужда и имперская Россия и Советский Союз. Путин не пытается построить ни царскую Россию, ни восстановить Советский Союз. Всё что делает Путин, это пытается остаться у власти, проводя спецоперации. А также публично заявляя то, что общество хочет услышать (вот почему в России такая гремучая смесь царизма и советизма). Вот как политики на Украине 30 лет морочат голову гражданам, что «ещё чуть-чуть и нас примут в Европу», так и в России вся деятельность Путина и Ко направлена именно на то же самое, с тем отличием, что вместо Европы - «угроза НАТО», «плохие украинцы», «опасный Азов» и «Россия в кольце врагов».

From my point of view, the author did not understand both Putin and Russia.
The title of the book is very catchy and promising. The book seemed to promise to uncover something unimaginably important, and interesting about the issue of post-Soviet Russia. Perhaps some analysis of the situation and an interesting forecast for the future. The very phrase "Putin's wars," sounds frightening, threatening, and, perhaps, even insulting to some (after all, "Russia does not start wars-it ends them," as the propaganda slogan says). In any case, the book will find a reader who is not accustomed to thinking outside the paradigm offered by the author. However, despite the very lucid explanation, many facts that do not fit into the picture of the world created by the author, simply do not mention. Thus, we have Russia as the author of this book sees it, but not as it really is.

No, I don't mean to say that the author is wrong in mentioning all three wars that Putin's Russia has fought (Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine). All of these have taken place, and they are unfair and wrong. But first, a few words about the writing style of the book. The most accurate description of this work is that it is a digest of all the military conflicts (wars) that Russia has fought over the last 20+ years. Plus, all the anti-Western statements/actions that have taken place in Russia, such as Putin's Munich speech. In other words, this is a well-documented compilation of Russia's aggressive actions and declarations over the past 20+ years. For those who have not been following the news on this issue and know nothing about the events in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine, this book will give a general overview. Unfortunately, since the book is written in the style of a newspaper article, it is difficult to know whether the author's sources are credible. In principle, I did not see any particularly vivid biases. Except for one.

So, as I understand it, the point of the book: is to show the reader that Russia, with the beginning of Putin's rule, has returned to the practice of aggressive imperial policies. Well, it sounds beautiful, yes. The only problem is that it has little to do with reality, even with the events of 2022 in Ukraine. I would even say that it is by the events in Ukraine since the end of February 2022 that we can conclude that the author's conclusion regarding Russia's imperial or invading policy is incorrect. Today, Russia is often presented as an analogue of Germany in the 1930s, but this analogy is not supported by the main thing: its military potential. As we remember from history, Hitler had built not only an absolutely totalitarian regime (including a militarized society) but, also, an almost from the scratch military-industrial complex by the beginning of the war. The equipment of the army was at a very high level as Germany was preparing for a full-scale war of conquest. Do we see the same in today's Russia? No, we do not. Society in Russia is neither militarized (in all three months I have seen only one Z) nor living under rigid totalitarianism (although dictatorship is present). As for Russia's military potential, we can already see that the "second world army" has been stolen from top to bottom. Could such corruption have existed in Germany in the 1930s? Of course not, because Germany was preparing for war while Russia was preparing for a special operation. That is why it would be more correct to speak not about war but about a special operation by the method of war. It is necessary to understand that all of Putin's activity as President of Russia is a continuous special operation, beginning with the elections in 1999 (2000) and ending with the current situation between Russia and Ukraine (which is why I wrote that the author did not understand Putin). So yes, the people who say that Putin is conducting a special operation, not a war, are right. And they add that it is important for Ukraine itself that the special operation does not turn into a real war (I don't know whether they're referring to nuclear weapons or a general mobilization that could give Putin 10 million soldiers). In any case, we see Putin trying to pull off yet another special operation to end up telling the people of Russia and the world, "How I fooled you all!" We saw this most clearly in Crimea in 2014, i.e., when Putin first said that there were no Russian soldiers there and after it became clear that the special operation was successful, he announced without blinking an eye that from the very beginning he was in control of this special operation, i.e., that he was the one who was responsible for both planning and implementation and success (i.e., reward). And just like that, on all the issues that Putin was involved in. Putin never participates in anything that has negative connotations, i.e., failure. He should always be bathed in the rays of success, be it sports victories of the Russian team, the opening of a new enterprise/production, or a summit of the world's leaders. Nord Stream 2 is also a special operation.

So, what does the author write? The author doesn't write anything about it. The author simply rewrites the articles that were appearing at the time. In other words, the author writes not what really happened but what was on the surface and what the media wrote about. It is not an analysis but a retelling. For example, if Russia's policy was already imperial/invasive from the beginning, why didn't Russia occupy Ukraine when the moment was most favorable for it, i.e., in 2014? Since the book was published in 2014, but before the conflict started, the author does not write about it. But we can ask this question now, can't we? Secondly, if Russia has been preparing for revenge all these twenty years, why is its army in such a state? Why has everything been stolen? No answer? The only correct answer was given by Alexei Navalny in his very accurate characterization of Vladimir Putin - because (he) is a thief. And from this position everything becomes clear. Putin's regime is not trying to be either imperial or Soviet. Both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union are alien to Putin. Putin is not trying to build a Tsarist Russia or the Soviet Union. All Putin is doing is trying to stay in power by conducting special operations. And also by publicly stating what the society wants to hear (which is why Russia has such a rattling mix of Czarism and Sovietism). Just like the politicians in Ukraine have been bamboozling the citizens for 30 years that "in a little while we will be accepted into Europe", in Russia all the activities of Putin and Co. are aimed at the same thing, with the difference that instead of Europe - "NATO threat", "bad Ukrainians", "dangerous Azov" and "Russia in a ring of enemies".

[Lúcás de Hóra Ó Huaithnín · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was on my list for a while and ironically it was the Russian invasion of Ukraine which made me decide to listen to it.

Hindsight is 20/20 and all of that, but it’s clear to see from how Russia/Putin handled Chechnya and Georgia that he was never going to settle for an independent Ukraine.

I knew the way innocent civilians were treated during both of those wars was bad, but I never realised the extent of what they endured, it’s truly horrific and while Putin and many of his top brass deserve to be tried for war crimes in Ukraine, the victims in Chechnya and Georgia shouldn’t be forgotten and also deserve justice.

This was published right before the illegal annexation of Crimea, but eerily lays out how the events would unfold, with Russia/Putin claiming that there were Russians in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea who needed to be protected.

Overall a very interesting read which helps to explain at least some of the twisted logic behind why Putin does what he does.

[Jan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Marcel H. Van Herpen is a security expert specializing in Russia, Eastern Europe, and the post-Soviet states. In this volume he provides a thorough, crisp and unequivocal analysis of how the current regime in Russia is unflinchingly neo-imperialist. With a slight shudder the reader recognises how careful analysis, planning, learning from history and clearly stated longterm ambitions combined with a shrewd sense of exploiting the Western attention deficit disorder by intelligent disuse of disinformation provides a solid linkage between Chechnya 199-2009, Georgia 2008, Ukraine 2014 - and perhaps the Baltics 201x?

Read, reflect an react.

[Sasha Klymchuk · Rating 4 out of 5]

9/10 If the west does not stabilize the east, the east will destabilize the west.

[Scott · Rating 3 out of 5]

This workman-like book about recent Russian history helped me put into context another book that I have been reading: A Small Corner of Hell.

[Andrew Barkett · Rating 3 out of 5]

Much more academic than many of the books I've read about Russia recently, this one was basically a "sociological context of Putin's wars."

[PJ Jelének]

Ruský imperialismus, od jeho historických kořenů až po současné projevy. Autor zkoumá, jak se Rusko vypořádalo s postimperiální transformací po rozpadu Sovětského svazu a jak se za vlády Vladimira Putina znovu probudily jeho imperiální ambice. Kniha srovnává západní a ruské legitimační teorie impéria, přičemž se vrací k osvícenské kritice ruského despotismu. Analyzuje domácí mechanismy kontroly a propagandy, včetně zmanipulovaných voleb a vlivu mládežnických organizací typu Nashi. Současně poukazuje na kritiku ruských útoků v Čečensku a Gruzii a na snahy o sjednocení s bývalými sovětskými republikami. Van Herpen argumentuje, že Rusko historicky tíhne k územní expanzi a autokratické vládě, což se plně projevuje v Putinově současné domácí i zahraniční politice. Mezi klíčová témata patří Putinův "velkolepý plán" na obnovu sféry vlivu podobné SSSR, militarizace společnosti, využívání ultranacionalistických ideologií, manipulace se sousedními státy (zejména Ukrajinou a Gruzií) a strategické zneužívání mezinárodních organizací k dosažení geopolitických cílů.

[Rod Innis · Rating 4 out of 5]

Despite the difficulty of getting all the names of people and places straight, this book is very informative. I used online maps quite a bit to clarify where all the places mentioned are in relation to Russia. It certainly gives a negative view of Russia's expansion goals and paints a very negative view of Putin. This book was written in 2014, long before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine but it certainly points to the almost certainty of it happening. We are seeing Putin's disinformation campaign in the present conflict. This books show that this campaign has been going on for many years and has been
perfected by Vladimir Putin.

[Richard Hogg · Rating 5 out of 5]

The audiobook version is free with an Audible subscription so I gave it a go!! If ever there was a book that aged well it’s this one…no idea who the author is but full credit. The warning signs were there, the pretext and the implementation eventually came and here we are today!! But is THIS the end of imperialist Russia? I’d be interested to hear from the author again.

[Irina · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well that ended with an ominous chapter predicting exactly the kinds of horrors we are currently seeing in Ukraine. Chilling and infuriating to realise people were warning about this exact possible outcome almost a decade ago… and the West ignored it.

[Allen Edwards · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting book, does go off topic at bit times however does give a interesting look into the Chechen War and the links Chechen terrorism and Kremlin cover ups. Given the current crisis in Ukraine, this book gives a very accurate prediction given the time this book was published!

[GreyAtlas · Rating 3 out of 5]

Well organized though opinionated as anti-Russia. Didn't really add anything new to the conversation but a good start for beginner readers.

[Omar Al-Azzawi · Rating 4 out of 5]

A great book...

[Abhishek Kumar · Rating 2 out of 5]

Can't articulate the specific reason, just don't feel more aware or entertained (in the writing style sense of things)... after this.

[Mike · Rating 3 out of 5]

Quite a useful primer and contextualiser for Putin era Russian foreign policy. Could have done with a little more explanation of the precise objectives of these policies Van Herpen's theories are plausible but occassionally fall back on 'Russia is a historically, and therefore inherently, expansionist state' as my knowledge is insufficient to fill in the blanks. Still, a useful start to further explorations.

[Grant · Rating 5 out of 5]

Van Herpen must have a crystal ball, having accurately predicted Putin's moves into Ukraine. His poly sci-flavored history of Russia's efforts to reclaim the power and influence it lost with the fall of the USSR is insightful and highly readable.

[Valters Bondars · Rating 4 out of 5]

8/10