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Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific
Over the last decade, the center of world power has been quietly shifting from Europe to Asia. With oil reserves of several billion barrels, an estimated nine hundred trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and several centuries' worth of competing territorial claims, the South China Sea in particular is a simmering pot of potential conflict. The underreported military buildup in the area where the Western Pacific meets the Indian Ocean means that it will likely be a hinge point for global war and peace for the foreseeable future. In Asia's Cauldron, Robert D. Kaplan offers up a vivid snapshot of the nations surrounding the South China Sea, the conflicts brewing in the region at the dawn of the twenty-first century, and their implications for global peace and stability. One of the world's most perceptive foreign policy experts, Kaplan interprets America's interests in Asia in the context of an increasingly assertive China. He explains how the region's unique geography fosters the growth of navies but also impedes aggression. And he draws a striking parallel between China's quest for hegemony in the South China Sea and the United States' imperial adventure in the Caribbean more than a century ago. To understand the future of conflict in East Asia, Kaplan argues, one must understand the goals and motivations of its leaders and its people. Part travelogue, part geopolitical primer, Asia's Cauldron takes us on a journey through the region's boom cities and ramshackle slums: from Vietnam, where the superfueled capitalism of the erstwhile colonial capital, Saigon, inspires the geostrategic pretensions of the official seat of government in Hanoi, to Malaysia, where a unique mix of authoritarian Islam and Western-style consumerism creates quite possibly the ultimate postmodern society; and from Singapore, whose benevolent autocracy helped foster an economic miracle, to the Philippines, where a different brand of authoritarianism under Ferdinand Marcos led not to economic growth but to decades of corruption and crime. At a time when every day's news seems to contain some new story-large or small-that directly relates to conflicts over the South China Sea, Asia's Cauldron is an indispensable guide to a corner of the globe that will affect all of our lives for years to come.
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First published January 1, 2014
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About the author
Robert D. Kaplan
52 books1,265 followersRobert David Kaplan is an American journalist, currently a National Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly. His writings have also been featured in The Washington Post, The New York Times, The New Republic, The National Interest, Foreign Affairs and The Wall Street Journal, among other newspapers and publications, and his more controversial essays about the nature of U.S. power have spurred debate in academia, the media, and the highest levels of government. A frequent theme in his work is the reemergence of cultural and historical tensions temporarily suspended during the Cold War.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 347 reviews
February 21, 2015
Insightful primer on the geopolitical relationship between China and Southeast Asia. Being Malaysian, the chapter on Malaysia was of particular interest, as it allowed me to gauge the accuracy and depth of Kaplan's analysis.
Unfortunately there are glaring mistakes littered throughout the chapter, e.g. "Chinese and Indians know Malay, but the Malays, whose Islamic fervor is felt mainly in the cities, speak no Chinese and Hindi." First, the Indians in Malaysia are generally of South Indian origin and speak mainly Tamil, not Hindi. Second, the "Islamic fervor" is actually weaker in the cities than the less developed eastern coast of Peninsular Malaysia where the Malay-Muslim population is concentrated and where the Pan-Islamic Malaysian Party (PAS) has very strong support (and where it rules the state of Kelantan). Third, there is no such language as Chinese; Malaysian Chinese speak Mandarin and southern Chinese dialects such as Cantonese and Hokkien.
Nitpicking maybe? Perhaps Kaplan isn't an expert on Malaysia, but it made me question his accuracy on the other countries in the book and on the whole issue. Admittedly, I might also have been biased when reading this book as Kaplan came across as a not very well-disguised American apologist.
Well worth a read nonetheless. Moving on to Bill Hayton's "The South China: The Struggle for Power in Asia" next.
Unfortunately there are glaring mistakes littered throughout the chapter, e.g. "Chinese and Indians know Malay, but the Malays, whose Islamic fervor is felt mainly in the cities, speak no Chinese and Hindi." First, the Indians in Malaysia are generally of South Indian origin and speak mainly Tamil, not Hindi. Second, the "Islamic fervor" is actually weaker in the cities than the less developed eastern coast of Peninsular Malaysia where the Malay-Muslim population is concentrated and where the Pan-Islamic Malaysian Party (PAS) has very strong support (and where it rules the state of Kelantan). Third, there is no such language as Chinese; Malaysian Chinese speak Mandarin and southern Chinese dialects such as Cantonese and Hokkien.
Nitpicking maybe? Perhaps Kaplan isn't an expert on Malaysia, but it made me question his accuracy on the other countries in the book and on the whole issue. Admittedly, I might also have been biased when reading this book as Kaplan came across as a not very well-disguised American apologist.
Well worth a read nonetheless. Moving on to Bill Hayton's "The South China: The Struggle for Power in Asia" next.
June 3, 2019
By the cover, I expected more history than politics in Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific by Robert D. Kaplan. I figured the reader would have to slog through all the backstory reasons for why the Southeast Asian world has arrived at where it has. Nope, this is more about modern politics with a dash of history thrown in merely for reference. And most of the "history" is stuff that happened in the past few decades.
Just as well! I needed to read something more modern and comprehensive about the shit going down over there. Glad I did. I have a much stronger understanding of the situation, the US's role in it, the motivations for the various players, and the future projections for power shifts.
Just as well! I needed to read something more modern and comprehensive about the shit going down over there. Glad I did. I have a much stronger understanding of the situation, the US's role in it, the motivations for the various players, and the future projections for power shifts.
November 28, 2016
Discusses in some detail the geo-politics of the South-China sea and tries to show the world that is brewing in that cauldron - one where an assertive China will draw the U.S and its neighbors into conflict. This has echoes of Huntington in that a culturally assertive China is intent on creating a world of concentric circles of power, whereas the U.S overtly subscribes to a balance of power world order. These modes of thinking about global power does not sit well with each other and neither country can accept each other's system, leading to inevitable conflict, unless one falls off the economic ladder. According to Kaplan, it seems that China will win this tussle in the East, simply due to its Geographic location.
The book is not as good as Kaplan's previous works. Firstly, it needed a good editor - certain key ideas like how the South China sea is to China what the Caribbean was to the U.S is repeated so often using the exact same lines, that it seems like Kaplan's notes were converted to chapters without real organizational or editorial oversight. The book feels lazy for the most part and new ideas are introduced early and repeated often, without much supporting arguments.
However the book is a still a good introduction to the strange mix of ingredients that go to make the potent and volatile brew cooking here.
The book is not as good as Kaplan's previous works. Firstly, it needed a good editor - certain key ideas like how the South China sea is to China what the Caribbean was to the U.S is repeated so often using the exact same lines, that it seems like Kaplan's notes were converted to chapters without real organizational or editorial oversight. The book feels lazy for the most part and new ideas are introduced early and repeated often, without much supporting arguments.
However the book is a still a good introduction to the strange mix of ingredients that go to make the potent and volatile brew cooking here.
July 27, 2017
There's a chapter about the Philippines that starts off by saying Filipinos have no real culture or cuisine. It then goes on to alternatively imply that Filipinos are savages who attacked Americans for no reason (during the war for independence from the US!!) and that Filipinos are incompetent children who need the US to take care of them. Super, super gross.
May 3, 2022
Saw Charles' review of this and realize I could definitely use a better understanding of the contemporary geopolitical issues of the South China Sea/East Sea beyond the headlines and political rhetoric. This is not deep but gives solid viewpoints from the various players: Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, China, Taiwan. The analogy to control of the Mediterranean a couple thousand years ago and not the Caribbean last few centuries is easy to understand and makes me want to go back and finish reading the Peloponnesian War.
May 3, 2017
August 1, 2015- Kaplan seems to have some sort of bias against the Philippines- I suspect this may be because he does not find Filipinos to be sufficiently "Asian", and perhaps too Americanized. I may be over-sensitive to this, for two reasons, which are the following: in the first place, my wife is from the Philippines. She spent her early childhood in what was then a new housing development in a small village outside Metro Manila, but is now a densely packed subdivision well within the suburban sprawl surrounding that city. Second, many of the disparaging remarks Mr. Kaplan makes about the Philippines have been made in the past by others regarding my own ancestral homeland, Ireland (i.e.: the Irish Navy is an even bigger joke than that of the Philippines, and for similar reasons). Closer to home for Mr. Kaplan, an even more relevant comparison could be made with the IDF Navy, with has traditionally been used for the same purpose as the Philippine Navy: in both cases, the sons of the privileged upper classes tend to do their national service in the Naval Component as a means of avoiding the frequently dangerous, even deadly, risks entailed in serving in an Army engaged in constantly flaring, bitter counterinsurgency/counter-terror operations which have lasted for decades without an end in sight.
On page 130, Mr. Kaplan states that the U.S. sold the Philippines a 1960s vintage ship rather than one more modern because they considered naval turbine engines "too complex for them to maintain". Even a few seconds research online would have informed Mr. Kaplan via multiple sources that the vessel in question, BRP Gregorio del Pilar (PF-15), is in fact itself powered by turbine engines, specifically 2 Pratt & Whittney FT4A-6 gas turbines. This indicates, to me anyway, both sloppy research and the aforementioned bias...
The difficulty inherent in reporting about the Philippines is essentially the same difficulty one finds in the U.S., particularly here in Detroit: crumbling, elderly third-world style infrastructure with a thin overlaid veneer of high-tech modernity. This sort of paradigm does not lend itself easily to rational journalistic analysis precisely because it is inherently irrational and fundamentally disordered. This situation, in both nations, is the direct result of horrifyingly corrupt political systems and entrenched bureaucratic incompetence.
On page 130, Mr. Kaplan states that the U.S. sold the Philippines a 1960s vintage ship rather than one more modern because they considered naval turbine engines "too complex for them to maintain". Even a few seconds research online would have informed Mr. Kaplan via multiple sources that the vessel in question, BRP Gregorio del Pilar (PF-15), is in fact itself powered by turbine engines, specifically 2 Pratt & Whittney FT4A-6 gas turbines. This indicates, to me anyway, both sloppy research and the aforementioned bias...
The difficulty inherent in reporting about the Philippines is essentially the same difficulty one finds in the U.S., particularly here in Detroit: crumbling, elderly third-world style infrastructure with a thin overlaid veneer of high-tech modernity. This sort of paradigm does not lend itself easily to rational journalistic analysis precisely because it is inherently irrational and fundamentally disordered. This situation, in both nations, is the direct result of horrifyingly corrupt political systems and entrenched bureaucratic incompetence.
March 31, 2014
This is a brilliant look into the history, present and possible future of the South China Sea. Kaplan combines his trademark style of travel guide, literary review and geopolitical analysis. The book will give you much to think about (and want to remember).
My only complaints are:
1/ Some parts are a little redundant -- Kaplan sometimes likes to beat a dead horse
2/ While Kaplan correctly sees Vietnam as the linchpin to resisting Beijing's domination of the South China Sea, he doesn't seem to recognize how conflicted the Hanoi regime is in dealing with China.
These faults aside, "Asia's Cauldron" is definitely worth a read.
My only complaints are:
1/ Some parts are a little redundant -- Kaplan sometimes likes to beat a dead horse
2/ While Kaplan correctly sees Vietnam as the linchpin to resisting Beijing's domination of the South China Sea, he doesn't seem to recognize how conflicted the Hanoi regime is in dealing with China.
These faults aside, "Asia's Cauldron" is definitely worth a read.
June 28, 2015
"Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific" is a slim book on what may be the next global 'hot spot'.
Kaplan's analysis is methodical and consistently at '20,000 feet'. It neither veers into being either a: military, diplomatic, economic or cultural/historical analysis. However, the reader is expected to have more than a passing knowledge of all these aspects of South East Asia. (Without it, you'll be lost.) The author cites several books in his analysis that may be helpful. The bibliography of this book is going to provide me with a lot of future reading. I also found that his comments brought new understanding to some of these books for myself.
If I have a criticism of this slim book, its that it could have been slimmer. There is a enough repetition to be noticeable, and Kaplan's thesis is made quiet clear by the second chapter. Although, I did appreciated the chapter-by-chapter 'Cooks Tour' of the countries in the region. I found amusing Kaplan's periodic lapses into 'purple prose'. "the dead light of florescent tubes" and "the bottle-blue sea" come immediately to mind as overly florid attempts at imagery. The references to 'the dead, white Greek guy (Thucydides)' were annoyingly pedantic.
I liked this, and found it readable, but I can't recommend it for everyone. The book assumes an uncommon understanding of the region. While at 250+ pages its brief, it could alos have been briefer.
Kaplan's analysis is methodical and consistently at '20,000 feet'. It neither veers into being either a: military, diplomatic, economic or cultural/historical analysis. However, the reader is expected to have more than a passing knowledge of all these aspects of South East Asia. (Without it, you'll be lost.) The author cites several books in his analysis that may be helpful. The bibliography of this book is going to provide me with a lot of future reading. I also found that his comments brought new understanding to some of these books for myself.
If I have a criticism of this slim book, its that it could have been slimmer. There is a enough repetition to be noticeable, and Kaplan's thesis is made quiet clear by the second chapter. Although, I did appreciated the chapter-by-chapter 'Cooks Tour' of the countries in the region. I found amusing Kaplan's periodic lapses into 'purple prose'. "the dead light of florescent tubes" and "the bottle-blue sea" come immediately to mind as overly florid attempts at imagery. The references to 'the dead, white Greek guy (Thucydides)' were annoyingly pedantic.
I liked this, and found it readable, but I can't recommend it for everyone. The book assumes an uncommon understanding of the region. While at 250+ pages its brief, it could alos have been briefer.
July 15, 2014
Very disappointing. Could have been a much better book given the policymakers Kaplan had access to - could have been more about the dilemmas facing Southeast Asian states that are deeply economically integrated with China despite security tensions. But Kaplan wrote a boring, cliche-ridden tract. The book is at its best when Kaplan lets his interlocutors speak for themselves. Kaplan's own analysis is wretched: pseudo-macho, realpolitik claptrap that mocks liberals and journalists and intellectuals with their concern for democracy and human rights and engages in the power worship common to many realists. His pose as a disciple of Samuel Huntington is awful: parrots Huntington's "civilizations" reductionism, his disdain for liberal values, and his admiration of military men.
The funny thing is, though, that at times Kaplan's analysis is spot on. He frequently downplays the risks of conflict in the region, stressing Mearsheimer's "stopping power of water." Again, it would have been possible to write a much better book.
The funny thing is, though, that at times Kaplan's analysis is spot on. He frequently downplays the risks of conflict in the region, stressing Mearsheimer's "stopping power of water." Again, it would have been possible to write a much better book.
October 11, 2018
If only men lacked the instinct to fight over every scrap of ground.
This is a dense, complex, and thought-provoking account of South China Sea and its immediate surrounding countries. Unfortunately the writing also portrays the region as it becomes chaotic and repetitive at times.
Nevertheless, this book provides a very realistic overview - knowing Kaplan, no surprise there - and is not afraid to provide strong thesis that undoubtedly beckons for further inquiries and/or counter-arguments, especially in the midst of a rapidly growing, complicated and volatile neighborhood in which yours truly happen to live in.
This is a dense, complex, and thought-provoking account of South China Sea and its immediate surrounding countries. Unfortunately the writing also portrays the region as it becomes chaotic and repetitive at times.
Nevertheless, this book provides a very realistic overview - knowing Kaplan, no surprise there - and is not afraid to provide strong thesis that undoubtedly beckons for further inquiries and/or counter-arguments, especially in the midst of a rapidly growing, complicated and volatile neighborhood in which yours truly happen to live in.
July 6, 2017
Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, is an interesting analysis of the South China Sea issues currently in the works, with a few notable flaws. The book is an excellent place to start on this issue, analyzing the broad strokes viewpoint from the positions of the United States, China, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines; basically all the major players in the South China Sea dispute.
For those unfamiliar with this issue, the South China Sea is a flashpoint for tension in the modern world, due to many conflicting claims over the small islands and atolls that dot the two million+ square miles of this region. All the countries listed above have overlapping claims with some or all of the states that ring the region in southeast Asia. China and Taiwan claim most of the region, using the infamous "nine-dash line" to denote their territorial claims, and basing these claims weakly on historical documentation, and more assertively with out-right control and policing of some of the zones. This has placed primarily China into political conflict with the above listed nations. These smaller states have turned to the United States to try and exercise some military control over the issue. They have also turned to international law to try to arbitrate the dispute in terms of the International Law of the Sea - a weak claim as their guarantor in the region, the US, has not ratified this agreement itself.
As can be seen, both China and some of the principle states in the region have confusingly weak claims on these islands, but covet them all the same due to the potential for offshore mineral resources, control of the valuable trade routes that pass through the region, and a nationalism driven by both present and historical issues. The key conflict in the region is between the US and China. The United States currently has the most powerful navy in the world, and uses this massive and overwhelming force to police the worlds Seas to ensure stable trade routes and to ensure its hegemonic presence. China on the other hand is a rising world power with historical regional hegemony that is trying to break free of its past embarrassments and present constraints in order to assert itself in the region and continue its rapid economic growth. This is the crux of Kaplan's argument: two world powers with conflicting interests and a whole lot of smaller states with regional interests, and Machiavellian power schemes. The states of Southeast Asia seek to keep the US tied into the region to ensure China will not make aggressive or foolish moves in the dispute. They do so by leasing space to the US military (Vietnam, Philippines and Singapore), by encouraging US businesses to set up shop (Singapore, Taiwan), and through cooperation and alliance building (all of the above). In the region, US power is the key counter-balance to a growing and more forceful Chinese state.
Kaplan takes a brief look at the policy stances inherent in each country, and is generally unbiased about the issue. He posits that the US navy is becoming increasingly weaker due to slashed budgets and conflicting politics at home, and that China's is becoming increasingly stronger due to its rapid economic growth and subsequent growth in military spending. China has few land-border disputes, and aside from its position on Korea, no longer needs a strong military on its many vast borderlands. This frees up funds for investment in naval growth, and China is moving swiftly in this direction. Their investment focuses on submarines, naval bases, carriers and militarized naval ships, as well as on conventional security forces, defensive weaponry and coast guard ships. China will approach the US in approximate naval strength in the Pacific region possibly by 2020 (as the US is tied up in patrolling other routes and involved in regional disputes in the Middle East). China has occupied and built military facilities on many of the disputed islands (as have most of the other states listed above), and uses civil coastal guard units as a tool to patrol waters, signaling its stance that those waters are "internal" issues. It's military is far larger than any of the other states (even combined), and so it also leaves the option of hard power open if needed. Its biggest tool, however, is its economic ties. Most of the above states are reliant on China for trade and investment, all the while exporting raw goods and materials to fuel China's economic growth. All the states above (including the US) have massive business investments in China and engage in trade and economic cooperation. This is China's biggest card - pulling away the carrot, and it has been known to utilize this at times (for example, the anti-Japanese riots during the Senkaku Islands dispute).
Kaplan has written an interesting book on the rising power of China in this region, and the declining power of the United States, and how this potential power shift may lead to a flare up between China and those reliant on US military presence to keep the status-quo in the dispute. However, the book suffers a few flaws. Kaplan's analysis seems a tad shallow, as he just touches the surface of the many issues the smaller Asian states face, but shies away from in depth fact finding. A good chunk of his information is based on journalistic interviews with unnamed officials from each country, giving an interesting, if suspect, source for information. Kaplan also looks deeply at the characteristics of each nation, based on historical trends and the past precedents of each nation - which adds a tinge of fluff to some of the analysis.
Kaplan has written an interesting and engaging - if shallow look at the South China Sea dispute in all of its complex glory. This book serves as a great introduction to the topic, but the lack of depth on each countries supporting claims, and facts surrounding their positions does do it a disservice. This makes the book highly readable due to its historical analysis and positing on geopolitical and strategic thought, but does have an air of bluster to it. Even so, it is certainly an interesting read, and I can easily recommend it for geopolitics junkies looking for a good, short book on an event that will continue to be reoccurring for the near future. The South China Sea is a potential flashpoint for regional or even global conflict, and it is an important dispute to understand if one is to gain a holistic viewpoint of Asian politics in the early 2000's. Give it a look if this interests you.
For those unfamiliar with this issue, the South China Sea is a flashpoint for tension in the modern world, due to many conflicting claims over the small islands and atolls that dot the two million+ square miles of this region. All the countries listed above have overlapping claims with some or all of the states that ring the region in southeast Asia. China and Taiwan claim most of the region, using the infamous "nine-dash line" to denote their territorial claims, and basing these claims weakly on historical documentation, and more assertively with out-right control and policing of some of the zones. This has placed primarily China into political conflict with the above listed nations. These smaller states have turned to the United States to try and exercise some military control over the issue. They have also turned to international law to try to arbitrate the dispute in terms of the International Law of the Sea - a weak claim as their guarantor in the region, the US, has not ratified this agreement itself.
As can be seen, both China and some of the principle states in the region have confusingly weak claims on these islands, but covet them all the same due to the potential for offshore mineral resources, control of the valuable trade routes that pass through the region, and a nationalism driven by both present and historical issues. The key conflict in the region is between the US and China. The United States currently has the most powerful navy in the world, and uses this massive and overwhelming force to police the worlds Seas to ensure stable trade routes and to ensure its hegemonic presence. China on the other hand is a rising world power with historical regional hegemony that is trying to break free of its past embarrassments and present constraints in order to assert itself in the region and continue its rapid economic growth. This is the crux of Kaplan's argument: two world powers with conflicting interests and a whole lot of smaller states with regional interests, and Machiavellian power schemes. The states of Southeast Asia seek to keep the US tied into the region to ensure China will not make aggressive or foolish moves in the dispute. They do so by leasing space to the US military (Vietnam, Philippines and Singapore), by encouraging US businesses to set up shop (Singapore, Taiwan), and through cooperation and alliance building (all of the above). In the region, US power is the key counter-balance to a growing and more forceful Chinese state.
Kaplan takes a brief look at the policy stances inherent in each country, and is generally unbiased about the issue. He posits that the US navy is becoming increasingly weaker due to slashed budgets and conflicting politics at home, and that China's is becoming increasingly stronger due to its rapid economic growth and subsequent growth in military spending. China has few land-border disputes, and aside from its position on Korea, no longer needs a strong military on its many vast borderlands. This frees up funds for investment in naval growth, and China is moving swiftly in this direction. Their investment focuses on submarines, naval bases, carriers and militarized naval ships, as well as on conventional security forces, defensive weaponry and coast guard ships. China will approach the US in approximate naval strength in the Pacific region possibly by 2020 (as the US is tied up in patrolling other routes and involved in regional disputes in the Middle East). China has occupied and built military facilities on many of the disputed islands (as have most of the other states listed above), and uses civil coastal guard units as a tool to patrol waters, signaling its stance that those waters are "internal" issues. It's military is far larger than any of the other states (even combined), and so it also leaves the option of hard power open if needed. Its biggest tool, however, is its economic ties. Most of the above states are reliant on China for trade and investment, all the while exporting raw goods and materials to fuel China's economic growth. All the states above (including the US) have massive business investments in China and engage in trade and economic cooperation. This is China's biggest card - pulling away the carrot, and it has been known to utilize this at times (for example, the anti-Japanese riots during the Senkaku Islands dispute).
Kaplan has written an interesting book on the rising power of China in this region, and the declining power of the United States, and how this potential power shift may lead to a flare up between China and those reliant on US military presence to keep the status-quo in the dispute. However, the book suffers a few flaws. Kaplan's analysis seems a tad shallow, as he just touches the surface of the many issues the smaller Asian states face, but shies away from in depth fact finding. A good chunk of his information is based on journalistic interviews with unnamed officials from each country, giving an interesting, if suspect, source for information. Kaplan also looks deeply at the characteristics of each nation, based on historical trends and the past precedents of each nation - which adds a tinge of fluff to some of the analysis.
Kaplan has written an interesting and engaging - if shallow look at the South China Sea dispute in all of its complex glory. This book serves as a great introduction to the topic, but the lack of depth on each countries supporting claims, and facts surrounding their positions does do it a disservice. This makes the book highly readable due to its historical analysis and positing on geopolitical and strategic thought, but does have an air of bluster to it. Even so, it is certainly an interesting read, and I can easily recommend it for geopolitics junkies looking for a good, short book on an event that will continue to be reoccurring for the near future. The South China Sea is a potential flashpoint for regional or even global conflict, and it is an important dispute to understand if one is to gain a holistic viewpoint of Asian politics in the early 2000's. Give it a look if this interests you.
December 20, 2023
An engaging and prescient read that has aged significantly since its publishing in 2014, but has only becoming more relevant since that time. The author is quite knowledgeable on the topic and I learned something new about every country discussed.
March 31, 2018
Cuốn này trình bày tóm lược tham vọng của Trung Quốc; chính sách Biển Đông và chiến lược đối phó với Trung Quốc của Việt Nam, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippine, Đài Loan. Thỉnh thoảng kèm theo luận giải. Cuốn này là một cuốn thú vị để hiểu về những gì đang xảy ra xung quanh Biển Đông.
Bản dịch một số chương chưa thật tốt, nhiều đoạn tối nghĩa.
Tóm tắt:
Bản dịch một số chương chưa thật tốt, nhiều đoạn tối nghĩa.
Tóm tắt:
March 16, 2016
The last chapter is the most important!
China is trying to occupy the South China Sea.
Other Southeast Asian countries are facing in China.
Vietnam also opposed to China.
The United States is opposed to the occupation of China.
China is criticized as "the United States is occupying the South China Sea."
China is trying to occupy the South China Sea.
Other Southeast Asian countries are facing in China.
Vietnam also opposed to China.
The United States is opposed to the occupation of China.
China is criticized as "the United States is occupying the South China Sea."
February 12, 2023
Kaplan tries to explain why the South China Sea is a brewing cauldron of future conflict. This sea is as important to the bordering countries, especially China, as the European hinterland was to European powers a century ago. Only that a naval conflict would be somewhat different, because it requires different capabilities.
There is not much analysis in this book. Kaplan’s style is more akin to journalistic reporting than to academic research. He travels and he sees things and from a few interactions (we don’t know if there are five or fifty) with local decision-makers or experts he draws conclusions. He may have a trained eye, a sharp mind or good intuition, but ultimately, I feel that he is somewhat superficial.
The first two chapters more or less summarize the basis of the book and its conclusion. Here Kaplan puts forward the most of the analytical part. So, if a naval war breaks out in the South China Sea, there would be no humanitarian element to it, it would be just (because of normal) business. This means that we, in the West, won’t care much about it. It would be military confrontation for a few rocks in the middle of the sea, for resources, and we won’t care about it (unless, of course, it gets in the way of our way of life, SCS being extremely important for world trade). The USA may not have the capacity or the home support to intervene (no humanitarian imperative), because the US military and navy are already overstretched and underfunded (for its ambitions). This is extremely problematic because the US acts like a balancing power in this region. But, if the US defines the region as essential to its foreign and domestic policy and gets more entangled here, it may be more harmful to peace than China, a challenger in the region. Another argument why there would be no humanitarian case is that China may act detestable at home, but it is responsible abroad and she will pursue its goals because it feels like it has the right to: China wants to dominate the region as US dominates the West.
In the second chapter, Kaplan tells us that capitalism prosperity naturally leads to military acquisitions because countries want to protect their commercial lanes. According to him, we don’t pay enough attention to the military build-ups in the SCS, which are immense.
The rest of the chapters are focused on the countries in the region. Kaplan is a travel blogger, a journalist, an expert, a historian, everything at once in these chapters. They are a little bit useful, in the sense that you get a feel of the place (through Kaplans eyes only, of course) and how these countries are thinking regarding Chinese claims in the SCS and how they deal with them or with the US.
This is not a waste of time, but don’t expect anything ground-breaking. It was written 10 years ago, so, of course, much of the statistics can’t stand anymore and we miss info on military acquisitions for the past decade (military acquisitions being very important to the author and his arguments).
3.5/5
There is not much analysis in this book. Kaplan’s style is more akin to journalistic reporting than to academic research. He travels and he sees things and from a few interactions (we don’t know if there are five or fifty) with local decision-makers or experts he draws conclusions. He may have a trained eye, a sharp mind or good intuition, but ultimately, I feel that he is somewhat superficial.
The first two chapters more or less summarize the basis of the book and its conclusion. Here Kaplan puts forward the most of the analytical part. So, if a naval war breaks out in the South China Sea, there would be no humanitarian element to it, it would be just (because of normal) business. This means that we, in the West, won’t care much about it. It would be military confrontation for a few rocks in the middle of the sea, for resources, and we won’t care about it (unless, of course, it gets in the way of our way of life, SCS being extremely important for world trade). The USA may not have the capacity or the home support to intervene (no humanitarian imperative), because the US military and navy are already overstretched and underfunded (for its ambitions). This is extremely problematic because the US acts like a balancing power in this region. But, if the US defines the region as essential to its foreign and domestic policy and gets more entangled here, it may be more harmful to peace than China, a challenger in the region. Another argument why there would be no humanitarian case is that China may act detestable at home, but it is responsible abroad and she will pursue its goals because it feels like it has the right to: China wants to dominate the region as US dominates the West.
In the second chapter, Kaplan tells us that capitalism prosperity naturally leads to military acquisitions because countries want to protect their commercial lanes. According to him, we don’t pay enough attention to the military build-ups in the SCS, which are immense.
The rest of the chapters are focused on the countries in the region. Kaplan is a travel blogger, a journalist, an expert, a historian, everything at once in these chapters. They are a little bit useful, in the sense that you get a feel of the place (through Kaplans eyes only, of course) and how these countries are thinking regarding Chinese claims in the SCS and how they deal with them or with the US.
This is not a waste of time, but don’t expect anything ground-breaking. It was written 10 years ago, so, of course, much of the statistics can’t stand anymore and we miss info on military acquisitions for the past decade (military acquisitions being very important to the author and his arguments).
3.5/5
August 14, 2018
My first serious geopolitics books I guess haha. Quite amazingly interesting and you have to know how to illustrate the thoughts thrown out by the author. It shows how huge is South East Asian and how important is South China Sea to the world. IT is imperative that South East Asian countries to foster their relationship and maximize protection of themselves and the region , not forgetting Africa would be in dangerous confrontation before 2050.
August 20, 2018
Another Kaplan book guys and as per usual, it exceeded expectations. As the title suggests, the narrative revolves around the South and South East Asia with South China Sea at the center of this all. Lately the international media and our local one too has been talking a lot about this region and since they often tell you only a one-sided story, I was looking for a proper document from where I should start, the foundation upon which I would build all the news. Well I found it and I would recommend all of you to make this as a starting point while you are reading on the topic
Let us first understand as to why is this South China Sea important in the first place then we will try to look at it from different countries' point of view. In another book of the author, MONSOON, he has explained that there are 3 choke points in the world which have the potential to bring the most of the world, if not whole, to its knees. These are Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, Bab-el-Mandeb which connects Red sea to Indian Ocean and Strait of Malacca where Indian Ocean and Western Pacific intersect. Out of these 3, Strait of Malacca falls into the purview of the discussion of this book. Why? Because this helps to explain how South China Sea is important. The sea not only hosts the maximum number of oil tankers coming from the middle east to China, Korea, Japan and the Archipelago nations but also is a huge reservoir of oil and natural gas around three groups of islands namely: Paracel, Spratlys and Pratas islands. Most of the fight is about this because as per estimates they harbor some 7 billion barrels of oil and 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. But still we need not forget that in the near future, South China sea is more important because it brings in the imported oil and gas than because it has reserves of it too
Consider this area to be connected through concentric triangles. the outer one consists of India, Japan and Korea whereas the inner one consists of Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, China, Philippines and Indonesia. Players in the inner triangle are the one who are directly involved in the whole issue whereas the outer players are the ones who play the supporting roles now and then. Out of all the players mentioned above, China's economy is roaring ahead then comes India. Now, we need to understand that why did I mention economy here. Roaring economy directly translates to increase in the military expenditure provided that there isn't any internal political upheaval going on. China's presence in the South China Sea especially in the above mentioned islands is increasing through presence of naval vessels, construction of runways on the islands and fishing boats
"Why is this important?" I guess many of us might be feeling this so in order to dispel this question once and for all, I will have to bring in the legal angle. UN Convention on the Law of Seas, 1982 is the governing principle behind all of the international maritime activities in the world. As per this convention, any country's territorial claim over any water body is a function of its coastline. From the coastline, 200 nautical miles would be treated as the territorial waters of the country. China became a signatory of this convention in 1996 and surprisingly, US has not yet ratified this. If this definition is applied to the current conundrum, China gets a fleeting claim over some of the islands of Pratas and Paracel and absolutely no claim over Spratlys islands(which is estimated to have most of the natural resources). That is why this has been a raging hot topic because China has been trying to bulldoze over the claims of Malaysia, Vietnam and Philippines
The book tries to capture the history and the possibilities of future which includes ASEAN vs China or ASEAN+USA vs China or bilateral defense ties amongst the countries to counterbalance Chinese presence. All of these possibilities are required to be entertained in the aftermath of trade and diplomatic relations that each of these countries(including USA) share with China because if Chinese aspirations, however unrealistic, aren't fulfilled, there might be repercussions through trade or diplomacy
Let us first understand as to why is this South China Sea important in the first place then we will try to look at it from different countries' point of view. In another book of the author, MONSOON, he has explained that there are 3 choke points in the world which have the potential to bring the most of the world, if not whole, to its knees. These are Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, Bab-el-Mandeb which connects Red sea to Indian Ocean and Strait of Malacca where Indian Ocean and Western Pacific intersect. Out of these 3, Strait of Malacca falls into the purview of the discussion of this book. Why? Because this helps to explain how South China Sea is important. The sea not only hosts the maximum number of oil tankers coming from the middle east to China, Korea, Japan and the Archipelago nations but also is a huge reservoir of oil and natural gas around three groups of islands namely: Paracel, Spratlys and Pratas islands. Most of the fight is about this because as per estimates they harbor some 7 billion barrels of oil and 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. But still we need not forget that in the near future, South China sea is more important because it brings in the imported oil and gas than because it has reserves of it too
Consider this area to be connected through concentric triangles. the outer one consists of India, Japan and Korea whereas the inner one consists of Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, China, Philippines and Indonesia. Players in the inner triangle are the one who are directly involved in the whole issue whereas the outer players are the ones who play the supporting roles now and then. Out of all the players mentioned above, China's economy is roaring ahead then comes India. Now, we need to understand that why did I mention economy here. Roaring economy directly translates to increase in the military expenditure provided that there isn't any internal political upheaval going on. China's presence in the South China Sea especially in the above mentioned islands is increasing through presence of naval vessels, construction of runways on the islands and fishing boats
"Why is this important?" I guess many of us might be feeling this so in order to dispel this question once and for all, I will have to bring in the legal angle. UN Convention on the Law of Seas, 1982 is the governing principle behind all of the international maritime activities in the world. As per this convention, any country's territorial claim over any water body is a function of its coastline. From the coastline, 200 nautical miles would be treated as the territorial waters of the country. China became a signatory of this convention in 1996 and surprisingly, US has not yet ratified this. If this definition is applied to the current conundrum, China gets a fleeting claim over some of the islands of Pratas and Paracel and absolutely no claim over Spratlys islands(which is estimated to have most of the natural resources). That is why this has been a raging hot topic because China has been trying to bulldoze over the claims of Malaysia, Vietnam and Philippines
The book tries to capture the history and the possibilities of future which includes ASEAN vs China or ASEAN+USA vs China or bilateral defense ties amongst the countries to counterbalance Chinese presence. All of these possibilities are required to be entertained in the aftermath of trade and diplomatic relations that each of these countries(including USA) share with China because if Chinese aspirations, however unrealistic, aren't fulfilled, there might be repercussions through trade or diplomacy
April 20, 2014
I’ve been a fan of Robert D. Kaplan since reading Balkan Ghosts in the mid-90s. Although I don’t always agree with him, I do enjoy reading his blend of travelogue, history and political science, and I always learn something new.
Kaplan’s latest, Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, continues his tradition of focusing on areas of the world that are both lesser known to many and potential areas of conflict. It is also somewhat of a companion piece to an earlier work, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and The Future of American Power.
As the title suggests, Asia’s Cauldron closely examines the nations ringing the South China Sea: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore. In addition to being the world’s busiest intersection of commercial shipping (especially oil tankers), the sea is home to abundant stocks of fish and may have large stores of hydrocarbons beneath its seabed. Most of the bordering nations have staked claims in the sea, and all are following China’s lead in building up their navies, making the potential for conflict quite high.
I try to keep up with world events, but have to agree with Kaplan that the arms race around the South China Sea has gone mostly unreported by general U.S. media outlets.
The United States has already announced a planned “pivot” to focus more on Asian affairs as opposed to Europe and the Middle East, and this book is a fine primer for one of the reasons why. Given the relative size and strength of China, it is easy to see why the other nations bordering the sea are eager for the United States to maintain a vigorous military presence — an idea which Kaplan, unsurprisingly given his history, concurs in.
Still, Kaplan is a realist and he acknowledges China’s right to both build up its military and flex its muscles regionally, most tellingly by comparison to America’s dominance over the Gulf of Mexico in the early-1800s. The big difference, of course, is the nations surround the South China Sea are for the most part much more stable, economically and politically, than those the U.S. was dealing with.
A concern of many watching the situation is the ring nations becoming “Finlandized,” or deciding to accept China’s dominance in the region rather than remain in opposition to it. Only continued U.S. presence in the region can avert this, which Kaplan acknowledges could be difficult given the inevitable cuts to America’s military budget. He also points out that the relationship between the U.S. and China is much more dynamic and interconnected than that of Cold War America and the USSR, which makes the overall situation both easier and harder to manage.
All in all Asia’s Cauldron was everything I expect in a Robert D. Kaplan book. It was a highly readable blend of history, politics and culture, and I learned quite a bit about a region which could well be of crucial importance in the coming years.
Kaplan’s latest, Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, continues his tradition of focusing on areas of the world that are both lesser known to many and potential areas of conflict. It is also somewhat of a companion piece to an earlier work, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and The Future of American Power.
As the title suggests, Asia’s Cauldron closely examines the nations ringing the South China Sea: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore. In addition to being the world’s busiest intersection of commercial shipping (especially oil tankers), the sea is home to abundant stocks of fish and may have large stores of hydrocarbons beneath its seabed. Most of the bordering nations have staked claims in the sea, and all are following China’s lead in building up their navies, making the potential for conflict quite high.
I try to keep up with world events, but have to agree with Kaplan that the arms race around the South China Sea has gone mostly unreported by general U.S. media outlets.
Of particular note is the feverish acquisition of submarines, as surface warships become more vulnerable to offensive missiles. “Submarines are the new bling, everybody wants them,” Bernard Loo Fook Weng of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore told me. Note that submarines are moving, undersea intelligence-gathering factories. Unlike aircraft carriers for example, which in and of themselves constitute statements of national prestige and are useful for a variety of missions, including humanitarian relief, submarines are about sheer aggression, even as the gathering of information in which they engage may serve a stabilizing purpose by providing one state with knowledge about the intentions and capabilities of another.
— Kaplan, Robert D. (2014-03-25). Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (Kindle Locations 628-633). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
The United States has already announced a planned “pivot” to focus more on Asian affairs as opposed to Europe and the Middle East, and this book is a fine primer for one of the reasons why. Given the relative size and strength of China, it is easy to see why the other nations bordering the sea are eager for the United States to maintain a vigorous military presence — an idea which Kaplan, unsurprisingly given his history, concurs in.
Still, Kaplan is a realist and he acknowledges China’s right to both build up its military and flex its muscles regionally, most tellingly by comparison to America’s dominance over the Gulf of Mexico in the early-1800s. The big difference, of course, is the nations surround the South China Sea are for the most part much more stable, economically and politically, than those the U.S. was dealing with.
A concern of many watching the situation is the ring nations becoming “Finlandized,” or deciding to accept China’s dominance in the region rather than remain in opposition to it. Only continued U.S. presence in the region can avert this, which Kaplan acknowledges could be difficult given the inevitable cuts to America’s military budget. He also points out that the relationship between the U.S. and China is much more dynamic and interconnected than that of Cold War America and the USSR, which makes the overall situation both easier and harder to manage.
All in all Asia’s Cauldron was everything I expect in a Robert D. Kaplan book. It was a highly readable blend of history, politics and culture, and I learned quite a bit about a region which could well be of crucial importance in the coming years.
August 5, 2017
I was rather frustrated reading this book and was writing some comments as I went along, which I have left below, in case anyone feels the same way and is wondering if it's worth pressing on with the book.
Kaplan's opening and concluding chapters are probably the weakest of all, as he says a lot without actually saying very much at all, and throws in a lot of (to me) irrelevant historical facts from elsewhere to make a point.
His chapters on the various countries in Southeast Asia were more interesting, although being familiar with some of them, I noticed some factual inaccuracies that cast doubt on all the facts in his book - I would advice readers to proceed with caution and not assume that what Kaplan presents as fact is actually true.
Kaplan also has the nasty habit of concluding each chapter with a sweeping, grand statement that appears from nowhere with no justification to how he came to that conclusion - a style more akin to high school student trying to be clever with an essay than something I'd expect from a renowned journalist.
Overall, read this book if you want to but I wouldn't trust his conclusions or his facts.
=================================================================
These are my thoughts 5 chapters in.
Chapters 1 and 2:
Kaplan analyses events and issues in the south China sea from a very American lens. That's fine, except that the parallels drawn are lost unless you're familiar with historical events in the Americas (chapter 2 compared the south China sea to the Caribbean).
He also likes referencing irrelevant historical events and uses a lot of words to say very little. His prose is quite grandiose. Kaplan loves America and exaggerates its influence. His factual accuracies are also questionable - he claims that southeast Asia has little Chinese influence beyond north Vietnam, which is laughable to one with any knowledge of the ethnicities represented in Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.
I'm not sure why he's so critically acclaimed because I'm not finding this book that insightful so far (he's hasn't told me anything I don't already know, and I'm far from being an expert on the geopolitics of the south China sea) but I suspect his popularity stems from a fairly specific audience.
Chapters 3 - 5:
The prose flows a lot better and it's much easier to read - less disjointed. But Kaplan continues to make some rather sweeping statements or arrives at a conclusion without elaborating the reasoning behind it, and makes some terrible, politically incorrect statements tinged with a hint of racism.
Kaplan's opening and concluding chapters are probably the weakest of all, as he says a lot without actually saying very much at all, and throws in a lot of (to me) irrelevant historical facts from elsewhere to make a point.
His chapters on the various countries in Southeast Asia were more interesting, although being familiar with some of them, I noticed some factual inaccuracies that cast doubt on all the facts in his book - I would advice readers to proceed with caution and not assume that what Kaplan presents as fact is actually true.
Kaplan also has the nasty habit of concluding each chapter with a sweeping, grand statement that appears from nowhere with no justification to how he came to that conclusion - a style more akin to high school student trying to be clever with an essay than something I'd expect from a renowned journalist.
Overall, read this book if you want to but I wouldn't trust his conclusions or his facts.
=================================================================
These are my thoughts 5 chapters in.
Chapters 1 and 2:
Kaplan analyses events and issues in the south China sea from a very American lens. That's fine, except that the parallels drawn are lost unless you're familiar with historical events in the Americas (chapter 2 compared the south China sea to the Caribbean).
He also likes referencing irrelevant historical events and uses a lot of words to say very little. His prose is quite grandiose. Kaplan loves America and exaggerates its influence. His factual accuracies are also questionable - he claims that southeast Asia has little Chinese influence beyond north Vietnam, which is laughable to one with any knowledge of the ethnicities represented in Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.
I'm not sure why he's so critically acclaimed because I'm not finding this book that insightful so far (he's hasn't told me anything I don't already know, and I'm far from being an expert on the geopolitics of the south China sea) but I suspect his popularity stems from a fairly specific audience.
Chapters 3 - 5:
The prose flows a lot better and it's much easier to read - less disjointed. But Kaplan continues to make some rather sweeping statements or arrives at a conclusion without elaborating the reasoning behind it, and makes some terrible, politically incorrect statements tinged with a hint of racism.
August 19, 2014
Kaplan starts the book with some basic economics, geography and history of East Asia. Robert Kaplan says the Pacific will become unstable, but he does not think this must lead to war. Kaplan has found a niche writing books that are a cross between journalism and policy issues. Comparison of Asia to the Europe of 1914 is part of a bigger question about whether China just wants to be a benign regional hegemon, or if it has expansionist aims. Kaplan argues that comparisons to 1914 are overblown. He claims the big difference is Europe is a landscape; East Asia is a seascape and the oceans will act as a barrier against aggression. The author suggests the better comparison is America’s 19th century approach to the Caribbean. He says China is seeking an Asian version of the Monroe Doctrine.
One reason he is sanguine is the absence of a great ideological struggle. Kaplan insists that the Communist party will not necessarily bully abroad because it bullies at home. I say do not forget the brutality of Leninist Chinese Party State. The book suffers from largely ignoring the East China Sea and the relationship with Japan, which I think could be much more important.
Asia is far more complicated than Kaplan reveals. If oil is discovered in the China Sea it will only become more complicated. The China Sea is on the way to becoming the most contested body of water in the world. Kaplan said that a Singaporean said they did not wish to be Finlandized or to replace American’s embrace with China’s. The Singaporean went on to say “At the end of the day it is all about military force and naval presence—it is not about passionate and well-meaning talk”. We must remember China is building an enormous Navy and Air Force and the rise of China is now challenging the stability of the area as America’s naval dominance of the Western pacific fades.
Kaplan ends the book with a quote of a Vietnamese proverb. “Distant water cannot put out a nearby fire.” I read this as an audio book downloaded from Audible. Michael Prichard did a good job narrating the book.
One reason he is sanguine is the absence of a great ideological struggle. Kaplan insists that the Communist party will not necessarily bully abroad because it bullies at home. I say do not forget the brutality of Leninist Chinese Party State. The book suffers from largely ignoring the East China Sea and the relationship with Japan, which I think could be much more important.
Asia is far more complicated than Kaplan reveals. If oil is discovered in the China Sea it will only become more complicated. The China Sea is on the way to becoming the most contested body of water in the world. Kaplan said that a Singaporean said they did not wish to be Finlandized or to replace American’s embrace with China’s. The Singaporean went on to say “At the end of the day it is all about military force and naval presence—it is not about passionate and well-meaning talk”. We must remember China is building an enormous Navy and Air Force and the rise of China is now challenging the stability of the area as America’s naval dominance of the Western pacific fades.
Kaplan ends the book with a quote of a Vietnamese proverb. “Distant water cannot put out a nearby fire.” I read this as an audio book downloaded from Audible. Michael Prichard did a good job narrating the book.
June 15, 2023
I have been wanting to read more Asian history and geopolitics for a long time and Robert Kaplan's Asia's Cauldron was the perfect introduction for me. This is my fourth Kaplan book so I was used to his style (travel journalism combined with history and modern geopolitics) which made it easy for me to quickly consume the book.
Kaplan explains that the nationalism and wars that marked Europe in previous centuries will be the new reality in the South China Sea as all of the countries are now pushing their own claims. The main issue stems from the so called nine dash line (or the cow lick), this is a contested area in the South China sea which includes the Spratly and Paracel islands as well as many other small islands which has claims from all the countries in the area.
A future conflict in this area will be naval conflict which means means we won't see the large land battles of the past. However, it will also be a war with little humanitarianism as Western countries will have fairly little involvement outside of the US.
The book goes through the following countries:
- Vietnam - even though the Vietnam war is still within recent memory Vietnam actually wants a US presence in the South China Sea in order to balance China and will be probably an important US ally in the future. China is the historical enemy of Vietnam and will continue to be so.
- Singapore - Lee Kwan Yew took Singapore from a swampy backwater city to an international hub. Singapore was initially part of Malaysia but was kicked out because of the ethnic imbalance and inter-ethnic rivalry with the Malays. Lee is the model of the benevolent dictator who actually brought prosperity to his nation despite ruling with an iron and authoritarian hand. Singapore has one of the largest air fleet in the region and punches way above its weight when it comes to defense. It actually has a larger and more powerful air force then any other South-East Asian nation. Singapore is another major US ally in the region despite their good ties with China and the fact that they even have a statue of Deng Xiaoping.
- Malaysia - similar to Singapore, Malaysia also managed to rise from its humble beginnings. In fact, Malaysia did not exist as a unitary region before the British colonial times. It was the British that created the single Malaysian state. After gaining independence the native Malays used Islamic nationalism in order to create a foundation for their state. However, their brand of Islamic is a lot more moderate and Malaysia is one of the most successful Islamic democracies. Malaysia's challenge is to balance its three major ethnic groups: the Islamic Malays, the Indians and the Chinese.
- Phillippines - the Phillippines is the weakest and most unstable of all the South China Sea states. This is related to its Spanish colonial past and the weakness and corruption of its institutions. The dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos embedded corruption and prevented the development experienced by its neighbours. Being a former US possession the Phillippines have a very close association with the US, they are also the most threatened by China due to their competing land claims. The Chinese know that the Phillippines are a weak state and they are bullying them with their expansionist policies. The Phillippines is trying to arm and build a competent navy but they are far away from that and are reliant on US defence.
- Taiwan - Taiwan has a complicated history being. As opposed to other states occupied by Imperial Japan, Taiwan actually had a fairly positive experience under the Japanese. The pivotal moment in Taiwan's history is when Chiang and his Kuomintang army retreated from mainland China. Chiang was a little less of a successful leader compared to Lee Kwan Yew, however his reputation has been unfairly tarnished by reporters and by the antagonism of US commander Joe Stilwell. It is also likely that if not for the Korean War China would have occupied Taiwan in the 1950s. However, the Korean War brought back the US into Asian affairs and prevented Taiwan from falling. Taiwan is another major claimant in the South China Sea as they occupy some major islands.
- China - China is the great rising power in the world. It is outbuilding the US in terms of seapower, for example in new submarines China is beating the US 8 to 1. They also have the advantage of using Diesel subs which are more quiet compared to the US subs which need to cover longer distances and are nuclear powererd. China's major advantage is that they are operating close to their home base as opposed to the US. They are also far bigger and more powerful than any of their neighbours which allows them to move in the South China Sea with great confidence as they see this area as their historical backyard. China will use the old tactics of Finlandisation to try and isolate and contain its neighbours.
Overall Asia's Cauldron is a great overview of the geopolitics of the South China Sea and is extremely informative for people that are not versed in this area. Of course, many of the assessments are based on Kaplan's personal opinions and interpretations. As others have mentioned he does have some attitudes which can be seen as judgemental, for example his dismissal of the Phillippino culture. But I think the pros of the book far outweigh the cons and it is well worth the read.
Kaplan explains that the nationalism and wars that marked Europe in previous centuries will be the new reality in the South China Sea as all of the countries are now pushing their own claims. The main issue stems from the so called nine dash line (or the cow lick), this is a contested area in the South China sea which includes the Spratly and Paracel islands as well as many other small islands which has claims from all the countries in the area.
A future conflict in this area will be naval conflict which means means we won't see the large land battles of the past. However, it will also be a war with little humanitarianism as Western countries will have fairly little involvement outside of the US.
The book goes through the following countries:
- Vietnam - even though the Vietnam war is still within recent memory Vietnam actually wants a US presence in the South China Sea in order to balance China and will be probably an important US ally in the future. China is the historical enemy of Vietnam and will continue to be so.
- Singapore - Lee Kwan Yew took Singapore from a swampy backwater city to an international hub. Singapore was initially part of Malaysia but was kicked out because of the ethnic imbalance and inter-ethnic rivalry with the Malays. Lee is the model of the benevolent dictator who actually brought prosperity to his nation despite ruling with an iron and authoritarian hand. Singapore has one of the largest air fleet in the region and punches way above its weight when it comes to defense. It actually has a larger and more powerful air force then any other South-East Asian nation. Singapore is another major US ally in the region despite their good ties with China and the fact that they even have a statue of Deng Xiaoping.
- Malaysia - similar to Singapore, Malaysia also managed to rise from its humble beginnings. In fact, Malaysia did not exist as a unitary region before the British colonial times. It was the British that created the single Malaysian state. After gaining independence the native Malays used Islamic nationalism in order to create a foundation for their state. However, their brand of Islamic is a lot more moderate and Malaysia is one of the most successful Islamic democracies. Malaysia's challenge is to balance its three major ethnic groups: the Islamic Malays, the Indians and the Chinese.
- Phillippines - the Phillippines is the weakest and most unstable of all the South China Sea states. This is related to its Spanish colonial past and the weakness and corruption of its institutions. The dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos embedded corruption and prevented the development experienced by its neighbours. Being a former US possession the Phillippines have a very close association with the US, they are also the most threatened by China due to their competing land claims. The Chinese know that the Phillippines are a weak state and they are bullying them with their expansionist policies. The Phillippines is trying to arm and build a competent navy but they are far away from that and are reliant on US defence.
- Taiwan - Taiwan has a complicated history being. As opposed to other states occupied by Imperial Japan, Taiwan actually had a fairly positive experience under the Japanese. The pivotal moment in Taiwan's history is when Chiang and his Kuomintang army retreated from mainland China. Chiang was a little less of a successful leader compared to Lee Kwan Yew, however his reputation has been unfairly tarnished by reporters and by the antagonism of US commander Joe Stilwell. It is also likely that if not for the Korean War China would have occupied Taiwan in the 1950s. However, the Korean War brought back the US into Asian affairs and prevented Taiwan from falling. Taiwan is another major claimant in the South China Sea as they occupy some major islands.
- China - China is the great rising power in the world. It is outbuilding the US in terms of seapower, for example in new submarines China is beating the US 8 to 1. They also have the advantage of using Diesel subs which are more quiet compared to the US subs which need to cover longer distances and are nuclear powererd. China's major advantage is that they are operating close to their home base as opposed to the US. They are also far bigger and more powerful than any of their neighbours which allows them to move in the South China Sea with great confidence as they see this area as their historical backyard. China will use the old tactics of Finlandisation to try and isolate and contain its neighbours.
Overall Asia's Cauldron is a great overview of the geopolitics of the South China Sea and is extremely informative for people that are not versed in this area. Of course, many of the assessments are based on Kaplan's personal opinions and interpretations. As others have mentioned he does have some attitudes which can be seen as judgemental, for example his dismissal of the Phillippino culture. But I think the pros of the book far outweigh the cons and it is well worth the read.
December 23, 2022
"As Strategic as the Mediterranean and the Caribbean"
Kaplan's book is a well-written survey of the countries surrounding the South China Sea, published in 2014. The writing is direct and focused reporting. It gives a well-rounded perspective to many things in the news, despite the fact it is already eight years old. The author covers the geopolitical history and current state in detail. I found it to be a good analysis of affairs in the region. It accounts heavily for the ever increasing pursuit of a balance of power, and gives an account of economic and military growth.
I enjoyed this with Kindle Whisper-sync. It is a great resource, since it does give much factual information to refer back to in other reading. I will share a couple quotes below. If you are looking for your Kindle Book Notes (since Goodreads' new pages are not linking to them yet) I discovered them all on a dedicated page I will link here. I should have already known about that, but there it is. I also recommend Evernote, a web-based notetaking program that is great for note taking and accessing all notes on any device, since it stores them online.
Kaplan's book is a well-written survey of the countries surrounding the South China Sea, published in 2014. The writing is direct and focused reporting. It gives a well-rounded perspective to many things in the news, despite the fact it is already eight years old. The author covers the geopolitical history and current state in detail. I found it to be a good analysis of affairs in the region. It accounts heavily for the ever increasing pursuit of a balance of power, and gives an account of economic and military growth.
I enjoyed this with Kindle Whisper-sync. It is a great resource, since it does give much factual information to refer back to in other reading. I will share a couple quotes below. If you are looking for your Kindle Book Notes (since Goodreads' new pages are not linking to them yet) I discovered them all on a dedicated page I will link here. I should have already known about that, but there it is. I also recommend Evernote, a web-based notetaking program that is great for note taking and accessing all notes on any device, since it stores them online.
"The oil transported through the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean, en route to East Asia through the South China Sea, is triple the amount that passes through the Suez Canal and fifteen times the amount that transits the Panama Canal."
"It is not ideas that Asians fight over, but space on the map."
"Vietnam is Southeast Asia’s “principal protagonist” in the South China Sea dispute, asserting sovereignty over both the Paracel and Spratly islands, “based on historical usage dating back to at least the 17th century,”
"The very term Indochina is accurate to the extent that Indian influence is apparent throughout the rest of Southeast Asia, whereas Chinese influence is concentrated for the most part in northern Vietnam."
“China invaded Vietnam seventeen times. The U.S. invaded Mexico only once, and look at how sensitive the Mexicans are about that... Vietnamese identity is unique in that it has been formed “through and in opposition to” Chinese influence,"
On July 4, 1902, when President Roosevelt proclaimed the Philippine War over, 4,234 American soldiers had been killed in the conflict and 2,818 wounded. Overall, 200,000 people died, mainly Filipino civilians.
June 16, 2019
This book brings various international relationships within Southeast Asia, the strengths and weaknesses of various members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), a brief history of the region, and the ramifications for the United States.
Although the narrative is a bit dry in parts, there are enough anecdotal stories woven throughout to keep my attention piqued.
After being immersed in the many diplomatic, informational, military, and economic conflicts in this region during the nearly nine years I lived and served in the Air Force in both Japan and Hawaii, I can't say that I was very surprised about any of the information provided.
But I did learn more, especially about the history and politics of these countries. Even if i don't remember it all, I am sure many of the the overall salient points will stick with me for a long time.
interesting quotes (page numbers from edition with ISBN13):
[regarding the Philippines] "Perhaps no other country in Asia has seen such a political, economic investment for decades on end.
Perhaps no where else has it made so little difference.">/i> (p. )
" .">/i> (p. )
" .">/i> (p. )
" .">/i> (p. )
"." (p. )
"" (p. )
Although the narrative is a bit dry in parts, there are enough anecdotal stories woven throughout to keep my attention piqued.
After being immersed in the many diplomatic, informational, military, and economic conflicts in this region during the nearly nine years I lived and served in the Air Force in both Japan and Hawaii, I can't say that I was very surprised about any of the information provided.
But I did learn more, especially about the history and politics of these countries. Even if i don't remember it all, I am sure many of the the overall salient points will stick with me for a long time.
interesting quotes (page numbers from edition with ISBN13):
[regarding the Philippines] "Perhaps no other country in Asia has seen such a political, economic investment for decades on end.
Perhaps no where else has it made so little difference.">/i> (p. )
" .">/i> (p. )
" .">/i> (p. )
" .">/i> (p. )
"." (p. )
"" (p. )
April 13, 2024
Muy interesante descripción de la delicada situación del Mar del Sur de China, combinada con algo de historia de los países del entorno, incluyendo Singapur, Malasia, Vietnam, Taiwan, China y Filipinas. Escrito con un estilo muy ameno.
April 10, 2021
China is a rising economic power. Economically developing countries trade internationally and obtain global interests. Military might is needed to protect global interests which are based on capitalist prosperity. South China Sea is important because beneath the various small islands lies oil and natural gas. Many of the surrounding states have claims on the waters which are in conflict with China’s claims. The states require the United States for diplomatic and military support. To reconcile disputed seas will require hard power. This battleground has no enemies which could be an object of moral fury. This battleground is for economic reasons. Showcasing how US guards the global commons of communications which allow for international trade.
Kaplan makes clear that national values need to be guarded by military power. Navies are getting more prominence in the South China Sea than armies. It is more difficult to occupy lands with navies than armies. Wars can start through petty incidences which are tied to vital interests. In this case, its territorial disputes and energy supply. What makes the issue unnerving is China’s buildup of submarines, which is a clear indicator of aggression. To showcase what the situation is, Kaplan uses brief histories of Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, and Philippines.
A very important topic mired in problems. The flow of the writing is usually not that good. There is a confirmation bias against China and in favor of the US. Seeing China as an aggressor which needs to be contained, while US as defender of world interests. Although the author indicates minor US transgressions, there is a neglect of the many large US aggressions in world affairs. The values of US are above reproach in this book as they are so wonderful that other countries would not accept them unless the US to uses military might to enforce them. As in the author claims that China’s power is influencing international decisions that are less than voluntary, but no reference to what the US does with its influence because of its military power. Other than aggression and supporting some countries economically, China does not appear to have any positive qualities. Given that China also depends economically on other nations, the author does not even raise the possibility that China would also be willing to protect world interests. The book looks at events from strictly divisive perspective which leads to conflict. Conflict can arise and the author does a wonderful job at discussing the why, but without attributing much reference to potential conflux of international affairs, leave the reader with the mind that war is unavoidable.
Kaplan makes clear that national values need to be guarded by military power. Navies are getting more prominence in the South China Sea than armies. It is more difficult to occupy lands with navies than armies. Wars can start through petty incidences which are tied to vital interests. In this case, its territorial disputes and energy supply. What makes the issue unnerving is China’s buildup of submarines, which is a clear indicator of aggression. To showcase what the situation is, Kaplan uses brief histories of Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, and Philippines.
A very important topic mired in problems. The flow of the writing is usually not that good. There is a confirmation bias against China and in favor of the US. Seeing China as an aggressor which needs to be contained, while US as defender of world interests. Although the author indicates minor US transgressions, there is a neglect of the many large US aggressions in world affairs. The values of US are above reproach in this book as they are so wonderful that other countries would not accept them unless the US to uses military might to enforce them. As in the author claims that China’s power is influencing international decisions that are less than voluntary, but no reference to what the US does with its influence because of its military power. Other than aggression and supporting some countries economically, China does not appear to have any positive qualities. Given that China also depends economically on other nations, the author does not even raise the possibility that China would also be willing to protect world interests. The book looks at events from strictly divisive perspective which leads to conflict. Conflict can arise and the author does a wonderful job at discussing the why, but without attributing much reference to potential conflux of international affairs, leave the reader with the mind that war is unavoidable.
May 6, 2016
I was somewhat wary of Robert D. Kaplan's book, Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (2014), since he has a habit of seeing the sky falling. However, I found the book informative, engaging, and interesting in the future scenarios that he has considered and analyzed in the South China Sea. He looks at Indian influenced ruins in Vietnam to contemplate the connectivity of Asian in the "Prologue: Ruins of Champa." "Chapter I: The Humanist Dilemma" looks at the seascape issue at hand in the near future and compares it to the old European model-which was land based. "Chapter II: China's Caribbean" draws a parallel of the South China Sea with that of the Greater Caribbean and its economic importance in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. "Chapter III: The Fate of Vietnam" addresses Vietnam's history and role in the South China Sea. In "Chapter IV: Concert of Civilizations?", Kaplan analyzes Malaysian society and finds much to admire about the Muslim society that had become similar to their Christian cohorts in terms of conspicuous consumption and the benevolent dictatorship of Mahthir bin Mohamad-the man largely responsible for the modern transformation of the country. If Kaplan begrudgingly extols the virtues of Mohamad, he is truly ga ga over Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew in "Chapter V: The Good Autocrat." Singapore is truly an amazing case study, and I find it interesting that the "autocrat/stick" version of his ruling came from his experiences under Japanese rule in WWII. They showed him that you need to use the stick in order to keep society in line. One of the most problematic countries (strategically and economically) in the region is the Philippines, and Kaplan gives that country a close look in "Chapter VI: America's Colonial Burden." Taiwan is discussed as "Asia's Berlin" in Chapter VII. In this chapter Kaplan reveals his admiration and re-evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek's legacy and influence in the region. "Chapter VIII: The State of Nature" is Kaplan summing up the conflicts in the region regards land/sea rights: the Pratas in the north, the Paracels in the northwest, and the Spratlys in the southeast. The "Epilogue: The Slums of Borneo" sums up Kaplan's concerns by looking at that community as opposed to the Vietnamese one he opened the book with. And he mainly states that he has ended up with more questions than answers about the region and what the future holds in store there.
April 15, 2014
Let me begin by stating I have been following Robert Kaplan's career for many years. I have missed a couple of his books, but intend to eventually remedy that. At least one unread volume sits on my shelf.
Some people write by reading a mess of books, juggling the ideas, finding an angle, and producing a 'new' book. Kaplan does his share of reading and quoting: Kaplan also logs enormous numbers of air, land and sea miles. He goes and looks. He talks to the folks on the ground wearing the boots, and the ones in the high rises with the coats and suits. And he looks long and hard at maps. Indeed, one can hardly read a book such as "Cauldron" without referring frequently and at length to the included maps. I find myself spending time with the globe, too. A globe gives a perspective not possible with a flat map.
Much of the present volume looks at the countries ringing the South China Sea while evaluating them in relation to China and the U.S., especially in terms of Naval power. As such this book is an extension of his "Monsoon", which took a similar look at the Indian Ocean and its geographic boundaries.
There is no definitive take away, except that this region, this water world, is vital to the future of our planet: whether we will see a continuation of U.S. dominance, a Chinese surge to the forefront, a Chinese collapse, or even a return to fractious scattered states with no modernity is an open question, as is all the future. The joy here involves taking in a view of today's world and how we arrived at this juncture. It is history, politics, economics, military strategy, biography and literature whipped into a travelogue.
Highly Recommended.
Some people write by reading a mess of books, juggling the ideas, finding an angle, and producing a 'new' book. Kaplan does his share of reading and quoting: Kaplan also logs enormous numbers of air, land and sea miles. He goes and looks. He talks to the folks on the ground wearing the boots, and the ones in the high rises with the coats and suits. And he looks long and hard at maps. Indeed, one can hardly read a book such as "Cauldron" without referring frequently and at length to the included maps. I find myself spending time with the globe, too. A globe gives a perspective not possible with a flat map.
Much of the present volume looks at the countries ringing the South China Sea while evaluating them in relation to China and the U.S., especially in terms of Naval power. As such this book is an extension of his "Monsoon", which took a similar look at the Indian Ocean and its geographic boundaries.
There is no definitive take away, except that this region, this water world, is vital to the future of our planet: whether we will see a continuation of U.S. dominance, a Chinese surge to the forefront, a Chinese collapse, or even a return to fractious scattered states with no modernity is an open question, as is all the future. The joy here involves taking in a view of today's world and how we arrived at this juncture. It is history, politics, economics, military strategy, biography and literature whipped into a travelogue.
Highly Recommended.
April 19, 2014
China's unprecedentedly rapid naval build up is one of the most under-reported events today, per Kaplan. While the US retreats and cuts back China is accelerating its investment in surface, submarine and other access denial technologies. Absent a shift in one trajectory or the other, China will lead the US in active submarine deployments in the Pacific within the decade. If this trend continues then China's submarine warfare capacity will recast the strategic value of the US carrier fleet, making it the modern day Dreadnought. Kaplan eloquently describes why this dramatic expansion is expected, reasonable and does not necessarily lead to war. One aspect of Kaplan's style through me for a loop, he makes his case and then points out the weaknesses or frailties in his own argument. What a delightful, self-confident and honest approach. If only all of us adopted such a candid, tempered approach in our "opinionizing". This was a very thoughtful work explaining the import and conflict emerging in the South China Sea. Well worth the read, as is all of Kaplan for that matter.
January 15, 2017
2/10 It's written well enough, and there are some facts to be had here, but this is a paid opinion piece to deliver one opinion: USA should increase military spending. In this book, the author repeats the opinion of senior management of the Stratfor company (a military consulting firm) without disclosing in the text that he was employed by Stratfor while writing the book. Apparently based on conversations the author had, he quotes many, many government officials who he does not identify. Why even bother with the quotation marks? There are some footnotes which appear comically out of place next to so many quotes from anonymous sources.
December 13, 2017
Another insightful Kaplan book from someone who goes there and gets a feel for the environment, on the ground, in country. Kaplan captures the rise of China and the tension of the counterbalancing powers of its neighbors, and the US.
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