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Ulysses S. Grant: A Victor Not a Butcher
Ulysses S. Grant is often accused of being a cold–hearted butcher of his troops. In Ulysses S. Grant: A Victor, Not a Butcher, historian Edward H. Bonekemper III proves that Grant’s casualty rates actually compared favorably with those of other Civil War generals. His perseverance, decisiveness, moral courage, and political acumen place him among the greatest generals of the Civil War—indeed, of all military history. Bonekemper proves that it was no historical accident that Grant accepted the surrender of three entire Confederate armies and won the Civil War. Bonekemper ably silences Grant’s critics and restores Grant to the heroic reputation he so richly deserves.
464 pages, Paperback
First published April 1, 2004
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January 5, 2016
Edward H. Bonekemper III is moving rapidly to fill the role of Ulysses S. Grant’s chief academic defender, attempting to reverse what he views as decades of ill-treatment at the hands of “lost cause” revisionists and the apathetic historians that have accepted their version of Grant’s military acumen a priori. There is truth in this. There is no doubt Grant’s reputation has suffered since his death in 1885. Southern historians, needing to explain away the defeat of their hero and exemplar of Southern rectitude, Robert E. Lee in a way that did not signal an acceptance of the notion he was incompetent or out-generaled, began coordinated effort to cast aspersions on his military record. Thus was born the description of Grant as “butcher” and “drunk,” and the assertion his victories were only due to the application of brute force rather than tactical skill. Conversely, the man Grant defeated has been canonized, his victories celebrated as genius, his defeats blamed on subordinates or poor circumstances. An example of this bias until recently, was the way monuments to each were cared for by the National Park Service. Lee’s home at Arlington has been lovingly cared for, including a recently completed 6 year restoration. Ditto the hundreds of statues and historic sites related to Lee throughout the South, especially Virginia. By contrast, Grant’s tomb in New York City and his massive equestrian statue on the grounds of the United States Capital had, until recently, been allowed to deteriorate, with the former becoming a magnet for graffiti artists and the homeless looking for a place to sleep. It took a threat by Grant descendants to have his body moved to Ohio to get the Park Service to undertake a restoration. Other examples abound, including his treatment in popular culture and histories focusing on other topics in which Grant is a minor player. Rather than look at recent scholarship it is easier just to accept long held conventional wisdom.
It is not hard than, to sympathize with Bonekemper’s view that Grant has been given short shrift by historians and the public. And frankly, I share it.
On the other hand, by so specifically aligning himself with a specific version of history, Bonekemper runs the risk of criticism for lack of objectivity, and that those inclined to an opposite view of Grant will use it to dismiss his valid points. It’s why the word “hagiography” is often used disparagingly by historians. This book is hagiography. He also runs the risk of applying his bias to an interpretation of evidence that is not warranted. This is always a danger for historians, but for those more committed to arriving at a fair interpretation of the facts it is something that is more scrupulously guarded against. Having said all of that however, and having studied Grant’s career rather extensively, I didn’t see any glaringly obvious bias in the information presented.
The goal of this book is very simple, to refute the charge, first given voice by “lost cause” apologists and later incorporated into mainstream histories, that Ulysses S. Grant was a “butcher of men,” that his disregard for human life was such that he was willing to sacrifice his men in a series of incompetent attacks knowing he had an almost unlimited ability to replace them. This also implied that Grant’s abilities as a military tactician were limited at best, particularly when compared with those of Robert E. Lee. Here Bonekemper does a good job of marshaling statistics to refute that contention.
He argues, pretty convincingly, that Grant was far from being the butcher portrayed by detractors. Rather, he was actually a skilled tactician and strategist who deployed his troops wisely and judiciously. Grant always had in mind the dual goal of minimizing casualties while maximizing damage to the enemy. He recognized, as his predecessors did not, that winning the war was the fastest way to end the carnage, and that this would require relentless and nearly non-stop attacks against an often entrenched enemy. Previous opponents of Lee viewed defeat in battle as an opportunity to retreat and regroup. Grant viewed them as temporary setbacks and an opportunity to learn from hard experience.
Here the author highlights two data points to make his case. First, throughout the war Grant lost 37,000 fewer men than did Robert E. Lee. During the period when Grant and Lee were in direct competition Grant lost more men, but a smaller percentage of those engaged. He accomplished this while being on the offensive nearly the entire time. Second, during the period encompassing Grant’s appointment as General-in-Chief through to Lee’s surrender at Appomattox about a year later, the Union Army of the Potomac , fighting on the offensive for nearly that entire period, suffered fewer casualties than under all of its previous commanders combined, a statistic that, in Bonekemper’s view, not only vindicates Grant’s tactical and strategic skill, but also absolves him of the “butcher” sobriquet. I tend to agree with this. In fact, he argues by the standard applied to Grant by his detractors Lee deserves the butcher label far more than Grant does. He does not apply that standard however, believing the well-being of the troops was a priority of both Lee and Grant. He just argues that Grant was the superior General. Another view I am persuaded best fits the evidence.
This in a nutshell is Bonekemper’s argument. The rest of the book is a largely perfunctory and admiring biography of Grant.
This work is well written, and at times engrossing. The author’s admiration for Grant is clear, which in many ways is refreshing after so many decades of revisionist Grant bashing. His research and citation appears impeccable, although the reliability of casualty figures, particularly of Confederate forces, is often sketchy. Despite this however, he appears to be using up to date analysis on which he bases a very plausible interpretation. Where I had some trouble, as I mentioned earlier, was with the blatant hagiographic impulse he admitted to at the beginning of the book. Refreshing as this interpretation of Grant’s career is, for those whose bias is the opposite it gives a ready made reason to discount the solid analysis contained in it. He also takes great pains to assert the most charitable interpretation of some of Grants’s less admirable actions. This too provides an opening to discount the entire work.
For its direct refutation of misinformation regarding Grant’s military career this is well worth reading. As a biography of Grant it is perfunctory at best. There are numerous better options available.
It is not hard than, to sympathize with Bonekemper’s view that Grant has been given short shrift by historians and the public. And frankly, I share it.
On the other hand, by so specifically aligning himself with a specific version of history, Bonekemper runs the risk of criticism for lack of objectivity, and that those inclined to an opposite view of Grant will use it to dismiss his valid points. It’s why the word “hagiography” is often used disparagingly by historians. This book is hagiography. He also runs the risk of applying his bias to an interpretation of evidence that is not warranted. This is always a danger for historians, but for those more committed to arriving at a fair interpretation of the facts it is something that is more scrupulously guarded against. Having said all of that however, and having studied Grant’s career rather extensively, I didn’t see any glaringly obvious bias in the information presented.
The goal of this book is very simple, to refute the charge, first given voice by “lost cause” apologists and later incorporated into mainstream histories, that Ulysses S. Grant was a “butcher of men,” that his disregard for human life was such that he was willing to sacrifice his men in a series of incompetent attacks knowing he had an almost unlimited ability to replace them. This also implied that Grant’s abilities as a military tactician were limited at best, particularly when compared with those of Robert E. Lee. Here Bonekemper does a good job of marshaling statistics to refute that contention.
He argues, pretty convincingly, that Grant was far from being the butcher portrayed by detractors. Rather, he was actually a skilled tactician and strategist who deployed his troops wisely and judiciously. Grant always had in mind the dual goal of minimizing casualties while maximizing damage to the enemy. He recognized, as his predecessors did not, that winning the war was the fastest way to end the carnage, and that this would require relentless and nearly non-stop attacks against an often entrenched enemy. Previous opponents of Lee viewed defeat in battle as an opportunity to retreat and regroup. Grant viewed them as temporary setbacks and an opportunity to learn from hard experience.
Here the author highlights two data points to make his case. First, throughout the war Grant lost 37,000 fewer men than did Robert E. Lee. During the period when Grant and Lee were in direct competition Grant lost more men, but a smaller percentage of those engaged. He accomplished this while being on the offensive nearly the entire time. Second, during the period encompassing Grant’s appointment as General-in-Chief through to Lee’s surrender at Appomattox about a year later, the Union Army of the Potomac , fighting on the offensive for nearly that entire period, suffered fewer casualties than under all of its previous commanders combined, a statistic that, in Bonekemper’s view, not only vindicates Grant’s tactical and strategic skill, but also absolves him of the “butcher” sobriquet. I tend to agree with this. In fact, he argues by the standard applied to Grant by his detractors Lee deserves the butcher label far more than Grant does. He does not apply that standard however, believing the well-being of the troops was a priority of both Lee and Grant. He just argues that Grant was the superior General. Another view I am persuaded best fits the evidence.
This in a nutshell is Bonekemper’s argument. The rest of the book is a largely perfunctory and admiring biography of Grant.
This work is well written, and at times engrossing. The author’s admiration for Grant is clear, which in many ways is refreshing after so many decades of revisionist Grant bashing. His research and citation appears impeccable, although the reliability of casualty figures, particularly of Confederate forces, is often sketchy. Despite this however, he appears to be using up to date analysis on which he bases a very plausible interpretation. Where I had some trouble, as I mentioned earlier, was with the blatant hagiographic impulse he admitted to at the beginning of the book. Refreshing as this interpretation of Grant’s career is, for those whose bias is the opposite it gives a ready made reason to discount the solid analysis contained in it. He also takes great pains to assert the most charitable interpretation of some of Grants’s less admirable actions. This too provides an opening to discount the entire work.
For its direct refutation of misinformation regarding Grant’s military career this is well worth reading. As a biography of Grant it is perfunctory at best. There are numerous better options available.
January 16, 2022
With this effort, the author disputes Grant's reputation as a "butcher" and attempts to set the record straight as to Lee's true fighting prowess. I found the book to be very engaging,and it held my attention well. My only complaint is that the author didn't really focus on the impact of Grant's reputation throughout history in comparison to Lee. Otherwise, it was a very good effort.
April 15, 2013
This is good, solid answer to the flawed "Myth of the Lost Cause" historiography that often treats Grant as if he were a poor general, or at least second fiddle to Robert E. Lee. It makes a clear case that Grant was a skilled general who accomplished much with limited bloodshed, learned quickly from his mistakes and had a clear strategic vision for how to defeat the South. It's a decent read, and good tonic against bad history.
March 26, 2021
Ulysses S. Grant is one of those historical figures whose reputation has risen and fallen over time: Grant the hero, Grant the savior of the nation, Grant the drunk, Grant the butcher who only won because he had superior numbers and resources with which to overwhelm his enemies. “A Victor, Not A Butcher” is the counter to that last characterization. Author Edward H. Bonekemper uses facts, figures and persuasion to make his case that Grant’s victories were result of his superior generalship, rather than merely overwhelming resources which were not there as often as is generally presumed.
Devoting only a dozen pages to Grant’s early and none to his post-war life, these pages concentrate on making the case that Grant was, as the preface proclaims “The Greatest Civil War General”. Following the tide of war, Bonekemper analyzes the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson and Grant’s role in salvaging victory at Shiloh and the Vicksburg Campaign. With transfer to the East, he is proclaimed as having saved Chattanooga and planned a national campaign that had been lacking before Grant was given overall command. In the chapters dealing with the relentless attacks of 1864-1865 that wore down Lee’s army, casualties are presented as having been the price of victory, rather than having been endured for the sake of inconclusive stalemate as had been the case with his predecessors. The final chapter explores Grant’s winning characteristics. Three appendices assess historians’ treatment of Grant, the casualties in his battles and campaigns and the closeness of the 1864 presidential election and the impact of Grant’s victories on it. The eleven pages of pictures of generals mentioned in the text and war scenes add visual aids. The notes and bibliography provide helpful guides to further reading.
Bonekemper presents his arguments with the logical intensity of a legal brief, reciting the facts and presenting his arguments. The appendix on losses compares Union and Confederate figures battle by battle, with a few estimates from other sources and then Bonekemper’s “Best Estimate”.
I found the arguments to be convincing. I had never been confronted with specific comparisons of the numbers of troops involved and the casualties on both sides which support the author’s conclusion that, in contrast to what is generally believed Grant was actually more protective of his men’s lives than Lee. I had known that Lincoln’s popular vote win in 1864 was substantial, but did not realize that there were enough close states to have tipped the Electoral College in McClellan’s favor with a relatively shift in public opinion.
This book is well researched and written. I recommend it to readers interested in examining facts and looking for a critical analysis of one of the enduring myths of the Civil War.
Devoting only a dozen pages to Grant’s early and none to his post-war life, these pages concentrate on making the case that Grant was, as the preface proclaims “The Greatest Civil War General”. Following the tide of war, Bonekemper analyzes the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson and Grant’s role in salvaging victory at Shiloh and the Vicksburg Campaign. With transfer to the East, he is proclaimed as having saved Chattanooga and planned a national campaign that had been lacking before Grant was given overall command. In the chapters dealing with the relentless attacks of 1864-1865 that wore down Lee’s army, casualties are presented as having been the price of victory, rather than having been endured for the sake of inconclusive stalemate as had been the case with his predecessors. The final chapter explores Grant’s winning characteristics. Three appendices assess historians’ treatment of Grant, the casualties in his battles and campaigns and the closeness of the 1864 presidential election and the impact of Grant’s victories on it. The eleven pages of pictures of generals mentioned in the text and war scenes add visual aids. The notes and bibliography provide helpful guides to further reading.
Bonekemper presents his arguments with the logical intensity of a legal brief, reciting the facts and presenting his arguments. The appendix on losses compares Union and Confederate figures battle by battle, with a few estimates from other sources and then Bonekemper’s “Best Estimate”.
I found the arguments to be convincing. I had never been confronted with specific comparisons of the numbers of troops involved and the casualties on both sides which support the author’s conclusion that, in contrast to what is generally believed Grant was actually more protective of his men’s lives than Lee. I had known that Lincoln’s popular vote win in 1864 was substantial, but did not realize that there were enough close states to have tipped the Electoral College in McClellan’s favor with a relatively shift in public opinion.
This book is well researched and written. I recommend it to readers interested in examining facts and looking for a critical analysis of one of the enduring myths of the Civil War.
December 25, 2020
Originally published in 2010.
Re-published in 2017 by Regnery History.
Do you remember back in school when you would get a topic to argue for in an essay? That's pretty much what this book is. The topic is "Grant has the reputation for wasting his men in useless attacks. Is Grant's reputation as a butcher justified?"
This book might be mistaken as a biography of Grant, but it is not. What it is is a fantastic defense of Grant's record in the Civil War.
Bonekemper was a federal government regulatory attorney for 34 years before he started writing books, delivering lectures, hosting discussions and teaching classes on the Civil War as a second career after he had retired. All that practice of 34 years of digging through books and digging through stats and regulations shines through this book.
You would think that what I just described is a boring book, but it is well-written and flows smoothly from one campaign to the next. Very readable.
Bonekemper digs through all of the stats and shows that Grant consistently inflicted a greater percentage of losses than he suffered. Only 4 armies surrendered during the Civil War. Sherman took one. Grant took the other 3 - in 1862, 1863 and 1865. Grant has a reputation of being a hard charger that just made his men charge headlong into the enemy. But, if you just look at the Vicksburg campaign you hardly see any headlong charges (sadly, they happened in every theater under every commander because they were sometimes very effective) and you do see a lot of different, creative strategies that resulted in an entire army surrendering and a second army defeated, retreating and its commander removed.
Grant gets a bad rap for his time as the commander against Lee (May 1864-April 1865). The Army of the Potomac suffered more losses from all of the previous commanders combined than under Grant and were no closer to beating Lee then when they started. Grant had more losses per day, but he finished it.
To be honest, I am surprised that Regnery History publishes Bonekemper's books. They usually feature a lot of books that go wholeheartedly with the "Lost Cause" tradition of Douglas Southall Freeman and Bonekemper's certainly do not. But, I am not going to look a gift horse in the mouth. I am just glad they're being published.
Re-published in 2017 by Regnery History.
Do you remember back in school when you would get a topic to argue for in an essay? That's pretty much what this book is. The topic is "Grant has the reputation for wasting his men in useless attacks. Is Grant's reputation as a butcher justified?"
This book might be mistaken as a biography of Grant, but it is not. What it is is a fantastic defense of Grant's record in the Civil War.
Bonekemper was a federal government regulatory attorney for 34 years before he started writing books, delivering lectures, hosting discussions and teaching classes on the Civil War as a second career after he had retired. All that practice of 34 years of digging through books and digging through stats and regulations shines through this book.
You would think that what I just described is a boring book, but it is well-written and flows smoothly from one campaign to the next. Very readable.
Bonekemper digs through all of the stats and shows that Grant consistently inflicted a greater percentage of losses than he suffered. Only 4 armies surrendered during the Civil War. Sherman took one. Grant took the other 3 - in 1862, 1863 and 1865. Grant has a reputation of being a hard charger that just made his men charge headlong into the enemy. But, if you just look at the Vicksburg campaign you hardly see any headlong charges (sadly, they happened in every theater under every commander because they were sometimes very effective) and you do see a lot of different, creative strategies that resulted in an entire army surrendering and a second army defeated, retreating and its commander removed.
Grant gets a bad rap for his time as the commander against Lee (May 1864-April 1865). The Army of the Potomac suffered more losses from all of the previous commanders combined than under Grant and were no closer to beating Lee then when they started. Grant had more losses per day, but he finished it.
To be honest, I am surprised that Regnery History publishes Bonekemper's books. They usually feature a lot of books that go wholeheartedly with the "Lost Cause" tradition of Douglas Southall Freeman and Bonekemper's certainly do not. But, I am not going to look a gift horse in the mouth. I am just glad they're being published.
Read
December 30, 2016I have been fascinated with Grant for a long time, so I launched into this book already knowing quite a lot about him and his career. But this book gave me a new, and necessary, perspective about him, his values, and his accomplishments, adding to my respect and appreciation of this very complex, resolute and resilient man.
December 15, 2022
As an admitted admirer of U.S. Grant, I feel there is much to be liked about this book. Its central premise is that of proving that Grant was unfairly maligned with the characterization as a butcher of men. Through the use of narrative accounts of his military campaigns supplemented with statistics, he makes a compelling argument that not only has Grant not been given his due, but that the general with whom he has most commonly been unfairly compared — Robert E. Lee — was less respectful of his men’s lives than was Grant. This is not a bashing of Lee. Rather, it is a masterful explanation of how General Grant proved time and again that he was a masterful tactician, an extraordinary administrator and leader, used his resources better than all his many opponents, was politically savvy, grasped modern warfare better than any of his contemporaries, was dogged in his pursuit of the enemy, was more respectful of his men’s lives than even Lee, and above all was victorious. The only flaw of significance in this retelling of Grant’s generalship is its repetitiveness. This book is exhaustively researched, with meaningful references to all Grant’s key biographers: Catton, McFeely, Badeau, Fuller, Keegan, and Smith, and others.
March 3, 2025
This brilliant book outlines the reality of military leadership during the Civil War. It correctly points out that Grant was a brilliant commander and far outpaced Lee in leading a modern army. However, I can not give a book that praises laurels on Southern lost cause apologists. The heaps of flower praises to Shelby Foote is an automatic three-star. Foote is a lost cause apologist who distills down the Civil War into just the war. This is a tactic to remove the moral question from the Civil War. Anyone who does that is an apologist. This book should be required reading after the love fest for Foote is removed.
July 22, 2022
A well-researched, well-written, and academically-sound look at Grant's war record as a general. This fits in with some of my previous reads which keep with a theme of Grant being unfairly maligned on the field by revisionist historians with axes to grind of their own. Especially compelling are that sources outside American politics (Britain and Europe) treat Grant with more respect and that the contemporary casualty lists clearly show that Grant lost a smaller percentage of his soldiers than other Civil War generals even while on the offensive.
August 4, 2025
This was a very comprehensive book about Grant and his accomplishments. It also dispelled some myths about Grant and his drinking habits. The author's primary argument was to prove that Grant was not a butcher but instead was aggressively trying to end the war. The author uses numbers and charts to illustrate his point. It's a great book if you are wanting to learn more about Civil War battles.
April 6, 2021
It's simple, Grant is the greatest general since Napoleon and one of the greatest ever. Few generals (or none) can match what he did at Vicksburg, Chattanooga, Donelson etc...
This book does a fantastic job of removing the old simple Lost Cause half truths and tells it how it really was.
This book does a fantastic job of removing the old simple Lost Cause half truths and tells it how it really was.
April 8, 2024
A thoughtful, holistic analysis of Grant’s generalship during the Civil War. I was disappointed how much of the text was copied verbatim into the author’s future books. This is an important historical analysis that shouldn’t be shortchanged like that.
September 12, 2025
even 20 years after its' initial publication, this book proves that biased historians often lie, but numbers never do. in addition to the statistical data, this is a good succinct history of Grant's war.
January 11, 2019
Did not know that much about Grant. This book was a fast read with lots of info
February 15, 2023
Interesting perspective on Grant's military skills
February 3, 2025
Great read! I will be reading more of his books!
October 13, 2022
The book for the first two thirds seems to sometimes forget that it is supposed to be arguing a point and then will double back to explain why everything it said was related to its argument. Most of the book is just a timeline of events recounted poorly (not factually poorly, just not the best prose). The book also seemed to have a vendetta against Meade and every general in the army of the Potomac that was not Grant.
October 22, 2025
Bonekemper is the Obi-wan of Civil War history writing. Here he convinces, overwhelmingly, that Grant was a victor, not a butcher — thus thoroughly debunking this absurd Lost Cause talking point. The 1863 Vicksburg Campaign certainly takes the top prize of all campaigns in the war. Fort Donelson was a master stroke. And even the 1864 Overland Campaign, as bloody as it was, involved masterful maneuvering by Grant until he had Lee pinned to the floor in Petersburg, with a Pit Bull grip that never unclenched. Cold Harbor was a horror and a mistake, but it simply ranks along with the other terrible frontal assaults of the war, like Lee at Malvern Hill or Gettysburg. Grant had one of the only successes with the frontal assault at Chattanooga.
Bonekemper takes us through all of Grant’s battles and convinces that he was the War’s top military mind and tactician, more so than Lee, who was blindly “audacious” to a fault. Lee “butchered” many more of his own men than Grant did his, and yet the Lost Cause movement spun the myth that Lee was “brilliant” but overwhelmed by a “butcher” with endless manpower. Wrong. Lee blundered over and over — especially by moving into Maryland three times (in 1864, thru Jubal Early). And it was Grant who had to prevail against overwhelming odds, forced to take the offensive against a foe that had merely to defend. This is a task that requires at least four-times the manpower and resources to pull off. The US couldn’t even pull it off in Vietnam with overwhelming superiority of everything. Fortunately Lee came out of his safe defensive perimeter over and over (except Fredericksburg), sometimes with stunning results (Chancellorsville) but often with major defeats, or just as bad, wins that butchered a large percentage of his men (ironically, Chancellorsville).
In the end, Grant (unlike Hooker or Pope or McClellan) was too *talented* for Lee. Grant won because he was more intelligent and strategic. He was a victor not a butcher. It wasn’t more resources that won it for the US, it was superior leadership and fighting spirit (like Phil Sheridan had). Thank you Edward Bonekemper, rest in peace.
Bonekemper takes us through all of Grant’s battles and convinces that he was the War’s top military mind and tactician, more so than Lee, who was blindly “audacious” to a fault. Lee “butchered” many more of his own men than Grant did his, and yet the Lost Cause movement spun the myth that Lee was “brilliant” but overwhelmed by a “butcher” with endless manpower. Wrong. Lee blundered over and over — especially by moving into Maryland three times (in 1864, thru Jubal Early). And it was Grant who had to prevail against overwhelming odds, forced to take the offensive against a foe that had merely to defend. This is a task that requires at least four-times the manpower and resources to pull off. The US couldn’t even pull it off in Vietnam with overwhelming superiority of everything. Fortunately Lee came out of his safe defensive perimeter over and over (except Fredericksburg), sometimes with stunning results (Chancellorsville) but often with major defeats, or just as bad, wins that butchered a large percentage of his men (ironically, Chancellorsville).
In the end, Grant (unlike Hooker or Pope or McClellan) was too *talented* for Lee. Grant won because he was more intelligent and strategic. He was a victor not a butcher. It wasn’t more resources that won it for the US, it was superior leadership and fighting spirit (like Phil Sheridan had). Thank you Edward Bonekemper, rest in peace.
May 29, 2015
Ulysses Simpson Grant. A man who transcended mediocrity into magnificence. His leadership in the Civil War helped save the union (Abraham Lincoln didn't do it alone). Grant's military locus and what built it and sustained it is the focus of Bonekemper's analysis of Grant's authority during the war. The book is not a biography. But in his book's first chapter, Bonekemper surveys Grant's early life to set the stage for his participation in the war. Going chronologically from the start of the war to its rather subdued end, Bonekemper attempts to debunk the negative opinion that authors and historians have of the general. Specifically, many feel Grant sacrificed men, needlessly, in order to defeat the Confederacy (hence the sobriquet BUTCHER in the book's title). The author's approach quite nearly succeeds. What the book has going for it is its thorough telling of Grant's military and logistical acumen, and how the Civil War serves as a metaphor for the man and his key qualities. One such quality was Grant's worldview. He pursued a national strategy in winning the war. This is in sharp contrast to Robert E. Lee, who was mired in a myopic regional strategy. A key component of Grant's big picture was that, in his plan of attack, he never looked backward; the word retreat wasn't in his vocabulary. This mindset helped the North trump the South in the end. But despite the book's creative design and passionate inquiry, Bonekemper quotes the work of others too much, robbing the book of its own voice. What could have been a new and original take on Grant's military leadership instead is a glorified research paper. What a shame.
March 22, 2011
A decently written book that explores the thesis, advertised in the title, that Ulysses S. Grant was "A Victor not a Butcher" as general. Certainly, I see sense in this thesis. His bold attack on Vicksburg is a wonderful piece of work. His tenacity in the campaign in Virginia in 1864 and 1865 is another testimony to his generalship. But this is scarcely a novel thesis. Many others have made the same point. And there is often something of a lack of detail.
Overall, a worthwhile book, but not a pathbreaking work.
Overall, a worthwhile book, but not a pathbreaking work.
August 7, 2013
This was basically a book about all of Grant's battles, his strategy, etc. I didn't find it interesting. It was presented like a Thesis, and would probably have gotten an "A". The research was impecable, but just not very exciting, and I didn't feel that I really learned any more about the man.
December 28, 2019
Thoroughly enjoyed this account after having read Grant's autobiography. I wish that there had been better battlefield maps included.
January 8, 2017
Finally, some insight of the strategy and statistics of the Grant vs. Lee competition.
May 3, 2017
Listened to this as an audiobook. A bit less interesting than I hoped it would be. It was a decent enough look at Grant's actions during the war.
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